SIPC
Hazard & Operability Studies
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
1
Program Objective
To get an overall understanding of the HAZOP methodology
used in process safety review.
To practice a simple HAZOP review exercise on a production
separator.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
2
Program Outline
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Introduction
Types of HAZOP Studies
Organize HAZOP Workshop
Methodology & Workflow
 Project information
 Review by process nodes
 Guidewords
 Possible Hazards & Causes
 Assess Potential Consequences
 Recommendations
 Record & report
HAZOP Action Close-out
HAZOP Audit
Practice simple HAZOP exercise of a Production Separator
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
3
HAZOP Objectives
HAZOP Study is a qualitative review method that
 Identify possible deviations or problems in the design of
‐ New process plant
‐ Existing process plant (due to modifications or new standards)
 Identify possible operability and maintainability problems under
- Commissioning
- Normal operations
- Reduced throughput or turn down
- Routine start up & shut down
- Emergency shut down
- Other special modes of operations
 Assess possible causes and potential consequences to safety & environment
 Confirm adequate safeguarding and provide recommendation to improve
protection
 Identify those hazards require further assessment e.g. Level of Protection
Analysis LOPA to decide if SIS is required to reduce the risk to ALARP
SIPC Reference document: SIPC HSEMS PSG03 HAZOP
Reference Standard: IEC 61882 HAZOP Studies Application Guide
HEMP Bow-tie Model
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
4
HAZOP Reference Documents
SIPC HSEMS PSG03 HAZOP
 IEC 61882 HAZOP Studies
Application Guide

HSE
Policy
HSE
Expectation
Function
HSE Management Manual
E&P Project
Seismic Operation
Well Engineering
Facility Construction
Production Operation
Common
HSE Management Manual
SIPC HSE-MS Manual
Function
HSE
Management
Manual
HSE Procedure
P01 Target & Performance Management
P02 HSE Monthly Report
P03 Incident Notification, Investigation & Reporting
P04 Risk Management
P05 HSE Audit
P06 Emergency Response Plan
P07 HSE Documentation Management
P08 Life Saving Rule
P09 HSE Observation Scheme
Common
HSE
Management
Manual
Occupational Health and Hygiene
Process Safety
Personal Safety
Environment
Contractor HSE
Transportation
Social Performance
HSE Competence Assurance
HSE Guideline
PSG01
PSG02
PSG03
PSG04
PSG05
PSG06
PSG07
PSG08
PSG09
Process safety assessment
QRA
HAZOP
Process safeguarding & alarm management
Design integrity review
Fire & explosion hazard management
Process containment management
SCE management
Evacuation, escape & rescue analysis
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
5
Project HEMP Reviews
项目风险管理（HEMP）
评价阶段
设计开始
HAZID
设计阶段
可行性
HAZID
- 对每个方
案风险评估
进行比较
发展计划
HAZID
- 基本设计
- HSE 理念
执行阶段
理论设计
HAZOP
详细设计
HAZOP
物理影响模型
定量风险分析
PLM
(LAYOUT)
火灾和爆炸分析
生产操作
开工建设
JHA
预审核
火灾保护分析
JHA
火灾保护分析
HAZOP
健康风险评估
人机工程研究
健康风险评估
风险管理始于整个项目
运作的初期阶段：
• 在项目设计过程中就
开展适当的HEMP研究
• 合理的最低限度
(ALARP)理念和示范
火灾保护分析
应急系统有效性分析 / 火灾和爆炸
紧急撤离和救援
电器安全操作分析
定量风险评估
监控HSE对法律的符合性
环境评估报告 / 环境与影响评估报告
持续改进的HSE 例卷 (包括. Bowtie)
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
6
Importance of HAZOP Review
Lessons from Esso Australia’s Gas Plant Explosion at Longford
In September 1998 Esso Australia’s gas plant at Longford in Victoria suffered a major fire.
Two men were killed and the state’s gas supply was severed for two weeks.
What happened was that a warm lean oil system failed, allowing a metal heat exchanger
to become intensely cold and therefore brittle. When operators tried to reintroduce
warm lean oil, the vessel fractured and released a large quantity of gas which found an
ignition source and exploded.
A major contributing factor was the fact that Esso had not carried out a critical hazard
identification process, standard in the industry, know as a HAZOP. This process involves
systematically imagining everything that might go wrong in a processing plant and
developing procedures or engineering solutions to avoid these potential problem. HAZOPs
had been carried out on two of the three gas plants at the Longford refinery but not at Gas
Plant 1, the oldest of the three.
A proposed HAZOP of this plant had been deferred indefinitely because of resourcing
constraints. By all accounts a HAZOP would have identified the possibility of cold
temperature embrittlement caused by a failure of the lean oil system.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
7
HAZOP Reviews in Project Lifecycle
SEQUENCE OF HAZOP STUDIES THROUGH A PROJECT
Procedures
Coarse
HAZOP
HSEHAZID
Final
HAZOP
Main
HAZOP
Minor Change
Mini-HAZOP
Identification Phase
Definition Phase
Prospective Project
Front End Engineering
Ability to Change the Design
Execution Phase
"Will it Work?"
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
8
Major HAZOP Reviews
Coarse HAZOP
• Conducted at the end of the development of project's basis for design
• First opportunity for all the design disciplines, project management and
operations to be involved in a complete review of the project
• Key objective is to optimize the design and minimize any significant rework
Main HAZOP
• Conducted towards the end of FEED when “AFD” drawings are ready
• Most comprehensive study in the project and examines in great detail all
aspects of the design
Final HAZOP
• Conducted towards end of detail design when “AFC” drawings are ready
• Focus on changes after Main HAZOP and any additional vendor details, and
not reviewing the approved design
• AFC drawings should be “frozen” once the recommendations of this study
have been reviewed and incorporated
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
9
Minor HAZOP Reviews
Mini HAZOP
• Formal HAZOP studies carried out for minor changes to drawings following the
Main HAZOP
• Not requiring the full team used for the Main HAZOP but just the core
members involved in that area of the process.
• A safety statement should be issued on each minor change, involving the
process or procedures, to confirm that it does not affect the safety of the main
process
Existing Process HAZOP
• Due to modifications in years’ of operation or the need to demonstrate
adequate management of risks for existing processes
• Special consideration should be given to the interface/tie-in points, consistency
of design codes and standards, and the risks involved in the intermediate
operating period
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
10
HAZOP Review Workshop
HAZOP Team
• The team usually consists of 5 to 8 people. A smaller team of 3 to 4 people may be
sufficient for a small facility or a change order. The key is to provide an appropriate
level of project knowledge coupled with independent members providing relevant
expertise.
• Typically team members include:
‐ Leader (Chair and facilitate workshop as independent person)
‐ Secretary (familiar with the recording system)
‐ Process engineer for the process being considered
‐ Users (e.g. Operations/Maintenance Personnel)
‐ Discipline specialists (Machinery Specialists, Civil/Structural/ Piping/
Instrumentation/ Electrical/Mechanical/Corrosion engineers etc as appropriate)
‐ Safety engineer
‐ Client Representative ( as appropriate)
11
HAZOP Study Duration
• The HAZOP Leader should estimate the overall time based on the predicted length of
the individual nodes and the number of schedule sessions per day.
• Typically a Coarse HAZOP for a new development would take 3 days. A Main HAZOP
for a major project would take 3 to 10 weeks and mini HAZOP for minor modifications
would take anything from 2 hours to 2 days.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
Role of HAZOP Leader and Secretary
Leader
•
•
•
•
Chair and facilitate the workshop
Prepare and run the HAZOP sessions
Prepare HAZOP report
Criteria for HAZOP Leader/Facilitator
 Experience in oil and gas industry or equivalent process industry, in both the
theoretical and practical application of the design and operation of oil and gas
production/processing facilities.
 Adequate training in both the HAZOP and management techniques, formal
training to be supplemented by on-the-job coaching under the supervision of a
competent Leader.
 For external HAZOP consultants, previous experience should be reviewed, in
terms of HAZOP skills, time management skills, and communication skills.
Secretary
• Ensure high quality records be presented to team members timely for review
• Record the agreed findings and recommendations on worksheets, demanding
significant skill and engineering knowledge
• Record each point must be complete and unambiguous
• Record of any action item must be clear
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
12
Main HAZOP Workshop Information Packs
Workshop details
Title, place and timing of HAZOP study sessions
Team member details
Name, title, work discipline, years of experience
Drawings
Philosophies & Standards
PFS, P&ID, heat & mass balance, cause & effect matrix, plot plan, including
revision number and status
List of design documents for reference in the workshop
Operation modes
List of operation modes to be considered in the workshop
Process nodes
List of proposed process nodes to be considered in the workshop
Life cycle issues
List of life cycle issues to be considered in the workshop
HAZOP introduction
Lists of the guide words and other HAZOP technique notes which will be of
use to team members who are less familiar with the study method
Project description
This is an advance version of the presentation to be given at the beginning
of the meeting by the Project Manager
Process design description Optional - if available. This is the presentation to be given at the beginning
of the meeting by the Process Engineer
Hazards & Effects
Management
If available, sections from HSE Case will provide an overview of the
facilities, hazards & effects register, safety critical equipment, etc primarily
for HAZOP of existing process
Previous HAZOP
outstanding issues
If the workshop is part of a series of HAZOP studies on the same project, it
is appropriate to discuss previous HAZOP outstanding action points
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
13
Methodology










Prepare Term of reference
Organize multi-disciplinary team chaired by an Independent Facilitator
Provide design drawings & documents to each team member
Responsible process engineer shall explain the design intent and operating
parameters of the process/equipment under review.
Select & section the process into logical nodes and each node shall be
reviewed using the set of guidewords as appropriate.
The Facilitator shall mark up a copy of drawing to show the extent of the node
to be studied.
Record all guidewords and deviations considered for each node, whether or
not causes or consequences were identified (full reporting).
Recommended actions to improve protection shall be discussed, mediated by
Facilitator (where there are different views) and be agreed by the team.
Where additional information is required to evaluate the consequence, this
should be recorded as an action and the study should then move on.
Each action should be recorded and be assigned to named individual/
discipline for resolution at end of the review session.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
14
HAZOP Work Flow
Select & describe
process
Identify &
describe cause
Select node &
describe design
intent
Record cause if
credible
Select parameter
& guidewords
Adequate
protection?
Y
Determine
Consequences
N
Agree on
recommendations to
improve protection or
further assessment
Record & determine
action party & date for
completion of each
action
List Existing
Safeguards
Y
Other
cause?
N
Y
Next Guide
Word
N
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
15
Review by Process Nodes
Node Definition and Intention
• The division of the process into appropriately sized nodes containing
process lines and/or equipment is made by the HAZOP Leader prior to the
study. This can be done based on changing nodes at a major piece of
equipment or where a critical parameter changes. Appropriately sized
nodes will facilitate the team to clearly identify all the design and
operation issues.
• The node intention defines how the process is expected to perform and it
should be recorded for all process operating cases. It is important to give
the full range of operating and design conditions.
• Before the study meeting, the process engineer should record the data on
a node detail form. During the study, he should give a brief description of
the design intent at the beginning of each node. This will be recorded in
the minutes. Similarly the operator should give a brief step by step
description of start-up and shutdown actions before these topics are
addressed.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
16
Example of Process Nodes
Gas Compressor Inlet Scrubber
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
17
HAZOP Guidewords & Process Parameters
Guidewords - word or phrase which defines a specific type of deviation or departure from
process design intent (e.g. high, low, reverse)
Parameter - qualitative or quantitative property of an element (e.g. flow, temperature,
pressure, composition, etc)
Use guidewords + parameters to stimulate ideas and thoughts to develop and identify all
possible deviations, hazards and operability issues against design intent
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
18
Possible Deviations & Causes
Deviations
• Deviations are departures from the design intent of the process and are
identified by the systematic application of the appropriate process
parameter/guide word combinations.
• In some cases the parameter + guide word combinations make a well
understood deviation, e.g. less flow. In other cases explanations may need
to be developed for the deviation.
Causes
• There may be many causes identified for each deviation, and all potential
causes should be discussed, as the consequences and recommendations
for action may be different. It is not sufficient to refer to generic causes,
e.g. blockage, since the method of prevention and operational issues
cannot be adequately defined.
• Causes have to be credible, to avoid expensive and unnecessary
modifications to the process.
• The three major categories of root causes in decreasing probability are:
human error, equipment failure, and external events
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
19
Potential Consequences
Consequences
• Having identified the credible causes of the deviation, the significance of the
consequences should be assessed, including effect of the potential
consequences and the mitigating effect of all protective measures.
• The protective measures, normally provided by a combination of hardware,
instrumentation and operating practices, may fail due to human failure and/or
hardware failure.
• Potential consequences due to this failure should be assessed during the
HAZOP. A separate column for protection can be created in HAZOP worksheets.
Action Recommendations
• The recommendations should be clear, concise and stand-alone as possible.
• Inconclusive recommendations in the “study”, “consider” or “investigate”
categories will not be effective, and should be avoided.
• Priorities should be set for each recommendation, based on the severity of the
consequences and the potential likelihood of the occurrence.
• A unique number should be provided for each recommendation, to allow
adequate Quality Assurance measures to be applied to the action responses.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
20
Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment Ranking
• With reference to SIPC RAM, the likelihood and consequence of hazards can
be estimated, and the recommended actions can be categorized for
prioritization of follow-up.
• Where assessment of the risk cannot be done by the team, and there is
residual concern regarding the severity of the consequence, further in-depth
analysis may be recommended (e.g. QRA study).
Use of Documentation during a Study
• It is important for each team member to follow the study on their own
drawings.
• A master set of full-size drawings should be displayed on the wall and
marked-up to show progress through the study.
• The master drawings should be archived with the study.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
21
HAZOP Review Records
Typical HAZOP Worksheet
HAZOP Worksheet:
Project Title:
Company Name:
Meeting Date:
Leader:
Project Contract No.:
Node:
Node Details:
PFD No.:
Parameter:
Intention:
Guideword
Deviation
Causes
Consequence
Safeguard
Recommendation
By
Priority
Ref. No.
No
More
Less
As well as
Part of
Reverse
Other than
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
22
HAZOP Review Report
The draft report should be reviewed and agreed by team members prior to
final issue.
The HAZOP report should contain the following sections:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Introduction
Quality of the study
Areas of potential weakness
Comments applicable to the whole process
Major and priority findings
Further studies required (QRA, FMEA, Reliability Model)
Highlight areas for next HAZOP
Reports and comments for other safety meetings
Appendices (including the worksheets and drawings)
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
23
HAZOP Review Follow-up
Implementation/rejection
• Follow-up is the responsibility of the project manager. An auditable, fully
documented record of all actions taken, decisions and alternative solutions is
required.
Completion Statements
• The responding engineer should always explain the reasoning and justification for
his decision. Completion statements should be specific and unambiguous.
• Use of the word installed is an example of a lack of reference point being given.
• A drawing reference and revision number or a drawing change notice, etc. are
required.
• Passing the recommendation forward, e.g. 'will be included in detail design', is
also not acceptable.
Overlapping Recommendations
• Some recommendations on the same or separate nodes may overlap with others.
• To be handled carefully and may need to be reviewed at the next HAZOP meeting.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
24
HAZOP Action Response
Important to get formal acceptance of the response from the responsible
parties. For a design contractor, a number of specified signatures are required.
Typical Action Response Form
HAZOP Worksheet:
Workshop date:
Company Name:
Project Title:
Facilitator:
Project Contract No:
Node:
Deviation:
HAZOP action No.:
HAZOP action by:
Priority:
Cause:
Consequence:
Protection:
Recommendation:
Action:
Resolution:
Contractor Approval:
Project Owner Approval:
Date:
Date:
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
25
Close-out of Recommendation Actions
A formal system of review and authorisation should be in place for the closeout of HAZOP action recommendations, to cover elements of the following
hierarchy:
Signature by the
Engineer’s
supervisor, to
indicate that the
normal
departmental
quality
assurance has
been achieved
Approval by the
Project
Manager, to
confirm that it
has been
implemented
on the project.
Implementation
usually means
inclusion on the
relevant master
drawings rather
than actually
built and
installed．
Approval by the
Asset Holder:
this is required
for
modifications to
existing process.
Approval by the
Client
Representative:
for a HAZOP
with design
contractor (or
vendor) and
client
involvement,
the client
representative
should also
agree that the
response is
acceptable.
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
Approval by the
HAZOP Leader,
to show that
the action taken
actually does
address the
intention of the
action point and
deals with the
concern of the
team.
26
Audit HAZOP Process
The audit typically addresses:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Assessment of the team size and composition
Duration of the HAZOP workshop
Content and quality of the worksheets
Examination of the HAZOP Leader’s report
Availability of follow-up schedules
Timely closure of follow-up actions
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
27
End of Presentation
中国石化集团国际石油勘探开发有限公司
Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration and Production Corporation
28