Austro-German Plans for the Future of Serbia (1915)
Author(s): R. W. Seton-Watson
Source: The Slavonic and East European Review , Mar., 1929, Vol. 7, No. 21 (Mar., 1929),
pp. 705-724
Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College
London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4202346
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UNPRINTED DOCUMENTS.
AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR THE
FUTURE OF SERBIA (19 I 5).
IT will be remembered that in the autumn and winter of I9I4
Serbia showed unexpected powers of resistance to the enemy
-and in December defeated the Austro-Hungarian forces at Rudnik
and expelled them from Belgrade. There followed a long period
of inactivity on the Balkan front, due on the one hand to Serbia's
exhaustion and the outbreak of a severe typhus epidemic, and
on the other to Austria-Hungary's absorption on the Russian
front. During this period the Entente made a series of efforts
to win over Italy, Roumania and Bulgaria to active participation
on its side. With Italy this resulted in the secret Treaty of
London, concluded on 26 April, I9I5, and Italy actually entered
the War on 24 May. But with Bulgaria the negotiations were
inconclusive-first because the failure of the Dardanelles expedi-
tion and the events of the Galician campaign confirmed the King
and General Staff in their belief in the ultimate victory of the
Central Powers; but secondly because the entry of Bulgaria
could only be secured by such a cession of territory in Macedonia
as the Serbs were unanimous in refusing. A compromise might
perhaps still have been reached, but the Entente realised too
late (or failed to realise altogether) that by assigning to Italy
under the Treaty of London so large a portion of Jugoslav national
territory on the Adriatic, it had made Serbian concessions in the
east impossible, since national unity and full access to the Adriatic
could alone atone for the loss of the Vardar valley with its
economic outlet to the LEgean.
Thus from May onwards the Serbian Government in Nis
was in a very difficult position and found its allies negotiating
behind its back with Italy, and less secretly with Bulgaria, and
in each case using vital Jugoslav interests to pay the bill. It
was only natural that this should have been regarded by some
people as a favourable moment for exploring the possibility of
winning Serbia for a separate peace and thus liquidating one
at least of the theatres of war.
705
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z
706 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
On 23 May, Germany and Austria-Hungary officially
approached Bulgaria, offering in return for mere neutrality both
zones of Serbian Macedonia. On 29 May the four Entente Powers
handed Bulgaria a note offering in return for war on Turkey the
Enos-Midia Line and Macedonia up to the line Egripalanka-VelesOhrid-Monastir, but only if she refrained from immediate occupation and only if Serbia obtained compensation in Bosnia and on
the Adriatic-in other words, a futile offer, much inferior to
that of the Central Powers. On I4 June Bulgaria replied with a
series of questions of detail: but it was not till 4 August that the
Entente again answered, guaranteeing the " Undisputed " Mace-
donian Zone and Kavala, if Serbia and Greece were compensated
elsewhere, and the immediate occupation of Thrace. This being
rejected as quite inadequate, Bulgaria on 3 September signed a
Convention with Turkey and on 6 September a secret alliance
with Germany and Austria-Hungary, which guaranteed to her
in return for entry, not only both Macedonian Zones but also all
Serbia proper east of the River Morava from the Danube to the
Sar mountains; and the military convention pledged the three
High Commands to joint action against Serbia. The Bulgarian
Government continued to dupe the Entente representatives, whose
further Note on I3 September (threatening to revoke their former
offer) was only answered on 4 October and then quite evasively.
But already on 6 October the Austro-German forces attacked
Serbia on the Danube front, Bulgaria joined in a week later (not
declaring war until I4 October in order to delude the Entente
up to the last moment), and the conquest of Serbia followed.
Skoplje fell on 2I October, Nis on 5 November, and what was
left of the Serbian army retreated across Albania to the Adriatic.
This brief summary of events will enable the reader to grasp
the significance of the following important documents copied from
the Austrian archives in the months immediately following the
War and handed to me from a trustworthy source. From them
it appears that the pressure exercised by the Entente upon Serbia
during the summer of I9I5 led to suggestions of a separate peace,
that the Roumanian statesman Marghiloman attempted to
mediate on these lines, and that late in September Herr von
Jagow hoped that Serbia's surrender might avert the impending
campaign. Naturally, however, the desire of both AustriaHungary and Bulgaria to crush Serbia overrode the practical
considerations of Berlin.
The conquest of Serbia naturally led to a discussion of her
ultimate fate. Germany proposes that what remains of Serbia
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 707
after Bulgaria has annexed the south and east, should be united
with Montenegro and Albania under the Montenegrin dynasty
(No. I2). Count Metternich, the new German Ambassador to
the Porte, talks, both in Vienna and Sofia, in favour of a separate
peace and opposes Serbia's complete disappearance (Nos. I4-I5):
and his Austro-Hungarian colleague, Marquis Pallavicini, endorses
his view (No. i6) on the ground that a Big Bulgaria would be
quite as great a danger to the Central Powers " as the Great
Serbia founded in I9I3."
Of special interest are two memoranda of the Hungarian
Premier, Count Tisza-the first addressed to Francis Joseph, the
second to Baron Burian-in which he opposes the annexation
of the whole of Serbia, not on grounds of equity or humanity,
but simply because it would be difficult and dangerous for the
Monarchy to increase the numbers of her Southern Slav subjects.
His remedy is one of the most cynical and amazing in the whole
war. Bulgaria is to annex Macedonia and all Serbia east of the
Morava, Albania would receive territory from both Serbia and
Montenegro (this is of course less exceptionable), Montenegro
would be cut off from the sea, and Belgrade, with the fertile
districts along the south bank of the Save and Danube, would
be cut off from Serbia and annexed to Hungary: while Magyar
and German colonisation on a grand scale would be adopted in
the new frontier districts, with the deliberate object of driving
" a wedge between the Serbian State and the Serbian population
of Slavonia and Southern Hungary." This " mangled " and
isolated Serbian state would then be " bound by economic and
military ties to the Monarchy " : the Karagjorgjevic dynasty
would of course disappear, and the question of the Montenegrin
dynasty might be left open.
These memoranda deserve the closest attention, as showing
that Tisza's opposition to complete annexation, of which his
adherents have made so much capital, is merely part of a well-
thought-out project for preventing the development of the
Southern Slavs, in the interests of Hungarian hegemony. His
relative mildness toward Montenegro is explained by the later
series of documents, showing that Crown Prince Danilo had offered
himself to the Central Powers, in the hope of supplanting his
Serbian kinsmen, and that his brother, Prince Mirko, was
definitely in the pay of Vienna.
R. W. SETON-WATSON.
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708 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
I. COUNT TARNOWSKI 1 to VIENNA. Tel. No. 2340. Dated Sofia,
22 May, I9I5.
My German colleague tells me, has had instructions to impress King
and Government, and has warned Mr. Radoslavov,2 that according
to certain signs there is inclination in Serbia towards understanding
with Austria-Hungary, to which, in view of conflict with Italy, Monarchy might consent. German Minister has also put this flea in
ears of Macedonians, in order that they may demand action from
Government. I said I had no information at all in the matter.
German colleague requested me not to announce the above, but
rather to wait until something is communicated to me regarding it.
When I then spoke with Premier, he mentioned what Dr. Michahelles 3
had said about Serbia, and asked me what I thought. I said I was
quite without information about Serbia and had no view. Radoslavov said he could not believe the story; it couldonly be a matter
of floating opinions (Stimmungen) in Serbia.
2. COUNT CZERNIN 4 to VIENNA. 2773-I232. Tel. No. 947. Dated
Sinaia, I3 August, I9I5.
Mr. Marghiloman 6 told my German colleague that Serbian
Minister had spoken to him as follows: " Entente demands from
Serbia cession of all Macedonia, including Uskuib, to Bulgaria, without
promising access to the Adriatic in return. As compensation Serbia
would only obtain Herzegovina."
Serbian Minister is said, apparently in agreement with Mr. Pasic,7
-to have expressed his desperation at this demand and at Serbia's
,desperate state, yet to have hinted that Serbia, if she cannot free
herself from the arms of the Entente, will have to accept demands.
But Serbian Minister appears further to have given Mr. Marghiloman to understand, that separate peace with the Monarchy
seems to him desirable, in which case Serbia would be ready tb cede
Macedonia as far as the Vardar, if she received assurance of access
to the LEgean and were not cut off from Greece.
Mr. Pasic, it is alleged, only wants to give a definite answer to
Entente in about five days, if he has received further news from the
Serbian Minister here. German colleague and Marghiloman have
impression that Mr. Pasic, who knows the good relations that we have
to Marghiloman, may have intentionally chosen this channel (Weg)
and could be strengthened by Your Excellency in his resistance to
the Entente.
1Austro-Hungarian Minister in Sofia.
2 Bulgarian Premier.
3German Minister in Sofia.
4 Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bucarest.
Summer resort of Roumanian Court.
6 Leading Roumanian Conservative statesman, favourable to Central
Powers.
7Italics in original.
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 709
Marghiloman comes to-day to me at Sinaia, in order to repeat
again to me direct these news, which have already been transmitted
through German colleague. German Minister has wired the incident
to Berlin. I beg for instructions to regulate my language.
3. COUNT CZERNIN to VIENNA. Tel. No. 963. Dated Sinaia,
I9 August, I9I5.
(In continuance of my Tel. 952 of I4th) I have to-day repeated
to Mr. Marghiloman what my German colleague has already said
to him, namely that the German Government has let him know that
the Central Powers find no reason for approaching Serbia and must
leave it to her to make possible (eventuelle) proposals.
Marghiloman thereupon had a conversation with the Serbian
Minister, who is alleged to be disappointed at this answer and to
have ventilated the view that there was great danger of Serbia and
Bulgaria coming to terms against us.
4. PRINCE GOTTFRIED HOHENLOHE 1 to VIENNA. No. 428. Dated
Berlin, 27 September, I9I5. (Strictly secret.)
The Secretary of State 2 said to me to-day, he had heard from
various sides, that it was not excluded that Serbia would not let
matters come to a conflict: he had therefore instructed Herr von
Tschirschky 3 to discuss with Your Excellency the situation which
might result from this, in the event of Serbia really at the last moment,
out of fear of being crushed by the Central Powers, being ready to
submit to our wishes in a peaceful manner. Herr von Jagow would
be glad to know what conditions the Cabinet of Vienna would in
this case put to Serbia.
I replied that for the present I knew nothing whatever of such
an intention on the part of Serbia, and could therefore give him no
information as to the attitude which Your Excellency would take
in such a case. It also seemed to me not very probable that Serbia,
without fighting, would come as far towards us as we should have
to demand of her. I considered any half-measure towards Serbia,
unless we were simply compelled to content ourselves with this,
as incompatible with our prestige, and in view of the future
as more than questionable. The possibility of avoiding the whole
expedition to Serbia seemed to be extraordinarily desirable to Herr
von Jagow. I doubt whether Serbia's attitude will render this
possible and would also, for above-mentioned reasons, regard it as
by no means desirable.
5. ANSWER OF THE BALLPLATZ to PRINCE HOHENLOHE. (No date.)
The German Ambassador came to see me to-day regarding the
enquiry which your telegram 428 led me to expect. I answered Herr
1 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin.
2 Herr von Jagow.
3 German Ambassador in Vienna.
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7IO THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
von Tschirschky, that according to all indications available to us,
Serbia will certainly take up the struggle against our attack and will
not make any offers of peace. But if this should unexpectedly be
the case after all, I regarded it as a fatal error to let ourselves be
held back in our action by it for one moment. We must make sure
of all the aims which led us to start a new offensive and to conclude
our treaties with Bulgaria. This we owed as much to our own interests
as to those of our Balkan allies.
If Serbia should offer us peace before the beginning of military
operations, we must none the less first of all occupy all those parts
of the country which we need for the attainment of our war aims,
and can then, in possession of the territorial pledge, and of free connection with Bulgaria and Turkey, examine Serbia's proposals.
An abandonment or delay of our action in face of a yielding
attitude of Serbia, which might after all possibly arise in order to
win time, would in my view . . . (verb missing) 1 not only at the
Dardanelles and in the Balkans but also in its ultimate effects, in
the other theatres of war. The remarks with which Your Excellency
met the feeler (Anwurf) of the Secretary of State, meet with my full
approval.
6. BARON SZILASSY2 to VIENNA. (Numbers missing.) Dated Athens,
28 September, I9I5. (Strictly secret.)
The King 3 told me, with a request for secrecy, that German
Government wishes him to mediate peace between us and Serbia,
" but that it is difficult." His Majesty told me that Greek Minister
in Berlin had announced the impression that we were inclined to give
to Serbia North Albania and all Montenegro.
In case the German Legation . . . (faulty cipher), I remind you
that its cipher has probably been deciphered.
7. ANSWER OF THE BALLPLATZ to BARON SZILASSY. No. 339.
30 September, I9I5.
Re your telegram, unnumbered, of 28 inst. For your informatiorn
and guidance: here 4 there is no possible cause of any kind to consider
peace ideas with Serbia.
8. COUNT TARNOWSKI to VIENNA. No. ii6i. Sofia, 30 September,
19I5.
It was widely said here that latterly in military circles serious
fears prevailed as to surprise attack of the Serbs, who have sent
five divisions to the Bulgarian frontier and could interfere with
1 Either a faulty cipher, or an error on the part of the co
2 Austro-Hungarian Minister in Athens.
3 Constantine XII. of Greece.
4 I.e., in Vienna.
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 7II
mobilisation. A connection was even assumed between the ministerial
crisis (resignation of Toncev 1) and this fear, in the sense that King
and Radoslavov, by negotiations with Democrats and perhaps by
their inclusion in the Cabinet, wanted to create a calming effect upon
the Entente and thereby hold Serbia back from the attack.
Premier said to me in this connection, that at the War Ministry
they were really excited, but that there was no ground for this.
General Zekov was sensible, but otherwise there was not a man
of judgment in the War Ministry, nothing but gas-bags (Schwdtzer),
and so on. The theory of a connection with the crisis of Mr. Toncev
was nonsense, fear of Serbian attack was quite unfounded; in Serbia
indeed there was great fear of Bulgaria, and Premier knew that
Mr. Pasic, recognising danger, had put out peace feelers in Berlin.
Baron Wangenheim 2 had told Premier that Serbia's peace proposals
would not be taken up at all now and without consultation with
Bulgaria: they wanted to beat and punish Serbia.
9. BARON SZILASSY to VIENNA. Tel. No. 964. Athens, 2 October,
I9I5. (Secret.)
His Majesty 3 told me, Serbian Minister here 4 was entirely won
for a separate peace. King fears that the Serbian statesmen, bribed
by England, will be hard to win over. As last time, I told His Majesty
that I knew nothing of this and did not believe that we want separate
peace. Your Excellency's telegram No. 339 just received.
IO. PRINCE HOHENLOHE to VIENNA. Tel. No. 470. Berlin, 3I
October, I9I5. (Secret.)
In answer to No. 7I2 of Your Excellency, I have to-day informed
the Secretary of State of the contents of above-cited telegram and
Your Excellency's remark contained therein: he was already informed
through a telegram of Herr von Tschirschky.
Herr von Jagow remarked in this connection that to him also
an unconditional surrender of Serbia seemed to be the only goal to
aim at, but only in the event of our not having to solve yet other
difficult tasks in the Balkans. But now according to all news the
Entente seems resolved to throw large masses of troops into the
Balkans and to wish to strike a great blow there. For this speaks
the circumstance that General Monroe, a personal friend and favourite
of Lord Kitchener, has taken over the command of the English troops
in Salonica, in place of the quite incompetent Hamilton. He therefore asks himself whether it would not be of advantage to have concluded the whole Serbian question by then-that is to say, in the
event of the Serbs coming with a request for peace, to make known
to them our conditions. I remarked on this, that these conditions,
1 Member of the Radoslavov Cabinet.
2 German Ambassador in Constantinople.
King Constantine.
4 Mr. Balugdzi6, afterwards Jugoslav Minister in Berlin.
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7I2 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
apart from the cession of the territories demanded by us, must also
consist in the surrender of the Serbian Army.
If we could preserve peace on these conditions, continued the
Secretary of State, he saw in this the great advantage that for England
and France the reason for an expedition to save Serbia would disappear, after the latter had already officially accepted her fate.
To this I replied, that if the Entente in spite of everything were to
move against Bulgaria and perhaps win successes, Serbia would most
probably not worry in the least about pledges given and would in
spite of them attack us, if at all possible.
Herr von Jagow admitted this indeed, but held that this outweighed in such a case, and besides an accomplished peace with
Serbia would have the great advantage of proving to the Entente
that we could conclude peace with our opponents even separately.
Who knows whether this might not be the prelude to general peace.
As regards the unmasking of our treaty with Bulgaria, this was
not bound to happen, in view of the fact that we would simply demand
of Serbia the cession of territory, without expressing ourselves till
later as to its future destination. Herr von Tschirschky had further
reported that Your Excellency adhered to the foundation of an independent Albania: as regards this, the Government had an extremely
sceptical attitude after the experiences it had had, and had not the
slightest desire to take any further share in it. From Your Excellency's remarks that the Monarchy's frontier must march with Albania
(as reported by Tschirschky), it seemed to him (i.e., Jagow) to follow
that Austria-Hungary wished to occupy the Sandjak, which he found
quite comprehensible. In the same way he fully endorsed the wish
of the Monarchy that the two coasts of the Adriatic should not come
into the same hand: but this could perhaps be met (abgeholfen)
by an Austro-Hungarian protectorate over Albania, if we held this
to be practicable.
He quite agreed with the&ejection of the Karagjorgjevic, but an
union of what was left of Serbia with Montenegro seemed to him a
less favourable solution than one by which Serbia, in whatever form,
came into complete economic and military dependence upon us.
I said to Herr von Jagow at the close of our conversation, that
for the present there were still no signs whatever of Serbia turning
to us with a request for peace: and according to the whole mentality
of the Serbs it seemed to me much more probable that they would
fight to the end, which must of itself involve unconditional collapse.
ii. BARON BURIAN to PRINCE HOHENLOHE. No. I459. Sofia,
I4 November, I9I5. (Strictly confidential.) Remains as a
draft (bleibt im Concept).
He treats as the essential points of peace with Serbia: I, " unconditional capitulation; 2, immediate cession of all territories demanded
by us."
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 7I3
I2. SUMMARY OF NOTE DRAWN UP IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN
VIENNA, dated 4 November, I9I5.
Falkenhayn 1 is eager for the speediest possible close of the Serbian
war and urges that the conditions which we are both willing to offer
to Serbia if she asks for peace, should be quickly stated. The German
Government's view of such conditions is: complete capitulation,
and union of what is left of Serbia with Montenegro and Albania, under
the Montenegrin dynasty.
Germany considers the sole way of bringing Serbia to capitulate
is if she does not have to capitulate in a state of uncertainty (aufs
ungewisse), but receives a clear picture as to her future fate. Germany
therefore asks Vienna for its views.
I3. SUMMARY OF NOTE DRAWN UP IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN
VIENNA, dated 5 November, I9I5.
The fate of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania is to be discussed
at the impending discussion at Berlin.
Their union will not be proposed by Austria-Hungary.
It is desirable to end the Serbian war as soon as possible, but
this can best be attained by war. Neither Serbia nor Montenegro
is likely to offer peace, " since they will scarcely abandon till the
very last the hope of obtaining help from their allies."
I4. COUNT TARNOWSKI to BARON BURIAN. No. I459. Sofia, 14
November, I9I5.
Radoslavov recounted to me his conversation with the new German
Ambassador in Constantinople, while travelling through here. Count
Metternich had expressed his personal view in the sense that speediest
possible conclusion of separate peace with Serbia was now urgently
desirable, since final termination of this (i.e., Balkan) war must
have favourable reaction upon attitude of Roumania and Greece.
Premier said, he could not properly understand this idea, firstly
because Serbia was not yet conquered and it was likely to last not
a few days, as Count Metternich thinks, but several weeks more,
till Serbia is altogether finished; and secondly, before considering
peace negotiations with Serbia, one must know whether Serbia would
exist at all as state. But on this point Count Metternich had not
been informed and only mentioned that from a conversation with
Count Tisza he had won the impression that the annexation of con-
siderable (grosserer) Serbian territories would not suit Hungary.
Count Metternich had asked Premier for his opinion on this,
whereupon Radoslavov spoke not quite clearly and remarked that
this question depended not on Bulgaria, but on the Central Powers,
especially on us. To me Radoslavov then said openly that Bulgaria
wished the complete disappearance of Serbia. He inquired whether
our views in this connection were known to me, which I denied. It
1 German Chief of Staff from Septerrber, I9I4, to August, I9I6.
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7I4 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
would be very important for him, Premier remarked, to learn something positive on this, and he begged me in friendly way to try and
get authentic information on this point.
My German colleague confirmed that Count Metternich had questioned Radoslavov and also King regarding views here (in Sofia)
about future disposition in the Balkans (Serbia, Albania) ; King
Ferdinand was for complete disappearance of Serbia, Radoslavov
less pronounced. Count Metternich had also expressed to Radoslavov his personal view, mentioned at outset, as to usefulness of
separate peace with Serbia.
I5. BARON BURIAN to COUNT TARNOWSKI. No. 664. I5 November,
I9I5.
The view expressed by Count Metternich as his personal opinion,
that now the early conclusion of a separate peace with Serbia is urgently
desirable, does not agree with our standpoint and indeed does not
coincide with the present German view, so far as is known to us.
I can only agree with Radoslavov when he marvels at above
frame of ideas of German Ambassador: for it is clear that a
peace with Serbia could in practice only be attained if the Serbian
army has laid down its arms and if we also have finished with
Montenegro.
As regards the Premier's question regarding status (Gestaltung)
of Serbia, Your Excellency can tell him that our decisions regarding
the reduced Serbia are not yet finally reached, we are exchanging
ideas on the subject with Germany, but this from the very nature of
the case was not yet concluded, since the question is too closely bound
up with the further development of affairs.
i6. MARQUIS PALLAVICINI to BARON BURIAN. (No. ioo/P. A-C.)
Constantinople, i December, I9I5. (Secret.)
My best thanks to Your Excellency for the strictly confidential
communication of the telegraphic correspondence with Count Tarnowski regarding a conversation between Count Metternich in Sofia
and Mr. Radoslavov, in which the former raised the question of
Serbia's future.
Since receipt of this correspondence I had a longish conversation
with the German Ambassador, in which he came to speak on the same
theme. He told me he had on his way through Budapest visited
Count Tisza and put to him, among other things, his view (which
he expressly described as purely personal) that Serbia as such ought
not to be allowed to go under completely, because she was according
to his conviction a factor in the Balkan Peninsula whose continued
existence would be highly useful for Austria-Hungary in the first
instance.
I have the impression that Mr. Radoslavov perhaps did not
understand Count Metternich quite correctly: for as the latter reproduced to me what he had said to Count Tisza, he had no idea of trying
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 7I5
now to reach a separate peace with Serbia: on the contrary he thinks
that when Serbia had been completely conquered it might perhaps
be useful to let the Serbs know in some way, that the Central Powers
by no means have in mind the complete annihilation of Serbia, but
would actually wish that a reduced Serbia should continue to exist
in future. To this Count Tisza, he said, had answered that the
Monarchy must desire a " resigned," not a satisfied Serbia.
Count Metternich told me then the further line of argument
which he had developed to the Hungarian Premier. There seemed
to him to be an advantage in letting the Serbs know of this desire
for the continuance of a reduced Serbia, because in this way it might
perhaps be easier to reach a general peace. Not that he believed
that Russia would at once negotiate on that account, but in that
way for Russia the main reason which had caused the war would
certainly have been removed. In the same way the situation would
be made easier for Serbia, as soon as she knows that the Central
Powers do not reckon with her complete annihilation. Besides any
further action of the British and French in the Balkans would then
lose its raison d'e'tre, and finally the giving of a turn to the future
Balkan situation could not remain without influence on the attitude
of Roumania and Greece.
Count Metternich thinks of the future Serbia as reduced by the
loss of all Macedonia and the Morava territory: but as she ought in
his view to be capable of life (lebensfahig), he thinks that at least
an exit to the Adriatic must be ceded to her. He said he had come
more than ever to the view that an independent Albanian state was
an Utopia. He believes that the present Albanian territory should
be partitioned between Greece, Serbia and possibly Montenegro.
He is quite aware that with us there is a general dislike of a Serbian
advance to the Adriatic, owing to the Russian influence. But he
cannot see what danger there would be in the case of a small and
weak Serbia; whereas he would see a far greater danger for AustriaHungary and the Central Powers as a whole, in the establishment
of Italy on the East coast of the Adriatic; besides, after all, Montenegro already had a harbour on the Adriatic, so that a Serb-an
d ebouche could not be of such far-reaching importance.
Count Metternich told me finally that he had had the impression
in Sofia that King Ferdinand was against the survival of even a
reduced Serbia and would like at all costs to see the Karagjorgjevie
dynasty disappear from the surface. Mr. Radoslavov had expressed
himself less decidedly, but he (Metternich) thought he could detect
in his (Radoslavov's) language, that the Bulgarian Premier would
also prefer that there should be in future no independent Serbia.
I of course did not mention to Count Mettemich that I was aware
of his conversation in Sofia. I only said to him in my replies that
so far as I knew, people in Vienna were not of opinion that there
could be peace negotiations with Serbia at the present moment.
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7I6 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
Even though the Serbian question does not fall into my present
direct sphere, I none the less think that the experiences gathered
during my long activity in the Balkans give me the right, and indeed
the duty, to express my opinion.
I believe that the question whether in future a Serbia should or
should not exist, must in the first instance be judged from the general
angle of Balkan policy. I should regard it as an error to presuppose
that by the foundation of a Great Bulgaria the Southem Slav question
as such will have found its solution. A Bulgarian realm stretching
from the Marica in the East to the Lake of Ohrid in the West, will
still be by no means saturated 1: sooner or later it will want to
expand still further. Even now it is clearly recognisable that Bulgaria
aims at the Enos-Midia line, and that her aspirations perhaps even
go beyond this line: moreover a great Bulgaria will one day have
to seize Salonica for itself, and besides in time the western frontier
will certainly not suffice, and it will press on to the Adriatic. In
short, I believe that this Great Bulgaria in its further development
will gradually lose its Bulgarian character and will develop more
and more into a, or better said, into the, Southern Slav realm, so
that the present King of the Bulgarians will see his goal in becoming
Tsar of the Southern Slavs.
But such a Great Bulgaria will in my opinion, considered from
the standpoint of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, then play a role
just as dangerous as the Great Serbia founded at the Treaty of Bucarest.
It seems to me not out of the question that this Great Bulgaria also
might come into the wake of Russia and pursue under her oegis a
far-sighted policy at the expense of the Monarchy. In order to
meet this danger, one must therefore try always to restore a certain
equilibrium in the Balkans and not allow one of the Balkan states
to enjoy, so to speak, sole dominion in the Balkans. This might be
attained on the one hand by supporting Greek aspirations so far
as possible, especially in South Albania, but on the other hand by
allowing the survival of a Serbia, small but still capable of life (lebenlsfdhig). It may be assumed that Serbia under Bulgarian rule would
in time be Bulgarised or be swallowed up in the great Southern Slav
state, so that the Serbian element as such might disappear. But
if an independent, even though small, Serbian state survives, the
Serbian element also will be preserved, the antagonism between Serb
and Bulgar will thus continue and assert itself to our advantage.
If I consider the idea of Count Metternich, as he put it to me,
I think it is not to be simply rejected, but on the contrary that it is
to be carefully considered whether there would not be a real advan-
tage in giving the Serbs a hint that their further existence is desired,
and thus enabling them to crawl to the cross, without having to surrender dead or alive.
1 Saturiert was the phrase used by Baron Aehrenthal to express Au
Hungary's lack of appetite in I906.
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 7I7
I7. COUNT TISZA to FRANCIS JOSEPH,' 4 December, I
With regard to my conversation with His Majesty the German
Emperor, I feel it my duty, without waiting till my next audience,
to report most humbly, that I had noticed, not without anxiety,
as a result of recent military events, an atmosphere and point of
view which might lead the Emperor William to underestimate the
strength of our opponents and the difficulties and dangers still awaiting us, and might lead him to decisions such as would postpone still
further the possibility of an advantageous peace.
This optimism seems to me all the less justifiable, since from
various remarks of Emperor William, I feel bound to draw the con-
clusion that in the immediate future (auf absehbare Zeiten) there
is no prospect of breaking through the Western front or of a decisive
victory in France, and thus the only possibility of bringing at least
one of our enemies to his knees is eliminated (entf/llt).
A defensive, however effective, on the two main theatres of war,
cannot produce among our enemies the necessity (Zwang) of making
peace: and it depends in the first instance upon the moderation of
our war aims and purposes, whether, under the impression of our
successes in other theatres of war, the intention of making peace
ripens among the Entente or not. A truth which we ought to neglect
all the less because despite all heroism and glorious successes
exhaustion must set in sooner with us than with the enemy.
I carefully avoided treating the question in such a way as would
infer our war weariness or weakness and might have led to disagreeable comparisons between our force and that of the German Empire,
but I tried to bring His Majesty to a juster estimate of the enemy
reserves and of the toughness (Zdhigkeit) of the English will to warunhappily without any real effect.
In any case I feel bound to point out the need of a very close
intimate contact with the responsible leaders of German policy, in
order that Emperor William may be permanently influenced in the
sense of moderation.
The intoxicating effect of our last successes also showed itself
in His Majesty's remarks about the Balkans.
With regard to Emperor William's fundamental views, I could
only note with pleasure the change which they show in our favour
and could listen with a certain satisfaction to his eloquent plaidoyer
(schwangvolle Parteinahme) for Bulgaria and its permanent attachment to the Central Powers, and also his contemptuous judgment
on Roumania, who could only be brought back to our sphere of
influence and kept there, by fear of us and of Bulgaria-all this in
the same room, in which barely a year and a half ago the first attempts
were made to win over His Majesty from the very opposite point of
view to this just estimate of the Balkan situation.
1 Since published in O5sszes Munkai, III., p. 296.
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7I8 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
Moreover the idea of a Serbian separate peace, coupled with the
abandonment of Albania to Serbia, had entirely vanished-though
only a few weeks ago, even after the decisively favourable turn in
the Serbian campaign, it was strongly advocated not only by the
diplomatists, but also by General Falkenhayn. On the contrary,
His Majesty put to me in his usual eloquent way, that only a complete
dissolution of Serbia and the annexation of what was left of it could
bring a satisfactory solution of the Serbian problem.
This emphatic support of action so nearly affecting the life of
the Monarchy leads me to deal with this matter more closely, and to
ask Your Majesty's most gracious permission to submit most humbly
my views. I believe I may begin by taking for granted that Serbia
will lose the eastern and southern portion promised to Bulgaria and
by our annexation of its north-west corner will be completely cut
off from the Save and the Danube.
I should thus imagine a territory whose south-west frontier, starting from the middle Drina, would join the new Bulgarian Morava
frontier not far from the Danube, in which connection military considerations of a favourable strategic line must of course be borne in
mind, but an attempt must be made not to make too big the territory
to be conquered by us, and to limit it in the main to the fertile river
valleys.
Serbia would have to suffer a third diminution by the cession
of the Albanian territories assigned to her in the London Protocol.
Albania would receive back the important Albanian districts taken
from her both by Montenegro and by Serbia, and would thus recover
economic and ethnographic conditions for national development.
Bound up with the exclusion of Montenegro from the Adriatic
and the establishment of territorial continuity between Albania
and Montenegro, the experiment of an independent national existence
must be permitted to the Albanian people, in which connection
we must aim mainly at the complete elimination of Italian or Serbian
influence there. As to the results of this attempt, it would be premature to express an opinion. It may equally well lead to a more or
less ordered national Albanian state, or to the union (Angliederung)
of Albania to another state friendly to us.
For the further state existence of Serbdom there would thus
remain Montenegro, reduced and cut off from the sea, and also the
eastern part of middle Serbia-a poor and mainly barren mountainous
district cut off from the waterways, shut in between powerful neighbours, economically entirely dependent on the Monarchy. It is my
conviction that from the standpoint of our well-conceived interests
it is decidedly better not to annex these districts, but under forms
such as satisfy their economic interests to bind them economically
anI militarily to the Monarchy.
In this I also start from the standpoint that we should block the
path to a renewal of the Pan-Serb danger,- only I ask whether the
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 7I9
incorporation of Serbia and the union of almost the whole Serbian
race is really the most effective means to the attainment of this
aim.
Very deserving of attention is the circumstance that in the
experience of people in close contact with our Serbs, this wish is
already showing itself in strongly nationalist Serb circles, even now
immediately after the Serbian defeat. The same people who were
enthusiastic for a Great Serbia and whose attitude, in the event of
a victorious Serbian inroad, would hardly have been free from Irredentist infection, seem now to wish the annihilation of Serbia and
the annexation of all Serbian territories, in the just expectation that
an ever closer union (Zusammenschluss) of the Serbian inhabitants
of Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary proper and the newly acquired
territories would only be a question of time, and that the Serbian
element sooner or later would represent a concentrated power in the
South of the Monarchy, with which it will be necessary to reckon,
and whose national aspirations will assert themselves.
The task of shaping conditions properly in Bosnia is in itself a
hard test for the centripetal forces of the Monarchy. Here Austria.
would hardly enter into the reckoning. In the well-understood
interest of her loyal elements it would be most advisable to diminish
the number of her Southern Slav subjects: to increase them would
be to render the already difficult situation of the Austrian Germans
quite impossible.
Consequently the task of solving the Southern Slav problem
with due regard for the internal unity of the Monarchy and its capac
for action as a Great Power, falls in the first instance upon the Hungarian state. Certainly a heavy burden, which must fill with grave
cares all those responsible for the fate of their fatherland, even if
the Southern Slav population is only augmented by the incorporation
of Bosnia and a small part of northern Serbia. If the i,6oo,ooo
to 2,000,000 Serbs of what remained of Serbia and Montenegro were
to be added, that would not only alter the numerical balance (Krdfteverhdltnisse), but would also kindle the national aspirations and
hopes of the already incorporated Serbs to such a degree that the
Hungarian State would be in danger of losing its firmly knit unitary
stamp (Geprdge).
But if those elements which are centrifugal, or if not hostile, at
least indifferent to the state, win the upper hand, and if Hungary
also loses the character of a living organism blending all its parts
into a single whole, then the Monarchy has lost the greatest force
which had rendered it possible to stand victoriously the gigantic test
of this World War.
And with all emphasis I must take my stand against the illusion
that the incorporation of all the Serbs in the Monarchy would at
least put an end to Russian machinations and to Serbian intrigues
against the Monarchy, and that in the worst case by sacrificing the
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720 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
Hungarian national state Serbdom at least might be permanently
won over.
The experiences of many decades provide proof that to belong
to the Monarchy neither stifles the separatist aims of hostile elements
nor has prevented Russia from deliberately carrying her work of
destruction into their midst; and the present war has with brutal
force opened the eyes even of the blindest.
The incorporation of all Serbs would certainly not kill the Great
Serbian idea: on the contrary the increase of the Serbian subjects
of the Monarchy, the union of all Serbs under the sceptre of one
ruler, the strengthening of the Serbian element as against the other
races, the creation of a great majority of Orthodox Serbs against
the Croats, would be so many factors in the Great Serbian agitation.
Every concession made to nationalism would be a new weapon in its
hand in the struggle for the final goal, separation from the Monarchy.
I believe myself fully justified in recommending the opposite
path to this development-thereby assigning to the remainder of
the Serbs, reduced in numbers and cut off from the world, a separate
state existence: and in that case the question can for the present
remain open, whether these territories are to be kept apart as Montenegro and Serbia, or unified under the Montenegrin reigning family
or perhaps under a new ruler friendly to the Monarchy, and to receive
a new organisation.
In any case, however, the whole territory should be bound by
economic and military ties to the Monarchy. Its inclusion in the
customs area would not noticeably affect home production, but on
the other hand would be the greatest possible boon for the territory
in question and would make its whole existence and future economic
development dependent on our good will. We should thus have
achieved their dependence to a sufficient degree, without giving them
any share in the political life of the Monarchy and increasing the
Serb element inside the Monarchy.
This isolation of the Serbs living outside our frontiers from our
own Serb population would have to be promoted still further by the
incorporation in Hungary proper of the Serbian districts to be annexed.
These would for a presumably longish period have to be administered
on autocratic lines, and at the same time colonisation of Hungarian
and German elements on a grand scale (grosszigig) would have to be
begun, so that they would maintain an altogether reliable patriotic
majority and would have to serve as a wedge between the Serbian
State and the Serbian population of Slavonia and Southern Hungary.
Hand in hand with a well-planned (zielbewusst) augmentation
of the Hungarian and German settlements in Syrmia, in the Backa
and in the Banat, the iron wall protecting our southern frontier and
keeping off Great Serbian infection from our native Serbian population, would grow ever stronger.
With these remarks I think I have proved that the path proposed
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AUSTRO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SERBIA. 72I
by me is the better one, from the standpoint of the Monarchy's own
permanent interests.
In conclusion, however, it should be also pointed out that this
path is in all probability the only passable one.
To this mangling (Verstiimmelung) of the Serbian state, alike
territorially and as regards its sovereignty, Russia will certainly
submit very reluctantly. The complete annexation of Serbia would
be a blow and a humiliation for Russian policy, to which Russia would
hardly ever consent without a complete defeat-a complete defeat
which certainly does not belong to the most probable events.
Unless we want to render it necessary for us to fight out a war
a outrance with Russia, and ourselves to block the way to an honourable and advantageous peace, we must avoid putting forward war
aims with regard to Serbia, such as go far beyond a due regard for
our own safety or the military probabilities of our heroic struggle
with a superior force.
I8. COUNT TIsZA to. BARON BURIAN. Budapest, 30 December, I9I5.
(Strictly secret.)'
This Memorandum was an answer to one of the C.G.S., Baron
Conrad, on the relation between " foreign policy and military leadership." T'sza argues that " of a complete success we can really only speak
in the Balkans, and even there only after the Entente's expulsion from
Salonica," and that there can be no question of " a blow at the heart"
rof Russia. There is no hope of bringing France or England to theil
knees: Italy can only be reduced by a victorious offensive. In short,
-a good defensive position, but no chance of complete victory over the
main enemy-not a position for fixing war aims " according to our
good pleasure'" (nach Gutdiinken). Great caution is needed in proclaiming our desire for annexation.
He then deals in detail with the Serbian question.
" The formula of a solution of the Serbian or Southern Slav question
within the framework of the Monarchy may be variously interpreted.
If by it were meant that steps are to be taken to check Serbian
des gns against the integrity of the Monarchy and if Serbia's fate is to
be regulated in such a way as to make her harmless, nothing could
be said against this. But if it means the incorporation of all Serbs
in the Monarchy, I must oppose this with the greatest emphasisneedless to say, from the standpoint of the interest of the whole
Monarchy.
"That this coincides with the properly understood Hungarian
national interest, requires in my opinion no further proof. The
existence of the Hungarian national state is altogether interwoven
with the Monarchy's position as a Great Power. . . . This identity
was the fruitful basis of the Ausgleich of I867: it fully proved itself
in the Balkan crisis of the seventies and eighties and has undergone
I Full text in Grof Tisza Istvain, Osszes Munkdi, III., p. 337.
3 A
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722 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
the test of fire in the present struggle. . . . Not merely have the
loyalty and heroic sacrifice of the Hungarian race been used to help
the Monarchy in the trials of the first half of the war . . . but also its
constructive power, which unites the zo million inhabitants of Hungary
in a living organism. . . . Unless one is quite blinded by prejudice,
one cannot after the experience of this war dispute that not only
the energy of the Hungarians in an ethnic sense, but the firm framework
of the Hungarian national state, is the main support of the whole
Monarchy's power. If it is not desired to rob the whole structure of
the Monarchy of its strongest support and conjure up dangers worse
than any outside enemy, then one must not overlook this point of
view in any decision regarding Serbia.
" The claim that the incorporation of all Serbs in the Monarchy
is the only effective way of dispelling the Serbian danger, rests in
my opinion on a double error-(i) that the annexation of Serbia
would really remove the Great Serbian danger, and (2) that a Serbdom
living its own separate state life could not be brought within the
Monarchy's orbit and made harrnless for it. . . . For the annexed
Serbs the Monarchy will remain the arch-enemy as much after as
before the annexations, and to increase the number of our Serbian
subjects by several millions will provide a greater sounding board for
Serbian nationalist agitation and raise its hopes and claims.
" The saying that the Monarchy is 'territorially saturated' was
no phrase ad usum Delphini . . . but expressed the truth that the
proportion of centrifugal to centripetal forces in the Monarchy was
already highly unfavourable and could not brook an increase in the
former. The glorious events of this war must not let us abandon this
accurate estimate....
Austria, he went on to argue, could not cope with an increase in
the number of hostile elements in the South, and such an experiment
would have lamentable consequences in the Austrian state. " Under
these circumstances the centre of gravity in the Serbian question falls
upon the lands of the Hungarian Crown, and only harmonious cooperation between Hungarians and Croats can assure success. If the
Croats were hostile, Hungary would not be strong enough to digest
all the Serbs, while to assign all the Serbs to Croatia would be to
hand over the Croats to a Serbian majority and would lead in a few
decades to their absorption. It is a matter of life and death for the
Croats to rely on Hungary in the struggle against Panserbism, and
not to take in more Serbs than they can manage. ...
"If we want to influence the Serbs of Bosnia, Croatia and South
Hungary in a patriotic sense and to improve the situation there, we
both have enough to do. An incorporation of several millions in
Serbia and Montenegro would confront us with an impossible task
. . .and compromise the Monarchy's future. . . On the other
hand what remains of Serbia and Montenegro could be transformed
in such a way as to give the Monarchy a handle for successfully checking
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MONTENEGRO AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 723
hostile currents. If we cut off from the Serbian state all that was
promised to Bulgaria, if we give to Albania the parts of Serbia and
Montenegro which belong naturally to her, and if we cut off Montenegro
from the Adriatic, then it is only necessary for us to annex the northwest corner of Serbia, in order to cut her and Montenegro off from the
outer world and bring them into complete economic dependence on
the Monarchy.
" There would then remain one or two poor, utterly dependent
petty states (Staatchen), for which the good will of the Monarchy would
be an absolutely vital question, and which would be brought into
permanent dependence by far-reaching trade concessions and military
arrangements.
" While favouring this solution . . . I would add that I regard
any further solution as not only harmful, but also impracticable. The
annexation of Serbia would prove to be as much an obstacle to peace
as that of Belgium, and the Monarchy must submit to leaving Serbia
a certain state existence, just as Germany in the case of Belgium.
" It is not the first time that this question has occupied the competent factors of the Monarchy. It was raised by the Hungarian
Government before the war and resulted in the unanimous resolution
of the Joint Council of Ministers on I9 July, I9I4, by which Serbian
territory was only to be annexed within the limits of a rectification
of frontier. This decision was a condition of the Hungarian Government's consent to the dispatch of the Note to Serbia, it was put forward
as such by me and accepted by all present. It thus forms a solenm
admission binding upon all competent factors, such as can only be
annulled or altered by unanimous resolution.
" Though I feel bound to adhere to this fundamental principle, I
cannot resist the grounds which seem to render a certain revision of
this decision expedient. The extent of the Serbian territory to be
united with the Monarchy may be somewhat greater than was then
contemplated, and certain questions connected with the fate of the
annexed territory and of what remains of Serbia would have to be
cleared up, and on this the military authorities to be established there
have every right to be informed.
II. MONTENEGRO AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
I9. COUNT TARNOWSKI to BARON BURIAN. No. I449. Sofia, II
November, I9I5.
Transmits a telegram from Crown Prince Danilo of Montenegro
to Baron de Kruyff, couched in the following terms:
Pouvez-vous pas penetrer veritables intentions des Centrales 'a
l'egard de Montenegro, Serbie: faites comprendre si possible Kaiser,
annexion de Montenegro serait boulet intrainable, causant troubles
continuels; convainquez Vienne avantages reels, grand interet pour
Centrales conserver toujours un etat serbe leur reconnaissant, donc
attache, pour pouvoir, cas echeant, contrebalancer velleites, aspira-
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724 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.
tions etendues Bulgarie devenant probablement bientot trop exigeante.
Nous pourrons assurer cet e'quilibre, quand le Montenegro serait
aggrandi par partie Serbie, extremite Dalmatie, nord Albanie, dej a
occupes, faisant ainsi un seul royaume serbe. Dans ce cas nous
serons a meme et disposes faire deriver retraite serbe vers I'Albanie,
et pas admettre troupes serbes, non plus troupes allies sur notre territoire et accepter traites avec Centrales sur bases indiquees. Repondez
aussi vite que possible, et cas affirmatif agissez sans perdre aucun temps.
20. COUNT TARNOWSKI to BARON BURIAN. No. I474. Sofia, i6
November, I9I5. (Summary.)
Reports a conversation with Baron de Kruyff, a kinsman of Crow
Prince Danilo of Montenegro. De Kruyff spoke of a Montenegrin
request for peace. King Nicholas had been driven into war by the
Serbian party in Montenegro. She had always tried to show as little
enmity as possible towards the Monarchy, and had already in July,
I9I5, tried to open peace negotiations. The interests of Montenegro
and Austria-Hungary must henceforth run parallel. De Kruyff was
ready to go to Vienna and Switzerland, to see Prince Danilo.
2I. BARON MITTAG to BARON BURIAN. No. I562. Sofia, 5 December,
I9I5.
Has learnt from Baron de Kruyff that King Nicholas is
in order to meet the Duke of Aosta, and King Peter of Serbia if he
can get there.
22. BARON BURIAN to COUNT THURN. NO. 5788 pro domo. I7
December, I9I5.
Reports desire of Mr. V. Petrovic for conversation with respons
representative of Austria-Hungary, and refusal in view of his antecedents. " For this refusal on my part the decisive factor is not
merely the person of the said Serbian politician, but above all the
consideration that it hardly seems expedient to deal with individual
Serbs whose following is more or less restricted: there are at present
at our disposal wider and more passable paths by which to establish
contact with the people and get to know its wishes and needs."
23. On 26 November Vienna insisted upon being assured of King
Nicholas's " knowledge and sanction " as a condition sine qua non
of negotiation.
24. On I7 December Baron de Kruyff wrote to Count Forgach,
announcing that Crown Prince Danilo proposed visiting Switzerland.
25. On 8 August, I9I8, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office addressed
to the War Office a communication (2I. 38I3), stating that between
i April, I9I6, and 31 March, I9I8, it had disbursed I14,000 kronen
(&4,75o) on behalf of the late Prince Mirko of Montenegro. It appends
full details of twenty-one separate payments (gegen Ersatz vom Kriegsminister) and asks for repayment, showing the various receipts.
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