BOOK I
‘Republic’ sets out to answer two questions: what is justice? Why should we be just?
Socrates among group of friends and enemies, and asks them to define justice - refutes
every suggestion and does not offer his own. This ends in aporia, which would usually be the
end of the Socratic dialogue - in this one, he offers nine books’ worth of justice theory.
FIrst to offer theory is Cephalus (spokesman for traditional Greek values). He tries to define
justice by saying that it means living up to your legal obligations and being truthful. Soc
refutes this with a counterexample: giving weapon back to madman. You owe it to him
because he legally owns it, yet the act itself is unjust (but this is using an example?).
Cephalus’ son Polemarchus takes over. He defines it as helping your friends and harming
your enemies. Similar to first definition in that it renders to each what is due and gives to
each what is appropriate.
Soc points out inconsistencies - our justice concerning friends and enemies is fallible, so we
may end up harming the good and helping the bad. Our friends may not be virtuous.
Thrasymachus is now introduced - he is a Sophist, who wish to do away with justice and
moral standards. He claims that justice is just the advantage of the stronger. Just behaviour
only works towards the advantage of others, not the ones who behave justly. He assumes
that justice is the unnatural restraint on our desire for more. It is imposed upon us.
Here, Soc has to define justice and show us that it is worthwhile. He has three arguments:
1) T’s view promotes injustice as virtue, and life is seen as continual competition to be
successful. He reasons that injustice cannot be a virtue, because it is the opposite of
wisdom, which is a virtue. The wise man does not seek to get more and beat others.
2) In order to reach societal goals that T praised earlier, one must be at least
moderately just.
3) Since it was agreed that justice is virtue of soul, and virtue means health, justice is
desirable because it means health of the soul.
BOOK II
Soc believes he has adequately responded to T, but others aren’t satisfied.
Glaucon states that all goods can be divided into three classes: those we desire for their
consequences (physical training), those we desire for their own sake (joy), and things we
desire for both (knowledge, sight, health). He wants Soc to prove that justice is in the third
class.
Most people class justice in the first group: we must suffer through it in order to avoid the
greater evil of a life without it. It stems from vulnerability - since we all suffr from each others’
injustices, we all agree to be just to one another.
Glaucon then claims that if the just man became invisible, he would perform unjust acts,
proving that people are only just because they are scared of punishment.
His brother, Adeimantus, jumps in to say that no one praises justice for its own sake, but for
its rewards.
Socrates then claims that there are two kinds of political justice: the justice belonging to the
state, and that belonging to the individual. It is easier to look for it at the political level than at
the individual. To do this, he will build up a city and see when and where justice enters it.
Here, he introduces the principle of specialisation: each person performs the role for which
they are naturally best suited. Behind this is the idea that humans have natural inclinations. If
this is fulfilled, everything can be done at the highest possible level.
In Soc’s city, the first roles are those that provide for life’s necessities. This creates the
producing class, and makes what Soc calls the ‘healthy city’, due to it being governed only
by necessity.
Next stage is to transfer the city into a luxury city, with merchants, actors, poets. All of the
wealth will lead to wars, so warriors are needed (‘guardians’).
Soc spends fucking ages talking about the education of the guardians - they must be
properly trained in every aspect, down to the stories they are told in youth.
BOOK III
The guardians must be protected against a fear of death. They must always be portrayed as
honest. Other art forms must not represent violent, graceless characters. He also says it is
vital for the young guardians to see the correct love between a boy and a man (huh) but no
erotic elements, only pure love.
Physical training is important, but must be balanced with arts education. Doctors must also
be trained, but only to cure those who suffer from curable ailments. Those with incurable
physical diseases must die naturally, and those with incurable mental diseases must be put
to death (HUH).
The best of those trained will be ‘guardians’, while the rest will be ‘auxiliaries’ and aid the
rulers. They go through various tests and all live together in housing - receive no wages and
cannot hold wealth.
BOOK IV
Adeimantus interrupts to say that no one would want to be a ruler as it sounds unpleasant Soc responds that the goal is to make the city as a whole happy, not one group.
Soc also limits the size of the city and says it should not have money. The guardians share
everything in common amongst them, and since it is a just city, there are no laws.
The four virtues within the just city are wisdom, courage, moderation and justice.
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Wisdom: lies with the guardians because of their knowledge.
Courage: lies with the auxiliaries, who fight for the city.
Moderation and Justice: spread across the whole city. Moderation identified with the
agreement over who rules the city, and justice is its complement (specialisation laws)
Since he has defined societal justice, he looks towards individual justice. Justice in the
individual involves the correct power relationship among different parts (aspects of the soul).
Soc claims there are 3 parts of the soul: one that lusts after truth (rational), one that lusts
after honour (spirited), and one that lusts after everything else (appetitive). These three parts
are the same as the 3 groups within the city (rational = guardians, spirited = auxiliaries,
appetitive = producers).
In a just person, the rational aspect of the soul rules over the other parts, the spirited part
keeps the appetitive in line (same as in city). In a just soul, the soul is geared towards
fulfilling a desire for knowledge.
This is different to our understanding of justice - we think of it as a set of actions, but Soc
claims it is part of the structure of the soul. A person whose soul is in the right arrangement
will behave according to the norms of justice. Soc’s notion of justice accounts for our
intuitions and explains them. Since a just person is ruled by the love of truth, he will not be in
the grips of lust, greed or honour. The love of truth weakens the urges for vices.
A just soul has its parts arranged properly, and is therefore a healthy soul.
—Lecture 1:
The Republic captures Plato’s vision for a ‘perfect state’ - justice is the virtue that governs it.
Justice is, intuitively, the way we act rightly towards others in society. The goal of the
Republic is to show that justice is to the greatest benefit of the just person.
Immediately, there is a prima facie problem: what if acting justly towards others entails one’s
own disbenefit? If justice is costly, no one will be just. This problem is addressed from Book
2 onwards.
Book 1: focuses on Thrasymachus - tries to win every argument.
T arrives, frustrated; he accuses S of refuting others but never offering an answer to the
argument himself.
T’s definition of justice: the advantage of the stronger.
1. The stronger = the city’s rulers
2. Rulers devise laws for their own advantage
3. Justice = obeying these laws.
Claim 2 is fairly weak, and doesn’t really explain what the rulers should be doing if they were
just. Descriptive, not normative claim.
S targets (2): are the city’s rulers infallible about what is to their advantage? Or are they
liable to error? T admits that they can be fallible and are weaker when in error, so we should
not necessarily obey them, as they are not promising what is best for them.
T modifies: a ruler unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do
to be just.
S focuses on the example of a doctor: does a doctor practice for his own advantage? Or to
help people? Crafts are by nature set over their subjects to provide what is to their
advantage. Each craft is perfect insofar as it serves its subject.
So, no one in any position of rule orders what is advantageous to his subjects?
T: what about the shepherd? He works for his own advantage, and true rulers think of their
subjects as sheep. So the just sheep (servant) serves his master.
So what people call ‘justice’ is in fact injustice - helping strong to pursue own advantage.
This is freer and more masterly than other forms of justice.
S counter-attacks:
1. T has not distinguished true shepherd from the money maker. Wage-earning is an
additional craft, and true professionals don’t aim as profit; true rulers don’t want to rule but
see it as necessary. The good ruler is truly humble.
2. A conventionally just person wants to get the better of the unjust, but not of other just
people. Contrasted with the unjust person: wants to get the better of both. In any branch of
knowledge, a knowledgeable person does not seek to outdo others (doctor does not seek to
disagree with other doctors).
3. We assume that injustice is more powerful than justice. The members of any group
(whether just or unjust group) cannot be unjust to one another, as they will not achieve their
goals. With an unjust individual, injustice will also cause dissension (at war with themselves).
Therefore, injustice is less powerful than justice.
Lecture 2:
Now onto defining justice. There are three kinds of goodness:
1. Goodness per se (in of itself)
2. Goodness that is instrumental / per accidens
3. Goodness that is both
Glaucon believes that justice is type 2, while S believes it is type 3. G claims justice is only
good as a means of getting ahead, and challenges S to show him that it’s good per se.
G: the ‘best’ outcome for someone is to be unjust with impunity (not being caught).
Meanwhile, the ‘worst’ is to suffer injustice without being able to take revenge. No one
values justice per se, only instrumentally.
He uses the ‘Ring of Gyges’ thought experiment - shepherd in service of ruler of Lydia, who
finds ring that makes one invisible at will. Shepherd seduces king’s wife, attacks and kills
king, and takes over kingdom.
No one would stay on the path of justice when he could do what he wanted. One is never
just willingly, but only when compelled.
The natural origins of justice lie with our inability to get away with injustice and our desire for
just treatment. We make an agreement to guarantee that unjust behaviour is punished.
Nature is forced by law of the perversion of treating fairness with respect, so justice is good
merely as a means.
Take an unjust man with a reputation for justice, and a just man with a reputation for
injustice. G asks S to prove that justice is still valuable per se, by showing that it is better to
be the latter in all situations.
S begins with isomorphism - being in the same form as something else. There is more
justice in a larger object (city) than smaller (person) - but they must take the same form.
S creates a theoretical city. To meet our many needs and to create efficiency, we need a
division of labour.
He claims we need:
- producers (servants, craftsmen, merchants, retailers)
- soldiers (to protect wealth and be courageous)
- rulers / guardians (to rule and be wise)
Book 4:
If this city is to be completely good, it must be wise, courageous, moderate (self-controlled)
and just.
- Wisdom: the kind of knowledge that the rulers have.
- Courage: embodied in class that have true beliefs about what it is to be feared according to
the law
- Moderation: control of the producers by the rulers, and a form of harmonious relation
between the classes.
Lecture 3
Justice in the city is “what is left over” → doing one’s own work and not meddling with others.
Inter-class mobility is more dangerous than intra-class - if you, as a producer, try to become
a soldier, it will be very harmful. Meddling and exchange is the greatest harm to the city, and
a just man won’t differ at all to the just city.
Each of us has within us the same parts as the city - we have wisdom, courage, moderation
and justice.
- Wisdom in the soul: reason
- Courage in the soul: spirit
- Moderation in the soul: desire
- Justice in the soul: these parts in proper relation to one another.
The principle: you can’t have contradictory movements within the same thing (i.e. moving
and standing).
1) Argument for rational vs appetitive parts of the soul: thirst is an appetite for drink, but
there are thirsty people who don’t wish to drink (i.e. offered poison). Rational part tells you to
stop. The rational, calculative part controls the irrational, appetitive part.
2) Argument for spirited part of soul: one can be angry at one’s own actions, and this
represents the spirit. It cannot be reason, as this is often portrayed in young children who
don’t have reason.
Appetite is properly ruled by reason. Moderation keeps the harmony between spirit and
reason, and justice keeps the parts separate.
Injustice entails psychic disharmony and ignorance - so is injustice tantamount to ignorance?
Even more so, is injustice tantamount to mental illness?
Body illness is a disequilibrium between parts, so is mental illness a disequilibrium of the
soul? Can we define virtue as a kind of soul health?
Even if someone can do what he wants, just or not, how can it be worth living when the soul
is in turmoil?
To critique, we can question isomorphism - thing that are good for the city may not be good
for the individual. Also, if the majority are producers, will they be able to grasp justice? The
city might be repressive to enforce justice.
Tutorial:
Thrasymachus is Socrates’s biggest enemy in the dialogue – they are Sophists (people who
charged for their wisdom – hired to purvey wisdom. Teachers of wisdom).
S does not charge – thinks wisdom is beyond a price. He also denies that he has wisdom –
he loves it but does not have it.
T defines justice as the advantage of the stronger (the rulers). Doesn’t matter who it is.
Justice consists in obeying them, and therefore when you are just you are benefitting the
rulers.
For Soc, this is inadequate – descriptive not normative. There can be an ‘unjust law’.
Unsound argument for Soc.
Needs to overcomes T’s cynicism surrounding justice – he reduces justice to something
unflattering. The Cynics were a school of philosophers in Greece, majorly disliked lol.
Ring of Gyges: any of us would be unjust if we could get away with it. We are only just due
to punishment.
Maybe we are still like children – respond to punishments and prizes.
To disprove his, Soc launches into the city-soul analogy.
The city is like the soul – you have the same form of justice in the city and in the soul. If we
can find just city, we can find just soul. This is an assumption of isomorphism (same form).
Structure of the just city:
Soc identifies classes within the city: rulers, auxiliaries, producers.
Rulers / guardians have wisdom, auxiliaries / soldiers have courage, producers have selfcontrol of their passions. Justice in the city is performing your own role, not crossing the line
– this will generate social harmony.
Reason in the soul is the seat of wisdom. Spirit in the soul is the seat of courage. Appetite in
the soul is the seat of self-control.
Justice in the soul is where each part does their proper job.
(Williams and Lear papers !)
Williams objects to analogy – does not deliver harmony in the city.
Rulers are the smallest part of the city, then auxiliaries, then producers. By hypothesis,
reason is the weakest and smallest part of soul, and appetite is largest. Why would
producers listen to the rulers? Would become tyrannical.
Also, are the producers unjust – ruled by their passions? Would the city even be just as a
whole?
Lear: we could recognise the different groups, but not understand them. Producers cannot
understand wisdom, but they have enough reason to recognise wise laws and obey them.
Wouldn’t be able to create a wise law, but could follow it.
That is how our society functions – we recognise experts but do not always understand the
content of their wisdom (doctors).