P. D. No. 968
PROBATION LAW
PATERNO DE LOS SANTOS, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS 13TH DIVISION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 181306: March 21, 2011
FACTS: Paterno de los Santos, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of intentional abortion,
and then he filed an application for probation. It was ruled that he is ineligible to apply for
probation, considering the fact that he has waived his right to avail the benefits of probation
law when he appealed the judgment of conviction by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation, considering that he
had appealed his conviction, contrary to the provision of Section 4, P.D. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1990.
HELD: Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified
offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to
immediately admit his liability and save the State the time, effort and expenses to jettison an
appeal.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact
alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for Probation. Having appealed from the
judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had
affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Furthermore, it was clear that when petitioner filed his appeal before the appellate
court, what he was questioning was the merit of the decision convicting him and not the
propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court for the purpose of correcting a wrong
penalty — to reduce it to within probational range. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner,
therefore, ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus, rendering nugatory the
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at
the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; who
manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Considering that the prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner opted to appeal his conviction, he, therefore, deemed to
relinquish his right to the benefits of probation.
ALEJANDRA PABLO vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 12510: August 3, 2000
FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was convicted of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. She
applied for probation and was later denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the he should be denied probation on the ground of
disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.
HELD: The Court ruled that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following
offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than two hundred
pesos ;
d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree
became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
The National Probation Office denied petitioners application for probation under
Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because a prior conviction was entered against the petitioner
on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with a fine of P4,648.00; thereby
placing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) of
P.D. 968.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not only
that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced that "the
policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the categorical provisions of the
law."
Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person who
was previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos, is
disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and unqualified.
There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous conviction" as referring to
a conviction for a crime which is entirely different from that for which the offender is applying
for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or transaction as petitioner would have
the court to understand.
It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore, the
principle of liberal interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is clearly discernible
from the language of the statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003
FACTS: Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide for the death of John Barry Abogado. He filed a motion for partial reconsideration,
which was later denied, and an application for probation. He then filed a notice of partial
appeal which was denied for the reason that the application for probation is deemed under the
law to be a waiver of the right to appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial or approval of probation is appealable.
HELD: We recall that the law which governs all matters relating to probation is
Presidential Decree No. 968, commonly known as the Probation Law, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1990. The provision of the law that is pertinent to the current
controversy reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Relying solely on the letter of the law, the filing of the application for probation should
be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. However, in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, we had
occasion to rule that the above provision of the Probation Law clearly provides only for the
suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It
has absolutely no bearing on civil liability.
This ruling was clarified in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, wherein we ruled that, although
the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the
civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.
The Probation Law prohibits a judge from entertaining or granting an application for
probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The fact of
conviction most certainly refers to the criminal liability of the accused, as a result of a finding
made by a judge that he is guilty of the crime charged. However, the appeal in this case
involved only the civil aspect of the trial courts judgment. Hence, we see no reason why,
between the conjoined criminal and civil aspects of a felony, a line cannot be drawn marking
where the one springs from the other. Even if by definition civil liability ex delicto arises from
the criminal act, once its existence is established, it should be treated separately from the
criminal liability. Indeed there is even categorical statutory basis to state that it subsists despite
the extinguishment of the criminal liability from which it arose. This was the finding in Budlong
v. Apalisok and Salgado v. Court of Appeals.
Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the criminal liability and
the civil liability ex delicto should be considered independently, each with its own
corresponding effects. In the present case, the law that bars an appeal of the judgment of
conviction, as well as its corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civil
aspect of the same judgment.
ARNEL COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182748 : December 13, 2011
FACTS: Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
ISSUE: Whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty.
HELD: Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to
apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted
by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968)
provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction”. Since Arnel appealed his conviction
for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel
has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for
that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4
months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still
up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking
into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But,
as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against him. He will not be
entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More,
the Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also
have to bend over to the trial court's judgment--even if this has been found in error. And,
worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court's erroneous judgment with the
forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals. that the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year
and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to
ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for
probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of
course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly
could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws
the element of speculation on the part of the accused--to wager on the result of his appeal-that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand,
and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an `escape hatch'
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction."
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a
position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty
that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow
Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the
sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty
imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the
law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused.
Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law
but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction would not be
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to
"provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who
appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction.
Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide that carried a
penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which
as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its
maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced
penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel
the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to
apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the
right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely
since the penalty he got was not probationable.
WILLY TAN y CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 148194: April 12, 2002
FACTS: Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy, and then he applied for probation which
was granted by the trial court but the release was withheld in view of the filing by the
prosecution a motion for modification of penalty. He later filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not he is entitled to an appeal after he has applied for probation.
HELD: In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal
with the trial court. Ordinarily, the Court should have the case remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings. The clear impingement upon petitioners basic right against
double jeopardy, however, should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative by this Court to
relax the stringent application of the rules on the matter. When the trial court increased the
penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on
which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be deemed
to have lapsed into finality.
Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused,
be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation-
implements a substantive provision of the Probation Law which enunciates that the mere filing
of an application for probation forecloses the right to appeal.
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best: Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Such a waiver amounts
to a voluntary compliance with the decision and writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the judgment. There is no principle better settled, or of more universal application, than
that no court can reverse or annul, reconsider or amend, its own final decree or judgment. Any
attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the same, except in respect to
correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
LOURDES A. SABLE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ENRIQUETA LOQUILLANOBELARMINO, Presiding Judge, Branch 57, RTC, Cebu City
G.R. No. 17796: April 7, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner convicted of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code on November 28, 2000 but
acquitted Ildefonsa Anoba for finding not guilty. However, the court finds that Lourdes
Abellanosa Sable was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years ,2 months and one day to 6 years.
On August, 25, 2003 petitioner intimated her desire to apply for probation instead of
appealing the judgment of conviction which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of application for probation is tenable.
HELD: The court held that probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible
convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state the time, effort and expenses to
jettison an appeal.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation.—Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant
within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place
the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.(Emphasis supplied.)
It is quite clear from the afore-quoted provision that an application for probation must
be made within the period for perfecting an appeal, and the filing of the application after the
time of appeal has lapsed is injurious to the recourse of the applicant.
In the present petition before us, petitioner filed the application for probation on 25
August 2003, almost eight months from the time the assailed judgment of the RTC became
final. Clearly, the application for probation was filed out of time pursuant to Rule 122, Sec. 6 of
the Rules of Court, which states that an "appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from."
In Palo v. Militante,this Court held that what the law requires is that the application for
probation must be filed within the period for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within
such period is intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity.
Furthermore, the application for probation must necessarily fail, because before the
application was instituted, petitioner already filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC on 17 June
2003. The Probation Law is patently clear that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction."
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
the accused -- to wager on the result of his appeal -- that when his conviction is finally affirmed
on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
now applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s
affirmation of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first
opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended, precisely to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for
the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in
his bid.
DANIEL G. FAJARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO P. PEDRONIO; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and STATION COMMANDER OF ILOILO CITY
G.R. No. 128508: February 1, 1999
FACTS: On May 26, 1988, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, convicted
petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
eight (8) months imprisonment and to pay the costs, in Criminal Case No. 14196. He appealed
to the Court of Appeals. By decision promulgated on February 27, 1990, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction.
Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a
motion for probation contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he
committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified
to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused
who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not applicable to
him.
On January 5, 1996, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for probation.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to
annul the lower court's denial of his application for probation. On November 12, 1996, the
Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is qualify to apply for probation under Presidential
Decree No. 968 since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988, after Presidential Decree
No. 1990 amending Presidential Decree No. 968, became effective in 1986, providing that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5, 1985, "was printed in
Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985 but said issue was released for
circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P D 1990 became effective after fifteen (15) days from
July 1, 1986, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986."It is not ex post
facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity.An ex post
facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its
commission. Presidential Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in
character. It may not be considered as an ex post facto law.
At the time of the commission of the offense charged—violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22—in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of
probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time,
petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the
appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for
probation since he had appealed.
On October 13, 1997, the Solicitor General submitted a manifestation positing the view
that petitioner's application for probation may still be considered because when petitioner
committed the offense in 1981, he could avail himself of probation since the law as it stood at
that time provided that an accused convicted of a crime may apply for probation even if he had
appealed the conviction. We do not share his view. The case he cited is a Court of Appeals
decision, and, hence, not a precedent. What is more, it is inapplicable because there, the
accused's conviction became final on October 14, 1985. Presidential Decree No. 1990 although
enacted on October 5, 1985, was published in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985,and,
hence, was not yet applicable at the time the accused was finally convicted. Regrettably, the
Solicitor General has cited a Court of Appeals decision that is inapplicable to this case because
the facts were not similar.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues that petitioner has raised questioning
the constitutionality and wisdom of Presidential Decree No. 1990, amending the probation law.
RONALD SANTIAGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba Zambales; THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF, Third Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA MAYCONG, Suprvising Parole and
Probation Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Parole and Probation Office; and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 123936: March 4, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993.
His application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of
court for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court
likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve
the sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violation
committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities
to his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of
supervision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of his
probation warrant its revocation.
HELD: The Solicitor General argues that petitioner has committed violations, thus
justifying the trial court' s revocation of the grant of probation. He further points out that our
ruling in Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since what was involved in Salgado
was a program of payment already imposed upon petitioner therein. In this case, however, it is
petitioner who is being asked to submit his own program of payment and he had not submitted
any such program.
Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring
him to submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply with
said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although the
notice of the order of June 20, 1994 came belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to comply
with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement
imposed and harping on his alleged poverty as the reason for his failure to comply.
Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a condition precedent to
probation. If it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioner's assertion that only
moneyed convicts may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case, however, petitioner's
application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not
made a requirement before he could avail a probation, but was a condition for his continued
enjoyment of the same.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a
condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one
required by law. It is a consequence of petitioner's having been convicted of a crime, and
petitioner is bound to satisfy this obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under
probation.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court
with a program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the
reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment. Knowing
his own financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a program of payment that
fits his needs and capacity.
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight, more so when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only depends on his
parents for support. He can barely support his family. Petitioner ought to be reminded of what
is incumbent on a probationer, including those requirements that the trial court may set.
As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:
Sec. 10. Conditions of Probation. — . . .
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) Meet his family responsibilities;
(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment
without the prior written approval of the probation officer
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down
by statute. They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the
petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the
purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of
an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence. Failure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation,
pursuant to the Probation Law:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation." (Emphasis supplied.)
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be
imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court
also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances.
Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation,
petitioner cannot now assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has squandered
the opportunity granted him by the trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now
suffer the consequences of those afore-cited violations.
ANSELMO DE LEON CUYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192164: October 12, 2011
FACTS: On August , 25, 2009, Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
San Fernando City, La Union, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment of
four (4) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He was likewise ordered to pay private
complainant Alejo Cuyo the amount of P10,000 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioner was not present during the promulgation of the judgment and was represented by
his counsel instead.
His motion for reconsideration was denied on October 23, 2009. He subsequently filed a
Motion for Probation on November, 5, 2009 but is denied on the ground that it had been filed
beyond the reglementary period of fifteen days as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. 968.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
HELD: This court held that the RTC that the Motion for Probation was filed out of time.
Sec. 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the Court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a
light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment,
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he s
hall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of perjury. He was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correctional
penalty. Under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for
the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor (one to thirty days of imprisonment) or a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos (P200), or both are imposable. Thus, perjury is not a light
felony or offense contemplated by Rule 120, Sec. 6. It was therefore mandatory for petitioner
to be present at the promulgation of the judgment.
To recall, despite notice, petitioner was absent when the MTCC promulgated its
judgment on 25 August 2009. Pursuant to Rule 120, Sec. 6, it is only when the accused is
convicted of a light offense that a promulgation may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. In case the accused failed to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation despite notice, and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
accused shall lose all the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment.