Communication
Theory
Ten:
Three
Eytan Gilboa
Mass Communication and Diplomacy:
A Theoretical Framework
August
2000
Pages
275-309
This study offers 6 conceptual models that serve in defining and analyzing the role of the media in contemporary diplomacy. Divided into 2
groups, the first 3 models-secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy and
open diplomacy-deal with limitations officials impose on media coverage and the degree to which negotiations are exposed to the media and
public opinion. The models in the second group-public diplomacy, media
diplomacy, and media-broker diplomacy-deal with extensive utilization of the media by officials and sometimes by journalists to promote
negotiations, The closed-door and the media-broker models are comprehensively presented here for the first time. The other 4 models, although previously defined, have undergone serious revision in this study.
This article demonstrates the analytical usefulness of the models through
applications to various examples and case studies of significant contemporary diplomatic processes.
In this study diplomacy refers to a communication system through which
representatives of states and international or global actors, including
elected and appointed officials, express and defend their interests, state
their grievances, and issue threats and ultimatums. It is a channel of
contact for clarifying positions, probing for information, and convincing states and other actors to support one’s p0sition.l Up until the 20th
century, diplomacy was secret, highly formal, institutional, and interpersonal (Nicolson, 1963; Barston, 1997). In his famous “Fourteen
Points” speech of 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson advocated “open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view” (Williams, 1971, p. 79).
Exposing diplomacy to the media and public opinion created a “new
diplomacy’’ with new rules, techniques, and immense implications for
government officials, diplomats, journalists, and the public (Claude, 1965;
Pearce, 1995; Hindell, 1995; Eban, 1998).
Copyright 0 2000 International Communication Association
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Interrelated revolutionary changes in politics, international relations,
and mass communication have greatly expanded the media’s role in diplomacy. Growing mass participation in political processes has transformed many societies from autocracies into democracies. The revolution in communication technologies, the capability to broadcast, often
live, almost every significant development in world events to almost every place on the globe, has led to the globalization of electronic journalism and to substantial growth of networks, stations, and communication consumers worldwide (Mowlana, 1997). Consequently, a nation’s or a
leader’s image, not only military and economic power, help determine
status in the international community (Nye & Owens, 1996).
Politicians and journalists have suggested that the convergence of these
revolutions in politics and communication has created a new mediadominated governing system. Richard Lugar has called this system
“medialism,” and David Gergen (1991) has referred to it as “teledemocracy.” Others have suggested that this transformation in media
power has created a new phenomenon in foreign affairs known as the
“CNN (Cable News Network) Effect,” whereby-primarily in humanitarian crisis situations-officials have lost control over decision-making
to global television (Gowing, 1994; Hoge, 1994; Livingston & Eachus,
1995). Regardless of the fashionable terms, Kalb (1991, p. xvii) asserted
that “indeed, only the foolish foreign leader can any longer afford to
underestimate the power of TV news.”
Officials and diplomats have viewed the expanding role of the media
in diplomacy as a negative development. Abba Eban (1983, p. 347), a
former foreign minister of Israel, complained that the “new diplomacy”
endangers the chance to achieve international agreements. “The hard
truth,” wrote Eban, “is that the total denial of privacy even in the early
stages of a negotiation has made international agreements harder to
obtain than ever in past history.” Douglas Hurd, a former British foreign secretary, said that “public debate is no longer run by events, but by
the coverage of events” (Taylor, 1997, p. 92).
For Wilson and Eban there were only two opposite modes of interactions between media and diplomacy: secret and open. Yet, fundamental
changes in diplomacy, politics, and global communication have created
new modes of interactions between media and diplomacy. In turn, there
has been an effort to coin new terms that capture the new role of the
media in diplomacy: media diplomacy, teleplomacy, photoplomacy,
sound-bite diplomacy, instant diplomacy, and real-time diplomacy. However, such developments notwithstanding, to date, the media’s expanding role in diplomacy has received little attention in the relevant disciplines of communication, political science, and international relations.
Existing knowledge is fragmented and deals only with limited facets of
media-diplomacy interactions2
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Scholars have lagged behind politicians in understanding the significance of political communication in domestic and international affairs.
As Kalb (1991, p. xiii) correctly observed a few years ago: “Academics
are now coming to appreciate what successful politicians have known
for decades-that the press is a key player in the process of governance.”
Whereas this awareness is now becoming more widespread, the highly
complex interdisciplinary nature of research on media and diplomacy
and the lack of analytical tools and models have inhibited progress in
the field. Scholars have lumped together very different media-diplomacy
interactions under fashionable but tautological terms, such as “media
diplomacy,” “television diplomacy,” or the “CNN effect,” and this has
resulted in conceptual confusion. We don’t have yet theories and models
needed to understand the challenges of the modern media to officials
and diplomats, the options available for dealing with these challenges,
and their actual and potential effects on all the actors involved in
diplomacy.
This study is designed to make a modest contribution toward theory
development in this field through basic taxonomy of interactions between media and diplomacy. It offers a comprehensive theoretical framework that includes six conceptual models and clearly defined relevant
variables, variants, principles, and effects. Divided into two groups, the
first three models-secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy, and open
diplomacy-deal with the limitations officials impose on media coverage and the degree to which negotiations are exposed to the media and
public opinion. The models in the second group-public diplomacy, media
diplomacy, and media-broker diplomacy-deal with the opposite phenomenon-extensive utilization of the media by officials and sometimes
by journalists to promote conflict resolution processes. The closed-door
and the media-broker models are new, whereas the other four models
are more well-known but are in need of considerable revision. Each model
is appropriate only when certain characteristics or conditions are present,
and each has different professional and ethical ramifications for both
officials and journalists.
The presentation and discussion of the six models follow a similar
pattern. Relevant parameters, such as definition; examples; effects on
officials, the media, and public opinion; and professional and ethical
dilemmas highlight the description, analysis, and demonstration of all
the models. The first three models, determined by levels of media coverage, also specify variables and conditions under which each could be
maintained. The three remaining models also specifically discuss various uses of the media in negotiations. This article demonstrates the
analytical usefulness of the models by applying them to various examples and case studies of significant contemporary diplomatic
processes.
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Levels of Media Coverage
The first part of this article presents three conceptual models based on
the degree to which diplomatic negotiations are exposed to the media
and public opinion. In the secret diplomacy model, the media and the
public are totally excluded from negotiations, and there is no media
coverage of any kind, In closed-door diplomacy, they are partially excluded, and media coverage is narrowly confined to mostly technical
issues, such as who negotiates with whom, where, and when. In the
open diplomacy model, negotiations are much more open to the media
and coverage is more extensive. The presentation of these models includes conceptual clarification and development, a list of major variables for analysis, and effects. The variables were classified into three
categories: purpose, legitimacy, and controllability. Legitimacy refers to
recognition and acceptance of a negotiation process by the public. Controllability refers to means negotiators employ to control media access
and coverage of diplomatic processes. Effects are presented for officials,
journalists, and public opinion.
Secret Diplomacy
Secret diplomacy is characterized by the total isolation and exclusion of
the media and the public from negotiations and related policymaking:
Journalists, the public, as well as most politicians and officials, are unaware that meetings have taken place, proposals have been exchanged,
and agreements have been negotiated and agreed upon. Classic traditional diplomacy was secret, but as the world has become more democratic and more accessible to the media, it has become more difficult to
conduct diplomacy in secrecy. The public demands information about
negotiations; in general, the media satisfy this demand. The higher the
rank and the status of the negotiators, the more challenging it has been
to maintain secret talks. Yet, in a few critical and highly sensitive cases,
even well-known, high-level policymakers have been able to pursue secret negotiations.
In July 1971, Henry Kissinger went on a secret mission to Communist
China to investigate the potential for American-Chinese rapprochement
(Kissinger, 1979, pp. 733-787; 1994, pp. 726-732). The results of this
visit paved the way for President Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China,
one of the most dramatic shifts in American foreign policy in this century. Secret diplomacy produced several historical breakthroughs in ArabIsraeli relations, including the Oslo talks (Gilboa, 1998a). In 1993 a few
high-ranking Israeli officials negotiated secretly with high-level Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) officials in Oslo (Zartman, 1997;
Savir, 1998). The negotiations lasted several months and yielded a dra-
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matic breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations, celebrated in a sensational media event on the White House lawn.
Politicians and officials prefer secret diplomacy because of the nature
of international negotiations and the immunity from political cost in
case of failure. Negotiations to resolve difficult international conflicts
entail long and hard bargaining. They move in stages from the initial
presentation of tough opening demands, through the making of often
painful and risky concessions, to a final compromise based on reciprocal concessions of both sides, Diplomats believe that premature disclosure of initial negotiating positions and tactics, and of the potential to
make concessions, expose them to pressure from both the other side’s
negotiators and their own domestic opinion. Such stressful conditions
could end negotiations prematurely or hamper diplomacy with unnecessarily long discussions, resulting in less effective agreements. The media
invoke the public’s “right t o know” and demand to cover every aspect
and detail of international negotiations, whereas diplomats claim the
right to negotiate peace freely without being subjected to constant domestic pressure. The result is a built-in conflict of interest between the
diplomat and the journalist. “What one seeks to conceal,” Eban wrote,
“the other seeks to reveal” (1983, p. 347).
Variables
Secret talks are typically pursued by enemies who wish to examine options to resolve their conflict by peaceful means. The ability of officials
on both sides to agree on secrecy and to successfully pursue secret talks,
depends on several variables that are related to the work of both officials and journalists.
Purpose. The greater the significance of the talks and the more they
are designed to produce a breakthrough or to transform existing hostile
relations between actors, the greater is the motivation of officials to
maintain secrecy. The U.S. and China had been bitter enemies and fought
each other for more than 20 years when Kissinger went on his secret
mission to Beijing. The purpose of his trip was t o completely transform
U.S.-China relations. Similarly, Israel and the PLO had been fighting
each other for almost 25 years when their representatives met in an effort to end a century-old violent conflict.
Legitimacy. The more that mere contact between the sides is highly
sensitive or even legally prohibited, involving actors who might have
publicly committed themselves to never negotiate, the greater is the officials’ incentive to maintain secrecy. The weight of this variable depends
on how much one or both parties view the negotiations themselves as a
major concession, since they imply legitimizing a party previously not
recognized. For more than 2 decades the U.S. questioned the legitimacy
of the communist government of China and prevented it from occupying a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Similarly, in fear of giving the
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PLO recognition and legitimacy, Israel adamantly refused to negotiate
with this organization whose “national covenant” advocated the destruction of the Jewish state and who had engaged in terrorist tactics to
accomplish this goal. The PLO refused to negotiate with Israel because
this would have meant recognizing Israel’s legitimacy.
The legitimacy issue includes another variable at the personal level.
The greater the potential for personal political damage to the negotiators due to premature exposure of the talks, the greater is their incentive
to maintain secrecy. Should the mere existence of the talks get leaked
before acceptable results are achieved, the talks would end immediately,
with the negotiators facing serious domestic criticism. In both Kissinger’s
secret diplomacy with China and in the secret Israel-PLO talks the negotiators demonstrated this clear interest in maintaining secrecy.
Controllability. The fewer the number of negotiators on both sides
and the number of officials who are aware of the talks, the greater the
chance of preventing leaks. Until the last minute, even Secretary of State
William Rogers did not know about Kissinger’s mission to China
(Isaacson, 1992, p. 342), and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin kept
the Israel-PLO talks secret even from his own cabinet secretary (Beilin,
1997, p. 141).
Deception tactics also help officials to maintain secrecy. The more the
negotiators meet at unlikely locations and arrive there under false identities, the higher the probability of keeping the talks secret. Usually, a
third party is involved to help with the secret arrangements. Pakistan
helped organize Kissinger’s secret visit to China, and Norway assisted
the Israelis and Palestinians in conducting the Oslo talks. Norway was
an unlikely location for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the few officials involved in the meetings made enormous efforts to keep them
secret through special arrangements and covert methods (Savir, 1998,
pp. 30, 61).
Effects and Implications
Officials. The secret diplomacy model presents a difficult dilemma for
officials who may have to lie to the media and the public in order to
ensure that the negotiations remain secret. If they do tell the truth, they
could endanger the chances of reaching an agreement with the other
side. If they lie, they compromise one of the most important principles
of public service. Is it permissible to lie to the media and the public even
in the cause of peace? Kissinger (1979, pp. 738-739) recalled that in
order to divert media attention from his mission to China, American
officials planned in advance to lie by claiming that due to illness during
his visit to Pakistan, the secretary of state had to flee the Islamabad heat
to the presidential rest house in the mountains. Uri Savir (1998, pp. 6566), the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, who participated in the Oslo talks, admitted that he and his colleagues deliberately
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misled the press. Savir had no problems with this policy because he believed the goal of the talks justified the deception. However, Shimon
Shiffer (1997),a leading Israeli political reporter, criticized this practice
and argued that the officials were not just lying to the media but also to
the public.
Journalists. For journalists, diplomacy successfullykept secret is tantamount to professional failure. The media are expected constantly to
be abreast of developments in government circles and of the whereabouts
of high-ranking politicians and officials. Yet, sometimes the media’s misconceptions help officials to maintain secrecy. The less likely journalists
are to believe enemies are holding talks, the less likely they will be to
pursue leads that point to the existence of such talks. Although officials
committed to secret negotiations invest considerable effort to deceive
the media, they sometimes do make mistakes on which journalists, surprisingly, often fail to capitalize. For instance, M. F. H. Beg, a Pakistani
stringer for London’s Daily Telegraph, spotted Kissinger at Islamabad
airport in Pakistan before the national security adviser boarded a plane
to Beijing on his secret journey to China. Beg called his editor immediately in London, but he refused to believe the story and, in turn, did not
publish it (Isaacson, 1992, p. 344). Similarly, when the Israel-PLO talks
reached a critical point and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had to
travel to Oslo to conclude the agreement, the Israeli media declined an
invitation to accompany him, assuming the visit would be uneventful
(Peres, 1993, p. 14).
Adherence to rigid and false conceptual frameworks was the main
reason for the media’s failure in both cases to break the secrecy. The
American and Western media simply did not believe that there existed
even a remote chance that the arch-conservative, anticommunist Nixon,
would recognize communist China and turn the relations between the
two powers from confrontation to rapprochement, particularly when
the US.was still fighting in Vietnam. Similarly, the local and the foreign
media in Israel did not conceptualize that, despite the historical record
of violence between Israel and the PLO, the Israeli law prohibiting meetings with the PLO, and the tough security positions of Prime Minister
Rabin, Israel and the PLO could even meet, let alone negotiate (Raz,
1994; Makovsky, 1996).As a result of these misconceptions, the media
discarded reliable pieces of information that were available on the secret
negotiations and failed to adequately follow leads that could have enabled them to uncover the secret talks.
Public Opinion. In general, the public is far more interested in the
results than in the process leading to these results. If secret negotiations
succeed and produce agreements that the majority of the public perceives as beneficial, only those who oppose the negotiations or the agreements are likely to express reservations about secrecy (in addition to
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their reservations about the agreements themselves). However, if the
negotiations are fruitless or the results are unfavorable, the public is
likely to blame secrecy as at least one major reason for the failure. The
same arguments that critics raised against the secrecy of the Iran-Contra
negotiations could have been raised against the secret diplomacy that
produced the historic shift in US.-China relations. Criticism of secrecy
became an issue in the first case because the negotiators failed, whereas
there was no criticism in the second case because it succeeded (Ledeen,
1991, p. 131).
Another effect related to public opinion asks the question whether a
government in a democratic society may present agreements to the public as a fait accompli, or whether the public and the media should receive
information on critical negotiations so they can form an opinion and
make it known to their leaders before agreements are signed. In several
democracies, parliaments must approve international agreements before
they can go into effect, but if a parliament rejects an agreement concluded through secret diplomacy, the credibility of the negotiators, in
the eyes of enemies and allies alike, could be severely damaged.
Most participants in recent successful peacemaking processes agree
that they would never have been able to conclude agreements if the media had not been excluded (Gilboa, 1998a, p. 222). This model shows
that secret diplomacy succeeds when very few officials are involved on both
sides, if they have a lot to lose from exposure of the talks, and if they are
determined to maintain secrecy at all costs, with the discreet assistance of a
useful third party. Moreover, failures of the media to uncover secret talks
have also made it easier for officials to maintain secrecy.
Closed-Door Diplomacy
Secrecy cannot always be assured in high-level negotiations among several heads of state or ministers, should these negotiations last for an
extended period of time. Although politicians and officials are able to
deceive the media and disappear for a few hours or a weekend, they
cannot leave their offices for long periods of time without arousing media attention and speculation. High-level politicians who need several
days for intensive negotiations and want to minimize the adverse effects
of open diplomacy can use closed-door diplomacy. This new term and
model refers to the method of limiting the media to exposure of mostly
technical aspects of the negotiating process, but excluding the more substantive aspects. The media and the public are aware of the dates when
negotiations are scheduled to begin, where the talks will be conducted,
and the identity and ranks of the participants. Once the actual negotiations begin, however, a news blackout is drawn over the talks, with only
limited information being provided about the actual state of the talks.
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This way, the participants are effectively isolated from their respective
domestic public opinions, from opposition forces, pressure groups, other
states, international organizations, and transnational actors, as long as
the negotiations continue.
The following three peacemaking conferences are good examples of
closed-door diplomacy held at the highest possible level of leadership. In
September 1978, President Carter invited Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to a summit meeting at the
presidential retreat of Camp David. In an effort to end the war in Bosnia
in 1995, President Clinton invited Presidents Milosevic of Serbia,
Izetbegovic of Bosnia, and Tudjman of Croatia to a summit meeting at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio. Clinton again
used the closed-door model in October 1998, when he invited Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat to a critical summit at Wye Plantation, a secluded
retreat on a Chesapeake Bay estate in rural Maryland.
In all these cases, isolating the negotiations from the media was the
most important consideration. Before the summit at Camp David, Carter
decided to exclude the media from the conference and later explained
(1982, pp. 317-318): “It was imperative that there be a minimum of
posturing by Egyptians or Israelis, and an absence of public statements,
which would become frozen positions that could not subsequently be
changed.” Similarly, an American official explained the decision to convene the summit on Bosnia in a closed military base in the following
way: “We did not want the work to be interrupted by opportunities for
posturing before the cameras” (Johnson, 1995, p. 24). In the opening
session of the Wye conference, Clinton stated that “all of us are determined to keep our energies focused on the talks themselves. Therefore,
we have agreed to confine our dealings with the media . . . to periodic
briefings to be conducted by spokespersons”(Horowitz & Makovsky, 1998,
p. 1). A senior State Department official, however, candidly told reporters
that “we are not going to tell you what they are talking about in there, and
I hope the Israelis and the Palestinians also don’t return your calls.”
Variables
The actors in the closed-door model typically include a mediator and
parties to a conflict that had decided to seek conflict resolution through
peaceful means, having gone through several rounds of negotiation and
made some progress, but having failed to reach an agreement. The mediator feels that one more concentrated effort, isolated from media and
public pressure, can produce an agreement.
Purpose. As in the secret diplomacy model, the stakes in closed-door
diplomacy are high, and the negotiations are expected to break the deadlock and to save a negotiating process from totally collapsing. The goal
of the 1978 Camp David summit was to save the Israeli-Egyptian peace
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process. Despite a whole year of negotiations following the spectacular
visit of Sadat in Jerusalem, Israel and Egypt failed to reach a peace agreement (Gilboa, 1987, pp. 83-101). This failure threatened the position of
Sadat inside Egypt, the status of Egypt in the Arab world, the stability of
the region, and the prospects for comprehensive resolution of the ArabIsraeli conflict. The goal of the Ohio summit was to end a civil war in
Bosnia that had taken the lives of over 250,000 people (Holbrooke,
1998, pp. 231-312). The goal of the 1998 Wye summit was to break an
18-month stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that threatened to cause large-scale violence.
Legitimacy. Compared to secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy
is seen as more legitimate in the public eyes. The participants have already either recognized each other, as in the case of Israel and the PLO
after Oslo, or have been engaged in negotiations for some time, as in the
Bosnia case. Yet, the failure to reach peace agreements in spite of major
concessions already made or even implemented creates new controversies and inspires the opposition to negotiations in one or more camps to
question both the legitimacy and utility of the peace process.
Controllability.The physical seclusion in the chosen location increased
the chance of maintaining closed doors. Camp David, the U.S. Air Force
base in Ohio, and Wye Plantation were selected as the sites for the three
respective conferences precisely because they were secluded or highly
protected, with only a few narrow roads leading to them. Subsequently,
reporters were forced to camp near the closed main entrances. In Ohio,
one observer noted that the rival negotiators would not have been able
“to hop a taxi to a TV studio and in a few minutes be on a camera
denouncing one another, as they might have in Washington or New York
City” (Church, 1995, p. 20).
Strong, forceful mediators must determine the negotiation rules, including the news blackout. Carter and Clinton successfully performed
this role in Camp David and Wye Plantation by the sheer authority of
the presidency. In Ohio, with the full backing of Clinton, Secretary of
State Christopher and American mediator Holbrooke effectively commanded the talks and set the rules for media coverage. Appointing one
spokesperson for all the participating delegations helps to ensure a news
blackout. All the participating leaders at Camp David agreed that only
Presidential Press Secretary Powell would brief the media. From the beginning of the conference, Powell told the many correspondents that
one of his principal duties would be to see that nothing about the substance of the summit got out (Kalb, Koppel, & Scali, 1982, p. 41; Spragens
& Terwood, 1982, p. 125). In Ohio, State Department spokesperson
Burns was the only official authorized to issue statements about the status of the negotiations. At Wye Plantation, State Department spokesperson Rubin was appointed a principal spokesperson, but was challenged
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by spokespersons for Israel and the Palestinians, and consequently the
news blackout in this summit was less effective.
Effects and Implications
Officials. Politicians and diplomats view closed-door diplomacy as the
next best option after secret diplomacy because this model still offers
them substantial control over media coverage. Yet, the media and the public know that a significant diplomatic event is taking place and press for
information on the progress of the talks. Officials, particularly of the parties to the conflict, cannot satisfy the public need for details and deny themselves effective and useful tools-manipulation and use of the mass media-that they routinely employ to affect public debate over policy issues.
Journalists. For correspondents, closed-door diplomacy could be
more challenging than secret diplomacy. Reporters who know that a
significant diplomatic event is going on are under enormous pressure
from their editors and the public to provide information about the event,
but they have very little to report on. They are almost totally cut off
from their normal sources and are unable to conduct interviews or to
receive information at press conferences. Therefore, media coverage of
closed-door diplomacy becomes inherently limited and problematic. In
the absence of hard news, most of the coverage is confined to “background stories,” human interest stories, speculation, and vague assessments, such as “they were close on some of the issues, but they still don’t
have a deal,” which was made on September 12, 1978, by CBS correspondent Bob Schieffer when he covered Camp David. Instead of routine and special interviews with politicians and government officials,
correspondents interview each other and often file reports bearing little
substance or insight.
Public Opinion. The public follows significant closed-door diplomacy with hopes for a major breakthrough even if people are not fully
aware of the negotiators’ real goals. Yet, awareness of significant negotiations held in secluded locations with little or no information about
their progress may cause tension and concern about the final outcome.
Therefore, public attitudes toward closed-door diplomacy depend to a
large extent on how much trust people have in their leaders and negotiators. High levels of trust reduce public anxiety and concern about the
outcome, whereas low trust levels could generate public criticism over
the partial secrecy demanded by this model. When Begin went to Camp
David, the Israeli public trusted him to well defend Israeli interests. In
contrast, the same public didn’t trust Netanyahu when he went to the
Mye summit, and parts of his own coalition government criticized both
his decision to participate and the closed-door format of the conference.
Closed-door diplomacy reflects both the failure of officials to conduct secret negotiations and a major professional challenge to journalists; however, it may satisfy the minimal needs of both sides. Officials
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are effectively isolated from domestic constituencies and other pressures,
while reporters at least know that negotiations are being held at a particular time and place and are able to partially cover them. Journalists
will have to accept the need of government officials occasionally to impose secrecy on negotiations. Surprisingly, perhaps, correspondents covering the talks at the three summit conferences subsequently did not
protest the issue of media exclusion outright, as if they simply accepted
the negotiators’ rationale that in these cases a temporary news blackout
was justified. Closed-door diplomacy could be the ultimate compromise
between the requirements of open and closed diplomacy in the Television Age.
Open Diplomacy
Open diplomacy refers to negotiations that are readily accessible to the
media and to public scrutiny and debate. It is characterized by extensive
and direct media coverage of international negotiations. In this model,
negotiators frequently conduct official press conferences, hold briefings,
grant interviews, and even allow reporters access to conference rooms.
In both the closed- and the open-door models, the public is aware of
negotiations and knows who is negotiating, where, and when. In the
open version, the public also knows the general agenda and the main
goals of the negotiations and receives frequent reports on the progress
of the talks. Even the most open talks, however, are not fully exposed to
the public. Specific bargaining positions, for example, are seldom revealed. Bargaining in all types of negotiations requires that certain opening
positions be presented initially in a more extreme way in order to leave
enough room for maneuvers and concessions. Thus, even in the most
open version, officials prefer to keep some cards close to their hearts
and leak information to the media in order to influence both the positions of the other side and their own domestic environment.
Variables
Several variables determine whether officials employ open rather than
secret or closed-door diplomacy. Generally, officials oppose open diplomacy and prefer the secret or the closed-door models in which they have
almost full control over information that they wish to either conceal or
reveal to the public. On the other hand, they have fewer reservations
about exposure and openness in certain types of negotiations, depending on who the actors are on the other side, the issues being negotiated,
the goals, and the particular stage of the negotiations.
Purpose. It is much easier for officials to conduct open talks when
the other side is a friendly or neutral state or organization, not an enemy, and when the main purpose of the negotiations is to maintain or
develop relations within a normalization framework rather than dra-
Mass Co~n~nunication
and Diplomacy
matically altering a hostile framework. It is certainly easier to pursue
open diplomacy when the talks themselves are not controversial and
will have no or little effect on third parties. Officials typically allow
openness when they discuss relatively congenial issues such as culture,
education, telecommunications, tourism, environment, or health. Conversely, they prefer the secret or the closed-door models to resolve political, strategic, security, and trade issues. Accordingly, officials expect to
make deals based on minor reciprocal concessions and believe that a
substantial domestic majority will view the results as very advantageous.
Contrary to popular myth, the conduct of diplomacy is not solely
designed to promote conflict resolution or to preserve peace (Ikli, 1964,
pp. 43-58). Sometimes diplomacy is used for very different purposes,
such as improving a country’s image in world public opinion, gaining
time, getting rewards from interested third parties, deceiving opponents,
and obtaining valuable information about the other side’s secrets. To
achieve these goals, officials pursue open diplomacy and conduct long
and endless negotiations. During the Israeli-Syrian negotiations of 19951996, Israel complained that Syria was interested only in public relations, not in reaching an actual agreement. In 1998, the Palestinians
made a similar accusation against Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Legitimacy. Open diplomacy is often used following a breakthrough
in relations between enemies. Sometimes, as in all the Arab-Israeli peacemaking processes, breakthroughs produce only general principles or
frameworks. Additional extensive negotiations are required in order to
translate the principles into specific and detailed peace agreements. Officials often feel that after a dramatic act of reconciliation, there is sufficient confidence on both sides to allow successful continued negotiations in the open model. They assume that exposing the process to the
media would not damage the chances to reach a desirable agreement.
Controllability. By definition, in the open diplomacy model, officials
knowingly give up on measures they employ in the previous models to
control media access and coverage. Yet they invest considerable energy
and resources, directly or indirectly through spokespersons and communication directors, in efforts to shape media coverage according to
their interests and needs. These efforts include frequent press conferences, press and video releases, background meetings, briefings, official
reports released to the media, events staged for the media, media tours
and arrangements for traveling media, meetings with editors and editorial boards, leaks, supportive op-ed articles, and results of public opinion polls (O’Heffernan, 1993, pp. 198-199).
Effects and Implications
Officials. The open diplomacy model especially challenges officials who
feel they have to win public support for diplomatic moves primarily
through the use of the mass media. “Too often in recent years,” ob-
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served Gergen (1991, pp. 48-49), “U.S. officials have substituted the
power of television for the power of their own reasoning, believing that
successful policies must first and foremost please the Great God of Public Opinion.” He added that “what too often counts is how well the
policy will ‘play,’ how the pictures will look, whether the right signals
are being sent, and whether the public will be impressed by the swiftness
of the government’s response.” Based on his recent practical experience,
Kissinger confirmed this observation by commenting that diplomats seeking his advice used to ask him what they should do, and now they ask
him what they should say (Neuman, 1996, p. 270).3
Journalists. Journalists obviously welcome the open diplomacy
model because they regularly receive a flow of information about the
talks, and thus they participate more in the negotiation processes. Even
under the most favorable conditions of exposure and access, however,
media coverage of contemporary negotiations, especially by television,
has been frequently criticized as too limited and superficial. Critics have
repeatedly argued that print and electronic mass media have traditionally devoted little space and time to foreign news (Graber, 1993, p. 361;
Rosenblum, 1993), but observers have made contradicting claims about
foreign affairs coverage and public interest in international events since
the end of the Cold War. O’Heffernan (1993, pp. 200-221) argued that,
because of the increase in international mass media coverage and the
emphasis on global economic and political interdependence, “both the
general and the interested publics have paid closer attention to foreign
policy questions and have stepped up involvement in foreign policy issues.” Moisy (1997)noted, however, the tremendous expansion of global television networks such as CNN, BBC World, and Sky but claimed
that this has not been met by a similar increase in consumption. Utley
( 1997) observed that foreign coverage on American television networks
has substantially declined since the end of the Cold War because network executives believe that American mass audience’s interest in daily
events beyond their nation’s borders is declining.
There is much less disagreement on the charge of oversimplification
in foreign affairs coverage. Today’s negotiations are very complex and
deal with intricate issues. Yet, time constraints in television news programs dictate fast and brief reports that tend to simplify issues, personalities, negotiating phases, and results. “By its very nature,” complained
Gergen (1991, p. 50),“television is an instrument of simplicity in a world
of complexity.” As a result, a public that depends on television news
may receive somewhat distorted images of diplomatic talks and consequently may form unfounded opinions and adopt unrealistic expectations.
Public Opinion. Advocates of open diplomacy argue that public debate and scrutiny are required to assure sound policymaking and conse-
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quently efficient negotiations as well as sufficient public support. Serious public debate may help to prevent mistakes that officials make if
they are not forced to consider alternative options or to face certain
problems. Opponents of open diplomacy, though, claim that public debate depends on knowledge and understanding of complex international
issues, something the general public lacks. Critics often cite results of
public opinion surveys showing that most Americans were unable to
locate the Persian Gulf and could not identify correctly NATO members
or which side the U.S. supported in the battle between the Sandanistas
and the Contras in Nicaragua (Rosati, 1993, p. 365). Kegley & Wittkopf
(1996, pp. 265-267), however, cite similar evidence but add that “most
Americans may be uninformed about and seemingly indifferent to the
details of policy, but they are still able to discriminate among issues and
to identify those that are salient.”
Officials do not always prohibit exposing diplomacy to the media
and public opinion, but they prefer to allow access only after breakthroughs or when negotiations are taking place between friendly actors
on congenial issues that require minor concessions. Frequently, however, as in the efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the dispute
in Northern Ireland (O’Clery, 1997), premature exposure of diplomacy
to the media has led to stalemates and crises whose resolution required
a return to secret or closed-door diplomacy. The open diplomacy model
raises questions about the media’s ability to exploit free access to negotiations and demonstrates the debate between critics and advocates of
openness about the interest and the ability of the public to follow media
coverage of diplomatic negotiations.
Summary: Levels of Media Coverage
Figure 1 demonstrates the main differences among the three first models
across several major features, including actors defined by existing relations, purposes, degree of anticipated consensus, types of issues, expected
concessions, anticipated effects on public opinion, and levels of controllability and media coverage.
Officials exclude the media when they negotiate with enemies on highly
sensitive security and political issues, when the talks themselves may be
controversial and are designed to produce major breakthroughs, and
when the concessions are expected to be enormous and controversial
and the effects of agreements overwhelming and dramatic. They allow
very limited coverage when they negotiate security issues with antagonists in order to break impasses, when the talks might be still considered
illegitimate by some groups, and the concessions and the effects are expected to be significant. Officials have fewer reservations about media
coverage when the talks are held with friendly actors, when they deal
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F i g . t ,
Closed-Door,
and Open
Diplomacy: A
Comparative
Framework
Attribute
Secret diplomacy
Closed-doordiplomacy
Open diplomacy
Actors
Purpose
Legitimacy
Issues
Concessions
Effects
Controllability
Coverage
Enemies
Transform relations
None
Security/political
Enormous
Momentous
Full
None
Antagonists
Break impasses
Recognized/controversial
Security/political
Major
Significant
Substantial
Very limited
Allies
Maintaidimprove relations
Sanctioned
Congenial
Minor
Minute
Minimal
Extensive
with nonsecurity and nonpolitical issues, when the goal is to maintain
or develop existing good relations, and when the concessions are minor
and acceptable to the public and consequently the talks and the agreements are not expected to be controversial.
Political Uses of the Media
The second part of this article presents models showing extensive utilization of the media as a major instrument of foreign policy and includes
three conceptual models: public diplomacy, where state and nonstate
actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence
public opinion in foreign societies; media diplomacy, where officials use
the media to promote conflict resolution; and media-broker diplomacy,
where journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as
mediators in international negotiations. The presentation of these models includes conceptual clarification and development, principal variants, and effects and implications for officials, journalists or public relations experts, and public opinion.
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy has been used as a euphemism for “propaganda” or
“international public relations.” Grunig (1993, p. 147) defined propaganda as “one-sided, usually half truthful communication designed to
persuade public opinion,” whereas Wilcox, Ault, and Agee (1992, pp.
409-410) defined “international public relations” as “the planned and
organized effort of a company, institution or government to establish
mutually beneficial relations with the policies of other nations.” I intend
to preserve the original meaning of public diplomacy and to use it only
as a model of one-sided communication pursued mostly in international
confrontations and to include the purpose and method of “international
public relations” in the next model of media diplomacy. The core idea of
public diplomacy “is one of direct communication with foreign peoples,
with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their
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governments” (Malone, 1985, p. 199). In terms of content, “it describes
activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and
culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens” (Frederick, 1993, p. 229).
Public diplomacy uses several channels or techniques, only one of
which is the mass media, particularly international broadcasting. The
other channels include cultural and scientificexchanges of students, scholars, intellectuals, and artists; participation in festivals and exhibitions;
building and maintaining cultural centers; teaching a language; and establishing local friendship leagues and trade associations. The mass media channels are used to affect the mass public directly; the other mostly cultural
channels are oriented toward elite audiences believed to have influence on
public opinion. Whereas uses of the mass media focus on current affairs,
the cultural channels deal more with fundamental long-term perceptions
of countries and societies. I suggest three variants of public diplomacy
based on the characters of the participants, their goals, and methods.
Variants
The Basic Variant. Traditional public diplomacy used by a state against
other states has been employed mostly in antagonistic relationships and
is designed to achieve long-term results in foreign societies. It seeks to
create a favorable image for a country’s policies, actions, and political
and economic system, assuming that if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept that image, it will exert pressure on its government to alter existing hostile attitudes and policy. The idea is to provide
the public in the target society with more balanced information on one’s
own country, in order to counter the domestic propaganda of the target
society’s government.
Thus, during the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union developed and extensively utilized public diplomacy in order to shape favorable public attitudes all over the world toward their respective rival ideologies (Manheim, 1994a; Hachten, 1996, pp. 110-114). Their main
weapon was international broadcasting, including radio stations, such
as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe
on the American side and Radio Moscow on the Soviet side. In the late
1980s, the U.S. added overseas television programs, such as Worldnet
and Dialogue, to its arsenal of public diplomacy media channels (Tuch,
1990, pp. 103-105). The Reagan administration added Radio and
Television Marti, which broadcast to Cuba; President Clinton established Radio Free Asia to promote democracy and protection of human rights in China and Radio Free Iraq to undermine Saddam
Hussein’s regime.
The Nonstate Transnational Variant. The basic model has to be
expanded in order to reflect the growth in new nonstate actors and interdependence among all the actors in the world. While comparing theo-
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ries of public diplomacy and public relations, Signitzer and Coombs
(1992, p. 138) offered this broader definition of public diplomacy: “the
way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which
bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions.” The
campaign for democracy and human rights in several countries, including China, which has been initiated and pursued by nonstate actors,
demonstrates this broader transnational application of public diplomacy.
In May 1989, the prodemocracy opposition movement in China exploited an interesting media event, the summit meeting between
Gorbachev and the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, to demonstrate against
their government’s antidemocratic policies and human rights abuses
(Fortner, 1994, pp. 118-120). The demonstrations led to the violent
crackdown at Tiananmen Square; their purpose was to exert public pressure on the Bush administration to adopt harsher measures against Chinese human rights violations. Live coverage of the demonstrations on
CNN and other networks helped the campaign (Donovan & Scherer,
1992, pp. 308-310). VOA and other radio stations reported on the demonstrations and the inability of the government to contain them (Hess,
1994, pp. 297-302). The Chinese government interpreted the VOA
broadcasts as interference in their domestic affairs and in turn jammed
broadcasts and expelled journalists who reported the unrest (Fortner,
1993, p. 281). In this and other cases, such as the campaign to abolish
apartheid in South Africa, dissident nonstate actors sought to achieve
their domestic goals by using global television to create linkages with
influential individuals and groups in foreign societies, particularly in the
U.S. and Europe (Gilboa, 1998b, pp. 59-61).
The Domestic Public Relations Variant. In the basic model, a government uses its own means of communication, such as radio stations,
to conduct public diplomacy, but in the domestic public relations variant, it hires public relations firms and even lobbyists in the target country to achieve its aims (Wilcox, Ault, & Agee, 1992, pp. 426-428). A
government preferring this method believes it is much more effective
than direct government-sponsored public diplomacy, and that it may
help to conceal the true forces and the funding sources behind the effort.
The establishment of a local support group or a movement in the target
country could also strengthen the legitimacy and authenticity of the campaign. A local public relations firm is likely to know best how to achieve
the desired goals in a given political and cultural context, how to identify the weaknesses in the positions of the government interested in the
campaign, and how to effectively deal with them. This variant of public
diplomacy also includes using scientific knowledge and methods of
public opinion research known as “strategic public diplomacy”
(Manheim, 1994a).
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Mass Communication and Diplomacy
The domestic public relations variant has appeared in many cases,
particularly in the 1990s. In 1990 Colombia hired the Sawyer Miller
Group to erase its image in the U.S. as a major drug state (Greve, 1990).
During the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, the Kuwaiti monarchs in exile hired
the American public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton to assure sufficient public, congressional, and media support for an American-led war
to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait (Manheim, 1994b). More recently, suffering from sanctions and isolation, the military rulers of Burma
employed Jefferson Waterman International and The Atlantic Group
to repair their very negative image as ruthless authoritarian leaders
(Smith, 1998).
Effects and Implications
Officials. Public diplomacy may be perceived in different and sometimes contradicting ways by different actors. The Chinese government
saw the prodemocracy demonstrations as an American use of the classic
model: the use of international broadcasting to inspire public unrest in
China in order to force China to alter its policy toward democratic ref o r m ~From
. ~ the U.S. perspective, however, the prodemocracy campaign
in China was an example of the transnational variant. A prodemocracy
group in China used a media event on Chinese soil to exert public pressure on the Bush administration to adopt harsher measures against Chinese human rights violations. Unless one suggests that the Bush administration orchestrated the entire campaign to pressure itself, the application of the conceptual models to the available data shows that the U.S.
interpretation was the correct one.
Public Opinion. The domestic public relations variant raises several
ethical and professional problems in the activities of the public relations
firms. The actions of Hill and Knowlton during the Gulf conflict became very controversial. One senior official of the firm explained that
“we disseminated information in a void as a basis for Americans to form
opinions,” and another added “teachers get awards. We get blamed for
teaching” (Manheim, 1994b, p. 131). Critics argued, however, that the
firm established a fake popular movement, Citizens for a Free Kuwait,
and used questionable evidence and suspect witnesses to affect critical
decisions in the U.S. and the U.N. (Trento, 1992, pp. 381-389;
Grunig, 1993).
The domestic variant may include a reversed policy goal. If the classic
goal of public diplomacy is to get the public of a country to pressure its
own government to change its foreign or domestic policy, in the reversed
public relations variant, the goal is exactly the opposite: to direct public
debate so that government policy does not change. In this case, the government of state A supports the government of state B, but many segments in country A oppose their government’s policy toward B. State B
fears that, under public pressure, government A may change its existing
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Theory
favorable policy toward B, so state B tries to persuade the public of A
that B deserves A’s support. The reversed goal appeared in Kuwait’s public
relations campaign in the U.S. during the Gulf crisis and war, when the
goal was to prevent erosion in the already existing public support for a
confrontation with Iraq. Thus, Kuwait’s public diplomacy included both
the use of public relations firms and the reversed goal.
In recent years, public diplomacy has been used in nontraditional formats, including new participants, such as nonstate actors; new types of
relations between state and nonstate actors; new goals, such as cultivating support in a foreign country to maintain rather than change policy;
and new means and techniques, such as hiring public relations firms.
Laqueur (1994) argued that public diplomacy in its widest sense has
become a more important instrument to deal with the problems of the
U.S. in the post-Cold War era than the traditional military and economic tools. Metzl (1997) also suggested that, when great powers are
unable or unwilling to intervene to stop mass human rights abuses, the
international community should monitor and block radio and television
broadcasts that incite violence and genocide and counter them with peace
broadcasting.
Media Diplomacy
Media diplomacy has been frequently confused with public diplomacy
(Gilboa, 1998b). After defining public diplomacy as propaganda, Van
Dinh (1987, pp. 51-52) explained that this diplomacy has “become synonymous with TV diplomacy. Politicians and diplomats use TV for international propaganda, which in turn merges into domestic propaganda.’’ Most of the examples he gave for “TV diplomacy,” however,
were not propaganda. The televised ultimatum President Kennedy sent
to the Soviet Union about the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Nixon’s visit to
China in 1972, and Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem were not acts of
propaganda but were all designed to achieve breakthroughs in crises
and conflicts.
Fortner (1994, p. 35) wrote that “any effort to influence press accounts of events, personalities, or agreements on behalf of a nation-state
is public diplomacy.” I suggest, however, that, based on phases in conflict and policy goals, it is necessary to distinguish between two different
efforts to influence press accounts: public diplomacy, when the sides are
involved in a confrontation and their goal is propaganda, and media
diplomacy, when they seek, sometimes jointly, rapprochement and wish
to end the conflict through negotiations. In many ways, public diplomacy precedes media diplomacy and prepares the respective publics for
conflict resolution. In this study, media diplomacy refers to uses of the
mass media to communicate with state and nonstate actors, to build
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confidence and advance negotiations, as well as to mobilize public support for agreements. Media diplomacy is pursued through various
routine and special media activities, including press conferences, interviews, and leaks, as well as visits of heads of state and mediators
in rival countries and spectacular media events organized to usher in
a new era.
Variants
The Basic CommunicationVariant. In the absence of adequate direct
channels of communication, or when one side is unsure how the other
side would react to conditions for negotiations or to proposals for conflict resolution, officials use the media, with or without attribution, to
send messages to leaders of rival states and nonstate actors (Burns, 1996).
Sometimes during severe international crises, the media provide the only
channel for communication and negotiation between rival actors. During the first phase of the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis, the U.S. communicated with the terrorists holding the hostages exclusively through
the press (Larson, 1986; Newsom, 1988, p. 56). A similar case occurred
in the 1985 hijacking of a TWA jetliner to Beirut (Gilboa, 1990;
O’Heffernan, 1991, p. 49). Officials more frequently use global television rather than traditional diplomatic channels to deliver messages.
During the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict, Secretary of State Baker delivered
the U.S. ultimatum to Saddam Hussein through CNN and not through
the U.S. ambassador to Iraq (Neuman, 1996, p. 2). Similarly, in January
1998, Iranian President Khatami chose C N N to send a conciliatory
message to the U.S.s
Sometimes the media have been used to build confidence between
rival sides maneuvering for peacemaking. In September 1994, for example, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara answered for the first
time a question by an Israeli reporter at a press conference in London
and later gave a first-ever interview to Israeli television. This new attitude toward Israeli journalists was seen as an attempt by Syria to build
confidence required for peace with Israel (Rabinovich, 1998, p. 164).
The Traveling Diplomacy Variant. This variant refers to the use of
correspondents accompanying heads of state and foreign ministers when
they travel abroad to accomplish diplomatic missions, particularly mediation. Revolutions in communication and transportation made this
variant possible and have allowed it to develop. The classic example of
this variant was Kissinger’s 1973-1974 “shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle
East. He extensively used a few of the best-known American diplomatic
correspondents who accompanied him on his plane, such as Marvin Kalb
of CBS, Ted Koppel of ABC, and Richard Valeriani of NBC. He gave
them background reports, information, and leaks that were mostly intended to extricate concessions from Israeli and Arab leaders and to
break deadlocks (Kalb & Kalb, 1974; Valeriani, 1979).6Media cover-
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age of nonsecret diplomatic visits abroad has become a significant feature of the visit and sometimes determines its success.
The Media EventsVariant.Media events, defined as conquests where
a great leader is able t o conquer decades of hatred and war and replace
them with peace, represent media diplomacy at its best (Dayan & Katz,
1992, pp. 4-9). They are broadcast live with reverence and ceremony
and attract wide audiences around the world. Dayan and Katz (1992,
pp. 204-205) identified several direct effects of media events on diplomacy: trivializing the role of ambassadors, breaking diplomatic deadlocks and creating a climate conducive to negotiations, and creating a
favorable climate for a contract or to seal a bargain. The distinction
between the last two effects is significant because media events could be
used at the onset of negotiations to build confidence and facilitate negotiations, or at the end of negotiations to mobilize public support for an
agreement that has already been achieved.
An intermediary effect occurs when officials use media events to cultivate public support for a peace process after the conclusion of the initial phase and before moving on to the next phase. This effect typically
appears in cases where a breakthrough has been achieved, but the sides
have a long way to go before translating principles into a final peace
agreement. The intermediary effect mobilizes sufficient public support
inside the societies involved for the next phase in the negotiations. All
these effects of media events have appeared in “summit diplomacy” and
Ara b-Israeli peacemaking.
Gorbachev’s summits with Reagan and Bush demonstrate how the
two superpowers used the media in the transition from the Cold War to
the post-Cold War era. The summits reflected the dramatic changes in
superpower relations. As media events, they motivated individuals,
groups, and nations “to reassess their relations with each other in light
of the actions taking place live in front of their eyes” (Negrine, 1996, p.
172). Gorbachev used the summits with Reagan and Bush to cultivate
public support at home and abroad for his major political and economic
reforms. Reagan used the summits to legitimize the dramatic shift in his
attitudes toward the Soviet Union, which he had branded “the evil empire” at the beginning of his presidency.
Media events became a popular and frequently used media diplomacy
technique in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 (Bagnied & Schneider, 1982) and the 1991
Madrid peace conference (Bentzur, 1997) demonstrate the initial effect
of the use of a media event to facilitate negotiations. The signing ceremonies of three major documents represent the intermediary effect: the
Camp David Accords of September 1978, the PLO-Israel Declaration of
Principles of September 1993, and the Israel-Jordan Washington Declaration of July 1994. The signing ceremonies of two peace treaties dem-
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onstrate the “sealing effect’’ of media events: the Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty of March 1979 and the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 1994.
Effects and Implications
Officials. Global television has increased the speed at which diplomatic
messages are exchanged from weeks to minutes. This change represents
a serious dilemma for policymakers, particularly in crisis situations. If
they respond immediately without taking the time to carefully consider
policy options, they could make a mistake; if they offer no response,
they may create the impression, both at home and abroad, that they are
confused, don’t know what to do, or have no control over the event or
the issue at hand (Hoge, 1994, p. 136-137).
Media diplomacy is likely to fail if the participants do not sufficiently
cooperate to make it successful. This finding is especially true for media
events such as the 1991 Arab-Israeli peace conference held in Madrid.
Following the victory in the Gulf War, the U.S. initiated the Madrid
media event to break the deadlock in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. The
event was held under the joint sponsorship of Bush and Gorbachev and
was covered by about 4,500 journalists. However, the conference failed
to produce the intended results due to the absence of minimal cooperation among the adversaries who felt forced by the U.S. even to participate in the conference.
Journalists. Media diplomacy requires close cooperation between
officials and journalists. Sometimes this cooperation leads to cynical
manipulation of the media for political purposes. The intimate relationship Kissinger developed with the correspondents on his plane raises
several difficult dilemmas (Isaacson, 1992, pp. 573-586). The diplomatic correspondents had a stake in Kissinger’s success because the stardom status they acquired inside and outside the media depended on his
achievements. As Americans, they naturally supported a diplomatic effort that, if successful, could have restored American prestige and status
in world politics, particularly after the traumatic failure in Vietnam. They
also became too dependent on one source whom they could not afford
to antagonize. All of these problems could have compromised their journalistic integrity and objective reporting.
Public Opinion. One of main purposes of media diplomacy is to
cultivate public support for peacemaking. Sometimes, however, this model
backfires. Media events, for example, are spectacular ceremonies designed as such to maximize public support. At the same time, they create, as in Arab-Israeli media events, expectations so high that they have
no chance of being realized, at least not in the announced timetables.
The peoples involved become extremely disappointed, and consequently
support for peace measures is substantially eroded.
Media diplomacy includes uses of the media by officials and media-
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tors to communicate with state and nonstate actors, to send signals,
build confidence, and apply pressure. This model helps to place communication-based diplomatic processes and affairs, such as media events,
in the proper context. Media events are designed jointly by two or more
former enemies to mobilize domestic and world public opinion for changing their relations or for agreements. It would therefore be more appropriate to define them as media diplomacy, pursued in the context of
conflict resolution, than as public diplomacy, usually pursued when relations are antagonistic. The model raises ethical questions about possible manipulation of journalists to achieve diplomatic goals.
Media-Broker Diplomacy
While discussing the globalization of electronic journalism, Gurevitch
(1991, p. 188) noted the new role of journalists as “international political brokers.” He cited the examples of Walter Cronkite from CBS News,
who helped to arrange Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem, and television
news anchors who rushed to interview Saddam Hussein in Baghdad
during the 1990-1991 Gulf conflict. These examples, argues Gurevitch
(1991, p. 187), suggest that globalized television “may launch reportorial initiatives that tend to blur the distinction between the roles of reporters and diplomats.” News anchors interviewing the Iraqi president
“slid, almost imperceptibly, into the roles of advocates, as if representing their own government, and negotiators, exploring with their interviewee avenues for resolving the crisis.”
The examples cited by Gurevitch and others, such as Goren (1980),
Larson (1988), and O’Heffernan (1991, pp. 49-52; 1993), imply that
the model is not only a hypothetical abstraction, but actually has occurred in contemporary diplomacy. I suggest media- broker diplomacy
as a term to capture the essence of this new conceptual model. It refers
to international mediation conducted and sometimes initiated by media
professionals. The definition itself points to the main differences between
media diplomacy and media-broker diplomacy. The differences lie in
the actual activities of the journalists in the two models and sometimes
in the source of that activity. In media diplomacy, reporters pursue professional journalism work and follow moves initiated by policymakers.
In media-broker diplomacy, journalists act more as diplomats, sometimes initiating and conducting critical diplomatic moves. Geyer (1984,
p. 7 5 ) and Newsom (1988, p. 59) suggested that reporters who interviewed leaders unavailable to diplomats due to official policy or other
constraints, such as Fidel Castro or PLO leader Arafat before the Oslo
breakthrough, were conducting diplomacy. However, according to the
distinction suggested here, an interview used by a leader to influence
public opinion in another country in a confrontational context is public
Mass Communication and Diplomacy
diplomacy, whereas it is media diplomacy if the purpose is to seek conflict resolution. Both are different from media-broker diplomacy, which
consists of mediation and negotiation of terms and conditions.
Variants
The Direct InterventionVariant. This variant refers to situations where
journalists are actively and directly engaged in international negotiation. Cronkite’s role in the initial critical stage of the Israeli-Egyptian
peace process well illustrates the classic model of media-broker diplomacy. After Sadat stated in November 1977 that he was ready to travel
to Jerusalem to seek peace with Israel, Cronkite asked him what he needed
to go. Just a “proper invitation” from Israel, Sadat responded (Cronkite,
1996, pp. 495-502). Cronkite followed up by inquiring how soon he
could go, with Sadat answering “[in] the earliest time possible.” Cronkite
took the initiative by suggesting a possible time table: “[Tlhat could be,
say, within a week?” to which Sadat responded, “[Ylou can say that,
yes. ” Even before this interview ended, Cronkite’s producer began searching for Begin and located him 6 hours later. Cronkite informed Begin of
the results of his conversation with Sadat, causing him to respond: “tell
him [Sadat] he’s got an invitation.” This reaction, “tell him,” demonstrates how Begin perceived Cronkite as an actual mediator and not just
as a journalist. Cronkite recalled that he pressed Begin for details, with
Begin agreeing to make a statement to his parliament the following
day and later talk to the U.S. ambassador to Israel about forwarding
the invitation. A few days later, Sadat arrived in Israel, and history
was made.
Cronkite responded to some critics who argued that he overstepped
the bounds of journalistic propriety in the Sadat-Begin case by claiming
that he did not believe Sadat would really go to Jerusalem and that he
wanted only to “knock down the speculation over the visit.” Lack of
motivation or a special plan to engage in diplomacy, however, does not
mean that the reporter was not performing a diplomatic role. Cronkite
(1996, p. 499) testified that he was aware of the historic opportunity he
was handling. O n the interview with Sadat he wrote, “suddenly I was
trying to put the ribbon around a much bigger story.” He added that
“the important point is that television journalism, in this case at least,
speeded up the process, brought it into the open, removed a lot of possibly obstructionist middlemen, and made it difficult for principals to renege on their very public agreement” (pp. 562-563). Any professional
diplomat would be extremely proud of such achievements.
The Bridging Variant. This variant occurs when representatives of
rival sides are brought together on the air for discussions of the issues
dividing them. Well-known and respected journalists associated with
highly regarded programs have a better chance of performing this role.
Ted Koppel, with Nightline, is good example of this variant. The
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program’s motto, “bringing people together who are worlds apart,” reveals Nightline’s self-declared mission. 0bservers have agreed: “What
else is Nightline but an electronic negotiating table with the anchor bringing combatants together, searching for answers, probing for common
ground? Koppel may never get Kissinger’s old job, but he is already
television’s Secretary of State” (Alter, 1987, p. 50).
Two particular series of programs that Nightline broadcasted in 1985
from South Africa and in 1988 from Israel facilitated significant steps
toward conflict resolution. In both places, for the first time officials met
with representatives of their enemies. Israeli officials met with representatives associated with the PLO, including Ashrawi (1995, pp. 48-50),
who wrote that “the show broke barriers. It made acceptable the idea of
an encounter between Israelis and Palestinians.” O n the Israeli side,
Olmert commented that “there was this sense that this was more than
just a TV show, that this was a political event, an international event,
that TV had become more than just a technical instrument (Koppel &
Gibson, 1996, p. 116). A few years later, Israel and the PLO conducted secret negotiations in Oslo and reached historical reconciliation agreements.
The Secret Variant. Secret media-broker diplomacy appears to be a
contradiction in terms. Journalists are supposed to uncover events, not
to conceal them, and officials are hesitant to employ journalists in delicate negotiations that could increase the risk of premature disclosure.
Yet foreign affairs bureaucracies are known for being rigid and usually
resistant to fundamental changes in relations with rival countries, and
officials leak information on negotiations, particularly if they tend to
oppose them. Thus, in certain sensitive cases, officials prefer outsiders,
including reporters, to ensure secrecy (Ledeen, 1991, p. 124). An experienced journalist who enjoys the trust of high-level politicians or officials would know best how to protect secret negotiations from his colleagues. Also, a veteran diplomatic correspondent would have accumulated considerable knowledge and experience about the intricacies of
negotiations, perhaps as much as professional diplomats, and could execute a diplomatic mission effectively.
At the height of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a senior official at the
Soviet Embassy in Washington used John Scali, the diplomatic correspondent for ABC News, as a go-between for the U.S. and the Soviet
Union (Scali, 1964; 1987). Scali had excellent ties with U.S. officials,
who valued his accurate and professional reporting. Anxious to know
whether their proposal to end the crisis would be acceptable to the U.S.,
but fearing to lose face and credibility should it be rejected, the Soviets
asked Scali to pass it on to U.S. officials. Although American officials
were somewhat confused about the communication channel selected by
the Soviets, Secretary of State Rusk took the proposal seriously, met
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with Scali, and gave him America’s positive response (Kennedy, 1969,
pp. 90-91).
Effects and Implications
Four parameters should help to examine media-broker diplomacy: initiation and motivation, awareness, action, and consequences. Initiation
and motivation refer to the positions of those who initiate media-broker
diplomacy: the journalists themselves, policymakers, or other interested
parties. Awareness refers to the correspondents’ own knowledge and
understanding of their actions. Action refers to the specific measures
taken by a reporter in order to promote a diplomatic move, and consequences are the results of these measures. Application of these parameters to the various examples reveal different types of media-broker diplomacy. Cronkite didn’t preplan a diplomatic role, but was drawn into
one; Koppel clearly initiated mediation; whereas Scali was drafted into a
secret diplomatic mission. All were aware of the mediation roles they
were performing, and their specific actions had significant consequences
recognized by participants and fellow journalists.
Officials. From the governmental perspective, only officially authorized diplomacy is legitimate. “There is no place in diplomacy for journalists or anyone not authorized by the government,” says Hodding
Carter (O’Heffernan, 1991, pp. 50-51). His colleague in the Carter administration, Robert Beckel, argues that “it is a big mistake” for journalists to be “actively engaged in diplomacy,” but he considers Scali’s
role to be legitimate because it was authorized “and the government felt
that he was the best avenue to pass information back and forth.” Hurd
(Negrine, 1996, p. 174) argued that the relationship between journalists
and policymakers “will be fruitful provided each side recognizes the difference between the professions. The general shouldn’t fancy himself as
a commentator or the commentator as a general or a Cabinet Minister.”
These attitudes are understandable because of the politicians’ reluctance
to face additional competition, especially in an arena where the competitors are known almost as much as they are.
Journalists and Public Opinion. The variant pursued by Cronkite
was the only spontaneous one. In background conversations or in special interviews with high-level policymakers, experienced and well-known
journalists may identify a potential for negotiations (Sadat-Begin) or
attempt to negotiate on behalf of a particular actor (the U.S. versus
Saddam Hussein). In an official interview, a series of questions and answers may create a diplomatic move or accelerate one that is already in
the making. In this mode, journalists function as mediators and catalysts for negotiations.
The secret variant raises different professional and ethical dilemmas.
Scali continued to report on the Cuban crisis, knowing that there was a
whole other significant story in which he was participating: “I covered
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the entire Cuban missile crisis on TV and radio and never said one word,
even while I was covering it, about what I was doing behind the scenes”
(Kalb, Koppel, & Scali, 1982, p. 46). Even after the crisis, Scali claimed
that he could not reveal his role because Kennedy had asked him to
continue mediating to also get Soviet bombers out of Cuba. If Scali had
ceased his routine reporting, colleagues and officials could have suspected that something was wrong and may have questioned him about
his activities, but, by continuing his regular reporting on the event he
was participating in, his secret role could have adversely affected his
reporting. Scali explained that parallel reporting and secret mediation
were not difficult for him because “it was a crisis of magnitude that
surely represented an incredible disaster had it reached what appeared
to be its logical conclusion.”
Journalists may have an interest in the success of the diplomatic move
they help to initiate or are drafted to advance. In all the cases discussed
here, the journalists involved continued to report on the processes in
which they were participating and which could have affected the accuracy of their reporting. Cronkite had achieved a preferred status during
Sadat’s visit, along with Barbara Walters from ABC News, being the
only American journalists allowed to board Sadat’s plane on his way
from Cairo to Jerusalem. Thus, after helping to arrange Sadat’s visit and
being already partly rewarded for that role, Cronkite could have had a
stake in the results of the visit, bringing to question the possible effects
of his diplomatic role on his daily reporting and editing of the CBS
Evening News, before, during, and immediately after the visit. The
same reservation may apply to Koppel’s editing and interviewing on
Nightline programs.
The media- broker model may represent the most controversial interaction between officials and diplomats. Many theories of press-government relations advocate an adversarial role for the media vis-A-vis the
government. The media are supposed to report professionally and objectively and to critically examine official policies and actions. All the
media-broker diplomacy variants may potentially compromise this task.
Journalists who initiate or are drawn into brokerage roles must take
heed of the potential effects of that role on their reporting, and so should
the public.
Summary: Political Uses of the Media
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the main differences among the three distinctive models of media-diplomacy linkages determined by uses of the media to achieve diplomatic goals. The figure is particularly helpful in distinguishing between public diplomacy and media diplomacy. Although
both of these models deal with officials’ uses of the media to influence
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Mass Communication and Diplomacy
Attribute
Public diplomacy
Media diplomacy
Media-broker diplomacy
Context
Initiators
Time frame
Purpose
Method
Sides
Target
Medium
Confrontation
Officials
Long range
Generallfundamental
Promote favorable image
One sided
Foreign societies
Multiple channels
Conflict resolution
Officials
Short range
Specific
Appeal for conflict resolution
Joint
Domesticlforeign societies
Mass media
Negotiations
Journalists
Immediate
Very specific
Mediation
All sides
Officialslpublic opinion
Mass media
governments and public opinion, they substantially differ in contexts,
initiators, time frames, purposes, methods, sides, targets, and media.
Media diplomacy is pursued in the context of negotiations, whereas
public diplomacy is conducted in the context of confrontation. Media
diplomacy usually aims at short-term results; public diplomacy aims at
long-range outcomes. Media diplomacy is more specific than public diplomacy. Whereas the latter is designed to create a friendly climate within
a foreign society toward fundamental political and social issues, such as
capitalism versus communism, or human rights, the former is designed
to create a favorable climate for a particular diplomatic process at a
particular time and context. Further, whereas public diplomacy primarily entails one-sided propaganda designed to foster an image a broad,
media diplomacy primarily entails a serious appeal, sometimes made
jointly by two rival sides, for conflict resolution directed at both domestic and foreign constituencies. Finally, public diplomacy is conducted
through multiple channels, but media diplomacy is exclusively conducted
through mass media. Media-broker diplomacy is similar, but not identical, to media diplomacy in context, time, purposes, and medium but is
very different in initiators, method, sides, and target.
Conclusions
A study of the media’s involvement in diplomacy is becoming increasingly important because leaders of state and nonstate actors are using
the media more and more as a major standard instrument for communication and negotiation. Prominent journalists have even occasionally
assumed the role of diplomat in both crisis and peacemaking situations.
These uses of the media have had significant impact on the conduct and
coverage of diplomacy. In the Information Age, the inclusion and sometimes the exclusion of the media from diplomacy will have even more
dramatic effects on negotiations. As a greater number of people all over
the world watch the same news, leaders and government officials of
state and nonstate actors will use the mass media, particularly television, more frequently in both actual negotiations and in the prenegotiation
303
Table 2.
Public, Media
and MediaBroker
Diplomacy: A
Comparative
Framework
Communication
Theory
stages. Furthermore, the media’s growing involvement in diplomacy has
practical implications for officials pursuing peacemaking processes.
The media can help or hinder negotiations. Knowledge of how t o
avoid the pitfalls or how to use the media t o advance negotiations
may often determine whether a particular peacemaking effort will
be successful.
By identifying and developing as conceptual models six basic interactions, this article provides a more varied and complex picture of the
interactions between media and diplomacy. Closed-door diplomacy and
media-broker diplomacy are new models that account for relatively recent media-diplomacy interactions. The other four models I have updated, redefined, revised, and restructured. Based on the criteria of actors, contexts, contents, time frames, goals, methods, and stages in negotiations, each model corresponds to a particular basic media-diplomacy relationship. Finally, I have integrated the six conceptual models
into a comprehensive framework for analysis that introduces sharper
distinctions among the different interactions. The definitions suggested
here should help to avoid the frequent confusion between open diplomacy and public diplomacy and between media diplomacy and both
public and media-broker diplomacy. Separately, these terms describe very
different phenomena and should be employed accordingly.
The complex nature of the media’s involvement in diplomacy is also
demonstrated by examining the issue of influence and effects. Although
there is a wide consensus that the media have transformed diplomacy,
the question remains whether the media have functioned primarily as an
autonomous influential actor or mostly as a sophisticated tool in the
hands of officials. By definition, in media-broker diplomacy, the media
have functioned predominantly as an autonomous actor. The media have
brought new actors into the foreign-policymaking process, primarily
nonstate actors, and have been a rapid source of information to
policymakers. The media have accelerated the pace of diplomatic communication from weeks to minutes and have focused world attention on
crises in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia and on global
issues such as terrorism, global warming, and human rights. In some
cases, perhaps, leaders have had to address these issues even if they have
not been high on their agendas.
This article shows, however, that even in the Television Age, officials
have found innovative ways to insulate sensitive negotiations from the
media and public opinion. Contrary to the assertions made by diplomats such as Eban and Hurd, officials have been able to use secret or
semisecret negotiations, such as closed-door diplomacy, to resolve a few
of the most serious crises and conflicts of the second half of this century.
It has become clear that sometimes, as in the U.S.-China and the ArabIsraeli conflicts, only secret diplomacy can produce the necessary break-
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throughs. Officials have been aware of this requirement, and journalists
seem to have reluctantly accepted this principle.
The media diplomacy and public diplomacy models further show that
leaders and officials have demonstrated considerable ability to harness
the growing power of global communication to achieve diplomatic goals
at home and abroad. Often, they have been in control of the media’s
roles more than the journalists themselves. Newsom (1988, p. 64) said,
for example, that “in the last analysis it is the executive that has the
power to dominate the news,” and Neuman argued (1996, p. 8) that
even new communication technologies haven’t changed this balance of
power: “Media technology is rarely as powerful in the hands of journalists as it is in the hands of political figures who can summon the talent to
exploit the new invention.” The media, therefore, have transformed diplomacy more through providing leaders and officials with new tools
than in functioning as independent actors.
Despite the obvious significance of the media’s roles in contemporary
and future diplomacy as political tools or as independent actors, research on this topic is still scarce and underdeveloped. Better understanding of these roles is vital, not only for the sake of scientific progress,
but also for actual negotiations. This article offers a comprehensive framework for analysis that could help to analyze and understand how the
media have affected diplomacy. The six conceptual models included in
the framework provide a basic intellectual infrastructure that can help
to establish the necessary interdisciplinary bridges between islands of
theory on media-diplomacy relations in communication, political science, and international relations.
I
This definition represents a revised and expanded version of a formulation suggested by
Fransworth (1992, p. 179)
Davison (1974, 1976) did significant pioneering work in this field but his studies were related
mainly to the realities of communication and international relations during the Cold War. A few
scholars followed in his footsteps (Korzenny & Ting-Toomey, 1990; Roach, 1993).Van Dinh (1987)
contributed a Third World perspective, again primarily in the Cold War context. Dayan and Katz
(1992)developed the concept of media events which included diplomatic events. Jakobsen (1996),
Strobel (1997), and Livingston (1997) have critically explored the “CNN effect” theory. Several
scholars dealt with public diplomacy (Malone, 1988; Tuch, 1990; Manheim, 1994a). Arno (1984)
defined the media as “third parties” who shuttle messages back and forth between rival parties. Y.
Cohen (1986) studied media diplomacy, and R. Cohen (1997) investigated effects of intercultural
aspects. Putnam and Roloff (1992)explored the roles and effects of all kinds of communication on
negotiation. Several works have dealt with the topic from the perspective of foreign policymaking
(McGhee, 1987; Serfaty, 1991; O’Heffernan, 1991; Newsom, 1996).
Powlick (1991, 1995) found that American foreign policy officials generally accord greater
weight to public opinion than is sometimes thought, and that they use news media along with
elected officials as their major sources of information about public opinion.
Ten years after the tragic events, the Chinese government is still insisting on this view (Larii, 1999).
Excerpts from the interview with CNN were published in the Intermtional Herald Tribune
on January 9, 1998, p. 10.
British foreign secretaries employed a similar technique (Dickie, 1997).
305
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Theory
Author
Eytan Gilboa is a professor of communication and government and the chair of the Department of
Social Sciences at the Holon Institute of Technology in Israel. He also teaches international communication at Bar-Ilan University. H e is the author and editor of several books, and his articles have
appeared in many scholarly journals, including most recently Gazette, The Harvard International
lournal of PresslPolitics, Political Science Quarterly, and International Negotiation. Research for
this study was supported by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University.
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