1NC 1NC – Burke/Ahmad The aff embodies a political ontology driven by the security of the nation state. This makes their impacts inevitable. Burke ‘13 – Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, 2013 (“Security cosmopolitanism,” Critical Studies on Security (Vol. 1, No. 1, 13–28) Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Tandfonline) **Modified for ableist language. The ontology underpinning security cosmopolitanism necessitates a profound transformation of the national security ontology that precedes and frustrates it. While acknowledging the significance of states – as core actors and potential means of security, as structures of democratic governance, and as (one) of the legal foundations of international order and law – such an ontology understands human existence as irreversibly global in nature. When multiple and often anonymous human actions collectively produce such profound changes to the biosphere and climate that many now term ours a new geological era – the ‘Anthropocene’ – national borders lose their claim to define and enclose human existence, and humanity must be thought in non-anthropocentric terms (Ganguly and Jenkins 2011; Alberts 2011). Through interlocking historical, social, and systemic processes – imperialism, world war, decolonization, capitalism, cold war, globalization, migration, terrorism, nuclear strategy, intervention, and environmental degradation – human beings have effectively unified their life and death process on a planetary scale and extended it to other species and life forms. This event needs to be reflected in a transformation of the historically dominant ontological narrative of insecurity – the narrative of its origins, sources, nature, and necessity. In the traditional (and still dominant) narrative, security emerges from insecurity through the creation of a distinctive political form and subjectivity – that of the nationstate and its corporeal manifestation, sovereignty, the ‘body-politic’. As argued by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the origins of national security lie in a temporal narrative that traces the emergence of the sovereign state (the ‘Commonwealth’) from an originary ‘state of nature’: a realm of perpetual insecurity and conflict in which a natural equality ‘and Right of every man to everything’ remains governed by no rule or jurisdiction that could stabilize or order it; it resembles then a ‘time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man’ and there ‘can be no security to any man of living out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live’ (Hobbes 1985; Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 36–41). As Roberto Esposito explains, an ‘immunitary mechanism begins to operate’ in this narrative, because ‘if life is abandoned to its internal powers, [and] its natural dynamics, human life is destined to self-destruct’. An all-powerful sovereign – the paradoxical embodiment and governor of the body-politic – then functions to ‘immunize’ the body-politic against the potential of its own disorder and preserve the life that threatens it. This biopolitical life is not the degraded ‘bare life’ of Giorgio Agamben’s theory – which certainly remains an ever-present possibility for the subjects and objects of sovereign power – but a rich vision of life that Hobbes describes in De Cive as ‘happiness’ and in Leviathan as all ‘the benefit and good’ of ‘lawful industry’ and knowledge; a life, in short, enabled, protected, and transformed by modernity (Esposito 2008; Burke 2007, 37–38). Furthermore, as international relations grow in complexity and danger, and an international law based on the sovereign equality of peoples organized into states becomes normatively dominant with the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of the post-World War II national security state, the Hobbesian imaginary mutates: the nation-state comes to be thought of as a contained and vital body that must be immunized, or secured, against threats that come from without as well from within. This national body has integrity, sovereignty, borders – and international society, as Hedley Bull explained, comprises such ontologically separate body-politics linked together by a spiderweb of international law, strategic balances, and mutual interests. There is no common humanity, merely an anarchical society of states regulated by a minimal set of agreed rules (Bull 2002, 82). National enclosure becomes paired with anarchic balancing, strategic cooperation, and Realpolitik: this is the ontology that structures and animates dominant state approaches to both national and collective security, across the entirety of the security agenda. In security cosmopolitanism, there can be no successful immunization of the national body against insecurities that come from outside. Such immunization failure can be understood in two ways. First, the very constitution of the state and the national body can be a source of threat – to ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities, dissidents, indigenous peoples, the poor, and women – who become targets of exclusion, marginalization, discipline, violence, and repression. Masculinist and totalizing metaphors of state and community as body then mobilize their own violence, seeking to homogenize and exclude those designated as the other – the virus or cancer – of the state. Such policies generate both severe human insecurity and transnational insecurities in the form of refugees, the transmission of conflict, or the internationalization of struggle – the Palestinians being a powerful case in point. Second, dominant patterns of insecurity and threat – whether one thinks in terms of their causes, scope, or effects – develop within and across borders in ways that render containment models of national security inadequate, and are in fact exacerbated by the perseverance of such models. The atmosphere has no borders, and climate change – which will have dramatic effects on human security from environmental disruptions, degradation, disease vectors, climate-affected conflict, and ‘natural’ disasters such as hurricanes and storm surges – arises as a totality out of millions of often anonymous daily actions in industry, agriculture, government, and individual life. While action at the state and government level is obviously crucial, attempts to partition legal responsibility along national lines have done little more than create [irresolvable] paralyzing international disputes and no agreement on a global treaty framework to reduce emissions and arrest climate change. The antagonistic structure and ontology of international society here presents a profound obstacle to cosmopolitan ends: the result is what writers such as Esposito and Jacques Derrida have called ‘autoimmunization’, an immune response that threatens to destroy the social body rather than protect it (Esposito 2008, xiii–xix, 2011; Derrida 2005; Borradori 2003, 100–102). Nuclear weapons present a similar dilemma dating to the beginning of the post-war national security state: national efforts to seek security through nuclear threats soon became a threat to humanity as such, creating a global community of fate through escalating insecurity dynamics that could never be tamed or stabilized. In this way the nuclear balance of terror becomes the ultimate autoimmunization, as deterrence is forced by time compression and uncertainty to exist at the edge of pre-emption and thus of irreversible disaster, threatening to eliminate those it aims to defend. Similarly transnational Islamist terrorism operates, propagandizes, and recruits across borders, and violent and exceptionalist responses produce new autoimmunization processes that undermine multiculturalism and the democratic rule of law and drive new forms of radicalization and terror (Burke 2009, 2008, 2007, 4–13). Hence in security cosmopolitanism the founding narrative of security changes: insecurity does not arise before or external to a state that (in the classical narrative) acts as a double guarantee of both security and modernity, but arises out of that very modernity as a function of its histories, choices, powers, relations, and systems. It is not the enemy in possession of nuclear or conventional weapons that is the fundamental source of insecurity, but the weapons system itself; not the forced migrant or the massive storm creating insecurity for the nation-state, but the human interaction with the climate system; not the terrorist en route to an attack, but a historical system of injustice, geopolitics, and ideology around violence that enables terrorism as a normative choice and a social phenomenon. Similar arguments can be made about hunger and food insecurity, global health inequality, asylum seekers, transnational crime, weapons proliferation, and more. As Simon Dalby writes of climate change, its ‘irony’ is that ‘the threat is self-imposed; we are the makers of our own misfortunes’. This generates profound responsibilities toward peoples most vulnerable to climate disruptions and undermines ‘distinctions between nature and culture, human and environment’ such that ‘the global scale we now live in’ must be conceptualized as a ‘social nature’ (2009, 2, 6). While security cosmopolitanism does not deny that there are event-based sites and sources of insecurity, it argues that they can neither be fully understood nor ameliorated in their irruptive, symptomatic forms. Event-based threats – the insecurities of the moment – are epiphenomena of larger scale structures and systems. Insecurities arise as events out of multidimensional, interdependent, and often anonymous processes; out of complex articulations of agency, determination, and accident stretching far into a multilayered past and a future with multiple potentials. Against such a background, national governments can potentially be a valuable means of security, but will not be able to contain their communities within a prophylactic cocoon of safety in an insecure world; to secure nations, states must ensure that the world is secured. In sum, the potential for insecurity is immanent to political power, social organization, and cultural, industrial, and military activity under the conditions of modernity on this earth, not external to them. 1NC – Alt Vote negative to embrace water’s emancipatory potential. Reformulating securitized discourse is the only ethical alternative. Harrington ’13 [Cameron; Graduate Program in Political Science, The University of Western Ontario. Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy; “Chapter Six: Hydrosolidarity: The Ethics of Water Security”; 2013; Fluid Identities: Toward a Critical Security of Water; https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2884&context=etd; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Water security is an aperture – a window of opportunity – for deeper explorations of the social and power relationships that work to construct the world of international relations. Accepting the existing state of human relationships as necessary signals a moral choice, because reality then becomes essentialized. To argue the immutability of certain social and political norms in security studies, like the international state system, the pursuit of selfish national interests, etc., reifies and accepts specific configurations of power that contribute to an unjust and dangerous world. Traditional top-down, closed, and national-interest-based approaches to water management, no matter whether they explicitly rely upon nationalistic imperatives of sovereignty, or are hidden beneath the proclaimed values of hydrosolidarity, have the potential to be damaging to people and the natural environment. To overcome this, the first step must be to uncover the deeply held assumptions that ground the analyses of water-security relationships in terms most familiar to state strategists and policy-makers. From there, considerations must be made that question the connections of security with an objectivist view of knowledge generation and then seek to transform security towards emancipation. Partial and atavistic articulations of security, like the ones associated with territorial preservation of the nation-state and the threat and use of force, play an important role in limiting the potential of individuals and groups to lead full lives. As long as assumptions remain unchallenged about the primacy of states, the politics of security, the universality of security as state security, and the benefits of objectivity, it is doubtful that the world will be able to transcend contemporary water problems. However, there is hope that alternative approaches can and will be harnessed to produce normatively desirable, and analytically superior, evaluations of water security. The goal has been to produce the means by which it is possible to conceptualize water security in emancipatory terms. This approach disrupts “settled” norms of sovereignty, and points toward more holistic, “nascent” norms such as emancipation. This holism can work to incorporate ethical concerns and create a critical, continuous dialogical engagement; a humble, collaborative, recognition of others. Water is seen here as an important site that not only demonstrates the continued dominance of traditional security, but also the junctures at which it becomes insufficient, illogical, and obsolete. Perhaps the most vital impact of water is to demonstrate the complex, and multifaceted ways in which security, the self, and the natural environment might coalesce to promote hopeful alternatives that pursue emancipation as their core responsibility. Water can never be truly bounded or separated. It connects the world. The task then is to use water to catalyze and solidify human relationships, with each other and the natural environment, that are built upon shared understandings of a common future. 2NC – L L – Arctic The plan occurs through a grammar of colonialism ignoring indigenous folks – doing so only accelerates climate change and makes their impacts inevitable Greaves 2016 - PhD, Lecturer, Trudeau Centre for Peace, Conflict and Justice University of Toronto Wilfred, "Environment, Identity, Autonomy: Inuit Perspectives on Arctic Security" in Understanding the Many Faces of Human Security : Perspectives of Northern Indigenous Peoples, Chapter 2 there is ample empirical support for the argument that Inuit in Northern Canada discursively construct a holistic, human-centred understanding of what Arctic security means. For Inuit, security is primarily concerned with protecting the Arctic environment from degrada-tion and radical climate change; preserving their identity through the main-tenance of Indigenous cultural practices; and asserting and maintaining Two principal conclusions can be drawn from the Inuit views of Arctic secu-rity assessed in this chapter. First, Inuit autonomy as self-determining, rights-holding political actors whose claims to their traditional territory precede and underpin the sovereignty of the Cana-dian settler state. Inuit are securitizing actors who employ the grammar and language of in/security to identify threats to the continued wellbeing of valued referent objects linked to their survival as an Indigenous people. On the basis of the threat-referent relationships they ar-ticulate, Inuit are primarily concerned over threats to the Arctic environment, their Indigenous identity, and their political autonomy, but emphasize the interrelated nature of these In terms of securitization theory, security issues. Overall, however, human-caused environmental change permeates Inuit understandings of Arctic security; as a contributing factor to many longstanding challenges to Indigenous peoples, and as a cause of many new security hazards confronting Inuit and other Northerners, environmental change is the backdrop against which all Inuit understandings of in/security in the Arctic stand in stark contrast to the perspective that informs Canada’s current Arctic policy. While Inuit leaders and organizations have performed numerous securitizing moves identifying the compounding threats posed by rapid cultural change, political disempow-erment, and ecological transformation, Canada’s understanding of Arctic se-curity emphasizes military defence of its territorial claims and the northward expansion other insecurities in the Arctic are occurring. of an extraction-based natural resource economy. Canada insists on seeing climate change as an economic opportunity while “choosing not to see” the dangers it presents,68 whereas Inuit perceive climate change as foreclosing future opportunities to exist as Indigenous peoples in their traditional terri-tories. In effect, Canada’s Arctic policies the second conclusion of this chapter is that the security concerns of Inuit are virtually absent from the official Arctic security discourse prioritize the very practices causing the ecological changes that Inuit identify as threatening. As such, employed by the Canadian state. Despite the significant political achievements made by Inuit, their views of security in their own lands remain marginalized. In this respect, Arctic security discourse and its current Arctic policy framework remain fun-damentally colonial.To the extent that Inuit understandings are not included within official Arctic security discourse in Canada, it suggests there are limitations upon the capacity of Canada’s Indigenous peoples, and other non-dominant social groups, to successfully transform hazards threatening them into security issues acknowledged and addressed by the state. Though a full theorization of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this chapter, closer examination of the role of identity in the securitization process may cast light on the exclusion of certain groups’ views from official security discourse. Building on the discus-sion of securitization theory in the first section of this chapter, I propose that Indigenous identity operates as a barrier that obstructs the success of Indig-enous peoples’ securitizing moves. Since the facilitating conditions of securiti-zation reflect conditions of unequal social power, it seems reasonable that In-digenous peoples making security claims within the context of settler-colonial states that have historically and contemporarily Indigenous peoples – as an example of non-dominant may thus experience their identities as an inhibiting condition that impedes, rather than facilitates, acceptance of their security claims. Understood as reflecting the historical and contemporary relationships between Indigenous peoples and the settler-colonial states in which they regenerated the conditions of insecurity for their Indigenous populations would be analytically significant. societal groups with op-positional, antagonistic, or threatening identities to the authoritative audience of the sovereign state – side, Indigenous identity may result in structural limitations on the capacity to speak security to the authoritative audience of the state and thus to suc-cessfully securitize. This does not mean that dominant groups will always suc-ceed in securitizing their issues, or that non-dominant groups will always fail to securitize theirs. But it does suggest that identity may determine why some securitizing moves fail: not because of the relative seriousness of the danger or the value of a referent object, but because of the speaker making the security claim and their relationship to the audience whose acceptance is required to mobilize the power of the state in response to the specified threat. L – Biodiversity Biodiversity is not a neutral resource – it’s a strategic tool based on the furthering of national security. Erasga 12 [Dennis; Professor in De La Salle University’s Department of Behavioral Sciences; March 2012; “Biopolitics: Biodiversity as a Discourse of Claims”; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224829003_Biopolitics_Biodiversity_as_Discourse_o f_Claims; Accessed 7-17-2021; BM] 3.3 Third world: Resource is security Quite similar in their agenda regarding the political economy of biodiversity, the memberstates of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN)8 have finally launched a new wave of national and regional security discourse that assigns a strategic dimension to nature and the resources it contained.9 This security discourse is inspired by the Association’s “joint endeavors” on sustainable development broadly articulated in its collective “security and development” agenda. In her analysis of this agenda Hernandez noted (1995: 38): “To be sustainable, development in its economic dimension, must be sensitive to its excessive demands on both natural and human resources as well as its negative impact on the physical environment. Within this discursive platform, environmental resources have been assigned with a definitive status that directly impacts on the Associations’ burgeoning conception of security. The discursive shift in the status of biophysical environment as “resources” unavoidably ushered a new mode of thinking in terms of national vis-à-vis regional cooperation. In this context, biodiversity i.e. biogenetic resources of plants, animals and microbes found in the environment, are no longer seen as neutral elements of a physical border separating nations and their peoples. Environment as container and refuge of biodiversity is no longer perceived as a lifeless frontier demarcating nations and their cultures. Rather, environment and every genetic resource it contains are now considered integral and strategic component of the ASEAN’s national and regional security. This new political discourse is based on the emerging definition of political and economic security that sees environmental protection and sustainable development as key organizing principles. Peria’s (1998: 5) analysis of the ASEAN’s changing notion of the potential of environmental resources rightly concludes that: “ Given the growing scarcity of the world’s resources and the insatiable demand for it, security should be redefined to include the matter of safeguarding the integrity of a nation-state’s natural resources.” Notwithstanding, this new perspective is anchored on the insights that given the enormous economic, scientific and strategic potentialities of biogenetic resources,10 (which are most often found in underdeveloped and developing regions of the world with equally diverse cultural communities), national security is unthinkable without incorporating biological and genetic resources as key factors (cf. Dupont 1994). The invocation of biodiversity threats are twisted into a perverse tool to forefront the agenda of the nation-state. Erasga 12 [Dennis; Professor in De La Salle University’s Department of Behavioral Sciences; March 2012; “Biopolitics: Biodiversity as a Discourse of Claims”; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224829003_Biopolitics_Biodiversity_as_Discourse_o f_Claims; Accessed 7-17-2021; BM] When I was invited to write a paper about biodiversity for this volume, I was tempted to organize my key arguments around the politics of biodiversity (as it has been the original line of inquiry of my previous academic work on the topic). My reason was that the concept has been given birth by political claims of conservation biologists and evolved, henceforth as a form of political activism involving new sets of interest groups. However as an environmental sociologist who has been intrigued by the discursive nature of political claims, I decided to use a title that truly reflects the tricky nature this notion. Tricky because the conventional notion led many of us to believe that the politics of biodiversity was inaugurated by the way it has been used by the international community to promote common economic and political ethos (e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity). I disagree. My position was that the politics of this concept goes as far back as to the very day of its coinage. Tracing the genealogy of biodiversity as a discursive claim is a more strategic and encompassing way of reframing the issues it implicates. Phrased differently, it is my position that the discussion of the biography of the concept we call biodiversity is to highlight not only the politics that goes with it, but to call attention to the sociological relevance surrounding its current usage. Thus the thesis of my chapter is twofold: I submit that: i. Biodiversity is a politically charged concept as its birth is politically instigated; ii. Biodiversity is a politically charged concept as it is invoked to further political agenda. In order to amplify the major thesis of the chapter, I divided the discussion in two major parts. Part 1 elaborated on the scientific context that led to the naming of this concept. Part 2 highlighted the power play that goes with its current usage. Respectively, the former tackled the genealogy of biodiversity; its birth as a social construction to justify a call for collective action; while the latter documented how biodiversity as a political tool has been appropriated by and forms part of, the discursive armory of three grassroots epistemic communities1 as they advanced their respective political agenda. 2. Genealogy: The birth of biodiversity Before 1986 the term “biological diversity” or “biodiversity” is non- existent. This word was invented by a group of American conservation biologists in the conference “The National Forum on BioDiversity” held in Washington D.C. in 1986. Walter Rosen (who probably coined the term) organized the gathering with the support of Edward Wilson. The activity was under the joint auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the Smithsonian Institute. The group felt that a new catchword was needed to promote nature conservation and to make people aware of the lurking dangers of species extinction. The neologism apparently was created to replace several other terms, viz. ecosystem, endangered species, natural variety, habitat and even wilderness, that had been in circulation in promoting nature conservation (Nieminen 2001; Sarkar 2002). 2.1 Biodiversity as a scientific activism As a rare example of scientific activism, biodiversity then was originally conceived to be a scientific tool aimed to achieve certain ends: to prevent worldwide loss of species diversity, to alert the world that species extinction was rapid and problematic and to catalyze and solicit public interests and action (Lane 1999). Biodiversity as an organizing concept was invented as a communicative tool in the broader political arena. It was conjured up from the need to communicate and act in a concerted effort (Norton 2003). While the history of the term is relatively short2, it already has sparked distinctive philosophical debates. Some of these are entangled in the very definition of ‘biodiversity’, an issue, which becomes the hallmark of some of the present political, environmental, and social aporia. To date there has been no universally approved definition of biodiversity within the community of scholars with the exception, of course, of the original one proffered by the organizers of the 1986 Washington convention.3 Since then, biodiversity as a concept becomes so stretchable a term there seem to be no chances of bringing it back to its original usage. 2.2 Biodiversity as feature of nature As if to lighten the vagueness of the term and the confusion it generates among its scientific users, two complementary schemes have been proffered the hub of which are the issues of (i) pinning down a precise definition (i.e. definitional problem) and (ii) operationalization of its indices (i.e. application problem).4 These schemes are complementary in the sense that the first served as the take off point of the second. The second approach, on the other hand, did not abandon the optimism of the search for categorical definition. Rather, it fleshed out the ethics and practicality of such process. 2.3 Policy discourse The first scheme has been advanced in a paper presented during the 2000 London 3rd Policies for Sustainable Technological Innovation in the 21st Century (POSTI) Conference on Policy Agendas for Sustainable Development. The approach divides biodiversity into two parts when analyzing its use in environmental policy namely: (i) biodiversity as a feature of nature (i.e. the variety of species, phenomena, and processes that exist in nature); (ii) biodiversity as a policy discourse (i.e. a concept and a discourse that is used to argue for the need of nature conservation, and in legitimating different conservation policies). As explicitly argued by Nieminen (2001: 2) “Biodiversity as the essential feature of nature is foremost the realm of scientists, it is the realm of scientific measuring, categorization and theorizing. Biodiversity as a discourse, on the one hand, is the realm of policy-making, administration and communication.” Biodiversity along the first divide refers to the pure objective status of the variety of living organisms, biological systems, and biological processes found on Earth. This bias is aptly captured by the following definition articulated by its staunchest supporter- Edward O. Wilson: “Biodiversity…is all hereditary-based variation at all levels of organization, from genes within a single local population, to the species composing all or part of a local community, and finally to the communities themselves that compose the living parts of the multifarious ecosystems of the world.” (Wilson 1998: 1-3) As a policy initiative, biodiversity is embedded within the “rhetorical resources for identifying the responsibilities, characterizing social actors and groups, praising and blaming, criticizing conventional knowledge or accepting it, legitimizing courses of action or political strategies and for promoting the factuality of otherwise contestable claims” (Nieminen 2001: 3). In other words, biodiversity is a form of social standard that can be used to evaluate human actions in relation to utilization, conservation and management of the benefits of biodiversity. It must be noted though that whether conceived as an objective feature of nature or as an object of policy initiatives, biodiversity remains to be a ‘discursive (or linguistic) creation’ of stakeholders - originally of the conservation biologists and later on of policy makers. It is difficult to pin down an exact definition of discourse. The works of Fairclough and Wodak (1997), van Djik (1997), Jaworski and Coupland (1999) and recently, of Wetherell, Taylor and Yates (2001) attest to this problematique. Generally speaking though, discourse refers to the actual practices of speaking and writing (Woodilla 1998, see also Gergen 1998). Hall (1992) posited that discourse is a group of statements which provided a language for talking about – i.e., a way of representing- a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. Hence, when statements about a topic are made within a particular context, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way and viewed this way, they are constitutive of identities (Hajer 2003; Norton 2003) as discourse allows something to be spoken of by limiting other ways in which the topic can be constructed (see Foucault 1987; Burr 1995; Parker 1992). As the social history of biodiversity attests, conservation biologists who invented the term did not merely describe what they see as biological diversity; but the very act of description constitutes the object so described. The following quote from the book ‘Making Nature, Shaping Culture’, poignantly captured this strong constructivist theme: “Nature exists only through its description, analysis, mapping, and manipulation… What we call as objective reality is constituted by both the actual physical configurations of elements in things and in human conceptual frameworks (theories, definitions, and ‘facts’)… It is our ordering of the information received by our senses that constitutes the picture of ‘all that is’ and that we refer to as nature” (Busch et al 1995: 3-4). The second scheme muses not so much on ‘how’ to define biodiversity. Rather it inquires as to ‘why’ define the concept in the first place. It bolstered the constructivist stance described above by stressing that words like biodiversity do not correspond to pre-existing objects, individuals and categories5 (cf. Hajer 2003). By act of (usually implicit) choice, the development of a vocabulary of terms to discuss observable phenomena ‘constitutes’ the objects and categories humans recognize and manipulate linguistically. According to Norton (2003) communicative ‘usefulness’, and not ‘truth’ should determine our definitionsusefulness implies careful examination of our shared purposes toward which communication is directed, which ultimately leads us back to the subject of social values and commitments. Within the context of second scheme, we could neither find nor create any ‘correct’ definition of biodiversity, for virtually there is none. What we could and must strive for, instead, is to look for a definition that is ‘useful’ in deliberative dialog regarding how to protect and preserve biological diversity, however defined. Our categories including biodiversity must be developed from the need to ‘communicate’ and to ‘act’ together within the broader political ethos (Norton 2003). Quite obviously, the second scheme interrogates both the possibility and utility of precise definitions. It sensitizes us to the fact that carefully worded definition is not a necessary guarantee that a cooperative discourse would ensue or that concrete actions will be taken. On the contrary, definitions may alienate, either by silencing or relegating to the background, the local ‘voices’ of those who may have equal and valid stakes on the very issues these definitions bring about. 3. Claimants: Biodiversity as political discourse From the conservation biologists to policy makers to the general public the currency of the term biodiversity mutates in unimaginable forms. The concept has become a buzzword that serves to promote the various political, economic and cultural agenda of scientists and decision-makers as well as of individuals, communities, institutions and nations (Escobar 1999). With its usurpation by these new sets of articulators came newer modes of discourse, hence a whole new array of meanings and usage. Biodiversity has become a masterframe used by the epistemic communities of various stakeholders. As a masterframe from where all sides draw meanings, biodiversity looses its ‘signature meaning’.6 A fascinating consequence of this development is the blurring of the distinction between the scientific discourse (of the experts) and the popular discourse (of lay or nonexpert) (Haile 1999; Nieminen 2001, Dwivedi 2001). As Eder (1996: 183) observed: “Biodiversity becomes a collectively shared ideology undermining the hegemony of science and at the same time seriously weakening the position of traditional environmental organizations and movements as primary mouthpiece of the environment.” L – Brownfields Brownfields aren’t bad because they hurt people, they are bad because they are not productive- the affirmative’s attempt is one of managerialism, making ecological capitalism inevitable Luke 2003 Timothy [Program Chair of the Government and International Affairs Program, School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University]; EcoManagerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation; Aurora; Issue 2003 Resource managerialism can be read as the essence of today's enviro-mentality. While voices in favour of conservation can be found in Europe early in the 19th century, there is a self-reflexive establishment of this stance in the United States in the late 19th century. From the 1880's to the 1920's, one saw the closing of the western frontier. And whether one looks at John Muir's preservationist programs or Gifford Pinchot's conservationist code, there is a spreading awareness of modern industry's power to deplete nature's stock of raw materials, which sparks wide-spread worries about the need to find systems for conserving their supply from such unchecked exploitation. Consequently, nature's stocks of materials are rendered down to resources, and the presumptions of resourcification become conceptually and operationally well entrenched in conservationist philosophies. The fundamental premises of resource managerialism in many ways have not changed over the past century. At best, this code of practice has only become more formalized in many governments' applications and legal interpretations. Working with the managerial vision of the second industrial revolution, which tended to empower technical experts like engineers or scientists, who had gotten their degrees from agricultural schools, mining schools, technology schools like the one I work at, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, which prides itself as they say on producing the worker bees of industry. Or, on the shop floor and professional managers, one found corporate executives and financial officers in the main office, who are of course trained in business schools. Put together, resource managerialism casts corporate administrative frameworks over nature in order to find the supplies needed to feed the economy and provision society through national and international markets. As scientific forestry, range management, and mineral extraction took hold in the U.S. during this era, an ethos of battling scarcity guided professional training, corporate profit making, and government policy. As a result, the operational agendas of what was called sustained yield were what directed the resource managerialism of the 20th century. In reviewing the enabling legislation of key federal agencies, one quickly discovers that the values and practices of resourcification anchor their institutional missions in a sustained yield philosophy. As Cortner and Moote observe, the statutory mandates for both the Forest Service, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act, and the National Forest Management Act, and the Bureau of Land Management, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, for example, specifically direct these agencies to employ a multiple use sustained yield approach to resource management. More often than not, however, these agencies adjusted their multiple use concept to correspond to their primary production objective -- timber in the case of the Forest Service, grazing in terms of the Bureau of Land Management. Although sustained help is not specifically mentioned in the legislated mandate of agencies such as the National Parks Service or the Bureau of Reclamation, they too have traditionally managed for maximum sustained yield of a single resource - visitor use in the case of the parks, water supply in the case of water resources. So the ethos of resourcification imagined nature as a vast input/output system. The mission statements of sustained yield pushed natural resource management towards realizing the maximum maintainable output up to or past even the point where one reached ecological collapse, which in turn of course caused widespread ecological degradation, which leads to the project of rehabilitation managerialism.¶ The acknowledgement of ecological degradation is not tremendously difficult. Indeed, the will to manage environments arises from this wide-spread recognition back in the 19th century. One obvious outcome of building and then living around the satanic mills of modern industrial capitalism was pollution of the air, water, and land. As it continued and spread, the health of humans, plants, and wildlife obviously suffered, while soils and waters were poisoned. Yet the imperatives of economic growth typically drove these processes of degradation until markets fell, technologies changed, or the ecosystem collapsed. At that juncture, business and government leaders, working at the local, regional, and national level, were faced with hard choices about either relocating people and settlements in industry to start these cycles of degradation anew, or maybe rehabilitating those existing economic and environmental assets to revitalize their resource extractive or commodity producing potential. Rehabilitation management then is about keeping production going in one way or another. Agricultural lands that once produced wheat might be turned to dairy production or low-end fibre outputs. Polluted water courses, poisoned soils, and poverty-stricken workers can all be remobilized in environmental rehabilitation schemes to revive aquatic ecologies, renew soil productivity, and replenish bank accounts. The engagements of rehabilitation management are to find a commodifiable or at least a valuable possibility in the brown fields of agricultural excess and industrial exhaustion. Even after decades of abuse, there are useful possibilities that always lie dormant in slag heaps, derelict factories, overused soil, polluted waterways, and rust belt towns. Management must search for and then implement strategies for their rehabilitation. Such operations can shift agricultural uses, refocus industrial practices, turn lands into eco-preserves, and retrain workers. But the goals here are not return ecosystems to some pristine natural state. On the contrary, its agendas are those of sustaining the yields of production. Of course, what will be yielded and at what levels it is sustained and for which environmental ends all remains to be determined. On the one hand, the motives of rehabilitation management are quite rational, because these moves delay or even cancel the need to sacrifice other lands, air, and soil preserves at other sites. Thus nature is perhaps protected elsewhere or at large by renewing industrial brown fields in agriculturalized domains for some ongoing project of industrial growth. On the other hand, rehabilitation managerialism may only shift the loci and the foci of damage, rehabilitating ecosystemic degradation caused in one commodity chain, while simply redirecting the inhabitants of these sites to suffer new, albeit perhaps more regulated and rational levels, of environmental contamination in other commodity chains. If one doesn't want to rehabilitate what has been ruined, one can then perhaps get into restoring it.¶ So a restoration managerialism is a recognition that lies at the root of many environmental problems that has sparked a reaction so intense that many called for going beyond rehabilitation and returning to some status quo anti. The call is first stop exploiting nature's endowments, and then move towards restoring those sites in systems that have been most abused. Ecological restoration, however, is a very tricky proposition, because what is to be restored? How will it be reclaimed? Who must revive what has been damaged, and exactly which prior state of existence is to be privileged as the state of restoration? Most appeals for restoration are made on aesthetic grounds. But restoration management has also developed more macrological engagements for maintaining the integrity of the earth's carrying capacity. In this respect, restoration managerialism focuses upon mobilizing all of the biological, physical, and social sciences to address the major economic and political affects of current environmental problems. Their resourcifications allow ecosystem managers to infrastructuralize all of the earth's ecologies in the name of an almost complete restoration for some biomes, bioregions or biosystems. The earth becomes, if only in terms of contemporary technoscience, an immense terrestrial engine. Serving as the human race's ecological support system, it has, with only the occasional localized failures (as restorationists like to say), provided services upon which human society depends consistently and without charge. As the environmental infrastructure of technoscientific production, the earth then can continue to generate these ecosystem services or their derivative products of natural systems, but only if they are restored. So this complex system of systems is what must survive, and its outputs include of course what we know: the generation of soils, the regeneration of plant nutrients, the capture of solar energy, the conversion of that solar energy into biomass, the accumulation, purification and distribution of water, the control of pests, the provision of a genetic library, the maintenance of breathable air, the control of micro and macro climates, pollination of plants, diversification of animal species, development of buffering mechanisms in eco-catastrophes. And, at the end of the day, some aesthetic enrichment to make it all seem worthwhile. Because it is the true capital stock of trans-national enterprise, the planet's ecology requires such highly disciplined treatment in order to restore some of its original capacities, and then guide perhaps its subsequent sustainable use. Restoring as much or as many as possible of these ecosystems is very important, because it might even bring back some almost extinct ecosystems to enlarge our existing carrying capacity. That in turn leads to another engagement, which is renewables managerialism. L – China Mainstream IR tokenizes quasi-official discourses about China’s foreign policy intentions only insofar as it supports the Western frame of the China rise theory Kristensen 15 – fellow in IR at the University of Copenhagen (Peter, ‘How can emerging powers speak? On theorists, native informants and quasi-officials in International Relations discourse,’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 637-653) A third way of speaking in Western IR discourse is quasi-official speak. This is related to the native informant, with the difference that quasi-officials not only contribute with ‘local data’, they also aim to represent their country’s view of the world. While native informants are accepted by mainstream journals because they provide empirical material of a certain truth-value about their country or region, the quasi-official is accepted because he (it is only men) speaks for the country and its leadership. In the case of emerging powers, quasi-official speak becomes interesting to mainstream IR because it tells the West something about ‘how the Chinese view the world’. It is epiphenomenal and politicised discourse. Quasi-official speak is accepted largely because of the position from which it is spoken, not only because of what is spoken. It tends to come from scholars who are also advisors, diplomats or government officials, or who work in international organisations or NGOs. Quasi-official speak is exemplified by Wang Jisi’s Foreign Affairs articles, which not only try to represent the Chinese perspective (‘Here is a Chinese view’), but also do so in the typical Realpolitik discourse of Foreign Affairs, where states (usually referred to as capitals, Beijing and Washington) are the primary units trying to safeguard their ‘core interests’ against external ‘threats’: ‘Washington will not regard Beijing as its main security threat’; ‘many Chinese still view the United States as a major threat’.74 While quasi-official speak tries to explain China’s foreign policy concepts and leadership intentions to the world, i.e. the USA, it does so within the Western frame of ‘China’s rise’ and ‘“China threat” theory’.75 As Wang argues in relation to debates about a China model, the Beijing Consensus and China Dream, ‘the Chinese leadership does not dream of turning China into a hegemon or a standard-bearer’, rather ‘it is in China’s interest to contribute to a peaceful international environment’.76 Foreign Affairs also published an interview with the Chinese ambassador to the USA explicating Xi Jinping’s notion of a ‘new type of great-power relationship’ based on ‘mutual respect and mutual benefit’ rather than a ‘zero-sum game’, and explaining why China is not a ‘revisionist’ power but seeks integration and follows the rules: ‘We stand for necessary reform of the international system, but we have no intention of overthrowing it or setting up an entirely new one’; ‘We never provoked anything. We are still on the path of peaceful development.’77 Quasi-official articles represent ‘the Chinese view’ in reassuring plus-sum terms that posit the country as peaceful and only ‘rightfully’ aiming for international restoration and responsibility.78 The impact is a theoretical silencing of radical non-Western perspectives that do not simply respond to the Western security agenda but innovatively reconfigure the terms of geopolitics itself Kristensen 15 – fellow in IR at the University of Copenhagen (Peter, ‘How can emerging powers speak? On theorists, native informants and quasi-officials in International Relations discourse,’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 637-653) In quantitative terms emerging powers still cannot speak in mainstream IR. Like scholars in other non-core, non-Western, non-Northern settings, the majority of Chinese, Indian and Brazilians are ‘subaltern’ in the sense of having no voice in mainstream IR. It is difficult to ascertain whether the problem is that ‘they’ are not talking or ‘we’ are not listening.85 This paper has shown that when ‘we’ are listening, however, the few articles that access the infrastructure of global/Western IR discourse tend to speak in one of three voices: first, as theorisers within established Western theoretical traditions such as realism, constructivism or English School; second, as native informants presenting empirical material from their own country; and third, as quasiofficials representing a perspective from their country. Theory speak from ‘non-Western’ IR scholars does not deliver the radical difference usually expected from scholars based in a different context – there are no ‘third world radicals’ or indigenous theorisers in mainstream journals. Rather it often looks like ‘social science socialised’ disciplined by the mainstream discipline.86 The majority, however, speak about or for their own country and region. In the past decade they have done so increasingly using the ‘emerging power’ prism. There is no doubt that the growing attention to emerging powers opens up the discursive space of IR for scholars located in those countries to speak at all. However, native informants and quasi-officials not only speak about and for themselves, they often do so within a securitised discourse. Chinese articles in particular frame their empirical contributions in the debate over the ‘China threat’ and ‘peaceful rise’. It seems that Chinese scholars must, at least peripherally, engage the ‘China threat’ discourse to get published in a mainstream Anglo-American journal. But why would even articles on political economy be dressed up in security speak? Why does a Chinese scholar frame the study of, say, China in the IMF in terms of whether China is a threat or not, whether it will be peaceful or not? It is almost inconceivable that articles on Germany or the USA in the IMF would have a similar framing. It is somewhat paradoxical to read Chinese scholars debating whether their own country will be revisionist or status quo-oriented, whether it will overturn the American-led liberal order or integrate into it – questions infused by US/Western security concerns and a status quo bias. This mode of ‘speaking back’ has its pitfalls because it is always more of a negation of US threat theories, a ‘non-China threat theory’, than an opening to alternative and innovative theorising. Although there is no India threat theory, Indian scholars are not exempt from this logic when they try to correct negative US images of India and reassure the country that India will be a different, democratic great power, nor are Brazilians who try to explain why Brazil and the BRICS seek greater influence. This raises the question of whether ‘non-Western’ emerging powers can speak in IR without always already speaking back to the ‘West’, its theories and security agendas. L – Econ Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a liberal order-building method of security—justifies violent intervention Neocleous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, p.101-105] In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic wellbeing’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conflict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen fit to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the figures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identified as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign officials; drug-trafficking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism flowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the five Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and figuring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difficult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a figure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum figure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum figure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than confirmed by events in the twenty first century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the official National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-first century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security benefits of ‘economic liberty’, and the benefits to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justification for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty. Economic collapse predictions create self-fulfilling prophecies Mckendrick 12 (Joe, Independent analyst who tracks the impact of information technology on management and markets, author of the SOA Manifesto, written for Forbes, ZDNet and Database Trends & Applications, 9/18/12, “Are economic downturns self-fulfilling prophecies,” http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/are-economic-downturns-self-fulfillingprophecies/26329) There are tangible, and often painful, fundamentals that determine the course of the economy — unemployment, interest rates, housing prices, inflation, industrial production, government debt. But more than anything else, markets are psychology, and an atmosphere of fear and panic among producers and consumers leads to scaling back of purchases, which further exacerbates a downturn. Over the past few years in particular, there have been plenty of messages of impending doom circulating through the mass media. Like Eeyore, the miserable mule from Winnie-the-Pooh, many pundits ignore any bright spots and flood the airwaves with grim predictions of imminent collapse and despair just around the corner. In an economy heavily tied to consumer confidence, such talk could have far-reaching consequences. Such downbeat messages may eventually result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, actually translating into job losses. A new analysis by Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu, analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, says there is a statistically measurable impact from “talking down” the economy. The economists say that the atmosphere of uncertainty in the recent downturn of 2008-2009 added at least one to two percentage points to the unemployment rate: “During the Great Recession, the increase in uncertainty appears to have been much greater in magnitude…. Our model estimates that uncertainty has pushed up the U.S. unemployment rate by between one and two percentage points since the start of the financial crisis in 2008. To put this in perspective, had there been no increase in uncertainty in the past four years, the unemployment rate would have been closer to 6% or 7% than to the 8% to 9% actually registered.” Policymakers and pundits can’t be pollyanish in the face of economic troubles, of course. But the Fed authors suggest that as media channels fill up with dire and downbeat talk, fear levels go up, and people start to lose their jobs. “Heightened uncertainty acts like a decline in aggregate demand because it depresses economic activity and holds down inflation,” the Fed economists observe. Another thing is clear as well: when analysts and pundits put their Eeyore faces on, it doesn’t help anybody. What is needed is more discussion and ideas about solutions and disruptive innovation that create opportunities, improve our world, and provide people more control over their economic destiny. L - China (Generic) Anti-China rhetoric justifies extreme US policies and magnifies the risk of war. Ooi and D’arcangelis 17 Su-Mei Ooi is a professor at Butler University. Gwen D’Arcangelis is a professor at Skidmore College. “Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric”, Global Media and China https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096, [Accessed: 7-182021]//cblasi Peter Hays Gries once suggested that the way Americans view China is most likely motivated by “cold calculations of their own self-interest … intertwined with deep-seated ‘gut feelings’ about China” (Hays Gries, 2006, p. 209). And while we “frequently infer Chinese intentions from Chinese capabilities,” admitting to these features in US policy is something that we are often unwilling to do (Gries, 2006). China has, since the end of the Cold War, occupied a space in the US imaginary as the potential enemy Other, and the areas of contention highlighted above have become ample context for the reification of negative images of China as an imminent source of threat. These images have been drawn from older tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils and also newer incarnations of the “sleeping” or “awakened” giant. As previous work has shown, such tropes have the ability to do the cultural work that shapes and justifies US policies (Buzan & Wæver, 2003; de Buitrago, 2012; Steuter & Wills, 2010; Turner, 2014). In the present moment, negative images of China have enabled the justification of an increasingly hardline approach to China. The latest National Security Strategy articulated by the Trump administration has unequivocally named China a challenger to “American power, influence and interests” who has attempted to “erode American security and prosperity” (Landler & Sanger, 2017; U.S. White House Office, 2017), and the United States’ hardline tack toward China has been further reflected in the areas of contention in the US–China Comprehensive Dialogue. 280 Global Media and China 2(3–4) We have aimed to interrupt post–Cold War representations of China as a potential enemy Other that encourage a reductive attitude toward a “rising China.” We have been particularly concerned with how this may disable the US public from fairly evaluating China’s actions as a rising power, as well as the US government’s policies toward China. Indeed, if China is essentially a lawless bully, a thief, and a cheat incapable of learning international norms of acceptable behavior, what options besides the exercise of hard power does the United States have to meet its long-term security objectives? A treatise on the aims and modes of US national security is beyond the scope of this article, but we hope to at least foreground the way othering frames the “truths” about China, so that the wider public may view US China policy with a more critical filter. The ability of the US public to do so could become increasingly important—diversionary wars have been used as a tactic to shore up public support for unpopular leaders threatened by domestic discontent, after all (Sobek, 2007). Although China’s longtime position has been to maintain a strong partnership with the US based on mutual interest, benefit, and respect, it is imperative that the US public understands when US policy encourages China to retreat from that position, and the potential that holds for conflict. L - China – (Cyber) China Cyberwar rhetoric reinforces the notion that China is perpetually uncivilized. Ooi and D’arcangelis 17 Su-Mei Ooi is a professor at Butler University. Gwen D’Arcangelis is a professor at Skidmore College. “Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric”, Global Media and China https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096, [Accessed: 7-182021]//cblasi The construction of China as potential enemy Other takes on an additional hue when we look at the depictions of China’s cyber activities—China moves from cheat to a more malicious cousin, the thief. The United States first focused on issues of “cyber warfare” in the mid-2000s to late 2000s, but at the time, the trope associated with China was not necessarily that of thief. In the mass news media, a militaristic lens framed much of the discussion, depicting China as a rule breaker flouting international norms and thus posing a security threat. For example, a Los Angeles Times article highlighted that “China in the last year has developed ways to infiltrate and manipulate computer networks around the world in what U.S. defense officials conclude is a new and potentially dangerous military capability, according to a Pentagon report” (Barnes, 2008). C hina is even placed in relation to al-Qaeda: “Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage pose a greater potential danger to U.S. national security than Al Qaeda and other militants that have dominated America’s global focus since Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s top intelligence officials said Tuesday” (Dilanian, 2013). This juxtaposition with al-Qaeda only served to heighten the military valence of China’s cyber activities, and a push to prepare for such a threat. Indeed, in the words of Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL): “The threat, to be sure, is real—and, we cannot allow ourselves to grow complacent …” (Nelson 2008). Snowden’s revelations of US spying on China in June of 2013 drastically changed the shape of the discussion however. Snowden demonstrated that the NSA (1) had two data centers in China from which it had been inserting spy software into vulnerable computers; (2) targeted the Chinese University of Hong Kong, public officials, businesses, and students; (3) hacked mobile phones; and (4) in 2009, hacked the Pacnet headquarters in Hong Kong, which runs one of the biggest regional fibre-optic networks. In response to Snowden’s revelations, a spate of articles compared the United States’ and China’s hacking, displaying a range of attitudes from journalists—some espoused that both countries demonstrate equivalent transgressive behavior, while others argued that China has crossed the line into more aggressive hacking that goes beyond the United States’ more benign “preemptive” hacking. The latter attitude indicates the resilience of tropes of the Yellow and Red Perils, a China whose inherent ideological and cultural differences with the West makes it a threat. The different lenses through which journalists and pundits viewed China’s spying in comparison with that of the United States further invoke this Orientalist demarcation. An article in The Washington Post thus contrasts China’s behavior against that of the United States, which merely seeks “to examine huge amounts of communication metadata around the world to look for trends” and “to preempt some threat against the U.S.” China’s spying is described, however, as “infiltrating almost every powerful institution in Washington, D.C.,” “breaking into major news organizations,” “stealing sensitive military technology,” and “stealing so much intellectual property that China’s hacking has been called the ‘greatest transfer of wealth in history’” (Fisher, 2013). Drawing in particular on incendiary words like “stealing” and “infiltrating,” this article distinguishes China as a sneaky thief. US journalists and pundits, in charging China with stealing economic resources, have further solidified the demarcation of China as an inferior and dangerous Other. A well-circulated quote by national security pundit Adam Segal stated, “The problem is we’re not talking about the same things … We’re trying to make a distinction between cyber economic espionage and normal political-military espionage. The Chinese don’t make that same distinction” (Bengali & Dilanian, 2015). By portraying China as unable to grasp the fundamental distinction between economics and national security, Segal suggests China’s thievery is connected to a more fundamental character flaw—China is unable to grasp proper civilized norms. Similarly, US official response has been that China’s view of data collection as a sovereign right has rendered them essentially different from the United States and by implication, the civilized world. That Chinese governmental espionage involves the collection of economic intelligence that is shared with Chinese companies further departs from civilized norms. Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency thus explained that “they clearly don’t have the same lines in the sand, if you will, with that regard” (Bennett, 2015). Historically, US depictions of China as uncivilized have occurred whenever China has gained power or threatened US interests. The narrative of China as a sort of child following in the United States’ footsteps on the path to modernity has proven exceedingly popular since World War II and frames the US approach to China as a potential ally and resource who at the same time may never be civilizable (Kim, 2010; Vukovich, 2012). In this Orientalist narrative, China’s journey to modernity is always understood as precarious and, moreover, subject to US vigilance as to whether it meets the appropriate benchmarks. The title of an editorial in The Washington Post epitomizes current iterations of this sentiment and the ease with which Orientalist imagery can be invoked to portray China’s path to modernity as needing US guidance when China falls out of line: “The US Needs to Tame the Cyber-Dragon: Stronger Measures are Need[ed] to Block China’s Economic Espionage [emphasis mine]” (“The U.S. Needs to Tame,” 2013). In reality, US vigilance can be attributed to the concern since the end of the Cold War, that a “sleeping giant” able to challenge US global hegemony is awakening (Kim, 2010). Thus, the cultural work done by portrayals of China as unable to adhere to civilized norms serve to bolster the image of China as perpetually unprepared to be a responsible member of the international community. In fact, this narrative of China’s thievery serves to persuade the American public that China is a threat to the international community. One Wall Street Journal journalist perfectly echoes this sentiment: A China that leads the world in the theft of intellectual property, computer hacking and resource nationalism will prove extremely destabilizing. If it continues on this course, Beijing should not be surprised if other countries begin to band together to collectively counter some of the more harmful implications of China’s rise. A better outcome for all will be for China to embrace its responsibilities to help lead the world … (Metzl, 2011) This article, although hopeful that China may at some future point become a responsible global actor, even leader, ultimately reifies that an increase in China’s global power is always suspect. the notion L - China (Maritime Conflict) China’s territorial claims in the SCS are valid—the aff’s rhetoric gaslights China to portray them as a lawless bully to serve US security interests over the global good. Ooi and D’arcangelis 17 Su-Mei Ooi is a professor at Butler University. Gwen D’Arcangelis is a professor at Skidmore College. “Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric”, Global Media and China https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418756096, [Accessed: 7-182021]//cblasi China as lawless bully: maritime disputes To cheat and thief, we can layer the trope of lawlessness, readily employed in media representations and political rhetoric over maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China and its neighbors in the Western Pacific. China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are largely historical in nature and do encroach on the 200 nautical miles EEZ of neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not expressly prohibit land reclamation in the sea as long as due notice is given to other concerned states and due regard to the rights of other states (Art. 60.3, 56.2, and 56.3) is taken into account, while the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment is observed (Art. 192). Parties to a dispute are also obligated to refrain from acting in a manner that would jeopardize or hamper a final agreement resolving the dispute (Art. 74.3 and 83.3). The frantic building of artificial islands to enhance the legality of China’s claims, unilateral installations, and skirmishes in the disputed areas are thus amenable to interpretation as lawless bullying. An editorial in the Wall Street Journal titled “Calling Out China’s Lawlessness; The US Points Out that Beijing’s Claims to the South China Sea Don’t Stand Up,” describes the “sketchy legality of its [Beijing’s] actions” and claims that “China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea with force and the threat of force” (“Calling Out,” 2014). This characterization in the media is consistent with political rhetoric. US Secretary of State John Kerry was reported to have said in May 2014 that China’s “introduction of an oil rig and numerous government vessels in waters disputed with Vietnam was provocative” (Ives & Fuller, 2014). Eliot Engel of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee framed China’s actions in skirmishes with Vietnam as “needless provocations” (Engel, 2014). At the same time, media representations and political rhetoric have tended to obscure the fact that China’s regional neighbors all built airstrips and outposts on the claimed islands long before China ever did. China also displays inconsistent behavior in that it has reached agreements with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and South Korea in the Yellow Sea to divide fisheries equally and carry out joint enforcement patrols in keeping with international law.3 Indeed, China has in land disputes signed “fair and balanced” treaties with 13 out of 14 neighbors in keeping with international legal principles (Kraska, 2015). These instances have not, however, drawn any significant media attention. Instead, the emphasis on China’s non-compliance with international law in the South China Sea disputes has served to recapitulate China in Orientalist terms as uncivilized and, moreover, as a fully awakened “sleeping giant” that bullies its neighbors and is unsuited to replace the US as regional leader. US political rhetoric and media representation has also obscured the vagueness of international law when applied to the East China Sea dispute as it would be inconsistent with the image of China as a lawless bully in the South China Sea. The UNCLOS appears to have a straightforward framework that gives states maritime jurisdiction over resources 200 nautical miles from their coastal baseline, but it says nothing about how overlapping maritime jurisdictions are to be resolved. In the case of the East China Sea, the area of dispute is only 360 miles across at its widest point. At the heart of the territorial dispute between China and Japan is the “territorial acquisition” of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, but there is no convention on how states acquire sovereignty over disputed territories .4 The flexibility of applicable principles in international customary law have instead allowed both China and Japan to invoke the law to justify their claims to sovereignty (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008). China’s refusal to have the dispute adjudicated by an international body reflects the unpredictability of outcomes and not necessarily China’s lawlessness, especially when viewed, in light of a similar disinterest on the part of the Japanese. The essentialization of China as lawless, despite the malleability of international law and dissimilar behavior in other disputes, has the potential to drive a wedge between China and her neighbors, thus “containing” China’s growing influence in the region. Indeed, the depiction of China as a lawless bully plays up the insecurities of its immediate—and in many cases, much weaker— neighbors, whose heavy reliance on international law to constrain hegemonic behavior is palpable. The breaking of norms has been identified as a crucial signal that heightens threat perception (Farnham, 2003). In the context of long-standing maritime territorial disputes, playing up an image of China as a lawless bully also suggests that the United States continues to be a necessary power broker in the region. The notion that there is an overbearing bully in the neighborhood that could care less about the rules of the game returns the United States to the role of protector in the post– Cold War period—its ostensible “manifest destiny.” Since the late 1990s, titles such as “Spratly Spat Heats up over Chinese ‘Bullying’” (Lamb, 1998) or “Asian Nations Support US Silently” (Wiseman, 2001) demonstrate how constructing China as a lawless bully serves to reinforce this purpose. Indeed, a recent editorial in The Wall Street Journal makes this link explicit in the text: Washington’s hesitant response has allowed controversy to build around freedom-of-navigation missions that should be routine. Beijing’s strategy in the South China Sea is to bully its neighbors and achieve regional hegemony through coercive means short of war. Turning peaceful naval patrols into diplomatic hot potatoes is exactly the sort of change Beijing seeks. (“A 12-Mile,” 2015) 278 Global Media and China 2(3–4) Here, China’s behavior is portrayed as incorrigibly belligerent, in distinct contrast to genteel US diplomacy. One Wall Street Journal article makes this point clear in its title alone: “Chinese Diplomacy Off Course; By Overreaching in the South China Sea, Beijing has Drawn the US Irrevocably into the Debate” (Wain, 2000). This article embodies the dominant narrative that assumes implicitly the rightful role of the United States to dole out proper diplomacy and take on any transgressors to maintain world peace. A Wall Street Journal article describing China’s “increasingly powerful—but highly opaque—military and its more assertive stance [towards the South China Sea]” emphasize China’s military as an inherent threat to world order but construct the US military according to a different standard, again assuming the righteousness of US military intervention (Page, 2011). In this regard, it is important to note that US grand strategy consists of preventing the development of any regional power capable of obstructing US access to Eurasia—where most of the world’s resources and economic activity are located. This long-term security goal has informed the Obama administration’s much-touted Pacific Pivot policy, which many have viewed as a “China containment policy.” A Congressional Report notes that although U.S. policymakers have not often stated this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military (and diplomatic) operations in recent decades—both wartime operations and day-to-day operations—can be viewed as having been carried out in no small part in support of this key goal. (O’Rourke, 2014) China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea cover about 90% of the area that could potentially allow China to deny the United States such access. As China continues with the modernization of its naval and air capabilities, US apprehension has increased that the disputed land features in the South China Sea are being used to bolster military and coast guard forces that can monitor and respond to the activities of US allies, deny the US navy access to these waters, and ultimately check US naval dominance in the region. It is for this reason that the United States has insisted on freedom of navigation and innocent passage—protected by UNCLOS—through these contested waters, although tensions with China have ratcheted up considerably as a result. As direct conflict between the United States and China has become a real possibility, and as the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS, the United States has attempted to base its actions on firm legal principles, and in turn, to frame China’s behavior in the region as lawlessness. Through US portrayals of China as a lawless bully, China incurs reputational costs in the global and regional community that have the potential to exert pressure on China to stand down. The guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen was thus sent in October 2015 on a “freedom of navigation” patrol within 12 nautical miles of islands artificially built by China in the Spratly chain, which the United States insists is in compliance with international law.5 The United States revealed this aim in another dispute on whether China has an international legal right to regulate foreign military actors operating within China’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ. The United States’ view, which China disagrees with, is that China has a right to restrict military and surveillance activities only within 12 nautical miles of its territorial waters. Tensions reached new heights when China announced in November 2013 an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that not only covered her territorial waters but extended into its EEZ and thus, the contested areas in the East China Sea. US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel responded in a press statement that “We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and Ooi and D’Arcangelis 279 miscalculations,” yet the United States followed shortly by flying two B-52 bombers through the zone (Harlan, 2013). Certainly, there have been media analyses that characterize China’s behavior as motivated by normal national self-interest or that point out that US actions to curtail China are “hypocritical” and “hegemonic” (see, for example, Denyer, 2015; Wu, 2005). However, many more choose to reprise longstanding debates about whether China is a military threat or not, with titles such as “US Starting to View China as Potential Enemy” (Mann, 1995) and “Weakening Yet Still Aggressive, China Poses Test for U.S. Presidential Candidates” (Sanger, 2015). None take seriously China’s claims that its actions in the region have been defensive in nature. Even with a wide range of opinions on the matter, by focusing on the issue of China’s military buildup, these news articles only serve to heighten this perceived threat by inferring threatening intent from growing military capabilities. Political rhetoric tends to contain far less ambiguity, however, some even going so far as to suggest that the United States has been unnecessarily patient toward China. Senator John McCain (2016), Chairman of the Committee of Armed Services, thus commended and encouraged the continuance of the freedom-of-navigation operation of October 2015, adding that “this decision is long overdue.” In a keynote speech delivered at the Fourth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference in 2014, Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence further advised that the United States should stop being “deferential” to China’s “naked aggression” as it continues to “bully” and “intimidate” its neighbors.6 Indeed, political rhetoric appears to take China’s image as lawless to its logical conclusion—China as the full-fledged threat to regional stability legitimizes any force that the United States might be compelled to take in the future to contain such a threat. Unpacking the great power rivalry in the maritime disputes thus helps us to understand the cultural work that the trope of lawless bully does to bolster the long-term security objectives of the United States in the region. L – Climate Change Securitized conceptualizations of climate change transform into demands for more resilient governmental warfare. Lucke ’20 [Franziskus von; Postdoctoral Researcher in International Relations at the University of Tübingen. His research focuses on critical security studies, climate politics and climate justice, and he has worked extensively on the securitisation of climate change.; “Chapter 5: Revisiting the Securitisation of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security”; 2020; Springer; The Securitisation of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Reconstituting something as security issue reduces complexity, for instance, by hiding the environmental and economic implications of climate change as well as deflecting attention away from the root causes. At the same time, it refocuses the attention on a limited set of qualities—a specific ‘security truth’ (Burgess 2011, p. 39)—which can be more easily targeted by specific political interventions. This quality of securitisation resembles the key effects of power in discourse, namely to establish a specific understanding of reality as ‘true’, an effect which is reinforced by securitisation. With increasing strength, security discourses present their particular meaning as objective, their representation becomes reality, or in Gramsci’s and Laclau and Mouffes’s conceptualisation, hegemonic (Cox 1981, pp. 137–138, 1983, p. 169; Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Focusing on this very specific truth makes it easier to discuss the political handling of the issue than trying to grasp it in its entire complexity. It can also suppress political opposition. In the case of climate change, this has contributed to establishing a specific understanding of climate change be it as national security threat, human security issue or long-term risk, or a specific combination of all three, as almost hegemonic and without feasibly alternatives—at least for a certain amount of time and in a specific context. In practice, this constitutive process begins when security discourses bring something on the political agenda and help to politicise it. It is precisely the redefinition and constriction of the political meaning, for example, from ‘soft’ towards ‘hard’ politics or from ‘environmental’ to ‘human security issue’ that is one of the drivers behind increased attention, urgency and novel political solutions. The resonance for the issue broadens significantly, new actors play a role and new audiences are drawn to listen. A key example is the US debate where the increasingly dominant understanding of climate change as direct threat to national security made it easier to handle the issue politically across both isles of the political spectrum. At the same time, it seriously narrowed down its meaning. This last point demonstrates the contradictory effect of securitisation that although the reconstitution of issues as security related can revive and politicise the debate, at the same time it narrows it down, which eventually can lead to a de-politicisation. The discursive claims for objectivity and urgency that come with securitisation can make it very difficult for alternative discourses and actors to keep playing a role. While certainly finding its theoretical endpoint in the extraordinary measures described by the Copenhagen School, these exclusionary tendencies already exist below this threshold. One example is the absence of environmental groups and discursive alternatives in the US, which during the rise of the sovereign discourse were increasingly framed as naïve, left-wing ‘tree huggers’ while the military and defence establishment’s view was constituted as neutral voice of reason. In stark contrast, in Germany and Mexico, the armed forces or more unilateral conceptions of national security never had a real chance to play a larger role in the human security and risk-dominated debate. At the same time, in both countries, the climate security debate was broader (concerning discussed topics as well as actors) than in the US, indicating that the disciplinary and governmental discourses are less exclusionary and better compatible with politicising the debate than the sovereign discourse. The above-discussed qualities of securitisation to narrow down the debate as well pertain to the three power forms that are at the core of the governmentality approach. Thus, pointing to an existential threat contributes to transform these power forms and associated security conceptions and ultimately can drive them towards their theoretical extreme. Consequently, in a securitisation context, sovereign power does not merely mean to take matters into the hand of the sovereign, for example, by issuing climate laws or taxing GHGs. Instead, it is often directly linked to one-dimensional national security conceptions that are firmly rooted in defence and security policy. The narrow understanding of national security in the US climate security debate in the mid-2000s exemplifies this transformation. At the same token, as the US and German cases have demonstrated, human security does not only empower or emancipate individuals. Instead, in its extreme, securitised variants, it can contribute to exert behavioural control over people and can entail problematic paternalistic notions that constitute actors from the Global North as champions of climate protection while victimising poor people in the Global South and robbing them of any meaningful agency. Likewise, in a securitisation context, governmental power and associated conceptions of risk can go beyond the ‘laissez-faire’, indirect governance originally imagined by Foucault. Ultimately, they can legitimise drastic preventive approaches to gain control over seemingly existential risks that in the end can come very close to traditional conceptions of security (see Methmann and Rothe 2012; Ahmed et al. 2016). The debates about ‘black swan’ events in the US and associated military planning to control for any possible future serve as an example. Another constitutive feature of securitisation is its propensity to merge formerly separated policy areas. Whereas linking nontraditional issues such as climate change to security conceptions under specific circumstances can lead to a militarisation or to a constriction of the political meaning of this issue, it also has the reverse effect. A key finding of the empirical analysis of this book is that securitisation is not a one-way street but has bidirectional effects, which other have already described respectively as ‘climatisation’ or ‘medicalisation’ (Oels 2012; Elbe 2011; Maertens 2018). It is not only the securitised issue that changes its meaning, but the very concept of security itself and the governance practices in the security and defence sector transform as well in the course of the securitisation process (see also Duncanson 2009 who makes a similar argument concerning masculinity). This is not necessarily confined to the traditional security sector. If the securitisation primarily rests on nontraditional conceptions of security such as human security or risk, it can also have a considerable influence on the sectors that are usually associated with these alternative forms of security, for example, the development or insurance sector. In general, the bidirectional effects of securitisation are part of the broader process of the governmentalisation of security, which blurs the boundaries between ‘normal’ and ‘security’. In the case of climate change, on the one hand, the securitisation transformed what people understood under the label climate change. It legitimised new security-related policies and directly affected climate research by increasing the demand for security-related ‘actionable’ knowledge. On the other hand, this also had profound consequences for the policy sector that now became a part of climate governance. In Mexico, for instance, seguridad nacional meant something quite different in relation to climate change than it did in connection to the drug trade. In the US, even the most traditional defence policy think tanks highlighted the multifaceted security challenges posed by climate change, which necessitated entirely new (security) practices. They hence recognised that ensuring US national security was increasingly also about different forms of risk management, about coping with disasters, poverty and humanitarian problems abroad, as well as associated with ‘greening’ the military (see Oels 2011, p. 26, 2012, pp. 198–199). Moreover, the securitisation in Germany, which emphasised the foreign policy components of climate and national security, facilitated entirely new concepts such as ‘climate foreign policy’ and ‘climate diplomacy’. Finally, in both the US and Germany, the securitisation of climate change accelerated the merging of defence and development policy. It hence contributed to the spread of concepts such as ‘networked security’ and underlined the political mantra that there is no development without security but also no security without development (Merkel 2010; Pospisil 2009; Tschirgi et al. 2010). Existential risk framing produces counterproductive climate strategies – turns case. Warner and Boas ’19 [Jeroen; Associate Professor, Sociology of Development and Change Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; Ingrid; Associate Professor at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; “Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire”; 2019; Vol. 37, Issue 8; Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space; https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419834018; Accessed 7/15/21; NT] Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-as-clockwork (Enlightenment) discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy’ (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action. The lack of ‘full closure’ has not stopped some from trying to securitise climate change. But overstressing the security dimension risks reducing democratic accountability (Coaffee et al., 2008). Some scholars have indeed warned for a security discourse to induce aversive policies, such as a larger role for the military to cope with feared effects of global warming like climate migration (Hartmann, 2010). Indeed, issues that can harm military capability, are more likely to become securitized than those that cannot (Fidler, 2007). Not only is climate a ‘threat without an enemy’ (Prins, 1993) but also lacks a ‘hero’ to save the day. Armed forces can defeat an invading enemy, a SWAT team can neutralise a terrorist, ICT experts can intercept a hacker, civil engineers and water managers can stop the flood, but no single actor can stop climate change. A pitfall of climate securitization therefore a sense of ontological insecurity in the intended audience rather than rallying support. Presenting an apocalyptic picture without a ‘way out’ upsets people’s basic sense of security and trust in the world around them. ‘Insecuritizing’ them (Bigo, 2002) instils a feeling of helplessness in the recipients of the message, a perceived lack of agency, leading people to ignore the issue and hide behind a false sense of security in their home is that of instilling and community (Harries, 2008). The way out becomes the domain of more mundane technocratic practices. ‘[A]pocalyptic climate change is articulated as overstraining the capacity of political actors, and thus as ruling out exceptional measures and passing responsibility to the “political machine” (...)’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). The security discourse on climate change has not resulted in successful securitization in the sense of having led to exceptional measures being accepted and implemented (Corry, 2012; Methmann and Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2012). Instead, it ‘is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micro-practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as pre-empting but as a combination of the former two’ (Methman and Rothe, 2012: 337). Climate securitization stalls effective mitigation measures and makes its effects inevitable – depictions of apocalypse preclude productive discussions Warner and Boas ’19 [Jeroen; Associate Professor, Sociology of Development and Change Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; Ingrid; Associate Professor at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; “Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire”; 2019; Vol. 37, Issue 8; Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space; https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419834018; Accessed 7/15/21; NT] A securitizing move involves an existential, life-and-death threat and its corollary: an extraordinary course of action as the only way out. Both case studies discussed here (Table 1) show a dramatic securitising move, where climate change was presented as the source of great potential crisis that will harm us all, unless we take urgent action – either for mitigation (the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) or for adaptation (adjusting to climate impacts). In the UK case, the FCO warned about the security implications of untamed global warming – such as climate conflict or mass climate migration – to persuade the international community, and in particular the emerging economies, to mitigate their emissions to prevent these potential security threats. In the Dutch case, the security framing legitimized considerable interventions in the form of dike reinforcement, river rehabilitation and defence infrastructure, raising the level of Lake IJssel in the Central Netherlands, digging a bypass, and moving huge amounts of sand around (‘Building with Nature’). A special Delta Fund and Delta Commissioner added to the special pleading to counter the climatic threat. By reducing the number of scenarios and options, and successfully controlling the ‘staging’ (Hajer et al., 2010) of its public launch, the Delta Commission almost seems a textbook example of turning the logic of ‘choice’ into one of ‘necessity’ (Verduijn et al., 2012). In the end however the mandate of the Commissioner and the extent of intervention was seriously curtailed. Our analysis helps us to further explain discrepancies in climate securitization processes. Once successfully placed on the policy agenda, its effect has been lacklustre in both cases. Whilst endorsing an exceptional discourse, in both cases the securitizers ultimately sought to endorse ‘a rather piecemeal and technocratic approach’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 324). The UK FCO’s securitising move was strategic and instrumental. Instead of purposefully endorsing, exceptional measures such as military intervention and martial law, the agency sent apocalyptic warnings to raise the urgency of mitigation measures. Even its actions within the UN Security Council seemed mundane, although clothed in alarmist discourse considered excessive by India and other BRIC countries, risking the further polarization of the climate debate in the international arena. The FCO primarily used the Council as a platform for raising further awareness, rather than to actually institutionalize climate change within the UN Security Council, which would have been a more exceptional move. The Delta Commission did not call for drastic action either. Instead, the Commission aimed to secure long-term year-on year funding and legitimacy for infrastructural investments, and was successful in that striving, if in a watered-down form. In many other countries, a commitment to infrastructural funding up to 2200 would be considered absurd. Attrition and erosion inevitably took their toll, but the plans essentially still stand. Thus, in line with arguments advanced by scholars such as Trombetta (2008), Corry (2012) and Methmann and Rothe (2012), we note the urgent action promoted here is within the everyday realm of climate policy: the mitigation of GHG emissions via carbon markets, technological innovation without major implications for the world economy and raising flood defences against potential sea-level extremes. Our cases furthermore demonstrate the instrumental nature of these securitizing moves, as carefully planned and developed within policy settings. As the interview quotes from the UK case in particular show, the FCO employees promoting the narrative were instrumentally using its argumentative value for their climate diplomacy efforts, making it integral to their climate communication strategy. However, both cases illustrate that security language can but does not necessarily help to increase the urgency of climate action, particularly if it comes across as strategic. In the words of one Indian interviewee, interviewed in relation to India’s position as audience to UK’s efforts in the UN Security Council: ‘If you want policy to be changed you [will] have to tell people: this is the challenge and this is the policy response for it and it has to be believable’.14 Instead, the FCO’s securitising move fuelled further distrust amongst key target audiences within the UN Security Council debates. It made emerging countries more sceptical of the UK’s intentions on climate change and felt pressured through scare stories that were unfounded. The lesson from this case, then, is that a framing has to be genuine and valid for it to be convincing and successful amongst an already sceptical audience. Furthermore, as the Dutch Delta case demonstrated, apocalyptic discourses risk fuelling public disengagement with climate change and promote a sense of fatalism or scepticism leading ‘to denial of the problem and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it’ (O’Neil and Nicholson=Cole, 2009: 371). In this case, the dramatic imaging of climate change fuelled a sense of anti-environmentalism and scepticism regarding the likelihood of extreme weather impacts, such as severe and sudden storms and sea-level rise (see also Bettini, 2013: 69; Hulme, 2009: 213; Lowe et al., 2006). Exaggerating the gravity of the crisis, the Delta’s commission risked losing its credibility and playing into the hands of hard-line populist scepticism. In both cases, the security frame backfired like a ‘policy boomerang’ (van Buuren and Warner, 2014a). To conclude, the analysis illustrates that particularly in the domain of climate change, where the future remains uncertain and many of discussions focus on issues of risks and potentialities (Corry, 2012), successful securitization is complex. An audience is not easily persuaded when hearing that something is an urgent threat – such a discourse needs to resonate with a context giving some indication that the doom scenario might come true. The debate on climate change and security is in many respects ‘dominated by its futurology’ (Baldwin et al., 2014: 121), making it an easy target for politicians to play on but also a difficult one to successfully securitize. When there are multiple audiences, chances are that not all will accept the securitization, which obtains for both cases. Given the lack of an immediate threat, the time element inexorably works against climate securitizers. The ‘affect’ of climate change (Protevi, 2009) moreover was short-lived as climate change became out-securitized by economic and immigration concerns in both countries. Climate issues however have bounced back; these days it seems to have returned shape of things to come in a warmer world (Le Page, 2015). Likewise, natural disasters are increasingly ‘climatized’ (Grant et al., to the global agenda again, as the plight of Syrian refugees has been framed by some as the 2015; Oels, 2012). Employing the lens of national security legitimizes the militarization of climate change – turns case. Loeff ’20 [Agnes Schim van der; MSc Human Ecology, Lund University; “Climate Change and National Security: Contradictions Challenging the Status Quo”; 2020; Issue 1; SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal; https://www.soas.ac.uk/ugrj/issues/volume-1/file146234.pdf; Accessed 7/14/21; NT] National security’s traditional focus on threats of a military nature limits its understanding of nonmilitary threats such as climate change, where militarization might bring it higher on the policy agenda but compromises the chance of an effective solution. Taking states as the referent object of security generally assumes threats will come in the form of external military attacks or “internal subversion of the political order” (Dalby, 2009: 2). Consequently, the military and related security institutions are considered the main actors in providing this security. As mentioned above, climate change being a non-traditional, non-military threat for a long time kept it off the policy agenda. Thus, the military addressing climate change is a positive development in that its securitisation makes it “an urgent, existential threat which demands immediate action” (Trombetta, 2018: 595). Particularly since the 2007 UN report on climate change there has been an “extension of the military and the national security state into the arena of environmentalism” (Marzec, 2015: 1). However, serious questions must be asked as to whether the military is in fact an appropriate actor to address the issue of climate change, especially considering it is “one of the most polluting of human institutions” (Dalby, 2009: 4). While military threats usually involve intentional attacks by states or terrorist organisations, threats related to climate change are “diffuse, indirect, and international, originating both inside and outside the state concerned” (ibid: 50). Additionally, while the former tends to be occasional and rare, “environmental degradation is a long-term process usually derived accidentally from routine economic activities,” and therefore not easily ‘fixed’ by the military (ibid). Although the profound differences between ‘new’ environmental threats and ‘traditional’ military threats requires a non-traditional approach to security, this is not yet the case in the militarisation of climate change. Military reports addressing climate change as a national security threat exclude the possibility of transformative policies that could mitigate its effects, considering it unavoidable and attempts at mitigation useless (Marzec, 2015: 2). The result is the militarisation of the environment with a singular focus on adaptation as a crucial element in “the “exceptional” war on global warming” (ibid: 4). This is exemplified in the 2007 US military report National Security and the Threat of Climate Change which concludes that “the U.S. war machine must expand its power globally to avoid significant disruptions to international stability” (ibid: 7). Furthermore, climate change is presented as a “threat multiplier” exacerbating conflicts and existing vulnerabilities in alarmist discourses that direct policies to limit migration rather than solve the root causes of poverty and environmental change (Dalby, 2009: 50). This is partly because in the militarisation of climate change the ideological basis is left unacknowledged, an ideology that “disadvantages the potential for alternatives and can result in the reduction of the state to an aggressive ecological policing agent” while still prioritizing “market forces over the needs of the planet’s dispossessed and their environments” (Marzec, 2015: 26). Ignoring this is dangerous, considering that the relative affluence in the Global North combined with higher vulnerability to climate change in the Global South could lead Northern security institutions to impose a “defence-oriented solution that seeks to remap the earth along the lines of a gated community” (ibid: 27). Thus, climate change itself remains unaddressed, and its victims are turned into a threat that is more readily understood in the realist framework of national security. The status quo: threatened or threatening? The most fundamental contradiction in adopting a national security approach to climate change is that while the former aims to preserve the status quo, this is exactly what is driving the latter. The painful “irony of climate change is that the threat is self-imposed”, at least for those in affluent consumer societies (Dalby, 2009: 2). Therefore, any adequate response to this threat requires transformation of the current political system of nation-states and the economic system of carboniferous capitalism. In this way anthropogenic climate change questions the legitimacy of the dominant conceptualisations of modernity and development, since the security this has given the Global North is based on fossil fuels that are now creating insecurity (ibid: 3). However, as pointed out by Lacy, there are “networks of power that have an interest in protecting a limited vision of security”, which is reflected in the strategies employed by national security agents in relation to climate change (Lacy, 2005: 6). These strategies focus primarily on “securing and protecting a particular mode of existence” and the people who benefit from that, as opposed to “disrupting the strategies of powerful actors in the fossil fuel economy” (ibid: 105-106). For example, the European Union was advised to take responsibility for ‘managing climate security risks’ through “more proactive […] interventions in crisis regions” (Fetzek and van Schaik, 2018). Meanwhile, fossil fuel subsidies were recently estimated at €55 billion per year in the EU (Coleman and Dietz, 2019). Other scholars have noted that the dominant way of conceptualising environmental change implies that climate change can only be addressed by “remaining within the existing [neoliberal] frame of our politico-environmental relations” and following the realist conclusion of the inevitability of adaptation (Marzec, 2015: 26). Alarmist depictions of migration driven by climate change are rooted in violent threat discourse – turns case. Boas and Wiegel ’21 [Ingrid; Associate Professor at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; Hanne; PhD candidate at the Environmental Policy Group and the Sociology of Development and Change Group at Wageningen University and Research Centre; “7. Climate migration between conflictive discourses and empirical realities”; 2021; Edward Elgar Publishing; Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Migration; Accessed 7/15/21; NT] The issue of climate change-induced migration, or environmental change-induced migration more broadly – referring to migrations in the context of significant changes in the natural environment – has gone on and off the political radar over the last two decades. It became particularly popular in the early 2000s when climate change turned into an issue of high politics, particularly in Europe (Boas 2015; Trombetta 2008). At that time, most writings on the climate change– migration nexus, both academic and non-academic, portrayed the issue in what has later been labelled as an alarmist way (see discussions in Bettini et al. 2017; Gemenne 2009). Within academia, most such writings came from those working on environmental studies, seeking to highlight the gravity of environmental change by referring to its implications on society (Gemenne 2009). For example, Norman Myers (Myers and Kent 1995; Myers 2002), as an environmental specialist, warned of 200 million environmental refugees by 2050, largely caused by sea-level rise. Such estimates have later been critiqued for being ‘at best, guesswork’ (Parry et al. 2007: 365) and have thus far not been supported by empirical evidence (Gemenne 2011). Nevertheless, this estimate has been adopted by several policy documents and NGO reports on climate change and migration (for example, Christian Aid 2007; Stern 2006) and is still today referred to during policy conferences held on the subject.1 As such, these high numerical estimates have the political function to gain attention and to create a sense of urgency around the issue of climate change-induced migration. Indeed, supported by a discursive lexicon of alarming phrases, such as ‘climate refugees’, ‘mass migration’, ‘climate conflict’ and ‘chaos’, national governments, the United Nations, NGOs, think tanks, and some academics also tried to put the issue of climate change-related refugees and migrants on the political radar (Bettini 2013; Boas 2015; Warner and Boas 2019). One of the authors of this chapter employed this framing in previous work, emphasizing the vulnerability of ‘climate refugees’ in order to stress the existing lack of legal protection (Biermann and Boas 2010). This was (perhaps naïvely) done without considering the discursive implications of framing the subject in such a fashion, which, rather than helping refugees by signalling the gravity of the situation, can support a fearsome imagining of ‘climate refugees’ as ‘barbarians at the gate’ trying to make their way into Europe (see Bettini 2013 for this critique). Such a framing can result in an apocalyptic imagining of the subject matter through which the ‘envisioning of an ultimate threat (the tsunami of climate refugees), … raises the imperative “If I don’t do this … some unspeakably horrible X will take place”’ (Žižek, cited in Bettini 2013: 65). A number of humanitarian NGOs such as Christian Aid have, in trying to convince policy-makers to act on both climate change and migration to avoid a future crisis, indeed adopted such a scaremongering discourse by framing climate refugees as the threatening ‘Other’ posing risks to the stability of the international community (Bettini 2013; Boas 2015). It is on this basis that they have then argued for more interventionist action in the fields of climate mitigation, adaptation and conflict prevention work, with the rationale to prevent future risks from unfolding (for example, Boas and Rothe 2016). Yet, in this discourse, ‘climate refugees’ are not only framed as a threat, but simultaneously as passive victims of changes in the environment (on a similar discursive tension between migrants as threat or victims, see Thibos and Howard in this volume, Chapter 12, on human trafficking). To make the argument that the international community should help protect affected ‘climate refugees’ (for example, Biermann and Boas 2010), these so-called ‘refugees’ are often depicted as having low adaptive capacities and limited agency to protect themselves. This framing has received much criticism, not least by those being framed in such a manner. For example, inhabitants and politicians from the Pacific small island states of Kiribati and Tuvalu reject the label ‘refugees’, since for them it ‘evokes a sense of helplessness and a lack of dignity that contradicts their very strong sense of pride’ (McAdam and Loughry 2009). Furthermore, the definition of refugees in the 1951 Geneva Convention signals persecution or lack of protection from one’s government, which is not necessarily applicable in the case of climate change-induced migration (cf. Hart, Chapter 8 and Crawley and Setrana, Chapter 16, both in this volume). These concerns about the alarmist discourse have been supported by a wave of criticism coming mainly from academics specializing in migration studies or in discourse theory. Migration scholars highlighted the multi-causal nature of migration and the persisting scientific uncertainties around the impact that climate change, or environmental changes more broadly, have or can have on migration (Black 2001; Castles 2002). These scholars argued that other factors, such as economic, political, demographic and social factors, are intertwined with environmental drivers of migration in a complex manner, so that in most cases it is impossible to single out the impact of climate change on migration decisions (Black et al. 2011). In addition, many migration studies have noted the multiple and diverse ways in which people respond to climate impacts: whereas some may decide to migrate to more distant places, many others prefer to stay or to move only temporarily or locally, whilst again others may remain unwillingly ‘trapped’ in dangerous situations as they do not have the means to move away (Foresight 2011). For instance, in New Orleans, USA, those most affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were those without access to a car, who, having to rely on a failing public transport system, got ‘trapped’ in New Orleans when the hurricane hit (Hannam et al. 2006). This shows that moving away does not necessarily reflect vulnerability. Instead, it is the ability to move or to stay, and the inequalities experienced in that process, which are crucial to understand (Gill et al. 2011). Several scholars have also demonstrated that the political effectiveness of the apocalyptic framing of climate change-induced migration is questionable (Boas 2015; Hulme 2009; O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole 2009). Presenting an issue as a major threat does not necessarily result in more action. Indeed, it can further induce scepticism amongst an already sceptical audience (Boas 2015), or make people and decision-makers feel that climate change is too big an issue for them to manage (Hulme 2009; Methmann and Rothe 2012; O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole 2009). As argued by O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole (2009: 371), it can lead to ‘denial of the problem and disengagement with the whole issue in an attempt to avoid the discomfort of contending with it’. Despite the strong criticism, the alarmist discourse continues to be influential. In particular, the 2015 ‘European refugee crisis’ brought projections of ‘future waves of climate refugees’ firmly back on the radar of influential organizations and governmental agencies. It has resulted in numerous news headlines, ranging from those emphasizing the dangerous impacts of climate change (for example, ‘Climate change key in Syrian conflict – and it will trigger more war in future’ (The Independent 2015)2 ) to those using it to warn about future migration (for example, ‘Calais migration crisis is a taste of what a warmer world may bring’ (New Scientist, 2015)3 ). This shows that the apocalyptic imagining continues to re-emerge as a strong political message, even when it has been shown to be empirically unfounded (Bettini 2013). L – Disease Disease politics operate under a cloak of fear that justifies internalizing violence Debrix and Barder 2012 Francois [prof of polis ci @ Virginia Tech] and Alexander D. [Dept of political Sci @ American U of Beirut]; Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence, And Horror in World Politics; p. 63-5 Put differently, if insecurity or unease is the problem, and if fear/terror dispositifs¶ are to be the answer, governmental agents/agencies must certainly¶ make sure that the conduct responsible for the alleged irregularity or¶ abnormality is done away with (before it turns into an endemic, as we¶ saw above). This is once again what biopolitical and governmentalization¶ centered analyses show us. But, more importantly, these terror dispositifs¶ upon which governmental agents rely turn to bodies or organisms that are¶ actively recruited in the maintenance of these regimes of governance. It is¶ precisely these bodies, organisms, or amalgamations of human flesh that must¶ self-rationalize, self-normalize, self-securitize, and indeed self-terrorize. They¶ must mobilize themselves against the possibility that their own conducts,¶ movements, gestures, reactions, or even instinctive responses will be what will¶ lead to contemporary society's insecurity and terror. They must immunize¶ themselves (by putting their flesh in danger as much as protecting it, as¶ Esposito suggested69) against the ever present (virtual) possibility that they¶ will be the responsible "agents" for the "ill health" of humanity itself, or what is left of it.¶ Ultimately, then, it is against their own self-induced terror that human¶ bodies must guard. To guard against such a terror that one's being (mind,¶ body, and soul) promotes, radical measures need to be in place, irrespective of¶ whether the body remains alive or not. Human bodies thus end up conspiring¶ in many contemporary situations of terror, whether they are conscious of it or¶ not. In a way, without humanity itself being directly implicated in its own¶ operations of horrific disfiguration, contemporary systems of terror and¶ indeed horror would probably not be so effective. This is once again the crucial¶ but terrifying insight one is led to draw from the kind of analytical perspective¶ (introduced by Cavarero, as we saw in the "Introduction" to this¶ book70) that recognizes the passage from biopolitical regimes of terror and¶ terror reproduction to agonal conditions of horror.¶ A telling example of this self-mobilization and self-immunization against¶ one's body and flesh can be found in the way Western states (or, rather, some of their governmental agents and agencies) along with some transnational¶ organizations (the World Health Organization, the United Nations) asked¶ populations the world over to preemptively take charge of their health,¶ hygiene, and everyday routines in the context of the recent A/HlNl (or¶ "swine flu") pandemic. In this popular health scare, as with many other¶ instances of spreading epidemics over the past decade (SARS, the H5Nl¶ "bird flu," but also AIDS before), individual beings were asked to be the¶ primary layer of securitization and defense against terror by turning their¶ bodies (and those of family members, neighbors, co-workers, and so on) into¶ primordial sites of scrutiny, intervention, and indeed governance. With the¶ "swine flu" fear, a constant questioning of one's body movements and symptomatic¶ features, along with one's daily habits, became an automatic (and¶ auto-immune) and mostly unquestioned safeguard against the epidemic.¶ Humanity's bodies, the physiology of the human species, but also the meaning¶ of what it means to be human (and whether humanity should be reduced to a¶ management of the flesh) became the main targets of the pandemic terror but,¶ just as crucially, of the containment terror that followed the revelation of the¶ pandemic. This governance of the "swine flu" and its scare (the disease and¶ its terror were indeed inseparable from the moment a pandemic discourse was¶ launched) was then based on a series of menial operations at the level of the¶ human body and flesh (do I have a fever? Is my cough a sign that I have been¶ infected? Did I remember to wash my hands after riding the bus or the¶ subway?). Of course, it also relied on several self-cancellation measures¶ (I must stay home for days if I feel sick; I must wear a protective mask if¶ I venture outside and have a runny nose; we must close entire schools for as¶ long as necessary if we suspect that children in the community have the flu).¶ In the end, the swine flu terror also raised vital questions about what¶ humanity today is by proliferating a succession of moral quandaries that¶ actually sought to reconfigure humanity as that which is always already¶ primed for sacrifice. Among such so-called fundamental social dilemmas were¶ questions like: Must I sacrifice my body and myself if my children are not yet¶ sick but I am (and thus, I could infect them)? Will I have to allow myself to¶ go without treatment (and possibly not make it) if it turns out that, as was¶ reported, there are not enough vaccines for everybody? Must I segregate¶ myself, and remove my body from the community of the living, so as not to¶ let the remaining healthy bodies be even more at risk? The sacrificial logic¶ involved in the swine flu scare may evoke some of Rene Girard's theorizations,¶ particularly to the extent that this form of sacrifice appears to be aimed¶ at the safeguarding of the community. But today's self-sacrificial or selfeffacing¶ logic goes far beyond the claim advanced by Girard that "the sacrifice¶ serves to protect the entire community from its own violence." 71 Or, for¶ that matter, that the ritual of the sacrifice "prompts the entire community to¶ choose victims outside itself."72 To the contrary, the encouraged sacrificial¶ ritual of the swine flu pandemic terror is, to repeat, an auto-immune response¶ or attitude that, far from casting violence away, actually seeks to keep it within and strives to spread it, sometimes in a horrific fashion, to as many¶ living members of the community as possible. In fact, by placing itself beyond¶ the threshold of both life and death, and by questioning the meaning¶ of the human itself (and suggesting that the human should be redefined¶ as that which is always ready for sacrifice), the swine flu sacrificial terror¶ enters the realm of agonal politics and brings in the specter of a horror¶ whereby humans must allow themselves to be quarantined, potentially culled,¶ possibly manipulated and tested upon beyond death, and eventually left to¶ decay in a condition of neither life nor death (not bios, not zoe, and not even¶ thanatos) where the human is rendered unrecognizable as human.¶ From this perspective on how human bodies in societies of unease enable¶ and reproduce conditions of terror that can open onto sites of horror¶ no centralized model of power can make sense of the fear that is necessary¶ to these regimes of agonal or agonizing governance. At the same time, what¶ these regimes of perpetuation of selfgovernmentalized terror tactics and biopolitical¶ insecurity call for is the beginning of a different understanding of¶ what human life under agonal conditions means (as we already suggested in¶ Chapter 1). It is not enough anymore to think of life as docile or regulated.¶ It may also not be sufficient to think of today's living bodies as abandoned¶ beings (as Agamben affirms73) who are caught in a state of endless sovereign¶ exception (we will return to the issues of states and spaces of exception in¶ Chapter 3). Rather, the self-rationalizing, self-securitizing, self-terrorizing, and¶ self-horrorizing bodies and lives that act, react, and interact in societies of¶ fear production today are closer to another analytical paradigm, one that was¶ recently introduced by Mick Dillon and can be called "emergent life."74 L – Energy Security Energy security is a rhetorical ploy to further the nation-state’s technocratic goals – turns the aff via rash securitized actors and psychological numbing. Dunham & Schlosser 16 [Ian M.; Assistant Professor of Business and Society / Sustainability in the Management Department in the Lam Family College of Business at San Francisco State University; Kolson; assistant professor of instruction in GUS/ES with research interests ranging from geohumanities to political ecology; 2016; “Energy security discourses and environmental protection measures in U.S. federal energy legislation: An introductory exploration”; The Extractive Industries and Society Volume 3, Issue 1, January 2016, Pages 86-94; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.11.015; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] This paper seeks to provide an empirical analysis of U.S. energy security policy, and build out an understanding of how energy security is conceptualized, used as a rhetorical tool, and the subsequent outcomes or effectiveness of the use of energy security as a useful frame for addressing environmental issues. After President Jimmy Carter’s usage of the term energy security in the 1970s, energy security has become a recognized frame used by policymakers to emphasize a link between energy issues and national security concerns. Analyzing the degree that securitization— the ongoing political praxis that reflects dominant structures of power in society—has manifested rhetorically in American federal energy legislation provides insight into the process of securitization of legislative policy-making related to energy. This research reveals that, as energy policy has evolved, so too has the lexicon used by policymakers when crafting legislation, the range of problems addressed as security concerns, the range of bills that include environmental provisions, and the quantity and quality of the environmental provisions of the legislation. Building out an understanding of the nuanced process of securitization, as well as delineating differences in policies, is an important step forward in understanding the legislative process and the desirability of framing energy issues as security concerns. The use of security rhetoric serves as an exercise of power in the policy-making process that may be intentionally adopted by lawmakers to achieve certain goals. Framing energy issues as security concerns may be a strategy to create urgency for a particular policy and serve to elevate energy policy on the legislative agenda. The energy security argument may also be used help to build a consensus among policymakers with divergent opinions. Energy security may be an attractive bargaining point, capable of bringing together lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle. The concept may have the potential to close a political gap by having energy and environmental issues addressed in the context of national security. After all, what politician wants to been seen as soft on national security? However, actors may simply invoke national security as a rhetorical device, a way to get the legislation enacted, and may be somewhat unaware of the larger structural, distributional, and other outcomes. Securitization may be a very deliberate political act for some and a mere strategy (that may lead to perhaps unintended outcomes) for others. The security-threat binary reflects the inclusive exclusion that Agamben (2005, 2014) identifies as being as old as sovereign authority, dating back to antiquity. That invoking security politically constructs threat (and vice versa) is nothing new, and as stated at the outset of this paper, illustrating this process is still important. On the day of the passage of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congressman Steny Hoyer (MD) compared its historical relevance to the attacks on Pearl Harbor almost 66 years prior (Hoyer, 2007). While lending immediacy to energy issues has its merit, to do so by invoking an existential threat at the national scale potentially obscures finer scale policy questions with social justice implications. This may be why there is a lack of consensus as to how the elusive goal of energy security should be met. For example, energy security may be used to advocate for increased supply of domestic nonrenewable energy sources at any environmental cost, and without regard for the social impacts of the negative externalities it creates (not least of which is climate change). To put it differently, energy policies justified via reference to Pearl Harbor-like threats leads to the ‘post-political’ (Smith, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2010) condition whereby the complexity of energy policy is simplified into a matter of government technocratic expertise. Questions of who is to be made secure, in what way, and through what type of alteration of what social, economic or political structure become, simply, how to import less foreign oil. Further complicating the issue is that the interpretation of what constitutes emergency is subjective (Agamben, 2005). In this way, the energy security argument is vulnerable to opportunistic political posturing, which is typically reductive by its nature. Thus, while securitization itself is very old, illustrating how it manifests in contemporary federal energy policy can help add precision and clarity to a complicated debate. Extending from the existing arguments in the literature about the desirability of framing environmental issues as security concerns, a number of questions about the energy security frame and praxis emerge. First, energy security may be used as a rhetorical strategy to unfairly justify or champion one issue over another, possibly detracting from decision-making processes that are democratic, based on scientific research, and employ uniform risk assessment. Second, energy security may be susceptible to future misuse. Security carries rhetorical meaning as a justification for swift and deliberate action by policymakers. Linking energy and national security too closely may make future policy decisions about energy highly susceptible to future shifts in national security. Third, energy security may be losing its meaning due to overuse. The use of catastrophic or overly exuberant language to frame energy problems may erode the usefulness of the energy security argument. If every energy or environmental issue must be presented as a catastrophic risk in order to be addressed, eventual skepticism of the rhetoric may emerge. Exploring the construction of meaning in beliefs about environmental protection and the conceptual promise and analytical difficulties that those beliefs create is important for those involved in the governance process. Future research can improve upon this analysis with a more complex evaluation of environmental provisions. However, this analysis is a crucial first step to evaluating the motives of legislators, and providing a greater understanding of the discourses used to address energy issues. L – Environmental Racism Critiques of environmental racism fail to problematize racism while whitewashing other hegemonic forms of domination Pulido 2000 (Laura [Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity @ USC]; Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern California; 2000. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90(1), 12-40 The concept of environmental racism – the idea that nonwhites are¶ disproportionately exposed to pollution – emerged more than ten years ago with the¶ United Church of Christ’s study, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States (1987).¶ Given the social, ecological, and health implications of environmental hazards,¶ geographers have explored environmental racism with the goal of contributing to better¶ policymaking. Studies have sought to determine if inequalities exist and the reasons for¶ such disparities, and to make recommendations (Cutter, 1995). While these are¶ obviously important research contributions, studying environmental racism is¶ important for an additional reason: it helps us understand racism.¶ Although the study of racial inequality is not new to geographers (Anderson,¶ 1987; Gilmore, 1998; Jackson and Penrose, 1994; Kobayashi and Peake, 1994; S.¶ Smith, 1993; Woods, 1998), environmental racism offers us new insights into the¶ subject, particularly its spatiality. Unfortunately, scholars of environmental racism¶ have not seriously problematized racism, opting instead for a de facto conception¶ based on malicious, individual acts. There are several problems with this approach.¶ First, by reducing racism to a hostile, discriminatory act, many researchers, with the¶ notable exception of Bullard (1990), miss the role of structural and hegemonic forms¶ of racism in contributing to such inequalities. Indeed, structural racism has been the¶ dominant mode of analysis in other substantive areas of social research, such as residential segregation (Massey and Denton, 1993) and employment patterns¶ (Kirschenman and Neckerman, 1991), since at least Myrdal’s An American Dilemma¶ (1944). Not only has the environmental racism literature become estranged from social¶ science discussions of race, but, in the case of urban-based research, it is divorced from¶ contemporary urban geography. A second and related concern is that racism is not¶ conceptualized as the dynamic sociospatial process that it is. Because racism is¶ understood as a discrete act that may be spatially expressed, it is not seen as a¶ sociospatial relation both constitutive of the city and produced by it. As a result, the¶ spatiality of racism is not understood, particularly the relationship between places. Yet¶ pollution concentrations are inevitably the product of relationships between distinct¶ places, including industrial zones, affluent suburbs, working-class suburbs, and¶ downtown areas, all of which are racialized. A final problem with a narrow¶ understanding of racism is that it limits claims, thereby reproducing a racist social¶ order. By defining racism so narrowly, racial inequalities that cannot be attributed¶ directly to a hostile, discriminatory act are not acknowledged as such, but perhaps as¶ evidence of individual deficiencies or choices. Yet if we wish to create a more just¶ society, we must acknowledge the breadth and depth of racism. Voting negative is an act of rejecting the whiteness embedded in the 1acvoting affirmative will only gloss over the underlying racial order, making the aff a double turn Pulido 2000 (Laura [Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity @ USC]; Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern California; 2000. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90(1), 12-40) In this paper, I investigate how racism is conceptualized in the environmental¶ racism literature. Using Los Angeles as a case study (Figure 1), I apply an alternative¶ concept of racism, white privilege, in addition to more common understandings of¶ discrimination, to explain disparate environmental patterns. I identify three specific¶ issues that contribute to a narrow conception of racism: first, an emphasis on¶ individual facility siting; second, the role of intentionality; and third, an uncritical¶ approach to scale. Typically, a study may acknowledge environmental inequity if¶ nonwhites are disproportionately exposed to pollution, but environmental racism is¶ only conceded if malicious intent on the part of decision makers can be proven.2¶ I argue that the emphasis on siting, while obviously important, must be located¶ in larger urban processes, and thus requires us to “jump scales” in our analysis (N.¶ Smith, 1993). This is especially true given recent findings that pollution concentrations¶ are closely associated with industrial land use (Anderton et al., 1994b; Baden and¶ Coursey, 1997; Boer et al., 1997; Colten, 1986; Pulido et al., 1996). This research¶ recasts issues of intentionality and scale, as it requires us to examine the production of industrial zones, their relation to other parts of the metropolis, and the potentially racist¶ nature of the processes by which these patterns evolved.¶ Because of the limitations of the prevailing approach to racism, I seek to¶ broaden our understanding through a complementary conception of racism: white¶ privilege. My understanding of racism begins from the premise that race is a¶ material/discursive formation. Because race exists in various realms, racial meanings¶ are embedded in our language, psyche, and social structures. These racial meanings are¶ both constitutive of racial hierarchies and informed by them. Thus, it would be¶ impossible for our social practices and structures not to reflect these racial¶ understandings. Given the pervasive nature of race, the belief that racism can be¶ reduced to hostile, discriminatory acts strains logic. For instance, few can dispute that¶ U[nited] S[tates] cities are highly segregated. Can we attribute this simply to¶ discriminatory lenders and landlords? No. Residential segregation results from a¶ diversity of racisms. Moreover, there is growing evidence that racial responses are¶ often unconscious, the result of lifelong inculcation (Devine, 1989; Lawrence, 1987).¶ Thus, focusing exclusively on discriminatory acts ignores the fact that all places are¶ racialized, and that race informs all places. Clearly, our preoccupation with discrete¶ discriminatory acts ignores vast dimensions of racism.¶ A focus on white privilege enables us to develop a more structural, less¶ conscious, and more deeply historicized understanding of racism. It differs from a¶ hostile, individual, discriminatory act, in that it refers to the privileges and benefits that¶ accrue to white people by virtue of their whiteness. Because whiteness is rarely¶ problematized by whites, white privilege is scarcely acknowledged. According to¶ George Lipsitz, “As the unmarked category against which difference is constructed,¶ whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an¶ organizing principle in social and cultural relations” (1995, 369). White privilege is¶ thus an attempt to name a social system that works to the benefit of whites. White¶ privilege, together with overt and institutionalized racism, reveals how racism shapes¶ places. Hence, instead of asking if an incinerator was placed in a Latino community¶ because the owner was prejudiced, I ask, why is it that whites are not comparably¶ burdened with pollution (see Szasz and Meuser,¶ 1997)? In the case of Los Angeles, industrialization, decentralization, and¶ residential segregation are keys to this puzzle. Because industrial land use is highly¶ correlated with pollution concentrations and people of color, the crucial question¶ becomes, how did whites distance themselves from both industrial pollution and¶ nonwhites? L – Environmental Threats The fetishization of state security central to environmental conflict discourse constitutes environmental imperialism that inflicts exclusionary violence on the Global South. Kumari 12 [Parmila; LLB Law and International Relations Masters, University of Birmingham and University of Nottingham; 1-29-2012; “Securitising The Environment: A Barrier To Combating Environment Degradation Or A Solution In Itself?”; E-International Relations; https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/17235; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] This essay argues that securitising environmental issues can constitute a solution to combating environmental degradation. This is because framing environmental degradation as a security concern gains the attention of highlevel decision makers and allows mobilisation of resources towards a solution. However although the concept of security has been ‘widened’ to include environmental issues, the failure to ‘deepen’ it to include human security has meant that there is still a “fetishization of the state” (Wyn-Jones 1999:chapter 4 in Hough 2004:8). The traditional concept of ‘national security’ is applied, where the state is to be secured against environmental threats and the best perceived way to do this is by maximisation of power through use of the military (Hough 2004:3). This has resulted in environmental conflict discourse, which depicts environmental degradation as contributing to scarcity of resources, which then ultimately leads to conflict. Not only is this theory flawed but it also justifies military intervention in the Southern states(Detraz and Betstill 2009: 305). This type of intervention is seen by the South as a form of environmental imperialism, which operates as a barrier to cooperation with the developed states. Such emphasis on national security also ignores other effects of environmental degradation such as climate change, which are transnational and which the military can do little about. A focus on human security rather than state security will make a coordinated effort between the North and South to combat environmental degradation possible, and will help to address the underlying causes and exacerbating circumstances (such as socio-economic inequalities). Finally, this essay looks at how constructivist theory can be used to reconstruct ‘security’ and how this may facilitate solutions to environmental degradation. “There is, in short, no neutral place to stand to pronounce on the meaning of the concept of security, all definitions are theory-dependant, and all definitions reflect normative commitments” (Smith 2005: 28) Environmental conflict’s focus on national security shifts the burden on resource-strapped countries – it culminates in endless conflict and a selffulfilling prophecy in climate mitigation efforts Kumari 12 [Parmila; LLB Law and International Relations Masters, University of Birmingham and University of Nottingham; 1-29-2012; “Securitising The Environment: A Barrier To Combating Environment Degradation Or A Solution In Itself?”; E-International Relations; https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/17235; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] “The Dilemma should by now be apparent; securitising environmental issues runs the risk that the strategic/realist approach will coopt and colonise the environmental agenda rather than respond positively to environmental problems.” (Barnett 2001:137) The realist take on ‘security’ in the post-WWII period still holds a firm grasp today, so that the state is still the referent object of security and it is still its sovereignty which is to be secured against the threat of states. The problem is that, in the context of the environment, this makes no sense because the traditional focus of national security (interstate violence) has nothing to do with the focus of environmental degradation (human impact on the environment). Furthermore, talking of national security is too restrictive because a state’s ecological footprint may cross its sovereign domain. The wealthiest 20% of the world’s population consume 84% of all paper, use 87% of the world’s vehicles and emit 53% of all C0². Yet those least responsible suffer the effects the most. This is because wastes are exported to and resources come from the Southern poorer countries, so that their lands experience resource depletion and extraction (Barnett 2001:13). A focus on national security selects the military, because environmental degradation is viewed as having the potential to destabilise regional balances of power (Hough 2004:13-16). One only wonders how the military alone could prevent the effects of depletion and extraction. The environmental-conflict literature is a good example where traditional national security concerns have been linked with the environment. The narrative within this discourse is that environment degradation will lead to resource scarcities, which will make the developing countries more militarily confrontational towards the industrialised states (Barnett 2001:38). Conflict over scarce resources undermines the security of the state (Detraz and Betsill 2009:305), so it is the state which is to be protected. Emphasis on such an account is undesirable for many reasons. Firstly, it is untrue that the only consequence of environmental degradation is conflict. Bogardi and Brauch have noted how environmental security involves freedom from want (economic and social security dimensions), freedom from hazard impacts (natural or human-induced hazards as effects of environmental degradation) and freedom from fear (violence and conflict)(Brauch 2008: 17-8). This demonstrates how conflict is but one consequence of degradation. Environmental-conflict literature ignores the root socioeconomic causes and hazard impact dimensions of environmental security; a focus on which would lead to conclusions of undertaking non-military efforts like disaster preparedness, adaptation, mitigation, early warning systems etc (Brauch 2008:17-8), and economic solutions like pricing goods to reflect the costs of their provision (Mathews (1989:172). Secondly, the assertion that environmental degradation is a primary reason of conflict is purely speculative (Barnett 2003:10). Barnett suggests that the ‘evidence’ provided in support is a collection of historical events chosen to support the conflict-scarcity storyline and reify the realist assumption that eventually humans will resort to violence (Barnett 2001:66). This is as opposed to acknowledging that humans are equally capable of adapting. Thirdly, research shows that it is abundance of resources which drives competition, not scarcity (Barnet 2003:11). This makes sense because any territorial conquest to obtain resources will be expensive. A poor country suffering from resource scarcity would not be able to afford an offensive war(Deudney 1990: 309-11). The second and third points mean that environmental-conflict literature counteracts any attempts at solving the problem of environmental degradation. The discourse attributes high intentionality to people-because of scarcity they decide to become violent. This ignores the fact that human actions are not intended to harm the environment. The high intentionality given to people prevents them from being seen as victims who need help. Instead they are pictured as threats to state security. This view can exacerbate ethnic tensions as the state uses minority groups as scapegoats for environmental degradation. It also means that only those involved in conflict are relevant to environmental security, not those who are vulnerable (Detraz and Betsill 2009:307-15). In this way the South is scripted as “primeval Other” (Barnett 2001:65), where order can only be maintained by the intervention of the North, rather than by the provision of aid. The North’s agency in creating the environmental problems is completely erased. Instead environmental degradation is seen from the perspective of the individual state, questioning how it could affect the state, i.e. increased migration (Allenby 2000:18) and this leads to the adoption of narrow policies. Saad has said that securitising the environment in this way allows the North to justify intervening and forcing developing nations to follow policies which encapsulate the North’s norms (Saad 1991:3257). In this way the powerful become stronger, and the weak weaker. This view may affect the South’s relations with the North. For example, Detraz and Betsill have commented on tensions between the North and South in the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change. Only 29% of the Southern states compared to 70% of Northern speakers supported the idea of the Security Council being a place to develop a global response to climate change. The reasons for this difference was that shifting decision-making to the Security Council would make Southern states unable to promote efficiently their interests in obtaining resources for climate adaptation and mitigation plans. Furthermore, Egypt and India argued that in suggesting this Northern countries were avoiding their responsibilities for controlling greenhouse gases, by trying to “shift attention to the need to address potential climate-related conflict in the South” (Detraz and Betsill 2009:312). In this way environmental security becomes a barrier because the traditional (realist) concept of security is used to immobilise any action towards dealing with the root causes of environmental degradation. Rhetoricizing climate as a security risk folds the military-industrial complex into environmental solutions – guarantees failure. Davoudi 15 [Simin; Professor of Environmental Policy and Planning at Newcastle University. She is Past President of the Association of European Schools of Planning and, as coordinator of the Planning Research Network, advised the Department of Communities and Local Government on its research priorities until 2007; 3-13-2015; “On Securitization of Nature”; disP – The Planning Review; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02513625.2013.892780; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] There are two terms that have come to define the twenty first century: urban age and the ‘age of man’. While the former is often rehearsed, the latter is rarely mentioned despite their interconnection. It is widely known that the 21st century is the first urban century because for the first time in history more people live in cities. However, what is less known is that the urban age is the manifestation of ‘the age of man’. The latter, also known as ‘Anthropocene’, describes an epoch which is paradigmatically different from the previous 10,000-yearold geological period of relative climate stability (called Holocene). For the first time in history, human activities have caused planetary changes whose significance is on par with geological forces. A compelling evidence of this is the reconfiguration of the planet’s carbon cycle by anthropogenic release of quantities of fossil carbon over the past couple of centuries that took the planet hundreds of millions of years to store away. The outcome is multifaceted and includes global warming, sea level rise, melting of the Arctic, changes to oceans’ chemistry, and a whole range of other changes that are attributed to climate change. What has made this process materially possible and ethically acceptable is the anthropocentric view of the world that has prevailed since the Enlightenment era. This was the time when scientific revolution stripped nature from its divinity and symbolic values and by doing so gave humans both means and the right to exploit nature. The rise of environmentalism in the 1960s followed by the sustainability agenda of the 1990s began to question the fallacy of the modernist assumption about our ability to conquer and exploit nature with little or no consequences. This realisation was firmly confirmed by climate change which has become a powerful reminder of our complex and precarious relationship with nature. However, elsewhere 1 I have argued that the reflexive environmentalism which imbued the sustainability agenda is increasingly displaced by the increasingly dominant discourses of climate change that are shifting the focus from nature as asset to nature as risk. This is a new way of seeing nature which is radically different from the one evoked by sustainability because it construes nature not as a finite asset to be sustained for future generations but as a threat against which future generations should be secured. Seeing nature as risk ushers in deep anxieties about security. The more nature is conceived of as a threat to us, the more our relation to it is framed in terms of safety and security. Therefore, risk and security feed from one another in the sense that keeping up the demand for security requires maintaining a heightened sense of risk. Given the attraction of such circularity, many of our contemporary social and environmental problems, including climate change, are being re-cast as security problems, making securitisation the hegemonic discourse of our times. As a result, the hallmark of the reflexive modernity has become not just the risk society, as Ulrich Beck suggests, but also the security society. In this context, security is not just a means to an end (i.e. protection from risk), but is an end in itself (i.e. a tradable good). It is ‘sold’ as a commodity with a price tag and is factored into both business plans and governance strategies. In the environmental field, the axis of debate seems to be swinging from development versus environment to: which security should take precedence. For example, the debate over energy crops has turned into a competition for priorities between energy security and food security. This is an anathema to traditional environmentalism because increasingly, food security trumps biodiversity, energy security trumps renewable energy, and climate security trumps sustainability. In many ways, this is hark back to a pre-modern conception of human-nature relations that was centred on what nature does to us rather than what we do to nature. The securitisation of nature has profound implications for how the environment is treated and valued, what kinds of environmental policies are formulated, and what types of environmental politics are mobilised. Risk and security provoke strong emotions that can legitimise extraordinary measures which may otherwise be indefensible. A clear manifestation of this discourse is reflected in the language used by the national military advisors who are now active participants in the international climate change negotiations. For them, climate change is a “threat multiplier” ; i.e. an underlying condition for all other threats such as terrorism, and hence is open to military strategies if need be. The language of risk and security create imaginaries of fear which can renounce social conflicts, foreclose politics, and crowd out any descending voices in the name of urgency and emergency. They squeeze out the arenas in which questions about justice and fairness can be raised. The interpretation of climate change as national security problems can turn the conflict over the distributive implications of climate change into a new geopolitics in which nation states may consider military strategies as acceptable responses to the conflicts over who is exposed to what climate risk, and who has access to what climate security. The danger is that democracy may suffer in the name of urgency and emergency. L – Green Militarization The aff’s environmental management culminates in violent forms of green militarism. Massé et al. ’18 [Francis; PhD, Department of Geography at York University; “Linking green militarization and critical military studies”; 2018; Vol. 4, Issue 2; Critical Military Studies; https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2017.1412925; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] A robust literature chronicling the intersections of military activity and the environment now spans a range of disciplines. Often influenced by Westing (1975), this literature highlights the negative impacts of military activity on the environment. This includes the massive consumptive patterns of an expansive physical and social military infrastructure, the direct impacts of conflict and military buildup on ecosystems and wildlife, and the often-indirect impacts caused by the victims of warfare such as refugees (Hanson et al. 2009; Hupy 2008; Woodward 2004). This is joined by a growing literature on the strategic deployment of animals and the harnessing and manipulation of biophysical processes in the name of war and other military interventions and military research (Brady 2012; Cudworth and Hobden 2015; Gregory 2016; Kosek 2010). Others point to climate change as a new military–environment encounter driven by environmental security and resource scarcity discourses (Gilbert 2012). Further analysis reveals an array of complexities found within military–environment encounters, especially those that involve sites into state protected areas, or military to wildlife (M2W) conversions, a phenomenon we see stretching from North America (Havlick 2011) to Southern African (Mckenzie 1998). ‘De-militarized zones’ – what are in fact heavily militarized landscapes – have also emerged as important sites of biodiversity conservation, as these spaces are too environmental conservation. One example is the increasingly common transformation of former military dangerous for human habitation and development (Kim and Cho 2005; Brady 2008). The example of M2W conversions and demilitarized zones illustrates novel and arguably nonintuitive military–conservation encounters and outcomes. Military actors also play a more concrete role in biodiversity management and spaces of conservation, highlighting a direct relationship between environmental conservation and the military, among other security forces. Indeed, this has emerged as a quickly growing area of inquiry within the field of political ecology. The establishment and management of protected areas have historically been used to exert state control over recalcitrant populations and their resources (Neumann 2001; Peluso 1993; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). Often made possible by the framing of vulnerable and marginalized populations as the enemy of conservation, the state and its military apparatus have played a leading role in policing such populations through the use of overt and covert forms of violence (Devine 2014; Neumann 2001; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Ybarra 2012). Such engagement is increasingly translating into green militarization or ‘the use of military and paramilitary personnel, training, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation efforts’ (Lunstrum 2014, 814). This is a trend we see across parts of Africa (Duffy 2014, 2016; Dunlap and Fairhead 2014; Marijnen 2017; Marijnen and Verweijen 2016; Massé and Lunstrum 2016; Verweijen and Marijnen 2016) and Asia (Barbora 2017), with military builup also unfolding in protected areas in Latin America (Devine 2014; Ojeda 2012; Ybarra 2012).4 Indeed, there is a long history of military involvement in conservation (Devine 2014; Ellis 1994; Lunstrum 2015a; Spence 1999; Wels 2015). The difference today is that such involvement is quickly intensifying and vastly expanding within a broadly framed conservation context and sense of ecological crisis. L – Food Wars Food security discourse is an exploitative tool of developed nations for profit generation, power accumulation, and competition – it’s the self-fulfilling prophecy that creates resource conflicts Shepherd 12 [Benjamin; Center for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, Australia; 2012, “Thinking critically about food security”; Security Dialogue, 43(3) 195-212; DOI: 10.1177/0967010612443724; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] Co-opting of food security A consequence of casting food security as an availability problem is that actors use food-security language to legitimize competition over increasingly scarce food-production resources. The underlying implication is that controlling or hoarding of resources must be good; however, control and hoarding by some invariably implies exclusion and deprivation for others. Food-security language has become widely employed as a way of pursuing particular agendas and legitimizing particular actions, especially those of powerful actors, but at the expense of others. Food-security language is used to legitimize the securing of rights over agricultural lands (Alshareef, 2009; People’s Republic of China, 2008), which one African scholars described as ‘a dubious way to solve the food security conundrum in Ethiopia’, noting that it seems paradoxical that one of the most vulnerable countries in the world is handing over vast land and water resources to foreign investors to help food security efforts of their home countries.2 It is used by transnational agribusiness corporations in the legitimization of their profit-generating activities (ArcherDanielsMidland, 2010; Cargill, 2010; Monsanto, 2010), which range from the corporatization and amalgamation of farmlands – sometimes pushing small- and medium-sized landholders off their farms – to the pursuit of revenues from patented inputs that have been argued to be detrimental to poor farmers in developing countries (Holt-Giminez, 2011; Patel, 2007; Shiva, 2002, 2005, 2007). It is used to justify the pursuit of speculative profit by wealthy investors (Emerging Asset Management, 2010). It is also used in the pursuit of political agendas – for example, in concert with the subsidizing of electorally sensitive rural constituencies (USDA, 2010; Philpott, 2006) or, contrarily, providing an argument for the reduction of trade barriers in the quest for greater access to foreign markets. For example, the official Australian foodsecurity policy position is that developing countries must reduce trade barriers in preference to supporting local food producers.3 This privileges Australia’s major agricultural exporters over the agrarian poor in the developing countries. In such ways, the current paradigm of food security is used to privilege the interests of certain actors, often at the expense of others, including those at risk from the inability to access adequate food. The commandeering of food-security language helps explain the contradiction that, while it is ostensibly about hunger (achieving sufficient food for ‘all people at all times’), food security has instead become a game for powerful actors competing for advantage (profit or scarce resources such as agricultural land) in an increasingly resource-constrained world. They’re part and parcel to the hegemonic pursuit of governance over the Global South via biometric dataveillance – it’s justified under the guise of food security. Alcock 09 [Rupert; graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009; 2009; “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security”; University of Bristol School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] Conclusions: Speaking Security/Governing Risk Risk is a way – or rather, a set of different ways – of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form. It is a way of representing events in a certain form so that they might be made governable2 in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals… The significance of risk lies not with risk itself but with what risk gets attached to (Dean, 1999: 177). This notion of risk embodies the hegemonic form of rationality which characterises the modern liberal mode of governance. In so far as a government is legitimated by its capacity to provide its citizens with security and insure them against whatever may threaten it, the calculation and articulation of risk has become its primary occupation. In what Michael Dillon has called the practice of ‘underwriting security’, risk management has become the central concern of the biopoliticisation of security: ‘Underwriting… captures the essence of how risk operates as an assemblage of mechanisms for measuring and commodifying exposure to contingency’ (2008: 310). In modern industrial societies, risk insurance is provided by a range of public and private assemblages and covers every aspect of social life; we are literally insured against life and death. Many populations in the developing world, however, lack these social safety nets; Duffield argues that the non-insured status of what he calls ‘surplus life’ in the developing countries provides a more instructive criteria to distinguish global populations than the traditional developed/underdeveloped binary (Duffield, 2007: 22-24). In the last half century it has been the professed aim of the aid and development industries and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations 52 to fill this insurance gap, or, in other words, to locate, measure and manage the risks faced by those people exposed to contingency. Food security is the constructed categorization of one set of such risks. As a technology of global liberal governance, food security represents one aspect of the biopoliticisation of security. The notion of biopolitics derives from Foucault’s investigations of the new technologies of political power which he sees emerge at the end of the eighteenth century. While sovereign power had previously been concerned with ‘the contracting individual’ and the right of the sovereign ‘to take life or let live’, biopolitics is concerned with the administration of life itself at the level of population and applies regulatory mechanisms to control and manage aggregate life processes (Foucault, 2003: 245). While biopolitics and liberalism are interconnected, they are not equivalent; liberalism is a form of government which necessarily incorporates biopolitical imperatives but attempts to constrain their unlimited operation (Dean, 1999: 113). Global liberal governance is thus described by comprised of techniques that examine the detailed properties and dynamics of populations so that they can be better managed with respect to their many needs and life Dillon and Reid as ‘substantially chances’ (Dillon & Reid, 2001: 41). The notion of ‘human security’ comprises the contemporary articulation of the totality of life dynamics rendered amenable to global biopolitical management, of which ‘food security’ is one sub-component. Human security, as a rationalising framework of global governance, complements an erosion of the legitimacy of the developing state and a challenge to its right to political sovereignty (Pupavac, 2005: 178). As the current modus operandi of the development community, human security represents the mutual conditioning of development and security and begs the question of which humans it is concerned to 53 secure. The destabilising effects of underdevelopment are now conceived to directly threaten the security of the industrialised countries, in the guise of such issues as international terrorism, environmental degradation and global health crises. The function of human security – and food security by analogy - is thus to contain the instability wrought by ‘Third World’ underdevelopment and enable increasingly extensive surveillance of those regions deemed threatening to the functions of massconsumer society. Conterminously promoting self-reliance and basic needs, these governmental technologies also provide the means for emotional adjustment, hope and the moderation of desire in societies where the prospect of material development has been abandoned and re-problematised as destabilising (Pupavac, 2005). The establishment of world food security as an international and developmental concern at the emergence of biopolitical techniques which monitor and manage how food is produced and consumed at the level of global populations. At this embryonic World Food Conference in 1974 represents the stage the monitoring techniques available were relatively crude; as my analysis of the International Undertaking (IUWFS) has shown, indicators of world food security were limited to national levels of food supply. The resolution adopted at the Conference to establish a system of ‘international’ grain reserves represents a rudimentary attempt to manage the risks of an unpredictable global market, devoid of American surpluses, by means of an insurance level of buffer stocks. The other main emphasis was on the need for more data and information, to enable more comprehensive monitoring of the ‘world food situation’. This resulted in the establishment of the Global Information and Early Warning System for Food and Agriculture (GIEWS), which marks the first stage of a 54 process of techno-scientific informationalization regarding food and the patterns of its global production. ‘Biopolitics’, writes Michael Dillon, ‘change according to changes in the technologies through which ‘life processes’ are made transparent to knowledge’ (2008: 310). The biopolitical securitisation of people’s food consumption thus becomes possible as new technologies enable more comprehensive global monitoring of these ‘life processes’. From its early focus on national production aggregates, the GIEWS now incorporates a view from space using satellite technology to analyse the very constitution of the earth’s crust. The juxtaposition of the poor Indian farmer working his land with plough and ox while surveyed from beyond the ionosphere by the latest in satellite technology – as a means to ensure his food security – exposes the absurdity that characterises what Baudrillard conceives as ‘the precession of simulacra’: Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra – that engenders the territory (Baudrillard, 1994: 1, emphasis in original). Just as new technologies enable new models of the hyperreal, I suggest that new forms of ‘knowledge’ simultaneously enable the development of new technologies of monitoring and surveillance. The food security discourse which emerged in the 1980s regarding access to food, adapting Sen’s work on entitlements and famine, led to the establishment of more complex mapping systems which construct the risk of hunger 55 via an economic grid of intelligibility. Critically enabled by what Duffield calls the zenith of the non-governmental trajectory of the NGO movement in the 1980s (Duffield, 2007: 25), in which the economic dynamics of non-insured and ‘food insecure’ peoples became increasingly exposed to international surveillance, the world was accordingly remapped to incorporate the new conflation of risks articulated at the World Food Summit. The Food Insecurity Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) is the culmination of this re-rendering of reality; just as GIEWS produced the poor and hungry as victims of risk inherent in nature, FIVIMS produces a new category of people as victims of risk inherent in a global economy and social (dis)order. As the logics of biopolitics evolve, so do its calculative techniques: One has to be classifiable to exist in species terms. One now has to be classifiable as informational code to be admitted to the category of contemporary biological species. One has to be in circulation as value to exist as economic species (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2009: 5). The current political obsession with climate change represents the final liquidation of security and the full assimilation of risk management as governmental rationality. Current FAO publications are dominated by the language of risk, disaster and vulnerability: Disaster risk management and climate change adaptation are ultimately about reducing the risk posed by climate change to the lives and livelihoods of 56 vulnerable people and therefore are key tools for protection of food security (FAO, 2008d: 21). Adapting to climate change involves managing risk by improving the quality of information and its use, providing insurance against climate change risk, adopting known good practices to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable livelihood systems, and finding new institutional and technological solutions (FAO, 2008e: 32). In an age now characterised by existential and perennial risk, what we require is more information; ending world hunger now depends in no small part on monitoring and managing the chaos that constitutes a changing climate. 5 Yet another information system, the Food Security Information and Early Warning System (FSIEWS), is now under construction (FAO, 2008e). A similar trend is discernible in the construction and management of international terrorism; to mitigate the uncertainty posed by the terrorist ‘threat’, governments require a dramatic increase in surveillance technologies. The erosion of civil liberties by way of more intrusive modes of surveillance is presented as a legitimate means to secure citizens by reducing the risk of future attack. New techniques of biometric ‘dataveillance’ represent the biopoliticisation of security at perhaps its most acute: To misconceive risk is to misconceive the ontopolitics, the apparatuses of power/knowledge and techno-scientific devices by means of which Western societies are now governmentally secured: from the macrocalculations of 5 Early formulations of chaos theory were derived from studying weather patterns in the 1960s (see Gleick, 1988). 57 geopolitical analysis – no matter how scandalously they misconduct their risk assessments (Iraq) – to the biopolitical micro-management of individuals and populations (Dillon, 2008: 327). L - Forest fire Media reps of environmental disasters is securitizing. Scheffran et. al. 12 Prof. Dr. Jürgen Scheffran, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Institute of Geography Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg PD Dr. phil. habil , Department of Political and Social Sciences, Free University Berlin; Dr. Peter Michael Link, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Institute of Geography, Janpeter Schilling, Research Group Climate Change and Security (CLISEC), Institute of Geography; “Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict” Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. https://linkspringer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28626-1.pdf, [Accessed: 7-22-2021]//cblasi In this sense, looking at climate change and its process of securitization, one can distinguish a wide variety of methods being used to convey messages to the corresponding audience. Public addresses by government officials are considered to be the most common types of speech acts since these securitizing actors hold the main institutional positions in western societies. Passing environmental laws, urging environmentally responsible behaviour, or using uncommonly bold language to convince the public of the necessity of drastic measures are all perceived as institutionally supported speech acts. Apart from these, if the suggestions by Williams and McDonald of incorporating visual representations into the speech act concept are taken into account, it comes as a natural consequence to shift the interest toward images and their indisputable capacity to carry compact and comprehensive meaning. In the case of climate change, in particular, images tend to acquire a significantly greater communicative power because through them the public comes virtually in visual contact with the consequences of this phenomenon even in the most remote areas of the planet. Pictures of long-term catastrophic developments, like desertification, or relatively swift natural disasters striking unwary communities, easily travel around the world spreading the dire news to an international audience. People from around the planet got to know and actually see what the aftermath of hurricane Katrina was like for those directly affected. The same applies to the great 2007 forest fires in southern Greece or to the cataclysmic floods in central Europe in 2009. A vast audience witnessed these and many similar events, all of which were linked somehow to climate change, and was consequently sensitized about humanity’s fragility in facing nature’s responsive fury. In this way, modern media with advanced audiovisual capabilities provide the securitization process with another kind of communicative technique, usually more expressive, and sometimes more efficient, than speeches. The concept of a ‘speech act’ in the securitization of climate change is thus opening up another dimension which largely complements the way securitization itself is perceived. Political addresses to the public, the passing of laws, television representations, and images constitute a wide array of instruments that function as speech acts with the only difference that actual speech is now just another constitutive element, rather than the exclusive means of communication. Having taken a quick look at actors and speech acts in their broader concept, it only remains to turn to the ‘audience’ as the third and last pillar of securitization in order to gain an understanding of how this triple-factor process works. As ‘audience’, the Copenhagen School is referring to a significant part of the public which the securitizing actor’s efforts are aiming at when performing a speech act. It is the final receiver of the securitizing move and the one that judges whether the particular highly politicized issue, referred to as a threat, actually deserves to enter the security agenda and thereby be effectively addressed by any means possible and with an increased priority. This, however, may be described as an ideally democratic process, whereas in reality securitization can often mean a rather undemocratic course of events triggered by the unilateral decisions of political actors concerning the elevation of specific issues on the security agenda. Securitization, as Didier Bigo argues, can regularly lead to exceptional measures in dealing with a given issue, as well as to institutional empowerment of security experts such as the military or the police (Bigot 2006). Therefore, when the Copenhagen School uses the term ‘audience’ in the securitization process, it generally refers to the society (or population) whose prosperity or physical safety is allegedly affected or challenged by the so-called ‘referent object’ that is none other than the threat under examination. However, the actual, or falsely assumed, threatening nature of the issue under discussion and the subsequent possible vulnerability of the public’s security is something pointed at or advocated by the securitizing actors. This audience, naturally, includes people who can be seen as individuals, citizens, the electorate (national or broader), or civil society in general. In this sense, the audience can be perceived not as a single monolithic element but as a broad and polymorphous human entity responding to a wide array of political, ethnic, and social characteristics. Taking this into consideration, concluding the cycle of securitization appears to be a rather tricky procedure since the response of the third pillar can under no circumstances be accurately predicted without a comprehensive ad hoc approach having preceded it. Culturally, ethnically, politically, and socially dependent diversity leads to differently placed audiences and this, in turn, creates the conditions for varying comprehensive capability, responsive will, and of course outcomes in the securitization process. Much of the theoretical emphasis on the audience’s readiness to be convinced (Balzacq 2005: 192) as part of the facilitating conditions of securitization relies exactly on this broad diversification that defines the content of the third pillar and further highlights the constructivist nature of the securitization framework itself. Likewise, successful (in the sense of being complete) securitization of climate change ultimately rests upon public acceptance. What matters in the final phase of the process is how the audience will react to the securitizing move after the designation of climate change as a threat by the actors. Thus, addressing this challenge effectively and within the securitization process already under way requires a threefold development within the third pillar, one that includes a broad and polymorphous audience being convinced, concurring, and acting back. Single individuals, people constituting local communities and broader social groups, and national populations, as well as those comprising supranational ones, are all part of it and they all share an equal amount of participatory responsibility in the threefold process mentioned above in order for the securitization of climate change to be concluded. The completion of this cycle, negative in some senses (in terms of elevated cost, harsher measures, and restrictive policies), should be considered a prerequisite before a de-securitization of the subject and a return to the normal political sphere can become possible. L – Human Security Conceptualizing climate change as an issue of human security relies upon on faulty narratives of threat construction. Lucke ’20 [Franziskus von; Postdoctoral Researcher in International Relations at the University of Tübingen. His research focuses on critical security studies, climate politics and climate justice, and he has worked extensively on the securitisation of climate change.; “Chapter 5: Revisiting the Securitisation of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security”; 2020; Springer; The Securitisation of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Apart from these emancipating qualities, however, seen through the lens of disciplinary power, human security also unleashes the concept of normation. This became particularly apparent in the German and US cases: the recurring argumentation that the ‘poorest will be hit first and hardest’ helped to establish a juxtaposition of wealthy and climate savvy people in industrialised states with the poor and unprepared in the Global South (Buxton et al. 2016, p. 11). Discursively, this reinforces the hierarchy between powerful Western actors and vulnerable populations of the Global South that have to be saved, controlled and disciplined by external interventions (Methmann and Oels forthcoming; Oels and Carvalho 2012; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015, p. 44). It perpetuates a paternalistic relationship between industrialised and developing countries linked to concepts such as the ‘West always knows best’ or ‘developmentality’ (Donnelly and Özkazanç-Pan 2014; Lie 2015; Mawuko-Yevugah 2010) and reinforces the dependency of those countries on outside support and guidance. Moreover, primarily pointing to human security threats to people that live far away in countries that have enormous political problems anyway, reframes climate change as a problem of poverty and underdevelopment. Not the severity of climate change per se determines the level of the threat but the inadequate coping capacity of the affected (Hardt 2017, p. 12). Similar to the sovereign discourse, this shifts the responsibility for the security implications of climate change away from industrialised countries and locates it directly in seemingly dysfunctional Southern communities (Hardt 2017, p. 95). It hence deflects attention away from problematic behaviour at home. Examples are Germany’s disappointing climate mitigation record in the second half of the 2010s (Dröge and Geden 2016; Geden and Tils 2013) or the US’ failure to implement any progressive federal mitigation legislation. Instead, it constructs climate change as a problem that can be cured by scaling up—or merely renaming (Ayers and Huq 2009; CCCD 2009, p. 12)—existing development aid or by short-term interventions without investing much into tackling the root causes in industrialised countries (Methmann and Oels 2015; Barrera and Schwarze 2004). Additionally, human security can function as a starting point for truly ‘disciplining’ measures such as monitoring activities and attempts to transform behaviour deemed inappropriate for climate protection. Examples are the scaling up of monitoring instruments of the German development sector or public awareness and educational campaigns aimed at transforming individual behaviour towards the desired direction in Mexico. Compared with direct interventions by sovereign institutions such as the military, this is a more subtle way of exercising power but nevertheless can have far-reaching and problematic consequences. As it relies on concrete conceptions as to what is appropriate behaviour or what the best solutions for the climate problem are, it can overlook regional expertise and impose inappropriate solutions. A disciplinary representation of climate change hence partly legitimises Western-led climate and development measures in developing countries that partly go against the priorities of local people (Lewis 2003; Dalby 2014a, p. 13). Especially when it comes to mitigation, including the shift to renewable energies that has been popular in Germany, there is often a conflict of goals between the aims of industrialised countries such as Germany and developing countries. The former try to abate climate change by changing energy production, economies and behaviour of people in the Global South, which to a certain extent is an excuse for not changing anything too fundamental at home (McMichael 2009). At the same time, poor people in developing countries strive for fast economic growth to escape poverty and improve their living conditions (OECD 2010, p. 82), which often runs contrary to mitigating climate change. In addition, large-scale renewable energy projects (e.g. dams, wind power projects and energy crop cultivation) can become immensely problematic for local populations and meet fierce resistance, as examples from around the world (McMichael 2009, p. 254; Arungu-Olende 2007) and from Mexico indicate (Interview 2014b; Burnett 2016). Thus, even though a human security focused securitisation directs the attention to the needs of individuals, it nevertheless primarily empowers actors from the Global North and legitimises far-reaching policies that directly affect Southern populations without granting the affected people much control over their scope and content (Lewis 2003; Boas 2014; von Lucke 2018; Oels and von Lucke 2015). Linking Human and National Security Beyond that, the US case provides examples for the subjugation of human security to national security conceptions and a resulting transformation of its core meaning. This underlines the common criticism that the human security framework has ceased to live up to its emancipatory ideals and instead increasingly has been reconfigured to support imperialist and interventionist Western agendas (McCormack 2010; Duffield and Waddell 2006; Chandler 2004; Oels and von Lucke 2015; Burgess and Begby 2009). Thus, to ‘help the poor for the sake of our own security […]’ (Ziai 2010, p. 157) has become an increasingly popular argumentation in industrialised countries. While the German case has exemplified how this connects to the concept of normation, the specific articulation of the disciplinary discourse in the US illustrates this even further. Alongside the dominant national security construction, human security the sovereign narrative. The discourse constructed vulnerable groups in the Global South as potentially dangerous (Oels 2012; Methmann and Oels 2017) because a deterioration of their living conditions would be a first step towards instability, conflict, terrorism, mass migration and hence ultimately threats to US national security (see Buxton et al. 2016, p. 12). considerations were repeatedly invoked to strengthen This strengthened the exclusionary sovereign discourse and at the same time furthered the ‘security-development nexus’ (Pospisil 2009; Tschirgi et al. 2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010). Examples are the alleged need to plan for ‘complex emergencies’ or catchphrases such as ‘networked security’. Although the cooperation between the military and aid organisations can contribute to human security, it can also undermine the legitimacy of civilian operations and organisations and function as a door opener for more robust military interventions (Christie 2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Hartmann 2010) L - Markets The 1AC’s use of markets to solve climate makes the violence of capital invisible and more pervasive Parr 2016 – teaches sociology @ U of Cincinnati, UNESCO co-chair of water Adrian, “The how and for whom of green governmentality” in Green Growth: Ideology, political economy and alternatives, Zed Books, p. 75-76 Inclusive green growth presumes economic growth is an a priori social good. The assumption rests with the argument that each and every day the economy serves more and more people. Namely, economic growth can be neatly aligned with a rise in living standards and a fall in poverty rates. In the words of World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim: We live in a time of great contrasts, when fewer than roo people control as much of the world's wealth as the poorest 3. 5 billion combined. But we also live in a time when many developing countries have the strongest growth rates in the word, which each year helps millions of people lift themselves out of extreme poverty." The primary policy tools used to achieve economic growth in the service of an inclusive green agenda include: ecotax reform, subsidies, green stimulus investments, investments in green infrastructure, eco-tourism schemes, improved natural resource management, socially inclusive development, and research and development that will address knowledge gaps. The suggested approach is integrative and systemic, using the principles of efficiency and maximizing market solutions. Unsurprisingly, proponents of inclusive green growth view one of the challenges to realizing significant efficiency gains as 'a lack of instruments to "monetize" the benefits of conservation and efficiency and to reward sustainable consumption' .13 The solution to this is to introduce more innovative financing tools and to substantially increase investments in economic activities that improve natural capital. Emphasis is placed on the importance of public-private sector partnerships, whereby the private sector is viewed as an 'active partner of governments', in addition to the institutionalization of local knowledge and politics which has triggered a gamut of new political actors such as non-profit and non-governmental organizations, communities and religious groups entering the political frame of economic policy making. l4 Despite ambitiously setting out to bring social, economic and environmental concerns into balance by adopting a multi-scalar approach to governance that institutionalizes local political actors, the inclusive green growth model continues to push the neoliberal idea that the role of government is to encourage economic efficiency and privatization. 15 Unsurprisingly, one of the primary strategies of green growth is the privatization of the commons. By putting a price on what are otherwise common pool resources such as water, forests and ecosystem services, the model puts its faith in market mechanisms to solve social and environmental issues without defusing the circuitry of structural violence driving social inequity and environmental degradation. Environmental degradation and climate change are problems we share in common with people in different parts of the world, with other species, and future generations. These are therefore potentially solidarity-building issues. Although proponents of inclusive green growth acknowledge the common at the core of environmental issues, by analyzing the situation from the vantage point of economic efficiency and by using criteria such as surplus value, private property, and price, the commoning condition of the problem is appropriated and privatized. In the name of saving the commons, inclusive green growth takes the self-sufficient character of a commons and inscribes it with the law of the market, hereby denying the commons its distinctly autonomous condition. Accordingly, the commons is rendered noncommon. In the process the violence capital inflicts on all life forms, a violence environmental degradation and climate change forces out into the open, becomes invisible and inaudible once more. It is at this juncture where the political significance of prioritizing economic growth and efficiency comes into the light of day. Predictably, the assumption driving inclusive green growth is that economic growth is value neutral. Namely, that it is an unquestionable good in and of itself. However, as Piketty demonstrates, economic growth is not a reliable predictor of justice and equality and the reason is not just economic; it is political. L - Middle Power The aff’s solution to centuries of historical tension is capitalism and liberalism, such a strategy is doomed to fail and continue US domination Zhang 2015- School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol Yongjin, "Regional international society in East Asia? A critical investigation," Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought Volume 5, Issue 3, 2015, p. 360-373 Social boundaries between the regional and the global are further contested by the interpenetration of regional and global political economy, not in the least because public goods in the economic realm are global not regional. Historically, not only did ‘asymmetrical accesses’ to American markets lock emerging market economies such as South Korea and Taiwan into the US geostrategic orbit as they became dependent on US aid and its domestic market for finished goods. But also did the Cold War promotion of economic cooperation between Japan and non-communist Asian nations under the auspices of the US hegemonic power foster the development of a triangular trade relationship in the Asia-Pacific, i.e. the Japanese economy, Asian production networks initiated by Japanese corporations and investment, and the US market, which created a structurally dependent relationship between regional economic development and extra-regional markets (Arrighi et al. 2003; Katzenstein 2003). Regional production networks have produced two effects on the constitution of the regional vis-à-vis the global. On the one hand, regional production networks have clearly facilitated market-driven, bottom-up network-style regional integration in East Asia. On the other hand, the export-led growth strategy is made possible for East Asian developing nations precisely because of the structural interdependence between East Asian economies and global market created in part by regional production networks (Arrighi et al. 2003; Katzenstein 2003; Beeson 2014). Even when East Asia has been increasingly knitted together by regional production networks, regional integration in terms of rapid growth of intra-regional trade is still conditional upon the demand of extra-regional markets – the United States and the EU in particular. It is therefore telling how much the global continues to penetrate the regional in East Asia. As Beeson and Breslin (2014, 105–106) notes, When we employ a ‘value chain’ or production network focus, it becomes apparent that private sector actors based in ‘developed’ economies continue to play a decisive role in determining the way production is organized and the sort of activities that occur in different geographical areas. This production has also largely been reliant on demand from the major markets of North America and Europe. So we can argue that the real regional economic integration that has occurred through trade and investment flows in East Asia has (to date at least) been largely predicated on and driven by extra-regional economic interests and actors. Conclusion The universalization of primary institutions of the expanding European international society is pivotal in the historical process of the globalization of international society. While this historical process dismantled the traditional social order in East Asia in the nineteenth century, it is its culmination in the construction of the post-1945 order that sees nationalism and national self-determination norms rise to delegitimate colonialism/imperialism as primary institutions of the classical European international society. The revolt against the West both in normative terms and in the political struggles for national independence was instrumental in defining the legitimate statehood and rightful membership in the making of the ‘post-imperial’ and postcolonial international society. In East Asia, as in other regions of the world, the proliferation of postcolonial states is integral in the globalization of a system of juridically equal sovereign states in international relations and the universal acceptance of sovereignty as a primary institution, with an emphasis on sovereign independence and equality in international law. This historical process of the globalization of international society has at the same time given East Asia certain new cognition as a putative region in power-political terms. The rise and fall of Japanese imperialism, the entrenchment of the American power in East Asia and the emergence of China as a revolutionary power after 1949 – all combined – have produced complex regional power dynamics, which reverberate strongly today. The (re)emergence of East Asia as a region in contemporary global politics is, therefore, historically contingent on the dynamic transformation of global international society. This historical understanding is important for the social structural analysis conducted in this essay. Through the analytical lens of primary institutions, such analysis has demonstrated significant variations in how postcolonial and revolutionary states in East Asia conceive and interpret sovereignty, non-interference and self-determination and how they are practised at the regional level in East Asia. It has highlighted how capitalist ideas and economic practice embodied in the market as a primary institution at the global level have been adopted, mediated and developed imaginatively and innovatively in East Asia through the creative practice of developmental state. Such variations in interpretation and practice, it is argued, amount to political articulation of regional contestations to, and significant localization of, sovereignty and market as primary institutions of global international society. It has also interrogated the failure of indigenous great powers in the region, China and Japan in particular, in playing a custodian role in shaping and maintaining a regional order in East Asia and how such malfunctioning of great power management as a primary institution at the regional level invites the penetration of the global power, the United States, which complicates the crucial questions of disputed membership, the problematic nature of social boundaries and contested regional identity in understanding the existence and operation of regional international society in East Asia. This critical investigation suggests, therefore, that in social structural terms regional variations in terms of the content of institutions and institutional practices embedded in Western-global international society do exist, and they are not anomalous to but constitutive of global level of international society. Does a distinct regional international society exist in East Asia today, then? Insightful as some analyses conducted in this investigation might be, they are inconclusive. This is not in the least because the existence (or not) of any region is a matter of representation rather than ‘reality’. Arguments in this essay about distinctive regional practice of primary institutions present at the global level, sovereignty in particular, are counterbalanced by claims of crippled and underdeveloped indigenous great power management that have stunted the evolution of a regional international society in East Asia. Evidence of the existence of regional primary institutions such as the developmental state that differentiates the regional from the global in political economy is challenged by the suggestions of the mutual penetration regional production networks and global market. The existence of regional international society in East Asia is at best contested. L – Modeling/Heg U.S. legal leadership enables a neocolonial agenda of global neoliberal domination---this link is specific to their mechanism of boosting the prestige of institutional arrangements in order to export legal norms and practices. Ugo Mattei and Marco de Morpurgo 10, *Professor at the Hastings College of the Law and the University of Turin, **M.Sc. Candidate at International University College of Turin and LL.M. Candidate at Harvard Law School, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” April 2010, Bocconi Legal Papers, p. 7-8, There is a clear pattern of continuity, not of rupture, between the current policy trend in the international institutional setting and earlier practices, in particular colonialism. The Western world, under current U.S. leadership, having persuaded itself of its superior position, largely justified by its form of government, has succeeded in diffusing rule of law ideology as universally valid, behind whose shadows plunder hides, both in domestic and in international matters. Present-day international interventions led by the United States are no longer openly colonial efforts. They might be called neo-colonial, imperialistic or simply post-colonial interventions. Although practically all of European colonial states (most notably Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, France, Germany and even Italy) regarded themselves as empires, the concept of ‘empire’ is what best describes the present phase of multinational capitalist development with the USA as the most important, hegemonic superpower, using the rule of law to pave the way for international corporate domination. Export of the law can be described and explained in a variety of ways. A first example is the imperialistic/colonial rule, or imposition of law by military rules, as during military conquest: Napoleon imposed his Civil Code to French-occupied Belgium in the early nineteenth century. Similarly, General MacArthur imposed a variety of legal reforms based on the American government model in post World War II Japan, as a condition of the armistice in the aftermath of Hiroshima. Today, Western-style elections and a variety of other laws governing everyday life are imposed in countries under US occupation, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. A second model can be described as imposition by bargaining, in the sense that acceptance of law is part of a subtle extortion11. Target countries are persuaded to adopt legal structures according to Western standards or face exclusion from international markets. This model describes the experience of China, Japan and Egypt in the early twentieth century, and, indeed, contemporary operations of the World Bank, IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other Western development agencies (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and so on) in the ‘developing’ and former socialist world. A third model, constructed as fully consensual, is diffusion by prestige, a deliberate process of institutional admiration that leads to the reception of law.12 According to this vision, because modernization requires complex legal techniques and institutional arrangements, the receiving legal system, more simple and primitive, cannot cope with the new necessities. It lacks the culture of the rule of law, something that can only be imported from the West. Every country that in its legal development has ‘imported’ Western law has thus acknowledged its ‘legal inferiority’ by admiring and thus voluntarily attempting to import Western institutions. Turkey during the time of Ataturk, Ethiopia at the time of Haile Selassie and Japan during the Meiji restoration are modern examples. if the transplant ‘fails’, such as with the attempts to impose Western-style regulation on the Russian stock market, or as with many law and development enterprises, it is the recipient society that receives the blame . Local shortcomings and ‘lacks’ are said to have precluded progress in the development of the rule of law. When the World Bank produces a development report on legal issues, it invariably shows insensitivity for local complexities and suggests radical and universal transplantation of Western notions and institutions. Recent examples of plunder disguised by the rule of law rhetoric, and thus by the use of law as a façade of legitimacy, can be found in the 2002 Argentinean crisis13, the extraction and management of oil in Iraq and elsewhere14 and in the Interestingly, intellectual property law, as conceived and imposed by the WTO (based on an ethnocentric individualistic conception of the intellectual creation), denies any benefit to the real inventors (e.g. when they are a community with age-old traditions) and entitles profits to Western corporate actors that have ‘stolen’ the idea by patenting what for others is part of their widespread knowledge.15 This happens when ideas are stolen from other cultural traditions: because they do not have a status of numerous situations in which intellectual private property there, they can be legitimately patented by Western firms, where they do have such a legal status. Automatically, they then no longer ‘belong’ to the group from whom they originated. Hegemony is an ideological fantasy of US exceptionalism – their theoretically scary impacts obscure the real consequences of unchecked hegemony which have been untold suffering Richard Jackson 11, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, The World’s Most Warring Nation, www.e-ir.info/2011/07/02/the-world’s-most-warring-nation/ The history of US foreign policy is a violent and bloody one, although this is not necessarily the dominant perception of most Americans. From the frontier wars of subjugation against Native Peoples to colonial wars against Mexico, Spain and the Philippines, the Cold War interventions in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya and elsewhere, the post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya today, the US has an unrivaled record of war and foreign military intervention. There are in fact, few periods in its history when the US has not been engaged in war or military attacks on other countries. In addition, the US is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of military weapons, and has a military budget several times greater than all its nearest rivals combined. It is in fact, the most warring nation in modern history. It is in this historical context that we have to try and understand its current military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Libya. Although it is sometimes argued by apologists that these military actions are always defensive in nature rather than proactive and expansionist, and are the result of real and serious threats to US security or the wider international system, the virtually impregnable security position of the US, notwithstanding the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, makes this argument unconvincing. The reality is that the size of the US landmass and population, the vast oceans to its eastern and western borders and the friendly countries to its north and south, and the extent of its economic and military power, means that there are no serious obstacles to the adoption of an isolationist foreign policy or even the adoption of a pacifist role in international affairs. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about its long record of war and intervention. Explaining the historical record of US foreign intervention requires a careful evaluation of both its strategic interests and its ideological system, as it is the almost unique combination of these factors and the way in which they underpin and interact with each other which helps to explain why the US continues to be the most violent state in the international system today. Strategically, the US is today the world’s dominant power. In order to maintain this hegemonic position in the international system, which is the primary and preeminent goal of all US foreign policy (or at least, no major foreign policy initiative can seriously contradict this first principle goal), necessitates a number of key measures, such as: maintaining military advantage over rivals, which in turn requires a permanent internal military-industrial complex; a system of allies and a military presence in bases stretched around the globe, especially in strategic regions like the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; influence over or control of strategic resources such as oil; domination or at least influence over the global economic and trading system; significant influence in international institutions; and preventing the rise of serious challengers to its overall hegemony. At the same time, the US has evolved since the founding of the republic a core set of ideological beliefs which are now deeply embedded culturally and accepted by both the political elite and the wider society. Some of these beliefs are necessitated by, and functional to, the military power of the US: maintaining a costly and permanent militaryindustrial complex capable of staying ahead of its rivals, for example, requires a supporting set of cultural values which valorize military prowess, patriotism and sacrifice in war. These values are now part of the military-industrial-media complex in which video games and movies, among others, serve as recruitment tools for the military, narrative frames for interpreting foreign threats and as propaganda for generating support for foreign military intervention. Importantly, this military-industrial-media complex has come to generate its own material and political interests, in part because it requires actual wars to reproduce and sustain itself. Other important ideological values include the strongly-held belief that the US has been called by history (or God) to protect the so-called free world from major threats. Thus, it is believed that the US was first called to defeat the threat posed by the Axis powers, then the communist threat, and today, the global threat of terrorism. This ideological belief rests on the notion that the US is uniquely placed – by virtue of its military and economic power, and its moral values – to ensure the safety of the civilized world; it is the ‘exceptional nation’ which must lead the world. Related to this, the US has come to believe that its core values of liberty and democracy are actually universal values which is it bound to protect at home and spread abroad. As with its military values, these ideological beliefs are ubiquitous in popular and political culture. It is the combination of the US’s strategic interests and its ideological dispositions in the past two hundred years or more which explains the frequency and geographical distribution of its military interventions. In some cases, interventions have been launched primarily to protect perceived strategic interests, such as the case of the first Gulf War in which Iraq took control of Kuwait oil reserves and appeared to seriously threaten Saudi oil reserves. In other cases, the US’s strategic interests coincided with strong ideological imperatives, such as the Libyan intervention today where the presence of significant oil reserves and the desire to create a pro-US regime in a strategic region has combined with the US ideological value of spreading democracy and overthrowing a long-term dictator and US opponent. The key point however, is that ideological values such as democracy promotion only rarely generate sufficient will by themselves for military intervention, although Somalia and Kosovo may be considered exceptions (although there were strategic interests involved in both cases). In many other cases, such as Rwanda in the 1990s and Syria today, such ideological imperatives are insufficient on their own to generate US-led military intervention. At the same time, no wars can be justified or defended to the American public, except by claiming that they fit US ideological values; US politicians cannot admit that they are ever at war solely to secure strategic advantage. Of course, during some periods such as the cold war and to a lesser degree the war on terror, US strategic interests simply overrode ideological commitments to human rights or democracy promotion, as it supported a series of brutal dictatorships in places like Latin America, Asia and Africa. In some cases, the US even approved of mass murder, such as the Indonesian government’s suppression of Communists in 1965 which killed 500,000 people, its support for the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and its support for Latin American death squad activities in places like Chile and El Salvador. In other special cases, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, US strategic interests override ideological commitment entirely and little real effort is made to promote values-based policies. The war on terror, particularly the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, demonstrates the interplay of these two factors, with both strategic interests – dealing with the threat of terrorism, the securing of Iraq’s oil and Afghanistan’s potential role as an access-point to Central Asian oil reserves, fashioning pro-US regimes, and the construction of military bases in strategic regions to put pressure on countries like Iran – and ideological imperatives – bringing liberty and democracy to countries wracked by human rights abuses – driving the interventions. Paradoxically, of course, the war on terror, like many previous US interventions, has resulted in massive human rights abuses around the world and the denial of liberty to millions, with torture, rendition, and the denial of civil rights commonplace, among others. At the same time, it has also endangered US strategic interests: the attack on Iraq strengthened and emboldened Iran, destabilized Pakistan, and greatly damaged the reputation and standing of the US in the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world. In the end, the culturally and politically embedded ideology of the US – its militarized patriotism – blinds its leaders and public to the interests and consequences of its military interventions, and sustains the likelihood of future interventions . Few Americans accept that its country’s wars have killed, injured and displaced literally millions of people in the last few decades, most often for little or no positive result in either strategic or ideological terms – that in fact the real-world consequences of its interventions are virtually always the denial of its own stated values of liberty and democracy. Fewer still question why the US is willing to sacrifice thousands or even millions of lives to secure its strategic interests, or why the US population is so perennially vulnerable to ideological appeals by leaders which mask the deeper strategic reasons for violent intervention. While it is unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be significantly reduced in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements might emerge which are able to challenge, and perhaps even change, the militarized patriotism and deeply-embedded culture of violence which makes the US the most violent state in the world. L – Overfishing Only an anti-colonial approach can solve overfishing Jonsson 2019 - School of Law @ Orebo U Jessica H, "Overfishing, social problems, and ecosocial sustainability in Senegalese fishing communities," Journal Journal of Community Practice Volume 27, 2019 - Issue 3-4: Ecosocial Work and Social Change in Community Practice Destruction of fishing communities’ traditional sustainable living conditions and lifestyles is far from being a local problem. The EU and other powerful countries play a decisive role in such a destructive change of local communities in West Africa which force many youths of leaving their communities and migrate to EU countries. This is problematic for the EU politicians who complain about increasing migration and suggests that they are not aware of the role of EU actors and policy in creating hardship in and driving migration from West Africa. Local communities are subjected to powerful global forces, such as the EU, national postcolonial governments in cooperation with international governments and organizations and powerful multinational companies. Such a powerful alliance creating unbearable problems for many local people, cannot be counteracted only by local actors, who are fighting an unequal struggle. Social work could play a central role for a global mobilization for change in this area. Such mobilization needs cooperation and alliance with local and global actors and awareness of the shortcomings of the international organizations’ declarations and actions. In the same vein, we need a critical perspective on the ongoing colonizing processes that reproduce inappropriate social work approaches based on Western models. New horizons are needed for an inclusive and anticolonial social work practice responding appropriately to local concerns, such as those in West African societies, while critically aware of the impact of international development policies on local communities (Jönsson, 2016). Local social work could be supported by national structural reforms to eliminate overfishing in coastal areas. Cooperation between the international social work associations (IFSW, IASSW, ICSW) with the UN, in realization of the declaration of human rights and an equality-based sustainable development should include people in fishing communities. Although local communities are drained of their young population, who in many cases seek their future in European countries, there are many locals who are working to make fishing communities a better place for the young generation. This, however, needs international solidarity and national governments to pay attention to a local and human catastrophe not only targeting many of such communities but also the future sustainability of food production. The crisis of the oceans transports serious consequences for the rest of the world in terms of biodiversity loss, livelihoods, fresh water, clean air, rain, and protection against climate change. Commitments for international action to protect Africa’s fishing communities and local fisheries are urgently required. L – Water Wars Unfounded depictions of water wars produce colonial violence through deliberately dishonest narratives. Octavio ’17 [Marielena; Georgetown University; “Water Securitization Reconsidered: Intrastate Water Disputes in India”; 2017; Intercollegiate Issue 2017; The Yale Review of International Studies; http://yris.yira.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/YRIS-IntercollegiateIssue-2017.pdf#page=46; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] As previously mentioned, the securitization process contains a structural/institutional mechanism (for example, military personnel protecting water infrastructure or the exclusion of civil-society from decision-making processes),22 and a preceding linguistic one, which includes the framings and narratives to justify securitizing practices. Science often justifies these discourses, given the technical and managerial nature of water securitization: “in the case of the environment the relevance of th[e] scientific agenda is evident in the attempts to legitimize different competing claims with the authority of science.”23 There are two main issues with the over-reliance on scientific authority in the context of water. First, while scientific knowledge and data are crucial for establishing effective water management and water governance regimes, they paint an incomplete picture of the sociopolitical context of water. Water is a resource with economic, political, social, cultural, and even religious dimensions. Besides economic benefits (agricultural production, hydropower, etc.) water is also linked to political goals (for example, self-sufficiency), social life (livelihoods, health, sanitation, etc.), and cultural and religious value (for example, the Ganges in India). Thus, scientific data can only go so far in analyzing water issues since it leads to a decontextualized approach that is ultimately counterproductive for the achievement of a just and equitable solution. Secondly, authority—including scientific authority—is a contested concept, particularly in the context of the era of “post-truth politics,” when facts and evidence are disregarded over bold rhetorical, often inaccurate, statements. Moreover, authors can easily manipulate (or omit) data to fit within a hypothesis and often leads researchers to confuse correlation with causation. An example of the latter is the scarcity-conflict thesis: while a vast array of quantitative studies show an overlap between scarce resources and armed conflict, jumping to the conclusion of scarcity being the sole trigger of conflict grossly oversimplifies what drives a country to armed conflict. In the case of Syria, many isolate the drought as the main trigger for the uprising. However, the first protests occurred in the governorate of Dara’a, where rainfall levels exceeded the average in 2009 and 2010.24 Claiming the drought as the main culprit of the Syrian revolution, rather than the government’s failure to respond to the humanitarian crisis ravaging the nation, oversimplifies and depoliticizes the issue and “diverts attention away from the core problem: the long-term mismanagement of natural resources.”25 Consequently, science-backed securitization cannot adequately respond to the issues it seeks to address because it de-contextualizes a resource which functions within social, political, economic, cultural and religious realms. The media has been particularly pervasive in spreading the water securitization discourse, in particular the “water wars” narrative. Besides the fact that it is hard to find a case of a true water war, this narrative perpetuates the idea that humankind is at the mercy of a capricious nature, and allows government to shift responsibility elsewhere. If we push this rather fatalistic image to its logical extreme, then why bother with global coordinated climate change action if humankind is always going to be subject to the unpredictable forces of nature? This narrative seeks to create a sense of urgency through fear and anxiety, which are not necessarily motivators for action. Moreover, “the main causes of contemporary conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including man-made). Conflicts are borne out of human choices and mistakes.”26 It is hard to claim that climate is the essential factor explaining collective violence in the Anthropocene—the current historical epoch where human activity changes the Earth and its processes more than natural forces.27 Employing this narrative transforms governments into passive actors and victims of nature. This is particularly problematic when governments are at the root cause of unrest and conflict, such as the Darfur case: “framing climate change as a factor in the genocide in Darfur helps push to the background the political and economic motivations for the fighting—and unwittingly could let the criminal regime of Khartoum off the hook.”28 The more nuanced version of the “water war” narrative—climate change as a “threat multiplier”—is equally as problematic since it “ underlines the complexity of predicting the future impact of climate change, not only on the environment but also on social and political unrest or conflict.”29 Regardless of these significant issues, government officials continue to employ the water war narrative and utilize it to justify the securitization of water: the threat of a war warrants the use of securitizing practices. The underlying logic of water security is the need for insecurity to address human concerns and eco-political issues.30 This allows decisions to be made on the basis of impulse, urgency, anxiety, and willingness to sacrifice, which will produce countless unintended consequences for the environment. Security becomes reactive rather than preventive, requires a “decisionist” attitude,31 justifies the use of force by creating a sense of urgency, and diminishes the space for discourse by taking issues outside the realm of “normal politics.”32 Securitization also implies a zero-sum rationality that greatly reduces the space for cooperation. Given these shortcomings, one cannot help but question if water security, or the broader Environmental Security, is even useful in the context of water management (or environmental governance). In fact, “to claim that climate change may have an impact on security is to state the obvious,”33 and while reframing water in security language has brought new actors into the water arena and broadened awareness of water problems it has, arguably, not fundamentally changed how water issues are approached. Oels argues that, if anything, the securitization of the environment has led to the “climatization” of security: the introduction of “new practices from the field of climate policy … into the security field.”34 In particular, water securitization has often tainted cooperation over transboundary basins, yielding inequitable and unjust cooperative regimes because of its de-contextualized nature. A new theoretical and analytical framework, that overcomes the issues of water securitization, may shed some light on how to ensure effective cooperation over transboundary basins. Problematic narratives of water security doom political action and worsen injustices – turns case. Octavio ’17 [Marielena; Georgetown University; “Water Securitization Reconsidered: Intrastate Water Disputes in India”; 2017; Intercollegiate Issue 2017; The Yale Review of International Studies; http://yris.yira.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/YRIS-IntercollegiateIssue-2017.pdf#page=46; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] First, a new analytical framework must move beyond what Selby and Hoffman (2014) call “scarcity framings.” They identify certain paradoxes of these framings relevant to the water war narrative. First, nonrenewable resources (such as oil) are associated to conflict through abundance, while the most renewable of resources (water) through scarcity.35 Second, scarcity and abundance are relative—“scarcity somewhere implies abundance somewhere else”— and these framings are sustained by state-centric political imaginaries and securitization discourses.36 Third, it is not resource quantity but the economic and the political values associated to it that drive conflict: conflict can happen without any changes in resource supply.37 Thus, these framings become geographically deterministic and shift focus away from the sociopolitical context of water disputes. Lastly, these framings ignore how global dynamics can drive conflict: under-development and state failure, while characteristics of developing states and societies, are often the result of their positioning and insertion into a highly uneven and hierarchical world economy.38 Accordingly, the new proposed framework will not focus on water quantity but on water access, distribution, and management. Water securitization de-contextualizes water and this is often what leads to ineffective policies responding to ensuing crises. Therefore, this framework will attempt to place water issues in their sociopolitical context by looking at both local and global dynamics that may impact water access or distribution by drawing from Environmental Justice theory. Patterns of environmental deterioration follow patterns of inequality. Additionally, environmental degradation does not only occur through the direct impact of policies from local central government but also through indirect forms of global oppression. The latter is particularly important in post-colonial societies and for the global South, where neoliberal policies, development, and insertion into the global market have transformed agriculture and peasant societies through the commodification of land and labor. Additionally, while most of the consequences of global environmental change are borne by the global South, most of the causes emanate from the global North. Environmental Justice theory has allowed for a re-orientation of focus from the oppressed to the oppressor: “small farmers might be degrading their environment because they had no choice … peasants worked harder and longer, often degrading their land, in order to ensure social reproduction in the face of price squeezes.”39 Taking this into consideration, this framework will encourage against imposing lifestyle changes on the most vulnerable, and point to the patterns of the North that have led to widespread human and biosphere insecurity. Another helpful tool this framework will utilize is discourse analysis. By looking at the discourse employed in the context of water disputes, the power asymmetries and the context of human vulnerabilities become clearer. Moreover, the aforementioned “patterns of exploitation and appropriation” are actually legitimized through discourses, in particular “discourses of climate crisis” (including the water wars narrative).40 The dominant discourse will represent the views and the interests of the powerful and will determine the outcome: “discourses … ultimately determine the willingness of policymakers and the public to act on pressing issues.”41 Therefore, this framework, by focusing on discourses rather than practices, will be able to analyze the sociopolitical nuances of water disputes, and thus propose responses that are adequate, efficient, and just. Portrayals of impending water wars privilege ahistorical constructions of water scarcity that preclude ethical understandings. Harrington ’15 [Cameron; Lecturer in the Departments of Political Science at King’s University College and Brescia University College; “Toward a critical water security: hydrosolidarity and emancipation”; 2015; Vol. 21, No. 1; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal; https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2013.846269; Accessed 7/16/21; NT] For the past three decades, the story often told has been one of a “coming anarchy,” where a host of environmental problems, in which water factors significantly, inevitably erodes the state’s capacity to govern (Kaplan 1994, Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999, 2007, Klare 2001, Dwyer 2007, CNA 2007, DIA 2012). According to this type of interpretation, this will eventually lead to an upswing of violence as states and groups fight over access to and control of dwindling natural resources, while at the same time experiencing their effects as conflict multipliers, coalescing with simmering ethnic and historical tensions. The persistence of this type of thinking has led to the conclusion that water will drive conflict in the future, and is likely to lead to instability, state failure and increased regional tensions (DIA 2012, Ban 2008, Association of American Geographers 2001). However, the continued reliance on familiar tropes of water scarcity leading to war and conflict is problematic in a number of ways. First, it ignores the historical record, which displays a distinct absence of water wars (Wolf 1998, De Stefano, Edwards, de Silva and Wolf 2010). Secondly, freshwater scarcity and ecosystem degradation hold far more importance as an inevitable source of conflict than “21st Century oil.” Water is more important than other resources, including oil. As Steven Solomon (2010, p. 367) puts it, “Oil is substitutable, albeit painfully, by other fuel sources, or in extremis, can be done without; but water’s uses are pervasive, irreplaceable by any other substance, and utterly indispensable.” Thirdly, focusing upon historically absent and hypothetical future water wars obscures the complex relationships individuals, communities and ecosystems have with scarce water sources, relationships that defy simple classification as competitive and protectionist (Zeitoun, Mirumachi, and Warner 2010). The result is that it diverts attention away from more pressing concerns related to the sustainable management of water resources and the integration of holistic water practices ensuring equitable distribution, which is fundamental to empowering individuals so that they may live a good life. Finally, it reflects an uncritical allegiance to state-centric, traditional security approaches to managing security, approaches that have been clearly ineffective for most individuals on the planet. Narratives that causally link water scarcity and conflict reinforce the deeply embedded assumptions of just what security means (survival) and for whom it exists (states). Despite the tenuous links between resource exploitation and conflict, there has been a continued tendency to situate resource wars as a prevailing fact of history and an inevitable focus for the future. However, there are developments that point to alternative understandings of water in an international context. This article looks at the theoretical development of the concept of hydrosolidarity and its potential institutional development in the actions of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-led policies of Global Water Solidarity, as one important alternative. Such reorientations of water security may demonstrate the latent emancipatory potential found in water security. Robert Cox claims that ontology lies at the beginning of an inquiry. We cannot define a problem in global politics without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the significant kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships among them ... There is always an ontological starting point (Cox 1996, p. 144). It is true that the continued frequency of popular warnings that privilege Malthusian concerns over dwindling water supplies and increasing human needs reflect deeper-rooted philosophical allegiances. When a wide range of world leaders, including the past three United Nations (UN) Secretary Generals, at one point or another, raise dire warnings of impending violence over water, they are reflecting long-held assumptions about the purpose and possibilities of international security, itself symptomatic of much deeper beliefs. When the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Davey, warned an audience in 2013 that “water wars are just around the corner,” (Harvey 2013) he was not simply reporting facts, but was signalling a commitment to water security defined and held within a traditional ontological interpretation of state self-preservation, political enmity and human control over nature. Water security is, in this regard, illustrative of what Horkheimer and Adorno referred to as a “corrosive rationality” that binds existence with repetition. In their reading, reason becomes locked in instrumental terms, in the service of domination and control, rather than in progress or emancipation. In modern terms, an idea of inevitability sets in because that which is sets the boundaries of possible experience. These boundaries work (like mythology) to reflect and replicate the essence of the existing order – characterized as cyclical motion, fate, domination of the world and the renunciation of hope (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 2004, p. 20). The starting point of this article, then, is an acknowledgment that conceptions of security are conditioned by larger understandings of being and reality, and that water security in particular is emblematic of traditional allegiances within the subject of international relations that are resistant to change. It takes this critical observation and extends it to examine the possibilities for emancipation in water security. The place of emancipation in water security Much of the water security literature follows the same trajectory as the broader environmental security literature. It evokes a picture of water as a dwindling natural resource that has the potential to act as a threat multiplier in an age of climate insecurity and domestic upheaval in a warming world. This literature admits that while it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to find a major conflict precipitated over water resources, water is often an important variable in conflict and is emblematic of the increasing importance of environmental factors going forward in the twenty-first century. Against this background, there is a need to shift the trajectory of water security towards a critical engagement with its emancipatory characteristics. Water can act as a progressive site for the articulation of emancipatory policies based upon cosmopolitan ethics. Rigorous, empirical analysis debunks the myth of water wars. The 1AC’s fabrication is complicit in production of violent narratives privilege fearmongering. Harrington ’13 [Cameron; Graduate Program in Political Science, The University of Western Ontario. Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy; “CHAPTER THREE: Water Wars and Environmental Security”; 2013; Fluid Identities: Toward a Critical Security of Water; https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2884&context=etd; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The problem, as Aaron Wolf has pointed out, is a lack of evidence. Libiszewski and Wolf have both produced extensive studies that conclude water scarcity has never been a cause of any Arab-Israeli war.202 A critical review of the water wars literature reveals that many of the studies are actually more acutely tied to “political tensions or stability rather than about warfare, or about water as a tool, target, or victim of armed conflict – all important issues, just not the same as “water wars.”203 It would be an overstatement to say whether there is one conclusive answer to the “debate” over the likelihood of water wars. Yet it is possible to conclude that there is indeed a burgeoning literature that examines water from an altogether different perspective from past interpretations. “Water peace” literature has grown in recent years, and encompasses a major academic sub-field of water security. In what has grown to become a landmark study, Wolf’s 1998 article, “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways”, found that there have been hardly any water wars in all of human history. In findings derived from Oregon State University’s Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), Wolf explained that a systematic study of the interstate interactions over water reveals a history more replete with cooperation than conflict. Wolf, and his team of researchers, using a comprehensive dataset that identified 412 crises for the period 1912-1994, found only four disputes where water was partially a cause. They broadened the scope to include a total of seven “incidents” where water may have been an independent variable influencing armed aggression, only to find that in three of these incidents no shots were fired. Wolf concluded that “As near as we can find, there has never been a single war over water.” 204 Instead of the interstate violence that has been consistently forecasted, the study, building upon earlier evidence compiled by Wolf205 and Hamner and Wolf206, found that cooperation along shared waterways is historically far more common. This has again been confirmed in subsequent findings by Wolf and others.207 Instead of wars over water, which are not “strategically rational, hydrographically effective, or economically viable,” states have endeavored to find common ground when it comes to shared waterways. Wolf’s team identified 3,600 treaties that have been signed over different aspects of international water (400 in the twentieth century alone.) This stands in stark contrast to the water wars literature that was commonplace in the early 1990s. The data produced by TFDD has had a major impact on how water can be seen alternative to the prevailing discourses that place water scarcity in the context of war and violent conflict. Indeed, Phillips et al. write that: “It is rare that findings within social science produce instant paradigm shifts. However, with the surprising results from The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database disclosing that there have hardly been any ‘water wars’ in human history, the tables were turned almost overnight.”208 New emphasis on the potential for water to bridge political and psychological divides has recently emerged in the wake of the quantitative studies produced by Wolf and others. Many studies produced in the last decade have emphasized the cooperative side of water politics.209 A few authors point to “discourses of cooperation”210 and “rising spirals of benevolent relations”211 instead of once-familiar discourses of conflict or spirals of insecurity. They contend that conflict over water – whether violent or not – is a rarity at the shared basin level. This new emphasis on the counter-hypothesis – that water scarcity can lead people to cooperate – is representative of a larger trend within environmental security studies. As chapter one of this dissertation showed, it is not without significance that the UN has declared 2013 the International Year of Water Cooperation. The speculative theorizing often at the root of early forms of environmental security has become less commonplace – at least when it comes to predicting future water wars. Instead, a teleological approach to the environment and cooperation has assumed a much more prominent place in academic studies. This approach has emphasized the discourse of cooperation and challenged sovereignty and the privileging of independent national development priorities.212 This has contributed to the emergent fourth phase of environmental security literature, discussed earlier in this chapter, which links together human, environmental, and gender security and peace research.213 Some, such as Spring, Brauch, and Dalby are hopeful that this new phase in the literature will be more comprehensive, and better integrate physical and human sciences in ways that “neither focus on states on the one hand, or environmental causes as a simple variable on the other.” This new type of ecological thinking should focus on adaptability, resilience, and interconnection: “understanding security in contrast to earlier formulations assuming central control and violence as the essence of security.”214 Many of these authors are careful to temper any undue enthusiasm for water to act as a magical panacea, curing international conflict. The intent is rather to present a fuller picture of the complex interactions that surround shared management of water resources. It is clear that water contains the potential to destabilize international relations, but it seems far more appropriate to speak of the consequences related to its unequal access, rather than competition over water resources.215 The authors writing on water as part of the new phases of environmental literature are more reluctant to produce extensive conclusions about either the inevitability of conflict or the likelihood of cooperation. It is clear that expanding the scope of analysis beyond conflict and war and including cooperation and negotiation has allowed for a wider range of approaches to water security. These new approaches often incorporate different facets of the relationship between water, conflict, and cooperation. Recent studies have highlighted the role of water regimes in facilitating hydrosolidarity216, the potential for spillover effects of water cooperation217, the role of the poor and the implications for water management institutions in future water related conflict218, and the coexistence of conflict and cooperation in transboundary water interaction.219 This is only a small sampling to demonstrate the diversity of the latest stage of water security literature. As was discussed at some length in the previous chapter, the reduction of a whole scope of environmental security studies to singular paradigms is a misleading discursive tactic that obscures a consistently complex literature. Nevertheless there is some value in producing some synthesis of the literature because it can shed some light on the new approaches that have arisen in response to previous empirical findings and theoretical advancements. It is clear that there exists a highly complex and diverse literature investigating the myriad political and environmental issues associated with the management of water. The debate over whether water wars will occur seems to have muted in recent years (at least in academic circles), with a larger focus on how states cooperate over shared water resources. And while it is accepted that states often cooperate in the field of water resource management, we should heed various warnings that there still remains rapidly increasing demands for strategic access to water by certain co-riparian states, which is caution against complacency.220 L - Warming Refugees Narratives about climate refugees depoliticizes warming while denying migrants subjectivity- this results in mass-victimization and policies driven by fear Bettini 2012 Giovanni [Lund U Centre for Sustainability Studies]; Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate refugees’; Geoforum; Volume 45, March 2013, Pages 63–72 The de-politicizing potential of such narratives is witnessed in the kind of subjectivity ascribed to the concerned people. The apocalyptic narratives centered on ‘climate refugees’ depoliticize and deprive the concerned of political subjectivity through a double movement: the figure of the climate migrant/refugee is victimized and at the same time de-individualized.¶ On the one hand, as noted by Kate Manzo, “at the epicentre” of climate change iconographies and narratives based on fear and apocalypse “stands the figure of the vulnerable being” (Manzo, 2010, p. 99). The centrality of the figure of the ‘bare victim’ de-contextualizes and de-historicizes the socio-ecological relations (at the intersection of multiple axes of power) that originate vulnerability and the risk of displacement (see e.g. Doulton and Brown, 2009, Manzo, 2010 and O’Brien et al., 2007). Described as destitute victim, the concerned is deprived of political subjectivity.¶ On the other hand, the construction of the ‘vulnerable being’ does not emphasize her individuality. To the contrary, the vulnerable beings disappear into the images of massive movements – the “rising tides” and “human tsunamis” from developing countries. These imaginaries resonate with the dominant Western representation of refugees. As noted by Johnson, while the refugee used to be imagined as a politicized individual fleeing persecution (often from the Soviet block), today the dominant representation is that of masses leaving the global south: the individualities and agency of the people moving disappear, overwhelmed by the images of mounting waves of the destitute from the south (Johnson, 2011). Such a construction of the (climate) refugee racializes and depoliticizes the figure of the refugee and constructs the concerned as a non-political subject (ibid: 2011).¶ The combination of victimization and ‘de-individualization’ reinforces postcolonial imaginaries: the silenced ‘Other’, with no agency and driven by desperation, easily becomes the unpredictable, wild ‘other’ that threatens “us” (Manzo, 2010).This disempowering ‘mass victimization’ resonates with various discourses: it proves functional to “mobilize public support and concern for the plight of refugees within a humanitarian discourse and at the same time to manage the threat of instability and difference presented by the refugees’ condition of statelessness” (Johnson, 2011). In any case, such narratives make the climate migrant/refugee into a destitute victim rather than a political subject – regardless of whether they are to be feared (as in conservative discourses) or to be protected (as in a humanitarian discourse). The construct of climate refugees alienates and marginalizes the concerned: someone else (a neutral humanity) is defining how to speak about their future (McAdam, 2011 and McNamara and Gibson, 2009). No room is left for contestation, and, as for any post-politicizing move, no struggling subject is present in the picture (Swyngedouw, 2010b). The depoliticizing impact of such representations and narratives is witnessed by the way the radical People’s Agreement deals with the issue. The WPC qualifies the climate migrant/refugee as a destitute, voiceless victim that developed countries should protect, “offering migrants a decent life [sic!] with full human rights guarantees in their countries” (WPC, 2010a). This is a matted and shy shadow of the conflictual attitude that permeates the text. One does not hear the voice of any struggling subject, rather a call for pity for a third subject. The revolutionary glance is inhibited and fades away. AT: Perm If we win a link it is proof the perm fails Parr 2015 - Taft Research Center, UNESCO co-chair of water, The University of Cincinnati Adrian, "The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections," Geoforum, Vol 62, p 70-72 Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. The perm coopts the alternative to maintain the squo, makes all of the impacts inevitable Anshelm 2015 – Prof @ Linkoping U Jonas and Martin Hultman, Discourses of Global Climate Change, Routledge, p. 190-191 There is, however, an overlooked utopian feature in the environmental eco· modern discourse. To date, there have been numerous studies about the history of environmental politics, especially with regard to how ecological modernization came into being, as well as research about its spread in different areas (e.g. Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). But very few analyse the visionary and utopian aspects that may explain how any such approach to politics can gain so much acceptance when it is described as a salvation from contemporary problems that are presented as apocalyptic. The ecomodern utopia's combination of the desire for a lost paradise with the promise of heaven meant that its proponents could argue that the chance for humanity to be saved was imminent. There is a clear determinism in the Industrial Fatalist dis· course, which becomes visible when every critique is brushed away with arguments of backwardness, earthen floors and poverty and puts the elements of time and progress in the hands of Liberal- Conservatives. These types of utopian ideas can be described as "millenarianism". The millennial good time restores something of the glory of a Golden Age, but it is also descri· bed as being at the end of time. Millenarianism is historically associated with Christianity's messianic message. This has created a dynamic dimension to the forward-looking determinism that encourages the acts of a selected few (Kumar, 1991), which is similar to the way that Sweden is described as being the frontrunner in climate-change politics. A green economy or eco-efficient economy is a partial critique of the present society, a critique based on scientific language. The solution can be seen as a form of millenarianism in the sense that those in government create a distinct actor network that infuses hope and creates a way out of the dilemma. The hope is infinite since it offers the prospect of the ultimate society, in the form of an eco-efficient economy. In line with the ecologically modern discourse, an "eco-efficient economy" is presented as an utopia that launches a couple of technological fixes, which means that contemporary society does not need to change fundamentally. Although the description of an utopia always contains a critique of the prevailing society, it need not necessarily be a total alternative to it (Kumar, 1987). An eco-efficient economy can instead be described as the opposite: a conservative utopia. Society is merely extrapolated from the present to the future, with some technological fixes added. Such utopias are characterized by the existence of a great faith in technology, although detailed descriptions of technology are left out. The direction that the society is moving towards is not altered although the pace of change is said to be increased (Segal, 1986). The image of conservative utopias is made attractive as a result of their effectiveness, purity, absence of noise and harmonious conditions. The government would be left to the experts, not citizens, which would create effective communities (Segal, 1986). The analysis of Sweden as a frontrunner and the ideal eco-efficient economy demonstrates that the understanding of utopia as a system-change is not valid. Such a limited understanding of utopia tends to reduce the possibility of certain types of utopias; conservative utopias might be dismissed from analytical scrutiny. In the case of the ecoefficient economy, it is not about changing existing institutions, behaviour or power relations, even if utopia in many other cases contains the call for radical change. Climate change is a much contested field. We find that during the period that we studied, the dominant discourse, Industrial Fatalism, was heavily attacked for not being able to manage the problem; simultaneously this discourse invested strong emotions in the image of Sweden as a frontrunner country while making the lowering of carbon emissions and continued economic growth a possibility, through an ecoefficient economy. By framing climate change as a problem for humanity, actors within the Industrial Fatalist discourse matched their deep-anchored faith in large-scale technologies, such as nuclear power, with comic apocalyptic scenarios in which they were in control. The comic apocalypse was cocreated with human solutions presented in a powerful way. Industrial Fatalist actors presented themselves as being able to manage both the problem and the answer. This proposed solution was halted - to a large extent, globally - after Germany decided to abandon nuclear power and Japan stopped all nuclear operations after the Fukushima disaster; at the same time, the UK and Finland were prominent examples of the opposite (Wittneben, 2012). In Sweden, as of 2014, the LiberalConservative government still supported the plan to swap old nuclear power plants for new ones and continue the dependency on uranium supplied by Ukraine and Russia. The post-political situation in which apocalyptic framing can occur simultaneously with conservative action is possible because the apocalypse, through its comic presentation, is made governable by humans and is met concurrently by big emotionally embedded planetary engineering solutions that offer the assurance that the industrial capitalist world's ecological system can handle climate change. AT: No Link - We acknowledge suffering The affirmative is a guise to further the squo – any acknowledgement of suffering was just a token gesture Wapner 2016- professor of Global Environmental Politics in the School of International Service at American University Paul, “Climate of the poor: suffering and the moral imperative to reimagine resilience” in Reimaging Climate Change, Routledge, p. 138-141 Radical resilience contravenes Climate Inc. in that it understands and honors the political dimensions of climate suffering and uses this understanding to craft more transformative responses to climate change. There is no question that suffering is a consequence of climate change. It happens as temperatures soar, oceans rise, and storms strengthen, and people and other creatures endure the negative consequences. Radical resilience recognizes how politics comes into play in defining and treating victims of climate suffering (as discussed above) and, in taking this seriously, devises responses that aim to shift the power relations having to do with the lived experience of climate pain. Radical resilience also, however, takes seriously the suffering that precedes and actually produces climate change in the first place. It notices how existing economic, political, and cultural systems that fuel climate change generate widespread pain across various social strata. They create and perpetuate severe inequalities, exploitations, and injustices that are simply part of contemporary collective life. In this sense, radical resilience sees climate travails not simply as the result of an alteration in the status quo (i.e. climate change) but a function of the status quo. That is, climate suffering is not some effect emerging from a beneficent system, but the expression of an unjust and exploitative system. Far from resulting solely from climate change, suffering also fundamentally drives it. Climate change is the atmospheric expression of a system of suffering. In her most recent book, Naomi Klein helps explain this wider view of suffering. She does so through her description of contemporary societies as "extractive." According to Klein, extractivism is a resource-depleting model of economic growth and development employed by governments across the ideological spectrum wherein the earth and its people are treated as objects to be used rather than honored, nurtured, or embraced: Extractivism is a nonreciprocal, dominancebased relationship with the earth, one purely of taking. It is the opposite of stewardship, which involves taking but also taking care that regeneration and future life continue. Extractivism is the mentality of the mountaintop remover and the old-growth clearcutter. It is the reduction of life into objects for the use of others, giving them no integrity or value of their own - turning living complex ecosystems into "natural resources," mountains into "overburden" (as the mining industry terms the forests, rocks, and streams that get in the way of its bulldozers). It is also the reduction of human beings either into labor to be brutally extracted, pushed beyond limits, or, alternatively, into social burden, problems to be locked out at borders and locked away in prisons and reservations. In an extractivist economy, the interconnections among these various objectified components of life are ignored; the consequences of severing them are of no concern. (Klein 2014, 169) Extractivism, thus understood, is the ultimate form of exploitation. It marginalizes people, renders the nonhuman world as ontologically inferior, and objectifies life so that the powerful can perpetuate and systematize legal, cultural, economic, and political conditions of privilege. Extractivism and its violences and injustices sit at the center of climate change. All along the climate change chain - excavation, processing, transportation, and the burning of fossil fuels as well as the buildup of atmospheric carbon concentrations - one finds debasement. Take mining. Many people near coalmines, oil refineries, or hydraulic fracturing facilities are living with contaminated water, polluted air, and despoiled landscapes, while distant others enjoy the advantages produced by such hardship. In these cases, the privileged displace the costs and burdens of fossil fuel use to those who are too poor or otherwise political weak to avoid such pain. At work is not simply the machinations of market economics but the moral arrogance of belittling those who live downstream. The same pattern pertains to the burning of fossil fuels. Not only are most coal burning plants, oil refineries, and natural gas facilities far from affluent neighborhoods, but, as mentioned, the poor disproportionately experience severe climate effects. Living on fragile lands and in substandard structures and lacking the means to protect themselves from climate-related incidents, the poor are implicitly on the receiving end of the buildup of C02 concentrations in the atmosphere. One sees this, by the way, not only within certain countries but also between them. For instance, Nepal has contributed virtually nothing to current climate challenges. Almost all its power is hydroelectric or biomass and its per capita energy use is, relative to other countries, infinitesimal. With 60 percent of its people living on less than two dollars a day, a tenuous system of rain-fed agriculture, and a typography that has many living on fragile lands, Nepal is the fourth most vulnerable country to climate disruptions (Maplecroft 2010). In recent years, the country has been ravaged by landslides and mountain flooding (including glacier lake outbursts) due to erratic and powerful rains, scorching heat and droughts in the plains, and intensified storms that have weakened and, in many cases, crippled much of its infrastructure - conditions that many associate with climate change (see, for example, Yang 2013 ). Nepal is the victim of a climate extractive mindset (Wapner 2014). Extractivism is not simply about taking from the poor and politically weak, it also involves robbing future generations. Fossil fuel reserves build up over geologic time yet the world is using them at breakneck speed with little regard about their availability to future generations. To be sure, warnings about peak oil were certainly exaggerated but it is clear that fossil fuels are, for all intents and purposes, finite. At some point in time - and it will certainly be after the world experiences runaway climate change - oil, gas, and coal reserves will tap out. Using them in such profligate ways and in such enormous amounts is to unfairly extract them from future generations. The same pattern, of course, holds for greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change is already being felt throughout the world but we know that current droughts, floods, and so forth only harbingers of a warmer world. As emissions continue to rise, successive generations will be on the receiving end of intensified, climate-related disasters. By choosing to burn fossil fuels (and cut down trees, graze cattle, and so on) present generations are making the choice to enjoy associated benefits while transferring costs across time to future generations. They are mining the future. Climate extraction hurts not simply people but also the more-thanhuman world. Mining fossil fuels rips apart landscapes, pollutes waterways, and thus literally destroys habitat for plants and animals. Even the most environmentally sensitive quarrying degrades air, water, and soil. Extractivism takes its toll deep into the earth's crust, far across its oceans, high into its skies, and into the very membranes of living beings that must suffer contamination from the mining and burning of fossil fuels. Climate extraction also includes deforestation not only because forests must be cleared to locate, remove, and transport shale oil, tar sands, and natural gas, but also because deforestation releases roughly 3 billion tons of carbon into the atmosphere each year and thus is part of the climate extractivist complex (Union of Concerned Scientists undated). Like those humans living downstream from climate extractivist practices, nature is silent in its suffering. The production of climate change fundamentally involves power as an anthropocentric mindset encourages humanity to treat nature with abandon. Politics operates not only at the causal end of climate hardship for the more-than-human world but also, as should be obvious, in the consequences. Hotter temperatures, changes in humidity, and newly emerging seasonal fluctuations are shifting biomes across the planet and undermining the ecological base of many creatures. To be sure, some animals and plants can migrate across ecosystems in search of accommodating conditions. But many others lack mobility and most are unable to cross highways, cities, and other manufactured features of the humanchanged landscape. In fact, many now identify climate change as a primary cause of species extinction and this represents a further example of extractive practice (CHGE undated; Convention on Biological Diversity undated). Nonhuman species and those people most vulnerable to displacement across time and space share the same status and condition. They are the voiceless, poor, politically powerless, and disregarded of the world - the "global residuum," as Mike Davis (2006) puts it. Future generations, for instance, do not vote, buy and sell goods, or otherwise lodge public preferences. Likewise, the marginalized, from whom industries grab resources and who lack material protection, have little influence on public affairs. In fact, they are usually the victims of other people's decisions. And of course nonhuman creatures not only find themselves undeserving of moral worth but also lack the capacity for political expression. In all three cases, power differentials structure relationships and assume patterns of injustice. The most disturbing thing is that these patterns, which reveal climate inequality, are not unique to fossil fuels or even environmental issues in general. They are part of, and in fact intimately constitute, the contemporary world (Wapner and Matthew 2009). Climate Inc., with mitigation and adaptation as its poster children, is either blind to or, for convenience sake, ignores contemporary societal injustices and hardships. This is unsurprising given its circumscribed aim to focus on climate protection but it also indicates how deeply extractivism and suffering are woven into contemporary regimes. Power differentials and widespread pain are often hidden from view. They are part of, what Edward Said calls, the "normalized quiet of unseen power" (Said 2001, quoted in Nixon 2011, 34). This correlates with Galtung's (1969) notion of structural violence or, more recently, Nixon's (2011) understanding of slow violence. According to Nixon, slow violence is "violence [that) is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales" (Nixon 2011, 2). This is exactly what is happening as the privileged and underprivileged go about their lives often unaware of the accretive brutality that courses through and imprints itself upon the very bodies of those living (or soon to be living) downstream. Mitigation and adaptation miss this wider, more intimate type of violence and therefore suffering. So focused on the legitimate horrors of climate change, they ignore the pervasive repulsions of contemporary life that produce climate change in the first place and that mark the lives of those living on the frontlines of climate intensification. Mitigation and adaptation, as insurers of the status quo, have little room to consider, let alone respond effectively to, climate suffering. Suffering remains a residual category invisible to Climate Inc. yet capable of harboring injustices that perpetuate the engines of climate change. 2NC – FW/Alt 2NC - Harrington Critical imaginations of water open up new possibilities for equitable and just understandings of security through cosmopolitanism. Harrington ’13 [Cameron; Graduate Program in Political Science, The University of Western Ontario. Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy; “CHAPTER FIVE: Toward an Emancipatory Security of Water: Inclusion, Communication, and Cosmopolitanism”; 2013; Fluid Identities: Toward a Critical Security of Water; https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2884&context=etd; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Water literally and metaphorically flows through everything; our struggle to properly manage it shows us the deeply troubled relationships that we have with nature and with each other. We cannot divorce water from issues like food production, population growth, climate change, species extinction, urbanization, development, gender disparity, social inequality, and a host of other social processes. Responding to these challenges requires an integrated and holistic approach that takes stock of the nature of the problems as arising from, to paraphrase Adorno and Horkheimer, “the administered totality of modernity.” Critical theory can in this regard, contribute an awareness of the self as an active recipient and participant in the replication of a modern world dependent upon an instrumental logic of reason and the commodity form. The growing global water crisis creates enormous problems and important opportunities. Up to eighty percent of the global human population faces a high risk to water security.430 That staggering number should give us long pause and compel us to construct alternative theories that can make better sense of the problem and begin to act in ways that comport with ethically valid principles and do so in a sustainable fashion. The aim of this chapter has been to do just that. By pursuing emancipation as the ultimate goal of security, it coincides with a young but growing tradition in security studies. Emancipation frees us to think about security away from traditional exclusionary means of enmity and conflict. It is argued here (and elsewhere) that the concept of emancipation offers humanity a means by which we might pursue a practical commitment to ensuring that life on this planet not only continues, but that it gets better. Roy Bhaskar may have put it best when he wrote that emancipation is “a special qualitative kind of becoming free that consists in the self-directed transformation from an unwanted and unneeded to a wanted and needed source of determination.”431 In the context of water security, emancipation helps to bind our knowledge of the interconnected nature of the problems with a theoretical commitment to “reimagining the future in genuinely liberating ways.”432 This chapter constructed a vision of an emancipatory security of water by focusing on three components that could shift traditional water security towards ethical and holistic means. It identified inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism, as the central foundations of what could become an emancipatory theory of water security. Each component is able to offer specific insights into the various deficiencies of approaching water security along traditional, business-asusual lines. Focusing on inclusion creates new possibilities for marginalized water stakeholders to voice their own concerns and wishes in a manner that respects the unique experiences of water insecurity. It also presents a multifaceted view of water security, critically upsetting the prevailing narrative of most water management strategies that hold an instrumentalist view of nature, and a statist understanding of international security. Focusing on inclusion in critical water security also requires us to adopt a constitutiverelational understanding of identity that avoids essentialized notions of the self and other so as to pave the road for free and open-ended forms of communication. This leads to the second component of an emancipatory security of water that highlights the important role that communicative rationality plays in ensuring that alternative voices are engaged in open-ended discussions. While consensus may or may not be reached, the important thing to highlight is that the process of communication – the reflexive use of communicative rationality – encourages the creation of deliberative spaces whereby a broader range of actors, including the most marginalized members of society, are given enhanced access. This has important effects on realizing the potential emancipation of individuals and encourages a more sustainable use of world water resources. The last component necessary for building an emancipatory security of water is a commitment to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism signals a commitment to a universal scope of moral concern, so that all individuals across the world share equal moral worth.433 Three main ideas were developed to construct a critical theory of cosmopolitanism useful for the pursuit of emancipation in water security. They highlighted that, 1) all people are morally equal; 2) arbitrary forms of power/domination are unjust and must be avoided and; 3) dialogue and inclusion over matters of public importance are crucial. Combined, all three ideas formed to create critical cosmopolitan imaginings that can propel water security towards new horizons that emphasize shared vulnerabilities and opportunities for integrated approaches that equitably and sustainably manage scarce water resources. There are signs layered in contemporary water approaches that signal such cosmopolitan possibilities. It is these possibilities that the next chapter examines. Developing new understandings and discourse surrounding water is a prerequisite to meaningful policy change. Harrington ’13 [Cameron; Graduate Program in Political Science, The University of Western Ontario. Thesis for Doctor of Philosophy; “CHAPTER FIVE: Toward an Emancipatory Security of Water: Inclusion, Communication, and Cosmopolitanism”; 2013; Fluid Identities: Toward a Critical Security of Water; https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2884&context=etd; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The benefits of linking the concept of emancipation with water have already been mentioned in earlier chapters. However, a more explicit attempt will be made here to point to the important junctures where relationships over water display emancipatory alternatives to traditional discourses of security. There are significant implications that arise from this. By identifying the junctures where water coalesces with marginalized individuals and communities to help articulate different interpretations of security, it becomes possible to decentre the analytical and prescriptive situation of the state, thereby suspending assumptions about traditional hierarchies of values and issues in international security.330 This, it is argued, has both analytical and normative value. In terms of analytical benefit, the critical approach elaborates a wide range of relationships that individuals and communities exhibit over shared waterways. This creates better analyses of “water security” by making it clear that traditional approaches - with their focus on state and system level interactions – are not sufficient for explaining the existing and potential effects of freshwater scarcity on individuals and communities. Political responses and approaches to the issue of water scarcity would indeed be well served to take heed of the elaboration of critical water security found in this chapter. Given that many new and innovative approaches to water management depend upon holistic values and rely upon interdependent, cross-sectoral cooperation (Integrated Water Resources Management – IWRM - being only one, albeit controversial example), the non-statist and cosmopolitan ethics at the heart of critical security analyses seem exceedingly prescient and appropriate for study. As myriads of studies show, the global environmental situation in the early twenty-first century displays crises on a scale not yet experienced in human history. 331 The interrelated nature of the epochal, structural, and decisional crises, require new and radical responses that push development of a world security. It is in such political arrangements, underscored by ethical attachments, that we are best able to achieve ‘security’ without depriving others of it.332 A water security developed to meet both human and environmental needs, through a form of cosmopolitan ethics, is one component of a global response to shared threats and vulnerabilities. It adds to a growing literature that seeks to identify alternatives to security characterized as statist, militaristic, and exclusionary, and to shift dominant discourses and practices of security in emancipatory directions. This chapter and the one that follows it contribute to these dual aims by demonstrating that progressive change in water management policy must consistently rely upon the opening up of dialogic space to include multiple actors engaging and contesting the dominant values that privilege business-as-usual. It is through this diffusion of power to marginalized individuals, so often left out of discussions of security, that it becomes possible to remove the arbitrary, oppressive, structural constraints that limit human potential and contribute to the processes of environmental degradation. 2NC – Discourse Policymaking DA – accountability instills responsibility for the justifications that shape water policy. Williams ’20 [Jessica M; Post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for Civil Society and Governance, Faculty of Social Science, The University of Hong Kong. LLB in Law from the University of Exeter, Master of Science (International Relations) from Cardiff University, Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the University of Hong Kong.; “Discourse inertia and the governance of transboundary rivers in Asia”; March 2020; Volume 3; Earth System Governance; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2019.100041; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Discourse comprises the group of ideas, concepts and categories that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a certain nexus of practices. Social and physical relations are given meaning in this manner. Discourses are context dependent and cannot be separated from the social practices within which they are fashioned (Jӓgerskog, 2002; Mirumachi, 2015). To create material change, social agents first need to work on a discursive level by creating significant and stable meanings to the territory within which they are competing (Rear and Jones, 2013). Discourses can become sanctioned. This essentially means that they become unquestioned and dominant. With resources such as water, issues such as nationalism can become intertwined in the sanctioned discourse. As a result, decision makers may not always implement the most seemingly rational policies (Jӓgerskog, 2002). Assumptions that dominate the sanctioned discourse will act to constrain the options available to policymakers and in doing so signal policy outcomes (Dayton, 2000; Gerlak and Schmeier, 2014). Thus, changes in the sanctioned discourse can indicate changes in policy direction. However, identifying discourse change is difficult. Change can occur slowly, over a long time period, or be sudden and dramatic. What initially appears to be change may just be a continuation of a larger story or the same discourse in an alternative form. Thereby, discourse can appear to change when in reality it has co-opted elements from another discourse. Normative concepts, such as ‘sustainable development’, are particularly susceptible to being co-opted (Christoff, 2013). Exogenous events or crises that confront the sanctioned discourse can effect a change in discourse. Pressure from foreign governments or financial/donor institutions may incentivise a shift in discourse to align with a certain perspective. Actors may also intentionally try and effect change through discursive strategies. Such strategies include constructing narratives and counternarratives, exclusion strategies, as well as employing normative power and delegitimising tactics. The success and extent of change is dependent on the power, position and resources of those seeking to effect the change, and the level of change being sought (Leipold and Winkel, 2013). Discourse can be used to consider how issues reach and stay on the political agenda and become policy. Discourse can show how broader interests underlying policies are shaped into physical consequences, which then indicates policy direction. The way discourse is formulated shapes how the problem or issues around which it is constructed are framed, interpreted, discussed and analysed. Therefore, it implies the favoured solutions, how policies are to be implemented and their potential success (Crow-Miller, 2015). Policy documents also instruct what needs to be done, what stands to reason and what is unquestionable (Apthorpe and Gasper, 2014; Bacchi, 2000). Issues are not seen as political problems unless they are constructed as such by influential actors or society (Hajer, 1995). The framing of policies can immediately close off some responses while making others seem selfevident. It is also rare for a problem to be ‘solved’. Instead it can be removed from the discourse or discussed as if it were a different problem. Policies may be utilised to this effect to constrain the impact of reform initiatives (Bacchi, 2000). The argumentative approach to discourse holds that policymaking reflects competition over meaning. Therefore, policies are the result of competing interests that strategically utilise discourse and is, therefore, a social phenomenon (Taylor, 2004). Policy discourse is thus the group of ideas, concepts, frames and definitions that provide meaning to a real-world phenomenon and structure it as a policy problem (Hajer, 1995, 2006). Policy creation, change and continuation are held as an interactive process of discursive struggle between actors. Policymaking is considered the competition over meaning, with policies being the result of competing interests that employ discourse strategically (Taylor, 2004). Policy creation, change and continuation are interactive processes of discursive struggle between actors. Through argument, actors position themselves or try to impose their views on to others during negotiations (Fischer and Forester, 1993). Institutions can be mobilised and solutions sought once a problem definition is established (Hajer, 1995). Within policymaking, discourses are essential in finding settlements between conflicting interests and this assists in regulating underlying social conflicts (Taylor, 2004; Hajer, 1995). Here, discourse is concerned with redefining a social phenomenon in a manner that allows a solution to be identified (Hajer, 1995). Discourse can move policies up or down the political agenda through depoliticising or securitising moves (Zeitoun et al., 2011). Depoliticising the policy process acts to distance policy makers from the policy's impacts thereby removing responsibility for the policy's outcome. Foucault (2009) utilises the concept of ‘political technology’ to illustrate how issues that are essentially political are removed from policy discourse and reframed in neutral scientific language. The role of expert knowledge in designing institutional procedures is essential to this process (Shore and Wright, 1997). When policies become highly politicised, they become securitised and are regarded as high priority issues that constitute an issue of national interest and essential to state sovereignty. As a result, exceptional measures are, or may be, legitimised (Buzan et al., 1998; Allan and Mirumachi, 2010). The securitising actor's ability to convince the audience and elicit a certain action/reaction is decisive to the securitisation process (Mirumachi, 2015). Once a common understanding of a threat is formed between the securitising actor and the audience, securitisation is held as successful (Trombetta, 2011). The main objective of a securitising discourse is to allow potential violations of rules that would not otherwise be accepted. Threats do not have to be real or in existence for a securitising act to occur (Stritzel, 2007; Mirumachi, 2015). Inertia DA – countering securitizing discourse via debates usurps hegemonic narratives. Williams ’20 [Jessica M; Post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for Civil Society and Governance, Faculty of Social Science, The University of Hong Kong. LLB in Law from the University of Exeter, Master of Science (International Relations) from Cardiff University, Ph.D. in Social Sciences from the University of Hong Kong.; “Discourse inertia and the governance of transboundary rivers in Asia”; March 2020; Volume 3; Earth System Governance; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esg.2019.100041; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] In the present paper elements of institutional theory, policy networks and analytical governance are used to complement discourse theory. This leads us to propose the conceptualisation of discourse inertia. In terms of discourse, inertia is considered to represent the persistent promotion and dominance of a perception of reality. This leads to the continuous reproduction of certain storylines and elements of a discourse. Sanctioned discourses, often ones that are institutionalised, are thought more likely to achieve or display inertia due to the involvement of path dependent tendencies and powerful entrenched interests. Discourse is considered to be dynamic, even where discourse inertia is present, as discourses must constantly be represented and reinforced. Once an actor's, or a group's, discourse becomes dominant, it is fiercely defended. Subsequently, dominant discourses are constantly reinforced and embedded. This can lead to certain narratives becoming entrenched within both institutions and political and social practices, thus reaching an ideational status. These privileged narratives become taken for granted and self-reinforcing, making them prone to discourse inertia. More shallow narratives can function over privileged narratives to achieve an interest or align with an outside commitment. These narratives are more fluid and flexible and are, therefore, easily manipulated. The concept of discourse inertia reflects how a discourse may persist and resist pressures for change. It contributes to our understanding discourse dynamics, dissonance and governance. Discourse inertia may aid in understanding the persistence of a certain policy pathway, despite evidence of its ineffectiveness or the presence of more suitable alternative approaches. Discourse inertia is illustrated by utilising and extending Den Besten et al. (2014) ‘discursive-institutional spiral’ (Fig. 1). The discursive-institutional spiral demonstrates how discourses evolve. A spiral exists between actors, their ideas, subject areas and institutional initiatives. Moments of institutionalisation start each loop of the spiral, which then leads to discussion and debates that draw in new actors. The more actors that become involved, the more likely that new ideas and concepts will be introduced. The expansion of actors and ideas subsequently leads to institutionalisation, which narrows the discourse. Certain ideas are excluded and actors are empowered or disempowered. Institutionalisation then begins the next loop of the spiral as well as the inception of new ideas and rise of critical discourses. Power can be exercised process (Den Besten et al., 2014). by excluding or including actors or ideas in the discursive-institutional This concept is extended through the proposal of a narrowing discursive-institutional spiral. Here, a process akin to institutional path dependency occurs within the spiral, which restricts the entry of new actors and ideas into the discourse. As a result, the evolution and expansion of the discursive-institutional spiral is limited (Fig. 2 and 3). Certain discursive elements that become institutionalised may be self-reinforcing along subsequent spirals. These elements may consistently exclude other elements and actors. This can further limit the ability of new actors to access the discourse, which reduces the introduction of alternative ideas Communities of Practice DA – uncritical acceptance of discourse embeds problematic practices that disrupt implementation. Kreuter ’21 [Judith; Research associate at the chair for International Relations, PhD thesis, Technische Universität Darmstadt; “Chapter 3: Ideas and Objects, Meaning and Causation— Frame Analysis from a Modernist Social Constructivism Perspective”; 2021; Springer; Climate Engineering as an Instance of Politicization: Talking Tomorrow’s Technology—Framing Political Choice?; Accessed 7/14/21; NT] Discourses play a significant role in this process of construction of meaning: “The world is not objectively accessible, but instead is imparted through language through discursive processes and symbolic interpretations” (Uther 2014: 60).2 This means that much of the meaning-construction of social reality, which the brand of social constructivism espoused here relies upon, is done through what many authors call discourse. The frames that are studied in this analysis are considered as elements in discourse. Discourse, here, is understood, following Maarten Hajer, as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2006: 67). This captures the simultaneous constructedness and constructiveness of the social meaning of material objects: Through language and practice humans both capture the meaning material objects have, and change or reproduce this meaning. Similarly, Dryzek defines discourse as “a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2005: 9). This means that meaning is constructed in discourses in “supra- individual and rather unconscious” ways (Methmann et al. 2013a: 6). At the same time, human actors, in this study, will not be considered as entities subordinate to a super-human structural power and constructing (see Uther 2014: 55). Following her approach, actors are considered to be the central active agents in any meaning-making situation, and thus not helpless pawns in the flow of discourse: “The actor is not passively subdued to the discourse, as, for example, the subject of discourse. Actors, according to Uther’s discussion, are both constructed of Foucault, but it actively participates in shaping the discourse through its own interpretive achievements” (Uther 2014: 66).3 This two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing is captured by practice theory. The terms ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ are considered to not be antithetical to each other: Practices are “meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and around the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4). Thus, (non-linguistic) practices are understood to interact with (linguistic) discourses and in this interaction construct or deconstruct meanings. Other authors reconcile linguistic and nonlinguistic elements of meaning-construction by subsuming both under the term ‘discourse’(see Anshelm and Hultman 2015: 11; Methmann et al. 2013a: 6) As Dryzek (2006: 3) argues, “discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action” (see also Adler 2008: 198). I assume, in line with these authors, that meaningful action—or practice—and meaningful talk—or discourse—construct or deconstruct the ideational meaning of an object. Further, I assume that practice is meaningful action which acts out certain meanings about the world, thus making it causally relevant. Practice theory provides tools to put actors center stage as practice as meaningful action depends on the existence of an actor. Adler and Pouilot describe practice theory as an “invitation […] to conceive of the social as bundles of ideas and matter that are linguistically, materially, and intersubjectively mediated in the form of practices” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 14). Practices as “meaningful patterns of action” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4) can more specifically be defined as a type of action, which, in turn, is a type of behavior. As Adler and Pouliot (2011: 5) describe: “[A]ction is behavior imbued with meaning. Running in the streets aimlessly is mere behavior, running after a thief is an action endowed with meaning.” For an action to be a practice, it needs to fulfill additional criteria: “Practices[…] are patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 5). Accordingly, a practice is behavior endowed with meaning, “embedded in an organizational context, repeated over time and space, constituted by knowledge […], and articulated as part of a complex set of other social performances […]” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). The knowledge in question is in part tacit, and it not only constitutes practices, but is also bound up in them. Adler and Pouliot call this ‘background knowledge’: “expectations, dispositions, skills, techniques, and rituals that are the basis for the constitution of practices and their boundaries” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 17). This background knowledge “does not create uniformity of a group of community, but organize[s] their differences around pervasive understandings of reality” (Adler and Bernstein 2005: 296). Ontologically, practice theory is understood by its proponents to provide a way out of the dichotomy of agency versus structure, or to conceptualize the two-fold characterization of actors as both constructed and constructing (see above). The agency-structuredichotomy describes an analytical problem similar to the one of hen and egg: Should agents inside of the structure be understood to have final causal power over phenomena in the social world, or is it the structure, which was in turn constructed by agents, that finally influences what happens? For example, should developments in global climate policy be accorded to the UNFCCC (structure) or to efforts of the government of small island states (actor)? According to the structuration theory by Giddens (1984), actors and structures determine and influence each other. Practice theory can give a more detailed insight into the workings of this reciprocal constitution: [P]ractices are both individual (agential) and structural […]. When ‘disaggregated’, practices are ultimately performed by individual human beings and thus they clearly are what human agency is about. […] Recursively, in and through practice, agents lock in structural meaning in time and space. (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 16) Adler argues that these agents, these ‘carriers’ of social structures across functional and geographical boundaries are not necessarily states or societal networks, but ‘communities of practice’ […] – like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice. (Adler 2008: 196) In the analysis of the discursive construction of CE, the tool of the Communities of Practice (CoP) approach is applied. The CoP approach allows for the analysis of actors which transcend national borders, such as transnationally active scholars, researchers and scientists as well as political and economic actors, all of whom can conceivably influence the social construction of CE—both of its ideational meaning and its causal materiality. The focus in this study lies on academic actors as a community of practice. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that communities of practice can be characterized as both actor and structure: Communities of practice are intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they also are agents, made up of real people, who – working via network channels, across national or organizational lines, and in the halls of government – affect political, economic, and social events. (Adler 2008: 199) The Epistemic Communities (EC) approach (see Haas 1992; Adler and Haas 1992), an approach “considered to be the most influential” (Beck 2015: 286) in the debate on the role of academic and other experts in global governance, can, according to Adler, be understood as the description of the role of a very specific type of community of practice (Adler 2008: 199). This approach provides the background for the explication of one of the central ontological assumptions of this study, namely that the academic discussion is particularly relevant in the construction and enactment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of CE as measure to address climate change. To sum up, the moderately idealist social-constructivist ontology defining the understanding of reality in this study means that specific communities of practice can—in interaction with other factors—constitute the meaning of an object and, by enacting this meaning through practice—again, in interaction with other factors— cause material change in the configuration of objects in the world. For example, a community of practice constituting the “normative and epistemic ground for action” (Adler 2008: 199) on cyber security such as the German Chaos Computer Club regularly constitutes the meanings of objects such as virtual networks or computer viruses by defining, for the former, their vulnerability to attack, and, for the latter, their threat potential. This is done, for example, in interviews or reports. The community also enacts these meanings through practice, e.g. by interacting with federal offices and agencies in order to change the material configurations in our reality according to the meanings applied to objects, e.g., changing the material basis of digital infrastructures in order to make them more resilient. In this study, the academic community researching CE constitutes the community of practice that is most interesting as it is assumed to play a significant role in the early construction of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of CE as a measure to address climate change.4 This community constitutes the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these approaches through framing them, for example in academic publications, which present a form of practice as these publications carry the framings of CE into the public, thus enacting these framings. However, it is important to note that this framing is, in most publications, not the main intention of the respective authors: Other than epistemic communities in their original conception, the group of academics researching and discussing CE approaches is not united in a common policy endeavor. The main intention of this diverse group of actors is the publication and discussion of research results. I claim, however, that even this disinterested activity can, when it concerns a set of physical objects that remain to be materially developed, influence the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these objects—in this case, CE approaches—even if this was not the intention of the actor. 2NC – Framing Urgency DA – short-term thinking limits out critical interrogation and distorts analysis. Bilgin and Morton ‘4 [Pinar; Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University. Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyt; Adam David; Former lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University; “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism”; 2004; Vol. 24, Issue 3; Political Studies Association; https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9256.2004.00217.x; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas ‘something’ needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of ‘short-termism’ in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as ‘approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation’. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-longterm implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state ‘failure’. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of ‘state failure’ in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa’eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, ‘strong’/’weak’ states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the ‘war on terror’ be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode ‘wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds’, towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude in relation to ‘failed states’, the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of ‘failure’ raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike. Governmentalization DA – failure to question irresponsible scholarship culminates in violent forms of management. Lucke ’20 [Franziskus von; Postdoctoral Researcher in International Relations at the University of Tübingen. His research focuses on critical security studies, climate politics and climate justice, and he has worked extensively on the securitisation of climate change.; “Chapter 1: Introduction and Theoretical Framework”; 2020; Springer; The Securitisation of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The above-described reconceptualisation of power and governance puts a new light on the concept of securitisation. Contrary to what the original framework implies (Buzan et al. 1998), securitisation processes do not consist of given subjects that utter speech acts independently from the overall discursive framing of the situation (Hansen 2000, p. 303). In fact, the subjects of security (e.g. securitising actors) cannot be thought of as existing prior to securitisation but are a product of the power relations ingrained in the securitisation process itself (Burgess 2011, p. 49). Ultimately, securitisation can be seen as an alternative way of exercising political power, and Foucault’s governmentality approach can help us to unpack this relationship. The starting point is the idea of a ‘governmentalisation of the state’ since the eighteenth century, which implies that top-down, sovereign power ceases to be the dominant way of ruling societies and is accompanied by other variants such as disciplinary and governmental power (Foucault 2006b, p. 163). This refocuses the attention of the state away from securing a territory by conventional security institutions such as the army, the police or intelligence services towards fostering the well-being of the population using a triangle of three different power forms and various ‘apparatuses’ or ‘mechanisms’ of security (Dean 2010, p. 29; Foucault 2006b, p. 161; Elbe 2009, p. 62). Instead of direct force, coercion or the issuing of laws, the exercise of power rests on statistical knowledge about the population and methods to discretely influence certain variables in the background (Foucault 2006b, pp. 90–97; Dean 2010, p. 29). This also leads to a blurring of the formerly much stricter boundaries between ‘normal’ politics and ‘extraordinary’ security practices. On the one hand, security becomes a technology of government, a way of ‘rendering things governable’ and thus changing how populations can be governed (Oels 2011, 2013; Opitz 2008, p. 2017). On the other hand, security practices and theoretical concepts themselves undergo a transformation and become less extraordinary and more multifaceted. Examples are new security concepts such as human security, environmental security, gender security or risk (Hardt 2017, p. 43). It is exactly this double transformation that marks the connection between the governmentality approach and securitisation theory. Elbe describes this as the ‘governmentalisation of security’ that has its origins in the 1980s and which means that security does no longer only draw on a sovereign form of power but incorporates disciplinary and particularly governmental forms of power as well (Elbe 2009, pp. 9, 64, 71, 78). The origins of this transformation of security lie in changing societal features and connected political and scientific debates that required new forms of government (Collier 2009). In this process, the importance of traditional security technologies declines, and they are combined with less direct and top-down forms of security based on the power triangle. Thus, the governmentalisation of security as well contributes to the blurring of (normal) and extraordinary or security politics. Security institutions and actors are progressively legitimised to help in fostering the welfare of the population outside the narrow military realm (Elbe 2009, p. 64). The field of environmental and especially climate politics illustrates this development. It shows the double movement of a ‘securitisation’ of nontraditional issues and a ‘climatisation’ (Oels 2012; Maertens 2018) of traditional concepts of security (Trombetta 2011; Corry 2012; Floyd and Matthew 2013; Hardt 2017), which I term as the ‘bidirectional’ qualities of securitisation. Following the premise of the governmentalisation of security means that we cannot conceptualise securitisation as mainly resting on sovereign power and its direct, extraordinary and supposedly negative effects—as done by the Copenhagen School (Opitz 2008, pp. 219, 220). Instead, to adequately account for the transformation of security, we should broaden the analytical approach and allow for different forms of securitisation that draw on different forms of power. The process of securitising an issue in this sense is an instance of governing, a process of rendering things governable through the lens of security and the application of different forms of power. As the term ‘governance’ in this reading of securitisation implies, securitisation processes are not a priori considered as something extraordinary; rather they constitute a specific way of governing, which may or may not entail extraordinary effects. However, this does not mean to entirely equate normal politics or governance with security. Instead, the core premise of securitisation theory still holds: designating something as an existential threat is different from a mere politicisation because it generates a sense of urgency, increases attention and eventually can narrow down the deliberative process. Security can act as a catalyst for the exercise of any form of political power and eventually can render the situation in a certain way and thus constitute a powerful ‘security truth’ (Burgess 2011, p. 39). Yet, based on a governmentality reading, this process becomes much more multifaceted, with different conceptions of security and power involved and different possible consequences of securitisation processes. Alt – Rethink Security Vote negative to rethink security. Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 19-21 A final point is necessary on the relationship between security and ethics as we conceive it, by way of introduction to this book. To develop a cosmopolitan ethics of security is not simply a case of applying "cosmopolitanism" to a particular issue area in global politics (security), but rather, rethinking how we understand and practice security. What limits existing accounts of the relationship between ethics and security is the tendency to ignore or downplay the particular politic of security: its centrality to the political legitimacy of the key actors in global politics; its capacity to define the core values of communities, and the manner in which they might be protected or advanced; its capacity to mobilise particular political responses or the actors undertaking them. -Fins is particularly applicable to discourses of "human security'', for example, and to some extent, critical engagement with security grounded in concerns with emancipation (Booth 2007). It is for these reasons that security is often seen to belong to the realm of "high politics": the most important objective of states, wherein the naming and relationship of "security" and "threat" designates political priority and can trigger extraordinary (and frequently illiberal and antidemocratic) responses, such as the violation of human rights or international law. This political function of security makes an analysis of the ethics of security more urgent, in part because of what is at stake in debates about security (definitions of community and values, and responsibilities to the self and others, for example). But this politics of security also complicates the simple application of cosmopolitan thought. In our view, what is needed is sustained engagement with the "politics of security" that argues for moral progress, while taking seriously the dangers of securitization and the apparent constraints placed upon the articulation of radical security alternatives. When taking account of the politics of security here, we particularly focus on the 'function of representations or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling particular policy or legitimating particular actors as security providers' (Browning and McDonald 2013). Engagement with the politics of security in this way has tended to come from theorists ofs ecurity in the post-structural tradition. For such thinkers, representations of security define political community or integrate individuals into an abstract notion of political community or national values (Burke 2008a; Campbell 1998a; Weldes 1999). Security, in this sense, can become a form of governmentality that shapes and moulds individuals for political ends. David Campbell's (1992, 1998a) analysis of the function of Cold War discourses of the communist threat in the United States is perhaps the most obvious case here. For Campbell, national security discourses served to define American identity in a narrow and highly, politicised way. In the process of constructing external threats to which the state ( in this instance) positions itself as the actor capable of providing security, those with power can exclude dissenting voices and political alternatives, and shut down needed debates about policy. For the so-called Copenhagen (or "securitization") School, security can be understood as a social construction, brought into being through "speech acts" that define particular dynamics, actors or things as existential threats. In the process, these issues are elevated above the realm of "normal- politics and into the high politics arena of security, where they are dealt with through urgency and secrecy. While its proponents do not deny the possibility that such developments may be progressive, ultimately their preference is for desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. This is most frequently based on the claim that security has an illiberal logic, limiting the possibility for dialogue and locating responsibility for providing security to those with power. But such a sedimented view of the logic of security can also apply to its meaning. For Ole Wxver (1995), at the heart of the concept of security 'we still find something to do with defence and the state' ( see also Berki 1986; Neocleous 2008). These alternative conceptions of security will be examined in more detail in the Chapter 1. They suggest something distinct about the study of security that makes it qualitatively different from other issue areas or "promises" of government. In this, we would agree, and reaffirm the need to take seriously the politics of security. But if these critics have most explicitly engaged with the politics of security and its dangers, their proposed response to the dangers of securitization—resisting or escaping security and its logics is problematic (Dillon and Reid 2009; Dillon 1996; W;,ever 1995). For these scholars, security is something that should be resisted, escaped or challenged. We think such critics go too far. They are right to identify the dangers of an unthinking embrace of security as a site of progress, and right too in drawing attention to the ways in which the promise of security for some can all too easily be defined on the basis of the continued suffering and marginalization of others, both within a particular political community and beyond. Yet, in acknowledging the pathologies of a dominant security discourse, and in failing to articulate a progressive alternative, they mistake this discourse for the timeless essence of what security means and does, paradoxically reinforcing its centrality in international relations. In rejecting the possibility that a range of actors can and do enact progressive notions of security, they deprive marginal actors and communities of a site of contestation and change. This pessimism has been contested in a range of " positive. " critical accounts of security (Booth 2007; Burke 2013a; Floyd 2011; Nunes 2012; Hoogensen-Gjory 2012; McDonald 2014; Roe 2012). What is needed, then, is an approach that is at once attuned to the dangers of embracing security—given its history of contributing to exclusionary practices and the status quo—while refusing to give up on defining a cosmopolitan conception of security oriented towards an integrated global society, and the rights and needs of the least powerful and most vulnerable. In a related way, we are concerned to see global security as a major priority that can be addressed as a part of the normal (not exceptional) practice of government and civil society action that are democratically and internationally accountable. In part, this is because exceptionalist practices have tended to reinforce nationalism and alienation, privilege the security of the few and undermine it for the many, and gravely damage global cooperation and consciousness. When international organisations become involved in global security governance, it is imperative that their practices and objectives either reflect the global interests and international norms painstakingly developed over decades, or seek to improve them in the cause of a just global security order that supports human dignity and flourishing. AT: Framework - CO2 Ag Arg Their framework is one that encourages CO2 ag debates and a continuation of broken politics, we must find a new way to debate climate policy Eubanks 2015 - Professor Emeritus Rhetoric and Composition @ Northern Illinois U Philip, The Troubled Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change, Routledge, p. x-xii I grew up in the 1950s and 1960s when everyone was worried about nuclear annihilation. In my grade school, we crawled underneath our desks and covered our heads with our arms to prepare for the atomic apocalypse. As young as I was, I realized that this might not be enough to shield me from an H-bomb. Nonetheless, no one-neither kids nor adults- found the premise of the exercise absurd: that if the world was going to be destroyed, we knew what was going to destroy it. It never occurred to us that the demise of human civilization might not come from any form of war but instead from an unintended consequence of prosperity. And here we are. Because of human activities that would seem to be far easier to manage than nuclear war, the world is engaged in an urgent debate about whether or not it has a future. A great majority of scientists have raised an alarm about rising temperatures and the all-but-certain devastation to follow. If the worst possibilities come to pass, books like this one won't matter very much for very long. The world as we know it just won't be here. Nonetheless, the subject of this book is far from trivial. We cannot begin to grapple with the looming climate crisis unless we address the problem of public argumentation. As we face what may be the greatest existential crisis in human history, I want us to ask ourselves anew: How should we argue when nothing could matter more than winning the argument? As a general proposition, I am not inclined to think of argumentation in terms of simply winning or losing. I share that disinclination with many other scholars of writing and rhetoric. We avoid talk of winning and losing for a good reason. Most of us imagine a world filled with arguments waiting to be made, a world in which the best argumentation moves us little by little toward ever-elusive truths-a world in which argumentation is essential, but no particular argument needs to prevail. In fact, many of us think it would be a mistake to hope for any particular argument to win, or even try to win, because good arguments lead to even better arguments in a messy but ultimately constructive process. Taking part in this process is how we live ethically and meaningfully; it is how we make a better world. That is not lofty idealism, either. Many times, it is both wiser and more realistic to think that argumentation- and persuasion of all kinds-ought to proceed according to Zeno's paradox: The best we can hope for is to move halfway toward an endpoint, then halfway again, and halfway again, never to arrive. That view requires us to respect others' ideas and to question our own judgments. However, when it comes to climate change, the notion of endless debate seems to be not just dissatisfying but also dangerous. Some arguments must get settled. Some arguments need to be settled the correct way. Straightforward victoryseeking argumentation would seem to be the right tool for the job. But that, of course, is the kind of argumentation that already dominates the public sphere, and it is- not just in my estimation-working very poorly. It has led not to victory or consensus but to stalemate and polarization. Indeed, what we are witnessing is a dismal case study in the failure of win-lose argumentation. The facts support one side and not the other. They have been established meticulously, expressed clearly, and disseminated widely. And yet the debate continues unabated. I am aware of the potential oversimplifications that my just-the-facts framing of the problem might inspire. Over the past few decades, scholars of the rhetoric of science have worked hard, and convincingly, to show us that the scientific "fact" is not as stable and selfevident as people commonly believe (Bazerman; Ceccarelli; Fahnestock; Knorr-Cetina; Latour and Woolgar; Myers). Science, it turns out, is as rhetorically complicated as every other human endeavor-perhaps more so because it so successfully conceals its vagaries within apparently objective procedures and language. Yet even if we adopt a clear-eyed view of the complicated ways that scientific knowledge is developed, we still have to recognize that, in the end, science deals with the physical world: that not all scientific judgments are equally valid. Among climate scientists, the idea that human activity is causing the Earth to warm dangerously is not the least bit controversial. The challenge is gaining broad acceptance of that fact among the general public. On the way to acceptance, scientists' findings about climate change must pass through the crucible of public argumentation . And what a crucible it is. As Leah Ceccarelli points out, climate change is one of many issues coolly agreed upon by scientists but hotly disputed in public argumentation. She calls these disputes "manufactured controversies" ("Manufactured"). But manufactured or not, they shape public opinion, even among those who are not fundamentally against science or, as I will show in this book, not especially unreasonable. In other words, we face what I call a daunting argumentative situation. In the chapters that follow, I describe what has gone wrong with our argumentative situation. I argue that the debate is plagued by a collection of mutually exacerbating problems that make the climate change debate more intractable than most of us already believe. Indeed, the debate is intractable in ways that render our usual responses largely ineffective. The problems, in brief, are these: • Although we usually see the climate change debate as a disagreement about science itself, both sides espouse nearly identical attitudes about science and objectivity, and neither recognizes the influence of its own predispositions on its attitude toward science. Although we often see opposition to climate change as a willful refusal to acknowledge facts, recent transformations in public attitudes toward facts and authority encourage us to confuse reasonable and unreasonable doubts. That confusion makes it difficult-not just for climate skeptics-to accept many public claims of fact. Although we usually see the climate change debate as a perversion of proper argumentation, it actually proceeds as argumentation typically does. Rather than arguing to correct error, all of us typically argue to preserve our intuitions. That allows basic human frailties, such as motivated reasoning and confirmation bias, to interfere with our judgments. Although we usually see the climate change debate as a competition between political and economic interests, the divide between pro and conwhich is to say left and right-is much deeper. In the United States and in much of the West, we are self-sorted into opposing ideological camps. These camps adhere to deeply held moral foundations, which are evident in predominant conceptual metaphors and metonymies, including the key figures that shape people's attitudes toward the Earth itself. Changes in the way we communicate--driven partly by technology and driven partly by a new emphasis on visual communication-make attention rather than truth the commodity that is most desired. And in the course of vying for attention, all of the factors that tend to undermine rational deliberation are amplified. Any one of these factors might by itself make the climate change debate difficult. But taken together, they create a situation that makes the worst of argumentation not only possible but likely. The fact is, the current argumentative situation is not very encouraging. But it's not yet time to give up hope. In the end, I will offer some suggestions about how we ought to argue when "winning" matters. I do not insist that my suggestions are the only possible ones. However, I do insist that we need to think anew about what we expect from arguments about climate change and how we should undertake them. Empirically their framework has failed – we must roll the dice on the alt Milkoreit 2016 - Senior Sustainability Fellow, Walton Sustainability Solutions Initiatives Manjana, “The promise of climate fiction: imagination, storytelling, and the politics of the future” in Reimaging Climate Change, Routledge, p. 188-189 Political decision-making on climate change faces major imagination challenges - envisioning possible and desirable futures based on available scientific data, understanding possible pathways of change in interacting socialenvironmental systems, and understanding how today's decisions might affect different pathways of change and ultimately the future humans will experience. Such imaginations are not only hard, they also hardly ever happen in the minds of political decision-makers today. It is a cognitiveemotional skill that needs to learned and practiced. This chapter has explored the potential power of climate fiction - a growing literary genre that deals with climate change - to stimulate, aid, and enrich the political imagination. I have argued that rather than offering novel solutions, climate fiction stories provide subtle and complex lessons concerning the intricate relationship between climate, society, economics, and politics. There are six possible effects of reading climate fiction on the individual and collective imagination regarding climate change: 1 meaning-making and learning; 2 mental simulation of (novel) solutions; 3 exploring values and ethical dimensions of climate change; 4 emotional time travel; 5 complex systems thinking; and 6 reaching diverse mass audiences. My discussion of three specific works of climate fiction Kingsolver's Flight Behavior, Atwood's MaddAddam triology and Turner's The Sea and Sumer - touched on some these, especially (1) and (5). None of the novels selected for this analysis has a happy ending, which raises important questions concerning the impacts of dystopian versus utopian writing. Dystopian novels might make it more challenging for the reader to envision positive and desirable futures. They can also generate a host of difficult, negative emotions, reinforcing the scientific doomsday messages that have had, at best, a mixed record in mobilizing people for change. At the same time, dystopian stories can offer valuable reflections concerning today's social challenges and the long-term implications of the decisions we make, both individually and collectively. At the very least they can help us understand what kinds of futures we want to prevent, motivating us to contemplate steps in more desirable directions. The ideas I have explored in this chapter are an invitation to scholars working at the boundary between social science, arts, and humanities to start exploring the phenomenon of imagination and the impact of climate fiction on climate politics empirically. Beyond this research awaits the question whether and how insights about imagination and climate fiction can be used to design or improve existing decision-making and governance processes, maybe through participatory methods or targeted interventions into a deliberative system. At the very least, I hope that this foray into cli-fi demonstrates the benefits of using the imagination in artistic ways to shake-up habitual thinking and create room for novel explorations into how to respond to climate change. Naomi Klein has recently argued that addressing climate change requires changing everything - our economic, technological, governmental, and cultural systems. If she is even half right, we need to move beyond Climate Inc. strategies. Cultivating an appreciation for cli-fi and mining cli-fi's insights for lessons and inspiration supports such an exploration. It allows us to get out of the bind that Einstein defined when he supposedly said, "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them." Ethics First If we win that the aff is unethical, we win the debate Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 173-4 Ethics is not an "optional extra" to discussions about or practices of security. Any attempt to define security involves inherently ethical choices about whose security is in need of preserving, about what priorities should be given to particular referent objects or in confronting particular threats, and about where the boundaries of ethical and political community ultimately lie. Rather than proceed as if the worlds of security and ethics are separate ones, we need to be clear about the ethical assumptions and implications of particular security conceptions and practices. From here, we can begin to identify those security perspectives and practices that might be ethically defensible or progressive and consider the conditions under which they might come to be articulated, supported and institutionalized. This is precisely what this book has attempted to do in a specifically global context. Dominant approaches to and practices of security in international relations, we have argued, have always been built on a limited moral edifice—the fiction of a universal strong nation-state and the straitjacket of the social contract. Aside from the nonnative limits of such approaches, detailed in Chapter 1, this conception of the strong state as security guarantor in an anarchic international system is increasingly inconsistent with the realities of world politics. It is clear that the key future and contemporary challenges of global politics—those major threats to international security—do not defer to the spatial imaganaries of the nation-state. And states themselves increasingly recognize the transnational nature of many of the most pressing security threats and the imperative of cooperation in response. While outlining the limits of traditional approaches to security and exploring the ethical assumptions and implications of a range of other security discourses, this book has also made a case for a cosmopolitan approach to global security. Such an approach orients around the three principles outlined in the Introduction to this book: a global security responsibility in which all security actors work towards enduring security for all; a future security responsibility in which security actors consider the impact of their decisions, choices and commitments through time; and a global categorical imperative of security, in which security actors act as if the principles and consequences of their action will endure across time and space. We have made the case that such an approach is the most ethically defensible approach to security in global politics, underpinned by cosmopolitan principles of non-discrimination. Nation-states, in this schema, should be viewed as legitimate security actors to the extent that they serve as agents of global security. This does not, as outlined in Chapter 6, preclude the celebration of forms of identity below the state. It does suggest that discrimination against, or reduced ethical consideration towards, nonmembers, can never be justified. At points, this cosmopolitan conception was extended further, as in Chapter 4, where we outlined the need for recognition of the rights and needs of other living beings. We ultimately believe a strong ethical case for principles of cosmopolitan nondiscrimination can be mounted in the context of global security. But if such an approach has normative appeal, it is also becoming a practical necessity (see Bray 2013). Simply put, it makes little sense to think of states as self-contained "referent objects" in the context of the most pressing security threats in the international arena, and states themselves are unable to unilaterally address these threats. This applies to a long list of global security challenges: climate change, population movements, WMD proliferation, disease, poverty, human rights, humanitarian assistance, regional conflict, and economic management. These dynamics cannot now if they ever could—be effectively addressed within or by an individual state alone, no matter how powerful. They require genuine and sustained international cooperation by a range of actors and in a range of institutional settings, and this in turn requires the embrace of a global sensibility oriented towards a "global community". Yet in exploring these issues, we self-consciously and deliberately addressed key dilemmas of interpretation and practice across the issue areas chosen, dilemmas that complicate a simple embrace of a cosmopolitan perspective. How can we balance the responsibility to provide security for the vulnerable with the need to preserve an international order, especially in zones of complex insecurity? How do we conceptualize a role for force as a tool for global security while working towards its eradication? How can we begin to orient our security considerations towards other living beings or the not-yet-horn? How can we find ethical solutions to the use of terrorism while recognizing the profound injustices that sometimes motivate it? How can we emphasize principles of cosmopolitan non-discrimination whilst recognizing the importance of more particular forms of community and identity? How can we consider what might seem an unchallengeable cosmopolitan practice humanitarianism in the complex and unequal practical circumstances in winch it is carried out? This volume did not shy away from these questions, instead addressing them directly. While they present complex dilemmas for any attempt to orient towards a global security perspective, they also serve to remind us of the inherent challenges associated with applying abstract ideas to an imperfect and acutely complicated world. Rhetoric Focus Key A focus on rhetoric is necessary to develop the tools to break down neoliberalism Schneider et al 2016 – Associate prof of public policy and administration @ Boise State U Jen, Steve Schwarze, Peter K Bsumek, and Jennifer Peeples, Under Pressure: Coal industry rhetoric and neoliberalism, Palgrave, p. 176-177 However, cultural critics and advocates alike would be wise to remember that the house that neoliberalism built was in fact built-it is a construct, if a very powerful one. Neoliberalism may be embedded, but it is not natural or inevitable. We must find and seek out examples of alternative social, political, and economic arrangements. One lesson that seems clear is that the house that neoliberalism built was not built in a day-its ideas and discourses were fomented and nurtured for many years before neoliberal political and economic coalitions were able to cloak themselves as disinterested and populist. To that end, we offer our identification of coal's rhetorical strategies as a heuristic for rhetorical invention, and we call others to join in this kind of work. By identifying and naming the rhetorical strategies that attempt to advance fossil fuel interests through neoliberal ideology, such work can generate a shared vocabulary for scholarly criticism and public resistance not only in relation to the coal industry but also in relation to the broader project of neoliberalization. Perhaps it is also worth remembering that in the US, it was during periods of sustained progressive governance (Progressive Era, The New Deal, and the Great Society), or at times when the ideas that enabled and sustained those political coalitions remained more or less intact and continued to hold sway (such as during the Nixon Administration) when some of the most significant environmental policy reforms were enacted. Thus, it is with an eye toward envisioning (environmental) rhetorics that might contribute to the deconstruction of neoliberalism's house, and with another eye on building a new house, that we have engaged in this critical project. Change will not happen overnight, but it will certainly not happen if it is not nurtured. In this way, analysis of environmental rhetoric helps identify provocative possibilities for critique and advocacy. Each of the strategies identified in this book suggests these possibilities. As our analysis in Chap. 2 demonstrates, opponents of environmental regulation have been making apocalyptic claims about the implications of environmental regulation from the start of the modern environmental movement. And, time after time, these claims have proven to be overstated and overwrought. By pointing this out, advocates not only debunk such claims, but can also call into question the ideological underpinning and enabling rationality of the argument. In short, there actually are alternatives to unfettered markets and neoliberal rationality. Polluting industries have been regulated in the past without apocalyptic outcomes. The environmental argument can engage neoliberalism's positive project by advancing a robust alternative of its own, emphasizing alternative social arrangements. We see much to be hopeful for in the rise of the localism, "maker," and "post-carbon" movements, which-though embedded in larger economies-offer visions for collective organization that are richer and more meaningful than some ofneoliberalism's more hollow promises. AT: Our Discourse Good Their discourse will get coopted—prefer the alt lone Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 176 Another set of objections might focus on the extent to which the approach articulated here is a novel one. For Mary Kaldor (2013), for example, a commitment to cosmopolitanism in security conceptions and practices could be viewed as consistent with the precepts of human security, itself built on liberal ethical principles. And for others, the link between security and emancipation articulated i n so-called "Welsh School" o r "Aberystwyth School" approaches t o security might be seen to sufficiently capture the cosmopolitan approach articulated here, not least as all three authors have broadly endorsed Booth's work in other contexts ( LeeKoo 2(107; Burke 2007, 2013a; McDonald 2012b). Certainly, the human security approach can he read as a powerful form of critique of existing security theories and practices, focusing on the perverse choices in traditional approaches to ignore the realities of insecurity faced by many of the ( poorest) people of the world. Yet this discourse has arguably been co-opted by existing political institutions, often in a manner that finds to accommodate the nature of the original critique (McDonald 2002). The Canadian Government's embrace of human security, for example, has been limited to the 'freedom from fear' agenda, and has focused on the question of organized violence. Such an interpretation risks leaving aside the profound global and structural arrangements and axes of insecurity that frequently drive direct violence and constitute important axes of insecurity in their own right (Christie 2010). The emancipatory security discourse is more compelling in this sense, revolving as it does around a concern with the rights and needs of the most vulnerable and their empowerment in the context of profound structural constraints (see Booth ed. 2005; 2007). There is much about this approach that we would endorse in this book. Yet even while recognizing the political significance of security, this approach inadequately accounts for the politics of security: the question of what security does, how it orders social relations, how it serves as a site of contestation between competing actors and discourses, and how it enables particular sets of practices and institutions (see Browning and McDonald 2013). In this book we have argued that an effective cosmopolitan account of global security must come to terms with these dynamics, including the dangers of securitization, while recognizing that the meaning and logic of security is not set across time and space. AT: Utopianism Utopian goals feed pragmatic solutions, but prior rethinking is necessary Anshelm 2015 – Prof @ Linkoping U Jonas and Martin Hultman, Discourses of Global Climate Change, Routledge, p. 94 What was visible in contemporary political debates in Sweden was mostly an anti-utopian utopianism, a conservative utopianism, in which the claim to pragmatism served to repress its utopian character. The consequence of this was the continued possibility of rejecting challenges and alternatives as "utopian" while placing the ideological/utopian claims of one's own position beyond scrutiny. One argument for the importance of utopianism was its inevitability, that is, by legitimizing the process of holistic thinking about the "good" society, it enabled the content of different "utopian" visions to be brought to the table. The green socialists argued critically against the hegemonic capitalistic system in their portrayal of a future ecotopia. Their description of utopia was characterized by the image of a future human community in which conflicts were no longer present. Utopia does not appear bizarre or uninteresting, but attract its readers with scientific terminology, logical necessity and emotions (Manuel and Manuel, 1979). As Bloch argued, utopian visions of the future and concrete actions for a better world underpin the human propensity to long for and imagine another life. Crucially, however, this longing cannot be articulated other than through imagining its fulfilment (Bloch, 2000). If utopia is understood as the expression of the desire for a better way of being, then it is perhaps a secularized version of the spiritual quest to understand who we are, why we are here and how we connect with each other (Harvey, 2000). Reality must include the horizon of future possibilities; utopia as forward dreaming is not esoteric culturally, or a distraction from class struggle, but an unavoidable and indispensable element in shaping the future. Utopia, in this sense, does not require the imaginative construction of whole other worlds. It occurs as an embedded element in a vast range of human practice and culture (Bloch, 2000). Green socialists in Sweden proclaimed that it would require collective political action and opinion formation to bring about climate-friendly decisions. This process could be extra-parliamentary and consist of occupations and boycotts, but it could also consist of appeals, mass demonstrations and the creation of local pockets of people who were striving towards climatefriendly lifestyles. Closely related was the notion that the discourse included both strong rationalist and romantic images of a climatefriendly society. The rationalist idea, that the way to achieve a climate-friendly society was through massive public investment and government-planned programmes, actually dominated the discourse. Large-scale government action programmes, comparable to the mobilization for war, rationing schemes and reconstruction that took place during the Second World War, were preferable. Side by side with this rationalist idea was the eco-socialist image of a climate-friendly society characterized by localization of the economy, cooperative forms of ownership, decentralization, small-scale self-sufficiency and self-determination. AT: Alt = Nihilism The affirmative is nihilism, not the alt Parr 2015 - Taft Research Center, UNESCO co-chair of water, The University of Cincinnati Adrian, "The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections," Geoforum, Vol 62, p 70-72 Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. 2NC – ! ! – Malthusianism Reinforcing neo-Malthusian notions of scarcity causes military interventionism along racial and gendered lines. Ojeda et al. ’20 [Diana; Assistant Professor, Instituto de Estudios Sociales y Culturales, Pensar, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana; “Malthus’s specter and the anthropocene”; 2020; Vol. 27, Issue 3; Gender, Place & Culture; https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2018.1553858; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] While LaBruzzo’s plan failed (and he was immediately removed from his Committee post), it bears noting that his coercive proposal was put forth within a context in which climate change is increasingly framed in hyperbolic terms. Climate change discourses say that life as we know it is threatened at a scale that was, in prior decades, unfathomable; that this is an immediate and overwhelming threat; and that the consequences of not acting expeditiously are untenable. In the context of such crisis-driven scenarios, strategies that might constrict individual reproductive rights are articulated as a necessary sacrifice. Climate change rearticulated through a neo-Malthusian lens also opens the door to militarized interventions. These are as much masculinist approaches to conflict as they are ones that spin decidedly on (often deeply racialized) gender norms (Enloe 2000). Betsy Hartmann, for instance, illustrates how militarized international strategies for reducing population growth especially in Africa are motivated by fears both of overly reproductive young women and of young men as potential terrorists. Interestingly, both images reflect neo-Malthusian fears, here of overly-reproductive, resource-degrading women and of men who turn to violence in the face of imperiled environments. The result is the development of what Hartmann (2014) refers to as MARA, or the ‘Malthusian Anticipatory Regime for Africa.’ MARA ultimately acts as a “gendered rationale for Western humanitarian and military interventions” into Africa particularly by Western actors (757). In this schema, with the health of both the planet and global political stability at stake, extraordinary interventions—including military interventions— are justified. As Hartmann notes, the growing War on Terror in Africa is supported by the perceived urgency of preemptively addressing climate conflict. Katz (2008) too points to the problematic effects of the rationale behind militarized responses and the criminalization of the victims of environmental harm—including storms like Hurricane Katrina likely made more severe by climate change—instead of focusing attention on their immediate needs. It is important to note that this move fits into a much larger masculinist response to environmental challenges that privileges a disembodied, top-down approach and reinforces coercive means of surveillance and control. This is one of developing militarized responses to climate change (Gilbert 2012) and to environmental challenges more broadly, what amounts to a growing commitment to green militarization (Lunstrum 2014). It is worth mentioning that discourses of overpopulation prove useful for elites who seek to avoid responsibility for fueling conflict, as explanations linking population growth, scarcity, and conflict provide leaders a sort of ‘natural’ alibi. This unfolded in the elite-orchestrated and state-sanctioned conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. Dismissing its historical roots in British colonial rule and vast economic, political and regional inequality, Darfur’s conflict has been framed by the UN and mainstream media as the result of increasing competition over natural resources (Hartmann 2014; Verhoeven 2014). Population fears are productive precisely because they play into class-based, gendered and racialized assumptions regarding the reproductive activity of ‘Third World’ women, as well as men, and their progressively degraded environments. T/C – Climatization The securitization of climate science recreates flawed scholarship and reinforced problematic understandings of water resources. Wine ’20 [Michael L.; Postdoctoral Fellow, Geomorphology and Fluvial Research Group, Ben Gurion University of the Negev.; “Climatization of environmental degradation: a widespread challenge to the integrity of earth science”; 2020; Vol. 65, Issue 6; Hydrological Sciences Journal; https://doi.org/10.1080/02626667.2020.1720024; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] Scientific climatization occurs when the role of climatic drivers in eliciting an observed state is overstated as part of the normal business of science. This overstatement can occur readily due to the often-high correlation between climatic and non-climatic drivers, growing awareness of anthropogenic climate change, and a persistent propensity for disciplinary investigation of inter-disciplinary problems. Instances of scientific climatization may occur when an idealized conceptual model is adopted (Abbott et al. 2019b), the effects of model uncertainty are neglected, a disciplinary team of scientists studies an interdisciplinary problem, or when incisive attempts to falsify the climatic thesis are overlooked. As a consequence of climatization, hydrologic process understanding is impaired until the misattribution has been corrected. The consequence of this misattribution then is a weakened scientific basis for water management. However, once scientific climatization is corrected, it often results in a more robust scientific literature. Securitization-aligned climatization bears many similarities to scientific climatization, with the exception of impairment of freedom of expression of affected scientists through encouragement and coercion (Wine 2019d) by a securitizing state actor.9 This coercion arises from the great expense involved in solving hydrologic problems – often water scarcity or water quality degradation – in comparison to the substantially lower expense of attributing those problems to climatic factors outside of the government’s control. As a result, instances of securitization-aligned climatization may be characterized by secrecy regarding key hydrologic data (Momblanch et al. 2019a, Wine 2019e), questions of reproducibility (Abbott et al. 2019a), or conclusions by scientists domiciled in securitized states that differ from those of scientists whose freedom of expression is protected (Wine 2019d), even on the basis of similar results. In contrast to scientific climatization, which following correction tends to lead to improved scientific understanding, this is not the intent of securitization-aligned climatization. By persistently funding, encouraging, and coercing a particular view, this perspective tends to persist in the scientific literature. The result of this persistent securitizing state-sponsored climatization is ambiguity regarding the state of the hydrologic science, with all that that implies for water policy. T/C – Serial Policy Failure Securitized climate discourse results in serial policy failure and worse forms of violence. Abrahams ’19 [Daniel; Former Research Associate in Environmental Studies, Ph.D. in Geography from the University of South Carolina and Master’s in Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University.; “From discourse to policy: US policy communities’ perceptions of and approaches to climate change and security”; 2019; Vol. 19, No. 4; Conflict, Security & Development; https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1637080; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The use of climate-security discourses in advancing political action on climate change more generally faces a paradoxical challenge. Though it would seem framing climate change in terms of national security – perceived as an issue relatable to a conservative audience – this assumption has been challenged, both by research participants and in literature examining political framings of climate change. For example, Myers et al. argue that when climate change is framed as a security issue, as compared with an issue of ecology or public health, it is more likely to elicit anger from those who doubt or dismiss the scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change.70 In this way, while the connection between climate change and security offers a message on climate change that appears compelling to non-traditional or uninterested actors, that message appears to be ineffective, even actively disagreeable, especially if coming from the environmental community.71 This paradox warrants further consideration in its implications for both mitigation policy that is informed by climate-security discourses and the risks of securitisation of climate change policy.72 Without greater evidence to clarify the questions of how to adapt and build resilience in a conflict-sensitive manner, there is a significant risk that policy will continue down a path of ineffective programme promotion, uneven motivation for engagement and strategic mobilisation of poorly understood conflict risk for political ends. At the same time, ineffective programmes might themselves trigger or exacerbate conflict.73 Finally, framing climate-security solely in the idea that climate change is a threat multiplier risks ignoring themes in peace-building literature that note the potential of leveraging climate change adaptation as a peace-building tool, and the importance of climate change and natural resource management in post-conflict settings.74 Such outcomes are unnecessary, but distressingly likely, in the absence of more nuanced discursive framings. AT: Dem Peace Theory Democratic peace theory encourages some of the worst atrocities in history Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 41-2 Liberal approaches therefore explicitly address ethical questions in their consideration of security. In particular, they engage directly with complex questions associated with the nature of the nonnative framework of an international society and the means through which those norms might be strengthened, defended or advanced. There is recognition here that the moral universe does indeed extend beyond nation-states to the international sphere as a whole, even while disagreements exist about the depth of universalism. There is something of a lowest common denominator tendency within liberal thought in this sense. In particular, the tendency towards preserving agreed minimal international standards does have the effect of prioritising concerns of order over justice. The focus on nominal standards also tends to encourage a focus on the laws of war rather than inquiring deeply into war as an institution or the complex sources of violence in the state system; likewise challenges to vulnerable outsiders associated with global environmental change or the structure of the international economic system remain invisible. The focus on states also creates ethical limitations; for some the reverence for the "good state" has the potential of validating the state system in ways that obfuscates movements towards a genuine global sensibility or fundamental responses to global problems (Burke 2013b; Fishel 2013). If an ethical minimalism is one danger or limit of liberal approaches, so too is a maximalist conception of what constitutes a good state. This applies to the so-called democratic peace thesis, which suggests that liberal democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other (see Russett 1994; Doyle 1986). The endorsement of this mode of governance arguably encourages a commitment to the spread of liberal democratic political systems in ways that risks imposing an external (and Western) conception of the "good'', even potentially through the use of force. For some critics, this liberal vision of security was evident even in the conunitment to regime change in Iraq in 2003, with the Bush administration invoking liberal principles of freedom and democracy to justify that intervention. Again, the tendency to validate states and the state system risks legitimising those actors with the capacity to define and implement universal standards of "acceptable" behaviour. This is particularly prominent in critical and post-colonial critiques ofliberalism and liberal conceptions of security (Hynek and Chandler 2010; Neocleous 2008). There is much in the liberal account of security that finds purchase in contemporary practices of world politics, from the norm of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) to practices of peacekeeping and intervention, and international cooperation on issues as disparate as climate change and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, if security hinges on the preservation of the normative structure of international society, tensions over what the norms of that society are create ethical ambiguity about a liberal vision of security. In essence, the pluralism of the liberal vision of security, combined with a tendency to validate states and the state system, contributes to a situation in which the most powerful actors are disproportionately able to define the nature and scope of the international society in need of protection. In attempting to develop a security framework with immediate relevance to the concerns of policymakers, liberals risk allowing those policymakers to define the "good" and the practices undertaken in its name. In turn, this enables those actors with an immediate interest in the preservation ofthe international status quo disproportionate power to determine the possibilities and limits of international society. From our perspective, given the failings of its key institutions to deal effectively with global security threats such as climate change, refugee flows and (growing) global economic inequality, this tendency to reinforce the status quo is unacceptable. AT: Environ Sec Good Environmental securitization ensures the militarization of the environment Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 32-4 Ethical questions and debates loomed large over such attempts to broaden the security agenda. The attempts to broaden this agenda to include issues such as environmental change were driven by normative commitments to addressing such problems, underpinned by the idea that with their designation as security threats would conic increased political profile, attention, funding and priority for these " neglected" issues. Indeed authors advocating the "broadening" of security in this way frequently emphasized the opportunity costs of the billions of dollars spent by states on armies and tools of war relative to more important priorities such as official development assistance or renewable energy (Mathews 1989). It is no coincidence, in this sense, that a range of authors arguing for the redefinition of security to include environmental concerns were affiliated with environmental NGOs or think-tanks aimed at mobilizing responses to environmental change (see Hartmann 2009; McDonald 2013a). There is much that is intuitively appealing about the attempt to lift issues such as environmental change onto the security agenda as a means of challenging the traditional association of security with the state and war, not least given the problematic priorities underpinning this discourse of security. Yet, while working from assumptions about the mobilizing power of security, these accounts failed to reflect on the politics of security itself. As Daniel Deudney (1990) asked, is it wise to assume that "security" has this progressive effect; that promoting environmental issues to the realm of security won't bring with it a militarization of such problems and logics of exceptionalism? Such a failure to systematically examine what security does is problematic: it opens "broadeners" up to the criticism that theirs is a project that potentially invites illiberal political practices and institutions to hold sway over the management of pressing transnational political problems like climate change and environmental degradation. In a more fundamental sense, the "broadening" agenda also risks leaving security power and legitimacy where it is. There is a danger that without redefining who security is actually for, issues such as environmental change might come to be seen as security threats to the extent that they are solely understood as threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state. Not only might we fail to challenge the statism of contemporary global politics, but we risk encouraging perverse responses to problems such as environmental change. States might recognize climate change as a threat, but if such a response is oriented towards realist strategic concerns, states with relative self-sufficiency may build physical barriers (even walls) around their borders to protect against an influx of so-called " environmental refugees" a scenario anticipated in a 2003 Pentagon report on the national security implications of climate change (Schwartz and Randall 2003). These issues are discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. In our view, security ethics is best honoured by more fundamentally questioning the meaning, structure, and ends of security. If we simply add poverty, environmental change, or disease to the list of challenges to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, we leave other key constituent elements of security in place, and enable existing security providers to embrace and potentially co-opt this "broader agenda", blunting more radical critiques of the association of security and the state system. Indeed it is probably no coincidence that recognition of the "broader range of threats" to security has found its way in to security statements and agenda of existing institutional security providers. AT: Growth Decoupling GHGs Growth is not decoupling from emissions, only the alt can solve Taminiau 2016 – post-doctoral fellow @ the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Joe and John Bryne, “Reconsidering growth in the greenhouse: The Sustainable Energy Utility (SEU) as a practical strategy for the twenty-first century” in Green Growth: Ideology, political economy and alternatives, Zed Books, p. 240-241 The blending of virtue with technological and management capability inserts the logic that every improvement in technological and managerial application delivers a normative benefit. Effectively, the commodification of the environment can be seen as a pursuit of making climate change itself efficient: the carbon price now becomes the dominant guiding mechanism whether climate change mitigating actions should be performed as marginal decision-making processes determine whether the reduction of one more unit of emission reductions is efficient. This notion was coined 'efficient global warming' by one of the authors.2i These considerations expose a critical weakness in growth-based strategies: the relationship between society, nature and economy- other than commonly represented 'triangles' of sustainable development which suggest economic activity, nature and society have independent components - is one of fundamental integration. In order to account for the fundamental nature of 'planetary boundaries',26 a principle of sufficiency thus needs to be inserted beyond which growth in an absolute sense is no longer pursued. The empirical record for absolute decoupling - impact decreases in absolute terms even as economic growth continues - however, is far from robust. 27 Evidence of relative decoupling is unsurprising as profit-maximization strategies continually seek to gain additional value from each unit of input, but absolute decoupling represents a more fundamental notion: limiting expansion to stay within absolute, non-market boundaries of the natural system. Studies on environmental dependency suggest that the empirical record to support decarbonization or dematerialization along lines of 'absolute decoupling' is weak.28 Additionally, a growing body of literature continues to critique the position that economies can grow their way out of environmental harm to the point where the position has become largely untenable.29 Indeed, it appears that only economic crisis has been able to materially affect the rising pattern of global greenhouse gas emissions. However, investigations into the effects of such downturns on global emissions suggest that the effect is not only short-lived but also marginaJ.i0 Cornucopian promises of equality, therefore, rationalize the weakening of the fundamental nature of ecological limitations and their social inequality consequences. In fact, absolute restraint in line with ecological limits is considered irrational unless market efficiency, in the form of for instance a carbon price, dictates such change. The fundamental and ethical character of ecological limitations is further eroded as technological and managerial capability improves. Equality as a construct of growth therefore fails to materialize as business-as- usual extrapolations demonstrate the unworkable energy and environmental future of the modern energy regime.3'· 32 The need for a different pathway is apparent. AT: Neolib Inev Rhetoric positing neoliberalism as inevitable naturalizes violence Schneider et al 2016 – Associate prof of public policy and administration @ Boise State U Jen, Steve Schwarze, Peter K Bsumek, and Jennifer Peeples, Under Pressure: Coal industry rhetoric and neoliberalism, Palgrave, p. 175-176 At the beginning of this chapter, we suggested that speculations about the future of coal often come with an air of inevitability. Procoal advocates see continued reliance on coal as inevitable, considering coal's abundance, affordability, and embeddedness in our social, economic, and politi- cal systems. Likewise, coal's opponents observe the increasing tempo of regulatory announcements, coal corporation bankruptcy filings, and insti- tutional divestment commitments, as well as the rise of natural gas, and begin to speculate about the inevitability of coal's demise. Even these lim- ited examples provide further evidence for how inevitability has become an important trope both in pro-coal advocacy (Rafey & Sovacool, 2011 ) and in neoliberal discourse (Gilbert, 2005). The trope of inevitability only reinforces the troubling aspects of neoliberalism for environmental com- munication, as it attempts to rationalize a state of affairs in which human agency and the possibility of choice has been foreclosed. It is for this reason that we encourage further examination of environmentalist claims regarding the "inevitable" decline of coal, especially given the industry's relative success in resisting regulation to this point. Furthermore, we find the rhetoric of inevitability a curious strategy for climate activists. While it may sustain a sense of hope among move- ment actors who find themselves confronting seemingly insurmountable resistance from the fossil fuel industry, it begs questions of agency and strategy: How, precisely and concretely, will this resistance be overcome? Such has been the central rhetorical and political problem for environmen- talists since the early 1990s, and the urgency of the climate issue demands focused, strategic thinking about this problem (Cox, 2010). The rhetoric of inevitability puts climate activists at risk of foreclosing examination of how they might articulate their concerns with other voices seeking fundamental changes to economic and political systems that are increasingly influenced by neoliberalism. Our approach suggests that the contradictions of coal's corporate advocacy present an opportunity for iden- tifying alliances and broader coalitions with those who wish to challenge the confluence of money/ speech and the dominance of corporate voices in the public sphere. Likewise, our analysis suggests that the coal industry is perhaps most vulnerable on issues of economics and morality that stretch well beyond the traditional "environmental" focus of messaging by environmental NGOs and pressure groups. That is to say, the primary contradictions in coal's corporate advocacy and in neoliberalism more broadly involve issues ranging from corporate subsidies and regulations, to free speech and democratic participation, to morality and social justice. However, cultural critics and advocates alike would be wise to remember that the house that neoliberalism built was in fact built-it is a construct, if a very powerful one. Neoliberalism may be embedded, but it is not natural or inevitable. We must find and seek out examples of alternative social, political, and economic arrangements. One lesson that seems clear is that the house that neoliberalism built was not built in a day-its ideas and discourses were fomented and nurtured for many years before neoliberal political and economic coalitions were able to cloak themselves as disinterested and populist. AT: Realism Realism fails in the context of warming – it will opt for a continuation of business-as-usual Falk 2016 - Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University Richard, “Climate Change, policy knowledge, and the temporal imagination” in Reimaging Climate Change, Routledge, p. 56-57 There is a final observation relevant to taking account of possibly grave risks relating to future catastrophe. The response to the advent of nuclear weaponry is a prime example of the hegemony of negative temporality, and should serve as a kind of instructive experience for the climate change debate and movement. With respect to nuclear weaponry, scientists are essentially irrelevant except to create a dire picture of what a post-nuclear world might be like, which may induce a certain degree of caution in policymaking circles, but does not give guidance as to making the central choice between "deterrence" and "disarmament" (Lifton and Falk 1986; Falk and Krieger 2012; Nye 1986). In my view a comparable failure to that of climate change exists on the part of the policy community to address properly future risks posed by the threat posed by nuclear weaponry, but its essential character is different than that bearing on climate change due to the greater relevance of the interaction between temporal categories of present and future. Instead of "scientific certainty" those that make security policy are guided by an epistemology that is best known as "political realism" drawing on views of the past, premised on history and a skeptical view of human nature. It bases its policy logic on interpretations of human nature and historical experience that correlate security primarily with physical strength, military capabilities, political distrust, and the susceptibility of human reason to expectations of gain and loss. The major premise of political realism lifts a line out of context from the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides: "The strong do what they will, the weak do what they must" (Thucydides 1954).10 In this regard nuclear weaponry can be rationally accommodated, and even prudently sought after, as a means to increase security against some of the threats that arise within a framework of sovereign states. Thinkers such as John Mearsheimer (1984-5) and Kenneth Waltz ( 1981) believe that we should be thankful for the presence of nuclear weapons as probably responsible for the avoidance of World War III. In this regard, there is no way to resolve the argument between those who favor deterrence and those who seek disarmament by an appeal to prudence in relation to addressing future risks as what is at stake are contradictory conceptions of prudence. As with climate change, I believe we are addressing a fundamental question of the appropriate epistemology in relation to somewhat indeterminate future risks. 11 Unlike climate change where a precautionary approach to knowledge would provide an appropriate guide to policy, for nuclear weapons I would argue for the adoption of a moral epistemology that unconditionally prohibits certain forms of behavior including genocide, torture, and weaponry of mass destruction whatever the instrumental justifications that can be advanced (Thompson 1982). It is true that the adoption of such a moral epistemology does not entirely eliminate the policy problem as it can still be argued from the perspective of use that the contrasting risks of possession and abolition are incalculable. In response, I agree with E.P. Thompson that the threat to use such weaponry is itself genocidal if not omnicidal, and therefore any kind of benefits from deterrence are tainted by the nature of the threat being made. In this regard it should be recognized that from the perspective of international law and morality threats can be as unacceptable as actual uses of force (Falk 2013).12 Admittedly, this somewhat begs the question as it is not clear that mere possession of the weaponry entails a threat to use (International Court of Justice 1996). Despite this degree of ambiguity, the case for reliance on a moral epistemology in a globalizing world seems indispensable if there is to be created the kind of global political community that will become capable of upholding the human interest as well as processing the interplay of national interest calculations (Johansen 1980). Discussion of the analogous concerns with respect to the status of nuclear weapons is intended to convey the differing ways that temporality in these two instances of ultimate concern is relevant. In relation to climate change, since the underlying causes of harm and risk are associated with intrinsically benign behavior, restrictions need to rely on a precautionary or prudential epistemology that is sensitive to present harms, unevenness of perception and experience, and the prospects of increasing costs and uncertain thresholds of irreversibility. In contrast, the role of nuclear weapons rests on threats and acts that are intrinsically criminal, and the elimination of this weaponry by prudent arrangements for phased disarmament relies on the authority of a moral epistemology. To assess the disarmament arrangement advocated and implemented does depend on a more prudential calculus as distinct from the categorical rejection of nuclear weaponry as instruments of protection or security. Positive temporality for nuclear weaponry concentrates on the means to attain the desired end, whereas for climate change the focus is how to adjust the means in light of competing values and risks. AT: Pragmatism Pragmatism fails – we must rock the boat to avoid the impacts of the 1AC Falk 2016 - Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University Richard, “Climate Change, policy knowledge, and the temporal imagination” in Reimaging Climate Change, Routledge, p. 63 Despite such hopefulness, this essay, as an exercise in climate imagination, is less interested in fantasizing unlikely occurrences than in posting warnings about the constraints of Climate Inc. Current efforts to address climate change are animated by, and further lock us into, the straightjacket of negative temporality. Negative temporality proposes that climate change is a distant threat, substantiated by weak science, and thus not urgent or significant enough to require immediate, dramatic policy responses. It encourages a politics of postponement so as not to rock the boat of a world order constituted by sovereign states concerned fundamentally with their territorial, short-term, national interests rather than global or even regional imperatives. Saturated by such a narrow and skewed view, often the most one can do is engage in wishful thinking. However, as this chapter has tried to suggest, one can also work to dismantle the conceptual perversions that privilege spatiality and thus negative temporality. Such criticism demands imagination to recognize limitations and identify opportunities. AT: Science Good Science is on our side, we must transition away from neoliberalism Anshelm 2015 – Prof @ Linkoping U Jonas and Martin Hultman, Discourses of Global Climate Change, Routledge, p. 93 The eco-socialist discourse promoted the image of climate science as an authority which revealed the destructiveness of industrial capitalist society and compelled extensive and immediate changes in basic economic structures, relationships, lifestyles, transport and energy systems, and forms of production in contemporary capitalist society. The impetus for radical social change was said to no longer come from the social sciences, but from the journals such as Nature and Science, and from some of the world's most trustworthy climate scientists. Hopes were pinned on an alliance between the global scientific elite and local opposition groups with strong commitments to the global environment, similar to that seen in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, an eco-socialist image of an environmental utopia, an ecotopia, was imagined and practical work was done to bring it to life. In an ecotopia, humans were part of the environment, economic growth was criticized, a decentralized democracy was proposed and small-scale technology drove development (Kumar, 1991; Pepper, 2005). It was a version of utopia that was created in response to an era of criticism of the industrial modern discourse of centralization, large-scale technologies and capitalism (Kumar, 1987). Eco-socialism's historical materialist analysis located the causes of contemporary environmental abuse in the workings of the economic mode of capitalist production, and the institutions and world view that undergirded its functioning. Eco-socialism argued that environmentally unsustainable development was inherent to capitalism, therefore it must be abolished and replaced by democratic socialism (De Geus, 1999). With eco-socialism, it was argued, people could end their alienation from nature and from each other, which was the root cause of environmental degradation. In the wake of the climate-change debate, numerous practical examples, theoretical elaborations and utopian visions were presented as transition paths towards a sustainable future (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Darley et al., 2006). In Sweden this type of eco-socialist utopian thinking was very rare. In contrast to an apocalyptic and harsh critique of the current economic system, there were very few actors who appeared (or were allowed to appear) on the public scene in Sweden expressing ecotopian, transitional visions. AT: Securitization Good Security studies has failed to prevent massive acts of violence, proving it’s ineptitude Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 1-2 With its world wars, cold wars, proxy wars, colonial wars, guerrilla wars, civil wars, drug wars, and new wars, not to mention its genocides, nuclear weapons, economic crises, gender-based violence, refugees, famines and environmental disasters, the twentieth century was a century of chronic and endemic insecurity. What will the twenty-first century become? It certainly has not started out well. Its first decade alone saw aircraft smashing into New York's World Trade Center, a new global war on near-death of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Indian Ocean and Japanese tsunamis, Cyclone Nargis, the war in Iraq, genocide in the Sudan, and three brutal wars in Palestine and Lebanon. The picture beyond that does not improve when we add global stalemate on climate change, mass slaughter in the Congo, Islamist terrorism in Pakistan and India, a craze for walls and "border protection", and strategic anxiety about Iran, North Korea, the rise of China, and a future of drone, cyber and space war. All of these examples have been riven with moral anxiety and exemplified particular ethical choices: whether to use poison terror, the gas against enemy forces to protect one's own; whether to bomb populated areas to shorten a war or degrade an enemy's industrial capacity; whether to develop and deploy weapons that can destroy cities in a few seconds and kill millions; whether to use starvation as a weapon of war; whether to support Islamic extremists in a proxy war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the face of warnings about how they were likely to turn on their masters afterwards; and when that time came, whether to fight such extremists by systemic violations of the international laws of war and human rights. The debates over these issues reflect many things: their inherent moral complexity, competing ethics and norms, and a global interest in their rightness and longterm impact. None of these ethical questions and dilemmas are new, but the field of security studies has been slow to address them, and it has not established a tradition of morally desirable, but as strategically necessary, and with this objective, we develop ethical guidelines for the decisions and policies of all security actors. We list these principles here in Box 1.1 below, and explain them in the section entitled 'Key Principles of a Cosmopolitan Security Ethics. AT: State good A state focused politics is guaranteed to fail – instead we should focus on ethics that make global security possible Burke et al 2014 Anthony [Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia], Katrina Lee-Koo [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland], and Matt McDonald [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland]; Ethics and Global Security; Routledge; p. 29-32 As a number of theorists have argued (Walker 1992; Baldwin 1997; Waever 1995), the way that security is thought about and practiced in international relations is bound up with the institution of the state. For traditional theoretical accounts of security, of course, the state is the only unit, referent or agent of security worth considering, and its security can be viewed as synonymous with the security of the people whose lives take place within its territorial borders. But even for those accounts critical of contemporary security practice, the state looms large over any attempt to think through alternatives to existing security practices. For liberals, the problem of security in international politics is one of ameliorating the worst excesses of state violence through an institutionalised recognition of the strategic benefits of interstate cooperation (Milner and Morayscik 2009; Keohane and Nye 1997). For critical theorists, a radical critique of state security and the need to refocus on people as the core unit of analysis (Booth 1991; McSweeney 1999) still necessitates engagement with the state as an agent of security and the crucial question of how its resources and capabilities can he redirected to the concerns of a global society. And for some sociologists, while many contemporary security practices cannot be defended, the nation-state still retains a crucial role. For Loader and Walker (2007: 4), for example, nation-states serve the critical function of defining community identity, and security can be seen as a "public good" that reflects the values of that community. In this sense, scholarship on security reflects the dominance of a "Statist" ontology in international relations scholarship more broadly. However, there is nothing inevitable about the umbilical association between security and the state, in analytical or normative terms. Historically, the meaning of security has shifted between a focus on the individual and collectivities (Haftendorn 1991; Rothschild 1995; Waver 2002; Constantinou 2000) and the state is just one of a number of institutions that have attempted to build their legitimacy on the promise o f providing for the protection or well-being of its constituency (see Williams 1998). And as post-colonial critiques suggest, the close association of security and states is based largely on Europe's history of state formation, characterised by 'a strong identification of the security of the state with the security of its citizens' (Krause and Williams 1996: 320; see also Grovogui 2007; Muppidi 1999; Barkawi and Liffey 2006). In normative terms too, the idea of the state as an appropriate unit of community is undermined by the relatively common disjunction between nation and state, and by radical and, at times, violent contestation over the boundaries of that community. This contestation should remind us of the need to interrogate or at least reflect on the state as the appropriate unit of community, and security, in global politics. And the moral legitimacy of a state system writ large is of course also called into fundamental question by the empirical realities of refugees and displaced persons; the scale of human rights abuses carried out by states against their own populations; and the failure to mount an adequate response to global problems such as climate change. Here, the failings of states and the globalization of contemporary insecurity provide a powerful rationale for moving beyond the nation-state when thinking about security. The dominance of the state in thinking about security in international relations is grounded in the powerful narrative of the ''social contract". In the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, the modern sovereign state emerged as a practical alternative to an ungoverned (and somewhat mythical) "state of nature" through the guarantee of order and security it could make to those it governed. Hobbes termed this sovereign figure the Leviathan: a 'mortal god' whose 'body-politic' represented, and contained, all the bodies of the people within it (Burke 2007a: Ch. 1, 2013a: 17-18). For post-war classical realists of the 1940s and 1950s, this Leviathan was the guarantor of individual protection m an otherwise dangerous environment. Morgenthau (1948) and Niebhur (1959) engaged with this directly, contrasting the moral world that was possible through this Hobbesian/Lockean bargain with the amoral world beyond the state's borders, and defending a Statist ontology on precisely moral grounds (Williams 2005). For these theorists, the state provided the possibility of ethics and morality in a brutal state of nature. Paradoxically, however, genuine engagement with and defence of the state on moral or communitarian terms in realist thought has become less prominent over time, even while the scale of the transnational threats—which cannot, by definition, be dealt with by states alone—has grown. As the state system of the post-war era solidified, neorealists such as Waltz (1979) sought to excise morality from questions of interstate relations. They suggested that the world inside states was irrelevant to the dynamics of world politics, and that state interests themselves were detemiined by the distribution of power within that system. As such, while the realist project itself was built on the foundation of the social contract, this 'moral purpose' (Reus-Snit 1999) was elided, ignored or even contrasted disapprovingly with a positivist concern with material power distribution. While much of the realist and neorealist conception of security has been challenged in recent years, the centrality of the state in thinking about security continues to cast a powerful shadow over the way security is thought about and engaged with. Here, the 'system of existential alienation that is the social contract and the anarchic world of power-seeking states' (Burke 2010: 97) continues to frame the way we think about and practice security in international politics. Even the most ambitious of liberal security projects, for example, the norm of the " responsibility to protect", does not ultimately challenge the social contract. Rather it tries to reframe it as a source of moral "good" within global politics by restraining the abusive power of the sovereign by emphasising state obligations to protect the lives and basic security of its people. Genuine commitment to this norm would ensure fewer human rights violations and potentially minimize refugee movements, yet it remains inconsistent with a global sensibility necessary for responding effectively to global problems. It also fails to expose and challenge those structures of the international system (ideational, political and economic) that create and constitute profound insecurities for much of the world's population ( Fishel 2013). At its best, an international order in which states were genuinely committed to the provision of rights to all of their population—in other words, in which state leaders lived up to their part of the social contract— would be an order with far fewer instances of harm than the contemporary international order. But a state system oriented in such a way can only really be defended on short-term, pragmatic grounds, not long-term or moral ones (Linklater 2011: 5). The problem of recognising forms of community that can and do exist below and above the level of the state, the problem of responding to genuinely transnational sources of threat, and the imperative of overturning the structures of violence inherent in the international system all remain within this schema. In developing a coherent relationship between security and global ethics, we argue in this volume that what is needed is more than a pragmatic intellectual project with a moral twist. We need to do more than attempt to speak to policymakers on their terms with a view to slowly civilizing the actions of the state. A more profoundly cosmopolitan approach is needed one in which communities are empowered to define and achieve their own security within a system of global responsibility, states change their policy to serve global ends and cede sovereign freedoms to do harm, and construct global cooperative institutions and practices that provide security to all without discrimination (Burke 2013a, 2013b). AT: Warming Kills all There is nothing cosmopolitan about their approach to warming evidenced by their discourse which is used to maintain the status quo Burke et al 2014 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, Routledge, p. 108-9 Increasingly, attention in both the scholarly and policy worlds has turned to the threats environmental change poses to international security. In many ways this reflects the increasing prominence of climate change in debates about environmental security: an issue that necessarily transcends the nation-state. In this discourse, the environment is again understood in broad terms, potentially encompassing transboundary resource management or global environmental change. And such issues are viewed as threats to international security to the extent that they challenge the key norms of international society, whether defined in terms of the imperatives of international order or global justice. This approach has been most prominently embraced by international organisations (UNEP 2007; Moon 2007), and reached its high point with UN Security Council discussions in 2007 and 2011 on the international security threat posed by global climate change (Oels 2013). These ( divisive) debates focused on the idea of climate change as a possible threat multiplier that contributed to or exacerbated conflict and interstate tension, along with the role of the "international community" in responding to it. In terms of its ethical commitments, an approach that focuses on an international society and its nonnative basis clearly extends ethical responsibility beyond the communitarian commitments of a national (environmental) security discourse. How far this ethical commitment extends is, however, ultimately dependent on the nonnative basis of that international society (Dunne 1998; Bellamy and McDonald 2004). This reflects similar tensions to the liberal security paradigm outlined in Chapter 1. To reiterate, key distinctions between a focus on order and justice, mapping on to the pluralist-solidarist divide in international society theorizing, suggest different moral universes and different forms of political response to climate change. While a focus on order might limit attention to environmental security issues to those that pose a threat to sovereignty (defined as non-intervention) and international stability, a focus on justice might enable some attention to environmental change that undermines human rights or creates broader harms. This tension is no more resolved or resolvable in practice, with key differences in the nature of international society and the role of international institutions in defending, that society playing out in UNSC debates about climate change. Clearly, more of a role for international organisations as agents of international security is assumed, from coordinating cooperation on environmental issues themselves through UN instruments to orchestrating, international environmental management through the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and, more recently, the UN Security Council (Rasmussen and Birk 2012). However, such an approach still tends to orient towards the preservation of the status quo—even while allowing some degree of hope for the management of transboundary or global issues (Smith and Vivekenanda 2007; Busby 2004). It is frequently the maintenance of international stability, rates of economic growth and existing political institutions that are seen as being important to preserve here. While international instruments managing global environmental problems might emerge or be strengthened in positive ways, existing international political and economic instruments have proven themselves inadequate to the task of responding effectively to environmental change at best or created/furthered that change at worst. It also tends to downplay the role of political and economic inequality within that system that creates inequalities in the level of vulnerability to environmental change and capacity to respond. As Andrew Dobson has argued ( 2005: 259), the language of interdependence that often underpins this discourse is frequently problematic, implying a rough parity of cause, effect, vulnerability and responsibility. AT: Warming Reps Good Environmental securitization ensures the militarization of the environment Burke et al 2014 Anthony [Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia], Katrina Lee-Koo [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland], and Matt McDonald [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland]; Ethics and Global Security; Routledge; p. 32-4 Ethical questions and debates loomed large over such attempts to broaden the security agenda. The attempts to broaden this agenda to include issues such as environmental change were driven by normative commitments to addressing such problems, underpinned by the idea that with their designation as security threats would conic increased political profile, attention, funding and priority for these " neglected" issues. Indeed authors advocating the "broadening" of security in this way frequently emphasized the opportunity costs of the billions of dollars spent by states on armies and tools of war relative to more important priorities such as official development assistance or renewable energy (Mathews 1989). It is no coincidence, in this sense, that a range of authors arguing for the redefinition of security to include environmental concerns were affiliated with environmental NGOs or think-tanks aimed at mobilizing responses to environmental change (see Hartmann 2009; McDonald 2013a). There is much that is intuitively appealing about the attempt to lift issues such as environmental change onto the security agenda as a means of challenging the traditional association of security with the state and war, not least given the problematic priorities underpinning this discourse of security. Yet, while working from assumptions about the mobilizing power of security, these accounts failed to reflect on the politics of security itself. As Daniel Deudney (1990) asked, is it wise to assume that "security" has this progressive effect; that promoting environmental issues to the realm of security won't bring with it a militarization of such problems and logics of exceptionalism? Such a failure to systematically examine what security does is problematic: it opens "broadeners" up to the criticism that theirs is a project that potentially invites illiberal political practices and institutions to hold sway over the management of pressing transnational political problems like climate change and environmental degradation. In a more fundamental sense, the "broadening" agenda also risks leaving security power and legitimacy where it is. There is a danger that without redefining who security is actually for, issues such as environmental change might come to be seen as security threats to the extent that they are solely understood as threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state. Not only might we fail to challenge the statism of contemporary global politics, but we risk encouraging perverse responses to problems such as environmental change. States might recognize climate change as a threat, but if such a response is oriented towards realist strategic concerns, states with relative self-sufficiency may build physical barriers (even walls) around their borders to protect against an influx of so-called " environmental refugees" a scenario anticipated in a 2003 Pentagon report on the national security implications of climate change (Schwartz and Randall 2003). These issues are discussed in more depth in Chapter 4. In our view, security ethics is best honoured by more fundamentally questioning the meaning, structure, and ends of security. If we simply add poverty, environmental change, or disease to the list of challenges to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, we leave other key constituent elements of security in place, and enable existing security providers to embrace and potentially co-opt this "broader agenda", blunting more radical critiques of the association of security and the state system. Indeed it is probably no coincidence that recognition of the "broader range of threats" to security has found its way in to security statements and agenda of existing institutional security providers. The securitization of the environment works to reinforce the squo – makes their impact inevitable Burke et al 2014 Anthony [Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia], Katrina Lee-Koo [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland], and Matt McDonald [Senior Lecturer in IR at U of Queensland]; Ethics and Global Security; Routledge; p. 98-9 If any issue lends itself towards a critique of the ethical choices and limits of traditional approaches to security, it is environmental change. Until recently, the " environment- was not seen as an issue relevant to the study or practice of security, despite the obvious fact that the natural world provides the conditions for human existence. Where environmental issues are seen as relevant to security, these are often viewed through the lens of national security. This is the case even though ecological zones and national borders do not usually coincide, and even though unilateral state action is insufficient for responding to global environmental change. In discussions of the environment-security relationship, environmental issues are often viewed as relevant to the study and practice of security if triggering armed conflict or related threats to national sovereignty such as large-scale population displacement. At its most ethically perverse, measures to redress environmental change are viewed as threats to the economic security of states. This highlights a more general problem. if security is approached as the preservation of the status quo whether defined in terms of the territorial integrity of the state or the preservation of international order it becomes harder to respond effectively to environmental change worsened by taken-for-granted elements of national and international governance. Simply put, international economic and political governance arrangements (the neoliberal economic system and the interstate system) are failing in their capacity to arrest processes of environmental change at best, and, at worst, are driving these processes of global change. In many ways, then, environmental change represents something of an "easy" case for the global security framework developed in this book. Some environmental issues, and responses to them, can only be approached at the global level. And dominant national security discourses encourage inadequate and in some cases perverse responses to environmental change. However, dynamics of global environmental change do not necessarily represent the easy case for a cosmopolitan approach to security that they may initially suggest. Complex questions arise about whether a cosmopolitan approach can come to terms with obligations to future generations and other living beings; about how we might mobilize responses to global security threats in a world of states; and even about how the "environment" itself is understood and approached. And of course for many, linking security and the environment is fraught in a political sense, either because the language of security does not increase the urgency or priority attached to environmental issues ( McDonald 2012a; Waver 2011), or because it risks endorsing problematic actors and responses to issues of environmental change (see Deudney 1990; Kakonen 1994). This chapter tackles these issues directly, building a case for an approach to environmental change that focuses on the global level, that recognizes obligations to future generations and other living beings, and that emphasizes the responsibility that everyone has to act as global environmental stewards. This case for a global security perspective, however, is preceded by a discussion of the ethical assumptions and implications of attempts to link the environment and security in theory and in practice. Here we suggest the need for attention to how the "environment" itself is understood, and to the key question of whose security is seen as worth protecting or advancing in the context of environmental change in particular. In the latter section of the chapter we focus on global climate change in illustrating the utility of our global security perspective. AT: Security K 2AC – L AT: Biodiversity Securitization of biodiversity is good – only according it requisite attention can reverse its existential threat Bliss 20 [Cebuan; PhD candidate with the Environmental Governance and Politics Group at the department of Geography, Planning and Environment. Her research seeks to explain relationships between animal and biodiversity governance systems, assessing the synergies and trade-offs using an Integrative Governance framework; 6-2-2020; “From bombs to biodiversity: why we need a conceptual shift in security”; Political Ecology Network; https://politicalecologynetwork.org/2020/06/02/from-bombs-to-biodiversity-why-we-need-aconceptual-shift-in-security/; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] The Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation is a response to their dissatisfaction with traditional, narrow definitions of military security which were prevalent during the Cold War. They argue for a broadening of the concept of security and established a new framework for analysis, one which considers issues of increasing prominence, including economic and societal security, and the environment (Buzan et al., 1998). Thus, it is a useful framework with which to comprehend the threat of biodiversity loss to human security. For Buzan et al., security is ‘a kind of stabilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state’ (1998, p4). Securitisation entails moving beyond the normal politicisation of an issue, where ‘speech acts’ are used to frame an issue as an existential threat. In other words, the issue is urgent, and its magnitude requires extraordinary measures. The key elements to be considered are ‘who securitizes, on what issues (threats) [and] for whom (referent object)’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p32). While there were some scholars, even in the late 1980s, arguing that biodiversity loss could be conceptualised as a security threat (Myers, 1989; Tuchman Mathews, 1989), the possibility and necessity of its securitisation has not been analysed. This may be in part because evidence on the extent and consequences of biodiversity loss has only recently come to the fore. With the second United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal outlined as ‘Zero Hunger’ and dire warnings issued about the current rate of species loss (IPBES, 2019), it is essential that policy-makers comprehend the existential risk that biodiversity loss poses to food, and consequently human, security. Food security as defined by the 1974 World Food Summit is: ‘the availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices’ (UN, 2018a). However, despite the efforts of recent years, the number of undernourished people has increased, after decades of decreasing (UN Security Council, 2018). Securitisation and the environment In People, States and Fear, Buzan outlines the need for a broader conception of security (Buzan, 2007). To count as a security issue, threats and vulnerabilities ‘have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p5). This actor can endorse emergency measures which may go beyond normal rules of engagement. Expanding on this, Floyd questions under what circumstances securitisation can be deemed morally right or just. She argues that three criteria need to be fulfilled simultaneously to ensure the securitisation is morally right: 1) there must be an objective existential threat as defined by a powerful actor which defines and responds to them (which endangers the survival of the referent object); 2) the referent object must be morally legitimate, in that it is required for human well-being (normatively assessed as the satisfaction of human needs such as adequate nutrition or a healthy environment); and 3) the security response must be appropriate to the threat in question (2011, 428). With regards to food security, biodiversity loss, particularly the loss of genetic variety, is significant as low diversity reduces resilience and increases vulnerability to shocks (McGowen et al. 2017). Cramer et al. argue that linking these two and finding synergies between them could ‘generate multiple benefits for social, ecological, and economic development’ (2017, p1257). Securitisation is a method to create that link and alert states to an existential threat, prompting collective action which may be impossible without the opportunity to pursue emergency measures, as sanctioned by extreme security threats. Biodiversity loss: an existential threat Ultimately, biodiversity is essential to our life on earth, providing food security, as well as medicines, fuel and sustaining livelihoods (UNEP, 2018). Therefore, it is necessary that biodiversity loss be conceptualised as a security problem. It is a worsening transnational issue which affects all who live on this planet. Consequently, the coordination and cooperation of states is essential to tackle such an urgent, global problem and it could be considered as morally right to do so, according to Floyd’s criteria outlined above. Photo credit: James Calalang By using the discourse of securitisation to shift conceptions of what constitutes a security threat, governments (and other important actors, such as the UN Security Council, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and G20 Agriculture Ministers) enhance their authority to implement measures to prevent and reverse biodiversity loss to ensure food security. This would go beyond standard policies, as securitisation allows for extraordinary measures. These measures would likely be counterintuitive to modern, mono-cultural agricultural methods because ‘biodiversity losses…can compromise ecosystem functionality and resilience in agriculture’ (Tscharntke et al., 2012, p55). In other words, humans rely on a very small number of species for food, which lowers our resilience. If any of these is compromised due to disease, conflict or climate change, we expose ourselves to greater risks of food insecurity. Biodiversity loss has not been accorded the attention it requires. International cooperation and emergency measures are long overdue and required to stem further losses and enhance resilience to food insecurity. Conceptualising this as a security threat is one of the surest ways to achieve this. Buzan et al. explicitly state that ‘the environment has to survive; therefore, this issue should take priority over all others, because if the environment is degraded to the point of no return all other issues will lose their meaning’ (1998, p36). Securitising in the Anthropocene At the turn of the millennium, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, extolled ‘respect for nature’ and stated that: ‘new security challenges require us to think creatively, and to adapt our traditional approaches to better meet the needs of our new era. But one time-honoured precept holds more firmly today than ever: it all begins with prevention’ (Annan, 2000, p44). The sixth mass extinction characterising the Anthropocene and resulting loss of biodiversity diminishes human resilience and increases food insecurity. A problem of this magnitude warrants nothing less than adaptive and preventative measures; it is morally right according to Floyd’s criteria. Cristiana Paşca Palmer, Executive Secretary of the CBD, states that ‘governments must send a clear message that safeguarding biodiversity and the health of the planetary ecosystems is fundamental to our survival and the social and economic well-being of everybody, everywhere’ (UNEP, 2018). Despite such calls, and the consensus that we are facing a food security crisis, I suggest that biodiversity loss has, for the most part, not been securitised. Given the urgency of the situation, desecuritisation is not an option. Ultimately, ‘security is about survival’ (Buzan et al.,1998, p21). From an anthropocentric stance, the survival of humanity, indeed, depends on biodiversity. Its loss poses an existential threat and a conceptual shift allowing it to be treated as such would allow actors such as states to pursue measures to mitigate the loss of biodiversity and ensuing food insecurity. AT: Climate Change Securitization of the climate is inevitable and legitimize discussions that force pragmatic action. Säll ’21 [Anna; Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Government.; “The securitization of climate change in the United States: A case-study of the Biden-Harris administration’s first hundred days in office”; Spring 2021; Uppsala University; http://uu.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A156174; Accessed 7/14/21; NT] In President Biden’s speech at a joint session of congress just before the end of the first hundred days in office, he said, “the climate crisis is not our fight alone; it’s a global fight. […] if we act to save the planet, we can create millions of jobs and economic growth and opportunity to raise the standard of living to almost everyone around the world”. 232 This quote summarizes the presented analysis of the Biden-Harris administration’s discussion on climate change to some extent. The climate change is presented as a global threat, though the transition generates a great opportunity for growth and the creation of jobs. As has been shown in the previous section there is identified securitization moves on the climate crisis of the Biden-Harris administration. Furthermore, the administration presents a need of urgent action. Though, the presented solutions should not be interpreted as extreme solutions, as described by the CS. If the climate change issue was presented as the only prioritized issue, it would be legitime to stop all emissions overnight, even if that would lead to unemployment, scarcity of food, water and electricity which could cause human suffering and even death. The approach of the Biden-Harris administration could instead be described as pragmatic. Already in Biden’s inaugural speech he pointed out several challenges that the United States were facing, climate change was one of these. As one senior administration official said, “our view is that we don’t have that luxury to choose between those challenges”. crisis is prioritized as a security issue though among the other challenges identified by the Biden Harris administration, like the economy and the COVID-19. However, Trombetta’s conclusion, described in the chapter on previous research, that securitization of the climate first and foremost is about prioritizing, is not 233 In this way the climate questioned by this analysis. By the securitizing moves on the climate crisis, the administration clearly prioritizes the climate issue. It should be noticed that the political context matter. When President Biden was sworn in as President, the United States were facing the devastating consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, an economy in crisis and a troubled democracy after the storming of the Capitol. In this political setting, it could be difficult to talk about and take action against climate change if it was not presented as a security issue. Therefore, the securitization moves on climate change could be interpreted as a way to legitimize the prioritization of the climate on the administration’s political agenda. Furthermore, the proposed solutions of the Biden-Harris administration to tackle the climate crisis can be seen as ambitious, though they are not going outside the political processes. The conclusion of Trombetta, to view securitization of the climate as a prioritizing act rather than an issue about extreme measures could thereby be supported by the analysis of the Biden-Harris administration. The Biden-Harris approach to tackle the climate crisis is to acknowledge the urgency and security aspects caused by the changing climate, at the same time as the transition is generating opportunities for labor and prosperity. This does not comply with the paradox discussed by Trombetta. No overlapping securitization has been observed in the securitization moves by the Biden-Harris administration since the politics to tackle climate change is described as an opportunity rather than a threat. Trombetta referred to the Bush administration as an example of the overlapping securitizations, since the Biden-Harris administration has another approach of securitization moves on climate without the paradox there is a difference between the two administrations. The conclusion of Scott, that since the introduction of climate security in the UNSC resulted in a reduction of treating climate as a matter of security in diplomatic circles, is questioned by this analysis since the administration has introduced climate as central for United States’ diplomacy. Including the presentation of the climate change as an existential threat at the Leaders’ Summit on Climate hosted by President Biden and the active role of Kerry at international high level meetings. Therefore, this thesis argues that Scott’s conclusion is incorrect in the case of the United States under the Biden-Harris administration. This analysis has shown securitization moves including a planetary danger and in the administration’s presentation of climate as an existential threat the whole world is identified as a referent object. This is in contrast to the research of Diez et al. in which it was argued that the discourse in the United States was influenced by territorial danger from the mid-2000’s and the securitization at the planetary level was no longer as prominent. Therefore, another kind of securitization moves have been identified in the Biden-Harris administration. Furthermore, since the climate is integrated in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and the speech made of Secretary Austin at the Leaders’ Summit this analysis has also identified securitization moves at the in a military setting, which was not identified in the study of Thomas. Securitizing climate change through the frame of human security places effective demands on the state and builds consensus for change. Jamshidi ’19 [Maryam; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law; “The Climate Crisis Is a Human Security, Not a National Security, Issue”; 2019; University of Florida Levin College of Law; https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1962&context=facultypub; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The concept of human security avoids these disadvantages while preserving the benefits of securitizing climate change. Initially articulated by the U.N. in 1994, human security has two main components.31 First, it requires that states protect people from chronic dangers, like hunger, disease, oppression, and environmental degradation.32 Second, it demands that governments work to reduce substantial disruptions to people’s daily lives.33 This “durable” approach emphasizes the inter-relationship between various components of security, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.34 A human security framework places the onus on governments to work towards achieving all these elements of security.35 This obligation extends to meeting the human security needs of the international community, more broadly.36 Rather than blunting the benefits of a security frame, human security strengthens them by connecting security directly to people’s survival and flourishing. As a result, a human security paradigm is likely to sustain and even increase public attention to security-related issues, as well as the institutional focus and resources that come with it. It also rectifies national security’s many shortcomings. This includes challenging assumptions that security is best and most effectively achieved through unilateral executive action. Of course, human security does not entirely prohibit these sorts of activities, which are reflected in various laws facilitating presidential engagement on climate change. Nevertheless, it challenges assumptions that the president should always have exclusive authority over national security matters. It suggests, instead, that security is something intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as grassroots civil society actors, social movements, and influential individuals, have a role in creating and sustaining.37 To facilitate this public involvement in national security decisionmaking, human security privileges government transparency over secrecy. Significantly, human security can help mitigate national security’s civil and human rights problems. In the permissible for security’s sake.38 At times, governments have even used national security to justify emergency measures typically disallowed in liberal democracies because of their threat to individual liberty.39 Under a human security approach, by contrast, human and civil rights are paramount.40 Focusing on the rights of national security context, derogations from these rights are often considered people, both as the objects and providers of security, challenges the notion that states of emergency and other suspensions of liberal, democratic norms are the best or only way of achieving security.41 As for national security’s strategic limitations, a human security approach yields three distinct benefits. First, unlike national security, human security de-emphasizes military strategies and emphasizes investment in development initiatives. In particular, it promotes reductions in military budgets and reallocation of funds to development work. Though human development and security are distinct, poverty and social inequality undermine the physical, material, and political wellbeing of individuals.42 In many countries, like the United States, military spending eats up resources necessary to tackling these pressing issues.43 By linking security to sustainable development, rather than to the military’s might, human security points dollars toward the former.44 Second, human security facilitates the integrated, interstate solutions necessary to address climate change. When it comes to tackling the climate crisis, experts agree that richer states must shoulder more of the economic burden and provide a range of support to poorer states.45 Domestically, a similar redistribution of resources is necessary to realize environmental justice and ensure the most vulnerable are protected from climate change.46 These cooperative strategies are precisely the sort of activities supported by human security, which emphasizes the connections between people and their responsibilities to one another. Third, human security’s people-centered approach provides a basis not only for top-down, but also bottom-up approaches to climate change.47 Addressing climate change requires both government regulation and decentralized action by citizens. As Naomi Klein has argued, [t]here is a clear and essential role for national plans and policies—to set overall emission targets that keep each country safely within its carbon budget . . . . But if these transitions are to happen as quickly as required, then the best way to win widespread buy-in is for the actual implementation of a great many of the plans to be as decentralized as possible.48 Of course, to be meaningful, a human security approach to climate change must be reflected in government policy. Even with a change of administration, achieving that goal will require overcoming multiple challenges. They include confronting intra-government actors invested in taking a military-first approach to climate change; building substantial political will within government to take public demands about climate change’s securitization seriously; and ensuring those demands remain rooted in a cosmopolitan notion of human security, rather than a nationalistic or nativist one. AT: Economic Analysis Bad Economic analysis is the only pragmatic solution Nyborg 2012 – Prof of Economics @ U of Oslo Karine, The Ethics and Politics of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis, Routledge, p. 113-114 What we need to secure environmental protection is, I believe, incentives and institutions; we need green taxes, tradable emission permits, subsidies to local communities protecting rare biotopes, subsidies to development of new climate-friendly technologies. We may need prohibitions, nudges, institutional rules, institutional reforms. To protect the environment, we should focus our attention on the factors affecting actual behaviors of consumers, firms, local communities, and governmental agencies in their everyday activities. Neither cost-benefit analysis nor any other method can provide ethically neutral measures of how important an environmental change is for society. This is true even if we consider only small changes that do not substantially affect the income distribution or relative prices. How important something is for society is, essentially, a normative question. Normative answers require normative premises. An analysis based on specific normative premises cannot, at the same time, be ethically neutral. Still, policy choices must, of course, be made. To do that, one needs to enter into ethical and political discussions. Ethics and politics are important and deserve serious, competent, and thoughtful attention. It is not obvious, however, that the person best suited to take care of those considerations is the project analyst. In a democracy, there are usually others who have been elected by voters to do precisely that. It is my belief that economic analysis can be more useful if, rather than explicitly ranking it is limited to the task of being systematically descriptive. The central question for the analyst is then not which project is best, but rather what information is most important for decision-makers. Will the environment be forgotten unless one attaches a price tag to it? That is, of projects according to their social desirability, course, possible. If one really believes that monetary valuation increases the probability that decision-makers will take environmental considerations into account, this is a strong argument for monetary valuation. Nevertheless, this reasoning may be overly optimistic about the influence of such price tags. If decisions were made solely on the basis of aggregate willingness to pay as estimated in cost-benefit analysis, placing price tags on the environment would be crucially important. But there is little evidence that decisions are made mainly on the basis of aggregate willingness to pay. And after all, why should a price tag be expected to matter if no one has to pay the price written on it? AT: Environmental Conflict Security discourse surrounding environmental degradation brings about awareness of crises that brings about action and resources dedicated to their reversal. Kumari 12 [Parmila; LLB Law and International Relations Masters, University of Birmingham and University of Nottingham; 1-29-2012; “Securitising The Environment: A Barrier To Combating Environment Degradation Or A Solution In Itself?”; E-International Relations; https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/17235; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] This belief was widely held up until the end of the Cold War, after which the security concept was adjusted to new dangers and concerns. These new threats were not coming from ‘another state’, nor did they involve the killing of people by weapons. One of the considered dangers became environmental degradation, which was ‘exposed’ by national and international organisations, scientific communities and the public’s progressive access to information through the internet(Brauch 2008:10). Environmental degradation is “the processes by which the life-sustaining functions of the biosphere are disturbed”. This includes climate change, biodiversity loss and depletion of fisheries and forests. There are two aspects to environmental degradation; firstly it concerns resource scarcities, which include the scarcity of “natural capital contributions to the economy” and secondly, the negative consequences of accumulation of waste in hydrological, soil and food cycles because of the biosphere’s decreasing capacity to absorb it (Barnett 2001:14). In this way environmental degradation came to be seen as a security threat where the ecosystem and its ability to sustain certain life forms was at stake (Brauch 2008:6). Deudney argues that just because environment degradation causes the loss of lives, does not mean to say it should be securitised. Disease, old age and accidents take lives, yet they are not considered matters of security. If everything that causes a decline in human well-being is framed as a security threat, then “the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of ‘bad’” (Deudney 1990:307). There are two issues that stem from this. Firstly, environmental security concerns the “vulnerability of people to the effects of environment degradation”, and so is a specific aspect of environmental degradation (Barnett 2001:17). It is not a catch-all concept because it excludes other environmental issues like sustainable development (Barnett 2001:23). It refers to what is bad for people more than what is simply bad. The second problem with Deudney’s analysis is that old age, disease and accidents cannot really be equated with environmental degradation. To a certain extent these three problems are a natural part of human life. However, environmental degradation is caused by people. Climate change has been brought about by an increase in co2 levels because of human activity, and its associated sea level rise can displace populations living along coastlines. Bangladesh, for example, is especially vulnerable to floods (Mathews 1989:174). In any case, any disadvantages of ‘loosening’ of security may not outweigh the possible benefits. Securitising the environment attracts the attention of high-level decision makers and results in the mobilisation of resources (Detraz and Betsill 2009:303) because “security encapsulates danger much better than concepts like sustainability, vulnerability or adaptation” (Barnett 2003:14). It is also ideal in that it facilitates communication between a diverse range of interests, which is important since environmental degradation impacts more than just one party (Barnett 2001:136). Consider the following scenario. Continued population growth means greater pressure on governments to provide adequate food, housing, jobs and healthcare. The task is all the more difficult for developing countries, where funds previously going to resource conservation are redirected to meet basic needs. Scarcity of resources due to lack of resource conservation is bad news for these countries’ economic performance, as resources are the natural capital contributions to the economy. This could lead to political instability and conflict, pushing people out of their homes to seek refuge across borders. These refugees will create extra demand for food and place new burdens on the land in the place where they settle (Mathews 1989:162-168). This is one of many paths down which population growth can take states, but the point is that resource scarcity in one area can spread its effects across borders. This is especially so now due to economic interdependence. If the effects of environmental degradation do not respect borders/areas, then this presents a case for cooperation with all those people in the world that are affected. If securitisation achieves high awareness and facilitates communication from various interested parties, then it seems worthwhile. In this way securitisation may allow the meaning of environmental security to be stood and pronounced not just from one place, but from many. The amalgamation of these standpoints may just lead to the closest thing possible to a neutral one. AT: Geoengineering Link Geoengineering is inevitable – the plan ensure that is has oversight and avoids their hyperbolic claims Nicholson 2016 - Dr. Simon Nicholson is the director of the Global Environmental Politics program in the School of International Service and Assistant Professor of International Relations @ American U Simon, “Reimaging climate engineering: the politics of tinkering with the sky” in Reimaging Climate Change, Routledge, p. 127-128 My own view is somewhat different. In engaging with the world as it is, rather than as one might wish it to be, it is essential to realize that climate engineering is far too enticing and powerful a notion to be shoved aside. Climate engineering is not going away. No new taboo will be erected that forces the climate engineering genie entirely back into its bottle. Desperation is too strong a motivator. And so for me the question is not climate engineering or no climate engineering. The question becomes, are there forms of climate engineering, and ways of conducting the conversation about climate engineering approaches, that can bring out the best in humanity's climate response? Climate engineering is emerging as a the struggle is not just over whether or not climate engineering is a good idea - a bipolar, "to geoengineer or not to geoengineer" debate. Instead, it is a more complex, nuanced struggle, which has to do with the role of engineering within the broader set of responses to climate change, and the particular character of engineering options that might see development or deployment. It will require extraordinary vigilance to ensure that climate engineering technologies are not advanced as some kind of false solution. The task ahead is to push the climate engineering conversation in productive rather than destructive directions. This can best happen to the degree that climate engineering is subjected to careful, early, and well-crafted social oversight. The need for active civic engagement with climate engineering Climate engineering is not some fiendish plot hatched by a group desperate to ward off real action on climate change. It could well serve the same function, though, by distracting us from other, more beneficial actions. Climate key site of political struggle. But engineering certainly fits neatly with current dominant ways of understanding and responding to climate change, by telling us that climate change is a discrete and manageable "problem" that can be tackled via technological means. And yet, at the same time, climate engineering is not something that can be written off or ignored. I have asked here, can any engagement with climate engineering be productive? The answer is, it depends; it rests on how the conversation is engaged. The argument set out above is that consideration of climate engineering is now inevitable, so that the task of those interested in climate politics and political action becomes to ensure that the climate engineering conversation is a productive one. As the chorus of voices calling for consideration of climate engineering continues to grow in size and volume, as it is bound to do, it will become ever more important for a wider array of actors to engage productively in the conversation. Climate engineering is not some aberrant, marginal response to climate change. It is, instead, the expected response of a culture that partly looks to technological solutions to complex societal challenges. Other approaches exist. These need to be heard to guide the direction of climate engineering research and incorporate such forays into the broader challenge of addressing climate change. AT: Food Wars Totalizing rejection of food as a security problem marginalizes billions facing hunger as an existential threat. Shepherd 12 [Benjamin; Center for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, Australia; 2012, “Thinking critically about food security”; Security Dialogue, 43(3) 195-212; DOI: 10.1177/0967010612443724; Accessed 7-21-2021; BM] Hunger is a security problem In the light of the food price hikes of 2007 and 2008 that were followed by protests, riots and violence in as many as thirty countries and led to political upheaval in Haiti and Madagascar (BBC, 2008a,b, 2009a,b; Nicoll, 2008), some states have started paying increased attention to ‘food security’ and have initiated actions to secure themselves against the risk of future supply shocks. Strategies include grain stockpiling, market interventions and agricultural land acquisitions in other – often less-developed – countries (Alshareef, 2009; People’s Republic of China, 2008; State of Qatar, 2011). Such actions suggest that surety of food supplies is seen by some governments as a strategic imperative. These actions also have international repercussions. Nevertheless, they are not usually studied as part of the (international) security practices of states. These actions also ignore the problem of hunger. Given the scale of hunger in the world, there are at least five reasons why hunger warrants greater attention from security scholars, notwithstanding the divergent views of what constitutes a security problem. First, as the deprivation of food, hunger is far more of a threat to life and a far greater source of physical harm on a massive scale than deprivation of land, income, capital, political voice or basic dignities. About one billion people regularly go hungry (FAO, 2009b,c, 2010). Many hundreds of millions more live in poverty and have little capacity to avoid the risk of future hunger in the face of exogenous shock, such as even a small rise in the price of staple foods. For many of these people, hunger is an existential threat. They risk early death from lack of nutrition or from lack of resilience to injury, infection or disease, and hunger dramatically curtails the physical and cognitive development of their children. For the remainder, hunger and malnourishment erode their livelihoods and limit their capacity as human beings. To paraphrase Booth (1997: 111), regardless of whether or not this is labelled a security issue for and by the elites who define security agendas, it is an existential threat for those one billion people. Second, by allowing this physical harm to continue, elites are failing in their selfassigned role as protectors and guarantors of security. In theory at least, this can be seen as a significant undermining of political legitimacy and the legitimization of security practices. Third, and more practically, vulnerability to hunger is a possible antecedent to conflict. Risks of deprivation conflicts and associated political violence could conceivably be mitigated if the underlying pressures were addressed. Fourth, pervasive hunger is demonstrative of a substantial lack of capacity not only for the individuals but also for the communities and states that carry its burden. Finally, as this article intends to demonstrate, despite some limitations in existing security frameworks, there is significant value, both practical and conceptual, to be gained from approaching the problem of hunger with the tools of security scholarship. AT: Pan K China is a country run by military elites interested in expansion – zero chance their authors can explain territorial expansion and maritime aggression Wilson 2014 – prof of strategy and policy @ the Naval War College Andrew R, The Chinese Way of War, Strategy in Asia, Stanford U Press, p. 123-125 After reviewing the five cardinal myths with more historical accuracy than they usually receive, the question remains as to which aspects of the Chinese military tradition still inform its strategy. One thing seems clear: there is no single Chinese way of war. One must take history and culture seriously when considering strategic inclinations, and as scholarship of the past two decades on Chinese military history and culture clearly has shown, Chinese military traditions are rich and diverse. But a Chinese strategist today who believes that the future trajectory of Chinese geostrategy is determined by an intrinsic Chinese way of war is no more correct in evaluating tradition than an ancient Confucian who predicted that an empire may be united only by a sage king. Today, Chinese political and military leaders are free to choose different models of military action in formulating policy, and though culture is one resource they may draw on, it does not confine their actions to a predictable range. Even though interest in the classics and the great captains and past campaigns is growing in China, the move back to tradition is tentative and superficial. Most of what appears in the Chinese media relies on tropes demolished above, and specialists in Chinese security studies appear to be obsessed with strategic culture and unearthing the Chinese way of war. This is an attempt to find both greatness and solace in history. Although a Chinese way of war existed in the past, tradition has been under intense attack for most of the last century, and the world view of Chinese leaders has been so conditioned by foreign ideologies and military doctrines that it is hard to find much continuity with that past. Aspects of contemporary Chinese strategy resonate with the past but may be coincidental. A deeper understanding of how statecraft has been practiced in peace and war is needed, but in the near term one should not be surprised by the continuation of self-Orientalizing reductionism that has characterized the debate. Understanding Chinese military experience calls for examination of the counterpoints to the myths that matter, including territory, size, strategy, culture, and the near seas. China has waged countless wars of territorial expansion and defense. Because controlling continental and maritime arenas is intimately linked to political legitimacy, China has tended to overemphasize the value of territorial objectives. The large Chinese population, relative economic prosperity, and sophisticated bureaucracy scholarship on the mainland is not particularly sophisticated. Many led to gigantism in military affairs. From vast continent-spanning fortifications and treasure fleets to the herculean efforts of the Korean War, even recent Chinese governments have translated immense military potential into immense military capability. While quantity may have a quality of its own, the gigantism of the past and present China has produced important works of strategy, among them The Art of War and writings of Mao Zedong. Perhaps it is because of the scale of warfare that thinking about the linkage between military operations and their political consequences has enjoyed a rich tradition in China. Historically, China has been a continental power, but it has been putting to sea since at least the tenth century. Proximity to the ocean and the first island chain is vital to Chinese security and prosperity. For most of its long history China has dealt with a region marked by both uncertainty and overlapping sovereignties. That worked to the advantage of Chinese states, because as long as a hostile power did not control the near seas, they enjoyed the fruits of maritime trade without the need for a large navy. Today Chinese views are conditioned by a century of humiliation. If given the requisite military capability and provocation, the Chinese will go to war at sea. As opposed to a single coherent strategic culture, myths represent flawed assumptions that many Chinese and foreign observers enthusiastically embrace. Myths not only seek to define a Chinese way of war but posit alterities that define the strategic culture of a potential enemy. The yin-yang of the philosophy ofDaosim and the dialectics of Marxism-Leninism may explain contemporary Chinese strategists who regard the inclinations of adversaries as the polar opposite of their strategic culture myths. China is not alone in embracing this version of strategic polarity, but given the insecurities that plague its growing military potential, it is nonetheless troubling to find questions of policy, strategy, and war dealt with in simplistic ways. AT: Water Wars Robust consensus backs up water wars – it will determine the future of 21st century conflict. Angelakis et al. ’21 [Andreas N.; Water Resources Engineer at the National Agric. Research Foundation, Institute of Crete, Hellas and Technical Consultant of Hellenic Union of Municipal Enterprises for Water Supply and Sewerage; “Water Conflicts: From Ancient to Modern Times and in the Future”; 2021; Vol. 13, Issue 8; Sustainability; https://doi.org/10.3390/su13084237; Accessed 7/19/21; NT] The current global population growth, as well as urbanization, exacerbate the difficulties that cities face to provide water and sanitation services, particularly in developing countries. On the other hand, complicated socioeconomic problems, including inequality, incompetent legal frameworks, land use/cover changes, poverty, and poor water governance have important implications for the management of urban and rural water resources. Reforms in the shape of ownership and management of water and sanitation facilities via privatization and various forms of semi-private and public partnerships also have impacts on access to water resources. These reforms may lead to the augmentation of water conflicts over access to water resource services if not undertaken with serious consideration to socioeconomic situations. The collection of references presented in this paper focus on water conflicts, politics, wars, arguments, fights, tensions, and violence, in an effort to determine controversial aspects of water resources management. As states rely on competing claims and rising war conflicts—which not only occur in modern history, but also in prior millenniums—it is no coincidence that, as the years pass, the inequity of water distribution will expand globally. This element is indicative of how likely the scenario will be of future wars causes (in regards to claiming aquifers) [170]. Since Bronze Age, massive droughts that wiped out cities, civilizations—as we have learned from history— depend on water. This precious resource has been a source of tension and a factor in conflicts among countries, states, and groups, and will continue to be a determining factor for development in the future. The United Nations recognizes that water disputes result from opposing interests of water users, public or private [171]. Other terms of water conflict describe it as a conflict between countries, states, or human groups over access to water resources [99,171–173]. The same methods of conducting armed conflicts are strongly influenced by the water factor, which has therefore constituted a crucial aspect of military logistics since ancient times. Units of the Roman army during the military campaigns were specifically assigned to water transportation, as shown in Rome on the Trajan and Aurelian Columns, depicting soldiers loading water barrels on wagons supporting the troops. In recent times, technological evolution has strongly influenced the logistics systems supporting the troops, especially in areas with a shortage of water resources. The first mobile desalination units— “distillers”—were used during World War II in the Pacific area; subsequently, since the 1980s, there has been increasing use of reverse osmosis systems. Various sub-disciplines have grappled with war’s etiology, but each in turn, as with definitions of war, often reflects a tacit or explicit acceptance of broader philosophical issues on the nature of determinism and freedom. Heraclitus decried that war is the father of all things, and Hegel echoed his sentiments. Interestingly, even Voltaire, the embodiment of the Enlightenment, followed this line: “famine, plague, and war are the three most famous ingredients of this wretched world...Air, earth and water are arenas of destruction” (from Pocket Philosophical Dictionary). The high number of shared rivers, combined with increasing water scarcity for growing populations, led many politicians to claim that the wars of the next century will be about water. The only problem with this scenario is a lack of evidence. While water supplies and infrastructure have often served as military tools or targets, no states have gone to war specifically over water resources, since the city–states of Lagash and Umma fought each other in the Tigris−Euphrates Basin in 2500 BC. Instead, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), more than 3600 water treaties were signed from 805 to 1984 AD. Whereas most were related to navigation, over time, a growing number addressed water management, including flood control, hydropower projects, or allocations in international basins. Since 1820, more than 680 water treaties and other water-related agreements have been signed, with more than half of these concluded in the past 50 years. The historical record proves that international water disputes do get resolved, even among enemies and even as conflicts erupt over other issues. Some of the world’s most vociferous enemies have negotiated water agreements, or are in the process of doing so, and the institutions they have created often prove to be resilient, even when relations are strained. As for the use of water as a weapon of war, one can conclude that it is unfortunately still an element present in military conflict or in situations of “asymmetric war”—from the bombing of dams in Europe in the Second World War to the destruction of water infrastructure, and attempts to contaminate water by terrorist groups, especially in the Middle East. Despite the existence of shared international rules, the problem persists, and this is why we need to be prepared—from a technical point of view—to protect the populations. Reasonable and democratic agreements are necessary. Future water conflicts will be somewhat different from the past with different types of challenges [174–176]. These new challenges include a water–energy nexus complicated further by the energy–water–land (EWL) nexus, which is then further complicated by the climate-EWL nexus, with many linkages and interactions, with the three resource sectors and climate fluctuations [176]. Water conflicts will also include water supply systems security [175], especially related to terrorism, where “water resources or water systems are either targets or tools of violence or coercion by non-state actors”. The vulnerabilities in water supply systems include raw water sources (surface and/or groundwater); raw reservoirs; raw water channels and pipelines; connections to water distribution systems; pump stations and valves; and finished water tanks and reservoirs. Physical disruption would include destroying or disrupting key elements of the water system; however, contamination has generally been viewed as the most severe potential threat to water supply systems. The concept of sustainability is also a major component of water conflicts. In particular, water resources sustainability, which is defined as follows [176]: “Water resources sustainability is the ability to use water in sufficient quantities and quality from the local to the global scale to meet the needs of humans and ecosystems for the present and the future to sustain life and to protect humans from the damages brought about by natural and human-caused disasters that affect sustaining life”. In summary, the future will be challenging in regards to water conflicts, especially in areas that have potential for water crisis challenges, such as central Asia [177,178]. It must be noticed that water can be considered as a weapon to fight enemies/rivals who want to access/withdraw water for their benefit. Additionally, it can be considered as a resource to fight for when its availability is very low. Therefore, the access to water could be a weapon against or a reason for a fight. Today and in the future, there is a greater focus on the peaceful sharing and management of water at both the international and the local level in the developed world. Moreover, there is a tendency to reduce water use and increase water production. However, in the developing world, internal, sub-state conflicts about water are endangering the livelihoods of millions of people and, therefore, deserve the international community’s full diplomatic, scientific, and financial attention. Impact Turns 2AC – Warming Discourse Good Deliberation over fear of warming is good – debating policy options criticizes worst forms of apocalyptic framing while preserving the best. Pfau 2007 - Prof of Communication – U Minnesota-Duluth Michael, “Who's Afraid of Fear Appeals? Contingency, Courage and Deliberation in Rhetorical Theory and Practice,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 40.2 (2007) 216-237 A fear appeal possessing each of these characteristics is not only relatively ethically unproblematic, but is a potentially valuable tool capable of enhancing [End Page 232] public deliberations about some issues. "Civic fear" as developed by Aristotle and explicated within this essay is an emotional disposition with the potential to help the body of deliberators (whether legislators or citizens) to enhance their collective perception of the events threatening the republic. It is the potential of "civic fear" to enhance collective perception of events that allows this emotional state to incline audiences toward deliberation. Once decision makers apprehend the potential dangers posed by events more clearly, they are in a much better position to begin formulating potential courses of action, and weighing which of these actions is likely to preserve the republic from danger. "Civic fear," in other words, is an emotional state that, at its best, opens up deliberative possibilities. This type of fear appeal is to be contrasted with the traditional "dichotomous" fear appeal that is depressingly common in contemporary political discourse, and remains a lightning rod for ongoing humanist suspicions of fear and fear appeals in politics. Such fear appeals, in fact, are often used as strategies to bypass deliberation and scare audiences into adopting a rhetor's preferred alternative (as in the case of the passage of the USA-PATRIOT Act).¶ While this essay falls short of endorsing standard "dichotomous" fear appeals, and even remains skeptical of many of the baser fear appeals populating U.S. political discourse, this is not to suggest that all "dichotomous" fear appeals are inherently irrational or manipulative. Walton's work has established the appropriateness and rationality of some of these traditional fear appeals, and provided some relatively clear rules from traditional argument theory and pragmadialectics in order to assist citizens and critics in their attempt to evaluate them.70 But the cognitive character of this emotion also allows the possibility that the fear appeal can be used in a specifically civic and deliberative mode, as a means to enable citizens and policy makers to better recognize the nature of the problems facing the political community, and to begin thinking about potential solutions. In some respects, appeals to "civic fear" are especially necessary now at a time when many leaders, policy makers, and citizens—due to self-interest, unwarranted confidence, or excessive fear—have turned a blind eye to the very real dangers posed by global warming, fossil fuel dependence, resource depletion, income polarization, increasing corporate control of politics, failing health care systems, record budget deficits, record trade deficits, and the long list of other problems that remain relatively unrecognized by a regime that seems focused solely on an object of fear that is already clearly recognized by all. Under such circumstances, one can only hope that legislators and citizens will possess the courage, as well as the foresight, to face these underappreciated objects of fear, and commence open and vigorous discussions about potential solutions. Perhaps the ongoing abuse of fear appeals by the powerful may eventually itself [End Page 233] become an object of "civic fear," and inspire academics, political leaders, and citizens to even more fundamental deliberations regarding the character of U.S. political discourse, and the fate of the United States itself. Debate is critical to bring awareness of conceptual solutions and the risks of climate change. Weber and Stern 11 Elke and Paul C, “Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United States,’” American Psychologist; Vol. 66, No. 4, 315–328 (May/June) The Future of Public Understanding and Its Relation to Action The trajectory of public understanding frustrates many climate scientists and educators who see climate risks growing, understand that delayed action will increase the risks further, and believe that concerted action is needed now to reduce them (e.g., Hansen, 2009). Many of these concerned individuals see climate literacy and continuing efforts by scientists to explain what they know as the way to accomplish the objectives of improved public understanding, increased public concern about climate change, and increased public support and action to reduce climate risks. However, unless existing behavioral science evidence collected in different domains of application is brought to bear on climate literacy and education, there is no reason to believe that future efforts will be any more successful in improving public understanding or willingness to take action related to climate change than past efforts have been. Conventional educational and informational programs are unlikely to have a major effect on aggregate public opinion, and more effective strategies need to be devised to improve public understanding and to increase individual and collective action. As political ideology plays a large role in people's beliefs about climate change and their policy support, problems with public understanding are not mainly due to a knowledge deficit but often result from a deficit in trust in the conveyors of climate models and data ( Malka & Krosnick, 2009).¶ Improving Public Understanding¶ Public understanding of climate change needs improvement, but the problem is not one of “illiteracy.” In comparison to the rest of the world, the American public has an average amount of knowledge about climate change and an average understanding of climate change phenomena ( Brechin, 2003). U.S. adults who doubt that climate change is happening, is anthropogenic, or presents serious risks should be assumed not to have a deficit of knowledge but rather to have different understandings. Individuals holding mental models that conflict with the available scientific evidence are not a blank slate, as the metaphor of illiteracy suggests, so the needed educational process is not one of adding to knowledge but one of inducing conceptual change. Research on science education indicates that preconceptions that conflict with scientific understanding can be tenacious and that instruction that does not address them typically fails to help learners adopt mental models that are scientifically accurate ( National Research Council, 2005). A developing literature, focused mainly on teaching fundamental scientific concepts to children, identifies common preconceptions in some areas of science and studies “learning progressions” that can lead learners effectively from their preconceptions to mental models that are consistent with scientific understanding ( National Research Council, 2007). Changing adults' misconceptions about climate change will likely prove more difficult than teaching children, but the general principle of beginning with learners' preexisting mental models surely applies ( Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991). What can scientists and educators do to improve U.S. public understanding? We begin by stating a position in favor of “nonpersuasive communication” ( Fischhoff, 2007). Much of value can be gained by efforts to inform the public in ways that are not disguised efforts to engage support for a line of public policy. Thus, it is important for scientists to continue to explain what is and is not known about climate change to journalists, policymakers, and the general public, using normal science education approaches, and to explain the difference between reducible versus irreducible uncertainty. Such efforts will be valuable to people whose understandings already approximate those of scientists, whose understandings are relatively unformed, or who become more open to input from scientists in the future. It is also important to continue to correct errors and mischaracterizations of the science of climate change, which continue to be publicized despite repeated corrections. These efforts are necessary, though unlikely to be sufficient, to raise the level of public understanding in the current politicized environment.¶ Other approaches are needed in addition. One is to explain a simple conceptual frame for understanding climate change that is more congruent with the state of knowledge than the persuasive frames on offer now—a frame that does not claim too much for the ability to make climate predictions or exaggerate the import of existing scientific uncertainties. 7 Recent scientific reports are beginning to define such a frame—one that emphasizes risk or uncertainty management ( Gober, Kirkwood, Balling, Ellis, & Deitrick, 2009; National Research Council, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Pollack, 2007). In this frame, climate change is shown to alter the profile of risks from the many events associated with climate, typically increasing such risks, including catastrophic ones. Responses to climate change are presented as options for risk management, not as self-evident responses to a predictable future.¶ The risk management frame is readily understandable. Everyone faces catastrophic risks (from life-threatening diseases, automobile accidents, house fires, and even climate-related events), and everyone understands strategies for managing them. One strategy is to reduce activities that might lead to catastrophe (e.g., controlling our diets, staying off icy roads, or for climate change, adopting energy-efficient and low-emissions technology). Another is to lower the cost of catastrophic events if they occur (e.g., installing air bags and fire extinguishers, buying health and fire insurance, or, with climate change, protecting vital infrastructure and improving early warning and emergency response capabilities). Yet another strategy is to invest in a better understanding of the risk profile and of the likely costs and benefits of the risk management options. People manage risks by employing combinations of these strategies or by employing none of them and taking their chances. 2AC - Security pedagogy good Discussions of security politics are necessary for education, no need to tie us to their faulty link logic Downs and Murtazashvilli 2012 Donald Alexander [Alexander Meiklejohn prof of political science, law, and journalism @ UW Madison] and Ilia [Assistant prof at the grad school of public and international affairs @ U of Pittsburgh], Arms and the University, Cambridge University Press, p. 405-408 Our purpose in presenting this discussion of the various approaches to security studies was not to take a side in the debates that have proliferated in the expanding field. We had two different purposes. First, we wanted to provide a framework to cast light on the empirical findings that we presented earlier in this chapter. To make sense of these findings, one has to have a basic idea of the fundamental thinking and controversies in the field of inquiry. Our second purpose relates to the pedagogical theme of the book: to provide reasons for taking the study of military-related issues seriously. In the context of security studies, this means appreciating the classical approach to security studies, for that approach consciously includes military power as a central tenet. As stressed throughout this book, the point is certainly not to push a militaristic or promilitary agenda, but rather to demonstrate how the inclusion of military-related study can contribute to liberal and civic education. Indeed, as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 2, the debate between realism and its critics raises profound empirical, normative, and philosophical questions that cut to the core of civic and liberal education: What is the meaning of citizenship? Is it rooted in universal principles, or is it socially constructed? What is the role of morality and ethics in international life, and what are the most effective means of promoting these goods? Is there such a thing as universal truth, or is truth contingent upon interest or social construction? Are ethical standards universal, or do they differ among different realms, such as private morality, economic relations, domestic politics, and relations among nations? How do power and the threat of force relate to citizenship and moral obligation? Classical security studies also pose questions regarding life and death. In addition, it is evident that classical strategic studies and realism are still very relevant to political and international life. First, who can reasonably avow that self-interest and the will to power (at both the individual and the state levels) have disappeared as important aspects of human motivations and action? Even if wars are less prevalent than in the past, and if the theorists of democratic peace are on to something, the fact remains that organized violence remains part of our world; and it lies in the background of states and international orders within which the practice of democratic peace prevails. 64 (In other words, democratic peace must ultimately be backed by power, whether the power comes from international institutions - which have not had an unblemished record thus far in protecting peace and justice - or the commitment of powerful states or alliances such as NATO f5 Second, such rogue states and "revolutionary regimes" as Iran and North Korea are on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons as of this writing. If they attain these weapons, the nations within the realm of democratic peace will be obligated to deploy the doctrine of deterrence against them. Some strategic thinkers are now even reconsidering the previously rejected doctrine of the threat of limited nuclear war to deter such regimes.66 Third, as many advocates of human rights acknowledge, sometimes military intervention is needed to secure those rights in the face of tyranny. And if such intervention does not come, the consequences are obvious, as the graves, hospitals, and rivers of blood in such places as Nazi Germany, Armenia, Darfur, Rwanda, Burma, Iran, and the Gulags of Communism have shown. Accordingly, sometimes peace is preserved not by pacifism or extreme reluctance to use arms, but rather by a plausible deterrent force. 67 If so, peace and war studies are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but can constitute two sides of the same coin. As MIT's Stephen Van Evera has remarked, most theories about the causes of war are also about theories of peace- and vice versa. 68 Fourth, some scholars have empirically demonstrated that even liberal states with republican forms of government are considerably more likely to follow the strictures of international law when it serves their interests to do so than when it does not. 69 And fifth, what do we make of conflict that arises from the animosity of nonliberal states or groups that lie outside the realm of democratic peace? Sometimes this conflict is itself a product of the very practices that contribute to democratic peace - supporting classic realism's grasp of the tragic nature of life and international relations. As Philip Bobbitt has demonstrated in two magnum opuses, the rise of "market states" in the late-twentieth century- the products of economic interdependency - helped to fuel the jihadist terrorism that now threatens those very states. The economic relations and activities of market states extend beyond traditional physical borders, embedding market polities in international networks that sometimes defy the limits and perquisites of sovereignty. (Market states are prime examples of the decentering of the state.) This expansion of economic activity and power alienates fundamentalist Islamists, but also provides networks of communication and information that Islamic terrorists use to recruit members and obtain technological knowledge. In many ways, liberal democracy's conflict with terrorism epitomizes the tensions and dilemmas that beset international relations theory today: Dispute reigns over whether the conflict should be considered a war or a law enforcement matter, and the legal status of non-state terrorists who violate the rules of war is a matter of continuous dispute. 70 Is the threat posed by terrorism real, or is it also influenced by our constructions of the threat? The confrontation with international terrorism provides both vindication and refutation of all schools of security studies. But at the very least, realism and traditional security studies have something important to say about terrorism on a variety of levels. Constructivism has usually been used to question realism's suspicion of international organizations and order. But a constructivist sensibility can also cut in the other direction. For example, some commentators have observed that some liberal internationalists and peace advocates project their own beliefs in goodwill and peace onto others whose purposes are much less benign. (Among a multitude of examples are Woodrow Wilson's faith in the League of Nations, Neville Chamberlain's views toward Hitler, Jimmy Carter's earlier views toward the Soviet Union, and George W. Bush's earlier assumptions regarding Vladimir Putin.) Accordingly, constructivism can be used to question the assumptions of all schools of IR, including its own when some of its practitioners unduly dismiss realism's claims. Realism- including the "moral realism" as we have conceptualized of it in this book - and the traditional core of security studies remain highly relevant, even if responsible scholars and policy makers must account for alternative understandings. And since the project of this book deals with pedagogy, we are not obligated to pick a horse in this race. It is enough to acknowledge that the tenets of realism and traditional security studies are important regardless of one's policy or normative position, and that such tenets broaden and deepen the knowledge to which students are exposed in campus life today. Security studies programs remain hospitable to realism, and it is not isolated from the university or singular in its approach. In general, the security studies programs that we asked about are sources of productive friction to varying extents. 2AC – Eco Rhetoric Good Our rhetoric is good—their links are industry propaganda to make protecting the environment sound radical. Peeples et al. 14 Jennifer Peeples is Associate Professor in the Department of Languages, Philosophy and Communication Studies at Utah State University; Pete Bsumek is Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Co-Director of Center for Health and Environmental Communication at James Madison University, Steve Schwarze is Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Communication Studies at The University of Montana; Jen Schneider is Associate Professor of Liberal Arts and International Studies at the Colorado School of Mines. “Industrial Apocalyptic: Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque Frame”, University of Montana Law Review. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=communications_pub s, [Accessed: 7-18-2021]//cblasi In the realm of environmental controversy in the United States, apocalyptic rhetoric is consistently associated with environmentalist voices. Examples of such labeling abound: an editorial in the Investor’s Business Daily discussing clean air concludes, “Meanwhile, green groups froth with apocalyptic rhetoric.” 2 Describing a case of ecotage, the editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch claims, “It is mildly tempting to blame mainstream environmentalists, with their sometimes apocalyptic rhetoric, for fostering an atmosphere upon which the lunatic fringe feeds.”3 And in a piece provocatively titled “No reason to fear the environmental bogeyman,” Ben Eisen contends, “For decades, the more radical elements of the modern environmental movement have employed terrifying, apocalyptic rhetoric in an effort to scare citizens and policymakers into enacting an agenda that can go beyond common sense environmental policies.” 4 But the easy association of environmentalism with apocalyptic rhetoric is inaccurate and politically misleading. When mass media identify environmentalism as apocalyptic, they mark environmentalism as radical, outside the mainstream, and unreasonable, which clears a space for 3 industry voices to be perceived as the rational center, the common sense approach to environmental issues. 5 This association also deflects attention from the apocalyptic rhetoric that comes from industry. In his history of environmental politics, Samuel Hays problematizes the association of environmental discourse with the apocalypse, claiming that historically, "environmentalists were the purveyors of optimism about the possibilities of human achievement while administrative and technical leaders were the constant bearers of bad news. In the media the roles were reversed: Environmentalists warned of impending catastrophe, while the technical leadership exuded optimism.” 6 Rhetorical scholars who continue to identify apocalyptic rhetoric with environmentalism reinforce this distorted perception of the rhetoric of environmental controversies—a move that unnecessarily limits our understanding of apocalyptic rhetoric. For example, although M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer acknowledge that “the enemies of environmentalism have regularly devised apocalyptic narratives of their own,”7 they also identify apocalyptic narrative as “a standard feature of environmentalist polemic”8 and focus primarily on environmentalist voices while giving brief attention to only two examples of apocalyptic rhetoric from opponents of environmentalism: Monsanto’s rejoinder to Silent Spring titled The Desolate Year, and the rhetoric of former Interior Secretary James Watt.9 More recently, Christina R. Foust and William O. Murphy analyze apocalyptic framing in US press coverage of climate change, yet those frames are almost exclusively built from quotations of proenvironmental sources.10 In our view, the scholarly and public focus on environmentalist uses of apocalyptic discourse has deflected attention away from the structure and function of apocalyptic rhetoric used by countermovements to environmentalism. This essay seeks to remedy that oversight. We propose the concept of industrial apocalyptic as a significant rhetorical form in environmental controversy, using texts in support of the US coal industry as our examples. We define industrial apocalyptic as narratives that constitute the imminent demise of a particular industry or a broader economic system for the purpose of influencing public opinion and public policy. This form of apocalyptic is consistent with the secular apocalyptic that Kurt Ritter and David Henry identify in the conservative rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, a rhetoric that, in James Arnt Aune’s view, consistently seeks to manage the ideological tensions between free market capitalism and patriotism. 11 We find that the industrial apocalyptic rhetoric used on behalf of the coal industry relies on a burlesque frame to disrupt the categories of establishment and outsider and to thwart environmental regulation.12 Ultimately, the industrial apocalyptic co-opts environmentalist appeals for radical change in the service of blocking such change and naturalizes neoliberal ideology as the common-sense discourse of the center Case turns the K—critiquing environmental rhetoric reinforces neoliberal ideology Peeples et al. 14 Jennifer Peeples is Associate Professor in the Department of Languages, Philosophy and Communication Studies at Utah State University; Pete Bsumek is Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Co-Director of Center for Health and Environmental Communication at James Madison University, Steve Schwarze is Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of Communication Studies at The University of Montana; Jen Schneider is Associate Professor of Liberal Arts and International Studies at the Colorado School of Mines. “Industrial Apocalyptic: Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque Frame”, University of Montana Law Review. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=communications_pub s, [Accessed: 7-18-2021]//cblasi The apocalyptic rhetoric and the burlesque framing deployed by the coal industry also enable the industrial position to be seen as the common-sense discourse of the center. As Star Muir explains, the very assertion that environmentalists engage in apocalyptic rhetoric and the absence of a countervailing label for similar industry rhetoric does the rhetorical work of positioning environmentalism as extreme and its proposed solutions as hopelessly utopian. 81 Moreover, as Hays suggests, labeling environmentalists as doomsayers elides the optimism that comes with the belief that environmental problems can be identified and solved, and deflects attention from the inherent pessimism of industrial apocalyptic discourse, which asserts that any attempt at addressing environmental problems will lead to certain economic decline and job loss. 82 That pessimism is reconstituted as commonsensical and realistic. Our analysis extends Hays’s insight by developing the ideological implications of these rhetorical strategies; in particular, that industrial apocalyptic in a burlesque frame provides a rhetorical form that is well suited to normalizing neoliberalism as common sense. It is effective for two main reasons. First, liberalism, and by extension neoliberalism, are ideologies that are often articulated through a burlesque frame. As Burke notes, “The method of burlesque (polemic, caricature) is partial not only in the sense of partisan, but also in the sense of incompleteness.”83 Liberalism, according to Burke, offers rights, but denies obligations. It defends liberty and private property in absolutist terms, and ignores corresponding and complementary duties to society and the common good, which, in turn, would “require us to stress the ambivalence of rights and obligations.” 84 For Burke, “the very basis of classic liberal apologetics, the overemphasis upon freedom, was but a sober way of carrying out the burlesque genius.” 85 Neoliberalism, like liberalism, utilizes this same kind of over-emphasis on freedom to craft an extreme and polemic ideology that identifies individual liberty with private property and market rationality. The use of the burlesque frame masks the apocalyptic character of the industrial narrative. The frame helps manage the tension between the apocalyptic narrative’s implied call for radical rebellion and the neoliberal goal of restoring traditional freemarket principles According to Killingsworth and Palmer, apocalyptic narrative “is an expansive and offensive rhetorical strategy.” 86 It goes on the offensive by implying “the need for radical change,” by marking “oneself as an outsider,” risking “alienation,” and urging “others into the open air of rebellion.” 86 By deploying apocalyptic narratives, the coal industry is able to go on the offensive, position itself as a radical outsider, and call for rebellion against a caricatured opponent. But in combination with the burlesque frame, industrial apocalyptic turns away from calls for radical social or ideological change and thus avoids risking alienation. In this sense, industrial apocalyptic is a new twist on the strategy of aggressive mimicry that Jennifer Peeples observed in the rhetoric of the Wise Use Movement, 88 in which pro-industry organizations employed the anti-establishment identity and discourse of environmental groups in order to force environmentalists to use limited resources to defend themselves against the characterization that they were government insiders focused solely on special interests. In this case, the coal industry co-opts the apocalyptic language and appeals of environmentalists, but then uses a burlesque frame to position those who produce and benefit from an entrenched neoliberal ideology as radical outsiders being attacked by powerful and dominant foes. Just as Tea Party rhetors position themselves as radical outsiders, even while they defend the most basic and traditional liberal principles (individualism, liberty, private property), so too is the coal industry able to position itself as a radical agent of social change, even while it works to prevent social change. The appearance of burlesque in industrial apocalyptic, its degree of intensity, and its potential shading into tragedy89 all may serve as indexes of neoliberal ideology, and point toward sites where neoliberalism’s footing is not yet secure. In other words, industrial apocalyptic marks key moments of the ideological suturing of neoliberalism’s contradictions. The burlesque frame is just one rhetorical tactic for pursuing this work. The exaggerated, absurd extremes of industry rhetoric analyzed in this essay mark an aggressive mode of neoliberal rhetoric, whereas the rhetoric of coal front groups that makes support for coal inherent to regional cultural values or national identity reveals its more positive, celebratory mode. Ultimately, industrial apocalyptic rhetoric attempts to clear the rhetorical field of competing voices and naturalize neoliberal ideology as the commonsense way of approaching environmental and economic crises. AT: Identity Shapes Policy Their assertion is non-falsifiable and wrong Gray 2014 – prof of politics and strategic studies, director of Centre for Strategic studies @ the University of Reading Colin S, Strategy and Culture, Strategy in Asia, Stanford U Press, p. 93 The influence of culture simply asserts the identity of actors or organizations. Even when the United States must respond to strategic circumstances shaped by a foreign strategic culture, that response will bear some American characteristics. However, it is not self-evident that those characteristics will be particularly American. To state the matter bluntly, the notion of strategic culture is logically and empirically problematic. One cannot presume identity drives behavior. More often than not, identity is overcome by exigency. People tend to behave in ways not only because of who they are and what they believe in but also because of where they find themselves, and not necessarily by their own volition, either politically or strategically.