In Search of a New Order:
Essays on the Politics and Society
of Nineteenth-Century Latin America
Edited by
Eduardo Posada-Carbó
Fav0r ris es:rid!r rl subrzyar
1es I I bros y î°.’his'a s ûracla s
SlsteBia d°. ßiõ liote¢as
UNIAtíDES
Institute of Latin American Studies
31 Tavistock Square, London WCIH 9HA
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
CHAPTER l
9
perspective taken, New Granada’s first republican period must be treated as an
Building Politica l Orde r• The ‘FíPSt Republic’ in New
¡¡nportarlt moment in the region’s history. It was, after all, during the years
Granada, 1810-isis
fo jqTtS Of identity started, and experiments with new kinds of political expression
and organisation undertaken. The politics of the First Republic were, in short,
the essential precursor to the Colombian republic later put in place by Bolïvar
and Santander. This chapter will focus on the ramifications and vicissitudes of
attempts tO bUÎld this first new political order, examining the conditions which
made it possible to establish autonomous centres of power, tracing the directions
they took, and reflecting on the influences which shaped their development and
decline.
Anthony McFarlane
The first attempts to create
a new politiGal order in New Granada
when small groups of creoles
began in 1810,
in the region ’s leading towns
and cities ousted
royal officials and set up autonomo us
juntas. Their action inaugurated an
extraordinafy interval in New
quickening of
political activity, Granad a’s hiStOf y, marked by a dramatic
major changes in the system of
periodic GIVÍI War between
governmen t, and
Granada, new men entered the forces Of Competing causes. Throughout New
espousing new political
]2O1ltÍGS, taking power from Spanish functionaries,
ideas and values, establishing the first forms of
republican government
seen in the region, and thereby p
tUfmOil in societie s
roducing considerable
monarchical authori ty. By 1815, however,
àGG
tistomed
these experimen ts With new
formstoof politÍCal order
were collapsing. In 1815-16,
royalist counter-r
evolutio
swept
New Granada, ñRd Spanish forces
Crushed the new rep
l 816,through
ubliCS.nBy
royal government was firmly restored, and
the remains of
New Granada ’s ‘First Republic’ of
1810-15 were summarily
swept away.
In Colombian hÍStoriograph
y, the political failures Of this First Republic
often regarded as its defining feature. Indeed, the period
are
has C
called the Patrfa Boba, or FooliSh Fatherland’ , to denote
Ommonly been
the immaturity and
impractic ality of its political l
eaders and their signal failure
order thàt WAS Stable,
to build a political
unified, and capable of defend in
indep
endence. These
g
its
flaws in the First Republic are attributed
to various causes. Some h
istorians point
to the excessive idealism of creole
]2O1ÍtÍGal models, and inexperience ideologues, th e use of inappropriate foreign
governmen t.’ Others blame New in managing the functions and finances of
Granada ’s
the FÍfSt Republi
c, on the grounds that
creole oligarchies for the failin of
gs
power and protecting class interests their preoccupation with holding local
independence and impeded the
narrowed Stl]2p ort for the cause of
unity essential to its success.2 But
whatever the
This Was the position adopted
by the first, classic
history of New Granada’s revolution,
Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la
in José
P°!! !^. It has been much repe Revolución de Colombia, VOIS. (BOg tà, repr. 1969), vol. 1,
ated. Rafael Gómez Hoyos, in La
independencia de Colombia
(Madrid, 1992), the most recent history of Colombian independen
takes
ce,
à Si ffl ildf approach.
A forceful and persuasively argued statemen t
A gUirre,
of this view is given by Indalecio Liévano
Los grandes COnf ’lCfO $ Sociales y
económicos de nuestra
historia (3rd edition, Bogotà,
1968), pp. 617-70.
betwee n 1810 dftd 1815 that ties with Spain were first broken, the search for new
The crisis and the collapse of the Old Regime
How, first, was political innovation inaugurated in New Granada? At the start, it
was driven largely by external events. Political change in New Granada, as in
other regions of Spanish America, was inseparably linked to the larger crisis that
affected Spain and the whole of its empire after Napoleon seized the Spanish
throne and ousted its Bourbon king in mid-1808. With the overthrow of the old
regime, Spain entered into years of internal war and revolution which
transformed government in both the metropolis and the American colonies. The
transformation started in Spain, where, in the absence of the legitimate king,
sovereignty was said to have reverted to the people, and authority was claimed
by self-generating juntas which organised regional government and resistance to
the rrench invader. These juntas subsequently sent delegates to a Central Junta,
which claimed to represent the Spanish ‘nation’ (defined as all Spaniards
throughout the monarchy), sought to coordinate the war against France, and
introduced the revolutionary prínceple of representation into Spanish politics.
The Central Junta was superseded by a Council of Regency in early 1810, but
the changes which the former had introduced continued to reshape the politics
and government of the Spanish kingdom. Indeed, the shift towards a
representative form of government was significantly advanced during 1810,
when a general Cortes convened at Càdiz to draw up a constitution. With the
proclamation of the Constitution of Càdiz in 1812, Spain formally abandoned
absolutism for constitutional monarchy, and introduced the principle of
representative government throughout Spain’s dominions. This extraordinary
development was later temporarily reversed, between 1814 and 1820, when
Ferdinand VII’s return to the throne saw a return to the institutions and practices
of the old regime. By this time, however, the imperial crisis of 1808-14 had sent
shockwaves throughout Spanish America, damaging and partly fragmenting the
empire. ln 1810, several of Spain’s American dominions had broken away from
the parent power, New Granada among them, and neither Spanish government
nor the institutions of empire were ever fully to recover their old form and
equilibrium.'
" For accounts of events in Spain in these years and their implications for America, see Raymond
Carr, Spain, 18h8-1939 (Oxford, 1966), pp. 79-119; Timothy Anna, Spain and the Loss of America
10
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
The onset of political innovation in New Granada was inseparably linked to
the general crisis of the Spanish monarchy. At first, Spain’s crisis triggered a
loyalist reaction, as the social elites of New Granada’s leading towns responded
to news of the king’s capture by rallying to the royal cause. A contemporary
observer later recalled that, in late 1808, ‘men of the better sort’ in New Granada
‘celebrated and appreciated the action of the Seville Junta, with which they were
at once united with the sole purpose of cooperating in the common cause of the
monarchy...’ 4 However, when the Spanish crisis continued to deepen in 1809-10,
creoles began to express open dissent against colonial government, and to aim at
replacing the Spanish system with alternative forms of government. Even then,
the rhythm of rebellion was closely attuned to events in Spain. When the
authorities in Spain declared the sovereignty of the people, introduced the
principle of representation and called for the defence of the nation, they not only
sparked an unprecedented debate among creoles concerning the application of
these principles in America, but also further eroded the authority of leading
Spanish government officials in America, already weakened by association with
the old regime of Charles IV and his favourite Godoy. In New Granada, these
circumstañces gave a small elite of cultured creoles an aroused awareness of
their grievances, as well as an unprecedented oppominity to contemplate, and to
mobilise support for, an assault on the existing system of government.
The ability of men from New Granada’s elites to imagine a new regime and
bring it to fruition was facilitated by Spanish government policy in 1809-10. In
January 1809, the Central Junta decided to call for elected delegates from
America to join in its deliberations; in May 1809, it advanced the principle of
representation a stage further by calling for a general Cortes composed of
delegates from aII the provinces of the empire. These decisions had powerful
political repercussions in New Granada and throughout Spanish America. The
Central Junta’s call for delegates to represent all the ‘kingdoms’ of the monarchy
conceded the principle that Americans should henceforth be formally
represented in their government, and thereby stimulated debate throughout
America over the meaning of representation in the American context.’ In New
Granada, the election of a delegate to the Central Junta also brought creoles into
politics in an unprecedented way. For, during the elections (in May and June
1809), small groups of educated creoles found an opportunity to engage in a
political dialogue that helped them to conceive the construction of a new
political order, and to build an organisation which contributed to achieving it.‘
(Lincoln, Nebraska & London, 1983), pp. 15-63; François-Xavier Guerra, Modernidad e
independencias (Madrid, 1992), passim.
Jost Antonio de Torres y Peña, ‘Memorias sobre la revoluci6n y sucesos de Santafé de
Bogotá...’, in Guillermo Hernández de Alba (ed.), Memorias sobre la independencia nacional
(Bogotá, 1960), p. 80.
On the impact of the first elections in Spanish America, see Guerra, Modernidad e
independencias, pp. I 77-225.
* On the elections of 1809 and the emergente of a poIiticised creole network in New Granada,
see Margarita Garrido, Reclamos y representaciones: Variaciones sobre la política en el Nuevo
11
Creole demands for representation in New Granada’s government acquired
events in neighbouring regions during late 1809 and
d
adde force from political
when
The first suGh source of encouragement came in August 1809,
early 1810.
this
an
autonomous
junta.
When
was
patricians
in
Quito
established
creole
it
was
d,
regime
intensified.
Indeed,
opposition
to
the
viceregal
suppresse
exacerbated when repression in the colony was combined with Calls for
New Granadan side,
cooperation and conciliation from the metropolis. On the
local participation in
rejected
demands
for
simply
the viceroy and audiencia
iolently
government, and by steadfastly opposing creole claims (and at times v
suppressing dissent), helped further to polarise opinion and to harden
friendship
Spanish government, on the other hand, offered creoles
and reform. In February 1810 the council of Regency appealed to Spanish
French, and promised that ‘your destinies no
i2ntagonisms.
7
Americans for solidarity against the
hands...’.'
longer depend on Ministers, Viceroys or Governors, they are in your
increasingly
Spain’s
recovery
look
As successive defeats at French hands made
improbable, so creoles were able to look upon a change of government as an
metropolitan regime
Indeed, the frailty of the ailing
increasingly real possibility.
alternative forms
obliged creole elites to consider
virtuallyroyal
and
its clouded future
in the formation of
of government.
Pressure
offlCiàls
to
collaborate
on
ovemment to
juntas therefore intensified, and brought the system of colonial g
breaking point in the middle months of 1810.
Demolition of royal government and the concomitant and creation of new
started in May 1810, Shortly after Venezuelan creolesInhad
the
political arrangements
established
an autonomous junta in the city of CaraCaS On 18 April 1810.
following two or three months several new govemments sprang up in New
Ferdinand
Granada, all of which, like the juntas of Spain, asserted the rights of
tÍlílt
while
proclaimiflg
had
reverted
to the
simultaneously
sovereignty
vII
forcing
their
royal
govemor
first,
people. Citizens in Cartagena de Indias moved
deposing him ífí
a junta on 22 May 1810, before
to accede to the institu tion of him
from the city. In July, smaller towns in New
mid-June and then deporting
Granada followed this path. Leading creoles removed royal oficials and
Pamplona (4
replaced them by juntas based on the local cabildo in Cali (3 July),
Granada,
of
New
then
reached
the
capital
July), and Socorro (10 July). Rebellion
acceded to
at Santafé de Bogotà. There, on 20 July 1810, the viceroy reluctantly
e1f
from the city cabildo for the foundation of a junta, and WàS hilTlS
demands
briefly co-opted as its president.
within the
Initially, these juntas insisted on their legality and legitimacy
Reino de Grattada, 1770-1815 (Bogotà, 1994), pp. 93-115.
analysed in Anthony McFarlane, Colombia
The radicalisation of creoles in these years is
Bourbon Rule (Cambridge, 1993),
before Independence: EGOHomy', Society, and POlitiCS under
.
328-38.
ón de Independencia, 2 VOIS.
’ Quoted in J. D. Monsalve, Antonio de Villavicencio y la Revoluci
(Bogotá, 1920), vol. I, p. 70.
12
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
existing system of governmen t. The
y declared loyalty to Ferdina nd VII, swore to
uphold the beliefs of the Catholic Church,
recognised the Council of Regency as
the legitimate representative of King Ferdinand,
stated
their doffiGÍàlS
Spanish
miàíntain good relations with SpàÍfl. In some and
cases,
eterminatiswore
on to
allegiance to the junta, and were i
ncluded as members of the new autonomous
governme nts. Generall y, however,
recognition of the Regency was soon
withdrawn , peninsular Oficials were im
prisoned and expelled, and the juntas
turned into the i nstruments of home rule.
Overthrowing the officials of the
oId regime inevitably involved some civil
disorder. In SOGOITO dnd Pamplona, ]3df1lSh
corregidores came under violent
S
attack frOm townspeople, while in Bogotà rioting crowds helped push the
viceroy from power.9 Generally, however, the juntas of New Granada were
installed withoUt bloOdshed,
and achieved a relatively
transfer of
from Spanish functionaries to creole notables. This smooth
peaceful transiti power
on was
possible Jargely because S anÍSh power and
authority were greatJy dimin
by the effects of the crisis in Europe. During
ished
the year or so
were created, S aÍn’s deepening crisis had
before
the
juntas
undermined the
credibility of royal
officials appointed under the old regime, while the c
rePreSerltation by the Central Junta and Regency made oncessio
n of rights
creole
demands
for to
a
share of power seem reasonabl
e and respectable. In these
dÍSSident s were able to present themselves as
circumstances, creole
government. Indeed, they claimed that they were legitimate heirs of royal
acting legally in taking the
reins of government from the
functionaries of a metropolitan regime
which
lacked a legitimate mandate.
The preservation of order during this transition Of power was further
creole dissidents ’ employment of
facilitated by the
existing institutions as
instruments for opposing royal govpe ¡t¡¡¡¡ e t and building new forms of
governm ent. Under
Spanish rule, all lawful power emanated from the
crown and
was embodied in the administrative
system run by royal officials. Within this
system,
the solelittle
stronghold ofAlthough
weak,laythe
had
relatively
authority
normally
became
in Cabildos
power. creole politÍCal
the cabildo,
whicha
GftlClà) ÍflStitutional bridgehead for creoles
whO
Wanted autonom y. In the first
legal forum for
place,
providedto a
expression; secondly, being
legallythey
empowere
d convene assemblies political
in cabildos abiertos, they could claim
to represent the ‘people’, and thus become the foundations for autonomous
juntas. The junta, too, WítS a SpaflÍSÏ1
iflStÍtution that eased the transition from
absolutist tO GOl lStÍt tltionaI gove r
nme nt. Regional juntas had been the
means of challenging French soverei
gnÇ and representi ng the people principal
during 18
i» spain
08-10, and they furnished a powerful precedent
for Americans who
" Accounts
Of the overthrow of royal govern ment in these cities are given in Sergio Elit
Génesis
de la Revoluci
ortiz,
ón de 20 de
Julio de 1810 (Bogotà, 1960)j Gabriel Jiménez M ]inafCS,
Mòrtires de Carta ena de 1816, 2
dos
and Horacio Rodrfguez Plata, £n vols. (Edieión oficial,
Depar
tamento
Bolívar, 1948), voi ¡
Antl
l•OVI’ttCia del 5oCorro y la de
Independenci a (Bogotà,
1963).
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
13
claimed the right to imitate their peninsular counterparts. Thus the establishment
of juntas in New Granada (and elswhere in America) during 1810 drew on
Hispanic institutions and practices which, being familiar, enjoyed greater
legitimacy and allegiance than would a set of wholly new institutions, invented
for the occasion. Moreover, though they broke with the Spanish Regency, these
jufltKS further emphasised continuity by declaring their loyalty to King
Ferdinand VII and to the Catholic religion.'°
Another condition propitious to a smooth transition from royal
administration to home rule was the weakness of Spanish military forces. Most
New Granadan provinces had no military garrisons and their governors relied on
the loyalty and cooperation of leading local citizens. Without such support, royal
officials were easily removed, as proved to be the case in virtually all those
towns where juntas were established. In Cartagena and Bogoti, which did have
Spanish army garrisons, the support which professional soldiers might have
given to royal officials was neutralised by political divisions within army ranks.
In both cities, opponents of royal government won military officers to their side,
and hence were able to mount what were essentially local coups d’état.
The very first moves to take power from the crown were, then, accomplished
with relative ease. In New Granada, there were neither prolonged and violent
insurgency against the royal authorities of the kind which occurred in Mexico,
nor large-scale civil war between central government and insurgents of the kind
that took place in Spain. Indeed, once the Supreme Junta had been established in
Santafé de Bogotä during late July 1810, the stage seemed set for a new central
government to move into the position vacated by the viceroy. Constructing a
new, stable and integrated political order was, however, to prove much more
difficult than demolishing the old one, since the power vacuum left by the
collapse of Spanish government was filled not by one, but by several selfproclaimed governments.
Foundations of the New Political Order
A first priority for members of the juntas of 1810 was to ensure that their
rebellion against Spain did not provoke indiscipline or disorder in local society.
Opposition to Spanish officials had brought some domestic grievances and
animosities to the surface, and the overthrow of royal officials sometimes
involved a surge of popular participation and civil disorder. In Santafé, for
example, rioting crowds played an important part in establishing a junta, and, in
its wake, the creole notables who took command of the city’s government had to
move swiftly to contain popular political effervescence, stirred by young
radicals. Social protest was not, however, a serious problem. Elite anxieties
about social discipline periodically reappeared in the years that followed, and, to
i
" See, for example, the oath taken by members of the Santafé junta, in Manuel Antonio Pombo
and lost Joaquín Guerra, Constituciones de Colombia, 2 vols. (Bogotá, 1951), vol. I, p. 90.
14
demonstrate their determination to defend social order, political leaders
occasionally inflicted exemplary punishments on individuals whose behaviour
was thought to threaten it.’' But on the whole, social stability was not
immediately threatened by the clash of competing ethnic or class groupings.
What, then, were the principal problems that faced the creoles who took power
in 1810, and what were the main influences that shaped the development of the
new political regime?
The most important issue that faced the advocates of political change during
and after 1810 was the form that government should take, now that sovereignty
had reverted to the people. In Spain, the sovereign ‘people’ was readily
identified with the ‘nation’, meaning its traditional political community, and this
identification provided a basis for redefining the nation in modem terms during
the revolutionary years after 1808. 12 In New Granada, it was much more difficult
to establish an identification between people and nation. This was not because
creoles were entirely incapable of conceiving a New Granadan nation. The
sentiments of creole patriotism were much less developed in New Granada than
in Mexico, but the concept of New Granada as a patria had been cultivated
around the turn of the century among a small group of creoles who had absorbed
the cultural values of the Enlightenment and shared a common commitment to
promoting educational, scientific and economic progress in New Granada. 13
From the early 1790s exposure to the scientific and political ideas of the
Enlightenment undoubtedly encouraged members of this group to see New
Granada as a patria with which they could identify, and provided a novel focus
for thinking about the future. Such ideas were even briefly reflected in New
Granada’s politics during the mid-1790s, when Antonio Nariflo printed the
French ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man’, and, together with a number of
young creoles, seemed to threaten the security of the colonial state. i The idea of
New Granada as a patria that was politically as well as emotionally distinct from
Spain did not, however, gain any real currency until the crisis of 1808-10, when
the Spanish monarchy suddenly became assailable. Then, the New Granadan
patria imagined by creoles in the late eighteenth century became an alternative
focus for loyalties among the educated creole minority which had seen its
" The diary of a Santafereño reflects creole concerns for social discipline in its constant reference
to crime, and gives a famous example of an exemplary punishment inflicted on a black slave who
killed his master. See José Maria Caballero, Diario de la independencia (Bogoti, 1974 edition),
passim.
"
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, l810-1815
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
Guerra, Modernidad e independencias, pp. 319-46.
" On these enligJitened creoles, see Thomas F. Glick, ‘Science and Independence in Latin
America (with Special Referente to New Granada)’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 71,
no. 2 (1991), pp. 307-34; Renán Silva, Prensa y revolución a finales del siglo XVIII.‘ Contribución
a un análisis de Ía%rmación de la ideología de independencia nacio 1 (Bogotá, 1988), R á ssim ;
Hans Joachim K0nig, En el camino hacia la nación: Nacionalismo en el proceso de formación del
Estado y de la Nación en la Nueva Granada, I 750-1856 (Bogotá, 1994), pp. 71-125.
" For a brief assessment of this conspiracy, see McFarlane, Colombia before Independence, pp.
285-93.
15
the refusal of Spanish governments to allow equality
aspirati ons frustrated by
monarchy.
pd autonomy to creoles within a reformed
creoles who played a key role in setting up the juntas in
mong
the cultured
A
roto-nationalist vision of New Granada’s political
l 8l0, several had a distinctly p
the concept of New Granada aS a
yture, and sought to promote and defend
overnment. Such men as IgnaciO de
Gutiérrez were all eloquent
patria which required its own, united g
Herrera, Camilo Torres and Frutos Joaquín efforts towards bringing the
politiGal
is
exponents of this view, and bent their
under a single authority.
and
within
a
single
nation
provinces together
very
difficult. For,
wás, however,
than
in neighbouring
c onjuring unity from New Grafladan diversity
were rather less acute rovincial, town and
although ethnic and soCial divisions
was organised in p
Granada
olitical identity,
and
Quito,
New
Venezuela
the primary focus for p
village communities which provided
of how to
plicated the problems
com
.
These
divisions
greatly
loyalty and activity
regime, and hOW government
restructure power in the absence of the Spanish
became apparent that there was no nation on
was to be legitimated. lt soon
even a strong state
order;for
indeed,
there
was not
a new
order.
to build
a new political
Instead, New Granada
become
the platform
which could
erich
fractured into many parts, generally breaking along the boundaries of the
subdividing along the fault lines left by
colonial provinces and often further
municipal rivalries within the provinces.
rovinces began to separate into distinctive, sometimes
New Granadá’S
With Spain occurred in mid-1810, and the
first break
warring parts soon after thebecame
the outstanding feature of political life in the
dispersion of sovereignty
which the old
ces in
the circumstan
First Republic. lt stemmed in part
wasfrom
to mano
Juntas rather than
transferred
regime dissolved, when power
differences in political
inherited by a single authority, but also derived from
ayán and
PO}3
position taken by local elites. ln the cities of Santa Marta, Panarila,
were in the ascendancy in 1810,
to the Regencyentered
those who remained loyal
Pasto,under
into a struggle with the
ficials,
of
royal
the
command
of
and,
They did so for different reasons.
autonomous governments of ‘patriot’ regions.
Santa M arta’s loyalty arose in part froIR its traditional competition with
both the political agility of
Cartagena for maritime trade, and was sustained by
6
its royal governors and the support given by some indigenous peoples
Popayán ’s royalism owed much to decisive action by a determined royal
isting rivakies in the
govemor, Miguel Tacón, and his ability to make use of ex
leading families and
city and region.17 Within the city, he won over some of the
populace than those few
clergy and, in turn, enjoyed a greater authority over the
Constituci
" For the views of these men, see Pombo and Guerra,
102-4; K0nig, En el camino hacia la nación, pp. 165-85.
HeS de COlOmbia, VOl. 1, pp.
see Ernesto Restrepo Tirado, Historia de
politics lf\ Santa Marta during the First Republic,
On
II, pp. 303-408.
Provincia de Santa Marta (BOgotá, 1953), NOI.
Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, pp. 142-3.
16
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
creoles who wanted a self-governing junta. He also played on Popayán’s
traditional rival with Cali (which set up the first autonomous junta in the
Cauca region), and, by recruiting a
leading figure in the Patía Valley, secured
widespread support from the
]2OOf bláGks and castas who
lived in the Valley.
Tacón’s later offer of freedom to
make
slaves
who fought for
the Patianos into some Of New
the King was indeed to
Granada’
S lTlOSt GOlTl bative
adherents of the
i
oyal cause. ' To shore up Popayán, Tacón
turned
Pasto,
which became the leading bastion alSO
of royalism in to the city and region of
in other regions of New Granada, Pasto’s r
oyalism the Colombian south. As
much from clear ideological preferences fOr
probably stemmed not sO
R
defend traditional aspirations for autonomy Spanish rule as fFOm a desire to
against Quito and Bogotá, both of
WhÍch vied for control
of the region."
royalist regions were militarily
These
quite weak and suffered periodic
defeats at the hands of creole patriots. N onetheless,
they played an important
part in destabilising New Granada’s first
independent government s. For, though
not Stifficiently strong to restore S
rule to New Gfá nada by their own
unaided efforts, the royalist regions pdflish
kept alive the cause of Ferdinand VII and
reconciliation with Spain, while
idea ofand
rthe
esources
simultaneo
morale of patriot governments
draining the
energies,
and theirusly
Supporters.
Marta,
Santa
for example, WaS a constant preoccupation for the leaders of independent
Cartagena and later acted as a base for royalist reconquest
from the outside.
Popayin and PáSto meanwhile swung between royalist and patriot control,
bringing civil War and instability to the SOtith of the country, threatening
neighbouring patriot provinces, and further diminishing the
creating a unified state in New Granada. Eventually, Santa ]3OSSibilities for
became platforms from whiGh the Spanish government
Marta and Pasto
was able to launch
military enterprises of counter-revolution and
r
econquest into other regions of
New G ranada, thereby discharging a role
SiiTiilar
tO that played by Maracaibo
and Coro in Venepzuela 20
The opposition of royalist and patriot regions
mp
onlyitone
of
the divisions that sundered New Granada afterwas
1810;
was anifestation
aralleled by
competition and conflict among the patriot regions
themselves. Once provincial
elites had seized power ffOlTl SpdflÍSh authorities,
they faced
that were
dÍffiCUlt to resolve in both theory and practice. If sovquestions
ereignp,' had
been
transferred to the people, who were the
people? Were the provinces to become
separate nations, Of Was the sovereignty previously held by Spain to be
transferred to the govemment of a single state
and nation? Who constituted the
Francisco Zuluaga, ‘Clienti lismo y guerrillas
en el Valle del Pat at 1536-1811’, in
Germán
Colmenares (ed ), ¿a independencia.
Ensayos de historia social (Bo gotá, 1986), pp. 111-36.
‘nation’ in New Granada? Who was to decide on the future form of government,
and how were new governments to be structured? Differences on thèse issues
a peared during the opening months of the First Republic, when Bogotä’s junta
issued the first call for New Granadan unity.
When the Junta Suprema de Santafé was established at Bogotà on 20 July
1810, its members assumed that they had inherited the authority of the old
regime. Thus the junta immediately proclaimed itself the interim supreme
government of this kingdom’, and called on the provinces to join in creating a
constitution for the new state.°’ On 29 July the Junta took action to affirm this
authority by summoning the provinces to send delegates to Bogotä, in order to
form a General Congress and act as a constituent assembly and legislature for
New Granada as a whole. Thèse plans for creating a unified government for
New Granada, centred on Bogotà, were spurned by the provinces, however, as
appeals to a general sense of identification with New Granada were countered by
more localised identities and loyalties.
The first negative response to Bogoti’s initiative came from Cartagena,
which accused the Supreme Junta of seeking to form a Central Junta like that in
Spain. This it denounced as a ‘monstrous government that would bring great
ills’, and called instead for a General Congress to be held at Medellin, with the
provinces represented in proportion to their populations and with the avowed
purpose of establishing ‘a perfect and federal government’. Cartagena’s
intervention reflected the forces that were to shape the new political order, and
hinder its unity. For, as Jose Manuel Restrepo observed, it paralysed the
convocation of deputies from provinces which would otherwise have sent them
immediately to Bogoti, and thus cost New Granada its ‘only opportunity for
establishing a government which would have merited the name and preserved
unity’.2° Certainly there was a chance at this time for Bogoti to exercise
leadership and exert hegemony over the provinces. For, according to Antonio
Nariño (writing in September 1810), there was as yet no shared or clear opinion
concerning the form that government should take in New Granada. It was
generally accepted that sovereignty had reverted to the people and that this
sovereignty should be exercised through representatives; but, he said, there was
no matching consensus about how, when, where, and under what laws these
representatives should be chosen. For this reason, Nariño argued, a Congress in
Bogoti was an urgent necessity, since it would provide the forum required to
make critical decisions about New Granada’s political future and direction.°'
"
"
Orl Pasto In the
1958).
independence period, see S. E. Oriiz, Aguswn AguQioff@ f
•u I! e mp O (Bogoti,
"’ The patriot and royalist campaigns that
tOOk place during the FirSt Republic are fully recounted
in CamÍlO Riaño, Historia Militar.La Independen cia,
1810-1815, irl Academia COlOmbiana de
Historia, Historia Extensa de Colombia , vol. VIII,
tomo 1 (Bogotá, 1971).
17
‘Cabildo extraordinario’, in Pombo and Guerra, Constituciones de Colombia, vol. I, p. 88.
"
Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, pp. 147-8.
Nariflo’s words were: ‘En el estado repentino de la renovación, se dice que el pueblo reasume
la soberanía; pero en el hecho ¿c6mo es que la ejerce? Se responde también que por sus
Representantes. ¿Y quién nombra estos Representantes? El pueblo mismo. ¿Y quién convoca este
pueblo? ¿cuándo? ¿en d6nde? ¿bajo qué fórmulas? Esto es lo que...nadie me sabrá responder.’ See
‘Consideraciones sobre los inconvenientes de alterar la invocaci6n hecha por la ciudad de Santafé
en 29 de julio de 1810’, reprinted in Carlos Restrepo Canal, Nariño Periodista (Bogotá, 1960), pp.
18
In the event, the Congress did meet at Bogotà, where it held a first session
between 22 December 1810 and 12 February 1811. It started on a strong note by
proclaiming that, while recognising the rights of Ferdinand VII against the
French usurper, New Granada would henceforth not acknowledge ‘any other
authority than that which the peoples and provinces have deposited in their
respective provincial juntas, and are to embody in the General Congress of the
Kingdom ...’.24 However, after making this de facto declaration of independence,
the new Congress was unable to achieve unity or provide a strong sense of
political direction for New Granada as a whole. Indeed, its first session simply
reflected New Granada’s political disarray. Only six provinces sent delegates
(Santafé, Socorro, Pamplona, Neiva, Nóvita and Mariquita), and they soon split
over the fiindamental issue of rights to participate in the Congress, a problem
that was precipitated by the arrival of representatives from the towns of Mompós
and Sogamoso. When some members of Congress and the Santafé Supreme
Junta opposed the entry of these delegates, on the grounds that they did not
represent provinces, the movement for political union suffered a further setback.
For the ensuing impasse caused several deputies to withdraw, poisoned relations
between Congress and Supreme Junta, and led finally to the dissolution of the
Congress due to the absence of most of its members. 25 Thus, though the Bogotà
Supreme Junta had called the Congress in order to promote unity under its
leadership, it seems to have had the opposite effect. During 181 I politics in the
regions under patriot control became increasingly focused on intemal affairs, as
local elites struggled to resolve their own political problems.
In both Cartagena and Bogotá, New Granada’s two leading cities, those who
had come to power in the juntas of 1810 became increasingly absorbed in local
politics and factional manoeuvres. In Cartagena, the junta inclined towards the
Regency and recognised the Spanish Cortes which had been inaugurated in
September 1810; by February 1811, Spanish loyalists were sufficiently strong to
mount a coup which was only narrowly defeated. A republican clique then
seized the initiative, and in November 1811, Cartagena became the first province
ofNew Granada formally to declare its independence from Spain.°6 In Santafé de
Bogotá, the Supreme Junta set about turning itself into a constitutional
government in February-March 1811, and, guided by the creole aristocrat Jorge
Tadeo Lozano, its constituent assembly created the sovereign state of
Cundinamarca as a peculiar kind of constitutional monarchy. It had a
constitution which was modelled on that of the North American republic, but
acknowledged Ferdinand VII as ‘King of the Cundinamarcans’. While
Ferdinand was absent, Lozano was chosen to be vice-president to rule in his
157fi5; quotation from p. 158.
2
* ‘Acta de Instalación del Congreso General del Reino’ (22 December 1810), in Pombo and
Guerra, Constituciones de Colombia, p. 112.
' S The most vivid account of the first Congress is found in Liévano Aguirre, Nos grandes
confiictos, pp. 656-67.
”
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
II SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, pp. 155-60.
19
place. Politics in other provinces was, meanwhile, equally taken up with local
competed for power and struggled to
›ffai rs, as the elites in provincial capitals
urisdictions.
retain authority over the towns and Villages of their j
In these circumstances, those who were committed to an independent future
into two opposing camps. On one side were
fo New Granada tended to divide
future
in a confederation of separate, sovereign
political
those WhO saw the
who
wanted a single, centralised republic.
repliblics; on the other were those
increasingly
sharp foriTi III 1811-12, as the
This fundamental difference took an
Congress became the the paladins of these
leaders of CUndinamarca and the
pposing political projects.
r
This conflict stemmed from the fact that, when the Supreme Junta failed to
of
cá st a mantle of authority over the provinces, its successor, the government
Granada.
to
try
to
exert
leadership
in
New
continued
the State of Cundinamarca
When Jorge Tadeo Lozano WBS its president in 1811-12, he took steps to create a
unified government for New Granada, both by annexing the neighbouring
province of Mariquita to Cundinamarca, and, more strikingly, by launching
plans for restructuring New Granada into four large departments which would
2
enter into a general confederation with Venezuela and Quito. ' During the same
Antonio
Nariño
emerged
as a vociferous
revolutionary
period, the Santafereño
critic of any kind of federalism and as a champion of strong, republican
government based in Bogotâ.2’ Indeed, when Nariño launched his newspaper La
Bagatela in 1811 OT1 14 July (Bastille Day), it was largely for the pu ose of
demonstrating that federalism was hopelessly unsuited to conditions in New
G ranada. HiS Cfiticism was not of the US constitution per se, but of its
irrelevance to New Granada. ‘We are told as if it were news’, said NarifíO, ‘that
until
the Constitution of the United States is the wisest and most perfect known
today; its followers therefore conclude that we should adopt it to the letter ...’
But, he added, it is not enough that the Constitution of North America should
it .. 30
be the best, it is necessary that ... we should be able to USe
During Nariño’s rise to political ascendancy and his subsequent spells in
office as leader of Cundinamarca, divisions between capital and provinces
deepened. Shortly after the Congress reconvened for its second session (on 15
September 1811), Nariño became president of Cundinamarca (on 19 September
1811), and the Congress and Cundinamarca now became still more firmly
single,
entrenched in opposite positions. While Nariño continued to aim at a
Spain,
the
centralised republic, dedicated to ensuring independence from
Constituciones de
" For the constitution of the State of Cundinamdfca, see Pombo and Guerra,
Colombia, pp. 123-95.
"
Restrepo, Historia de la Revo luCiÓ'n, VOl. 1, pp. 165-8.
Antonio Nariño, Hero of
" For a brief account of Narifio’s rise to power, see Thomas BlOS5Offt,
75-97.
Colombian Independence (Tucson, Arizona, 1967), pp.
"' Quoted by Gómez Hoyos, La independencia de Colombia, p. 177.
20
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
members of the Congress moved towards creating a confederation
of sovereign
a larger number
of provinces than had the first, with 11 representatives
attending its opening
bession, and thus seemed to have more authority than its predecessor. The
delegates also came under stronger pressure to act, if only to
resist Nariño’s
design for centralised government. In these circumstances,
the
Congress
finally
agreed to the Act of Federation of the United Provinces
of New Granada, drawn
up by Camilo Torres and signed by deputies from five provinces on 27
November 1811.
states. When the second Congress started, it drew deputies from
The Act of Federation formally structured New
and independent
Granada into a set of equal
states formed from the old
Spanish
provinces. The states were
to be the primary repositories of
political authority and power; they were to have
representative governments
chosen by their people, able to exercise legislative
and executive
powers with full responsibilities for internal administration,
appointment
to office, and management of fiscal resources. Some powers were
ceded
to the General Congress, which WáS charged with responsibility for
matters of common defence, regulating
international relations, and making war
and peace. The Congress was also allocated revenues from ports, post, and
minting to support these activities. Executive and legislative power were
temporarily united in members of the Congress; the
creation of an independent
judiCiary was postponed until the danger of war was over."
This restructuring of
power did not, however, succeed in integrating New
Granada into a political
whole. Not only were the separate states to find it very difficult to cooperate,
but
the Congress of the Federation also faced outright
opposition from forces which
it had insufficient power to overcome.
after ccreating the Federation, the Congress hád to acknowledge that
Cundinamar
the Shortly
a government rejected its authority.
Harassed by centralist
opponents, its members moved out of Bogotá, first to
Leiva, and finally
Ibagué, then to Villa de
to Tunja. The departure from
antagonism between the govemment of C
Bogotá marked the growing
undinamarCiá
the Congress, and,
under the leadership of Nariño and Torres
respectively,ándthey
moved on to a
GOllision course. Federalists and
centralists now had their own regional bases,
and
eachRestrepo
now began
Manuel
laterto try to impose its political project on the other. As José
recalled: ‘The question of the form of government was
always the issue
which divided peoples, and the champions were always the
Congress on one side and the leader of Cundinamarca on the other.832
" The AGt of Federation is printed in Pombo and Guerra, Constituciones
de Colombia, vol. I pp.
208-36.
"' Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. 1, p. 369.
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
21
7s e Federalist Project
t,ike prominent contemporary observers, historians have generally explained the
adhesion to federalism as an imitation of the United States’ experience. In fact,
the form of federalism adopted in 181 l was considerably weaker than the
f&er al system found in the United States at that time. The model adopted in
lx l l was much closer to the Articles of Confederation of 1776 than to the US
Federal Constitution of 1787.3' In other words, New Granada’s federalists
initially inclined towards the diluted form of US federalism as their model, not
the harder, more nationalist form represented by the postwar Federal
Constitution. The Anglo-American Articles had created no more than a loose
union of independent states, presided over by an assembly of deputies (the
Continental Congress) whose principal purpose was to organise the war against
Britain. The US Federal Constitution, by contrast, made an altogether tighter
union, with a federal government endowed with executive, legislative and
judicial powers, and with representatives who were elected in the states in
proportion to their populations, rather than simply sent as individual delegates
by state governments. In 1811 New Granada’s political leaders evidently
regarded federal government of this kind as inappropriate. They preferred the
early federalism of the United States of 1776, with its confederation of equal and
independent states, to the later, more nationalist federalism of the 1787
constitution, which endowed substantial domestic political powers on an
overarching government of President, Congress and Senate.
New Granada’s federalist project was clearly an initiative from above,
emanating from educated creoles who were familiar with the political ideas of
their times. Does this mean, as is often said, that federalism was an exotic
foreign implant, unsuited to the political environment of New Granada?
Certainly this was the view taken by some prominent participants in New
Granada’s First Republic, including Nariflo, Bolivar, Santander and Restrepo, all
of whom denounced federalism as impractical for New Granadans, who had
little experience of self-government and faced a powerful enemy." Restrepo also
assigned specific responsibility for the adhesion to federalism to Camilo Torres,
whom he described as having a ‘veneration bordering on idolatry for the
institutions of the United States ... which he thought could be adopted by our
people without any alteration’." To portray the federalist project as the work of
” Historians of Colombian independence invariably overlook this point. See, for example, the
comments of its most recent historias, Gómez Hoyos in La independencia de Calombia, p. 173.
The fact that it was based on the North American Articles of Confederation is explicitly stated by
José Manuel Restrepo who, as Secretary to the Congress when the Act of Federation was signed,
recalled lengthy discussion of the Articles. See Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, pp. 1878.
" Bol ivar’s best known comments on the matter were made immediately after he left New
Granada, in the famous ‘Jamaica Letter’ of 1815. Santander’s comments were made in his statement
‘Las diferencias del gobiemo en la guerra y en la paz’. Both are reproduced in Jaime Jaramillo
Uribe (ed.), Antologia del Pensamienlo Poliiico Colombiano (Bogot6, 1970), vol. I.
"
Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. 1, p. 259.
22
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
a few doctrinaire intellectuals who disregarded the realities of Colombia’s social
life is, however, to oversimply a complex matter. It was no doubt convenient for
political leaders to blame the defeat of the First Republic on foreign ideas,
particularly at a time when they were seeking to justify a unified and centralised
form of government. It does not, however, fully explain why the federalist
model was so enthusiastically taken up by New Granada’s political elites during
the First Republic.
In fact, there are many good reasons for supposing that federalism came
naturally to New Granadans in 1810. It is true that during Spanish rule New
Granada’s provinces had been united under one overarching government, had
similar forms of political organisation, and had, of course, shared the same laws
and language. On the other hand, there was also much to divide them, not only
the fact that they were based on regions with distinctive social and economic
characteristics." There were also powerful strains in New Granada’s traditional
political culture which predisposed it towards federalist rather than centralist
forms of government.
One such strain came from Spanish political thought and law. Under the
Habsburgs the Spanish monarchy was regarded as a union of kingdoms under
the
Crown
Castile,
with each
kingdom
held
to the king
by a pact
between
crown
and of
people.
Bourbon
kings
and their
ministers
had tried
to alter
these
relations,
oldwith
attitudes
legal argument
used
in between
18 10 to
justify
thebut
break
Spaindied
washard.
that, Indeed,
withoutthe
a legitimate
king, the
pact
the crown and people was broken, and the provinces of New Granada were thus
cast loose. Camilo Torres pointed this out in 1809:
With Spain lost, the monarchy dissolved, the political ties which united
Spain with the Americas broken, and the government which had
organised the Nation destroyed ... there is no remedy. The kingdoms
and provinces which compose these vast dominions are free and
independent, and they cannot and should not recognise any government
or governors other than those which these same kingdoms and
provinces nominate and choose freely and spontaneously ... according
to the spirit, character and customs of their inhabitants."
The traditional notion of a pluralistic monarchy, composed of separate but
equal parts united under one authority, was of course also readily converted into
the modern concept of a confederation made up of separate, independent and
equal sovereign states, of the kind designed by Camilo Torres for New Granada
in 1811.
’" For an outline of the principal regions and their socioeconomic characteristics, see McFarlane,
Colombia before Independence, chapters 2 and 3.
” Camilo Torres, ‘Carta a su tio el oidor Tenorio’, in Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810.
Documentos (Bogotá, 1960), p. 66.
m
towards federalism, then the
sr is h political thought disposed creoles
associated
with
the
raditional
organisation and practices
t
aCtivities
’tudes and
Granada reinforced
this tendency . In theory, SpaniSh
overnment within New
£if g ial government in the late colonial period was highly centralised and
CCilofl
practice, it tended to be decentralised, displayed strong
atlC;
I
heavily on local notables and their
pureaucr
nÍC1]3al autonom y, and relied
of
mu
traditiOrlS
The parishes, villages and towns which were the
ersonal relationships."
life in New Granada were also its
social and economic
enta1 units of
mmunities, in which a sense of identity and social cohesion
ira political co
and festivals and the
was underpinned by the practice of public ceremony uments.3’ Moreover, in
titles
and
GÍty
dOG
t reation of a shared history rooted in
other ancien régime societies, the sense of community WA S
a,
N eW G ranad fts 1f1
the
maintenance of law and order relied heavily on
reinforced by the fact that
p»d
co o peratioR
and participation of citizens.
Throughout the colonial period, the crown depended on local men to
represent and discharge the essential functions of the law (by acting, for
to provincial g overnors, tOWfl COilncillorS, or magistrates
g3mp1e, as lieutenants
e
primary criminal jurisdiction in town and countryside). Such
xercised
course functionaries of the Spanish COlonial order,
ers
were of
officehold
imposing externally made laws upon an array of subaltern groups and protecting
privileged positions. But local
they
held
identify
with
the colonial state. Kinship ties and
the stability of a society in which
officeholders could not simply
authority
ensured that they were
mmunities.
For also
the praCtical realities of exercising local
maintaining order involved
made outside the colonial society and
closely involved with their local C O
more than imposing impersonal rules ractice, law enforcement depended to a
backed by a coercive policing force. In p
and cooperation of members of
considerable extent on the brOad participation
police
or military
had to
istrates,
for
example,
rarely
denounce
crimesforce
and to
to
communitie s. Mag
citizens
to
rely
on
fellow
had
support them, aftd
4
law was
enforce their decisions of arrest, trial and imprisonmen t. ° Enforcing the
respect
and
who e
magistrates had tO ITlàif1tàÍI’1
thus open to negotiation, since
colombian federalism, see John L. Phelan, The People and
"• On the medieval Spanish roots of
Colombia , 1781 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1978) p. 176. A
the xitig: The Comunero Revolution iH
in government is given by Peter M¡ zhal, Town in the
good account of the role of local notables
in Sevenleenlh-Century Popayàn (Austin, Texas, 1978).
Empire.’ Government, Politics and Society
in Guerra, ‘Identidad e
Spanish America as a whole
'" This point is made in ielation to
(eds.), Imaginar la NctCióH
independencia’, in François-Xavi er Guerra and M6nica Quijada
(Munster and HambU£g, 1994), pp. 107-8.
and its enfoicement in New Granada, but à
There is no comprehensive study of criminal law
ion for crimes against property and persORS
recent monograph suggests that policing the Tunja reg
actiYity:
see
Guillermo
Sosa Abella, Labradores, lejedores y
was a broadlytos
based communiW
rovincia de Tunja, I 74S-1810 (Bogotà, 1993), especially pp.
ladrones. Hur y homicidios en la p religiosas en una sociedad colonial: El OOflcUbinato en la
32-5. Anthony McFarlane, in ‘Las reglas
Anderle (ed.), /g/esia, religión y sociedad en la hi$torià
hueYa Granada, siglo XVIII’, Ítl Adam
where detection derived
lalinoamericana, vol. II (Szeged, 1989) also examines a category of crime
invariably for reasons that had nothing to do with the
from denunciatioll within the community,
enforcement of impersonal ethicaJ rules.
24
1810 1815
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA,
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
cooperation in the community, and magistrates who failed to observe this
necessity could suffer humiliating rejection.4' It seems, then, that laws and
orders emanating from the metropolitan state were mediated through local
relationships, and the official order was paralleled by an unofficial and informal
system, where law enforcement was governed by the officeholder’s need to
maintain good relations with his community.
The structuring of political life around urban and proto-urban communities,
and the fact that members of such communities in colonial New Granada
expected to participate in their own government under leaders who met with
community approval, are firmly attested by studies of popular political
behaviour in the region. In the tumultos, levantamientos, sublevaciones, motines
and rebeliones of eighteenth-century New Granada, we can see participation in
disorder as one expression of the belief that common people had a right to
secure justice and to participate in local politics.’2 The sense of a right to
participate was also more conventionally and commonly expressed in the
selection and actions of municipal officials. Choosing municipal officials
generated a lively tradition of political action, in which common people became
involved with government, learned how to act collectively, and both expressed
and developed ideas about their rights. Although rich creoles might manipulate
elections for their own purposes, ordinary vecinos were by no means the passive
instruments of local elites. Indeed, they were often ready to use the law to
combat monopolisation of power and oppression by cliques, to reject officials
who did not have local approval, and to express disapproval of priests who
charged excessive fees, behaved immorally, or otherwise neglected their
responsibilities. Ordinary vecinos also entered local politics by combining to
improve the standing of their communities (usually by seeking to convert a
parroquia into a pueblo, a pueblo into a villa, or a town into a ciudad), and
through such activity they experienced a sense of local identity and community
which allowed them to think and act in the defence of collective interests."
Rivalries between and within such communities strongly influenced the
politics of the First Republic, when proclamations of liberty were interpreted in
primarily local terms. In provincial capitals, the first impulse of the juntas was to
express their autonomy by securing the adherence of the towns and villages
within the colonial jurisdiction; these either accepted that jurisdiction, or broke
away in efforts to form their own governments; in some cases, towns and
villages joined with other cities as a means of breaking with their own provincial
neighbours. Take the case of Socorro, often seen as one of the most radical areas
" For an example of such rejection of a magistrate’s decision, see Anthony McFarlane, ‘Civil
Disorders and Popular Protests in Late Colonial New Granada’, Hispanic American Historical
Review, vol. 64 (1984), pp. 17-54.
" For this argument in full, see ibid., pp. 1†-54.
’" Margarita Garrido, ‘La política local en la Nueva Granada, 1750-1810’, Anuario Colambiano
de Historia Social y la Cultura, vol. 15 (1987), pp. 37-56; see also Gariido, Reclamos y
representacione s, pp. 116-236.
25
Granada. There, the assertion of lOCíll autonomy took a decidedly
One of the first acts Of the junta in SocorrO WaS to claim the
t. ditional form.
bishop, on the grounds that local people were deprived of
right to have its own
because they were rarely visited by the archbiShO Of
adequate spiritual care
off to the capital.” Throughout the period of
s tafé and had their tithes drained
to pursue the claims tO autonomy which
C,
the F j¥S t Republi Socorro continued
life in the colonial period, exploiting the fall
h•d been so central tO ÍtS Olitical
then manoeuvring to secure that
of r yal government to assert its independence,
e through alliances with neighbouring states.
independenc
r
mid-1810, breaking old
simila regiorlal differences quickly multipliedofafter
areas. In the Province Popayàn, the foundation of
t vinces into competing cauca towns seems to have persuaded the elite of
in Cali and other royalist governmen t, while the presence of a SpaniSh
an
popay to continue with encouraged
to
Cali and the towns of the Cauca Valley
In patriot
govemor in Popayàn then
Cities
of
the
Valley’
alliance
of
the
ted
Confedera
other
form à defensive
to seek independence from each and
regiofls, the tendency for towns and cities
was no less pronounced. On the coast, Mompós split from Cartagena,
Va lledupar from Santa Marta. In central New Granada, SOgaiTlOSO,
ju ntlls
Muzo broke from Tunja, Giron and Vélez from
c hiquinquirà, Leiva and
Socorro, Ibagué and Tocaima from Mariquita and Timanà, Garzón and
NóVita, the sparsely popUlated towns
up in opposition to each other. The liberty
on the far west mining frontier, set
in the terms of the old
regimethan
was,freedom
then, often
culture.
politicalby
for interpreted
the newRather
offered
the individual within a system of
and
Purificación from Neiva. Even Quibdó
was first taken to mean freedom for
government which guaranteed his rights, it
towns and villages from subordinatio R tO àrt outside authority.”
in which the old regime was overthrown both reflected and
The manner
As we have seen, the
reinforced these underlying centrifugal tendencies. ÍtS heart: it was dislodged
down
by
a
single
blow
to
viceregency was not struck
authority that began in provincial
in a sequence of separate attaGks on royal
towns were
y, the juntas in these
autonom
their
and
cities.
Having
secured
place of the v iceroy. Now that
towns
ts
ill-disposed to accept a new external authority in
governmen
sovereignty was located in the ‘people’, they set about constructing
Unity
that were based in local society rather than linked to any larger ‘nation’.
colonial society and politics,
between provinces had not been a strong feature of
New
Granada’s
towns and cities emerged
and once Spanish rule was removed,
era, promulgating
as the primary political communitie s of the first republican
bdividing, forming alliances and even
their own constitutions, dividirlg and su
”
Garrido, Reclamos y representaciones, p. 320.
l rivalries in the polítics Of
is Ibid., pp. 322-42. For comment On the infl uence of inter-fnunicipà
patrones de poblamiento y
‘Castas,
independence in the Cauca Valley, see Germàn Colmenares,
ta independenGi0.'
conflictos sociales en las provincias del Cauca, 18 I 0-1830’, in Colmenares,
Ensayos de historia social, p . 15†-†5.
26
1810- 1815
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA,
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
going to war with each other. New Granada was, in short, more akin to
congeries of city-states than a unified nation state.
Fragmented Authority: The Sovereign States of New Granada
At the end of 1811, shortly after the Federation of the Provinces of New
Granada was formed, the country was a patchwork of states and provinces
which, as José Manuel Restrepo put it, ‘did not form a national body because
they lacked a general government’. 46 This situation did not improve in the years
that followed. On the conEary, division between the provinces deepened. In
1812-14, the government of Cundinamarca and the Congress of the United
Provinces were constantly at loggerheads. Cundinamarca’s forces attacked
Tunja in 1812, and the Congress retaliated by attacking Bogoti in 1813.
Defeated
on thiscommanded
occasion, thebyCongress
attacked
in 1814, and this
time its forces,
Bolivar, again
conquered
the Bogoti
city. Cundinamarca
had
meanwhile been fighting to overcome the royalist bastion of Pasto and to clear
the Upper Cauca of royalists. After initial successes, this anti-royalist campaign
suffered a damaging reversal when Nariño was captured during his campaign
against Pasto in 1814. Cundinamarca’s forces were now thrown on the
defensive, and Spanish forces from Quito joined with loyalists in the Colombian
south to extend royal control over growing areas of the Province of Popaydn.
The failures of insurgent Cundinamarca, and particularly the loss of Nariño,
weakened the insurgents’ morale, and brought a war weariness among the
general population which greatly reduced the effectiveness of its struggle against
Spain. During the same period, Cartagena was also engaged in a long and
indecisive struggle against a royalist region, as well as in an internal struggle for
power between opposing factions. Its war with Santa Marta ended in confusion
and defeat, while internal riot and revolt plunged the city’s government into
chaos during 1815, greatly weakening its capacity to resist the subsequent attack
by Spanish forces in 1815-16.”
Already, in late 1814, when Ferdinand had been restored to the Spanish
throne and a resurgent Spain was planning to ‘pacify’ its insurgent American
provinces, the independent states and provinces of New Granada were on the
defensive. By 1815, they had largely succumbed to Spanish military forces and,
in 1816, General Morillo entered Bogotâ. Royal government was now restored
to New Granada until the occupying Spanish army was defeated by Bolivar’s
liberating army in 1819.
New Granada was, then, eventually brought back under Spanish rule by
’“ Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, p. 198.
” For a brief account of events in Cartagena, and on the Caribbean coast generally during this
period, see Adelaida Sourdís Nàjera, ‘Ruptura del estado colonial y trànsito hacia la república,
1800-1850’, in Adolfo Meisel Roca (ed.), Historia económica y social del Caribe Colombiano
(Bogotà, 1994), pp. 157-81.
27
conquering and occupying army. A
force aRd repression, wielded by a
ved imperial state was not the sole reason for the resurrection of royal
revi
under the strain of ÍtS
however; the First Republic had foundered
doc ument, divisions, as provincial elites preferred to defend their own
internal ather than sacrifice themselves to the defence of the general cause
ignties r
From the outset, as José Manuel Restrepo recalled: ‘no
S pe re
independence.
vereignty, however impraCtical. The example
wanted to renounce its so of the United States of America, with which
province
and other provinces
1 dthemselves
comparab
ghode
belie1ved
4 Not
of
calling
confidence
to go oneffective
all could become
they
le, gave them
endent
states’.
'
gn
and
indep
themselves soverei
the revenues and
for instance, lacked
Neiva, casanare and the Chocó,
the
However, and
ates:
Sters
states,
onnel to support
fully fledged constitutional governments.
independent and sovereign
cause of
major provinces adopted constitutions as
detriment of the common
l
interna
affairs
to
the
d
their
ntrate
on
»c•pendence. This did not mean that the leaders of these states shunned
inde
contrary, their pursuit of revolutionary goals added to
political change. On the
the instability of the new political order.
of The
the
in the
states arebetween
reflected1811
the new
ns and goals ofwere
andtexts
1815.
promulgated
The aspiratio
state constitutions
that
various
n t fully elaborated constitution was that of the State of Cundinamarca,
of an anomaly because, as we
d on 4 April 1811. This was something
proiriulgate
noted earlier, it created a constitutional monarchy, in which Ferdinand VII
he should ever take up residence
would take the throne in the unlikely event that
in Cun dinamarca. When Nariño carne to power, this disguised form Of
a became a republic.
independence was abandoned and, in 1812, Cundinamarc
PISO
and
Mariquita
adopted republican
Tunja, Antioquia, Cartagena
rmally
grounded their
fo
,
that
of
undinamarca
C
with
constitutions, and, together
principles taken from the Anglo-Amer ican
political systems in the same liberal
and French Revolutions.
basic Similarities of purpose andá
All were aimed at mdkÍRg
The constitutions Of the states share some
design, even where they differ in im portant details.
formal break with Spain, building a GiVil order to replace the Spanish
conditions for a new
patrimonial state, and, last but not least, providing the
shows that they conformed
society. A cursory review of the constitutional texts
to a similar pattem, being based on key principles taken from the North
They invariably began with a
American and French revolutionar y constitutions.
duties of the citizen, draWÍl
declaration of the rights of man and the rights and
of 1793
or from the French constitutions
from the French declaration of 1789
asserted the equality
and 1795. From this declaration of individual rights, which
the
to establish
— and
Testing on
of citizens, ofthey then proceeded
— in greater or lesser
of thedetail
people
framework governmen t based on the sovereignty
were
separated,
of
govemment
their representation and consent. The powers
”
Ibid., pp. 198-9.
28
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
with an executive, a legislature and a jU
diCiary. Legislatures were bicameral, and
OffiCials were concentrated
powersoftothe
hands
make
laws arld
appoint
representati
largely in the
ve assembl
executive and the judiciary were
y. The powers and responsibilities of the
alsO laid down, with the
former tending to be
closely circumscri bed. Rights
to vote and to hold office were stated, and
generally gave rights
QUii lifications; the mode tO male suffrage on age, literacy, and property
and timing of elections — which were invariably
— were also set
indirect
Rules goveming the armed forces and provision
for
education showeddown.
the importanc
e attached to engaging and
training citizens for
life in
a new political and SOCial environme nt. 4Ü It seems, then, that the
constitutio
ns accom plished revolutions on
paper. Bât did they mean in
practice?
One
of understanding the new political order enshrined in the
constitutiway
ons of
the First Republic
is to treat them Simply as in struments of
narrow Cläss
interests. Seen from this perspective, the
apparent idealism of New
Granada’s first republican period — with its rash of constituti
ons declaring the
rights
the Of miäfl and instituting governments based on consent — merely concealed
underlying determination Of local creole oli
garchies toOfpromote
their own
soci oeconomic interests, and to present the diffuSÎOfl
power among
the
the
sovereignty of the state was now theoretical ly
‘people’ on whom
based."
Another approach to und erstanding the
political order created during the First
Republic, which also emphasis es its fundame
ntally conservative characteristics,
suggests that the conversion of Spanish
to liberal tenets
superficial, and masked a continuingAmerican
COlTlmitstatesmen
ment to traditional
formswas
of
political thOtight and behaviou r.
faCt
it ÎS SäÎd, the COf lStitution s rejected the
that ‘their authors showed a Thus,
remarkable
genius for adopting the language,
style, and enthusiasm s of the age while retaining their own nondemocratic
heritage intact’. In the first place, the framers of New Granada’s earliest
constitutio
ns rejected the principal tenet of the
political liberalism upon which
Anglo-Amer
their
ican models were based. They Started from the
same
Hobbesian premises as the North American founding fathers:
human nature WftS ftirldamenta lly comipt
namely,
that
and self-seeking, and
that
politics
was
an unending
hUflgr
struggle between
y men constantly
struggled
to turn
liberty
andtheir
tyranny,
in hich aggressive, powerfellows
However, Uf llike the North
into servile dependents.
American constituti onal thinkers,
they did not
belicve that thèse evils could
be neutralised through institutional arrangem ents
whÎCh balanced
citizens
forces
of tyranny
whateverthe
their
andAlimericans
Com pelled
berty, andstarted
morals.
SpaniSh
mencotonviction,
be good
with the
plainly stated in the Tunja
constitution, that ‘No one
ÎS £t gOOd citizen if he is not
a good father, good son, good brother, good
friend
and
good husband’. In other
words, only the morally good man can be a good
citizen, and good government
depended on good Citizens. Thus, to
take jtist two examples, the
Constitution of
The constitutio ns of the period are printed in
Pombo and Guerra (eds.)
Colombia, vols. I and Il.
Cofl stitucfon f s de
""
Lfévano Aguirre, Los grandes confl icto
s, pp. 642-70.
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
29
Tunja laid down that officials had to be men of proven virtue, and the
5 Cinstitution of Cundinamarca stipulated that electors had first to hear mass and
edifying sermon before voting, so that they would behave in an honest and
dispassion ate manner when choosing their representatives. And, of course, these
constitutions all established Catholicism as the state religion and prohibited the
praCtice of other cults, while also curtailing the rights of free speech and of a
free press."
It is, however, simplistic to assert that the constitutions of the First Republic
were merely instruments of class oppression, or unwitting distortions of French
and US liberalism. They were, in the first place, an affirmation of the elites’
respect for law and a recognition that governments needed to be lawful in order
to enjoy legitimacy. The men who created the juntas had, after all, insisted that
their seizure of power in the absence of the legitimate king was completely legal.
They were, secondly, within the mainstream of liberal thinking in their times.
Requiring the citizen to display moral qualities and making Catholicism the state
religion were not simply echoes of Hispanic authoritarianism. The first of these
provisions is found in the French revolutionary constitution of 1795, while the
insistence that citizens must be Christians is found in the original North
American state constitutions, some of which also specifically denied political
rights to Roman Catholics.’2 In short, the constitutions reflected the major shift
in the political thinking that underpinned the institutions and practices of the
state, and were, for New Granada, enormously innovative. Like the US and
French revolutionary constitutions on which they drew, New Granada’s
constitutions reflect the modern beliefs, spread by the North American and
French revolutions, that the individual should be free, that society should be
based on a new social pact, and that politics should express the sovereignty of
the people. If these ideals were not always realised, the fact that they were
embodied in state constitutions suggests that those who framed the constitutions
wanted to transform their societies and their politics, and were not governed
simply by economic interests or blind desire to protect social privilege.
The revolutionaries’ commitment to creating a new political and social order
is reflected in efforts to mobilise popular support and to educate public opinion
into new ways of thinking. In Bogotä, for example, creole leaders tried to reach
out to the populace not only through the printing press, but also (and more
importantly in a largely illiterate society) through ceremonies, images, icons,
and symbols that would deliver political messages. At times, traditional rituals
and symbols were invoked as a means of signalling the continuity of order.
Thus, for example, masses were said and formal processions held before or after
important political occasions, such as the convocation of the Congress or a
constitutional assembly, thereby harnessing the majesty of religion and the
" Glen Dealy, ‘Prologomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition’, Hispanic American
Historical Review, vol. 48 (1968), pp. 37-58; quotations from pp. 42, 44.
” J. R. Pole, Foundations of American Independence, 1763-1815 (lndianapolis and New York,
1972), p. 91
30
lN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
authority of the Church to the institutions and deliberations of the new political
order. ° At other times, as Hans-Joachim Kõnig has shown, new
images, symbols
and institutions were used to inculcate and disseminate
political ideas that were
radically discontinuous with the old regime, and
which SOUght to convey new
meanings. Thus, for example, images of Indians
were used to symbolise Spanish
oppression, and put on coins in place of royal
insignia. ‘Liberty trees’ were
planted to signal the new era, the Phrygian cap of liberty was
introduced, and 20
July celebrated as a day of liberation. The term citizen’ also entered
political
lexicon as creole leaders
sought to stimulate patriotism and athe
republican
consciousness."
COmmitment to change was not kept on a purely symbolic plane.
Governments of New Granada’s independent states
also carried out a series of
striking reforms. Apart from introducing systems
of representative, republican
government which attempted to expand political participation, they also
brought
in a number of im portant social and economic reforms. In the economic
sphere,
these included freedom for tra and abolition of state monopolies.
In
the
social
sphere, they included an end de
to discrimination against Indians, by abolition
of
tribute and corporate ownership of Indian land, and,
in Antioquia, the
introduction of the principle of free birth for slaves. Such policies were of course
far fromofconsonant
a mereintransfer
of power from the old order; the major
centres
insurgent WÍth
govemment
New Granada
all had SiTlall groups of radical
creoles who were determined to change their societies, and who mobilised
popular support to secure their aims. Indeed, this GOlTlmitment to
advance the
process of change started in l 810
one reason for the instability of politics in
cities like Cartagena and Bogotá was
during the years before 1815, as it induced
fierce competition between radical and conservative factions, even leading to
virtual Civil war within the insurgent camp, as in Carta
gena during 1815.
The Fragility of the New Political Order
When, during these years, New Granada’s cultured creole elites looked for
models on which to
base their new regimes, they frequently looked to the
American Revolution for both inspiration and example. Indeed, as we have seen,
the constitutions of the sovereign states established between 1811 and 1815
drew
heavily on the US model, as did the Federation
of the United Provinces set
up in 1811. The genesis of the revolution in New Granada had, however,
followed a very different course from that taken
by the British colonies in North
America, and the course of the revolUtions was to produce equally
distinctive
results.
In one respect, the American Revolution and the New
Granadan Revolution
A contemporary document which provides an excellent
1810- 16 period is Caballero, Diario de la independencia.
An excellent account of the ways in
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ lN NEW GRANADA, 1810- 1815
a broad similarity. Both were based in essentially political and
tional conflicts, rather than struggles between social groups. However,
constitu
mis broad SÎlTlilarity conceals important differences which directly affected the
course and outcome of the two conflicts. In the first place, political upheaval
came to New Granada as the result of an external crisis which suddenly obliged
creoles to reappraise their relationship with the metropolitan regime. There was
no long prelude of widespread debate, discussion and political mobilisation of
the kind that occurred in the Anglo-American provinces between 1765 and
1776, and which had gradually transformed political attitudes, thrown up new
political institutions, prepared colonials for war with the mother country. On the
Contrary, pOlitical crisis in New Granada stemmed from the convulsions of Spain
which, as it fell apart, left a vacuum of power and authority. In this setting,
creating new political structures had to be quickly improvised and lacked any
broad basis in prior political organisation and mobilisation.
Share
Another important difference between the New Granadan and North
American revolutions was that of social and cultural context. In North America
political change was preceded by social and economic changes which corroded
the norms of traditional society, and encouraged wider participation and
democratisation in a political culture already accustomed to government by
consent.” During New Granada’s first revolutionary period the hierarchical
social order was intact, political power remained largely in the domain of
leading families, and political life was still strongly influenced by the canons of
a colonial political culture in which participation was restricted and highly
localised. Thus, despite changes in political structure and policy, political
activity continued to gravitate towards traditional issues, such as the struggles of
prominent local families to get and hold office, old aspirations for municipal
autonomy, and other such jurisdictional rivalries. The Church was also a
powerful counterweight to political change. Most clerics opposed the new
republics, and Restrepo remembered them as enemies who ‘made formidable
war on the cause of independence, which they portrayed as an enemy of God
and religion’.’6
Securing popular adhesion to the new republics was, moreover, made even
more difficult by the demands that increasingly penurious governments placed
on local taxpayers. Often new governments abolished Spanish impositions, such
as the hated state monopolies, which they depicted as symbols of oppression or
obstacles to freedom. Such policies had political costs as well as benefits,
however. In particular, they deprived governments of important sources of
revenue, and thus forced them to adopt expedients such as levying forced loans
and printing paper money, neither of which did anything to enhance their
popularity. Even in Socorro and Tunja, where popular commitment to
independence was reputedly widespread, financial problems damaged the patriot
sense of the political ritUals of the
which these symbolic occasions and objects were used to
promote order and change is given in Konig, Eu el camino hacia la nacióy, pp.
234-97.
31
Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992).
" Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. 1, p. 359.
32
THE ‘FIRST REPUBLIC’ IN NEW GRANADA, 1810-1815
IN SEARCH OF A NEW ORDER
cause. For, in these areas, they undermined provincial governments by leaving
them without the resources necessary for defence against royalist attack.
By the beginning of 1815, the new political order was in deep crisis. Jose
Manuel Restrepo recalled that, their expectations crushed, the mass of the
populace looked nostalgically to the past:
The people to whom official documents and public papers had offered
great happiness and prosperity at the start of the revolution, seeing that
these conditions never came, that fighting continued, and that
republican government had burdened them with the maintenance of
armies, with the waste of youth in war, and with new taxes, hated the
new system and sighed for the old regime.’7
‘
33
the political command of the capital, federalists fighting
it]j provinces resisting
q
vatives defending the Church and social hierarchy against
centralists, and conser
determined to create the new society which had
the bla ndishmen ts of liberals
ries of New Granada’s ‘First Republic’."
eluded the revolutiona
•
That the republics had lost support was confirmed by the rapid restoration of
Spanish rule to New Granada in 1815- 16. Cartagena mounted a long and costly
resistance, and was only worn down after a prolonged and damaging siege.
Elsewhere, Spanish forces met with less resistance, and Morillo’s army’s march
into New Granada’s interior was, according to one historian, a mere ‘military
parade’."
The first efforts at building a new political order in New Granada were, then,
aborted amid widespread disillusion and disaffection. In 1810, Spanish
government had lost its authority and power; by 1815, the New Granadan
republics had suffered the same fate. When republicanism revived, in 1819-20, it
took a different form and led to a different outcome. This time, political change
came in the train of an invading army of liberation and under a leadership
which, having learned that unity was the cardinal political virtue in time of war,
lost no time in creating a single republic. Indeed, Bolivar’s Republic of
Colombia stood at the other extreme from the confederal republicanism of 181015. Now known as ‘Gran Colombia’ because it embraced all the provinces
which had previously come under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Viceroyalty of
New Granada, the restored republic was a large, centralised state which drew the
resources of all the territories of the old viceroyalty into the fight against Spain.
Nonetheless, though far more successful than the predecessor states of the first
republican period, Gran Colombia eventually proved unstable.’9 In 1830 Gran
Colombia broke into the three republics of Venezuela, Ecuador and New
Granada, and in New Granada the centrifugal forces which had undermined the
First Republic reasserted themselves in further cycles of civil conflict. Much of
the remainder of the nineteenth century was, indeed, to be spent as it had begun,
” On economic and political conditions in New Granada in late 1814 and early 1815, see
Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución, vol. I, pp. 357-86; quotation from pp. 385-6.
"’ Jorge Mercado, Campaña de invasión del Teniente General Don Pablo Morillo, 1815-1816
(Bogotá, 1919), p. 201.
’" The strengths and weaknesses of the Gran Colombian republic are laid out in the standard work
by David Bushnell, 77ie Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark, Delaware, 1954).
“’ An excellent introduction to the politics of the period is found in David Bushnell, 77ie Making
ofModern Colombia: Nation in Spite o/the//(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), chapters 4 and 5.