1 1. PROJECT DEFINITION 1.1. Background and project stakeholders During the 1960’s, there were plans to eventually create a large road throughout the current section of land to be known as the F35 Freeway, the land was therefore untouched in the resulting 40 years to enable the road to be built. In October 1999, the Bracks’ led government announced that the plans to create the roadway had been scrapped in favour of the Rowville railway line being lengthened. However, in August 2000, the same government performed a “U-turn” and announced that they would be seeking federal funding for the commencement of the roadway as they believed it would be of national importance to the roads systems. Leading up to the EastLink project, there was a decision to create the largest urban road project ever constructed in Victoria which would help link the Eastern Freeway in Mitcham to the Frankston Freeway in the South-East of Victoria. This would include 39km of tolled motorways and 6km of bypass roads at Dandenong and Ringwood which would help alleviate the number of vehicles travelling on Springvale Road, Park Road, Doncaster Road and Reynolds Road. The project would help connect Victoria with other major arterials as the current numbers of vehicles is rising and travel time is lowering year by year. This allows for more options for those travelling along the EastLink corridor. In 2003, the Victorian Government established the Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority (SEITA) to help manage and complete the EastLink project. SEITA had to hear the private sector bids and select the option that they felt was the best going forward. The contract to fund, design, build and operate EastLink was chosen in October of 2004 and was awarded to ConnectEast for a period of 39 years. Stakeholders of the Eastlink project includes: - Victorian Government (in particular, Vic Roads, Department of Planning, Department of Treasury and Finance, Department of Transport, Department of Environment and Water, etc.); 2 - Local residents and business owners; - Communities in the east and south-east of Melbourne; - Special interest groups (includes environment groups, transport industry stakeholders and aboriginal communities); - Motorists (commuters whom will be affected); - Finance companies; - Contractors and Subcontractors; - Eastlink operators. By identifying the stakeholders, it helps determine the best way or ways to manage their expectations. Every stakeholder, regardless of his level, wants or expects something from the project or its outcome. You can use this to your advantage, for example, during a project proposal meeting. The more thoroughly you address stakeholder interests in defining project objectives, working methods, planning and problem-solving, the better chance you have of getting your project approved. Selected by the government agency, SEITA, ConnectEast became the most viable as to further move on with the project as they won the bid war against Transurban (operating CityLink). The East Link project was introduced as a solution for the increasingly heavy traffic on Melbourne’s north-east suburbs. It was expected to improve the relationship between the road and its users, including many groups: population of nearby areas, big companies that use roads to flow their production, as well as supply a range of retail chains, supermarkets, and other stores. The stakeholder management during the construction stage was considered a success by the leaders of the project, the holding Thiess Jonh Holland. It was based on the early communication with all stakeholders, running community forums to introduce the project, as well as update information about them. The main interest of all stakeholders was the new, modern, fully electronic and free-flow toll road that was being developed, and its benefits. For locals, especially those who had to make the way to Melbourne CBD daily, the East Link was a synonym for free traffic. Population of nearby suburbs was continuously increasing, and the small streets in those areas were no longer supporting the heavy traffic. 3 In addition, the rail system was continuously failing in its mission to carry people from outer suburbs to the city centre. Accidents were causing disruptions on the network, many of them caused by the ground-level intersections between suburban streets and railway tracks. This fact was leading to the increase of traffic in eastern suburbs, and the other consequent issues. Furthermore, the easier and faster connection to the CBD brought a significantly economic development to East Link surround suburbs. Living close to a modern tollway is considered as a big advantage. New projects were released and built, making people’s lives better. The cost of living in those areas has also increased, making properties become more valuable than before. For companies, the fully traffic-free road allowed them to spend less time in their delivery services, being important to improve the quality of their products and services. As a consequence, those companies could reduce their loss rates, increasing their profits. Meanwhile, heavy trucks no longer had to go through small streets in the suburbs, contributing to the improvement of liveability in those areas. However, locals were concerned about some possible drawbacks within the project, despite of the main benefits previously mentioned. The road was expected to bring a higher level of noise for nearby areas, as well as an increase on pollution rates. Furthermore, some people do not have to go to the CBD every day, and prefer to walk, or ride a bike between nearby areas. How would a project, developed for the heavy traffic, include those people? East Link project’s developers were also concerned about those issues, and proposed some solutions, which were accepted by population. As a part of that, a pedestrian and cyclist track was built throughout the road. In addition, panels were installed on the edges of the road, in order to contain the spread of noise, and trees were planted to compensate the higher pollution levels. 1.2. Goals and objectives The goals and objectives of the EastLink project cover five major areas: transport, environment, land use, implementation and providing a financially feasible solution. 4 The transportation goal includes the connection of Eastern, Monash, Frankston and Peninsula Link freeways, in order to improve transit mobility in the EastLink corridor. This connection was expected to allow the increase in transit accessibility, improving the quality of transit service and maximizing EastLink ridership. Meanwhile, the environmental goal concerns about the preservation of environmental quality in the corridor. It means that the goal is minimizing potential adverse operating and construction impacts on the natural and built environment. Consequently, a special attention was given to Mullum Mullum Valley in order to minimize the impacts of the construction there. The land use goal aims to support regional and local land use goals and objectives. In addition, the implementation goal aims to minimize risk in the corridor. It was designed a system to reduce the construction risk. Thus, key safety strategies were implemented in the concept phase since the handover phase to achieve this goal. In addition, building relationships and support over time with the stakeholders and community through communication strategies were very important to avoid risks. Therefore, all the actions should be financially reasonable, allowing their application. Building a system within project budget with quality and rapid completion. In addition, building a system that is cost effective and rapid completion and it can be operated and maintained within available revenue. The decision to proceed with the East Link project came amid much controversy about the project. One of the major concerns was its environmental impact, especially that it comprises two 1.6 km tunnels, running under the environmentally sensitive Mullum Mullum Valley. So, one of the project goals is to preserve any environmentally sensitive areas and minimise any negative environmental impact. The project must deliver social and environmental improvements to the area in which it operates, where 1.1 million residents lived in the Mitcham-Frankston corridor. Although the EastLink conveyed economic benefits beyond the region in which it operates, to the wider Victorian economy. Direct economic benefits of the project were realised through the creation of 7550 additional jobs. The project was forecasted to provide the safe and smooth travelling for vehicles, alleviating traffic congestion and hence providing the benefits of reduced vehicle 5 operating costs, reduced accidents, fuel saving and reduced carbon dioxide emissions. ConnectEast has a continual obligation during the concession period to ensure that the project is fulfilling its initial intended goals. Many special resources were required for the execution of the project. They included the excavation of the tunnel under Mullum Mullum Valley, which required attention to the archaeological heritage in the area. Also, 450,000 meters cubic of rocks were excavated, using modern technologies of rockhammers and blast techniques. Furthermore, the East Link project has a set a new record for consumption of asphalt – during its peak, more than 4,000 tonnes were used per day. A facility was opened in the LaTrobe Valley in order to supply more than 22,000 primary items required by the construction. They included roughly 1,650 bridge beams, 4,630 barriers and more than 15,000 noise walls. 1.3. Assumptions of the project According to Office of the Chief Information Officer, a project to be successful needs to have assumptions which are circumstances and events that occurs which are out of total control of the project team. Assumptions are considered true even if no proofs are available for demonstrate that. Every project has its constraints which might restrict or limit it and it is outside of control of the project team. A project assumption is believed to be true by historical data or experience of the people involved in it. Furthermore, it may not have empirical evidence. These assumptions are considered potential risks so it is important that the communication between the interested participants be clear, documented and validated. A project may be very impacted by assumptions which are proved incorrect. It is important that all participants agree with the assumptions before the project begins. Generally, those parts are composing by stakeholders, project participants and executives. If the assumptions are accorded before the project begins it is more likely to detect some incorrect one which can avoid its impact on the project. Assuming that all projects have constraints, it is important that these limitations are detected and defined. If the project manager knows its limitations, its parameters such 6 as deadlines, funding, skill levels and resource availability may be better developed in the project plan. Risk analysis normally uses assumptions and constraints as starting point. Therefore, taking all the knowledge possible before the project begins may have a positive impact to the project and prevent it to possible negative impacts. According to Office of the Chief Information Officer, a good and clear to describe project assumptions is list them based on the current knowledge of the current day. For instance, this list can contain assumptions related to technology, resources, scope, expectations or schedules. It is interesting to give more consideration to cost, timing and people around the project. In addition, it is important to considerate that the initial phase there is a lot of undetermined aspects which means that the assumptions are the first step to clarify some unknown aspects of the project. In this case, for the East Link, there were made many assumptions in order to develop a successful project. One of which is the timeframe that it was completed in, it was said that the project completed 5 months ahead of schedule. The project was commenced on October 2004 and was completed on June 2009. This proved that the communications between the stakeholders and the time management of the contractors Thiess John Holland, were effective and successful. Another assumption that possibly was made was of cost of the project. According to DTF (Department of Treasury and Finance), the project was delivered on budget of $2.5 billion, this provides proof of effective planning by TJH. Another important assumption is of the environmental impact that may occur when commencing the project. According to Eastlink builders, the road will relieve congestion throughout Melbourne’s eastern and south-eastern suburbs, resulting in more efficient traffic flow, therefore reducing fuel consumption and exhaust output. However, during the planning phase there was a huge debate regarding the damage to the Mullum Mullum Valley. Despite this the option selected proved to be the second-to-most environmentally friendly, the two 1.6 km tunnels. Other assumptions were also made, this includes the 35 km of bicycle and pedestrian paths, the 88 bridges, the 45 km of new freeways and 17 interchanges. Additionally, the purpose of this construction is to create an efficient flow of traffic, reducing time travelled and creating job opportunities to better the economy. 7 1.4. Resources, services and risks There were certain things outside the project scope that required special addressing. The first one is the Relocation of existing utilities. Over 850 pre-existing services had to be relocated along the 39km strip of roadway. The construction process in certain areas could not be initiated until the relocation of these services was complete. These utility services included major metropolitan water mains, gas mains, powerlines, telephone lines and cables. (DJ&HH 2009) Secondly, East Link developers were also concerned about Archaeological and Heritage Excavation stage. Since the Eastlink project was built over one of the biggest archaeological sites discovered in Victorian history, which involved the local aboriginal communities. This was not uncovered in the project development phases and was only discovered during the pre-construction site surface testing. Because of this the close and careful observation of construction activities was required in order to keep and preserve the archaeological endeavour. This has led to the diversion of hundreds of trucks moving per day away from the archaeological trench via a carefully constructed chicane. Earthworks also was completed on either side of the trench, construction crews were repositioned to other areas, and a toll gantry and shelter were also relocated. (Eastlink 2016) (DJ&HH 2009) Thirdly, there was a special concern about the large amount of water required by some stages of the project. The use of recycled water came as a solution for that issue. The water used on the construction site was acquired from the projects 250 sedimentation ponds. Because of drought circumstances at the time, recycled water was obtained from the treatment plant at the Mullum Mullum Valley tunnels and from the Melbourne Water Eastern Treatment Plant for the southern area of the project. (DJ&HH 2009) Furthermore, many risks were related to the construction of the Eastlink. Many environmental groups in Melbourne's east and south-east objected to the project. This is for a number of factors, including vehicle emissions and disruption of habitat in some places such as the Mullum Mullum Valley and Dandenong Valley Wetlands. The statement predicted that there will be 18.5 per cent increase in carbon dioxide, impacts on groundwater and wetlands, high impacts on areas of conservation value and the potential to affect 38 species of rare or threatened fauna and flora if the freeway was built. 8 Construction of Eastlink would result in unacceptable environmental impact. The types of impact would be soil erosion, vegetation loss and disruption to plant and animal communities and consequent fragmentation of habitat. It allowed the destruction of trees and associated habitat along the full length of the proposed Eastlink route. The other specific concerns was the impact on Aboriginal and European heritage. The construction of the Eastlink power line will necessitate the use of heavy machinery and access to pylon sites about every 400-500 metres along the entire length of the line. In some places it would be impossible to fully rehabilitate the land. Once the soil was disrupted, a scar would be there forever. This transmission line would cross farming land that is subject to high erosion from water. Particular concern was about the potential for soil erosion following the excavation of pylon sites and creation of access roads. Soil erosion affects not only the immediate construction sites but has the potential to affect the water quality of the river systems through siltation and increased flow of nutrients from fallen trees. Construction of Eastlink project caused the destruction of many hundreds of trees along the power line casement. Though government legislate to ensure tree preservation and provide funding for tree replanting, yet allow large scale destruction of trees by power authorities. Clearing of trees, could lead to soil erosion and increased stream siltation, and which will have an impact on biodiversity, animal habitats, weed invasion, and reduction in environmental integrity. The consequences of tree clearing along the power line route will be fragmentation of habitat. There was a concern at the prospect of extensive damage to vegetation and wildlife habitat, at a time when every effort was being made to reduce habitat loss and thereby species loss'. Various submissions expressed the view that the creation of a bare corridor through native vegetation, and revegetated farmlands would have a negative impact on wildlife, particularly tree dwelling mammals such as koalas, possums and gliders, and birds such as the Red Goshawk, Squatter Pigeon and Glossy Black Cockatoo. These submissions pointed out that habitat for such wildlife is already fragmented and any further breakup of the integrity of the areas in which they live could threaten their viability. The easement created by Eastlink would result in a continuous 9 north south barrier to the movement of tree dwelling animals, especially in areas where trees are already scarce. Part of the area through which Eastlink would pass was of significant Aboriginal heritage. The area was used as a camp by Aboriginal people and many of the trees bear marks of Aboriginals removing bark. There is also an Aboriginal camp site and a site of rock quarrying. For the towers and cables of Eastlink to be in close proximity to this site would destroy much of its significance and atmosphere’. The New England and Toowoomba regions have been settled for many years and some properties have been in the hands of the one family for three or more generations. Owners of these properties felt a strong pride in their family heritage and expressed a strong desire that their property should remain in the ownership of their family for many more generations. They felt that the imposition of Eastlink has threatened future heritage: that younger generations would not want to live on a property which had traversing through it a high voltage power line for health reasons, for aesthetic reasons and for reasons of privacy. 10 2. PROJECT DELIVERY SYSTEM The type of delivery system used for the East Link was a Public Private Partnership. A Public Private Partnership system is a government service venture that is funded and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private sector companies, in this case, the Victorian Government and Connect East. In a world-first for a project of this type, the concessionaire has committed to a range of key performance indicators that ensured a level of service delivery for the users. A Public Private Partnership system would be beneficial for this type of project as all the risks that are associated with the cost, performance and design would be headed by the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which in this case would be ConnectEast. The Public Private Partnership system allows incentivising the private sector to deliver projects on time and within budget which was reflected by EastLink coming in under budget and being completed 5 months before the estimated completion date. By clearly outlining present and future costs of infrastructure projects throughout the lifetime, the budget can be expressed very specifically and can often be met with ease in a Public Private Partnership delivery system. Public Private Partnership delivery systems also help deliver better value for money and help create productive working relationships between the public and private sectors. Public private partnership (PPP), was introduced as a tool to overcome the governments’ budget shortcoming to deliver public infrastructure. PPP places the financial burden and most of the risk liability is transferred to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that is formed as a single purpose entity for the procurement of a project. Also, public private partnership contracts’ strategies follow a pattern that emphasises three common policy objectives: achieving a specific toll rate, managing congestion, and minimising state subsidy/maximising revenue (Gross, 2010). Eastlink serves as a prominent paradigm for successful public-private partnerships. Much effort and research has been invested in understanding the contractual and functional framework of public-private partnerships. In a capitalised economy and liberal democracy such as Australia, the partnership is implemented through the market exchange system (privatisation), where the production and consumption are decided by the private market (Estache & Philippe, 2012). For the procurement of the Eastlink 11 project, Linking Melbourne Authority and Department of Transport contracted with ConnectEast, a single purpose entity dedicated to the successful delivery of Eastlink. ConnectEast was the successful bidder, and hence, on 14 October 2004, it was awarded the 39-year concession to finance, design, construct, commission, toll, operate, deliver customer services, maintain, repair and ultimately hand over EastLink to the State at the end of the concession period. This system offers efficiency and convenience as the production process is controlled by the private sector, risk is shifted from the the government to the private partner, and the private partner is given the incentive to perform at its optimum as they are allowed to reap the profits of the infrastructure for the period of the contract. The EastLink Project is one of the largest PPP projects under the Partnerships Victoria Policy. ConnectEast was a consortium of Macquarie Bank, Thiess John Holland (TJH), and ConnectEast who put their strengths and skills together (Alam, et al., 2014). TJH was contracted by ConnectEast to design and construct EastLink. TJH is a major construction company and has constructed numerous major road projects in Australia. The Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority (SEITA) (SEITA) Victorian Government Victorian Government (SEITA) Independent Reviewer (IR) Theiss John Holland (TJH) Connect East Macquaire Bank Figure 1 – Contractual relationship flowchart The above flowchart in Figure 1, illustrates and simplifies the contractual relationships established for the procurement of EastLink Project. In 2003, the Victorian government established the Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority (SEITA), to act on behalf of the government to oversee and manage the EastLink Project. 12 Hence, SEITA managed the selection process of the private sector bids and currently manages the state’s ongoing interest in the project (Johnson & Humffray, 2010). The public private partnership (PPP) contract created for East Link was unique compared to the other contracts created in the other states of Australia. In this contract there was a provision for an independent reviewer (IR) who acted as a verifier, and had direct contractual relationship with the state and Connect East, but had no contractual obligation with the construction and design company (Thiess and John Holland). Its main objective is to review the work and certify it when it is performed in accordance with the specifications of the contract. Another feature of the contract that made it unique, is that the East Link Concession deed outlined clearly a series of key performance indicators (KPIs), that ensured a certain level of service delivery during the entire concession period (Alam, et al., 2014). Even though it is a member of the Connect East partnership, Thiess and Jonh Holland company awarded the Design and Construction (D&C) contract in a separated process. Meanwhile, Macquaire Bank acted as a financial supporter of the project, controlling funds in order to ensure the construction would be always on budget. 2.1. Development process East Link’s development process included various stages: initiation, development, construction and handover. For the initiation phase is necessary that some points would be evaluated such as identifying the problem, identifying stakeholders, team member, feasibility studying and defining goals and objectives for the project. In order to identify the problem, the magazine EastLink: Melbourne’s motorway masterpiece states that Aleksic, previously with the State Government’s road agency VicRoads, studied the traffic in the late 1990s and concluded that there was a demand for a north-south highway to the east of the city. However, only in 2002 the government decided to combine the Eastern Freeway Extension and Scoresby Freeway projects. After a clearly identifying what the problem is and the physical circumstances that exist, the government worked through possible solutions and selected team members. 13 Thus, in 2003, the Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority was established to manage the EastLink Project on behalf of the Victorian Government. They managed the selection of the private sector bids which ConnectEast was awarded the contract to fund, design, build, own and operate EastLink for a period of 39 years. Then, the Connect East contracted Thiess John Holland to design and construct EastLink (Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, 2008). Beside the government and private sector, local residents, motorists, business owner and community were stakeholders involved in the project. Other important feature in the early stages of the EastLink was a feasibility study. The linking Melbourne authority presentation to the assessment committee information session (2003) presented some diagrams and possibly environmental risks and impacts which were identified in areas such as flora and fauna, vibration, historical heritage, groundwater, contamination, air, noise and surface water. This was important to avoid future financial risks. Finally, the circumstances that led to the project, the identification of the stakeholders, the selection of team members and the feasibility study were major features in this initial phase to define the goals and objectives of the project which were previously listed. For development phase, there are some important procedures in order to have a strong project. The stages are designing process, risk management planning and preparing work breakdown structure. The first stage is designing process. At this moment happens the process drawings and a specification on which construction will be carried out were developed. In the article EastLink: redefining the possible (Johnson and Humffray, 2009), the author presents that before a drawing was issued for construction, an in-house design management team was assembled to oversee all designs, plans and drawings issued by five civil works design consultants. The design was broken up into a series of elements such as bridges, road geometry, landscaping, noise walls and mounds and conduits. In addition, the InCite document tracking system was used. For an effective project it is important to have clear procurement and contracts. A project-specific Enterprise Agreement with unions like Australian Worker’s Union, the 14 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, the Electrical Trades Union, the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union and Thiess John Holland, allowed a number of pioneering measures in terms of workplace flexibility. The Risk management plan needs to be done. For the Eastlink project, Thiess John Holland was responsible for all risks excluding a couple of carve-outs where risk was shared with the State, and on a fixed time, fixed cost basis. According to Johnson and Humffray (2009), Thiess John Holland in order to coordinate a large and complex project divided the project into six key regions: Mitcham, Ringwood, Knox, Monash, Dandenong and Frankston. Each region included a regional office with locally-based management and project teams covering key aspects such as safety, environment, quality, community and traffic. These regions were supported by a global project team based in Mount Waverley, which included senior management, human resources, planning and design. Within the construction process, according to Johnson and Humffray (2009), there were more than 850 services, mostly involving major metropolitan water mains, gas mains, powerlines, telephone lines and cables were relocated along the 39km motorway. In most cases construction work could not begin until utility relocation was completed. Following it is listed some of activities which were done for Thiess John Holland in the construction phase and were done in the design and development phase: - Ringwood rail bridge slide - Precast concrete tunnel inverts - Tanked tunnel with low water ingress requirements - Precast concrete piers and bridge cross-heads - Twin, three-lane, 1.6km tunnels under the Mullum Mullum Valley - 103 structures, including 88 bridges To keep the project on track at all times a number of programming initiatives were implemented (Johnson and Humffray, 2009), including: - Regions receiving monthly development and supply of programs by the teams of project. 15 - Reports summarizing monthly the tracks in critical paths or works and quantifying gain or delay or anything important that can lead to changes to the program. - In order to ensure no completion obligation, contractual completion obligations were documented and tracked day by day in the last year of the project. - To improve the knowledge work teams about the relevance of activities, a time chain chart programming occurred to allow the appliance of programs - Graphical representation was provided by schematic completion diagrams or programs. - Photographs were taken of all important works on site more than two times per week to document the progress at that moment. This type of photograph was called ‘Myth-buster’ Eastlink was delivered on budget and construction completed 5 months ahead of schedule. The construction cost was $ 2.5 billion and it was opened to traffic on 29 June 2008. According to the magazine EastLink: Melbourne’s motorway masterpiece the ConnectEast’s managing director, John Gardiner, said ConnectEast is proud of the high quality finish and urban design of the motorway. In addition, the community response to East Link has been extremely positive, with the vast majority of neighbours happy, commuting times reduced, and local industry has been especially pleased at time and cost savings realized on deliveries and distribution from the first weeks of its operation. 2.2. Contracts and tender process According to Zhang (2016) there are some steps to define a contract. Firstly, it is needed to have intention to make a legal relationship between the participants. A valuable consideration is important and a reciprocity in terms of offer and acceptance. In addition, the contract must create legal obligations for each part. Zhang (2016) still points that there are some contracts called by the nature of remuneration which are fixed price contract and cost- plus contract. At type, there are two subdivisions which are Lump Sum and Schedule of rates. the first 16 In lump sum cases, all the works are done by the contractor for a quantity amount of money which should cover all costs, overheads, risk contingencies and profit. In addition, the scope is essentially very well defined. In schedule of rates contracts, the work done by the contractor will be measured by the unit price rates. This means that the work is scheduled and the price will be taken by actual quantities used until that moment. This contract is very well used when the extent of the work is unknown and the prices may be adjusted due to variations of market, for instance. Cost-plus is subdivided in two main areas, cost-plus fixed fee and cost-plus fixed percentage. Firstly, the first normally is used to reimburse actual costs and also a fee to cover other payments off-site. Normally, this payment is a percentage in the initial predicted cost of the project. For the second type the cost is to reimburse actual costs and off-site cots as much as the first type. However, the fixed fee is usually a percentage of the actual project cost. According to ConnectEast media release (2004), the type of contract between ConnectEast and John Holland and ConnectEast and Thiess was fixed-price with a fixedterm contract for the design and construction of the road. As the project is really big and there is an enormous quantity of unknown quantities with will be needed in some parts of the project the most likely type of fixed-price contract is the schedule of rates. This type may be chosen because of the size of the project and the complexity of its procedures in each step on the scope. The Open Tendering process was used in the East Link project. It is commonly used by government agencies to ensure fair accountability of public funds and to avoid accusations of favouritism. It is known as a way to promote competitive and fair bids. The tendering process depends on nature of contract, complexity of the construction, expertise needed and several reasons. But usually for the government project all over the world, is tend to make open tender to ensure the procurement and works to be done in fairly manner without prejudice. The open tender is one of the types of tendering that commonly used in this world. It allows any interested contractor to tender. Therefore, it gives opportunity for an unknown contractor to compete for the work. It is a traditional method of tendering, 17 familiar to all sector of the engineering and construction industry. Client will obtain the bargain possible. 18 REFERENCES Alam, Q., Kabir, M. H., & Chaudhri, V. (2014). Managing Infrastructure Projects in Australia: A Shift From a Contractual to a Collaborative Public Management Strategy . Administration & Society , 46(4), 422-449. Department of Treasury and Finance Public Private Partnerships, 2008, “Projects – Eastlink” [ONLINE], http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Publicprivate-partnerships/Projects/Eastlink, Viewed 21/03/16 EastLink, 2014, “EastLink – Motorway Info” [ONLINE], http://www.eastlink.com.au/MOTORWAY, Viewed 21/03/16 Estache, A., & Philippe, C. (2012). The impact of private participation in infrastructure in developing countries: Taking stock of about 20 years of experiance. Gardiner, John (March 2006). "In the Headlights". EastLink News. ConnectEast. p. 2. Vehicles travelling at reasonably consistent speeds use less fuel ... emissions are all reduced by betterand more consistent speeds. Greeman, A. (2009), “Eastlink: Melbourne’s Motorway Masterpiece”, 1st ed, World Highway Magazine Greeman A.,' The initial plans', EastLink: Melbourne’s motorway masterpiece, pp.16. Gross, M. E. (2010). Aligning Public-Private Partnership Contracts with Public Objectives for Transportation Infrastructure. Holland, J. (2016). Eastlink. John Holland Group, viewed 26 March 2016, <http://www.johnholland.com.au/our-projects/eastlink/>. Johnson, D., & Humffray, H. (2010). EastLink: Redefining the possible. Australian Journal of Civil Engineering, 7(1), 1-8. Linking Melbourne Authority Presentation to the Assessment Committee Information Session (2013). East West Link. Linking Melbourne Authority Presentation to the Assessment Committee Information Session, viewed 21 March 2016, <http://www.dtpli.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/230368/LMA-ProjectBriefing-Presentation.pdf> Media Release (2004). ConnectEast: Consortium Awarded Mitcham-Frankston Project Concession. Media Release, 14 October, pp1-2. Praveen, M. (2014). What are Project Assumptions? PM by PM, viewed 23 March 2016, <http://www.pmbypm.com/what-are-assumptions/> 19 Office of the Chief Information Officer, Assumptions and Constraints, Office of the Chief Information Officer, viewed 25 March 2016, <https://ocio.wa.gov/pmframework/initiation/organization/assumptions>. Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, 2008, “About Eastlink” [ONLINE], http://web.archive.org/web/20080601105438/http://www.seita.com.au/pages/wh os-involved.asp, Viewed 04/04/2016 Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority (2008). Who's involved?. Southern and Eastern Integrated Transport Authority, viewed 28 March 2016, <http://web.archive.org/web/20080601105438/http:/www.seita.com.au/pages/w hos-involved.asp>.