LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. Nos. 95494-97
September 7, 1995
Puno, J.
FACTS: The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents. A
few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties.
First, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to provide
security services for their business premises. The Union branded the security guards as private
respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their
members.
Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR).
Among the topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company. The Union claimed
that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine
Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other
leftist groups.
These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting. After private respondents explained the issues,
the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union
directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates.
Thereafter, the Union filed, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused
the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members and unionbusting.
On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. With the apparent settlement of their differences,
private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.
However, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house. The
gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private respondents.
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They
returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system". On September 14, 1988, Private
respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and
damages, with prayer for injunction.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike
won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on
October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union struck.
ISSUE: Whether the strike held on October 12, 1988 was legal or not?
HELD: No, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the
seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in
holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval
of the majority of the union members.
The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to
verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. Our laws require
the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge
against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the
strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed.
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its
protection against exploitation by management. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures will render the
strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.
The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated
December 24, 1986.
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c)
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice
of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended
date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly
certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization
in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence
of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action
immediately.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(f)
A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose.
The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds
considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike
or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed
the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been
obtained and reported to the Ministry.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial
or labor dispute."4 It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to
force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably,
strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also
on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by
balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest.
Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the procedural steps to be followed
before staging a strike — filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result
to the Department of Labor and Employment. In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs.
Overseas, et al., 5 we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character, thus:
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not
the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed)
far which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS' GUILD v. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA
G.R. Nos. L-20662 and L-20663
March 19, 1968
Makalintal, J.
FACTS: The respondents Compañia Maritima, Philippine Steamship Navigation Company and Madrigal Shipping
Company are domestic corporations engaged in the operation of motor ships and vessels in the different ports of the
Philippines, while the petitioner, Philippine Marine Officers' Guild (hereinafter referred to as PMOG), is a labor
organization composed of marine officers and engineers.
On different dates PMOG sent separate letters to several shipping firms, each letter containing a set of demands. A
dispute thereafter arose between PMOG and each of the COMPANIES, and on July 17, 1954 PMOG filed with the
Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor notices of its intention to be against MARITIMA and PHILSTEAM,
alleging refusal to bargain and other unspecified unfair labor practices. The Conciliation Service called a conference
of the parties but no agreement was reached by them.
PMOG thereupon declared a strike against the three COMPANIES and pickets were placed. The picketing at Pier 4
did not last long, but that at Pier 8 and on the Escolta was carried on for weeks and months. On January 14, 1955,
while the strike and the picketing in these two places were still in progress, the President of the Philippines, pursuant
to Section 10 of Republic Act 875, certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations. On January 18, 1955 the
CIR issued a resolution ordering the "strikers to return to work immediately upon receipt of this order, and the
respondent companies to readmit them". The following day, PMOG filed a manifestation expressing its willingness to
abide by said resolution and requesting that "three bailiffs accompany the three groups of members to their
respective companies" and that the "members of the petitioner . . . in the provinces . . . be given ten (10) days from
date to report to duty to their respective companies."
ISSUE: Whether the CIR correctly held that the strike of PMOG against Maritima was illegal?
HELD: Yes. The legality or illegality of a strike depends first, upon the purpose for which it is maintained, and,
second, upon the means employed in carrying it on. Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by
means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable, or unjust or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or
cause injuries to persons or damage to property, the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by
the court illegal with adverse consequences to the strikers.
Here we find that the majority opinion predicated the illegality of the strike not merely on the infringement of said
agreement by the union but on the proven fact that, in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation
with physical injuries, sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by
top officials and members of the union in an attempt to prevent arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
In the present case, where the strike against MARITIMA was not only unjustified but also carried on illegally, we find
no justifiable ground to disagree with the majority in the court below who voted against the reinstatement of the
strikers.
PHILIPPINE METAL FOUNDRIES INC., v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
G.R. No. L-34948-49
May 15, 1979
Antonio, J.
FACTS: Petitioner, in its complaint dated November 21, 1963 charged the Regal Manufacturing Employees
Associations FTUP and its members, with unfair labor practice for declaring a strike on October 5, 1963 and picketing
the company's premises without filing a notice of strike in spite of the existence of a no strike, no lockout clause and
grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Union.
In their answer, the Union and its members denied the charge and, alleged that the Union requested the
management for a grievance conference, but the company, through its General Manager, refused and instead
handed the Union's President a memorandum dismissing him from work and told the Union members not to report for
work, which is in violation of the no lockout and no strike clause of the contract.
ISSUE: Whether the strike declared by the Union on October 5, 1963, is legal or not?
HELD: The strike declared by the Union in this case cannot be considered a violation of the "no strike" clause of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement because it was due to the unfair labor practice of the employer. Moreover, a no
strike clause prohibition in a Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only to economic strikes.
It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a grievance conference on October 5, 1963.
Yet, two hours after it accepted the letter of invitation, it dismissed Baylon without prior notice and or investigation.
Such dismissal is undoubtedly an unfair labor practice committed by the company. Under these facts and
circumstances, Baylon and the members of the Union had valid reasons to ignore the schedule grievance conference
and declared a strike. When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the dismissal of Baylon was due to union
activities, said strike was not illegal. It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by
the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a
strike.
The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes arising out of and against a company's unfair
labor practice, a strike notice is not necessary in view of the strike being founded on urgent necessity and directed
against practices condemned by public policy, such notice being legally required only in cases of economic strikes.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. ERNESTO U. GAMIER
G.R. No. 159460
November 15, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.
Note: Article 212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy
or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. The term strike shall comprise not
only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or
sabotage plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. Thus, the fact that the conventional term strike was not
used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
FACTS: Sometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees Union (Union) were
set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two
years thereof. Negotiations commenced but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock
and filed a Notice of Strike. In view of the impending actual strike, then Secretary of Labor and Employment
Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
as amended. In his Order, Secretary Laguesma resolved all economic and non-economic issues.
Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a
rally. As a result of the employees concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. On the same
day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum addressed to all employees calling
their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they
have put their jobs at risk as they will be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in
the union-instigated concerted action. The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days, from April 3
to 5, 2000.
On the third day of the concerted work boycott (April 5, 2000), Vistan issued another memorandum,[8] this time
declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting April 6, 2000 provided
these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in
this illegal act. Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513 returned to work
and were accepted by the bank.
ISSUE: Whether the protest rally and concerted work abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents violated the
Order dated January 18, 2000 of the Secretary of Labor?
HELD: Yes, applying pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, we rule that the protest actions undertaken by the
Union officials and members are not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for
redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The Unions position is weakened by
the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold rallies. They were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated
through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse
that they will hold a rally.
Moreover, it is explicit from the directive of the Secretary in his January 18, 2000 Order that the Union and its
members shall refrain from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation, which certainly includes
concerted actions.
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. Article 264 (a) of the Labor
Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency
of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
xxxx
The Court has consistently ruled that once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. A strike
that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is a
prohibited activity and thus illegal.
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. There is no dispute that when respondents
conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending
as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated
the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration simultaneous with concerted work
abandonment/boycott.