Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. United States Supreme Court 556 US
868 (2009
●
28 U.S.C. §455 and analogous state statutes already require a judge to recuse himself if his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Judge Benjamin had declined to do so.
●
Caperton holds that under some circumstances refusal to recuse is a denial of due process.
Potentially, that makes every refusal to recuse a constitutional violation.
Rule of Law: A judge is biased and should recuse himself when a contributor’s influence on his
election is so substantial that it would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him
not to be impartial.
Facts: Hugh Caperton, Harman Development Corp., Harman Mining Corp., and Sovereign Coal
Sales (plaintiffs) sued A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) (defendant) in West Virginia state court
for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. A
jury found Massey liable and awarded plaintiffs $50 million. Massey planned to appeal the verdict.
Don Blankenship was Massey’s chairman, CEO and president. After the verdict but before the
appeal was heard, West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections. Blankenship supported a challenger
to Justice McGraw, Brent Benjamin. Blankenship donated the maximum amount to Benjamin’s
campaign, and donated $2.5 million to a 527 organization that supported Benjamin. Blankenship
also spent $500,000 individually on direct mailings and letters in support of Benjamin. Blankenship
donated more than all other supporters of Benjamin combined. In total, Blankenship spent $1 million
more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.
Benjamin won the election in a close race. The West Virginia Supreme Court then heard Massey’s
appeal. Plaintiffs requested that Benjamin recuse himself but he declined. The court reversed the
$50 million verdict against Massey. Plaintiffs sought rehearing, and again sought Benjamin’s recusal.
The court granted rehearing and in April 2008, the divided court again reversed the jury verdict in a
3-2 decision.
Issue: Should a judge recuse himself when a contributor’s influence on his election is so substantial
that it would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him not to be impartial?
Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.): Yes. Although not every campaign contribution by a litigant
or attorney creates a conflict of interest, there is a serious risk of bias when a person with a personal
stake in litigation before the court had a significant and disproportionate influence on placing the
judge on the case by contributing to the judge’s election. The factors to be considered are the
contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount contributed, the total amount spent on
the election, and the effect of the contribution on the outcome of the election. It does not matter
whether Blankenship’s contributions were the cause of Benjamin’s election. The test is as to whether
due process has been violated is whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the
circumstances would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him not to be neutral.
Here, although there was no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement between Blankenship and
Benjamin, the fact that Blankenship’s enormous financial contributions were made at a time when he
had an interest in the outcome of a case to be heard by the court. On these extreme facts, the
probability of actual bias rises to an unconstitutional level. Reversed and remanded.
Dissent (Roberts, J.): I disagree that a judge’s failure to recuse himself because of a probability of
bias violates the Due Process Clause. A “probability of bias” cannot be defined and provides no
useful guidance to judges who are asked to recuse themselves.
Civil Procedure II (Spring 2022): Civil Case Timeline Exercise
Listed below, in random order, are certain steps in a civil lawsuit. Put these steps on the timeline below in the order in which they would
normally occur. Then provide the Rule or Rules that govern each step you have added (no subsections needed). (Some information about
what has occurred in the suit is provided to help guide you).
STEPS:
Answer
Summary Judgment Motion
Service of Process
Expert Discovery
Motion for JML
Renewed Motion for JML
Motion for New Trial
Pretrial Disclosures
Entry of Judgment
Motion to Dismiss
Initial Disclosures
TIMELINE (add missing steps):
1.
Fact Discovery
ADD GOVERNING RULE(S):
Complaint is Filed
2. Service of Process
2. Rule 4
3. Motion to Dismiss
3. Rule 12
4. Court's denial of Motion to Dismiss
5.
Answer
6.
Initial Disclosures
7.
Fact Discovery
8.
Expert Discovery
9.
Summary Judgment Motion
5. Rule 7
6. Rule 7, 26
7. Rule 26 - 36
8. Rule 26
9. Rule 56
10. Denial of Summary Judgment Motions
11.
Pretrial Disclosures
11. Rule 26
12. Trial begins
13.
Motion for Judgment M of L
14. Jury Verdict
13. Rule 50
15.
Entry of Judgment
15. Rule 58
16.
Renewed Motion for JML
16. Rule 50
17. Post-trial motions denied
18.
Motion for New Trial
18. Rule 59
38 Right to a Jury Trial: While we imagine a jury when we think of a trial (from a movie or
television, for example), in real life, a party is NOT always entitled to a jury trial -- sometimes the trial
will be presided over by a judge (also known as a "bench trial"). Whether a party may demand a jury
in a federal civil case is governed by two things:
(1) Whether the Seventh Amendment gives the party a right to a jury in this particular type of
civil case; and
(2) Whether the party properly exercises that right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules 38 and 39).
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial: In civil cases in the federal courts, the right to a jury trial is
addressed by the Seventh Amendment. This constitutional provision states that in suits at "common
law" the jury trial right is "preserved" - a reference to the existence of jury trial rights as they existed
in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. These rights are retained but not expanded.
●
In the modern era, this Seventh Amendment right is applied by a historical test that asks
whether the issues in a case are "legal" (they would have been tried in a court of law) or
"equitable" (they would have been tried in a court of equity).
○
●
Legal issues carry a right to a jury trial; equitable issues are decided by the judge
The challenges of applying this historically-based doctrine to cases in a modern procedural
system are addressed in the Beacon Theaters case, which lays out a road map for assigning
issues to the judge and jury in a modern federal case that combines legal and equitable
issues.
●
United States Constitution, Amendment VII: In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
○
○
○
7th amendment in the modern era:
■
●
courts of law= juries and court of equity=
judges decided
Pages 606-6012
●
Plaintiff prevail in only ½ of the Jury trials
●
juries do not sit in all cases. They will be present only if two conditions are met:
○
(1) at least one party asks for a jury;
○
and (2) it is a case of the sort in which the parties are entitled to a jury
●
Jury trials: No other nation in the world uses them to the extent we do.
●
the insistence on the right to civil jury trials was an important part of the fight to ratify the U.S.
Constitution. But—because there was a fight over the jury issue—the right to jury trial does
not extend over the whole realm of civil litigation.
●
Right ot the jury trial in a civil case in federal court stems from the 7th amendament
●
●
(Holding)
●
Rules 38 and 39:
●
Damages: court of law → juries
●
Rule 38 b jury demand must be timely served and filed:
●
●
●
○
Serve other party a written demand not later then 14 days after the last pleading
○
Rule: 38
○
Put it in her complaint
Jury right to both parties!
Defendant wanted a jury trial what he would do: put it in the answer or file a paper
constituting a written demand jury trial on the
-
-Forming Jury Pool Key phrase: Litigants… entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to… juries
selected at ransom from a fair cross section of the community..” (28 USC Section 1861)
●
Who may serve as a federal jurier:
●
●
citizens with Felonies cannot serve
ppl who are exempt are: active military, professoral police and firefighters, public officials
of feral, state, and local governments
Fair cross section 1816: summoning big pool of potential jurors
Voir Dire= speak the truth: a preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or
lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury
●
●
- court says: the purpose of VD is to exclude from the jury ppl who may not be able to
decide the case fairly
-From those in the courtroom 6 or 12 are selected to sit in the jury box for initial questioning, a
process called voir dire.5 This stage provides the parties a basis for exercising challenges to
individual jurors.
●
Rule 47(a): Examining Jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to examine prospective jurors or may itself do so.
● Juror Bias: knows one of the parties, knows one of the lawyers, knows
one of the witnesses, knows about the case, Juror’s job, Juror’s
prejudice, life and experience
● Challenges for cause-Lawyers try to convince the judge that their are
some jurors that are biast
- The DC must grant a challenge for cause… if a prospective juror
shows actual prejudice or bias (Getter V. WalMart Stores p.619)
- Actual Bias can be shown: (1) the jurors own admission of bias
(2) proof of specific facts which show the juror has such a close
connection to the facts at trial that bias is presumed
● Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray
- federal employment descrimination case: title 7
-plaintiff alleged employment discrimination and one of the jurors said
that they were an employer and owner of a business and that it would def
sway their judgment in the case
- the judge allows the juror to stay on- ask “if instructed you as to
what the law is, would you be able to apply the law recognizing that you are
a business owner?
- Juror Answered “I think my experience will cloud my judgment but I
will do my best”
- the plaintiff loses and on appeal: the district judge should have followed up
and “pushed her”
-Appeal judge court says “ had the judge pushed the juror and had she
finally given unequivocal assurances that he deemed credible, his ruling
could not be disturbed. But he failed to do that”
● Getter v. Walmart Stores:
-In the cited case, the prospective juror owned stock in defendant Wal-Mart, which also employed
his wife; the court held that in spite of the prospective juror’s statement that he would base his
decision on the law and the facts, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to dismiss him for cause
-” courts have presumed bias in extraordinary situations where a prospective
juror has a direct financial interest in the trial’s outcome.”
-Examples: “a case in which a prospective juror was a stockholder in or an
employee of a corporation that was a party to the suit”.
● Assume that Juror D is not struck for cause, even though the Plaintiff’s
Lawyer has a strong feeling that she is biased against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff’s Lawyer feels that ruling is likely to be upheld on appeal. Is
there anything the Plaintiff’s lawyer can do? → She can exercise her
(Peremptory Strikes)
● A challenge for cause is an objection to a juror alleging that the juror
is incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. ... A peremptory challenge is
made to a juror without assigning any reason.
○ One of the parties has convinced by they shouldnt be on a jury
■ Actual prejudice or bias can be shown by:
● The jurors own admission of bias
● Or such a close connection to the facts at trial that
noas is presumed(e.g a direct connection to the
defense council)
● each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges → 28 US Code §
1870
● the specific term used for a request that a judge disqualify himself or herself from
sitting on a particular case?(recusal)
● From what constitutional source do parties get the right to an unbiased
decision-maker at trial? (The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)
● Peremptory Strikes: does not need to be supported by a reason→ one
of a party’s limited chances
○ In a civil case each party gets three peremptory challenges
● Peremptory challenge may be used to strike a prospective juror for any
reason, without giving a reason → *narrow exception* BUT may not
be used to intentionally discriminate based on race or
gender(unconstitutional)
● Ones strike= no pattern yet
● If discrimination is charged the party making the peremptory challenge
must give a nondiscriminatory reason fro striking the juror
○ the court must consider several factors in deciding whether the
proffered reason is merely a screen for illegal discrimination
● Taken to the extreme.. Peremptories conflict with the ideas of the
cross-sectional jury embodied in the statutes like 28 USC 1861
● The batson principle(foster v. Chatman)- The “constitution forbids
striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.”
Batson Triumvirate:
● Batson: equal protection bars prosecutor’s race-based peremptory
challenges in criminal case
● Edmonson: extends batson rule to civil cases
● J.E.B extend the Batson-Edmonson rule to gender as well as race
Foster v. Chatman
● Death penalty case in GA: rape and murder charged
● Victim elderly white woman
● Def: 18 yrs, intellectually limited black man
● 42 potential jurors
○ 5/42 potential jurors were black
○ 1 black juror excused for cause
○ = now 5/42 black jurors
● Prosecutor struck all 4 black jurors with peremptory strikes
○ Pros gave 42 “race neutral” reasons
○ Court found no discrimination
● Des was convicted and sentenced to death by and all white jury
● After 30 yrs in prison, Supreme court took his case
● Prima facie case: a party’s production of enough evidence to allow the
fact-tier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor
● Both parties agree that forster has demonstrated a prima facie case
and the prosecutors have offered race neutral reasons for their strikes
○ Only address batson's third step
● A non-final judgment made by a court between the time of filing and before
there is a final judgment made.
○ in the ordinary course, a party who believes the district judge has made a wrong
ruling has to wait to appeal that ruling until the whole case is over.
● Interlocutory decrees are not final judgments because they do not settle all of the
issues presented in the case.
○ "interlocutory" ruling (a ruling issued before the rest of the case is over).--> before
the case is over
● Ordin. Appeal cannot be taken until the case is sover in district court
● On appeal→ parties can only argue issues if they properly “preserved”
them below
● The court of appeals is limited to the record of evidence in the DC
Final Judgment RUle: statute
● Final decision: is one which ended the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment- catlin v.
united states
○ Final decision of the district court
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE: INTRODUCTION
REISE v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
● Discovery dispute: Mental exam
● He tries to appeal the mental examinatiion
● Court of appeals outlines
● Facts: E.H. Reise (plaintiff) graduated from the Law School of the University of Wisconsin at
Madison (the University) (defendant) in the top 5 percent of his class. Reise then applied for
a faculty position with the University and was not hired. Reise sued the University, alleging
that Reise was not hired because of his race and gender. Reise alleged that the University
refused to hire anyone who is not black, female, or otherwise in a protected class. Out of the
previous 13 hires, only one was a white man. Reise sought $4 million in damages, arising
from the mental anguish, emotional distress, and illness allegedly caused by the University’s
failure to hire him. The University requested a mental examination of Reise under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 35. Reise asserted that the examination would not reveal anything,
because Reise was not experiencing emotional distress at that time. The trial court ordered
Reise to undergo the examination. Reise appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.
● Issue: May trial court decisions regarding discovery matters be appealed prior to a final
order?
● Holding and Reasoning (Easterbrook, J.) No. Trial court decisions regarding discovery
matters are interlocutory orders, rather than final orders, and cannot be appealed prior to a
final order. United States courts of appeal do not have jurisdiction over interlocutory orders.
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Review of discretionary discovery orders is deferential to trial courts and
would result in almost all discovery orders being affirmed. Additionally, appeals of discovery
orders would cause delay and be a burden on the court system. Therefore, the costs of
allowing appeals of interlocutory orders outweigh the costs of the few incorrect discovery
decisions that might be overturned. Finally, parties may obtain review of these orders after a
final decision is issued. This may require a party to refuse to comply with a discovery order
and face sanctions. However, if the decision was an abuse of discretion, the decision will be
overturned on appeal. This process ensures that only parties with a substantial belief that a
discovery decision was an abuse of discretion will pursue an appeal of the discovery order.
While there is a possibility that some cases may be remanded for new trials, the number of
actual retrials will be small due to the risk of refusing to comply with the order and the
deferential review of discretionary discovery orders. Here, the order to submit to the mental
examination is an interlocutory order. Therefore, the court of appeals does not have
jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. WETZEL
● filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
which they asserted that petitioner’s employee insurance benefits and maternity leave
regulations discriminated against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
○ Fired women if they didnt return after 3 months
○ And denied them disability benefits
○ Group of women sued lib mutual and sought injunctive relief( damages and attorney
fees)
○ After discovery the group moved to partial sum judgment on the issue of
liability-granted
○
○
○
Dc granted their motion = lib mutual violated title 7
Dc didnt grant the group requested relief
Lib mutual filed a motion for reconsideration which the DC denied
■ The DC issued an amended order stating that injunctive relief would be
withheld b/c of lib mut forthcoming appeal on the issue of liability
● Lib mutual appealed to the US court of appeals for the 3rd circuit,
which affirmed
○ US supreme court then granted cert
of liability that does not finally dispose of the plaintiff’s
prayers for relief is not appealable to the court of appeals.
● 54(b)- allows a court to enter judgment on fewer than all of the claims in a
multiple-claim action.
○ Not a multi claim action
■ It was a single claim and prayers for several types of relief
○
●
Rule: A finding
The only appealable interlocutory judgments are grants of injunctive relief. Since the district
court made no ruling on the request for injunctive relief, this was not a basis for appeal.
○
​The
DC order was merely a grant of partial summary judgment on
the issue of Liberty’s liability. Grants of partial summary judgment
are interlocutory, not final.
What's new here:
● For the federal courts the final judgment rule is jurisdictional: If there is no final judgment
(and the case doesn’t fall into any of the exceptions discussed in the next section), the Court
of Appeals has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
● And, if the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction, then the U.S. Supreme Court also lacks
jurisdiction to consider the case
●
Interlocutory Appeals from Injunctive Decisions:§1292(a)
○ The courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction of appeals from… interlocutory orders
of the district courts”
■ allows appeals from interlocutory orders of the district courts “granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to
dissolve or modify injunctions
○ Applies if district court grants or denies
○
Section 1292(a)(1) does not apply to a temporary restraining order. It applies to a
preliminary injunction.
■ TRO—14 days under Rule 65(b)
○
●
Certification of Issues for Appeal: §1292(b)
○ 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) permits a district court to certify interlocutory appeals from
○
○
non-final judgments.
Permissive- allowed where the court thinks there would be a benefit
■ A district court states in writing that :
■ that the order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion”
■ and that “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation. THEN
■ The court of appeals “may” in discretion allow an appeal (if w/ in 10 days)
● For interlocutory appeal to occur: district court judge so certify and
appellate court must agree
■ Rooom for disagreement
28 U.S.C. §2072(c), permits the Rules to define “when a ruling of a district court is
final for purposes of appeal”
■ Rule 23(f) now provides: “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an
order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition
for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within fourteen days after
the order is entered.
●
●
Judgments: Rule 54(b)
○ Allows district court to enter a final judgment on part of a case
■ Only to a discrete part of the case
○ “Would this particular ruling be a final decision if it were the only (claim, plaintiff,
defendant)
○ Test rules uses:
■ If an action involves “more than one claim for relief” or “multiple parties”
● The court “may direct entry of a final judgment” as to “one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties”
● ONLY IF the court determines there is “no just reason for delay”
(if granted creates a “final decision”)
○ If a district court enters a final judgment as part of a case under Rule 45(b), what
statute allows the losing party to take an appeal?
■ Section 1291
Catlin v. United States,
Final Decision: A final decision “is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment. Catlin v. United States,
●
The Collateral Order Rule A.k.a- Practical Finality: Cohen case(court created doctrine)
○ Court created exception interprets Section 1291 to allow an appeal:
■ An order conclusively determines a disputed question
■ It resolves an important issue completely separate from mertits
■ Effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment
(for example, ruling on a defendant’s immunity)
○ Court created exception interpreters section 1291 to allow an appeal where:
■ An order conclusively determines a disputes question
■ It resolves an important issue completely separate from merits
■ Effectively unreviewable on appeals from a final judgment
■ Example: ruling on a defendant's immunity
●
Writs of Mandamus
○ Not a substitute for an appeal = iTS like a case filed in the court of appeals
seeking an order directing a district court or agaency to take actions
required by law
○ Courts of appeals can issue writs in “aid of their jurisdiction.”
○ No a substitute of an appeal
○ Like a case filed in the court of appeals seeking an order directing a
district court or agency to take actions required by law.
○ Similar function to to an interlocutory appeal
○ A part seeking writ of mandamus: brings suit in an appellate court against the
○
○
○
○
○
trial judge in the case, seeking an order that that judge perform an act required by
law.
LaBuy v. Howes Leather, 352 U.S. 249 (1957): “the defendants sought a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals, ordering the district court to try the case.”
difficulty with mandamus =iit can become a tempting route for the avoidance of the
rules against interlocutory appeals explored in the preceding material
One area in which mandamus seems freely available= trial judge has denied a jury
trial.
Another exception to the general stinginess of the courts in issuing the writ is to
prevent the transfer of a case, under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), out of the circuit.
The Seventh Circuit requires parties to use mandamus rather than appeal.
■ the result makes sense: In most cases mandamus on these grounds will be
sought early in the case, before time has been wasted on proceedings that
must be set aside.
LAURO LINES S.R.L. v. CHASSER
● Respondents were passengers aboard the cruise ship Achille Lauro when it was hijacked by
terrorists in the Mediterranean
● Respondents filed suit against Lauro for damages and wrongful death of a passenger
○ Brought suit in the District court of the Southern District of NY
●
Lauro moved to dismiss district
Citing a forum selection clause printed on the
tickets
●
court denied→ ticket
did not give passengers reasonable notice that they
could not sue
●
Lauro sought to appeal DCs orders
●
Court of appeals in the second circuit dismissed Lauro’s appeal on the
ground that the district court’s decision was interlocutory,
○ did not fall within the exception for l final orders,
●
to fall within the Cohen exception, an order must satisfy at least three conditions:
○ “It must ’conclusively determine the disputed question,’
○ ’resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,’
○ and ’be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’
● Lauro claim that they should not be dragged to a court outside of Naples could have been
vindicated IF appealed after a final judgment
Concurring- Scalia:
●
The right to be sued only in a particular forum is not too important to be
vindicated only after the final decision has been entered and does not
outweigh the general policy of prohibiting interlocutory review.
● “right not to be sued elsewhere than in Naples” is not fully vindicated
● Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction
District court and court of appeals
Standards of Review on Appeal
● How much will the court of appeals defer to the district court in reviewing its decision?
● Rule 28 (appellant’s brief) The appellant's brief must contain…for each issue, a concise
statement of the applicable standard of review
●
●
●
●
De novo review: an appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial courts record but
reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings
○ Ex: DC ruling on a question of law is reviewed by de novo
○ De novo review looks at the issue “anew”(as if the court of appeals were deciding the
question in the first place)
Abuse of discretion: an appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to
be grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence
○ Ex: a dc’s decision granting or denying a motion to compel discovery is reviewed
only for abuse of discretion
○ Was granting this discovery motion outside the wide discretion given to the district
court
Clearly erroneous: the standard of review that an appellate court usually applies in judging a
trial court's treatment of factual issues. Under this standard, a judgment will be upheld unless
the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that an error had been committed
Anderson v. Bessemer City (case about the standard of review)
● Anderson applied for position of recreational director, only women among 8 candidates, she
was denied the job in favor of a less qualified man
● Sued the city under title 7(protects against employment descrimination)
● The DC presided at trial and found for the plaintiff
● The 4th circuit reversed the DC decision, finding the DC’s findings of fact clearly erroneous
● What question is presented to the Supreme court?
○ Did the court of appeals properly apply the “clearly erroneous” standard in reviewing
the district court’s findings of fact?
● Parties agreed to have the judge preside at trial
○
Rule 52(a)(6)(bench trials) “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”
○ Judge is acting as a factfinder(which is not a normal role)
●
Supreme court says: “where there are 2 permissable views of the evidence, the fact finder's
choice b/tw them cannot be clearly erroneous”
○ And “ the 4th circuit improperly conducted what amounted to a de novo weighing of the
evidence in the record”
●
●
Court of appeals scrutinize rulings of law more closely then finding of fact?
○ Ruling of law will go on past the case
Finding of fact or conclusion of law
○ Finding of fact: for particular case
record on appeal(fed rule 10)
● A court of appeals, when hearing an appeal, does not take evidence, hear from witnesses, or
hold trials.
● Instead, the court of appeals must limit its consideration to the evidence and materials that
were submitted to the district court below.
Rule 10: Record on appeal
(a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The following items constitute the record on appeal:
(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court;
(2) the transcript of proceedings, if any; and
(3) a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk.
●
●
●
(exception)Under "judicial notice," there are certain facts that a court may consider, even if
not introduced into the record, because the fact is so well-known and so reliably established
that the court may take "judicial notice" and rely on that fact as part of its decision.
○ ex:water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit, or the convention that stop signs are
colored red and white and octagonal in shape
From the federal rules of evidence→ (b) kind of facts that may be judicially noticed.The
court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
○ (1) is generally known w/ in the trial courts territorial jurisdiction
○ (2) or it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned
● Ex: population in a town as shown by official census data, etc.
Could a federal appeals court properly take notice of information the judges found in an
internet search?
○ Must distiguish: judicial web searched for:
■ “Mere background information” to help understand the case; or
■ “Facts or other information” proper for judicial notice
● ex: “when it became dark on a specific night”
PRECLUSION:
Respect for judgments (aka claim and preclusion)
● Stare decisis: to stand by things decided
○ The doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions
when the same points arise again in litigation
○ It applies to: a legal question is decided by and necessary to a court’s ruling
○ In future cases that legal ruling will be followed by
■ The same court adn
■ Any other court bound to follow the rulings of that court
Other aspects of Respect for Judgments:
● Claim and issue preclusion always includes 2 cases
● Claim preclusion: party already litigated a claim, tried to assert the same claim in a
new case
○ EX: joe is in a car accident in downtown providence. He says it was ritas fault
■ Joe sues rita for negligence seeking damages - RI fed court
■ Joe loses
■ Joe sues Rita again this time in RI state court
● Should he be able to do that? → that depends
○ Need more info WHY DID HE LOse
■ Reasonable if the court says you cant bring this to
federal court
● Issue preclusion: party already litigated an issue, tries to mitigate the same issue in a
new case
○ EX: man makes 3 loans to his nephew to help pay for college. 1st loan comes due
and nephew doesnt pay.
■ Man sues nephew for breach of contract
■ Nephew says he signed when he was 17→ should not be held liable because
he is a minor
■ Court agrees = contract unenforceable because he was a minor
○ 2nd cases
■ 2nd loan and nephew default the loan
■ Man sues nephew for breach of contract for 2nd loan
Question:Was there an issue decided in the first case that will have binding effect?
● Should the court dismiss the second loan based on its ruling that the first loan
contract was unenforceable due to the nephews age?
Answer:that depends
● Need more information: was the nephew still 17 on the 2nd loan
○ If all the loans were on the same day: then it would be precluded
Ison case pp.47
● George Ison (plaintiff) was injured in July 2003 in a car accident involving Anthony
Thomas (defendant). In August 2003, Ison sued Thomas for the property damages caused
to Ison’s vehicle. At trial, the jury awarded Ison approximately $5,000 for the property
damage. Ison then sued Thomas in April 2005 for damages arising from personal injuries
sustained in the crash. The trial court dismissed the second lawsuit, ruling that the
personal injury claim was part of the same cause of action as the previous property
damage claim and was merged with the prior judgment. Ison appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky
● Rule: All claims against a single defendant arising out of the same transaction, or series
of connected transactions, must be brought in a single action.
● Reasoning: Parties must assert all claims in a single action that: (1) properly relate to the
subject of the litigation and (2) may be brought forward at the same time if the parties
exercise reasonable diligence. Hayes v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31 (1946). If the parties do not,
then subsequent claims will be barred by res judicata.
○ A final judgment on a plaintiff’s claim extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 24.
○ one car accident caused both property and personal injury damages to Ison. Ison
only brought a property damage claim in the first lawsuit. The fact that Ison was
successful in the first lawsuit does not permit a second lawsuit regarding the same
car accident. If Ison had lost the property damage lawsuit, the subsequent claim
would have been barred by res judicata. Because Ison prevailed on the first
lawsuit, the personal injury claim and any other claims arising out of the car
accident have merged into the judgment obtained in the first lawsuit.
●
Ison sued Thomas and Thomas’s insurer for losses arising from the damage to Ison’s vehicle
○ Jury awared 5,000 -2003(property losses)
○ Ison brought personal injury claim - 2005
○ Tc ruled that Ison’s personal injury claim was part of the same cause of action as his
property damage claim and so had merged with the prior judgment. We agree.
○
- If the first case established that the accident was Thomas's fault, why did Ison lose the
second suit?
●
If the plaintiff prevails on his initial claim, other claims arising from the same transaction are
said to merge with his judgment,and if the plaintiff loses initially, that judgment is said to bar
any such subsequent claim. Restatement (Second), Judgments, §§18, 19 (1982).
- In the Ison case, the court explains (on page 49) the doctrines of "merger" and "bar," which
explain two ways that claim preclusion can apply. Which is at issue in the Ison case, merger
or bar?
●
merger
Frier case pp. 703:
●
Charles Frier parked one of his cars in a narrow street, forced others to drive on someone
else’s lawn to get around Frier’s car, the police left two notes at Frier’s house asking him to
move the car. did not work, called a local garage, which towed the car back to the garage.
○ 4 cars were towed and instead of paying the garages → Frier filed suits in the courts
of Illinois seeking replevin.
○
○
○
●
1 suit was dismissed
The other 2 cases were litigated
The court concluded that the police properly took the cars into the City’s possession
to remove obstructions to the alley, and it declined to issue the writ of replevin
because the City had the right to remove the cars from the street.
■ LOST IN STATE COURT→ WENT TO FED
Claims were closely related= Claim
preclusion bars a cause of action if the
second cause of action is based on a common core of operative facts with
the first.
- What was the legal claim that Frier asserted (and lost) in the first case? What is the legal
claim that Frier brought in the second case? How are those two related as a factual and legal
matter? How are they different?
●
replevin
- Why does the court discuss 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 before applying claim preclusion to the
case at hand (page 706)? What role in the analysis does this statute play?
●
●
●
Frier could not have obtained punitive damages or declaratory relief in a suit limited to
replevin. But he was free to join one count seeking such relief with another seeking replevin.
As we show below, the law of Illinois, which under 28 U.S.C. §1738 governs the preclusive
effect to be given to the judgment in the replevin actions would bar this suit.
The City therefore is entitled to prevail on the ground of claim preclusion, although the district
court did not decide the case on that ground.
- By ruling on the case based on claim preclusion, what difficult question of constitutional law
was the Seventh Circuit able to avoid deciding?
●
The final question is whether it makes a difference that only two of the replevin actions went
to judgment, while here Frier challenges the towing of four cars
- Why did Judge Swygert, in his concurrence, believe that the Seventh Circuit should have
reached this constitutional issue? What flaw did Judge Swygert find in the majority's analysis
of claim preclusion here?
●
Applied the wrong analysis → I would review the facts to determine whether Frier’s
procedural due process claims could withstand a summary judgment motion. Because I
believe the City was entitled to summary judgment,
●
SUMMARY OF ELEMENTS OF PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES
(1) Stare Decisis (Latin, for “to stand by things decided”)
(a) If a legal question is decided by and necessary to a court’s ruling
(b) In future cases that legal ruling will be followed by
(i)
The same court and
(ii)
Any other court bound to follow the rulings of that court
(Source: paraphrase of commentary to Black’s Law Dictionary definition)
(2) Claim Preclusion (often termed Res Judicata, “thing decided” in Latin)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
If the same parties (or their privies)
Litigated the same claim
To final judgment
That was on the merits
Then they are barred from relitigating matters that were or should have been raised as
part of the first claim
(Source: paraphrase/summary of Yeazell, pp. 704)
(3) Claim Preclusion: Defining a “Claim”
(a) Traditional formulation (“cause of action” test) (discussed in Frier)
(b) Modern Restatement approach (“transaction” test) (Restatement §24)
(4) Issue preclusion (also known as Collateral Estoppel)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
If an issue of law or fact
Is actually litigated and determined
By a valid and final judgment
And the determination is essential to the judgment
Then the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim
[and in some jurisdictions, the determination may also be conclusive against the party
who lost where the same issue arises in a second case with a new party]
[Source: Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Section 27 (added gloss in italics is from
Parklane Hosiery))
which states that claim preclusion will apply:
(a) If the same parties (or their privies)
(b) Litigated the same claim
(c) To a final judgment on the merits
(d) Then they are barred from relitigating matters that were or should have been
raised as part of the first claim.
1) What is a "Final Judgment"?
● the meaning of a "final judgment" is the same for purposes of claim preclusion as
it is for purposes of appeal (the topic we just finished). As for an "on the merits"
judgment, this is a more complex doctrine.
(2) What Does it Mean for a Judgment to be "On the Merits"?
● what this term really means is which types of judgments should be given claim
preclusive effect.
● There are case resolutions in which the court never reaches the merits of the
case that will still be treated as a judgment "on the merits" for claim preclusion
purposes.
○ For example, if a plaintiff's lawsuit were dismissed by a federal district
court as a sanction for the plaintiff's egregious discovery violations, such a
ruling would preclude the plaintiff from filing the same claim again, even if
the court made no ruling on the merits of the claim.
Taylor v. Sturgell
RULE: A claim cannot be precluded if the previous litigant is a different party and there is no
legal relationship between the current and past litigants.
FACTS: Brent Taylor (plaintiff), an antique aircraft enthusiast, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to obtain via Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request the plans for a particular model plane’s engine. Prior to Taylor’s suit, his friend,
Greg Herrick, also an antique aircraft enthusiast, filed a similar suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming seeking the same information. Herrick’s suit was dismissed
when the agency he made the request to, the FAA (defendant), refused to release the plans at
issue. The FAA stated that they would not release the information as it constituted trade secrets
on the part of the company that built the engine, Fairchild Corporation (defendant). When
Herrick produced a letter written by Fairchild in 1955 that appeared to be a repudiation of trade
secret protection on Fairchild’s part, the FAA contacted the company, which exercised its trade
secret protection. Herrick’s suit was then dismissed. Taylor sued, represented by the same
attorney, arguing in addition to claims raised in Herrick’s suit that Fairchild is not able to now
use trade secret protections when it appeared to dispense with them years prior. The district court
granted summary judgment to the FAA and Fairchild, finding that Taylor’s claim was barred by
claim preclusion. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed, finding that Taylor was “virtually represented” by Herrick. Herrick appealed. THEY
HAVE THE SAME LAWYER→ no privity
HOLDING: No. At the district court and court of appeals level, this case was dismissed by
invoking the doctrine of “virtual representation.”
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie
Facts: The United States filed suit against Federated Department Stores (plaintiff), alleging
Federated had violated the Sherman Act by engaging in price fixing of women’s clothing at
Federated’s California stores. Subsequently, several local retailers filed class-action antitrust
lawsuits, including a class-action suit filed by Moitie (defendant) in state court and Brown in
federal court. Both Moitie and Brown’s complaints were nearly indistinguishable from the
United States' complaint, except that Moitie’s complaint was couched in state, rather than
federal, law. Federated removed Moitie’s case to federal court based on diversity and federal
question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Moitie’s, Brown’s, and the other five plaintiffs’
antitrust suits on the basis that none of them had sustained a legally cognizable injury within the
meaning of the Clayton Act. The plaintiffs in five of the lawsuits appealed. However, Moitie and
Brown refiled their claims in state court instead of appealing. Brown’s second lawsuit alleged
four distinct state law causes of action. The district court dismissed Moitie and Brown’s re-filed
claims on res judicata grounds. Moitie and Brown appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the appeals were pending, the United States Supreme Court
issued a decision holding that retailers could sustain a legal injury to their business or property
upon which relief could be granted under the Clayton Act. As a result of this holding, the court
of appeals reversed and remanded the dismissals in the five antitrust cases. The court of appeals
also reversed the district court’s dismissal of Moitie and Brown’s claims. Although the court
acknowledged that res judicata prevented this reversal, it held that public policy and justice
demanded an exception to the doctrine. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the Ninth Circuit’s exception to the res judicata doctrine was valid.
RULE: An exception does not exist to the doctrine of res judicata for individual equitable
purposes.
HOLDING: No. An exception does not exist to the doctrine of res judicata for individual
equitable purposes. Res judicata provides certainty and finality to litigation and allows parties to
reasonably rely on the final judgments of the courts. Disturbing this solid doctrine for individual
equitable purposes would create much more havoc than benefit; ad hoc determinations of
fairness are no substitute for res judicata. In this case, if Moitie and Brown wished to avoid
preclusion on res judicata grounds, they needed to appeal the dismissal of their claims, rather
than re-file their complaints. Discontinuing this court’s enforcement of res judicata for Moitie
and Brown’s individual benefit would be an unwise precedent. Finally, there is no reason to
reach the merits on whether Brown’s state claims alleged in his second complaint were properly
dismissed, because his federal claims were precluded by res judicata with respect to his first
claim. The court of appeals decision is reversed and remanded.
Gargallo V. Merrill Lynch:
Rule of Law: An existing final judgment rendered upon the merits is conclusive of rights,
questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
Facts: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (Merrill Lynch) (plaintiff) sued Gargallo
(defendant) in Ohio state court for collection of debt due for losses incurred by Gargallo in a
margin brokerage account he opened with Merrill Lynch. Gargallo counterclaimed, alleging
Merrill Lynch had caused his losses through negligence and misrepresentation and had violated
federal securities law. The court dismissed Gargallo’s counterclaims with prejudice for failing to
comply with Merrill Lynch’s discovery requests. Gargallo then filed a complaint in United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, re-alleging the violations of federal securities
law which was dismissed on res judicata grounds. Gargallo appealed the dismissal of his suit.
Holding/reasoning: No. An existing final judgment rendered upon the merits is conclusive of
rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the
same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. A federal court is required to give a
state court judgment the same preclusive effect such judgment would have in a state court.
Gargallo’s claim would have been barred had he re-filed it in Ohio court, as the dismissal with
prejudice was a final judgment rendered upon the merits. However, Ohio courts hold that a
judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction should not be given preclusive
effect. Federal securities law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts, not Ohio state
courts, so Ohio courts would not give a judgment rendered by an Ohio court on this issue
preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Ohio court’s dismissal of Gargallo’s counterclaim does not
preclude him from bringing the suit in district court. Therefore the claim is reinstated.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois:
FACTS: Bertha and Jessie Parks (plaintiffs) were injured when their car collided with Illinois
Central Gulf Railroad’s (defendant) train. Bertha and Jessie sued the railroad and the train's
engineer, alleging negligence. Jessie sought damages for loss of Bertha’s services and
consortium, and Bertha sought damages for her personal injuries. The railroad and engineer
alleged that Jessie was contributorily negligent. A jury found in Bertha's favor against the
railroad and awarded her damages, but the jury found that the engineer hadn't been negligent.
The jury also found in favor of the railroad and the engineer on Jessie's loss-of-consortium claim.
When Jessie subsequently brought a negligence action against the railroad and the engineer for
his own injuries, the railroad and engineer again claimed that Jessie was contributorily negligent.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the railroad's motion, holding
that the prior judgment was not an adjudication of Jessie's contributory negligence, and that
remained an issue for trial. The railroad appealed.
RULE: If the judgment in a prior action could have been based on either of two different facts, a
party seeking to apply issue preclusion to one of those facts in a later action must show that the
prior judgment could not have been rendered without deciding that fact.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore:
FACTS: Shore (plaintiff) brought a stockholder's class action against Parklane Hosiery Co.
(Parklane) (defendant), alleging that Parklane had issued a proxy statement that contained
materially false and misleading information and statements, directly in violation of federal
securities laws and the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Before the case went to trial, the SEC also sued Parklane, likewise alleging that the proxy
statement Shore complained of contained materially false and misleading information and
statements. Following a nonjury trial, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of
the SEC, finding that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. Shore then moved for partial
summary judgment against Parklane, asserting that Parklane was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of whether the proxy statement contained materially false and misleading
statements, as was determined in the SEC lawsuit. The district court denied the motion on the
ground that such an application of collateral estoppel would deny Parklane its Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial only with respect to issues of fact not already
adjudicated in a prior proceeding. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
RULE: A litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nonetheless use that judgment
offensively to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding,
provided that (1) the plaintiff could not easily have joined in the earlier action and (2) use of the
judgment will not result in unfairness to the defendant
Subject matter Jurisdiction:
● Bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction
○ Diversity jurisdiction: requires that no plaintiff share state citizenship with any
defendant
○ Federal question jurisdiction: the plaintiff cause of action must arise under the
constitution or laws of the untied states
● the kind of claims the court can hear
● Concurrent: more than one court system can hear this kind of case
● Exclusive: only one court system can hear this kind of case
○ Bankruptcy
● General: a court can hear any type of case that is not excluded from its authority
● Limited: a court can hear only those limited cases that are specifically authorized ex:
family court
● Original: the court hears the case in the first instance
● Appellate: a court hears the case on appeal from another body
● the kinds of cases that federal courts can hear is limited.
○ Federal courts can only hear the types of cases that are
■ (1) within the grant of federal judicial authority set out in Article III to the
United States Constitution;
■ and (2) authorized by federal jurisdictional statutes.
● Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts(in General)
● Federal DCs can only hear those cases that are?
○ (1)w/ in the scope of constitutional authority laid out in article III and
○ (2) authorized by a jurisdictional statute
● Concurrent: federal and state court ex: diversity,
● Federal DCs are the courts where civil actions generally originate in the federal system
(i.e. they are the federal trial courts)
● The kind of claims a federal District court can hear:
○ Federal claims
○ divversity (citizens of different states)
○ Supplemental jurisdiction
○ Specialized jurisdiction statues
○ Removal jurisdiction
L&N RR v. MOTTLEY
● Federal court , Plaintiff: mottley , Defendant: lousiville and Nashville railroad
●
●
●
●
●
Breach of contract(lifetime pass)
Defense: contract barred by federal law—> so we can’t enforce this contract
Neither party questioned the jurisdiction
Rule 12(h)(3)
Supreme Court HIGHLIGHTER TEST: A case”raised under” federal law, as that term is
used in the jurisdictional statute, “only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of
action shows that is is based upon those laws or that constitution.”
● Court wanted to highlight that it is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated
defense that implicated federal law
● Well pleaded complaint rule → WAS MOTTLEYS complaint well pleaded= no
● “Arising other” = Supreme Court is interpreting the predecessor statue to section 1331
Facts:
● In 1871, the Mottleys (plaintiffs) were injured in a railway accident. The railroad,
Louisville & Nashville Railroad (defendant), settled the Mottleys’ claims with a lifetime
pass for free transportation on its line
● 1906, Congress passed an act forbidding passes granting free transportation
● 1907, the railroad refused to renew the Mottleys' passes.
● Mottleys brought suit in federal district court, seeking specific performance of their
settlement agreement with the railroad.
● The Mottleys alleged that the act did not apply to their free pass and that, if the law is
construed as prohibiting such passes, it deprives them of their property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
● PROCEDURAL: railroad demurred to the Mottley’s complaint, The trial court overruled
the demurrer and entered judgment in favor of the Mottleys, The railroad appealed to the
United States Supreme Court., decision of the trial court is reversed and the case
remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
RULE:
● For a suit to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, giving a federal
court jurisdiction to hear the case, a plaintiff must allege a cause of action based upon
those laws or that Constitution.
Holding:
● Yes. In order for federal question jurisdiction to be granted, a plaintiff's statement must
show that her original cause of action arises under the Constitution or a federal law.
● It is not sufficient that the plaintiff anticipates that the defendant will raise a federal
statute in defense
○ Instead, the plaintiff's "well pleaded complaint" must state that the defendant
directly violated some provision of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States.
●
● 28 U.S.C. §1331. The key provision of that statute gives district courts jurisdiction over cases
“arising under” the Constitution, statutes, or treaties of the federal government.
○ District courts shall have the original jurisdiction of all civil action arising under the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United states
Diversity Jurisdiction:
(Category of cases that can be heard by the federal courts)
● Fed. D. C. Can only hear those cases that ate:
○ (1) w/ in the scope of constitutional authority laid out in Article II and
○ (2) Authorized by a jurisdictional statute
Citizens os a state Section 1332:
● redner v. Sanders: A person is a citizen of a state of the US w/in the meaning of 28 USC section
1332 if he is a citizen of the United States and is domiciled w/ in the state in question
● Domicile: “the place where (one) had is true, fixed home and principal establishment, and to
which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning “
● Render is not Domiciled in California —> doesn’t live there or own property
● Has to bring this case to state court not federal
● If he really wants to bring his case to federal: he would need to move to California and take up a
domicile
● Personal and subject matter jurisdiction—> domicile is the same
● Change domicile 2 things: (1) residence and (2) the intention to remain there —> need both
● Military and prisoners—> station not their domicile because they did not choose it
●
●
●
●
●
●
Strawbridge rule: complete diversity is required under section 1332 (parties from the same state
may be on both sides of the case)
Complete for federal
What is the citizenship of a corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction?
Section 1332(c —> a corporation is a citizen of: its state of incorporation and the state in which it
has its principle place of business
How do we tell what a corporation’s “principal place of business”?
Hertz Corp v. Friend:
○ Filed in the United state Dc for the northern District of California
○ Plaintiff: hertz employee CA—> CA state law claim minimum wage statute
○ Defendants: Herz crop—> said it was a diversity case
○ Question: CA citizen or not?
○
●
●
Highlighter test: “we conclude that ‘principal place of business ‘ is best read as referring
to the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control and coordinate that corporation’s
activities.”
How to Identify the “citizenship” of a partnership?
(Because for diversity purposes, partnerships are not considered as entities, but as collections of
individuals; this the citizenship of each of the members of the partnership must be considered.” )