Research Programme
Engineering
Replacement of fixed lineside telecommunications
infrastructure with radio solutions
Research findings and conclusions
© Copyright 2007 Rail Safety and Standards Board.
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RAIL SAFETY AND STANDARDS
BOARD
RSSB T629 Replacement of Fixed
Lineside Telecommunications
Infrastructure with Radio Solutions
Phase 1 Report - Research Findings
And Conclusions
Issue 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
Executive Summary.........................................................................................................2
Introduction......................................................................................................................3
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3
Findings of Data Collection and Documentation Review ............................................6
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
5
Background ............................................................................................................................3
Remit/Brief of Research Exercise ..........................................................................................3
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................3
Purpose and Structure of the Document................................................................................4
Findings and Analysis of the Documentation/Standards Review...........................................6
Findings and Analysis of Telecoms Systems Review ..........................................................23
Findings and Analysis of Stakeholders Interviews ...............................................................28
Implications for Phases 2 and 3 of the Research Project ..........................................33
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................34
Page i
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Term
Meaning / Definition
ATOC
Association of Train Operating Companies
BTP
British Transport Police
CDU
Cab Display Unit
CSR
Cab Secure Radio
ECO
Electrical Control Operator
ECR
Electrical Control Room
EIRENE
European Integrated Railway Radio Enhanced Network
ERTMS
European Rail Traffic Management System
ETCS
European Train Control System
FTN
Fixed Telecommunications Network
GNER
Great North Eastern Railway
GSM-P
Global System for Mobile communications – Public
GSM-R
Global System for Mobile communications – Railways
HMRI
Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate
MMI
Man Machine Interface
NRN
National Radio Network
NRS
Network Rail Standard
OPH
Operational Hand Portable
OPS
Operational Shunting Hand Portable
ORN
Overlay Radio Network
ORR
Office of the Rail Regulator
PSTN
Public Service Telephone Network
PTT
Push To Talk
RETB
Radio Electronic Token Block
RGS
Railway Group Standard
RSSB
Railway Safety and Standards Board
SB
Signal Box
SCC
Signalling Control Centre
SMA
Strathclyde Manning Agreement
SMS
Short Message Service
SPAD
Signal Passes At Danger
SPT
Signal Post Telephone
STD
Standard Trunk Dialling
TD
Train Describer
TEC
Telecommunications Engineering Control
Page ii
TOC
Train Operating Company
TPWS
Train Protection and Warning System
TRN
Train Reporting Number
VDU
Visual Display Unit
Page iii
1
Executive Summary
This report is one of three which together comprise the outcomes of a study into
the feasibility of replacing fixed lineside infrastructure with radio solutions
throughout the Network Rail owned UK rail network. This phase 1 report contains
information gathered from industry standards, other related documents and
stakeholder interviews. Each section of the report contains a brief summary of the
value and implications of the information contained therein. All this baseline
information is an essential pre-requisite for subsequent phases of the research.
The documents reviewed for relevance to this project included 324 Railway Group
Standards, 738 Network Rail standards, four subject related papers and seven
accident inquiry reports. The purpose of this exercise was to determine current
mandatory requirements for both fixed and radio infrastructure, to assess the
scope of changes required in the event of a decision to alter the present
communications infrastructure and to identify any other factors that may influence
the research. From this exercise it was concluded that a considerable number of
standards specify the mandatory requirements for fixed telephony, eg at Stop
signals, signals protecting level crossings, token instrument locations, many level
crossings, station platforms and other locations within electrified areas. A total of
33 Railway Group Standards and 9 Network Rail Standards either directly refer to
or imply the provision of lineside telephones. With respect to radio systems, 25
Railway Group and six Network Rail Standards refer to the provision of train radio
systems. Standards specify the basic requirements for using radio for general
purpose applications, and the additional requirements for specific uses, such as
Driver Only Operation of passenger trains, or the passing of train movement
authorities from signaller to train driver. It appears that only the Rule Book
provides a hierarchical guidance for the use of communication technologies by a
driver when required to contact the signaller.
The number of lineside telephones currently stands at around 32,412 including
3,237 located at various types of level crossings, mainly for use by the public. It is
considered that the latter will be excluded from phases 2 and 3 because there is
little scope for their replacement by a radio based form of communications. The
remaining 29,175 are intended primarily for railway operational purposes although
some with direct connection to electrification controls are also intended for public
use.
The growth in numbers and operational value of lineside telephones began in the
1960’s with the progression of large centralised re-signalling schemes and
continued into the 1980’s before these schemes began to subside in numbers.
Until the arrival of radio based alternatives such as NRN and CSR in the 1980’s,
lineside telephones and in particular SPTs, remained the prime means of railway
operational communications. Since then radio has challenged the primacy of
lineside telephones and today plays a much greater role, particularly in train to
signaller communications.
In reality what has evolved is a balance of usage between fixed lineside systems
and radio which is now relatively stable. This position is unlikely to change
significantly until GSM-R proves robust enough to replace NRN and CSR, at that
point it is likely the withdrawal of some lineside telephones will be possible.
However this does not imply that lineside telephones can simply be recovered
where good alternative radio coverage exists. There are other considerations not
the least of which include safety implications, consistency of operation, possession
management, engineering requirements, regulatory influences and user
confidence that play a part in any policy change.
Page 1
Stakeholder interviews were conducted to capture some basic data relating to
each business and to explore their views on the possible withdrawal of lineside
telephones. The value of stakeholder input is seen as crucial if buy-in to any
changes is sought at a later date. Feedback so far does however lean towards
general support for the replacement of some lineside telephones with radio based
systems, subject to identification of the risks involved and suitable mitigation being
in place where necessary. Phases 2 and 3 of the project will address these issues
in more detail and draw a conclusion regarding the subject of this research.
Page 2
2
Introduction
2.1
Background
The future provision of GSM-R train radio systems has re-introduced the debate
regarding the concept that lineside communications can migrate from fixed
infrastructure to radio solutions.
As a consequence it has been identified that research is required to identify the
safety and commercial justifications to fully understand all aspects for the potential
replacement of fixed telecoms infrastructure with radio systems.
2.2
Remit/Brief of Research Exercise
The objective of this research, as provided by RSSB, is to explore, with key
stakeholders, the potential for transferring from lineside telecommunications
infrastructure to radio based solutions for the provision of safe and effective
communications for drivers, train crew and lineside staff. The research to be
undertaken includes:
♦
Detail the specific use of lineside communications systems including the
safety and non-safety requirements.
♦
Define the criteria necessary for the safe replacement of lineside
telephones to wireless applications.
♦
Develop a risk assessment and identify where commercial benefits
support replacement.
♦
Define a strategy for the removal of lineside telephones and associated
infrastructure nationally.
This research exercise has been split into three distinct phases or packages of
work:
Phase 1: Specific Use of Lineside Communications
This phase is basically a data collection and documentation review stage which
will identify and evaluate all the uses of lineside communications. This evaluation
will include what they are used for, frequency of use, the fitness for purpose and
perceived reliability. Furthermore where train radio systems (and other mobile
communications) are available the specific differences in the use of lineside
telecoms will be identified. A review of standards and other documentation will be
done to identify how the use of each telecoms service is controlled.
Phase 2: Criteria for Replacement
Phase 2 will develop the justification for safe replacement of lineside telephones to
wireless based solutions. For each category of fixed communications, a safety
and commercial justification shall be developed. This will also identify what level
of functionality and system redundancy is required for replacement to occur.
Phase 3: Strategy for Removal
During Phase 3, if the commercial and safety justifications have demonstrated that
replacement is possible, a strategy for the types and phases of railway
infrastructure removal will be developed.
2.3
Acknowledgements
The researchers gratefully acknowledge contributions made by the following
industry representatives –
Page 3
GNER
South West Trains
Balfour Beatty Rail Plant
First Group
Amey Rail Plant
EWS Railways
RMT Headquarters
Virgin Cross County
Chiltern Railways
ATOC
Network Rail
2.4
Purpose and Structure of the Document
2.4.1
Purpose
This document describes the data collection and review exercises and reports the
findings of these exercises carried out in Phase 1. Three work-streams have been
conducted and completed in Phase 1:
♦
A thorough review of existing standards and other documentation.
♦
An analysis of existing lineside telecoms systems, and train radio
systems.
♦
Interviews with key stakeholders and users of lineside telecoms systems
and radio systems.
Each of these 3 work-streams is documented along with their findings in Section 3,
as indicated below.
Page 4
2.4.2
Structure of this Document
Section 1
This section provides an Executive Summary for Phase 1,
highlighting the major findings and conclusions.
Section 2
This section provides the introduction, background and research
brief for the project.
Section 3
This section provides the findings and summarises the key issues
resulting from the 3 main work-streams
Section 4
This section looks forward to Phases 2 and 3 of the research
project and provides implications as identified during Phase 1.
Section 5
This section provides the conclusions from Phase 1 of the research
project.
Section 6
This section provides the Appendices to the document and
includes all supporting information and spreadsheets completed
whilst carrying out the three work-streams mentioned above.
Page 5
3
Findings of Data Collection and
Documentation Review
3.1
Findings and Analysis of the Documentation/Standards
Review
3.1.1
Procedure
A thorough review of RSSB Railway Group and Network Rail Standards has been
conducted in order to identify the key issues specified therein with respect to the
provision and use of fixed lineside telecoms and train and station radio systems.
The review has also identified the standards which would require changing if any
fixed lineside telephones were removed.
All Railway Group Standards (in total 324) were assessed. The standards were
reviewed in a ‘triage’ manner:
♦
An initial assessment was made from either the title or the synopsis to
determine whether the standard has any relevance to lineside
telephones, legacy radio systems or GSM-R radio. This determined
whether there was a definite relevance or not to the project. Where the
relevance of the standard to this project was unclear, “maybe” was
recorded in the spreadsheet for further review along with the “definites” in
Stage 2.
♦
A more thorough review of the “definites” and “maybes” from Stage 1. If
it was apparent that the standard merited a detailed review, then this was
recorded in the spreadsheet for review in stage 3. The rest of the
standards were skim-reviewed to identify whether there were in fact any
issues relevant to the research. These issues were recorded in the initial
findings columns under Stage 2.
♦
Finally, for all standards identified as requiring a detailed review, a
detailed commentary was added to the spreadsheet summarising the
findings of the review.
A similar (but not identical) exercise was carried out for Network Rail Company
standards. Because of the sheer number of catalogued standards (738) the initial
review of the standards was made using the current catalogue. Using the title and
the brief synopsis, along with operational and engineering judgement, a list of
possibly relevant standards was entered into the spreadsheet. Therefore, in effect
stage 1 of the triage process was carried out from the catalogue. Stage 2 then
became the detailed review. Each standard identified with a potential relevance
from its title and description in the catalogue was reviewed for actual relevance.
3.1.2
Findings
As a general rule, Group Standards should be limited to the requirements for safe
interworking and not prescribe particular solutions or technologies. Network Rail
Standards should be specific to Network Rail as infrastructure controller, and
generally relate to the detailed system or engineering matters, or operations where
this is limited to NR.
Guidance Notes and Approved Codes of Practice are not mandatory, but are often
used to record the detail of the historically adopted solution where this has been
removed from the Standard (to make it non prescriptive).
Page 6
3.1.2.1
RSSB Group Standards
A summary of the most relevant standards follows:
GE/RT8021 refers to the Facilities for Emergency Voice Communications with
Control Rooms. Communications facilities are required
♦
Between traction switching equipment rooms and ECRs.
♦
On station platforms (in the form of telephones) for members of the public
to request electrical isolations.
♦
Along tunnels and on station platforms on Underground Railways using a
conductor rail electrification system. These facilities allow a driver to
contact the ECR.
♦
At other lineside locations, as required, for communication to the ECR
where it is considered that communications systems provided for other
purposes are inadequate for requesting isolations.
The standard also details requirements for the railway internal network (ETD) with
respect to designated switchboards, telephone facilities at the ECR to identify
incoming calls, etc. Emergency calls from train radios shall be routed to the
designated locations (and subsequently other Control Rooms (as required). Train
radio systems shall provide simplified call set facilities for contacting the Control
room. The standard allows Train Operators to issue staff with mobile phones but
they must have the necessary telephone numbers to contact the relevant control
rooms for their journey. GE/GN8521, which provides guidance to GE/RT8021,
refers to using mobile communications as a quicker method of contacting control
rooms in an emergency compared with fixed telephone. However, there is a need
to ensure the caller knows who to contact, etc, and to describe their location
sufficiently and to ensure that the control room staff know where the emergency is.
Mobile phones must be checked before going on or near line to ensure they are
programmed with correct numbers and battery is charged.
GE/RT8026 refers to the Safety Requirements for Cab Signalling Systems. It
must be noted that this standard was issued before the technology has been fully
developed and implemented in Britain, and that it is liable to significant change.
The standard does require facilities for drivers to contact and communicate with
signallers and vice versa. The standard does indicate that introducing an in-cab
signalling system will potentially introduce hazards into the railway operations, for
example the possible loss of trackside telephones.
GE/RT8037 relates to Signal Position and Visibility. A signal sighting committee is
required to consider the positioning of SPTs (see review of GE/RT8048). The
committee shall also consider the train radio coverage whilst assessing the risk of
overruns, and the positioning of signals. Where the radio system automatically
routes calls to the appropriate signaller, the routing should be checked for correct
application (see GE/RT8080).
GE/RT8048 refers to the Positioning and Labelling of Lineside Telephone. The
telephone shall be positioned so that the user is in a place of safety unless where
permitted otherwise. If a user may stray out of a place of safety whilst using the
telephone, a barrier may be required. A level stable surface is required. All lineside
telephones must be identified and labelled accordingly. SPTs may not be
provided if the SPT is between two running lines and the user would not be in a
place of safety relating to the line the SPT does not apply to, AND radio coverage
for train radio systems is considered adequate, AND another fixed lineside
telephone is available in the vicinity to contact the signaller in an emergency.
Where the user of a telephone is required to talk to the signaller whilst operating
signalling equipment, the telephone must be positioned so that the user can carry
out the task whilst talking to the signaller. Telephones must be weatherproof and
resist vandals; if required additional anti-vandal measures will be provided.
Records are required for each lineside telephone and the telephone must be
inspected at agreed intervals.
Page 7
GE/RT8080 refers to Train Systems for Voice and Related Messaging
Communications. All radio systems from 1/1/2011 shall comply to parts 3, 4, 6, 7,
8 and 9. Prior to this legacy systems may be used as long as the present
functionality is maintained, and section 7 is complied to regarding maintenance,
etc, and a migration plan to a system that is compliant to parts 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,and 9 is
developed.
Part 4 provides train radio system requirements, i.e.
♦
Emergency calls (driver initiated, signaller initiated, regional controller
initiated.
♦
Non-emergency calls, driver initiated, signaller and regional controller
initiated.
♦
Calls initiated by a driver must connect to the signaller responsible for the
location of the train and emergency calls shall also include all drivers of
trains in a pre-defined area.
♦
The radio system shall alert the call initiator when the system has failed
to connect an emergency call.
♦
Signallers and regional controllers shall be able to make a nonemergency broadcast call to trains in a geographic area or a nonemergency two-way point to point call to a driver.
Train location information may be used to mitigate the risk of mis-routing driver to
signaller/regional controller calls, assessments shall consider the accuracy,
reliability and integrity of the information source, complexity of route sections,
intensity of train service, and whether legacy train radio systems have previously
used the information source.
For driver initiated calls, where the radio system does not have sufficient
information to determine the intended recipient, it is permitted to route the call to
more than one signaller or regional controller.
Any 999/112 call made on the radio system shall be routed to the railway
emergency operator.
The train radio system shall enable continuous communications between shorebased locations and trains at all locations.
A technical specification for coverage and performance will be produced and
maintained for each radio system.
Sections 4.5.2, 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 provide additional requirements where the train
radio is used as a primary means of voice communications between signaller and
driver for authorisation of train movements, ie:
♦
The system must know which trains are in each signaller’s area so that
calls are only routed to the one responsible recipient.
♦
Unique train identities and knowing where trains are allows signallers to
call trains directly by entering the train identity and also identifies
incoming calls from train based on the train ID.
Sections 4.5.6, 4.5.7, 4.5.8 and 4.5.9 provide additional requirements where the
radio system is used to support DOO passenger trains. The radio system must be
able to interface to the on-train driver safety device (DSD) and PA system. If the
DSD is activated then the radio system will provide the signaller with an alarm,
and provide details of the train ID. The radio system shall enable a voice
message to be relayed from the signaller over the train PA.
Section 4.5.11 provides additional requirements if the radio is part of the
electrification communications strategy on an electrified route. The radio shall
allow a driver to make two-way non-emergency voice calls to the ECO responsible
for the current location of the train. Pre-defined messages may be used but must
Page 8
not distract a driver whilst moving or prevent the sending or receiving of
emergency calls.
Variable content messages may be used, eg SMS if implemented with GSM-R.
They may be used to confirm safety critical instructions between signallers and
drivers, but must not be used to replace any existing procedures for passing safety
critical messages.
Part 5 provides train radio equipment requirements ie the equipment on the train,
eg call handling and indications, etc.
Where there is more than one radio system fitted on a train, only one shall be
operational at any one time.
Part 6 provides requirements for fixed infrastructure.
Part 7 provides the system management and maintenance requirements to ensure
safe maintenance, operation and modification. Processes are required to ensure
consistency between radio system and any interfacing systems, eg train location
systems. System data must be up to date. Software and hardware updates must
be controlled. A register is required to correlate train radio numbers and stock
numbers. Arrangements must be in place:
♦
to ensure equipment is operational,
♦
to monitor equipment performance,
♦
to share information on performance including where coverage is
unacceptable,
♦
to monitor compliance with requirements in Part 4,
♦
to identify for all calls where possible whether they connect or fail to
connect,
♦
to monitor quality of transmissions and reception of emergency calls and
other calls.
Temporary alternative radio arrangements and locations where radio
communications are to be used instead of SPTs are to be published in operating
notices.
Part 8 deals with the operation of multiple radio systems. It mainly deals with
migration considerations from one radio system to a new one, and that plans are
in place to ensure emergency calls are correctly handled and there is no confusion
caused by more than one system in use.
Part 9 refers to Shunting radio. A confidence tone must be provided and only
individuals involved in the shunting operation are to be party to the call and
therefore the confidence tone.
This standard has special status in that it is subject to more frequent review as the
subject area develops.
GE/RT8081 details the Requirements for GSM-R Voice Radio Systems. Trains
fitted with a GSM-R cab radio shall be able to communicate with the controlling
signaller and the appropriate regional controller. GSM-R allows more than one
connection within the train to the cab radio being used by the driver, eg for a
guard. When the guard is using his connection, the driver is aware of the
established call. Drivers can listen in to such calls or override low priority calls.
Pre-emption is used to provide call priority.
Train Operators may use group calls in the following circumstances
♦
shunting,
♦
assisting failed trains,
♦
banking movements,
Page 9
♦
where there is a driver in more than one locomotive,
♦
propelling,
♦
driving from other than the leading cab,
♦
working with a locomotive at both ends,
♦
single power car operation,
♦
uncoupling of multiple unit trains.
Except in an emergency, group calls shall not be used for
♦
passing signals at danger,
♦
protection of staff,
♦
protection of trains,
♦
electrical isolations,
♦
wrong direction and unsignalled movements.
Hand portables may be issued to drivers in addition to the train radio. Procedures
are required to control or limit the use of hand portables in particular:
♦
when they can/cannot be used, in particular if a driver has access to a
working train radio,
♦
protocol for identifying calls to signallers / regional controllers being from
driver of a specific train,
♦
availability and use of emergency call functionality,
♦
avoiding driver confusion if handportable and cab radio receive a railway
emergency call
♦
avoiding the initiation of unwanted railway emergency calls
♦
ensuring the battery life is maintained.
An operational radio may be used instead of the cab radio, but must meet
requirements of this standard, and the basic requirements of GE/RT8080. [When a
cab radio has failed, GO/RT3437 shall apply.]
Only signallers and regional controllers shall make broadcast calls to trains. A
written procedure is required for the receiving of emergency calls, and must cover:
♦
identification of emergency calls,
♦
broadcast areas for emergencies,
♦
when more than one emergency call is received,
♦
when more than one signaller receives the same emergency call,
♦
when the wrong signaller receives a emergency call,
♦
call prioritisation,
♦
wrongly routed calls,
♦
call transfer.
Geographic areas for the broadcasting of emergency calls shall be defined, taking
into account identifiable route sections, complexity of route sections, signal box
areas, signaller control areas, intensity of train service, service group patterns,
tunnels and viaducts.
The GSM-R system shall allow a signaller to broadcast a message over a train
PA, and allow the activation of the drivers safety device to be registered at the
controlling signal box.
Track workers who are required to use radio communication shall be issued with a
GSM-R handportable as the primary means of communications:
♦
when acting as an IWA or COSS,
Page 10
♦
when setting up and removing engineering protection limits/possession
limits,
♦
when setting up and removing engineering worksites,
♦
when giving and receiving instructions for the movement of trains within
engineering possessions.
As for the issue of handportables to traincrew, procedures must be in place to
control the use of handportables provided to trackworkers (see above).
Note this standard has special status in that it is subject to more frequent review
as its subject area develops.
GI/RT7012 details the design requirements for the provision of telephones at level
crossings, including the circuit types, positioning and labelling. Additionally, this
standard does not exclude the use of radio systems for certain types of crossing.
However, the same standard does state that radio systems must not be used for
automatically controlled crossings which are remotely monitored by the signaller.
GK/RT0025, which relates to Signalling Control Centres (SCC), details the
requirements for voice communications from the SCC to lineside locations. It
includes SPTs, level crossing telephone and radio communications. The standard
also requires that any system used to pass safety critical messages to train drivers
shall prevent the signaller’s speech being overheard when a call is established
and the speech is not intended for the caller. Lineside telephones such as level
crossings (not user worked) and limited clearance telephones must be displayed
and identified to the signaller, but the location of all phones with direct lines to the
signaller are known to him. The standard also requires that communications with
train drivers is maintained in the event of evacuation of the SCC.
GK/RT0030 requires the signaller and users of signalling lockout devices/systems
to be provided with two way voice communications, either through lineside
telephones or radio systems.
GK/RT0041, which relates to Track Circuit Block signalling systems, requires all
stop signals to be equipped with an SPT unless:
♦
the signal is close to the signal box or gate box and the signal is only
cleared when the signal box or gate box is open.
♦
The signal has an automatic signal sign and the telephone would be
limited clearance.
♦
Alternative communications systems are provided.
GK/RT0042, which relates to Absolute Block signalling, requires that an SPT or
alternative communications facilities are provided at an intermediate block home
signal. At other signals, the requirement for an SPT or alternative communications
facilities shall be considered where there is an anticipated or known requirement
for the signaller to instruct drivers without undue hazard or delay (e.g. at signals
protecting level crossings and at signals controlling the entrance to a section
where there are level crossings).
GK/RT0051 relates to Single Line Control. For Electric Token Systems, No
Signaller Token, Remote systems and One Train Staff Systems, voice
communications are required between Token Control Points and the supervising
Signal Box
In all the above cases, and additionally for Absolute Block, Interlocked Signalling
System, One Train Systems Without Staff and the Tokenless Block Signalling
System, SPTs or other communications facilities must be considered where there
is an anticipated or known requirement for the signaller to instruct drivers without
undue hazard or delay (e.g. at signals protecting level crossings and at signals
controlling the entrance to a section where there are level crossings).
GK/RT0054 refers to Radio Electronic Token Block signalling. RETB signalling
utilises the NRN radio system both for voice communications and for the passing
Page 11
of “electronic tokens” through the transmission of data over the radio system. The
controlling signaller’s Visual Display Unit must display locations of any lineside
telephone. Train positional information with RETB signalling is determined
through spoken messages between the driver and the signaller, supported by the
issue and return of tokens. Therefore the radio system must:
♦
Be able to carry voice and data between SCC and the train CDUs and
other radios provided for operations purposes in the RETB signalled area.
♦
Provide sufficient coverage at all token exchange points and approaches
to AHB crossings, where the signaller may have to give a train movement
authority or the driver report his position, and at channel change points.
♦
Be used in emergencies.
♦
Be compatible with train radio infrastructure on the route.
♦
Not allow data communications between trains.
There are no requirements to handle voice and data communications
simultaneously, or transmission and receiving simultaneously, or for voice
communications between trains. There are also special procedures requiring
additional voice communications during specific operational situations, for
example when it is necessary to issue a token to allow a train to proceed “wrong
road”.
GK/RT0061 refers to Shunters Releases, Ground Frames, Switch Panels and
Gate Boxes. This standard requires voice communications between a Ground
Frame / Switch Panel and the controlling signal box when the Ground Frame or
Switch Panel is released from the Signal Box. The standard also covers
communications between SPTs and Gate Boxes. Where provided, SPTs shall
communicate with the Gate Box if the signal is solely controlled by the Gate Box.
If the signal is controlled by the Signal Box, the SPT will communicate with the
Signal Box. Additionally, voice communications shall be provided between the
Gate Box and each supervised or monitored level crossing as if it were a Signal
Box unless the distance between the Gate Box and crossing is less than 50
metres. The standard also refers to general communications requirements at local
control points. These are to be assessed by Network Rail and Train Operators
based on the area of control, the extent to which the signaller retains signal
replacement facilities, the reliability of the communications systems and the
handling of emergency situations.
GK/RT0186 provides the Safety Requirements of Signal Post Telephone Systems.
SPT systems shall be designed to ensure that:
♦
Only one call can be established between the signaller and a remote
party at any one time
♦
No interruption by a third party shall be possible
♦
The level of overhearing shall be sufficiently low so as to eliminate the
possibility of confusion with other calls
♦
The unique identity of each telephone shall be presented to the signaller
when an incoming call is received and shall be maintained for the
duration of the call
♦
All systems must enable the signaller to call the SPT.
GK/RT0217 refers to the technical requirements for Axle Counters. This standard
specifies the requirement for communications between trackside equipment,
evaluation equipment and the controlling signaller.
TDGEN096 details the Telecommunications Requirements for General and
Emergency Use at Sub-Surface Stations. As far as fixed telecoms are concerned,
Page 12
this standard only requires the provision of at least one ETD telephone on each
platform, labelled accordingly and marked by an illuminated sign. A radio system
in accordance with BR1845 is required for the train driver to communicate with the
signaller, and the signaller to contact the train crew and passengers, whilst the
train is underground on lines identified in this standard.
A management radio for each station is required operating from remote and local
control points for station employees, with remote access by the line control centre
for underground stations listed in the standard.
Emergency tunnel pinch wires are required to provide both telephone
communication for the driver and an emergency power cut off facility in DC 3rd
and 4th rail traction areas.
Emergency radio systems are required as appropriate for fire brigade and BTP.
An underground station radio system will include a permanently available fire
authority radio channel. Coverage should extend outside the station to the incident
control point, and into running tunnels to the mid point to the next station/access
point. Fire authority systems shall be designed to allow switching between
adjacent stations at each incident control point so that adjacent stations may be
linked and operate as a single system.
A permanently available radio channel shall be connected through to the BTP
control.
At sub surface stations the fire authority radio channels should be fully operational
throughout the station complex using their normal above ground system. However,
if after testing these systems do not provide the coverage required, a system and
facilities as specified for underground stations shall be provided.
Similarly for BTP, their normal BTP channels may be used but if coverage is not
satisfactory then facilities as specified for underground stations shall be provided.
At Interchange stations, radio coverage of the two operators and BTP radio
frequencies, where they are different, must be provided throughout the other
operator’s part of the interchange.
There must be no interference between the radio systems, should there be
separate base stations provided by each undertaking. For emergency authorities,
coverage between the two parts of the interchange must be continuous.
TDRAD 054 details the procedures for the Use of Band III / NRN Base Stations for
Engineering/Emergency Work. Temporary Band III base stations (operating in
talkthrough mode only) may be used for essential and emergency works for
periods not exceeding 24 hours. The mast and equipment must be sited on
railway land at track level and the aerial height must not exceed 18.3m. For long
term engineering works an application must be made. In the event of a major
incident, an NRN base station may be used in local talkthrough mode until
alternative communications systems have been established.
GE/RT8217 refers to the Introduction and Use of Axle Counters – Managing the
Risk. Section E2 requires the infrastructure controller to ensure that the
alternative measures for arranging emergency protection result in the overall risk
of a secondary collision or of a train running into an obstruction, being equal to or
lower than it would be if track circuits and track circuit operating clips were in use.
The infrastructure controller shall consider the provision of an immediate, reliable
and continuously available means of communication between the traincrew and
the signaller. This could be achieved by the provision of a new system or
enhancing the existing arrangements for traincrew / signaller communications.
GI/RT7011 refers to the Provision, Risk Assessment and Review of Level
Crossings. The standard refers to risk assessments in order to improve the
control measures at level crossings. Amongst other things the communication
between users and the signaller is to be considered. Appendix 1 of this standard
Page 13
provides combinations of control measures (including the provision of telephone)
required for the different types of crossings.
GO/RT3471 refers to Incident Response Planning. As part of incident response
planning, risk assessments of potential incidents must include the communications
arrangements available. Section 3.3.4 requires incident response plans to include
provision of effective communications, including recording of calls to and from
control centres, compatibility and effectiveness of radio systems, alternatives if
radios cannot be used or fail, details of hotlines, etc. The assessment should also
include the need for communications or the operation of communications systems
by non-trained and non-railway persons.
GO/RC3501 provides a Code of Practice for setting up Temporary Block Working
in Emergency situations. Site communications should be considered when
determining the arrangements for temporary block working.
GO/RT3091 provides DC Electrified Lines Instructions. ECOs can be contacted
from lineside emergency telephone and from plug points if installed. If lineside
telephones are not available a BT number must be published.
The NRN system can be used to contact the ECO. If trains are fitted with CSR,
the driver can be switched through to the ECO, either by the signaller or using the
ETD. The NRN calling codes for ECO must only be used for matters concerning
the electrification system, running electric trains or calling the emergency services.
3.1.2.2
Network Rail Standards
A summary of the most relevant standards follows:
NR/SP/ELP/29987 Working on or about 25kVac Electrified Lines. The ECO can
be contacted directly via a train radio or fixed telephone on the numbers shown in
Appendix A. In addition, contact can also be made using cab secure radio
systems routed via the signal box.
NR/WI/ELP/27051 provides Working Instructions for dc Electrified lines in the
Liverpool area. This standard provides instructions for setting up the CSR system
prior to leaving the depot and that a train with defective CSR equipment must not
be allowed to enter service if it is Driver Only Operated. Instructions are provided
for requesting isolations using the tunnel wire system (TEC system) or an SPT.
The TEC wire system can be used for voice communications between traincrew
and the signaller.
NR/WI/ELP/27052 provides Working Instructions for dc electrified lines Northern
City Line. Tunnel telephone wires are provided and arranged in sections
corresponding to signal sections. Telephones in cabs may be clipped to the
emergency wires to contact the signaller. The same unit can be used to isolate the
traction current. Tunnel headwall telephones are located at stations for contacting
the signaller in emergencies and switching off the current using the headwall
emergency plungers adjacent to the telephone.
A two-way radio system is provided for all station staff. Plug-in telephone sockets
are located on platforms and throughout tunnels to make ETD calls from top and
bottom sockets. The centre socket is used for omnibus calls. Public Emergency
Telephones are located on each platform, when lifted these connect to Kings
Cross SB. Any person who is aware of any emergency requiring, or likely to
require, the traction current to be switched off must immediately telephone the
ECO or arrange this to be done. As an alternative to the driver to SB radio system,
any other radio or telephone system may be used if this would save time. Any
person receiving a message requesting the traction current to be switched off
must relay the message complete without any delay to the ECO.
NR/WI/ELP/27114 provides Work Instructions for Carrying out Testing on all
Electrified Lines. Section 7 states that communications shall be available between
the Test Engineer and all sites involved with the tests. Duplicate channels shall be
provided where loss of a single channel would result in unacceptable delays to
Page 14
traffic or a risk to traffic. It does not specify the communications required or
systems, but could involve a mixture of radio and lineside communication systems.
NR/SP/OPS/026 describes the Inspection and Risk Assessment Methodology for
User Worked, Footpath and Bridleway Level Crossings. This standard describes
the criteria for the provision of telephone equipment at level crossings where it
would not be mandatory. For example telephone may be considered where:
♦
The warning time less the crossing time ≤ 5 seconds,
♦
There is known regular use by herds/flocks of animals,
♦
The actual daily number of road vehicles using the crossing is > 50.
NRS/SP/SIG/10157 refers to Signal Sighting. Operational telephone such as
SPTs must be considered during signal sighting. The signal sighting process must
consider and assess the requirements for walking access to the SPT. Additionally
train radio coverage must be considered whilst assessing the signal overrun risks
and mitigation as part of the signal sighting process.
NRS/SP/TEL/30027 details the Technical Requirements for Legacy Train Radio
Communication.
DOO(P) radio systems shall enable direct two-way
communications between the driver and signaller at the controlling signalling
centre, at any time and location whilst the train is in passenger service. For
systems existing at April 1995, the radio may enable contact with a signaller at a
location which is not the controlling SB. This signaller must then arrange for the
signaller at the controlling SB and driver to talk to each other, via secure person to
person communications with no potential for interruption.
DOO(P) shore facilities at the controlling SB shall support:
♦
an emergency call facility,
♦
a train PA facility,
♦
a radio lost alarm on the train mobile,
♦
a DSD alarm,
♦
direct fixed line communications between signallers and the answering
location (where call redirection is allowed),
♦
direct or indirect interfaces for train descriptions and TD stepping info,
♦
berth maps and facilities for train registration,
♦
update and location identity.
CSR systems shall enable direct two-way speech between driver and signaller on
trains other than DOO(P) operating in the CSR area. Shore facilities shall be same
as for DOO(P) but they do not need to provide identification of train or its location,
and therefore cannot support DOO(P) operation.
RETB systems shall enable direct two-way speech between driver and signaller in
addition to the transmission data and shall be operative at token exchange points.
The system must be capable of use at any location and time the train is in
operation. Shore facilities shall provide support for train registration, identification
and exchange of electronic token messages.
The NRN is used on trains other than those operating DOO(P), CSR or RETB and
shall enable two-way communications between trains and designated locations
and locations on the ETD network. NRN shore facilities shall support:
♦
emergency calls,
♦
general broadcast calls,
♦
priority call to ECRs,
♦
direct lines to designated locations.
Page 15
The standard also details the coverage requirements for the legacy radio systems
mentioned above, based on their application and usage. Network Rail Territories
shall identify any coverage deficiencies to train operators involved, and any control
measures required to mitigate risks.
DOO(P) and CSR emergency calls will enable direct person to person
communications between driver and signaller at the controlling SB unless where
call redirect is allowed. Emergency NRN calls shall be directed to the designated
location best able to act to ensure safe operation of the railway via direct lines
(except 999 and 112 calls which are routed to the designated location through the
telephone network). Any incoming call will be distinctively announced to the
signaller or route control even when other calls, including an emergency call, are
already in progress.
General Broadcast calls can be initiated by staff at designated locations, to allow
messages to be heard simultaneously by drivers of all trains (without driver
intervention) in each area of radio coverage within their responsibility.
Where NRN allows a priority call for short code dialling as part of the electrification
communications strategy, this will be provided to trains as well.
Channel changing locations shall be identified by the Territory Telecoms Engineer,
who shall also keep DOO(P) and CSR management processor configurations and
channel change board locations up to date. Automatic channel changing shall be
provided on all DOO(P) radio systems. Where manual channel changing is to be
used, the risks must be assessed by Network Rail and the TOC.
Where more than one radio system is used, channel change signs shall indicate to
which system it applies.
The standard also provides details of the reviews, checks and tests to be carried
out to ensure system performance is maintained. The maintenance directorate
shall maintain detailed and complete records of DOO, CSR, NRN and RETB radio
systems.
NR/SP/TEL30031 details the Signal Box Telephone Concentrator System Design
and Application Requirements. This standard deals with the design of the
telephone concentrator itself. It also states the additional requirements to be
applied to lineside telephone circuits for certain operational applications, eg level
crossing telephones:
♦
incoming calls received from public telephones at AHBC or ABCL shall
be indicated by a distinctive and imperative tone.
♦
If a call is in progress at the operator’s MMI and a call is received from an
AHBC or ABCL public telephone, the MMI audible alert shall not be
suppressed until the call is answered.
♦
The circuit identity of an AHBC/ABCL public telephone displayed at an
MMI shall be distinguishable from all other circuit types on that MMI by
applying colour keys, etc.
♦
When a call is received from an AHBC/ABCL public telephone the
associated MMI indication shall latch until the operator presses the key.
Even if the caller clears the call before it is answered, the indication shall
remain illuminated until released by the operator. SPT circuits shall be
prohibited form being placed on hold or included in conference calls.
♦
An SPT circuit is usually only presented on a single MMI, however, it may
be necessary to present it on to a shift manager’s position as well as the
signaller’s. SPT or level crossing telephone circuits shall not be shared.
NR/SP/TEL/30032 refers to the Positioning and Labelling of Lineside Telephones.
Under a resignalling scheme the signal sighting committee shall confirm that the
chosen position for lineside telephones complies with this standard. For all other
lineside telephones, a special committee (telecoms, Network Rail production and
Page 16
TOC representatives) shall determine positional compliance against GE/RT8048
clause B5.1; this may require a site visit unless records exist. Justification for
selecting an alternative position other than that identified in GE/RT8048 must be
recorded. Alternative positions are defined in sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.1.3. The
committee’s justification for designating an SPT a limited clearance SPT as
defined in GE/RT8048 shall be recorded, as must the non-provision of an SPT (if
all the conditions listed in GE/RT8048 apply). Direct Lines to Signal Boxes and
ECRs shall comply with GE/RT8048 (ECR Direct Lines must be in a position of
safety). Lineside ‘phones shall be labelled as in GE/RT8048 and as amplified by
this standard. Records must be maintained (paper or electronic) for each
telephone and kept for a minimum of 6½ years(!) after completion of any
necessary alterations. Any changes to the labelling or positioning shall be
identified in the records.
3.1.3
Accident Reports
The following accidents were nominated by the client.
3.1.3.1
Clapham 12.12.88
Immediate cause: Train 1 was held at a red signal. The signal in rear showed a
false proceed aspect due to a wiring fault.
Result: Train 2 ran into the back of Train 1. Train 3 approaching on the adjacent
line ran into the wreckage.
Note: There was no cab radio at this time; recommendation 43 was made to
remedy this.
Relevance: Value of emergency stop transmission from Signaller to train(s).
3.1.3.2
Abbeyhill 13.08.94
Immediate cause: A locomotive was stabled in a platform but was not properly
secured, and ran away wrong line towards an approaching train.
Result: Head-on collision.
Relevance: Value of emergency stop transmission from Signaller to train(s).
3.1.3.3
Cowden 15.10.94
Immediate cause: Train 1 SPADed the signal protecting the entry to a single line
section. Train 2 was already in the section, travelling in the opposite direction.
The Signaller was made aware of the SPAD by the signalling indications but was
unable to warn the trains.
Result: Head-on collision.
Note: NRN coverage was patchy; recommendation 13 was made to remedy this.
Conclusion 5 stated that CSR would have allowed the collision to be prevented.
Relevance: Value of emergency stop transmission from Signaller to train(s).
3.1.3.4
Ais Gill 31.01.95
Immediate cause: Train 1 was derailed by a landslide, coming to rest foul of the
adjacent line. An NRN emergency call was made from the train, but was routed to
Control rather than the controlling Signaller.
A misleading exchange led to the
train not being protected by the traincrew. The receiving Controller was not
familiar with the Ais Gill area, which compromised the response. Confusion
between the Crewe and York Controls resulted in no NRN emergency message
being sent to Train 2 which was approaching on the adjacent line.
Result: Head-on collision.
Page 17
Relevance: Value of routing messages to controlling Signaller, value of emergency
stop transmission from Signaller to train(s). Key Action 3: Control office staff
training.
3.1.3.5
Doncaster 06.04.95
Immediate cause: A drive link became detached from a locomotive as it passed
through the station at 100mph.
Result: The link broke a window and came to rest inside a waiting room.
Relevance: Not clear.
3.1.3.6
Ladbrook Grove 05.10.99
Immediate cause: Train 1 passed a signal at danger, with the inference that the
Driver believed it to be showing a proceed aspect. Despite there being over
700yds to the point of conflict with the approaching Train 2, the signalling did not
alert either the Driver or the Signaller to the SPAD.
Result: Head-on collision.
Relevance: Inability to make quick contact with train under NRN.
Recommendation 51 (Cullen Part 1) for a national system of direct radio
communication between trains and signallers [GSM-R voice].
3.1.3.7
Hither Green 12.03.01
Immediate cause: Train 1 responded normally to one signal clearing as it was
approached but then passed the next signal at danger for no apparent reason.
Result: Collision with the rear of Train 2 which was in front.
Relevance: Driver received a radio message when approaching Hither Green;
inference of distraction. Recommendation to stop irrelevant and confusing
messages being passed to Drivers.
3.1.3.8
Other Relevant Accidents
Although not selected by the client, there have been many accidents where staff
using lineside telephones have been struck by passing trains, including Drivers of
trains standing at the signal concerned. These have led to the ‘limited clearance’
rules and markings now evident in the Rule Book. Specific accidents include:
♦
Driver Griffiths struck by a train whilst on the SPT at MP37 signal
(between Slade Lane Junction and Longsight) in July 1995; he died later
the same day from his injuries. This was not the first occasion on which
limited clearance SPTs were highlighted as a risk, although it did lead to
a much greater focus on identifying and distinguishing these.
♦
There was also another similar near miss to this on the former West
Coast Zone (Hemel Hempstead, circa 1994/95?), which led to the yellow
diamond with black cross Limited Clearance SPT signs being introduced
unilaterally by that Zone. They were then subsequently cited as a cause
of a driver mistaking a single yellow as double yellow (though this was
never proven).
Page 18
3.1.4
Review of Other Relevant Documents
3.1.4.1
Rail Safety & Standards Board, UK Application of GSM-R, The Operational
Concept, Issue 2A, July 2005, Reference NS-GSM-R-OPS-0503.
Purpose of document:
To provide a common vision of GSM-R and how it will function. Also intended as
the basis for operational acceptance. Includes a series of detailed operational
scenarios and differences in operation for international trains. Intended audience
includes all stakeholders and external bodies.
Relevance:
GSM-R is expected to bring benefits in safety, quality & efficiency in train
operation. It should deliver the radio-related recommendations of some accident
inquiries (see 3.1.3). Contingency planning assumes the continued availability of
lineside telephones, particularly SPTs. Migration has to be planned to control the
risk of legacy and GSM-R equipped routes. The introduction of GSM- R should be
on a route basis. Alternative arrangements for communication when GSM-R is
unavailable are yet to be determined. No statements or assumptions are made
about the extant lineside telephone infrastructure post-implementation of GSM-R
3.1.4.2
ATOC, Strategy for Communications, Issue B, October 2004, Reference CTO-040112-D
Purpose of document:
To provide ATOC with a wide ranging future direction on communications strategy
by examining existing solutions along with available and emerging technology.
Together the findings contribute towards the industry-wide adoption of best
practice and uniformity that meets business requirements.
Relevance:
It contains ATOC’s future aspirations on operational communications, and such
stakeholder views are required to be considered by this research.
There is considerable reference to GSM-R and comparisons with legacy systems.
No work has been done on examining possible cost savings by the withdrawal of
fixed lineside infrastructure with the introduction of GSM-R.
There is recognition that GSM-R could alleviate reliance on and possibly the need
for SPTs. SPTs could not be removed until GSM-R is proven over a sufficient
time, and even then a fall-back facility may be required when radio communication
is unavailable. It does not accept that fixed line systems could be entirely
eliminated.
GSM-R will not be provided on freight only routes.
It recognises that public cellular mobiles are widely used and in some cases
considered ‘just as good as NRN’ for some operational applications.
It examines the communications requirements mandated by some standards.
3.1.4.3
Rail Safety & Standards Board, GSM-R Differential Standards, Issue 1, August
2005, Reference NS-GSM-R-DIF-3501.
Purpose of document:
To provide defined, safety risk validated and geographically based data on
communications for a range of railway operational environments.
Relevance:
The main driver was the SRA requirement for a document that describes the most
appropriate operational communications according to a set of five criteria for
Page 19
triggering the application of GSM-R. It describes a range of railway operational
situations and the level of communication required between driver and signaller. It
takes into consideration the extant modes of communications and recognises the
role of SPTs.
3.1.4.4
Rail Safety & Standards Board, The Collection of Railway Safety Critical
Communications Error Data. 31 March 2006.Reference T365.
Purpose of document:
To examine the safety benefits and risk associated with the use of mobile ‘phones
by track workers.
Relevance:
It fills a gap in information regarding communications for engineering work and in
particular possession management.
It looks at the ‘pros and cons’ of using public cellular mobiles. It encourages the
acceptance of public cellular mobiles for railway operational requirements in that
they are ‘here to stay’. It takes into account a lot of research (non railway related)
regarding the use of public cellular mobiles. It considers the use of public cellular
mobiles provide a net benefit contribution to safety against the risk they import.
It considers that GSM-R will provide a better solution than public cellular mobiles
and recommends a trial using GSM-R with OPH to substantiate this.
3.1.5
Summary of Findings
3.1.5.1
Standards
The information in the Standards tends to fall into the following categories:
♦
Requirements related to the technology, concerning specification, design,
implementation, operation and maintenance of communications systems.
These define the particular system but have no influence over which
system would be chosen for a particular application.
♦
Requirements related to communication between railway staff, effectively
independent of the technology. These define the purpose and protocol of
communication but have no influence over which system would be
chosen for a particular application.
♦
Requirements related to communication between railway staff that are
technology dependent, in that they are only possible with certain
technologies
or
that
they
exploit
the
features
of
the
technology/application. Note that these links may not be explicitly stated.
♦
Requirements for railway operation that have been established around
specific communications technologies. The ease with which these can be
adapted to other technologies will vary.
The results of the RGS review can be numerically summarised as in the table
below.
Quantity
Total number of RGS assessed for relevance (Stage 1)
324
Total number of RGS reviewed (Stage 2)
74
Total number of RGS reviewed in detail (Stage 3)
11
Total number of RGS which refer to provision of lineside telephones
(of any description)
27
Page 20
Total Number of RGS which imply the provision of lineside telephones
(or other telecommunications systems) for communication with
signaller during incidents/degraded operations. These are in addition
to the 27 standards above.
6
Total number of RGS which refer to provision of train radio systems
(of any description, legacy or GSM-R)
25
The results of the NRS review can be numerically summarised as in the table
below.
Quantity
Total number of NRS assessed for relevance (Stage 1)
738
Total number of NRS reviewed (Stage 2)
47
Total number of NRS reviewed in detail (Stage 3)
47
Total number of NRS which refer to provision of lineside telephone (of
any description)
8
Total number of NRS which imply the provision of lineside telephone
(or other telecommunications system) for communication with signaller
during incidents/degraded operations. These are in addition to the 8
standards above.
1
Total number of NRS which refer to provision of train radio systems (of
any description, legacy or GSM-R)
6
It is clear from the review of standards that there are several standards which deal
with the requirements for the provision of lineside telecommunications, either fixed
infrastructure or through radio technology.
Certain standards specify when fixed telephones are required at Signal Posts and
when they are required at level crossings. Standards are specific about the safety
requirements to be designed into systems which are used for safety critical
messages (such as passing train movement authorities from signaller to train
driver) with respect to knowing the identity of callers, their location and security of
calls, etc. A signaller must be made aware of whom (generally through
communications protocol) and where (generally through the communications
system equipment) a call is coming from and that there is no possibility of the
subsequent conversation being overheard or intruded by a third party not involved
in the conversation.
Similarly there are specific requirements for the provision of public telephones at
level crossings and the associated safety requirements for these telephones.
There is an additional implication at level crossings in that the users of any
telecommunications system are members of the public who may not know where
they are and may be unfamiliar with the system and technology provided.
The provision of lineside telephones for emergency communications with Electrical
Control Rooms is also specified in RSSB standards. For example, platform
telephones in electrified areas are required for use by members of the public, with
similar issues as for level crossing telephones. Other trackside locations require
telephones, e.g. traction switching equipment rooms and tunnel wire systems
along DC electrified underground railways.
Page 21
RSSB Group Standards currently allow for the non-provision of SPTs in specific
circumstances. GE/RT8048 states that SPTs may not be provided if:
♦
the SPT is between two running lines and the user would not be in a
place of safety relating to the line the SPT does not apply to, AND
♦
radio coverage for train radio systems is considered adequate, AND
♦
another fixed lineside telephone is available in the vicinity to contact the
signaller in an emergency.
Additionally there are standards which deal with the provision of train
communications via alternative solutions such as train radio systems. The
standards governing radio systems separate the requirements between train radio
systems for general communications purposes and those requirements for
applications such as DOO(P) operation and systems which can be used for
passing train movement authorities.
Standards do not exclude the use of radio systems for certain types of crossings,
however they must not be used for automatically controlled crossings which are
remotely monitored by the signaller.
Train radio systems may be used for contacting the ECO either directly through
the NRN system, or via the signaller using the CSR system. Standards also allow
Train Operating Companies to issue traincrew with public GSM mobile telephones.
However, all relevant emergency numbers for the train journey must be
programmed into the mobile handsets.
There are standards regarding the provision of GSM-R technology for train radio
systems and how legacy systems (DOO(P), CSR, RETB, NRN) fulfil the various
requirements for train radio.
There are specific requirements for radio systems at underground and subsurface
stations, with respect to use by emergency services, e.g. Fire Service and BTP.
3.1.5.2
Rule Book
Communication is referred to extensively throughout the Rule Book, integrated
with the tasks relating to its use. Therefore the Rule Book does not readily
support the same analytical approach as the other Standards.
Some modules are worthy of individual mention:
♦
Communication protocols are addressed in Module G1 (11).
♦
General use of Signal Post Telephones is addressed in Module G2 (7.4).
♦
Restrictions on the use of mobile ‘phones are defined in Modules G1
(4.2) and G2 (6.3, 6.5).
♦
Communication with the Signaller by the Driver of a train detained at a
signal is addressed in Module S4. This includes a hierarchy for the use
of communication technologies, for example:
Situation
Prime
Secondary
Other
Normal SPT
SPT
NRN
As available
Limited Clearance SPT
NRN
Wait until
contacted
As available
CSR equipped train and
area
CSR
SPT
NRN or as
available.
RETB area
NRN
Lineside
telephone
As available
Page 22
3.1.5.3
Accident Reports
Key issues identified include:
3.1.5.4
♦
A common factor in all the accidents was the value of being able to send
an emergency radio message from a train to the controlling Signaller, and
vice versa, and the difficulties of doing so with NRN radio. These should
be addressed by GSM-R voice, at least in areas fitted with train
describers.
♦
The need for protocol for safety critical communication, so that the
persons concerned come to a clear understanding. This is particularly
necessary with radio communication to establish the calling location and
identify who the call has been routed to (especially if it has been
automatically re-directed).
♦
The need for recipients of re-directed calls to be properly trained for the
area the call has been made from.
♦
The potential for Drivers to be distracted by radio messages, in particular
broadcast messages requiring no specific response by the Driver. The
Driver is the only person able to determine whether it is safe to receive or
answer an incoming call. This implies the need for some indication of the
priority of incoming calls, and the need to limit messages to those
required for safe operation.
♦
The provision of lineside telephones in locations where the user is at risk
of being struck by passing trains is unacceptable.
Other Documentation
Key issues identified include :
3.2
•
Common theme in all documents is the wide range of issues that affect
the possible withdrawal of fixed lineside systems.
•
Only limited consideration has been made to the replacement of fixed
lineside systems with radio based solutions.
•
Factors such as the planned roll out of GSM-R will influence any trial
routes for withdrawal of fixed lineside systems.
•
The impact of public cellular mobiles for operational purposes requires
recognition and consideration as part of this research.
Findings and Analysis of Telecoms Systems Review
The objective of this element of phase 1 is to establish baseline information on the
extant telecommunications infrastructure embraced by this research project. This
information is essential for the next two phases of the project and also provides a
useful source of reference information.
3.2.1
Procedure
The principal sources of core data on existing lineside and radio infrastructure
have been Network Rail and the research consultants’ own archives.
3.2.2
Findings
There are approximately 32,412 lineside telephones in use of which 3,237 are
level crossing telephones that are primarily intended for use by the public. It is
considered these can be eliminated at an early stage from phase 2 of the project,
principally because it is unlikely they could be replaced by any form of radio based
solution in view of their intended users.
Page 23
Based on this assumption there are 29,175 lineside telephones that are primarily
intended for railway operational purposes and which fall broadly into the following
use categories –
♦
Driver – signaller & signaller – driver communications
♦
Possession management communications
♦
Operations staff – signaller communications
♦
Engineering staff – signaller communications
♦
Multi-user communications with electrification controls
♦
Multi-user emergency communications to signaller or electrification
controls
♦
Operations & engineering staff and public communications with signaller
(access points only)
♦
In the event of an incident, it is also possible the public may use this type
of lineside telephone to make an emergency call
There is no usage data available for any of these types of telephone. Whilst calls
to/from signallers are recorded in some signalling centres, this facility includes all
sources and types of calls and the information is not extracted for record
purposes. However as a result of the stakeholder interview process, there is an
indication that where the Rule Book permits a choice, the radio option is often
taken. Ease of contact seems to plays a part in choice ; ease of not leaving the
cab vs ease of not having to look up and dial a number. There is also a key safety
issue hiding here, in that a dialled number could be wrong (especially on multipanel signalboxes) whereas an SPT is direct.
The widespread provision and use of lineside telephones as the main method of
communication with the signaller or electrification controller originated well before
the availability of radio communications. Evidence of their existence in small
numbers dates back to the early 1900’s at localised ‘Signal Boxes or Cabins’
where the signaller did not have visibility of some signals or where distance played
a part in conveying messages. Since then considerable growth in numbers has
taken place, particularly as a result of the modernisation programmes which
occurred during the 1950s & 1960s, when re-signalling schemes brought about
the abolition of many small signal boxes in favour of centralised control centres
covering large geographical areas.
Prevailing standards at the time demanded direct communication to the signaller
from fixed signals, ground frames, level crossings, tunnels and various other
strategic locations. This practice continues today with current standards, the only
concession to radio being a choice of communications media on some routes
where radio coverage is provided . Other mandated radio situations include
CSR/RETB and limited clearance SPTs, often with the NRN number plated on the
signal. Large signalling centres such as London Bridge, Bristol, Motherwell and
Birmingham are equipped with telephone concentrators capable of handling many
hundreds of lineside telephones, with human factors considerations taken into
account in the design philosophy to reduce errors in identification and to aid
operation.
The development of lineside telephone technology has brought about benefits in
operation, particularly the signaller’s ability to accurately and easily identify the
position of callers. For SPTs the incoming call indication is usually identified by
being adjacent to the relevant signal control in modern signalling centres or by a
labelled switch/indicator on a multi-display type telephone concentrators in older
locations. This highlights one of the most often quoted benefits of lineside
telephones over radio communication in that the signaller is presented with an
unambiguous indication of where the train/person he is communicating with is
located. Provided any subsequent conversation follows the correct protocol, there
Page 24
should be no risk of misunderstanding between caller and signaller. A further
benefit is the provision of grid reference and key contact number information at
each lineside telephone. This can play an important role in the event of a caller
wishing to convey location details to the emergency services.
Communication by radio requires both parties to clearly identify their location and
agree on any train number or key identifier information, this should arguably
ensure there is no misunderstanding between caller and signaller when using
radio communication. The added obligation to use appropriate speech protocol in
the same way as a lineside telephone conversation carries more importance for
radio calls and similarly reduces the risk of misunderstanding by using the same
speech discipline. On CSR equipped routes there is a level of synchronisation
between the signalling system track circuit berth, the train describer and the train
radio, together they provides a unique indication of train position. This facility is not
available on NRN/ORN equipped routes.
CSR coverage extends over about 30% of the network and is predominant in the
south east of the UK where heavy commuter traffic is dominant. although not all
trains operating in these areas are CSR equipped. The design provides a number
of special features including a direct and secure link between driver and signaller,
emergency call initiation by driver or signaller, a stop message from the signaller’s
to a specific train or group of trains, broadcast calls and complete control over
incoming calls by the signaller. NRN was introduced in 1984 and covers a large
part of the UK rail network. It is a more basic system than CSR without any secure
driver / signaller link but does provide an emergency call feature to the Network
Rail control (not the signaller). Contact with the electrification control is also
possible, in all cases driver initiated emergency calls are given priority status.
Unlike CSR the NRN system is also used by infrastructure engineering staff for
general communication purposes.
In terms of fitness for purpose therefore, lineside telephones have a proven track
record and remained the unchallenged method of communication until the arrival
of NRN. Not originally designed as a train operating system, NRN was modified
with an overlay system known as ORN which provided additional functions
designed specifically for train operation. However it was not until the development
of CSR as a bespoke system, with all the safety requirements deemed necessary
during the 1970’s design phase, that a really effective alternative for lineside
telephones became available.
The widespread use of mobile ‘phones also plays a part in the demise of lineside
telephones and it is evident they are used to convey all types of messages not
directly concerned with safety or train operation but of an ancillary nature that help
day to day operation of the railway. Most TOCs now issue mobile phones to
traincrew for general and back-up communications purposes, usually
accompanied with specific instructions regarding their use. The Rule Book does
however restrict the use of mobile ‘phones in cabs and at the lineside because of
the distraction risk.
Routine testing of lineside telephones is undertaken by a mix of track and
signalling maintenance staff (this varies nationally) whilst maintenance and failure
rectification is undertaken by a mix of Network Rail and contractor’s staff.
Maintenance generally consists of a quarterly check of which one comprises a
more detailed annual overhaul. Failure rectification is undertaken in response to
testing or user reports. In some areas vandalism is a significant and persistent
cause of failures. Over the years this has encouraged the development of so
called ‘vandal resistant telephones’. Some success has emerged from these
initiatives but generally the persistent vandal will always succeed in rendering the
telephone unusable. In limited clearance locations any work on lineside
telephones will necessitate arranging train free periods to ensure worker safety.
This in turn has a disruptive and financial impact on railway operation for an often
little used asset.
Page 25
NRN and CSR radio fixed systems involve a more complex maintenance regime
which is undertaken by Thales on behalf of Network Rail. This also includes failure
rectification and various management tasks associated with operating NRN in
particular. The trainborne equipment is maintained separately by the owning TOC
maintainers Unlike lineside telephone systems which have evolved and could
continue to evolve using public telephone system technology, NRN/ORN and to a
lesser extend CSR radio systems, are more complex and rely on software based
solutions that are becoming increasingly difficult to support. This introduces an
important consideration for phase 2 of the project. Accepting that lineside
telephones have been in use for approximately 100 years and continue to be
relatively easy to support while radio systems, which have only been in use for
approximately 25 years, are less easily supported there may be a safety risk
consideration if the only means of communication is GSM-R, should it become
unreliable in a similar period.
The provision of lineside telephones on freight-only routes has been identified
separately in but failure information is not separately captured. It is unlikely that
the trend of failures is any different for telephones on freight lines and the absence
of this is not seen as an issue for this research study. Because of the design of
NRN radio and the positioning of base stations to achieve maximum coverage,
there are no separate records of freight-only route base stations. As with lineside
telephones, the absence of this information is not seen as an issue. The approach
to communications options on freight-only lines is considered further in section
3.3.
3.2.3
Communication System Characteristics
Even though the basic function of lineside telephones and radio communications
are the same, namely to facilitate communication between two (or more)
individuals, there are certain characteristics in the systems that influence their
implementation and use. Also, the functionality (generally options additional to
basic voice communication) will differ. These are summarised in the following
table:
Lineside
Telephone
Radio
Issues/Comments
Only available at
fixed locations
Available wherever
there is radio
coverage
Some uses require the assurance
that the user is at a known
location. Other uses require
communication wherever the user
is within the coverage area.
Fixed line operates
constantly.
Coverage subject to
vagaries of radio
propagation and
EMI.
This excludes equipment faults.
Power supplied by
fixed comms.
Operation requires
power source for
mobile user.
Nature of incident (train failure or
prolonged event) may be
important.
One user per
telephone,
independently of the
number of other
telephones in use in
the area.
Ability to
communicate related
to the number of
other users
communicating in
that area.
Capacity requirements can be
very peaky (e.g. during an
incident/accident). Limitations
also imposed by the manning of
the trackside location (Signaller,
Controller, etc.).
Linking
infrastructure is a
Linking infrastructure
limited to base
Lineside cabling can be disrupted
by an incident, which may actually
Page 26
vulnerability
stations and comms
centre.
affect either system.
Useable by anyone.
Mobiles only
issued/available to
railway staff.
Public will not be trained or
equipped with railway radio
systems.
Additional
functionality limited
and depends on
system.
Provides additional
functions, such as
maintaining contact
as mobile moves,
specific messages,
links with train
systems, etc.
Additional functions start as
optional extras but may become
important (e.g. faxing information
to a driving cab).
Intermittent
communication only
Trainborne radio
systems essential for
some purposes,
usually linked to
railway use
interworking, e.g.
DOO or signalling
(RETB/ETCS).
Integration of GSM-R hand
portables into operational
practices not finalised.
Requires user to be
stood at lineside.
User may
communicate from
location of choice.
Key issue here is safety of lineside
telephones with limited clearance.
System entirely
trackside
System split
trackside and
trainborne/userborne
Issues of responsibility and impact
on rail vehicles
Independent
technology
Subject to TSI
Affects introduction: Network
Change or legal requirement (and
hence who pays).
Communication
essentially
instantaneous
Communication realtime but subject to
variable system
delays
Radio system delays are subject
to probability distribution.
Developments in radio technology employed in GSM-R systems will improve some
of the radio related influences contained in the table but in practice they will still
remain whatever type of radio system because of the nature of radio itself. This is
an important consideration for phase 2 of the project when examining the safety
implications and risk modelling issues.
3.2.4
Rule Book Guidance on Choice of Communications System
Communication is referred to extensively throughout the Rule Book, integrated
with the tasks relating to its use. In particular guidance is given to train drivers
regarding the mode of communications they should use, the choice being
dependant on the prevailing situation. This guidance clearly recognises the loss of
lineside telephone status as the prime means of communication, only NRN
equipped routes give the SPT as first choice.
Situation
Prime
Secondary
Other
Normal SPT
SPT
NRN
As available
Limited Clearance SPT
NRN
Wait until
As available
Page 27
contacted
3.2.5
CSR equipped train and
area
CSR
SPT
NRN or as
available.
RETB area
NRN
Lineside telephone
As available
Summary of Findings
Lineside telephones, CSR and NRN systems all currently play a part in providing
operational communications paths. The Network Rail owned UK rail network
makes extensive use of lineside telephones (total 32,412) and NRN / ORN
systems (485 base stations) which together cover the majority of routes whilst
CSR (1,031 base stations) covers 30% of routes, mainly in the south east.
Communication takes place for a wide variety of operational reasons and
situations, including:
♦
Routine passing of information, with the requirement to establish a clear
understanding for safety critical information.
♦
Emergency situations.
♦
Degraded working in response to equipment failures (including temporary
block working, pilotman working, manual route setting, etc.).
♦
Degraded working in response to planned engineering work (including T2
protection of the line and T3 possessions).
Key issues arising from these include those where the technology facilitates:
♦
Communication quickly and directly to the controlling Signaller.
♦
Use by general trackside staff as well as trained operators.
♦
The provision of supporting information on the user’s location to the
Signaller.
The latter feature is important in that it may have been used to de-risk the
operating practices that have been established for its use. Use of an SPT
generally provides the Signaller with information on where the user is calling from,
both in general geographical terms and in terms that can be related directly to the
Signaller’s context (e.g. a signal on his panel). By removing ambiguity in this way
the integrity of procedures associated with degraded and emergency situations is
increased. It therefore follows that if this feature is not present, as may be the
case with radio communication, then the procedures will need to be reviewed and
strengthened.
It is also apparent that despite the absence of specific data on lineside telephone
or radio usage, the feedback from stakeholders is one of favouring the use of
existing radio options where possible whilst the use of the lineside telephones
remains essential in many area. However a means of quantifying usage will be
required in phase 2 for development of replacement options.
3.3
Findings and Analysis of Stakeholders Interviews
3.3.1
Process
In practice the format for each interview tended to vary depending on the
stakeholder’s available time, their enthusiasm for the subject and their desire to
get over particular key points which were seen as important.
Page 28
Without exception, each stakeholder that has been interviewed participated fully
and positively with a clear recognition of the importance attached to the project. Of
those that declined, most did so by failing to respond to our initial approach and
subsequent reminders, albeit this was a minority section.
Nine train operating companies, one trade union and three Network Rail engineers
have been interviewed. Contact with two of the Network Rail engineers has tended
to be more regular throughout phase 1 as issues have been identified and
dialogue is required to capture or clarify information.
Although not part of phase 1, preliminary approaches have also been made to 19
European railway organisations seeking their participation in phase 2. To date
favourable responses have been received from three but it is anticipated sufficient
replies will be obtained to get the necessary European flavour to the research.
3.3.2
Findings
The findings fall in to two broad categories, basic information about the
stakeholders company and policy / opinions / views / on the implications of
replacing lineside telephones with radio based solutions. Information so far
obtained from Network Rail has been limited to engineering data which is covered
by section 3.2.
A summary of the basic TOC information collected is provided in the following
table –
Company
No of Units
or Locos
CSR
Equippe
d
NRN
Equipped
Balfour
Beatty
Rail Plant
GNER
30
No
Yes
56 Units
4 Locos
131
No
Virgin
Cross
Country &
West
Coast
South
West
Trains
Chiltern
Trains
Amey Rail
Plant
EWS
Info not
available
Cellular
Equipped or
Carried by
Traincrew
Yes
(fixed in cab)
Use of SPT
Yes
Yes (by driver)
Limited
No
Yes
Yes (by driver)
Medium
Yes
Yes (for
some unit
operating
outside
CSR routes)
Yes (by guard).
Very limited
Desiro units also
have cab
equipped
cellular.
Yes
394 main line
locos.
75 shunt
locos
Yes (30
main
line
only)
High usage
(possessions)
Very limited
Yes (all
main line
locos & 28
shunters)
Yes (all drivers
are issued with
mobiles)
Medium
TOC stakeholder feedback falls into the following common themes and includes
the views of ATOC –
Page 29
♦
There is scope for withdrawal of some (but not all) lineside telephones
subject to the effective introduction of GSM-R and appropriate
identification and control of the associated risks.
♦
There is a level of reassurance about using lineside telephones and
SPTs in particular because there is certainty about the location of the
telephone and hence the caller. This is considered an important safety
factor by users.
♦
The use of limited clearance SPTs is seen as a ‘last resort’ means of
communications that will be avoided if possible. They are seen as a real
safety risk to users.
♦
Existing radio systems are now well proven and generally reliable; CSR
in particular is seen as ‘fit for purpose’. There is some concern that GSMR will not deliver the same level of performance.
♦
Drivers do not like using SPTs. They have to stop and secure their train,
climb down over an often steep ballast shoulder and walk to the SPT,
make the call and return to their cab. Inclement weather and darkness
add to this reluctance. In the majority of cases the call will in any case
result in a ‘wait for a proceed aspect’ from the signaller. Overall the
process is not driver friendly and the likely outcome of the call is known
but is nevertheless mandated by the Rule Book.
♦
Use of lineside telephones is time consuming and counter productive to
keeping the railway moving because the process takes time and so
imposes delays in train operation.
♦
There is evidence some SPADs have occurred where drivers have
slowed down on the approach to the signal but rather than stop at the
recommended distance in rear of the signal, allowed their train to coast to
a stand near the SPT, only to find they cannot stop and pass the signal at
danger.
♦
Driver standards have continued to improve with time, with a more
effective recruitment and training regime which encourages a speech
protocol discipline that is more fundamental to radio communications.
Having said that, a total switch from lineside telephones to a radio-based
alternative may require another look at re-training.
♦
There is a view that the same cannot be said of signallers and more
intense training of speech protocol and general voice communications is
required now.
♦
Communications with the signaller for most possession work is currently
achieved by lineside telephone. The issue of possession management
♦
and engineering work generally needs more research prior to GSM-R
implementation. Operating solutions do not seem evident at present.
♦
Some (not all) TOCs consider total abolition of lineside telephones is not
a good idea. An alternative suggested is ‘plug point’ facilities where train
crew can carry a portable handset that can be plugged into lineside
points when radio is not available for any reason (this facility already
exists on some routes today).
♦
Some (not all) TOCs believe lineside telephones will remain necessary in
yards and depots.
♦
There is a strong view that a cost benefit will arise for Network Rail as the
result of withdrawing lineside telephones. Questions were raised about
track access charges and will the introduction of GSM-R be managed
through the network change process? [Yes] It is clear the TOCs wish to
better understand the cost implications of introducing GSM-R and any
withdrawal of lineside telephones.
♦
There is a belief the industry is ‘in denial’ over the role public cellular
telephones can play in day to day operation of the railway. The
Page 30
widespread issue of mobiles to traincrew illustrates TOC recognition of
their use as essential parts of their ‘tool kit’.
♦
Public cellular mobiles carried by traincrew are generally accompanied by
company specific instructions on their use. These range from being
carried by guards but can be used by the driver when necessary to cabs
that are permanently equipped. Many carry programmed numbers of key
contact such as signalling centres and control offices.
♦
Public cellular mobiles are regularly used for calls such as driver to relief
driver, ‘I am approaching platform 8 and will be there in 5 minutes’ and
driver to signaller ‘can you route me through platform 3 because I am
expecting to pick up another crew member there’. None of these types of
call are strictly operational but do contribute to effective train working.
♦
Some TOCs require drivers to stop before making any radio call (except
emergency calls), other do not.
♦
Concern expressed by some TOCs that lineside telephones carry
essential information such as grid reference used in emergencies. How
will this information be provided if lineside telephones removed?
Union feedback can be summarised as follows –
3.3.3
♦
Would be against the withdrawal of lineside telephones whilst NRN &
CSR are the only radio systems in use. Would require GSM-R to be
proven first.
♦
Concern about the absence of lineside telephones in the event of an
accident where the train radio becomes inoperable or the cab cannot be
accessed.
♦
On routes where axle counters are used to detect the position of trains
rather than traditional track circuits, both lineside telephones and radio
are essential as track circuit clips cannot be used in an emergency. [All
traction and rolling stock is currently equipped with a device the traincrew
can use in an emergency to change the status of a track from ‘line clear’
to ‘line occupied’. This is known as a track circuit clip but it cannot be
used on axle counter equipped routes as the technology is different.]
♦
Cautious optimism regarding likely driver safety benefits that could be
achieved.
Summary of Findings
It is evident that the TOCs interviewed so far are generally united in their support
of replacing at least some uses of lineside telephones with radio based solutions
once GSM-R is proved to be a worthy successor to NRN and CSR in particular.
Since they only partly represent the train operating sector, some further interviews
are planned to enlarge the baseline information and to confirm or challenge the
findings to date. Anecdotal evidence from stakeholders already interviewed
suggests that support will be forthcoming.
The main thrust of the TOCs supporting argument is twofold –
♦
It must be safer and in the case of an emergency quicker to use
trainborne radio communications than to stop and use lineside
telephones.
♦
There is a clear business benefit in that lost time and disruption is
minimised.
That said, TOCs (at the level interviewed) clearly wish to better understand the
cost implications of any changes and how they will be implemented.
Page 31
The reliance and commitment to the extant radio systems has emerged as a key
factor in TOCs’ buy-in to GSM-R. Whilst not a primary function of this research to
evaluate these systems, it does however show that CSR in particular and NRN to
a lesser degree, do their job relatively well and are in regular use. To be a worthy
successor GSM-R must therefore meet user expectations. Dissatisfaction may
influence buy-in to any proposals to remove lineside telephones.
The role played by public cellular mobiles emerges as an important consideration
in this research. The degree to which traincrew use mobiles to enable general
communications and as back-up when other modes are unavailable appears quite
significant. There is also a picture emerging that each TOC approaches the use of
mobiles differently and that different rules apply to each. This in itself may not be a
safety issue but it would seem sensible that the risk be evaluated and a common
approach taken to the use of mobiles. The Rule Book already does this to some
extent by restricting cab use.
The real issue is not about providing train crew with mobiles but when they should
use them and in particular when they can be called on them. The risk of
distraction is severe, and company rules generally only allow mobile usage when
the train is at a stand for this reason. Back-up usually means an incident, when
everyone on the train is trying to use their own mobiles thus cells become blocked
and the mobile un-usable.
Page 32
4
Implications for Phases 2 and 3 of
the Research Project
4.1
The findings of phase 1 of the research have not identified any impediments to a
progression to phase 2.
4.2
The lack of data to quantify usage of lineside telephones is unfortunate and a
means of quantifying usage will be required in phase 2 for development of
replacement options.
4.3
It is considered lineside telephones which are primarily intended for use by the
public can be eliminated at an early stage from phases 2 of the project. It is
unlikely they could be replaced by any form of radio based solution.
4.4
The possible replacement of lineside telephones at some access points not used
by the public could be considered.
4.5
The lack of information on the dedicated provision of lineside telephones and radio
on freight-only routes is unfortunate and will require further clarification for phases
2 and 3.
4.6
Lineside telephones have been in use for approximately 100 years and continue to
be relatively easy to support while radio systems, which have only been in use for
approximately 25 years are less easily supported and are likely to have a shorter
life span. This may represent a safety risk for consideration in phases 2 and 3.
4.7
There are further stakeholder interviews planned during phase 2. These will
continue to add value to the already collected stakeholder data and are not seen
as an issue.
4.8
The extent and potential impact of the changes to Railway Group and Network
Rail Standards required subsequent to any recommendations for removal of fixed
lineside telephony must be considered during Phase 2.
Page 33
5
Conclusions
5.1
Conclusions
This phase of the research project has identified a wide range of base line
information on industry standards, other related documents, existing infrastructure
and stakeholder views. This information is sorted into there distinct sections of the
report the separate conclusions from which being summarised in sections 3.1.5,
3.2.5 & 3.3.3.
It is evident from research in to the relevant standards that any switch from fixed
lineside infrastructure to radio based solutions will involve changes to a
considerable number of documents, many of which are inter-related. Care will
therefore be required to ensure the changes are carefully managed to avoid any
contradictory standards being in place while the updates are processed.
In general terms related to the main objective of the research, evidence to date
indicates there is a range from ‘must stay as lineside telephone’ at one end to
‘must use radio’ at the other. The end categories are fairly clear, for example:
♦
Telephones for use by the public, such as level crossing and emergency
telephones, must stay as fixed lineside infrastructure.
♦
Communication between driving cabs and the lineside (Signaller,
Controller, TOC Control, etc.) will need a radio option because contact
may be required when the train is not held at a signal (emergencies,
failures, communication on the move). Also, limited clearance SPTs,
some signalling systems (RETB) and operating practices (DOO(P))
require it.
The interest is therefore in the grey area in the middle. This is where we need to
establish the cost/benefit, risk, practicality, migration, etc. issues, and then go on
to investigate them.
Page 34
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