MIDTERMS
VII.
RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
A. Section 1- Rights of the accused at trial
1. People vs. Sequerra – October 12, 1987 - ALLARSE
FACTS:
In barangay Calaba in Bangued, Abra, at about ten o'clock in the morning of March 31, 1980, Renato Bonete was shot in
the back while driving his tricycle. Rushed to the hospital, he died shortly upon arrival, of severe bleeding from the wounds
he had sustained. In the afternoon of the same day, Danilo Sequerra was picked up at his residence and thereafter
investigated for the killing.He was subsequently charged with the murder of Bonete and convicted after trial.
Four witnesses were presented by the prosecution to prove Sequerra's guilt. Rowena Bonete, a 15-year old girl, who was
the victim's passenger when he was shot that fatal morning. According to her, the tricycle had just passed by the accused,
who was standing along the barangay road, when he fired at the victim and then immediately ran towards the fields, still
carrying his gun. Carolina Bonete, her stepmother, testified that from where she was standing, about 30 meters from the
tricycle, she saw the accused running toward the fields after apparently having shot Bonete. Concepcion Barsuela, another
prosecution witness,testifies that Bonete was still able to walk after he was shot for she found him in her front yard lying
face down. She immediately went to give him assistance and asked him who had shot him. According to her, he thrice
identified his assailant as "Danny Sequerra." And Carmelita Bonete, the victim's wife, testified about the civil damages. She
also declared there was bad blood between her husband and the accused because the latter resented Renato Bonete's
acquittal of the murder of a relative of Sequerra; her husband had discovered Sequerra stealing chickens; and Sequerra
had stoned their house.
Sequerra claimed that he was not Calaba, Abra at that time of the killing and presented some 3 witnesses in support to his
alibi.
The Court finds that the trial judge did not err in giving credence to the witnesses for the prosecution and in finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Against his positive identification, all he offered was the feeble defense of alibi,
which he and his witnesses failed to substantiate. He is condemned, of course, not because he failed to prove that he was
in Tarlac but because the prosecution succeeded in proving that he was in Abra.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can rely on the presumption of innocence. NO
RULING: RULE 115, Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled
to the following rights:
(a)To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Confronted by the full panoply of state authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten
and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness
of his defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, he is entitled to be freed.
But as solicitous as the Bill of Rights is of the accused, the presumption of innocence is not an automatic or blanket
exoneration. It is at best only an initial protection. If the prosecution succeeds in refuting the presumption, it then becomes
the outlook of the accused to adduce evidence that will at least raise that inkling of doubt that he is guilty. Once the armor
of the presumption is pierced, so to speak, it is for the accused to take the offense and ward off the attack.
The accused cannot rely forever on the presumption of innocence. This is a disputable presumption. The prosecution
destroyed that presumption by presenting evidence of the accused's guilt.
2. People vs. Benemerito – 264 SCRA 677 Ampis
An appeal by accused-appellant Alexander "Alex" Benemerito from the Joint Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 91, convicting him of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa, the evidence
overwhelmingly established the fact that both the accused appellant and his sister Precy Benemerito were engaged in
the business of illegal recruitment. In their testimonies, Bernando Arcal and Carlito Gumarang were positive,
categorical and firm, even under grueling cross examination, that the accused-appellant actively participated in the
recruitment process. The latter was present when each complainant was offered a job in Japan, and the accused
appellant even made representations as to the existence of such jobs and accompanied the complainants for their
medical examinations. The accused-appellant likewise received installment payments from the complainants.
The accused-appellant asserts that he should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule" in view of the doubts as to his
guilt as shown in his arguments and that the evidence points in fact to his sister Precy Benemerito as the recruiter who
received the money from the complainants.
Issue: WON he should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule"
Ruling: No. The accused appellant’s plea for the application of the "equipoise rule" must likewise fail. This rule
provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. 30 There is, therefore, no equipoise if the
evidence is not ‘’evenly balanced." Not even a semblance of parity is present in this case. Against the direct, positive
and convincing evidence for the prosecution, the accused-appellant could only offer a mere denial and the incredible
claim that he was an unwitting victim of his sister Precy Benemerito. He miserably failed to overcome the prosecution’s
evidence, hence the rule is unavailable to him.
3. People vs. Calayca – 301 SCRA 192 - APA
FACTS:
A rape charge was initiated by Neddy Calayca through a sworn complaint and filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosecute the
appellant for the crime of rape. Consequently, on March 21, 1995, the corresponding Information was filed with the Regional
Trial Court reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II, upon sworn complaint of the offended party, Neddy Calayca,
accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Solo,
Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her(sic) own daughter, Neddy
Calayca, against her will and consent.
When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the crime charged. Trial
on the merits ensued thereafter.
A judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty of death was rendered by the
trial court in a Decision dated June 13, 1995
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him.
RULING:
YES.
There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information under which the appellant was arraigned,
he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified
rape. Appellant's conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged
must be alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional requirement is to enable the accused
to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.
A reading of the Information for rape filed against appellant in the present case reveals that he is merely charged with the
crime of simple rape which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of the
minority of the victim, is not stated in the Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offender
as the parent of the victim. Again, as the Supreme Court have emphasized in People v. Ramos, the elements of
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the Information
is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying circumstances stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. Thus,
the penalty of death prescribed in R.A. 7659 should not have been imposed against appellant.
In the aforecited case of People v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled: . . ., it has long been the rule that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be
considered only as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. Indeed, it would
be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of
due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
4. People vs. Bermas – 306 SCRA 135
PEOPLE v. BERMAS
G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999
TOPIC:
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
AUTHOR: Jade
NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS:
 Rufino Mirandilla Bermas was charged of the crime of raping her 15-year old daughter Manuela
Bermas while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their house in Paranaque. (Date of crime:
3 August 1994)
 According to the prosecution’s account, Bermas was armed with a knife, removed Manuela’s shorts
and panty, placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
movements. After satisfying his satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened the victim with death if she
reports the incident to anyone.
 9 August 1994 – Manuela was medically examined at the NBI. The findings are:
o No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time
of examination;
o Hymen, intact but distensible and its orifice wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete
penetration by an average sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing
any hymenal laceration."
 The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of his married
daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere
resentment by the latter.
 Bermas vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her daughter. –
o He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because he loves so much his daughter
and his other children.
o He even performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his
separation from his wife.
o Manuela might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view of the numerous scoldings
that she has received from him because she frequently comes home late at night.
 Luzviminda, Bermas’ married daughter denied that her sister, Manuela was raped by their father.
o Manuela did not come home in the night of 3 August 1994, and that, she is a liar.
o The concoction of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by the latter of the frequent
scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused.
o She was told by the previous household employer of Manuela that she is a liar.
o She went on to testify further that she does not believe her father raped her younger sister.
 2 May 1995 – The trial court found the case of the prosecution against Bermas and ruled out the
defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of Manuela that allegedly had motivated
the filing of the complaint against her father; found Bermas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the complainant in
the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.
 Automatic review = SC
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Bermas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Whether or not Bermas was properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel.
HELD: Yes. The case got remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
No. Bernas was not properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel;
RATIO:
 Defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva, in collaboration with the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force detailed several errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND
VIGILANT COUNSEL
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the accused's
counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing
of the information;
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;
b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the
accused.
B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN
IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND
FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."
 There is merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of the case for new trial.
 8 August 1994 – Manuela, assisted by her mother Rosita, executed a sworn statement before SPO1
Dominador Nipas of the Paranaque Police Station stating that she had been raped by her father,
Bermas, in 1991, 1993 and on 3 August 1994  signed and filed in accordance with Section 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court.
 The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the accused had waived
his right to a preliminary investigation.
 3 October 1994 – day of arraignment – Bermas was brought before the trial court without counsel.
The court assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to be the counsel de
officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
 19 October 1994 - The prosecution placed Manuela at the witness stand. She testified on direct
examination with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the
cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de officio. Her
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request was granted.
o Atty Villarin mentioned that she could not give justice to the accused (because as a lady
lawyer…. [she did not finish her statement]).
Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately
allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely had
time, to prepare.
o Atty. Gomez asked for 10 minute recess before his cross-examination, maybe to prepare.
o But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant upon whose testimony largely
rests the verdict on the accused who stands to be meted the death penalty if found guilty, is
far too inadequate. He could not possibly have familiarized himself with the records and
surrounding circumstances of the case, read the complaint, the statement of the complainant,
the medico-legal report, memos of the police, transcripts and other relevant documents and
confer with the accused and his witnesses, all in ten minutes.
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994 and was later reset to
09 January 1995.
When the case was called on 09 January 1995, his counsel did not appear (without notice of
withdrawal). The trial court appointed another lawyer as counsel de officio, Atty. Nicanor Lonzame.
Atty. Lonzame requested to reset the hearing to 16 January 1995.
16 January 1995 - Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio [because there
is a PAO lawyer present in the court] but later, reluctantly, retracted.
o Atty. Lonzame mention that he was appointed because the PAO lawyer (during the previous
hearing day) was not around.
Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva took over from Atty. Lonzame, who had ceased to appear for and
in behalf of the accused.
The Court finds that Bermas has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So
important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor
laws.
Even prior to the1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has already been recognized
under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions
is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and that if he is unable to employ counsel,
the court must assign one to defend him
The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring, in Article III, Section 17, that: In all
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criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution,
essentially, has remained unchanged.
Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision from
which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of
custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states
Sec. 12. (1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Sec. 14 (2)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
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The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in
Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the
judgment.
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People v. Holgado (CJ Moran): "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused
be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have
no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise
an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of
an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and
he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
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William vs. Kaiser (J Douglas): the accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of
overzealous prosecutors, of the laws complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment. An
accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is
great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal
perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings.
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The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means
that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is
amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of
the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient
and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked
whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own
choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request.
Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
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Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the
bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend the accused.
But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
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A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. A mere pro-forma appointment of de oficio counsel
who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. The exacting
demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He
must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of
justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling and
cogent reasons.
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People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, 29 March 1999: We cannot right finis to this discussion
without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with
their duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the
aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the
accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment
and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and
faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission
of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint,
aforequoted, under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Paranaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor
Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers
of the court and as members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with
most severely.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGTH TO COUNSEL; ACCUSEDS TO COUNSEL
VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. -- This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accusedappellant has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the
right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws. Indeed,
even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an accused has already
been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900, stating that a defendant in all
criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and that if he is unable
to employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AVAILABLE AS EARLY AS THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION STAGE. -- Except for
a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution, essentially, has
remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that has been
introduced is the provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the right to
counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFLECTED UNDER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES. -- The constitutional
mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1, Rule
115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE FORMALITY THAT MAY BE DISPENSED WITH OR PERFUNCTORILY
PERFORMED. -- The accused needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous
prosecutors, of the laws complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment. An accused must be
given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that
any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and
skills needed in the court proceedings. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
5. LEGAL ETHICS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; FINDS SUBSTANCE IN THE PERFORMANCE BY
COUNSEL OF HIS SWORN DUTY OF FIDELITY TO HIS CLIENT. -- The right to counsel must be
more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard
questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly
at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing
jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer
of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.
6. ID.; ID.; COUNSEL DE OFICIO; MERE PRO-FORMA APPOINTMENT THEREOF MERITS
DISAPPROBATION. -- A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. A mere pro-forma
appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation. The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when
one is a counsel de oficio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to assist
in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only
for the most compelling and cogent reasons.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
5. Carredo vs. People – 183 SCRA 273 BANUELOS
FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, petitioner Carredo elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In an order dated January 28, 1987, the said trial
court denied the same. Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari questioning the dismissal of the petition by
the trial court and submitting for determination the issue of whether or not petitioner can be compelled, on pain of being
arrested and his cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the trial for purposes of his identification by the
prosecution witnesses in a complaint for malicious mischief despite his written waiver of appearance. The issue is
not new.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial can be ordered
arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification.
RULING:
YES. Waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its
right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the
conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his
obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty
or obligation to the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.
6. People vs. Continente – 339 SCRA 1 (2000)
FACTS:
Donato B. Continente and Juanito T. were charged for two (2) separate amended Informations for murder and frustrated
murder in connection with shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in
Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya.It
appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zlueta. Zulueta
recognized Continente whom she had encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside the JUSMAG
Compound.
Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his own statements which are respectively dated August 29,
1989 AND August 30, 1989, insofar as the same establish his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his
driver on April 21, 198. Appelllant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August 27 and 28, 1989 in
Davao City; that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and that subsequently, he was hit and
mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus, causing him to loss consciousness.
Donato Continente testified and CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he knew something about it; that appellant
Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the investigation; that he signed his sworn statement in the presence
of Pablico and swore to the truth thereof before the administering fiscal for fear that something might happen to him while
he was alone; that he signed the last page of his sworn statement first before signing the waiver of his constitutional
rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal service was engaged by the CIS Investigators.
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein Petitioner’s rights during custodial investigation were violated as they have no counsel of their own
choice.
RULING:
No.
Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal assistance during their
respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that both appellants never signified their desire
to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where
a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer.
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to give their statements involving the
ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The counsel should never prevent
an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court,
the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. What is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to counsel is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to provide him with the best defense.
7. People vs. Crispin – 327 SCRA 167 Cabaña
FACTS
That this is a statement of facts, On August 12, 1993, around 11:30 p.m., spouses Crisanto and Evelyn Saul
were in the house of the Jamias couple (Aniceto and Angelita) located at Block 29, Lot 28, Kabisig Floodway, Cainta,
and Rizal. With them were Honoria Ontanillas and Nestor Jamias. The group was talking animatedly concerning the
deployment abroad of Honorio Ontanillas as well as Crisanto’s deployment in the last week of that month of August.
In the course of their conversation, two (2) masked intruders suddenly appeared from the door. One of the intruders
pointed a gun at the temple of Crisanto – then a shot rang out. Crisanto slumped on the floor. Evelyn was shoved
inside a room by Aniceto Jamias and a scuffle ensued between the second intruder and the rest of the group of the
Jamiases. The second intruder was subdued. Evelyn vividly recalled that the gunman who shot her husband had the
letter ‘M’ tattooed between his thumb and forefinger.
ISSUE
Whether or not the rights of the accused in this case are deprived?
RULING
YES. In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the court reasonably doubts, not
the innocence, but the guilt of the accused. Unless the identity of the culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt
to the exclusion of all others, the charge must be dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of
innocence has not been overcome. While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, it
connotes that degree of proof which, after an investigation of the whole record, produces in an unprejudiced mind the
moral certainty that the accused is culpable.
In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission of the crime and (2)
the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Upon the investigation over the accused the
prosecution’s basis for identifying the assailant was belatedly established, unsubstantiated, uncorroborated and
therefore unreliable.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal Case No. 93-9911
is hereby REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered RELEASED from custody,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM
this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement, or
of the reasons why he could not be freed therefrom. Costs de oficio.
An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify
on it.21 Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of his
right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statement or writing is attributed.22 The right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him23 is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily
done away with. Another reason why the right to confrontation is so essential is because the trial judge’s duty to
observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by his being brought to the witness stand.24 That the
affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because
the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.25 Such record must
be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.26 The
prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness, his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and
deserves no consideration at all.
8. Beltran vs. Samson and Jose – 53 Phil. 570
RIGHT TO SELF INCRIMINATION
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act,
because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner
herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.
(Posted by Dawn Guillermo)
9. People vs. Gallarde – February 17, 2000
Facts:
In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera,
Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed
Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the
kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him,
the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene
lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde. Soon Editha
left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and
Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed them that
Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad
Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew
Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the missing child.
When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he sawtalking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of
Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away from Gallarde's
house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I did not do
anything to her." To the question, "where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?" Gallarde
answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that
Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad
Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde was the last person
seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on
a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the disheveled grass. When
Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. Fernandez screamed in
terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heardshouts saying: "She is here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of
Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building. On their way though, they
met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of Gallarde, saying: "Here is the
suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you." The policemen together
with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless
Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken without any counsel present.
Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The trial court rendered a decision convicting
Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal
knowledge, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan
in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. The trial court rejected the photographs (Exhibits "I," "J" and "K") taken of Gallarde
immediately after the incident on the ground that "the same were taken while he was already under the mercy of the police."
Gallarde appealed his conviction to the SC.
Issue:
Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Held:
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation
of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical
acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery
may be compelled to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he
was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of
his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. (People vs. Gallarde, G.R. No.
133025. February 17, 2000)
10. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan – October 1, 1999 -
VIII.
Rule 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
A. Section 1 – Arraignment and Plea; how made
1. People vs. Mechor Estomaca – April 22, 1996
Facts:
Melchor Estomaca, an illiterate laborer, was charged with rape committed on five separate occasions against his own
daughter.
There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June 14, 1994 during the
arraignment. When he was arraigned, he pleaded guilty to all of the complaints against him. However, he
eventually informed the court that he was only guilty of two counts of rape, and a plea of not guilty to the other three,
alleging that those may have been committed by the victim’s boyfriend.
Since he was charged for a heinous crime, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which found the arraignment
process of the accused to be questionable.
Issue:
WON the arraignment was valid.
Ruling:
No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the
clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated
therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to
the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows
is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an
accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to
be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
Constitution.
In the case at hand, the arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript. There is also no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de
oficio was furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly
prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Moreover, the court found out that the complaint or information was not
read to the accused in the language known to him, as his local dialect was kinaray-a and the lower court
conducted the arraignment in Ilonggo.
The Supreme Court remanded the two criminal cases where the accused pleaded guilty back to the lower court for further
and appropriate proceedings.
2. People vs. Dea Asis – December 7, 1993 - CHUNG
PEOPLE vs. DE ASIS
December 7, 1993
HELD: “There is nothing that could prevent the prosecution from presenting witnesses in court not listed in the
information, as it is well settled that the court has the undisputed right to call on a witness whose name does not
appear in the list of the fiscal, unless the omission of said witness is intentional and tainted with bad faith. The
established rule is that the prosecution may call unlisted witnesses to testify.”
“Moreover, the purpose of the listing of the names of the witnesses in the complaint or information is merely
to avoid the presentation of surprise witnesses and to enable the defense to examine their record, morality and
character, but once placed on the witness stand, it can no longer be disputed that the defense has already the
opportunity to examine the character and credibility of the unlisted witness.”
“Finally, it is beyond question, that it is the prosecution's privilege to present such number of witnesses it
deems sufficient. Their non-inclusion in the list of witnesses is of no moment. In fact the omission of their names
in the list of prosecution witnesses in the information is commonly practiced for their own protection at least until
the termination of the case.”
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the
proceedings.
Q: Now, what happens if a case is tried without arraignment?
A: The GENERAL RULE, that is irregular – the proceedings are tainted with irregularity because arraignment is
MANDATORY. (U.S. vs. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207). HOWEVER, there was an instance where the SC considered the proceedings
as valid where the lawyer of the accused also did not object the absence of the arraignment. This the case of
3. People vs. Cabale – May 8, 1990- COLE
FACTS:
Demetrio Cabale, Bonifacio Cualteros, Florencio Daniel, and Benito Terante alias Bodoy were charged in two (2)
separate informations before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte, with the crimes of Robbery in
Band with Less Serious Physical Injuries for the crime committed against Ricarido Fernando and Robbery in Band
with Homicide, for the crime committed against Rufina Rosello.
After joint trial of the two (2) cases, the accused Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, and Benito Terante were found
guilty in both cases and sentenced in Criminal Case No. R-2895 for the crime of Robbery with Homicide, to suffer
the Death penalty and to indemnify, jointly, the heirs of the deceased Rufina Rosello.
In view of the death penalty imposed upon each of the accused Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, and Benito
Terante the records of both Criminal Cases were forwarded to this Court pursuant to law for the review of the
decision * rendered therein. However, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution under which the death penalty is
no longer imposable, the
accused, Florencio Daniel, informed the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal and that he
was willing to serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Since the judgment against the accused Demetrio Cabale has also become final due to his escape from detention,
only the appeal of the accused Benito Terante alias Bodoy is left for consideration. Earlier, said accused manifested
his desire to continue and pursue his appeal.
Benito Terante alias Bodoy, denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged in the information,
and interposed the defense of alibi. He also claims that there was an irregularity in his arraignment since it was done
after the cases had been submitted for decision, so that he was not afforded the chance to prepare properly for his
defense; and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Vicente Mangaring, Rosita Makiling, and Ricarido Fernando are not credible in view of the
inconsistencies and improbabilities in such testimonies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arraignment of Terante was valid.
RULING:
Yes.
The Supreme Court held that while the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after the cases had been
submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured.
The counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client, the appellant herein, had not yet
been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution.
Then, when the cases were being retried after the appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint
manifestation with the prosecution, adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment of the appellant. There
was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
B. Section 2 – Plea of guilty to a lesser offense
1. People vs. Villarama Jr. – 210 SCRA 226 Cuevas-Presores
FACTS
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information against him reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or
prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08
grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulate
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21,
1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for the private respondent verbally manifested in
open court that the private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates
or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug.
On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense
on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction
of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and
(3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991,
private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense alleging
therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense by the accused through its counsel will be granted?
RULING
YES. Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended
party that is the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the
trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.
C. Section 3 – Plea of guilty to capital offense
1. People vs. Albert – 251 SCRA 136
HELD: “The controversy over improvident pleas of guilty dates back to the early years of the American
administration, developed into a furor over the succeeding years, subsided during the martial law regime, and
was sidelined but occasionally invoked when the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of capital
punishment. With the return of the death penalty for heinous crimes, it is high time for the trial courts to review
and reflect upon the jurisprudential and statutory rules which evolved over time in response to the injustice created
by improvident pleas acknowledging guilt, at times belatedly discovered under the judicial rug, if at all.”
“The rationale behind the rule is that courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in
its severest form — death — for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience
has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose then is to avoid improvident
pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt
before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance, and
consequences of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid the Supreme Court on
appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.”
2.People vs. Alicando – 251 SCRA 293
HELD: “To show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the accused and that the court’s questions
demonstrate the accused full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, the records must reveal information
about the personality profile of the accused which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused must be
plumbed by the trial court.”
So, you must get the personality profile of the accused – the age, socio-economic status as well as his educational
background. Now, are the judges doing that? I don’t think so.
3. People vs. Estomaca – 256 SCRA 421
HELD: “Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a
proper "searching inquiry," it would be well for the court, for instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the
incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance.”
“The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters and this it can do,
such as by ascertaining from the accused himself the manner in which he was subsequently brought into the
custody of the law; or whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and, ascertaining from him the conditions under which he was detained and interrogated during
the aforestated investigations. Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not
said counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its
consequences, would be a well-taken step along those lines.”
So, the judge must be very, very patient in conducting a searching inquiry. Kung sundin mo ito, it may take one or two
days. Just take note that we are talking about capital offense.
According to one commentator: Before, the plea of guilty constituted the main evidence of guilt and the
evidence taken during the further inquiry was merely to aid the trial court in exercising its discretion as to whether
the lighter or graver penalty is to be imposed. That is the original principle. But under the new procedure, a plea
of guilt is only a secondary basis, the main proof being that which the court requires the prosecution to establish
the guilt of the accused. The plea of guilty by the accused can only be used as supporting evidence for a finding
of culpability. (So, baliktad ‘no?) In short, once an accused, in a charge of capital offense enters a plea of guilty,
a regular trial shall have to be conducted. Just the same as if no such plea of guilty was not entered. The only
effect of a plea of guilty, if ever, is to serve as an additional mitigating circumstance in case the penalty imposable
is less that an indispensable penalty and if the guilty plea is entered before the prosecution starts to present
evidence.
So if we follow that guideline: MURDER, or other heinous crime; “Guilty!” Disregard it! Trial! So, bale wala yung plead
of guilty because you still have to conduct a trial just the same.
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary. – When the accused
pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine
the penalty to be imposed. (4)
Q: Can there be reception of evidence if the accused enters a plea of guilty to a non-capital offense?
A: YES. There is no need for the presentation of evidence but if the court wants it, pwede rin, the court can till require it.
That is why reception of evidence is discretionary to determine the penalty to be imposed.
4. People vs. Besonia – February 24, 2004
5. People vs. Rogelio Gumimba – February 27, 2007
6. People vs. Mendoza – 231 SCRA 264
FACTS: The accused was charged with Robbery before the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon. During the
arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty. Instead of pronouncing judgment, the court conducted trial. The
prosecution failed to present evidence that the accused is guilty of the crime, so Judge Mendoza acquitted the
accused. The prosecution argued that the judge should not have acquitted him because he already pleaded guilty.
ISSUE: Was the acquittal of the accused proper?
HELD: YES. Under the Rules, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense the court may receive
evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed. This rule is at most directory.
Was the judge correct? “It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty
to the charge that his conviction automatically follows.”
However, there is something wrong here because the records will show that he pleaded guilty and yet he was
acquitted, so let us harmonize the record. The correct procedure, according to the SC, is for the judge to order
the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and substitute it with a plea of not guilty.
This principle has been embodied in Section 1[d] – “When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence,
his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (n)”
SEC. 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. – At any time before the judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted
by a plea of not guilty. (5)
Q: Can a plea of guilty be withdrawn?
A: YES.
Q: Suppose there is already a judgment of conviction, can he still withdraw?
A: YES, as long as the judgment of conviction is not yet final.
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. – Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused
is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign
a counsel de officio to defend him. (6a)
Section 6 should be read with the ruling of the SC in the leading case of PEOPLE VS HOLGADO (85 Phil. 752). In the
said case, SC enumerated the duties of the court when the accused appears before it without a lawyer. The following are
the duties of the court:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
The court must inform the accused that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned;
After giving him such information, the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
If he desires but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to defend him; and
If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. – The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident
of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. (7a)
SEC. 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for arraignment. – Whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed
by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with
the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment. (8)
SEC. 9. Bill of particulars. – The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable
him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint
or information and the details desired. (10a)
Section 9 is similar to Rule 12 on bill of particulars. If the complaint is vague and ambiguous, the defendant in a civil
case can more for a bill of particulars. Counterpart, if the allegations in the information are also vague and ambiguous, “I
cannot understand it, so I cannot intelligently enter my plea.” The accused, before arraignment, can move for a bill of
particulars to enable him to prepare properly for the trial. Then he must specify the defects. Civil case, pareho.
D. Section 6 – Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel
1. People vs. Serzo, Jr. – June 20, 1997- ENCINAS, CM
FACTS: The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court.
During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to be
represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during arraignment
and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accused’s
option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such an option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory
(slow to act) tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and the offended
party to speedy and adequate justice.
This will be amplified in this appeal seeking the reversal of the August 23, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, 1 in Criminal Case in convicting Serzo, Jr. of murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata, worded as follows: "That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Alfredo Alcantara y Casabal at the back, thereby inflicting upon him
stab wounds which directly caused his death."cy
ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to counsel.
HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the
proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the
Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where
an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the accused
not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.
The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438
provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable;
a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally important right to speedy and
adequate justice, and
b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.
E. Section 9 – Bill of Particulars
1. Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan – 202 SCRA 726
Cinco v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 92362-67
October 15, 1991
Art. III, § 21 Attachment of jeopardy
FACTS:
1.) On April 20, 1981, Fredeswinda P. Balana lodge a letter-complaint with the Office of the Tanodbayan (now of the Special Prosecutor) against
Cirilo A. Cinco, Jose Bantigue, Domingo Amaro, Antonio Abalos, Andres Sabalza, and others. She swore to her letter-complaint before Prosecutor
Perfecto Llacar, Jr., who certified at the bottom thereof that he personally examined the affiant and that he was satisfied she executed and
understood it (Annex A of Rejoinder, Record, pp. 125-132). The charge was docketed as TBP Case No. 81-042401.
Cinco submitted his counter-affidavit on June 16, 1981, and supplemental counter-affidavit on July 16, 1981. Amaro executed his counteraffidavit in June 1981 and supplemental counter-affidavit on July 16, 1981; Abalos filed his counter-affidavit on June 18, 1981; Bantigue, on June
25, 1981; and the others, on various dates in the same year; Sabalza, however, did not.
2.
On June 11, 1982, Balana filed another letter-complaint against Cinco and Amaro, which she put under oath before Prosecutor Ricardo
A. Buenviaje who also certified in writing that he personally examined the affiant and that he was satisfied she voluntarily executed and
understood the letter-complaint (Annex B of Rejoinder, Record, pp. 133-134). The additional charge was given the number TBP Case No. 82061408.
Cinco submitted his counter-affidavit on August 11, 1982, and Amaro, on a date which does not appear on record, but in or before 1986.
3.
After the submission of the countervailing affidavits which the defense impliedly admitted, Balana presented her reply affidavits.
4.
The preliminary investigation of the charges was assigned to Prosecutor Ricardo A. Buenviaje, and it was up for resolution when he was
appointed to the judiciary in 1986. It was then re-assigned to Prosecutor Gregorio G. Pimentel Jr., who, on July 23, 1987, issued a resolution
recommending the prosecution of the accused for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Annex C of Rejoinder, Record, pp.
131-143). The resolution having been approved by Raul M. Gonzales, the then Tanodbayan, the corresponding informations for the said
violations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1987, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12420 and 12421 against Cinco; 12422
against Bantigue, Amaro, Cinco, and Abalos; 12423 against Cinco; 12424 against Bantigue, Amaro, and Sabalza; and 12426 against Cinco.
5.
The accused filed a motion to quash on May 17, 1988, praying that the said informations be dismissed for lack of authority on the part of
Tanodbayan Gonzales or his prosecutor to file them and invoking Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843, which had held that the
Tanodbayan, now called Special Prosecutor, was
... clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
After hearing the prosecution, this Court promulgated a resolution on July 5, 1988, granting the motion to quash. In that resolution, it observed
... (T)he dismissal of these cases will be without prejudice to the right of the State, acting through the Hon. Ombudsman, to conduct a new
preliminary investigation and refile the cases if the evidence warrants the same.
6.
On August 4, 1988, Balana requested the re-filing of the cases, and in view thereof, the accused, through counsel, in turn requested on
December 26, 1988, that she did so 'under separate and distinct charges in accordance with the new rules of preliminary investigation' (Secs. 3
and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court effective October 1, 1988) so that the respondents can refute her charges and specific evidences she may
present in support of each separate charge (Annex A of Motion to Quash, Record, pp. 61-61).
7.
In his order of February 16, 1990, Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero, to whom the charges of Balana were re-assigned for preliminary
investigation, denied the request of the accused and noting that the parties had already adduced their respective evidence in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the previous prosecutor, gave her 10 days from receipt to manifest if she elected to adopt the same charges and
evidence already submitted. In the same order, he also granted the accused an equal period to adduce their controverting evidence.
Balana opted on March 8, 1989, to adopt her said charges and evidence, and the accused having failed to submit countervailing evidence or any
pleading, Prosecutor Guerrero construed their omission as waiver.
8.
On June 27, 1989, he issued a resolution finding prima facie cases for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
recommending the filing of the corresponding informations. The Hon. Ombudsman approved the resolution. Accordingly, (Criminal Cases Nos.
13827 to 13832 against the petitioners) were instituted on August 28, 1989. Each information carries with it the certification of Prosecutor
Guerrero
that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case; that there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime charged herein has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. (Rollo, pp. 136- 140).
On December 4, 1989, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the informations filed in the aforementioned criminal cases on the following grounds:
I.
THE INFORMATIONS ARE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE SAME WERE FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF
COURT AS AMENDED;
II.
THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED THE INFORMATIONS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO; AND
III.
THAT THE INFORMATIONS DO NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PRESCRIBED FORM. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
After the filing of appropriate pleadings by the Ombudsman in opposition to and by the petitioners in support of the foregoing motion, the
respondent court, on December 20, 1989, issued a resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash dated November 24, 1989, and submitted for resolution on January 29, 1990, to be without merit, the
same is DENIED.
ISSUE:
Whether accused’s right against double jeopardy is violated
RULING:
No.
Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in jeopardy of being charged with informations or crimes other than the crime imputed
in the dismissed cases is baseless. There could be no double jeopardy for the simple reason that they have not year pleaded to the offense.
Beside, a preliminary investigation is not a trial for which double jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc v. Resultan (G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5,
1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43) that:
“Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often that only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complain or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty therefor, and it does
not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
F. Section 10 – Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution
1. Webb vs. De Leon – August 23, 1995
Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Petitioners:  fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak
and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize
the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
 charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.
 Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation.
They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape
and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person
arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.”
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of
witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function,
the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
Posted by Victor Morvis
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G. Section 11 – Suspension of arraignment
1. Dino vs. Olivares – June 23, 2009-FOROSUELO
Facts:
Accused Olivares was charged with vote buying. Prosecutor found probable cause and filed information in the RTC.
Accused appealed the resolution of the prosecutor finding probable cause to the COMELEC, with motion to revoke
continuing authority. According to the accused, the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC
should prevent the filing of the information before the RTC as there could be no final finding of probable cause until the
COMELEC has resolved the appeal. Judge Madrona set the arraignment with a warning that the arraignment would proceed
without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue an injunctive writ.
Issue: Should the arraignment be suspended in view of the appeal by the accused to the COMELEC on the finding of the
prosecutor of probable cause?
Ruling:
NO, the arraignment of the accused is not indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an appeal before the
Department of Justice or, in this case, Law Department of the COMELEC; rather, the reviewing authority is allowed 60 days
within which to decide the appeal. Five months, which far exceeded the sixty days provided by the rules, was ample time
for the respondent to obtain from COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case has been brought to
court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the case should be addressed to the consideration of the trial
court.
IX.
Rule 117 – MOTION QUASH
A. Section 2 – Form and contents
1. People vs. Nitafan – February 1, 1999
PEOPLE VS NITAFAN
G.R. Nos. 107964-66, February 01, 1999
FACTS:
Several informations for violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 960 were filed against private respondent in different courts.
The Solicitor General filed separate motions for consolidation of the informations, which were granted. Before the Manila RTC, the
informations were reassigned to Branch 52 presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan.
The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case no 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB circular is an ex post
facto law. In a separate order, he also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases ruling that it violated the private respondent’s right
against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Can a judge motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismiss a criminal information or complaint without any motion
to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double
jeopardy?
RULING:
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared
by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent
nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule
nor
declare
it
void
unless
directly
assailed
in
an
appropriate
action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor
factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information,
or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. The first jeopardy
attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. Private respondent was not convicted or acquitted nor did the cases against her dismissed or otherwise
terminated, which definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attached.
The petition is GRANTED
B. Section 3 – Grounds
1. Lopez vs. Sandiganbayan – October 13, 1995
2. Cudia vs. Court of Appeals – January 16, 1998
3. Tolentino vs. Hon. Paquero – June 7, 2007 - GUILLERMO
Case: Violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) of Republic Act No. 82821 for failing to remit the premiums due
for his employee to the Social Security System despite demand.
FACTS: Accused moves to quash the Information x x x upon the sole ground that State Prosecutor not being the City
Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to
commence prosecution by the filing of the Information and thus prosecute the case.
ISSUE: WON the information should be quashed? YES.
HELD: Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.— x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.
In relation to…
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds: x x x
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; x x x
In this case, Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the
filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4. Danguilan-Vitug vs. Court of Appeals – 232 SCRA 460
5. Sasot vs. People – June 29, 2005
C. Section 6 – Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution
1. Gonzales vs. Hon. Salvador and Glen Dale – December 5, 2006 - LOVITOS
Facts:
Petitioner Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint against respondent Glen Dale arising from the publication in the
January 7, 1999 issue of “Today” of his article entitled “Glad Tidings for Manila Polo Club members” in the “Bizz „N‟
Fizz” column, under the nom de plume Rene Martel in which the Prosecutor‟s Office found probable cause for libel.
Respondent filed petition for review but was dismissed by the DOJ and when respondent was arraigned he pleaded
“not guilty”. Respondent later on filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, since the Information does not state that the offended party-herein petitioner actually resides in Makati or
that the allegedly libelous article was printed or 1st published in Makati. Such Motion to Quash was granted. 26
days after receiving order, petitioner filed a motion to amend the Information and argued that the motion was timely
filed since the Rules allow the filing of new information “within such further time as the court may allow for good
cause” and that it is not subject to reglementary period.
Issue:
WON amendment can still be made after an order granting the motion to quash
Ruling:
NO. Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash, the info. & such order becomes final & executory,
however there is nothing more to amend.
Section 4 covers the amendment of an information. Section 5 deals with the filing of a new information.
The amendment of an information under Section 4 of Rule 117 applies if the trial court finds that there is a defect in
the information and the defect can be cured by amendment, in which case the court shall order the prosecution to
amend the information. Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash the information and such order
becomes final and executory, however, there is nothing more to amend.
In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other than those
stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another information within
a specified period which is extendible to such further time as the court may allow for good cause. The order to file
another information, if determined to be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same
order granting the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of another
information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer direct the filing of another
information.
D. Section 7 – Double jeopardy
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes
the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former
charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former
complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except
as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited
with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. (7a)
1. People vs. Relova – 146 SCRA 292 - MAMAC
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent
Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy
and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric
wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the
walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was
filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and
prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant
City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with
resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed
a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy
because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the
approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case
was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal
Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged
against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas. YES
RULING:
Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the
case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights gives two instances or kinds of double jeopardy.
1. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the
2. second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall
bar another prosecution for the same act”.
In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition
of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and
the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one
and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under
the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from
the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
2. Mallari vs. People – 168 SCRA 422
3. People vs. Bocar – 138 SCRA 166 - MATARANAS
FACTS:
On March 28, 1967, the assistant fiscal for Manila filed before the respondent Court the following information:
The undersigned accuses CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO of the crime of theft,
committed as follows:
That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with three others whose true names. Identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another
did then and there willfully. unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the following property, to wit
Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at -P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging
to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
On May 3, 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty."
Proceedings were had on July 7, 1967. On said date, the respondent Judge conducted a "summary investigation"
directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation," the respondent
Judge issued the order under review.
Upon a summary investigation of this case the Court is of the opinion that the same is more civil than criminal.
The issue is who is the owner of the logs. Both parties claim ownership and both claim that they can prove ownership.
During the summary investigation the accused acknowledged to have taken the logs from the compound in the pier in
good faith, without any intention to steal them from anybody.
In view thereof, the Court orders the case dismissed, cost de oficio and the cancellation of the bond filed by the
accused.
Private prosecutors together with the Fiscal's office in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration" but was denied by
the respondent Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners filed a special civil action seeking the annulment of
the said dismissal order dated July 7, 1967.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the order dated July 7, 1967.
RULING:
Yes. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a
veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit. Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the
prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Verily, the prosecution was denied due process.
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does
not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
4. Binay vs. Sandiganbayabn – October 1, 1999 - MENDOZA
Facts:
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate information’s against petitioner Jejomar Binay,
one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,6 and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.7 The
information’s, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes
were committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. Petitioners
contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because at the alleged time
of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27 and that Municipal
mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975..
Issue:
W/N Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional
Trial Court.
W/N Respondents are stopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed
another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
Held:
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never
attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said
law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First,
jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. As a consequence of this
principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals that: It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one
court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the
competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the
proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether
erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court
that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however ,remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction
is vested by law
.Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the
court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision.
This is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly
asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous
motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of
the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve
the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners. Second,
petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal
action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or
information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the "People of the Philippines." Even then, the doctrine of
estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. Violations of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices
Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence,
criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.The filing of
the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not
guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a
court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the
Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in
the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED
5. People vs. Vergara – 221 SCRA 960
6. People vs. Mogol – 131 SCRA 296 MORAN
FACTS: The accused was charged with physical injuries. After trial in the MTC, the court discovered that it should not
have been physical injuries, rather it should have been frustrated murder because there was intent to kill. The MTC
dismissed the case of physical injuries and told the fiscal to file information for frustrated murder. The accused claimed that
he was charged for the same act. Thus, he moved for the dismissal of the frustrated murder case.
ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?
HELD: NONE. There was no double jeopardy because the order of the trial court dismissing the physical injury case is
wrong. It was a void order because what the judge should have done is to continue trying the case (amend) even if there
was an error in the offense charged. So, if the accused would be convicted, it is for physical injuries. In other words, you
cannot order dismissal and then re-file the case for frustrated murder. Because the order dismissal is void, there
is no double jeopardy.
However, there was one dissenting justice in the case of Mogol – former Justice Makasiar. He said that “there is double
jeopardy as the case had already been tried and submitted for decision where the MTC judge ordered the physical injury to
be dismissed and ordered the filing of a new case for frustrated murder in the RTC. Frustrated murder includes physical
injuries. Therefore, dismissal of the latter resulted in double jeopardy.”
If you look at it, all the elements are there. But the trouble is, the SC said, the order of dismissal is void, there was no valid
dismissal. The charge for physical injury was reinstated.
7. Gorreon vs. RTC of Cebu – 213 SCRA 138
8. Benares vs. Lim – December 13, 2006 - ONTAL
faCTS: Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale executed in 1976 where
he sold two parcels of land to respondent. Records show that after respondent had fully paid the amortizations and
after the deed of absolute sale was issued, petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of land to the Bank of Philippine
Islands. Thus, when respondent demanded delivery of the properties, petitioner failed to comply, thus respondent
was compelled to file a case for estafa against petitioner.
Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to formally offer its evidence.8
However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the
prosecution's submission of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence. 9
Despite receipt of notice of petitioner's motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing on the motion set
on December 4, 2001.
On January 28, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order10 giving the prosecution another 15 days within which to formally offer its
evidence which petitioner opposed.11 On February 27, 2002, the MeTC issued the following Order:
In view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the accused, showing that the private prosecutor received the
Order of this Court dated January 28, 2002 on February 7, 2002 giving them an extension of another fifteen days
to file their formal offer of evidence, yet failed to do so; the court finds reason to deny the submission of formal
offer of evidence.
Acting on the Motion of the accused for the dismissal of this case, for failure of the prosecution to prosecute this
case, the motion is granted. This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Respondent moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for the admission of Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits,13 claiming that she had difficulty securing documents from the court which were marked during
trial. Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.
Effectively, the Order of the Court dated January 28, 2002 15 is set aside and the case is reinstated in the dockets of the
Court.
iSSUE: whether the MeTC's Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave
petitioner the right to invoke double jeopardy.
Ruling: NO.
Double jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment,
(2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment,
(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused
In the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements. As to the last element, there was yet
no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, 23 but the
dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute.
A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy, except in
two instances, to wit:
(1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or
(2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.24
The prosecution's delay in the filing of its formal offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It appears that there was justifiable reason
for the prosecution's failure to formally offer its evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced.
9. Cerezo vs. people – June 1, 2011
10. Tan vs. People – April 21, 2009 - OSORNO
Facts:
On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the
Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People
of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."
Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best
World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 involve
the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his
beneficial ownership of BW shares.
In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation
of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and
No. 119829.
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation
praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases
No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled off to the Pasig RTC,
Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same
court.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the parties agreed that Criminal
Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not
interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove it.
Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On 18 September 2001,
the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence
within thirty days. After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to
file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.
On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the People's alleged failure to
prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for
an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he
was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed
to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an attached double jeopardy in this case due to the violation against the petitioner’s right to
speedy trial
Ruling:
No.
Petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of petitioner's right to speedy
trial.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; andc
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused
Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a
general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two
exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and
denial of the right to speedy trial.
While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830, the dismissal
thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy
should the same charges be revived. Petitioner's situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering
that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without
basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of
the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.
Following this Court's ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals, as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this
exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused - was not met. Where the dismissal of
the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as
the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
11. People vs. Nazareno – August 5, 2009- PASCUA
G.R. No. 168982. August 5, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DIR. GEN. CESAR P. NAZARENO, DIR. EVERLINO NARTATEZ,
DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, and THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) , respondents.
FACTS:
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an information against the respondents with the Sandiganbayan on
allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounded the procurement of three (3) separate but related contracts
between the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Beltra Industries, for the purchase and delivery of pistols.
The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Sandiganbayan agreed with the respondents' submissions and acquitted the respondents after trial.
ISSUE:
Whether double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus proscribes the resolution of the
issues raised by petitioner.
RULING:
Yes, double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus proscribes the resolution of the issues
raised by petitioner. The Court dismissed the petition on the basis of the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense".
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, reads:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present:
(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.
A first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
Here, the judgment of acquittal by the Sandiganbayan is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately
executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
Therefore, double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged in the resolution of the issues raised by petitioner.
12. Perez vs. Court of Appeals – 168 SCRA 236
13. Nierras vs. Dacuycuy – 181 SCRA 1 PREGLO
Facts:
September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Peter Nierras"
for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said motion to
quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment
of oil products which the latter delivered to him simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.
Issue:
whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa against petitioner under the Revised Penal Code after he had
earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy
of being convicted twice for the same offenses.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
which provides that:
"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court."
Second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
"(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check."
Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the
part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132
SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1)
a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the
same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance
negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is
essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public
interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are
mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between
the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because
what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does
not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
14. Suero vs. People – January 31, 2005
15. Mallari vs. People – 168 SCRA 422
16. Enrile vs. Amin – September 13, 1990-SIMBAJON
FACTS:
An information was filed against Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion "complexed" with murder and
charging him of violation of PD No. 1829.
It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort in
his house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure of the petitioner that prevented Col. Honasan's
arrest and conviction was allegedly a violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then, Sen. Filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information but then again was denied.
In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court on the following grounds:
a. the facts do not constitute an offense;
b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in complexed rebellion;
c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion;
d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and
e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No. 1829.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sen. Enrile be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 not withstanding the rebellion case
earlier filed against him.
HELD: NO- The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
The Supreme Court granted the petition of Sen. Enrile and quashed the information.
The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting
them to separate prosecutions. It is Hernandez case that remains binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its commission
or as an intended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Petitioner's act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constituting a component thereof. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in the furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes. It is the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by application
of Art. 48 of the RPC.
17. Santiago vs. Garchitorena – 226 SCRA 214
E. Section 8 – Provisional Dismissal
1. Los Baños vs. Pedro – April 22, 2009
FACTS;
Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the COMELEC a day before
the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not materialize.
The RTC granted the quashal
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on provisional
dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying that the provision
used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where
the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the
information was quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set
Pedro’s arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening.
The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his argument
that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed.
Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.
ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.
RULING:
The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate concepts. In
Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information has no
deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117
applies.
In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there is a legal
excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and provisional
dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned
and stand trial.
F. Section 9 – Failure to Move to quash
1. People vs. Rafon – September 5, 2007
X.
RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL
A. Section 1 – Mandatory Pre-Trial
1. Abubakar vs. Abubakar – October 22, 1999
(DKGG)
-complaint against AMININ for "Divorce with Prayer for Support and Damages." the complaint was mainly premised
on the alleged failure of AMININ to secure AURORA's consent before contracting a subsequent marriage, in violation
of Articles 27 and 162 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines."
At the heart of this action lies the time-tested policy of this Court regarding a litigant's voluntary limitation of issues
vis a vis the court's exercise of its judicial prerogative. Specifically, the petition seeks confirmation regarding the
effects of a pre-trial order and the finality of matters not appealed by an appellant.
That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in Rules 18 and
118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled and proved at the trial. A
less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of contention for the trial court to resolve. This
would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution according every person the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases. 11 If the parties can agree on certain facts prior to trial — hence, the prefix "pre" — the court can
later concentrate on those which are seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification,
abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. 12 The stipulations are perpetuated in a pretrial order which legally binds the parties to honor the same. 13
In the case at bar, AMININ and AURORA "agreed" on the divorce, and the limitation of partition of assets to the
PROPERTIES. The pre-trial order of 21 March 1997 — whose content and validity were never questioned by either
party — stated the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this wise: "What are the rights or the respective shares
of the herein plaintiff and defendant with respect to the property subject of partition after divorce?" This is precisely
the question answered by the CIRCUIT COURT in its order of 29 August 1997. The marriage was dissolved, the
PROPERTIES awarded and evenly distributed to the parties as co-owners, and support in the nominal amount of
P10,000 during the three-month 'idda or waiting period was awarded to AURORA. Such final order was, therefore,
consistent with the pre-trial order.
Since the size of the award is an issue which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, nor a
plain or clerical error, respondent appellate court did not have the power to resolve it.
B. Section 2 – Pre-trial Agreement
1. Fule vs. Court of Appeals – 162 SCRA 446
2. People vs. Hernandez – 260 SCRA 25 (July 30, 1996)
3. Bayas vs. Sandiganbayan – November 12, 2002
4. Chua-Burce vs. CA – April 27, 2000
5. People vs. Ancheta – January 14, 2004
C. Pre-trial Order
1. People vs. Guzman – January 26, 2007
XI.
-
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
As mandated by Sections 399 to 422 of R.A. 7160
Administrative Circular No. 14-93
Bañares vs. Balising – March 31, 2000
SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. –
(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as the lupon, composed
of the:
1. punong barangay, as chairman and
2. ten (10) to twenty (20) members.
The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein…..x x x
SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice.
-accused under detention;
-habeas corpus proceeding;
-preliminary injunction;
-statutes of limitation;
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any time
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
XII.
RULE 119 – TRIAL
Read: A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC – Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
A. Section 1 – Trial
1. Mari vs. Judge Gonzales – September 12, 2011 AMPIS
Facts: On 11 June 2008, an Information for Rape was filed in RTC Sogod stating that petitioner AAA was raped by
the respondent on 10 October 2004 at her boarding house in Sogod, Leyte. On 27 June 2008, the respondent was
committed to detention through voluntary surrender. On 30 June 2008, the RTC set the arraignment to 31 July 2008
but was canceled and reset to 20 August 2008. On that date, nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC
reset the arraignment to 31 October 2008 with an order that the case will be dismissed if the public prosecutor or
assistant fails to prosecute on that date. On 28 October 2008, the petitioner moved for cancellation of the hearing
manifesting that a private prosecutor had been granted authority to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor, and
praying that the arraignment is canceled due to the pendency of the petitioner’s petition for transfer of venue in SC.
The private prosecutor did not appear on the said hearing date.
The 31 October 2008, the hearing proceeded and the respondent was arraigned in the presence of the
Provincial Prosecutor designated by the RTC. Pre-trial was set for 24 November 2008. On that date, the private
prosecutor moved for cancellation of the hearing on the ground of the pendency of the petition for transfer of venue.
Thus, the respondent moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to prosecute but was denied. On said date, the RTC
terminated the pre-trial and set the trial to 12 December 2008. On that date, no one appeared for the prosecution.
Thus, the hearing was reset to 16 January 2009.
Again, on that date, the private prosecutor urgently moved for cancellation of the hearing stating that it was only
on 14 January 2009 that he was notified of the 16 January 2009 hearing. Thus, the RTC on 16 January 2009
dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Petitioners moved to reconsider but were denied on
16 March 2009.
Issue: Whether the delay brought about by the petitioner’s pending petition for transfer of venue in the Supreme
Court can be excluded in the computation of time within which the trial must commence
Ruling: No.
First, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functionsassigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition.
The policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise knownas "The Speedy
Trial Act of 1998," were enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of
trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme
Court Circular No. 38-98,which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule
119.Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such a right is not susceptible to precise
qualification.The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures the rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rightsgiven to the accused by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence,courts are to give meaning to that intent. In
this case, it must be emphasized that the privaterespondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was incarcerated from November
18, 2004, to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months; then again, when the Information had already been
issued and since rape is a non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008, until the case was
dismissed on January 16, 2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty
for any duration of time is quite oppressive.
B. Section 6 – Time Limit
1. Olbes vs. Buemio – G.R. No. 173319 (December 4, 2009) - APA
FACTS:
On a complaint, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila by Information dated June 28, 2002 which was raffled to Branch 22 thereof. On October 28, 2002,
petitioner posted bail and was released.
Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12, 2003 up to the first pre-trial
setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter date up to the second pre-trial setting on October 23,
2003 or for a total of 253 days — a clear contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to
trial.
ISSUE: Whether the accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case.
RULING:
NO.
It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objection to the setting of
the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of
the scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial court.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and SCC No. 38-98 have held that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, which did not obtain in the present case, petitioner himself
having been instrumental in the delay in the prosecution of the case.
In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of "speedy trial" is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Reiterating the Court's pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that "speedy trial" is a relative and flexible term,
Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of due process and the
strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the
other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial,
or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the
accused's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the proceedings, especially given that
he had posted bail.
C. Section 11 – Order of Trial
1. People vs. SPO1 Marcial – September 27, 2006
D. Section 13 – Examination of Defense Witness
1. Vda. De Manguerrra vs. Risos – August 28, 2008
E. Section 17 – Discharge of Accused to be State Witness
1. People vs. Ocimar – August 17, 1992
2. People vs. CA and Inspector Joe Pring – 223 SCRA 475 Cabaña
FACTS
Pring was involved in kidnapping and one policeman testified against him-Nonilo Arilie. There was a motion to
discharge Nonilo Arilie to testify against Pring. Then the prosecution gave the defense the affidavit of Arilie. The court
ordered the discharge of Arilie. Pring questioned the procedure. This is the first case where the Supreme Court applied this
rule on hearing on the discharge of an accused. Pring asked for the hearing while the prosecution is on the motion to
discharge.
ISSUES
Whether or not Nonilo Arile challenged by private respondent in this case in his Opposition to Discharge and become
State Witness against the accused Jose Pring be granted?
RULING
NO. Hence, in resolving this case in this petition, the proper question we should address is: Was there a failure to
observe the spirit and intent of Section 17, Rule 119 in the case at Bar. The ruling in this case is negative. The prosecution
has submitted the sworn statement of accused Nonilo Arilie and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge have
been met. It can be denied that the defense was able to oppose the motion to discharge Nonilo Arilie. With both litigants
able to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the courts’ ability to determine
whether the conditions prescribed under Section 17, Rule 119 were satisfied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 28933
rendered on October 23, 1992 is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order of Discharge of Nonilo Arile issued by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. 94159 on September 8, 1992 is thus REINSTATED. The temporary restraining order of March 30,
1993 issued by the Court En Banc is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED
3. Rosales vs. Court of Appeals – 215 SCRA 102
4. Bogo-Medellin Co. vs. Judge Pedro Son – May 27, 1992
5. Webb vs. De Leon – August 23, 1995
6. Monge vs. People – March 7, 20008 -CARREON
Facts:
Galo Monge and Edgar Potencio were found in possession of transporting mahogany lumber without permit and
authority from the DENR. Monge fled the scene whereas Potencio was brought to the police station and to the
DENR-CENRO for interrogation. Monge and Potencio were then charged with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705
as amended by EO No. 277, s. 1997.
Upon arraignment, Monge entered a negative plea. Trial then ensued. Potencio was discharged to be used as a
state witness on motion of the prosecutor. Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed
that for a promised fee he was merely requested by Monge, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same
down from the mountain. Potencio's testimony was materially corroborated by Molina. Monge did not contest the
allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber, and that contrary to what Potencio had
stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be
sawn into pieces. The court found Monge guilty as charged.
Monge raised the case to the Court of Appeals challenging the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the
ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his
testimony. The appellate court dismissed the challenge, hence this petition.
Issue:
WON Potencio’s discharge as state witness was erroneous.
Ruling:
No.
The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the circumstances surrounding
the apprehension well establishes the petitioner's liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership
over the pieces of lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to
provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes
acts essentially malum prohibitum. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was the petitioner himself
or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.
Further, not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is
left to the exercise of the trial court's sound discretion limited only by the requirements set forth in Section 17, 24
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of
the trial court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect
to this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of
discretion. No such grave abuse is present in this case. Issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be
raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.
7. People vs. De La Cruz – June 25, 2008 -CHUNG
FACTS:
Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.(R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.FACTS:
Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.(R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing
to which a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs was found.
Petitioner claimed that when he was in the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination,
but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and
not by the NBI and such request was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
Yes. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional right of an
accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak of his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against
self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s
urine for purposes of drug testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation. In the present case, though, the petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted
having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used
as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Law enforcement agents, must,
however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in
their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly
transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force
8. Salvanera vs. People and Parane – May 21, 2007- Cole
FACTS:
The alleged mastermind, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo
Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane.
The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses
however, denied by the trial court.
Salvarena contends that the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state witness must be
substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who
are not the accused in the same criminal case. Salvanera argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are
not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the
statement of Abutin and Tampelix that the petitioner is the mastermind.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper to discharge accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix to become state witnesses.
RULING:
Yes.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The Supreme Court agreed with Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two witnesses
Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory
the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of the state witness.” The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of
the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more
readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator
are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only
applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is enough that the
testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from
a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other's
testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent
that their trustworthiness becomes manifest.
F. Section 23 – Demurrer to Evidence
1.People vs. Turingan – 282 SCRA 424 Cuevas-Presores
FACTS
Accused-appellant Rex Turingan and his co-accused, Efren Turingan, were charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in an information dated January 12, 1988, the accusatory portion of
which alleges.
That on or about August 2, 1987, in the municipality of Enrile, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Rex Turingan y Babaran and Efren Turingan y Maraggun, armed with a
gun, conspiring together and helping each other with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Benjamin C. Cortez inflicting upon him
several gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
ISSUES
Whether or not the presentation of the evidence made by the accused Rex Turingan y Babalan will move to the
demurrer of evidence?
RULING
NO. Appellants’ alternative plea that he is allowed to present evidence must also be rejected. He cannot claim
denial of due process since he was given full opportunity to be heard. It was appellant's own counsel who insisted on
filing a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court. Said counsel even argued that the filing of such demurrer to
evidence without leave of court would shorten the proceedings and, in case of denial thereof, appellant expressly
waived his right to present evidence. Hence, it was made very clear in the order of the trial court dated April 5, 1994
that the filing of the demurrer to evidence under such circumstances precludes appellant from presenting his evidence.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for
the accused. There is no need for the court to act on said demurrer separately and distinctly from the judgment in the
main case. Appellant, by insisting on the filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court, waives his right to
present evidence to substantiate his defense and, in effect, submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution. He cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own evidence.
The rationale for the rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for
him to present any evidence is negated. It is said that an accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the
rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution
and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Rex Turingan y Babalan. SO ORDERED.
2. People vs. Cachola – January 21, 2004- DE CASTILLA
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
3. Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals – 278 SCRA 782
4. Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi – February 12, 2007
5. People vs. Cristobal – GR. No. 159450 (March 31, 2011)
6. Nicholas vs. Sandiganbayan – February 11-2008
7. Cabrador vs. People – G.R. No. 186001 (October 2, 2009)
G. Section 24 – Reopening
1. Cabarles vs. Hon. Maceda – February 20, 2007
2. Alegre vs. Reyes – 161 SCRA 226
- End of Second Exam Coverage FINALS
XIII.
RULE 120 – TRIAL
A. Section 1 and 2 – Judgment
1. People vs. Cayago – 312 SCRA 623 (1999)
2. People vs. Bugarin – 273 SCRA 284 (1997)
3. Kwan vs. Court of Appeals – November 23, 2000
4. Madrid vs. CA – May 31, 2000
5. People vs. Nadera – February 2, 2000
6. People vs. Ferrer – July 18, 2003 - GUILLERMO
7. Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia – 162 SCRA 665
8. People vs. Orlando De Leon – G.R. No. 126287 (April 16, 2001)
9. D’aigle vs. People – G.R. No. 174181 (June 27, 2012)
B. Section 4 – Rule on Variance
1. Navarrete vs. People – January 31, 2007
2. Consulta vs. People – February 12, 2009
C. Section 5 – Offense Includes or is Included in Another
1. Vino vs. People of the Philippines – 178 SCRA 626
2. Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan -197 SCRA 173
3.Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan – 238 SCRA 116
4. People vs. Verzosa – 294 SCRA 466 (1998)
5. People vs. Carmen, Et. Al. – G.R. No. 137268 (March 26, 2001)bail
6. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan – March 28, 2008
D. Section 6 – Promulgation of Judgment
1. People vs. CFI of Quezon Branch 10 – 227 SCRA 457
2. Cruz vs. Judge Pascual – May 12, 1995
3. People vs. Prades – July 30, 1998
4. Paredes vs. Manalo – May 10, 1995
5. Chua vs. CA and Wilfred N. Chiok – April 12, 2007
6. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan – January 25, 2012
E. Section 7 – Modification of Judgment
1. Tamayo vs. People – July 28, 2008
XIV.
RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
A. Section 1 – New Trial or Reconsideration
1. Magapay vs. People – August 19, 2009
B. Section 2 – Grounds for a New Trial
1. Gomez vs. IAC – April 9, 1985
2. People vs. Garcia – 288 SCRA 382 (1998)
3. Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan – 453 SCRA 24 (2005)
4. Dinglasan vs. CA – Spetember 19, 2006
C. Section 6 – Effects of Granting New Trial or Reconsideration
1. Luther Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. Nos. 96027-28 (March 8, 2005)
XV.
RULE 122 – APPEAL
A. Section 1 – Who May Appeal
1. People vs. Mendoza – 74 Phil. 119
2. People vs. Balisacan – August 31, 1966
3. People vs. Madali – January 16, 2001
4. People vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 164577 (July 5, 2010)
B. Section 3 – How Appeal Taken
1. Garcia vs. People – 318 SCRA 434 (1999)
2. People vs. Panganiban – 125 SCRA 595
C. Section 6 – When Appeal to be Taken
1. Obugan vs. People – May 22, 1995
2. Bernardo vs. People – G.R. No. 166980 (April 4, 2007)
3. Yu vs. Judge Tatad – G.R. No. 170979 (February 9, 2011)
D. Section 11 – Effect of Appeal by any of Several Accused
1. People vs. Fernandez – 186 SCRA 830
2. Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan – 533 SCRA 205 (September 13, 2007) Cabaña
Facts
In an Information dated July 31, 2996, Constantino, in his capacity as mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province,
together with his co-accused Lindong, was charged with the violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.
That on or about February 28, 1996 in Davao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public officer, being a then the Mayor of Municipality of Malungon Sarangani Province,
committing the crime herein charge in relation to while performance and taking of his official functions with evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring and confederating with accused Norberto N.
Lindong, President and Chairman of the Board of Norlovanian Corporation, Davao City then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally enter into a Lease Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments for a period of six (6) years for and
in consideration of the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN AND 11/100 (Php
257, 111.11) PESOS per month or a total consideration of EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE and 92/100 (Php 18, 511, 999.92) PESOS and a guaranty deposit of ONE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (Php 1, 780,000.00) PESOS contrary to the express mandate of Resolution No.
2 Series of 1995 of the Municipal Planning and Development Council Implementing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2
series of 1995 and Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 21 dated February 22, 1996 authorizing the Municipal Mayor of
Malungon to enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments on a five-year term basis for and in
consideration of the amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php 2, 200,000.00) per year or a
total consideration of ELEVEN MILLION (Php 11, 000,000.00) PESOS thus giving Norlovanian Corporation which was fully
paid for the Guarranty Deposit and was actually paid heavy equipment rentals for the period March 5 to May 6. 1996 in
the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100
(P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to the government.
Issues
Whether or not the effect of Appeal by any Several Accused (Mayor Felipe K. Constantino and Norberto N. Lindong)
will be granted?
Ruling
YES. The Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure operates in his favor. The Rule
provides: SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Although the rule states that a favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not appeal, we have held that a literal
interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal" will not give justice to the purpose of the provision. It should be read in its
entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the
appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable.58
In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his
appeal,59 failed to file an appellant’s brief,60 or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the
same.61 Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but for one reason or another,
their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment
in favor of their co-accused.62 Therefore, we cannot find a reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so in this case
where the public officer accused of violating the anti-graft law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed
on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 140656, although meritorious, is DENIED on the ground of mootness. The
petition in G.R. No. 154482 is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23433 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is permanently enjoined
from executing said orders.
SO ORDERED.
3. Lubrica vs. People – 516 SCRA 674 (February 26, 2007)
4. People vs. Tuniaco – January 19, 2010
5. Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals – 190 SCRA 63
E. Section 12 – Withdrawal of Appeal
1. Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals – 258 SCRA 643
F. Section 13 – Appointment of Counsel De Officio for Accused on Appeal
1. People vs. Rio – 201 SCRA 702
XVI.
A.
RULE 123 – PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
1. Riño vs. Judge Cawaling – June 7, 2004
2. Tan vs. Judge Tabin – January 20, 2009 Cuevas-Presores
Facts
The complainant Noryn S. Tan filed a complaint dated April 2, 2007 against Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City for denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628.
That on November 9, 2006, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police District (QCPD) served her a warrant
of arrest dated October 13, 2006, issued by the MTCC Baguio City, Branch 4 on the violation of the Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.
That was then she learned for the first time on the criminal case filed against her before the Office of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her temporary release. Upon verification, she learned that the
respondent issued on August 8, 2006 directing her to appear before the Court on October 10, 2006 for arraignment and it
was sent by mail to PNP Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive any copy of the Order and up to the
present has not seen the same; hence she was not able to attend her arraignment and there was no proof of service of the
Order or any notice of arraignment.
That the complainant was aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite the fact that
she was never notified of her arraignment. And the complainant prayed on the appropriate investigation to be conducted as
to the undue issuance of warrant for her arrest.
Issues
Whether or not the Summary Procedure on the discretion by Judge Maria Clarita Casugba-Tabin is valid.
Ruling
NO. The Court held that a Judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against
the accused in violation of –affidavits and countervailing evidence.
Wherefore, Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City is hereby found
guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined the sum of Php 10,000.00.
Section 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary
Procedure, while Section 10 was revised and portions thereof reproduced in Sections 12 and 16 of the 1991 Rules of
Summary Procedure. Granting that sections 10 and 12 of 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases were not
repealed by the 1991 Revised Rules, still it does not justify the warrant of arrest issued in this case. Section 12 talks of
instances when bails are required, one of which is when the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the
law or ordinance was committed. It does not state that a warrant of arrest shall immediately be issued even without actual
notice to the accused. Respondent’s interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated therein and
unduly expands their meaning.
3. Enriquez vs. Judge Vallarta – February 27, 2002
XVII.
RULE 124 – PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Section 5 – Extension of Time for Filing Briefs
1. Bernardo vs. People – 520 SCRA 332 (April 3, 2007)
B. Section 8 – Abandonment or Failure to Prosecute
1. Foralan vs. Court of Appeals – February 7, 1995
2. People vs. Zarate - February 28, 2005
XVIII.
RULE 125 – PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT
1. Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals – 250 SCRA 485
XIX.
A.
1.
RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Section 2 – Where Application Shall be Filed
Re: Request of Police Director General Avelino I. Razon – A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC (July 7, 2009)
B. Section 4 – Requisites for Issuing Search Warrant
1. Andy Quelnan vs. People – G.R. No. 166061 (July 6, 2007)
C. Section 5 – Examination of complaint
1. Uy vs. BIR – October 20, 2000
2. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff – December 26, 1984
3. Olaes vs. People – 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
4. People vs. Dichoso – 223 SCRA 174
5. Prudente vs. Dayrit – 180 SCRA 69 (1989)
6. Twentieth Century Fox vs. CA – 164 SCRA 655
7. People vs. CA, Hon. Dayrit and Siao – November 27, 1992 - GUILLERMO
D. Section 8 – Search to be Made in the Presence of Two Witnesses
1. Quintero vs. NBI – 162 SCRA 467
2. Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. vs. Bright Future Technologies, Inc. – 516 SCRA 62 (February 15, 2007)
E. Section 10 – Validity of Search Warrant
1. Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. CA – 257 SCRA 430 (1996)
F. Section 12 – Delivery of Property and Inventory
1. Washington Distillers Inc. vs. CA – 260 SCRA 821 (1996)
G. Section 13 – Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
1. Uy Khey Teng vs. Villareal – 42 Phil 886
2. People vs. Cendaña – October 17, 1990
3.People vs. Catan – 205 SCRA 235
4. People vs. Gerente – 219 SCRA 756
5. People vs. Quizon – 256 SCRA 325 (1996)
6. Posadas vs. Court of Appeals – 180 SCRA 283
7. People vs. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174
8. People vs. Bagista – 214 SCRA 53
9. People vs. Aminudin – 163 SCRA 402
10. People vs. Musa – 217 SCRA 597 (1995)
11. People vs. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1
12. Veroy vs. Layague – 210 SCRA 97
H. Section 14 – Motion to Quash a Search Warrant
1. Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC – November 23, 2001
XX.
RULE 127 – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
*** END OF FINAL EXAM COVERAGE ***