Facultat d’Economia
Degree in International Business
-------------Departament de Direcció d'Empreses
Juan José Renau Piqueras
Av. Tarongers, s/n
Facultat d’Economia – 1st floor
46022 Valencia (Spain)
Tel: +34 963828312 - Fax: +34 963828333
Assignment #2: STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS
(Activity especially related to the contents of Topic 2)
GOALS:
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Identifying and analysing organisational stakeholders
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Considering the relevance and role of organisational stakeholders in strategy decisionmaking
Manchester United FC: struggling to compete with Europe’s elite clubs1
Introduction
Manchester United is the most celebrated football club in England but in 2018–19 its
supremacy was challenged by both Manchester City (who won the English Premier League -EPL- in
2012, 2014 and 2018) and Chelsea (who won the EPL in 2010, 2015 and 2017 and the European
Champions league in 2012). Both clubs have mega-rich owners who, unlike Manchester United, have
invested heavily without plunging the club into debt. Even a resurgent Liverpool may become a force
to be reckoned with under manager Jurgen Klopp, having reached the European Champions League
final in 2018 and leading the EPL in early 2019.
Within Europe, Manchester United is ranked as the most valuable club and has the third
highest revenue, just behind Real Madrid and Barcelona. Manchester City was ranked fifth and
Chelsea eighth in 2018 – however both have ambitious owners and are likely to gain more success
and higher revenues in the future. MUFC has struggled to maintain its dominance in English football
after the retirement of long-term manager, Sir Alex Ferguson. In the period 2013–19 Manchester
United had three different managers (plus two temporary managers) – none of which was able to
win the title – and in three of those seasons MUFC failed to qualify for the European Champions
League (ECL). The financial position remains a concern with the highest level of net debt of any
European team. However, this is offset to some extent by the fact that MUFC has very high revenues
– reaching a record level in 2017 of £581m (€676m) and operating profits of £81m. Manchester
United remains one of England’s biggest and best clubs – in 2018 the club moved up to second place
in the English Premier League and returned to compete in the European Champions league. New
sponsorship deals and increased TV income means that the financial position has improved and
success on the field should enable the club to remain competitive but closest neighbours Manchester
City are doing even better – and that hurts.
Football finances in Europe are under much greater scrutiny as UEFA has a ‘financial fair play’
policy aimed at limiting excessive expenditure and unsustainable debt levels among European clubs.
Can Manchester United compete with its domestic rivals and rise to the challenge of the elite clubs in
Europe? Will MUFC’s unpopular ownership by the Glazer family remain in place? Will the club be
taken over by another ambitious billionaire attracted by ‘the beautiful game’ or will the fans get a
look in?
Manchester United FC – a brief history
Manchester United’s success and global brand is rooted in history. The club achieved limited
1
Whittington, R. et al. (2020). Exploring Strategy. Text & Cases, Harlow, Essex: Prentice Hall, pp. 599-608.
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success in the first 70 years of its existence but since the 1950s it has become increasingly successful.
MUFC continued to develop young and exciting teams and became the first English club to win the
European Cup in 1968. Manchester United is the best supported club in the UK and its fame is
international – the club claims to have 659 million fans worldwide and 71 million followers on
Facebook.
After the Premier League was introduced in 1992–3, Manchester United began to dominate
the English game – winning the league 12 times in the first 20 years. However, this dominance has
come under challenge as Chelsea and Manchester City have benefited from huge investments to
become key rivals.
The club was traditionally run as a private limited company. In 1989, MUFC was valued at
£10m but over the next 30 years the valuation of the club rocketed, as the value of an iconic football
brand was realised and the commercialisation of football grew. When live televised matches became
the norm it was realised that football clubs could be very valuable assets.
Changes in ownership
In 1991 MUFC was floated on the London Stock Exchange with a valuation of £40m. As a public
limited company (plc) the club was able to raise capital by share issues in 1994 and 1997. At the time
of the floatation in 1991, very few football clubs had the ownership structure of a plc and it was a
controversial move. The team continued to be successful and increased its financial revenues, with
Peter Kenyon being recruited in May 1997 for his marketing and branding expertise. Later, as chief
executive, he helped to build the club’s global business interests. MUFC’s merchandising success
became the benchmark for the industry, with Manchester United becoming a well-known brand
across the world.
A public limited company has a different set of purposes and priorities compared to other
forms of ownership structures common among football clubs. Shareholders demand profits and the
vast majority of shares were owned by financial institutions looking for a return on their investment.
MUFC as a plc was at the forefront of the revolution that was changing football from a traditional
working-class sport into a multinational business. Clubs were now receiving huge sums from the
media (Sky TV and BT Sport massively increased the value of football on TV) and clubs are getting a
lot more income from sponsors. Some genuine football supporters began to feel alienated by the
club’s values and global aspirations – should a football club be striving for profits? The range of
stakeholders that needed to be satisfied had got considerably wider.
In the 14 years that MUFC was a plc (1991–2005) it dominated English football (winning the
league title eight times and the FA cup four times) and the profits were rolling in. Everyone seemed
to be benefiting from the success but there was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction among supporters
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and resentment from other clubs.
The Glazer takeover – a return to private ownership
One of the disadvantages of plc status is the risk of a takeover. Manchester United was a cashrich club and the potential to exploit the brand attracted predatory interest. In the early 2000s
Malcolm Glazer (a multi-millionaire with diverse business interests in the USA) began to build a
shareholding stake in MUFC. Glazer saw the potential of a strong brand and believed that he might
be able to market it successfully in the USA and globally. When the final takeover was complete the
valuation of MUFC was estimated at £800m. However, the Glazer family were not rich enough to
finance the deal themselves and had to borrow heavily to gain control – much of this debt
(approximately £275m) was secured against the football club’s assets. Moreover, a significant part of
this finance was obtained at high rates of interest from US Hedge Funds. After being debt free for
almost 15 years, MUFC had become a privately owned company with total debts estimated at £660m
incurring annual interest payments of approximately £60m.
During the takeover, fans were worried that ticket prices would soar in order to pay the
increased costs of the borrowing undertaken by the Glazers. Ticket prices have gone up but they are
still less expensive than at several premiership clubs – notably the London clubs, Chelsea and
Arsenal. The Old Trafford stadium is full for almost every match and there is a long waiting list for
season tickets.
Manchester United continued to invest heavily in the stadium and its facilities – the
developments completed in 2006 took ground capacity up to 75.691, making it the largest club
ground in England. Average attendances (and revenues) are higher than key rivals – in 2017–18
Manchester United had an average league attendance of 74.976. In Europe only Barcelona and
Borussia Dortmund command higher average attendances. Revenues continue to rise due to
lucrative television deals and commercial income which has enabled the club to service the interest
payments on the debts.
The financial position of the club needed attention with the peak level of debt reaching £778m
in June 2010. Later that year a bond issue generated £504m which enabled MUFC to pay off most of
the debt held by international banks. The club's debt prompted protests from fans – the Manchester
United Supporters' Trust (which had opposed the Glazers from the start) held meetings with a group
of wealthy fans hoping to buy out the Glazers, but it soon became apparent that they were not going
to sell. In July 2012, the club decided to list shares on the New York Stock Exchange – thereby diluting
the Glazers ownership but without the family losing control. The shares (issued at $14) traded poorly
at first but recovered to trade at $16–$24 throughout 2017–18. Manchester United was valued by
Forbes at $4,12bn in 2018, making it the most valuable football club in the world – just ahead of Real
Madrid ($4,08bn) and Barcelona ($4,06bn). Nearby Manchester City has recently emerged as the
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second most valuable English club ($2,47bn) but, because of its private ownership structure, is
completely debt free and able to compete financially with any team in Europe.
Years of transition after Alex Ferguson
On the playing side, success continued while Alex Ferguson remained as manager Manchester
United completed a hat trick of league titles in 2009 and won again in 2011 and 2013. It also reached
the European Champions League final in both 2008 and 2009. However, at the end of the 2012–13
season Ferguson announced that he was retiring. Ferguson had proved himself to be one of the most
successful football managers of all time – in 26 years at Manchester United the club won 38 trophies.
In addition, a new CEO was appointed (Ed Woodward) who was not as experienced or dynamic as
previous chief executives. May 2014 saw the death of Malcolm Glazer but this had relatively little
impact on the club as control of the club had already passed to his sons Joel and Avram Glazer who
are co-chairmen.
The management succession proved more difficult: MUFC first appointed David Moyes but
2013–14 proved to be a poor season for the club – finishing seventh and failing to qualify for the
European Champions league. Moyes was sacked despite his six-year contract and commentators
feared that this mighty club faced financial meltdown unless they quickly returned to the top. An
experienced manager, Louis van Gaal was appointed in May 2014 on a three-year contract, with
former star player Ryan Giggs appointed as assistant manager – with a view to him taking over after
three years. Fortunately for Manchester United there was something of a recovery in 2014–15.
Although Chelsea won the league and Manchester City finished second, United managed fourth place
and so qualified for the lucrative European Champions League competition. That recovery was short
lived and, despite finishing fifth and winning the FA cup, van Gaal was sacked in 2016 to be replaced
by Jose Mourinho, a very successful manager who had twice won the European Champions League
and league titles in four different countries.
In 2016–17 MUFC finished only sixth in the league but won two cup trophies and managed to
qualify for the European Champions League because it had won the Europa League (a competition
designed for those not quite good enough to qualify for the Champions league!). In 2017–18 MUFC
finished second in the league and returned to the European Champions League – Mourinho had done
his job but not everyone was satisfied. The style of football was pragmatic, not the flowing attacking
football that Manchester United fans love and had come to expect under Ferguson. Moreover,
Manchester City had won the league by a massive 19-point margin and scored 38 more goals than
United – MUFC were looking distinctly second best and that upsets the fans. Mourinho was sacked in
late 2018 and another former star MUFC player, Ole Gunnar Solskjaer was appointed as the new
manager.
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European Football and the Champions League
UEFA launched the European Cup competition in 1956. Spanish champions Real Madrid
dominated the early years, winning the first five titles. In the second year, MUFC reached the semifinal and in 1958 they qualified again as English champions and were favourites to challenge the
dominance of Real Madrid – until the tragedy of the Munich air crash, which destroyed half the team
(eight players were killed). The European Cup continued successfully until 1992 and was joined by
some sister competitions (the Cup Winners Cup and the UEFA Cup) in order to involve more of the
top European clubs. MUFC finally won the European Cup for the first time in 1968 – the culmination
of an emotional ten-year journey for legendary manager Matt Busby and the Munich survivors.
A problem with the European Cup was that only one team from each country qualified and in a
knock-out competition there were relatively few games. In response to pressures from leading
European football clubs, in 1992 UEFA set up the European Champions League – in this new format
the biggest associations (e.g. England, Spain, Italy and Germany) could enter several teams, with
qualification based on a seeding system. Moreover the first round was played on a group basis, thus
guaranteeing each team at least six fixtures. This new format has been an outstanding success,
attracting large crowds and lucrative TV deals (shown in over 75 countries) – total revenues from the
competition are estimated to be in the region of €1,5bn. In 2017–18, Real Madrid alone earned
€89,5m: it is no surprise that all the elite clubs in Europe strive for qualification and success in this
competition.
An unfortunate effect of this development is that money, power and success have become
ever more concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of elite clubs, which dominate
their own leagues to such an extent that they can become very predictable. In Germany, Bayern
Munich has won the domestic league 16 times since 1992 (out of 25) including the last six seasons. In
Spain, Real Madrid and Barcelona dominate (winning 20 out of 25 titles since 1992). In Italy, Juventus
and the two Milan clubs are the most successful (winning 23 out of 25 titles since 1992) but it is
Juventus that has emerged as the dominant force, winning for the last seven years continuously. In
France the competition used to be much more open but after Qatari investors took over Paris SaintGermain in 2011, PSG have won six of the last seven titles – in 2017–18 by a clear 13 points. The
English Premier League remains more competitive, which might explain why it is the most popular
league for global TV audiences. However, even in England six clubs have become much richer and
more powerful, with Manchester City, Manchester United and Chelsea dominating (20 out of 25
titles since 1992). Arsenal have won the English Premier League three times since 1992 (but not since
2004) and Liverpool are historically a major team but haven’t won the league since 1990. Tottenham
Hotspur have just rebuilt their stadium and with an exciting young team and a highly rated manager,
aspire to join the elite clubs. Nonetheless, England too is in danger of losing its competitive
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excitement, as Manchester City – with the untold riches of Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Mansour – becomes
the dominant force: coach Pep Guardiola spent an extraordinary £448m on new players and this paid
dividends in 2017–18 when it won the league by a record 19 points. If football becomes too
predictable, it may lose its popular appeal – that is why season 2015–16 will live long in the memory,
when 5000–1 outsiders Leicester City pulling off one of the biggest shocks in football history by
winning the Premier League – a feat that may never be repeated in this age of financial giants.
Alternative ownership structures
There are alternatives to the debt-financed pattern of ownership that is now common in the
English Premier League. In Germany nearly all the professional clubs have at least 51 per cent
ownership by the members. In Spain the two richest clubs (Real Madrid and Barcelona) are owned
and operated by the members. Nonetheless this doesn’t stop these clubs taking on debt – the
irresistible drive to be successful demands that spending often exceeds income.
A further possibility is for clubs to be supported by large firms that use the club as part of a
promotion strategy and support the local club in the communities where they are located, e.g. Philips
support PSV Eindhoven and Bayer support Bayer Leverkusen. It is also possible for local government
bodies to support clubs financially and in other ways, e.g. provision of stadia, as in Italy – but this is
not common elsewhere at senior levels of football.
Some clubs are lucky enough to have rich benefactors who provide funding: Chelsea are
backed by the billionaire support of Roman Abramovich; Manchester City is fully owned by Sheikh
Mansour (part of the UAE ruling family). Similarly, the Qatar Investment Authority acquired Paris
Saint-Germain in 2011, since when PSG have spent over €1bn on players. The next wave of billionaire
ownership may well emerge from China – the phenomenal recent rise of the Chinese economy has
spawned a massive number of dollar billionaires (596 according to the Hurun report). Many of these
are interested in investing in European football. Chinese owners have already acquired historic
English clubs Aston Villa, West Bromwich Albion and Wolverhampton Wanderers – these may
become significant competitors again in the next decade. However, a lack of continuing interest or
support from rich owners can leave a club in deep financial trouble – this happened to Spanish club
Malaga FC after the Qatari owners pulled their funding.
It was problems like this, and the spiralling debt at many top clubs, that persuaded UEFA and
its president Michel Platini to develop a ‘Financial Fair Play’ policy. Platini expressed the concerns of
many when he said: ‘The goal is not to win titles but to make money to pay off debts. Look at Chelsea
and Manchester United. FIFA and UEFA owe it to themselves to fight this. I am very concerned by
clubs being bought by foreigners. I don’t see why Americans come to invest in these clubs if not to
turn them into “products”. It’s a never-ending gold rush.’
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The ‘financial fair play’ regulations
Many clubs in Europe have reported repeated financial losses and high levels of debt;
moreover the economic situation created difficult market conditions for clubs in Europe. Many clubs
experienced liquidity shortfalls leading to delayed payments to other clubs, employees and social/tax
authorities. With Platini as a driving force, UEFA decided to take action and set about tackling these
problems by publishing a financial fair play (FFP) policy in 2010. The principal objectives were to:
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introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances;
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decrease pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit the inflationary effect;
•
encourage clubs to compete with (in) their revenues;
•
encourage long-term investments in the youth sector and infrastructure;
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protect the long-term viability of European club football;
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ensure clubs settle their liabilities on a timely basis.
One important aspect of the policy is an obligation for clubs to balance their books or ‘break
even’: clubs may not repeatedly spend more than their generated revenues and will be obliged to
meet all their transfer and employee payment commitments. Higher-risk clubs that fail to meet key
indicators will be required to provide budgets detailing their strategic plans. UEFA has a range of
sanctions including warnings, fines, transfer embargos, deduction of points and disqualification from
tournaments. A Financial Control Panel has been set up to monitor and ensure that clubs adhere to
the financial fair play requirements.
There are, however, concerns that these regulations will not stop billionaire owners pumping
funds into clubs and circumventing the regulations. If benefactors put money into the club in the
form of excessive sponsorship, it would show up as football-related income. This would allow the
club to balance its books and facilitate more spending.
Some wonder if Manchester City are already doing this. The biggest driver of revenue growth
has been sponsorship. Not all of City's sponsors are suspect. However, it is striking that among its
portfolio of commercial partners it counts four companies that are either owned or controlled by the
UAE's government – Mansour's family, in other words. Etihad’s ten-year £400m sponsorship deal
with City is so astonishingly rich that UEFA announced that it would investigate the deal. However,
success has brought in other sponsors (e.g. Nike, Nissan and EA sports), which have helped to reduce
City’s dependence on UAE funding. Nonetheless this loophole will have to be closed as former
Arsenal manager Arsene Wenger noted: ‘It raises the real question about the credibility of Financial
Fair Play. If Financial Fair play is to have a chance, the sponsorship has to be at market price.’
The highest profile case of FFP infringement revolves around PSG – the French champions
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owned by Qatar Sports Investments (an investment vehicle for Qatari firms linked to the Qatari royal
family). Initially PSG were sanctioned by UEFA in 2014 for a sponsorship deal that was deemed to be
unfair. In 2017 the football world was shocked when PSG signed the Brazilian superstar Neymar for
€222m (£196m) – double the previous transfer fee record. On top of this, in 2018 they bought the
highly rated French teenager, Kylian Mbappe for a transfer fee of €188m (£166m). Various sources
have claimed PSG are not generating enough revenue to pay for these fees while remaining within
FFP guidelines.
Nonetheless the Financial Fair Play regulations do seem to be having some effect. UEFA’s
website makes the following points: ‘In the five years since the introduction of Financial Fair Play the
financial results of European clubs have improved every year. Club balance sheets are strengthening
significantly with net equity doubling and net debt dropping from 65% to 35%. These positive results
explain why the project receives almost universal support among football stakeholders. Amongst the
effects are:
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Restrictions on the clubs that make the most excessive losses, including 28 settlement
agreements designed to bring these clubs to break-even. Restrictions have been applied to
transfers and wages.
•
Efforts to prevent the build-up of debts by requiring the owners and shareholders of over 50
clubs to raise or inject new capital.
•
Sanctions created to persuade clubs to avoid delaying outstanding payments, including the
option of excluding clubs from UEFA competitions.
•
Creating an environment that encourages new and continued owner investment in a
properly regulated market.
•
Encouraging the introduction of domestic rules based on the principles of Financial Fair Play
with adjustments as needed for local conditions.
•
Increasing awareness of the importance of club finances with the public and media.’
In 2015, UEFA relaxed the FFP regulations to allow cash injections from owners that do not
involve increasing the club’s debts. This is good news for clubs like Manchester City and PSG and was
partly the result of lobbying by these clubs – it was also doubtful if the regulations were enforceable
in law anyway. Moreover there had been criticism that the FFP regulations tended to favour the
established richest clubs and re-enforce their dominance by making it very difficult for clubs outside
the elite group from spending the sums needed to compete with these giants.
Governance issues
Football has always had a poor image as regards good governance. Dubious characters seem
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drawn to the game and several clubs (and governing bodies) have suffered from the bad publicity
that attaches to the all-too-frequent scandals. Powerful men like Silvio Berlusconi (at AC Milan) and
Thaksin Shinawatra (at Manchester City) have faced charges of corruption. Several clubs have faced
bans for match fixing, e.g. five big clubs in Italy in 2006 (which included Juventus and AC Milan) and
Fenerbahçe in Turkey in 2012. Individuals in the game have been found guilty of tax evasion, e.g. Uli
Hoeness when President of Bayern Munich. Many others have been suspected of malpractice, e.g.
Terry Venables stood down as England manager following accusations involving his business and tax
dealings.
Taxation (and the thin line between legitimate tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion) has long
been a problem in football. Throughout the last 50 years stories about managers receiving ‘bungs’
have surfaced on a regular basis. More recently many premier league players have been caught up in
a tax avoidance scheme – it is claimed 129 players owe up to £250m in unpaid tax. The most highprofile cases involve the biggest stars in world football (Ronaldo, Messi and Neymar) and Jose
Mourinho – all were convicted of tax evasion in the Spanish courts and ordered to pay massive fines.
In 2010 the UK government set up an inquiry into Football Governance aimed at investigating a
range of issues including: cases of unfit owners, leveraged buy-outs (as in the case of MUFC and
Liverpool), clubs falling into administration, accusations of corruption and the role of football agents.
The Inquiry published several reports and made recommendations for governance of the FA – but
progress in addressing the widespread concerns raised has been slow.
Another governance concern was about the bidding process for deciding host countries for the
FIFA World Cup in 2018 (awarded to Russia) and in 2022 (awarded to Qatar), with widespread
rumours of bribery and malpractice. FIFA conducted an investigation under the leadership of Michael
Garcia (a former US attorney), who produced a 350-page report in 2014 – but FIFA only published a
42-page summary (which was considered a ‘whitewash’ by many). Garcia resigned from the ethics
committee of FIFA and it was only after sustained lobbying (and the threat of publishing a leaked
copy) that FIFA finally released the report in June 2017. Although it was unable to provide proof of
corruption, there were strong indications of malpractice. Garcia wrote: ‘A number of executive
committee members sought to obtain personal favours or benefits that would enhance their stature
within their home countries or confederations.’
Moreover, as ESPN reported, FIFA critics believed bid leaders in Russia and Qatar must have
engaged in wrong- doing to get the FIFA executive committee votes in 2010. Many of those who took
part in that 2010 vote have since been banned for unethical conduct, indicted on corruption charges
by the US Department of Justice, or remain under scrutiny in ongoing investigations by Swiss federal
prosecutors.
Perhaps the worst scandal erupted in 2015 when Sepp Blatter was suspended from his role as
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FIFA President after years of rumours about corruption. Shortly after, Michel Platini (UEFA President)
also became involved in the scandal and was suspended from his role. FIFA now faces a long process
to rebuild its reputation and regain the trust of football supporters. Yet, despite these issues, the
2018 World Cup in Russia was generally considered a success – much needed by Russia.
Future prospects
Manchester United has supported the financial fair play regulations and has never been in
breach of FFP – MUFC has much higher football revenues than any of their English rivals. As of 2018,
the financial future for all the English Premier League clubs was looking secure, with a new
broadcasting deal signed in 2015 being renewed in 2018. The TV deal was worth £5,1bn for the three
seasons 2016–19 – a 70 per cent increase on the previous deal – and in 2018 it was worth £4,64bn: a
small decrease but still the most lucrative deal in Europe. Moreover, Manchester United had
negotiated bigger and better sponsorship and marketing deals: a seven-year shirt sponsorship deal
with General Motors (Chevrolet), worth a reported £50m, and a sleeve sponsorship deal with Kohler
in 2018 for £10m. Purists may argue that footballers are looking more like billboard adverts, but
clubs don’t mind as long as the money rolls in.
The Glazer family’s investment in MUFC was certainly a successful gamble – they could now
sell the club at a huge profit. In September 2015, they announced that dividends would be paid on
shareholdings for the first time: in the next two years, the Glazers (who hold 80 per cent of the stock)
received £33m from share dividends. Nevertheless, the position remains tenuous: without playing
success, revenues would plummet – MUFC has to keep qualifying for the Champions League. The
debt level remains high and the club (and the fans) want to see this reduced. Without regular profits,
the interest payments on the debt could become a major threat. On the playing front the position
also remains questionable: Manchester City, Chelsea and Liverpool were all looking stronger in 2018,
eventually leading to Mourinho’s removal, but football is a results business – win the league and you
are a hero; fail to qualify for the European Champions League and you are sacked! ‘Short termism’ in
football is becoming more of a problem – Alex Ferguson went four years without winning a trophy,
but it is doubtful that any future manager will be given that long to build a successful side.
Postscript
As the 2018/9 season drew to a close, Manchester United improved slightly under new
manager Ole Gunnar Solskjaer and climbed the league to finish 6th, narrowly missing qualification for
the next European Champions League, and reached the quarter final of the European Champions
League (beating PSG) before losing to Barcelona. The English Premier League was an exciting affair
with Manchester City winning from Liverpool by just one point, also winning both domestic cup
competitions. Chelsea and Tottenham took the other two European Champions League spots. English
clubs did well in Europe with four clubs in the European Champions League quarter finals and
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Liverpool defeating Tottenham in the final. The Europa Cup final was also an all-English affair, with
Chelsea defeating an Arsenal team that had finished 5th in the League, again missing out on
European Champions League qualification, also by just one point.
Elsewhere in Europe, normal business was resumed: PSG ran away with the French league and
Juventus won the Italian league easily; Bayern Munich edged out Borussia Dortmund in Germany.
With Real Madrid having a surprisingly poor season, Barcelona had an easy run to the Spanish title
but were unexpectedly knocked out of the European Champions League by Liverpool FC.
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