ChavistJustice
Version April 30, 2017
Accepted by Latin American Policy
THE CHAVIST REVOLUTION AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Rogelio Pérez Perdomo
Andrea Y. Santacruz
Universidad Metropolitana. Caracas
Abstract
In past Venezuelan experiences with authoritarian regimes, the strongman directly handled
the punishment of the opposition, and the courts dealt with non-political cases. In the
present day ‘revolutionary’ regime, courts are not only in charge of punishing the dissidence
but they have become the main legitimation force of the regime. In December 2015,
following a landslide victory of the opposition in parliamentary elections, the lame-duck
National Assembly appointed the Supreme Court’s justices in an irregular procedure and
without paying attention to the constitutional requirement for these positions. The
Supreme Court is consequently completely dominated by the regime and has deprived the
National Assembly of its function, concentrating all powers in the President of the Republic.
A controversial Supreme Court has become the only instrument for the legitimation of a
regime that has lost completely the popular support. Citizens have taken to the streets to
protest against the regime that has destroyed democracy and has subjected the country to
deep political and economic crises.
Resumen
En las pasadas dictaduras venezolanas del siglo XX, el dictador manejaba sus propios
medios para castigar oponentes. Los tribunales se ocupaban de los casos no políticos. Bajo
el actual régimen ‘revolucionario’, los tribunales no solo están a cargo del castigo a los
opositores sino que la Corte Suprema se ha convertido en el principal apoyo del régimen.
Tras el demoledor triunfo de la oposición en las elecciones parlamentarias de diciembre de
2015, la saliente Asamblea Nacional designó los magistrados de la Corte Suprema fueron sin
seguir el procedimiento establecidos en la constitución. La mayoría de los magistrados
designados no tienen los requisitos constitucionales para ser designados. Esta Corte
Suprema ha declarado inconstitucional los actos de la nueva Asamblea hasta dejarla
definitivamente desprovista de funciones y concentrar todo el poder en el Presidente de la
República. Una Corte Suprema cuestionada en su legitimidad se ha convertido en el único
apoyo institucional de un régimen que ha perdido completamente el apoyo popular. Los
ciudadanos han salido a las calles para protestar contra un régimen que ha sometido el país
a una grave crisis económica y política.

Rogelio Pérez Perdomo is law professor and former dean. Andrea Santacruz is law professor and
head of the Human Rights Center, Universidad Metropolitana. We thank Sonne Lemke for assistance
with editing the English.
1
A common sense perception is that a strongman or top military or party
group holds the political power in an authoritarian regime and that judges and law
have very little importance. Scholarly research has added nuance or modified this
perception (Toharia, 1975; Osiel, 1995; Pereira, 2005; Hilbink, 2007) to
acknowledge that judges play a role in authoritarian regimes, even though the role
is not always the same. Judges may directly support the regime, be marginal to the
political system, or maintain relative independence that can serve to legitimize the
regime.
Venezuela has long experience with authoritarian regimes and thus provides
rich material for analyzing the relation between the political power and the justice
system. It also offers an opportunity to analyze the more general issue of the
relation between rule of law and democracy.
The early 20th century was dominated by the dictatorship of Juan Vicente
Gómez. From 1909 to 1935 General Gómez controlled the political scene. Even
though he was not the President of the Republic for all these years, he clearly made
the most important decisions. During this period the legislative branch produced
mostly liberal legislation (Caballero, 1993; Pérez Perdomo, 2007), and the courts
decided cases with apparent independence. Important judges and legal actors have
written that General Gómez did not order or suggest judicial decisions, and political
actors have reported that they respected the judges’ functions and independence
(Arcaya, 1983). These reports appear to be legitimate because important political
cases did not go to the courts. These cases were handled in another way: the
“tyrant’s justice”. This “justice” was not based on law, and judges did not intervene
in it. It was often very cruel (Pérez Perdomo, 2007, 2011).
Under General Pérez Jiménez (1952-1958), the relations between the
political rulers and judges were similar. Here again, an important actor, Tulio
Chiossone, a justice of the Sala Penal de la Corte de Casación, reported that the
President and the Minister of Justice did not influence decisions (Chiossone, 1988).
Evidence suggests that Luis Felipe Urbaneja, the Minister of Justice, protected judges
and their independence. On the other hand, the fearsome Seguridad Nacional,
famous for the free use of torture and political assassinations, reported directly to
Pérez Jiménez, and lawyers and judges were not allowed to interfere with the
resulting repression (Pérez Perdomo, 2011, 2015).
Under the democratic regime beginning in 1958, the political parties
controlled judges. From 1969 onwards, the Council of the Judiciary was in charge of
appointing, promoting and disciplining judges, and it generally performed these
tasks using political criteria. The police frequently abused citizens’ rights, especially
in the case of citizens from the lower classes. The legal complex had very little
concern for human rights, except if the affected individuals could pay their lawyers
well or were connected with the country’s elites (Pérez Perdomo, 2003).
2
In the 1990s the political system entered a deep crisis (Kornblith, 1998).
Political parties, politicians, judges and the national parliament had very little
prestige, in large part due to the perception of rampant corruption and impunity.
Street crime rose and the mano dura contra el crimen (iron fist against crime) policy
was in fact an increase in police abuses against the lower classes. The criminal
system was shameful. Prisons were filled with people awaiting verdicts, because the
courts worked at such slow pace that a final decision in a case could take five or six
years. A strong movement to provide access to justice, reform the criminal process,
regulate the police, and reduce systemic abuses took shape. Between 1995 and 1998
the National Congress approved legislation for a system of justices of peace, a new
code of criminal procedure, and new legislation on children and adolescents. The
general thrust of the new legislation was “garantist”: the protection of citizens’
rights and freedom. The country decided to invest in modernizing the justice system
and asked for loans from the World Bank for this purpose. The late 1990s became
the time of “justice reform” (Pérez Perdomo, 2004). This was part of a general
institutional reform (reforma del estado) that also provided more autonomy to
municipalities and states. The institutional answer to the crisis of democracy was
more democracy and freedom.
During this period, the Supreme Court of Justice gained in independence and
importance when the political parties and the political system experienced a grave
crisis. The failure of the “elite conciliation” or “harmony illusion” model resulted in
many more conflicts going before judges, particularly the Supreme Court. Cecilia
Sosa, the first woman Chief Justice, became a weekly fixture in television news
explaining the most important Supreme Court decisions. But the justices were
aware that the court was an outdated institution. By 1997 the court had streamlined
its administrative procedures and started using technology to publish its decisions
immediately and to provide frequent data on its performance (Pérez Perdomo,
2004).
These efforts came too late. In December 1998 the people elected as
president Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez, who had attempted a coup d’état six
years earlier. His promise was a Bolivarian revolution. This included “frying in oil
the corrupt politicians’ heads” and calling a national constituent assembly to
produce a new constitution and to refound the republic. Many people saw in Chavez’
irruption an opportunity to correct the flaws of Venezuelan democracy, in
particular, the severe flaws of the justice system. In the first part of this article, we
will analyze how this dream very quickly turned into a nightmare. In the second
part, we will describe some of the misdeeds of the new political situation. In the
conclusion, we will explain the present conditions: how a weak court has become
practically the only legitimation for a regime that has failed to achieve the minimum
requirements to operate a state.
A dream turned nightmare
3
Thanks to a quite creative interpretation by the Supreme Court, Chávez was
able to call a constituent assembly where he enjoyed a huge majority. The assembly
drafted a long constitution with five autonomous branches of public power, but with
a concentration of power in the President of the Republic. The Supreme Court was
strengthened with the elimination of the Council of the Judiciary and the creation of
a constitutional chamber with broad power to interpret the constitution and take
action to protect it. As defined by the constitution, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela became a state with “rule of law and justice” (Constitution, article 2).
The constitution also enacted a set of rules for guaranteeing the strong
intellectual preparation and independence of the justices of the Supreme Court and
of judges. The process of selection of justices is complex: there is a Judicial
Appointments Committee with representation of several sectors, opportunity for
the society at large to object to candidates, intervention of the Citizens’ Branch of
the Public Power (Poder Ciudadano) and final decision by a qualified majority of the
National Assembly. All other judges have to be appointed by a public and
competitive examination (concurso público de oposición). The matter was
considered so important that the National Assembly approved the rules for the
public examination of judicial candidates before approving the constitution.
The first public examinations went well. A good number of candidates took
the public examination, and 270 judges were appointed out of a total of 400
vacancies. But the Appointments Committee for justices of the Supreme Court never
was established, and the National Assembly chose the justices using political
criteria. The Supreme Court suspended the public examinations and decided to
appoint ‘provisory’ judges: judges who did not have any tenure in their position.
Very soon the Bolivarian revolution became the ‘socialism of the XXI century’
and Chávez showed his worst authoritarian face. Among the victims of the
authoritarian style was the Venezuelan oil company, a state monopoly that provided
a large portion of the country’s fiscal income. A previous tacit agreement between
politicians was to keep this company outside the control of political parties. Chávez
did not respect the agreement and took other measures limiting property and other
economic rights. Resistance to the regime increased very quickly. Large popular
demonstrations and strikes became common in Caracas and other cities. On April
11, 2002, armed gangs loyal to Chávez attacked a huge demonstration marching to
the presidential palace to demand Chávez’s resignation. The consequence was 19
people killed and about 100 injured. The military commanders, who had not wanted
to interfere with the demonstration, asked for Chavez’s resignation, put him in
prison, and decided to appoint a new president, without following the constitutional
procedure. General Baduel, who commanded the strongest garrison outside Caracas,
did not join the coup d’état, and Chávez was reinstated on April 13, 2002.
In the 1999 Constitution, high military officers enjoy a procedural privilege.
If they commit a crime, the Supreme Court has to authorize their trial. In August
2002, the Attorney General asked for this authorization but a divided Supreme
4
Court did not provide it. The argument was legal: there was no evidence of military
rebellion, the imputed crime. Chávez insulted the justices on television, and a violent
multitude attacked the Supreme Court building.
The political crisis that followed obliged the intervention of the Organization
of American States and the negotiated solution was a referendum revocatorio (a
recall). The population had to decide whether Chávez could continue as President.
With extreme populist policies, Chávez regained the favor of the majority and won
the recall in 2004. Profiting from the majority in the National Assembly, in May
2004, the regime approved a new Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia,
forced a number of justices to retire, and increased the number of justices from 20
to 32. Velázquez Alvaray, a leading Chavist Member of the Parliament, was
designated justice and President of the Judicial Committee. He led a radical purge of
the judiciary in which several hundred judges were dismissed. From that time on,
the regime exercised complete control of the Supreme Court and the entire judiciary
(Pérez Perdomo, 2011).
Given these events, it is no surprise that the Supreme Court has become an
“instrument in the service of the revolution” as Canova González et al. (2014) put it.
These jurists have examined all the Supreme Court decisions between 2006 and
2012 and found that there were no decisions against the government. These
findings are most remarkable because the government is openly arbitrary, for
example, decreeing expropriations without paying compensation, imprisoning
opposition leaders, and committing all manner of abuses.
The Supreme Court has exerted tight political control on the entire judiciary.
In March 18, 2009, the court declared a full restructuring of the judiciary. All judges
became subject to ‘institutional evaluation’. Tenure was suspended (TSJ Resolución
2009-0008). The official information of the Supreme Court states that 27 percent of
judges are ‘titulares’ (TSJ web page 2017), but this does not seem to imply a tenured
position. The Supreme Court justices have not escaped this tight political control. In
a public discourse in 2007 Chávez reminded them that they had to consult with him
on important decisions (Chávez, quoted by Brewer-Carías, 2012:47-48). Two
justices, who were prominent as Chavists, fell into disgrace and now are fugitive:
Luis Velázquez Alvaray and Eladio Aponte Aponte.
The Venezuelan political regime has been called ‘hybrid’, which implies a
special place for courts and judges (Sánchez Uribarri, 2011). It has a democratic and
rule-of-law façade and an authoritarian and repressive nature. This situation
distinguishes it from authoritarian regimes of the past. Under Gómez and Pérez
Jiménez there was a dual justice system. The tyrant’s justice was in charge of
political repression. Ordinary justice was responsible for non-political cases. Judges
were marginal to the political system but they could be ‘independent’. Under the
‘hybrid’ regime, independence is no longer possible. Judges are responsible for
repression and for sustaining the regime.
5
Postcards from the abyss
They are many examples of abuses of the justice system for political and
personal repression or advantage. In this section we will briefly describe some of
them.
In response to the attack on the huge political demonstration on April 11,
2002, a criminal investigation was initiated. It was a convoluted procedure that took
more than six years. Early on, the judge’s decision was to exclude from
consideration those Chavist supporters who shot at the demonstrators. Several
police officers who were in charge of protecting the demonstrators were
condemned to 30 year in prison. Seven other police agents were each condemned to
17 years in prison. Alfredo Peña, Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, the ultimate
supervisor of these policemen, went into exile to avoid prosecution and died in
Miami in 2016.
The Corte Primera de lo Contencioso Administrativo (First Administrative
Court) was the most important tribunal after the Supreme Court. The Corte Primera
made several decisions that interfered with important policies of Chavez’
government. On September 23, 2003, the Government decided to take over the court
with the help of the political police and military forces. This extreme move was
justified as necessary for an investigation of corruption. Instead of documenting
corruption, the government found that the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme
Court had previously revoked a decision on land ownership and that decision
revealed a serious legal error by the five judges of the court. On October 30, 2003,
the Supreme Court decided to fire the judges Apitz, Perkins Rocha, Ruggeri and
Morales and retire judge Marrero. In 2008, the Inter American Human Rights Courts
directed the Venezuelan Republic to reinstall the fired judges Apitz, Perkins Rocha
and Ruggeri or to pay compensation. This and other decision by the Inter American
Court led the Venezuelan government to pull out of the Inter American Treaty for
the Protection of Human Rights. It is remarkable that judges Morales and Marrero,
who had written dissenting opinions in other cases where the decision was
unfavorable to the government, were soon appointed justices of the Supreme Court
and Luisa Estella Morales became the chief justice.
On December 12, 2008, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni decided to give bail to
banker Eligio Cedeño, who had been in preventive prison for years in a delayed
criminal procedure. Cedeño immediately took advantage of the decision to
disappear. Shortly after the decision, President Chávez went on television to accuse
the judge of corruption and demand 30 years in prison for her. She was captured,
abused and violated in prison (Olivares, 2012). She was free on bail in 2013 but the
criminal procedure continues.
Mariela Casado, Judge-President of the Bolivar State Circuit, found guilty the
powerful crime boss Wilmer Brizuela (known as Wilmito). Wilmito had the
protection of the Governor of Bolivar and the Interior Minister. Wilmito ordered the
6
judge to be killed, but the killer mistakenly murdered her sister in 2010. As the only
effective protection measure available to her, judge Casado quit her position and left
the country. Wilmito, found guilty of several homicides, was injured when
vacationing in the Margarita Island with a special status given by the Minister for
Penitentiary Affairs. On March 30, 2017, Wilmito was killed by a rival criminal
organization (www.el-nacional.com. April 1, 2017).
On April 18th, 2012, Justice Eladio Aponte Aponte appeared on SoiTV, a
Miami television station, and described the functioning of the Venezuelan judicial
system and his role in it. He was the chairperson of the Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court and previously was the Attorney General for Military Justice. He was
a trusted Chavist judge in charge of conveying orders to other penal judges and
protecting drug traffickers associated with the government. Those familiar with the
functioning of justice in Venezuela knew of the tight control of judges and the
government’s protection of criminals but were surprised that a high-ranking
member of Chavist nomenklatura revealed all these misdeeds in detail. Aponte
Aponte asked for refuge in the United States and became an informant for the Drug
Enforcement Administration (www.eluniversal.com April 18, 2012. Partial
transcription and analysis in Brewer, 2012).
On February 12th, 2014, a huge demonstration took place across Caracas. The
demonstrators were demanding freedom for political prisoners, crime control and
the end of armed gangs supported by the government. When the demonstration
ended, violence erupted. Several people were killed, and the police forces took a
number of prisoners. Smaller demonstration by young people continued over the
next days, and the police and armed gangs increased their repressive measures.
More people were killed or made prisoners. Criminal indictments were brought
against more than 1,000. Many young people decided to leave the country in the face
of the threat of increased repression (Pérez Perdomo, 2014). Scores of people were
sent to prisons, including Leopoldo López, a leading opposition figure with great
appeal among young people. An irregular trial followed. On September 15th 2015,
the judge condemned López to 13 years and 9 months in prison for a number of
crimes and sent him to a military prison. A number of young people were also
condemned. On October 23rd Prosecutor Franklin Nieves declared that the entire
procedure was farcical and based on faked evidence. He declared himself repentant,
asked for forgiveness from López and his family, and took refuge in the United
States. The prosecutor’s act did not have any influence on the proceedings: the
appellate court and the Supreme Court confirmed the decision.
Because of election victories by the opposition, 2016 promised to be the year
of regime change. In December 2015 the opposition won the National Assembly by a
landslide. Soon the opposition parties demanded a recall of President Maduro
(referendum revocatorio). The recall procedure has to be authorized and conducted
by the National Council of Elections, which is controlled by the government. The
Council imposed all manner of obstacles. Furthermore, a previous referendum
against President Chavez was a bitter experience: those who signed the petition for
7
the referendum were placed on an electronic list of regime enemies (Lista Tascon)
and suffered discrimination. Civil servants were fired and any dealing with the
government became difficult or impossible for individuals on this list. It was a clear
case of political apartheid (Jatar-Hausman, 2006). Despite this previous experience
and new threats, people signed in massive numbers. However, the regime chose to
claim fraud in the collection of signatures by the National Council of Elections.
Several criminal judges in different parts of the country decided that there was
some evidence of fraud and asked the National Council of Elections to suspend the
recall procedure. The Council also suspended the election of state governors due in
December 2016 and instead called for a revalidation of the opposition parties.
Opposition supporters had to once again sign indicating which political party they
supported. In these actions, judges were instrumental in depriving Venezuelans of
their political rights.
On February 18th, 2017, journalists Andreas Díaz, Rumel Ochoa and Eduardo
Párraga flew a drone to take pictures of a demonstration demanding freedom for
political prisoners. The SEBIN (the political police) seized the journalists and
brought them to court on February 20th. Judge Karla Moreno ruled that they had not
committed any crime and ordered their release. The SEBIN group insisted on their
being held, and the judge submitted her resignation rather than comply. A big
brouhaha erupted in the court when the SEBIN group tried to take the judge with
them but was prevented by court employees who protected her
(www.accesoalajusticia.org). This incident makes clear that the SEBIN considers
itself above the courts. As of March, SEBIN held 21 political prisoners who had
received release orders (El Nacional, March 28, 2017, front page).
These postcards are only a small sample of the many abuses committed by
the regime. Judges collaborate with government repression, but when they do not
go along with it and show a minimum of independence, they become victims, too.
A weak court as regime’s Atlas
According to the 1999 constitution, the Venezuelan Supreme Court is very
powerful. It has control over the entire judiciary and can carry out extensive judicial
review. In particular, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has
extensive powers. It can review the decisions of the other chambers on
constitutional grounds and can enforce the constitution without the need of a case
being brought. If the legislature does not produce legislation or take the actions the
constitution requires, the Constitutional Chamber can take the necessary actions in
its place (Constitution, article 336, number 7).
The constitution also has established strict requirements and procedures for
the selection of Supreme Court justices. These are aimed at ensuring that the
justices are jurists of well-recognized competence, honesty and independence. They
are required to have a higher law degree and extensive experience (at least 15 years
8
of legal practice). Alternatively, they may be a tenured professor of law (profesor
titular) or an appellate judge with 15 years of judicial career.
For the selection of justices, the Judicial Appointments Committee, which
intentionally should represent different sectors of society, makes the initial
selection and hears any objection from the profession or the public. The preselected
candidates are then passed to the Citizens’ Branch of the public power, which makes
a further selection and presents the final list of candidates to the National Assembly
(Constitution, articles 263, 264 and 270). All judges should be politically
independent and cannot be members of any political party or trade association.
The regime has taken lightly these constitutional requirements. The Judicial
Appointments Committee does not exist, and from 2004 onwards, the actual basic
requirement has been loyalty to the regime. Most justices are little known and many
do not meet the constitutional requisites for being a justice of the Supreme Court. As
we noted earlier, a judge previously dismissed for having committed grave legal
mistakes was later appointed justice and became Chief Justice.
The opposition’s overwhelming victory in the parliamentary elections in
December 2015 led the regime to strengthen its grip on the Supreme Court. About a
third of justices then sitting on the court had terms expiring by mid 2016. The
regime pressured the justices in this situation to resign, and a lame duck National
Assembly rushed to appoint new justices in their place. All the steps of the
appointment process were disregarded. As a result, most of these justices do not
have even the minimum requirements for being appointed. Their qualification is
that they are trustworthy Chavist (www.accesoalajusticia.org/wp/perfil-poderjudicial, 2017). Present day Chief Justice Maikel Moreno has a homicide conviction.
As expected the Supreme Court has become the battering ram against the
National Assembly. The first decision was to suspend the deputies of the Amazon
State because of allegations of electoral fraud. But the Electoral Chamber did not
order a new election because the true political objective was to deprive the
opposition of its super majority. A new election would probably have produced
similar results or increased the opposition representation. During 2016, practically
every decision of the National Assembly was judged to be unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court, especially the Constitutional Chamber, has produced about 50
decisions of this nature in clear abuse of judicial review.
Pérez-Perdomo & Santacruz (2016) analyzed the Supreme Court decisions
during the first semester of 2016, but this research strategy would be extremely
burdensome today. Decisions are too many and span many fields. In a very abusive
interpretation of the constitution, the Supreme Court has deprived the National
Assembly of every constitutional function and, at the same time, the Constitutional
Chamber has concentrated all public power in President Maduro. Constitutionally,
the National Assembly can disapprove the declaration of emergency that gives
9
extraordinary powers to the President, but this constitutional disposition has fallen
under the interpretation power of the Supreme Court.
The crown jewels of the constitutional changes done by the Constitutional
Chamber are the decisions 155-2017 and 156-2017 (March 27 and 29). In the first
case the leader of the Chavist minority in the National Assembly asked the
Constitutional Chamber to void a declaration of support for actions by the
Organization of American States aimed at reestablishing democracy in Venezuela.
The Constitutional Chamber obliged, and in addition, exhorted the President to take
all necessary measures to counteract the external threats. The exhortation included
modification of criminal and military legislation. It also declared that the opposition
representatives in the National Assembly did not have the immunity established in
the Constitution and that their support to the Organization of American States could
be considered treasonous to the fatherland. The Supreme Court stated that the
National Assembly was illegitimate because it had disrespected the decisions of the
court.
The Venezuelan national oil company (PDVSA) started the second case. This
national company wanted to change the terms of association with the Russian oil
company (Rosneft). The Venezuelan government is desperate for cash, and Russia
and China have been helping, but in return, they want a bigger chunk of Venezuelan
oil and mining resources. The National Assembly has to approve such contract
changes. For this reason, in decision 156-2017, the Constitutional Chamber declared
that, given that the National Assembly had ceased to function, the approval of the
Executive Power was sufficient. According to this decision, the Supreme Court, or
the institution the Court chooses, can take over the functions of the National
Assembly.
Since the opposition victory in the parliamentary elections, the Supreme
Court and the Executive have created difficulties for the functioning of the National
Assembly. Representatives are not paid, and electric service to the Assembly has
been cut off. The Supreme Court’s decisions formally suppressing the National
Assembly were the straw that broke the camel’s back. Citizens went into the streets
to protest. The Attorney General declared that the constitution had been violated by
these decisions. Several Latin American governments recalled their ambassadors.
Mercosur, the common market for a group of South American countries, voted to
apply their democratic provision and suspended Venezuela’s membership.
President Maduro called the Council of Defense and Security, an advisory board with
military representation, on Friday March 31st. This Council exhorted the
Constitutional Chamber to revise its rulings. According to Venezuelan law, judges
cannot modify their decisions once they are made. They can only correct material
mistakes or clarify their meaning. The Constitutional Chamber met and decided to
“clarify” motu proprio the two decisions. The Chief Justice went on television
immediately to announce that the most controversial parts of the decisions had
been changed. This was a new demonstration of the justices’ lack of independence.
The Supreme Court only published the decisions (157-2017 and 158-2017) several
10
days later, on April 4th. The decisions received severe criticism from Venezuelan
legal scholars and lawyers (for example, Brewer-Carías, 2017).
President Maduro called for new dialog with the opposition. As the
opposition has bitter experience with delaying strategies, the supposedly
conciliatory moves did not have any effect. People kept demonstrating against the
regime and the Supreme Court. Bar associations, professors of law and a host of
institutions from many parts of the world condemned the Venezuelan regime. A
growing chorus of voices is demanding freedom for political prisoners and free
elections. But the regime has destroyed any possible institutional way out of the
crisis that grows deeper every day. The economy is in shambles. Increasing
numbers of Venezuelans are dying daily from hunger or lack of medication.
At the moment we write this article (April 2017), the regime’s lack of
legitimacy and inability to resolve the country’s deep crisis are evident. In recent
weeks, 29 people have died as a consequence of repression and fifteen hundred has
been detained. Other than naked repression, the only legitimacy that is invoked is
the Supreme Court’s decisions. But the shoulders of this new Atlas are too weak to
support the regime’s world. Six of the seven justices of the Constitutional Chamber
do not fulfill the constitutional requirements for being justices of the Supreme Court
(Moreno Losada, 2017). By maneuvering the composition of the Supreme Court and
putting it at the regime’s service in a naked way, the regime has weakened its
capacity to legitimate itself with the help of judges. Venezuelans understand that
these are not judges. With the institutional channels closed, the street, coupled with
international pressure, is the only course remaining. Changes in the government
thus become very traumatic. This is the drama and trauma we are living in
Venezuela.
Social sciences cannot predict the future. And it is difficult to go beyond this
simple chronicle of the very dark present. There is only a partial certainty: if the
regime falls, the Supreme Court’s justices and other judges will be in trouble. For
them the bench may become the dock.
(April 30, 2017)
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