The
Myth
of
Chinese
Expansionism
FRANCIS
L. K. HSU
University of San Francisco, San Francisco, U.S.A.
AFTER he was nominated
SHORTLY
to be Chief U.S. Delegate to the
Andrew Young (D. Ga.) spoke in favor of normalization
UN, Representative
of relations with Vietnam. He said that America needs "a strong Vietnam" that
could become an independent
Marxist state like Yugoslavia and might provide
a buffer against Chinese expansion (reported in Chicago Sun-Times).
The idea of reconciliation
Vietnam is
between the U.S. and long-suffering
but
the
on
which
his
based
laudable,
faulty premise
Rep. Young
suggestion is
should
be
blamed
for
not, perhaps,
regrettable.
Rep. Young
repeating a popular
of
A whole disastrous
Chinese
for
that
dies
hard.
myth
expansionism,
myth
Vietnam war was fought more or less on that myth and on the so-called domino
theory. It is time to put the historical and recent record straight. We need to
think more constructively
about international
affairs, less in terms of a game of
pitting one country against another.
I
Between World Wars I and II China was an object of international
pity
and sympathy.
Some Westerners
admirers of Chinese philosophies,
remained
manners and objects d'arts. Others sent charity from time to time. But most
viewed her poverty and famine, and political ineptitude
and military prostration with exasperation
and even disgust. This was especially evident after she
was subjected to Japan's
large-scale invasion which, within less than a year,
reduced her to so-called Free China in landlocked
southwest. After all, "God
and the Chinese just did not seem to help
helps those who help themselves,"
themselves.
Then came Pearl Harbor, and suddenly China was one of the Big Four in a
China
worldwide
Almost overnight
struggle against totalitarian
aggression.
became one of the world's largest democracies.
Books and articles attested to
China's "democratic"
tradition which began centuries back.
The Communist
victory in 1949 changed Western view of China just as
A
and proud Communist China who claims to take second
self-reliant
suddenly.
to
has
a Western nightmare.
none
become
China is called expansionist
place
and Chinese expansionism
is, according to many, the cause of most if not all of
Asian instability.
Many Westerners wished she would somehow disappear and
others would frankly like to see her atom-bombed
back to the Stone Age so that
they could once more lavish their praise and charity on the enduring and peaceful but poor and long-suffering
Chinese.
185
II
The reality is that China is not, historically or now, an expansionist power.
has so dominated
This erroneous assumption
the thinking of the Western but
the
American
world
that
it
has
a mental millstone, a psychobecome
especially
from
which
Americans
have
not been able to extricate
logical prison,
many
themselves.
In a scientific discussion we must clarify our basic terms, in order to be
certain that we know what we are talking about. Two basic terms must be
from each other: Act of Violence versus Expansionism, and, for our
distinguished
must also be
present purposes, two kinds of violence and of expansionism
clearly kept in mind, as follows:
A.
Aggressive Act
1. The use of force to coerce another power for whatever purpose; or
2. The use of force for securing a frontier, for revenge or because of other
grievances and irritations linked with historical circumstances.
B.
Expansionism
1. The tendency to use force or other coercive means to gain control over
new territory;
or
2. The tendency to use force or other coercive means to gain control over
new territory
and to impose the way of life of the conquering
on the
conquered.
At the outset it should be clearly understood
that these distinctions are not
one hundred percent. In human affairs they rarely are. Some aggressive acts
for revenge or otherwise may result in control of some new territory,
as in
border clashes between India and Pakistan and elsewhere throughout
human
history. Some expansionist
expeditions may lead to loss of old territory for the
because
of defeat, as when Napoleon was finally subdued.
expansionist
power
we
should
have
no difficulty in seeing Mongol conquest of Asia
However,
and Europe in the 13th century and Japan's invasion of China 1931-1945 as
while the continuing clashes between Catholics and Protestants in
expansionist,
Northern
Ireland, and the quarrels between Spain and Britain over Gibraltar
as aggressive acts over territorial disputes linked to historical circumstances.
In
this light we must agree that all the world's states have, at one time or another,
committed
aggressive acts against each other, but not all of them are expansionist.
In 1643 Tibet invaded Bhutan to protect Lamaist Monpa monasteries. The
latter complained
to the Tibetan ruler that they were having trouble with the
Bhutanese.
That was only one of the many conflicts. In 1740 the Bhutanese
attacked Sikkim, not unaware of the fact that the Sikkimese ruler was a minor
at the time. In 1788 Nepal was dissatisfied with Tibet's reply to her demands
the devaluation
of Nepalese coins circulating
in Tibet and the
concerning
of
salt
Tibet
to
The
purity
exported by
Nepal.
Nepalese forces were so strong
186
that the ruler of Tibet was compelled to sign a humiliating
treaty according to
which Tibet was to pay Nepal an annual tribute of 300 dotsed and to grant
privileges.
Nepalese in Tibet extraterritorial
These little known acts of aggression must come to most readers as a comseries of aggressive acts
plete surprise. But long before these a most spectacular
China.
was committed
Tibet
by
against T'ang
It began in 618 A.D. when the Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo sought the
hand in marriage of a daughter
of the T'ang emperor. For this the Tibetan
ruler massed an army of 200,000 troops and occupied some Chinese territory,
in the province of Szechuan.
The Chinese emperor eventually
did give the
to the Tibetan
princess in marriage
King. But that did not stop Tibetan
aggression against China, not even after a second princess was given in marriage
under similar circumstances
to another Tibetan king later. In 730 A.D. the
of the second Chinese princess, asked for various
Tibetan
ruler, husband
Chinese classics and histories. When this request was refused a second time and
after the death of the Chinese princess, he collected a 400,000-men
force and
invaded China.
The biggest Tibetan victory was scored in the year 763 A.D. King Trisong
Detsen's 200,000-men
force invaded China and sacked Ch'ang An, then the
national capital. The reigning T'ang emperor fled and the Tibetans installed a
puppet Chinese emperor, on whom the invaders forced a treaty of submission
and Chinese-style annual tribute. The tribute was paid by the Chinese only for
a few years.
We recount these facts for one purpose only: as far as the history of mankind
is concerned, no political power is free from aggressive acts against other powers. But such aggressive acts did not make Bhutan or Nepal expansionist
even
in their heyday. Even most of the aggressive acts on the part of Tibet against
All or most of these acts must be classed
T'ang China were not expansionist.
with
Bolivia's
invasion
of
together
Uruguay,
Turkey's
struggles in Cyprus,
the
federal
of Nigeria, ThaiBiafra's war of independence
against
government
and
India's conquest
land's land grab under the Japanese
against Cambodia,
of Goa and military occupation
of Kashmir,
to name but a few instances of
aggressive acts in the 20th century. They are aggressive acts linked with past
some real and some greatly exaggerated,
rooted in historical
grievances,
much more than actions designed to control new territories,
circumstances,
especially far away from the home base.
III
We are now in a better position to scrutinize some facts bearing on the
One sequence of facts had to do with China's
question of Chinese expansionism.
actions vis-a-vis Tibet and India: (1) the 1950 military occupation of Tibet and
we have
(2) the 1962 armed clashes with India. From the basic distinctions
made above it is obvious that these belong to the "aggressive acts" category,
but not "expansionism."
None of them was designed to achieve new territorial
and political goals. All of them involved China's immediate
borders but not
187
stakes far away from her home base. Furthermore,
of them was
every one
rooted in historical circumstances
with a Chinese side of the picture that needs
clarification.
For example, from the Chinese point of view their 1950 action in Tibet was
no invasion but one to regain control of a region over which both the British
and the Russians, in their worldwide expansionist drive, had been machinating
since the middle of the 19th century when China was weak. Among the first
acts in that drive was always to get the local leaders to declare independence
or
to conclude some bilateral treaty without China (Japan made the Korean rulers
before annexing Korea; Japan also created"Manchukuo"
declare independence
and installed a puppet emperor P'u Yi to be its ruler after she conquered
China's northeastern
provinces in 1931; and various European
powers signed
with
Chinese
warlords during the 1911-1928 period under the soagreements
Concalled Spheres of Influence).
But even as late as 1907 the St. Petersburg
vention between Britain and Imperial Russia concerning Tibet had to use the
word suzerainty to designate China's relation with Tibet. This was a Convention,
to which China was not even invited, instigated
by Britain to get Russia to
recognize all the "special interests" formerly acquired in Tibet. It is interesting
that after the 1950 Chinese military action in Tibet, when El Salvador requested a debate on Tibet in the General Assembly of the United Nations (November
7, 1950), the matter was adjourned sine die on a motion proposed by the British
that
delegate and supported by the Indian delegate. Great Britain maintained
Tibet's status was a matter of doubt.
The comparison
between Chinese relations with Tibet and U.S. relations
with Hawaii may seem fantastic, but it nevertheless
is a sound one. Chinese
over
Tibet
a
of U.S. over Hawaii.
has
much
than
that
suzerainty
longer history
Would the U.S. allow any United Nations debate on the status of Hawaii even
before Hawaii became the 50th State? Would the U.S. react kindly to any
bilateral agreement
between any of the Hawaiian
kings or their descendants
which repudiates U.S. control over the islands? Would India welcome a U.N.
debate on the status of Sikkim or Bhutan, or react kindly to a Chinese government trying to deal with Sikkim or Bhutan as independent
nations? I think not.
In international
relations no less than in domestic justice, the same standard
and the same logic must apply to all cases if peace is truly desired. We cannot
use one yardstick for India and the United States and another for China, any
more than we can use one for the rich and another for the poor in any society.
The Chinese-Indian
border dispute was of British origin. Britain, as lord
over India, and following her Younghusband
Expedition to Lhasa in 1904, laid
down the law to the Chinese and the Tibetans at the Simla (India) Convention
of 1913 concerning the status of Tibet and the disputed border. The border line
was drawn up by the British and was named the McMahon
Line after the head
of the British representative
General Henry McMahon.
This came just after
the fall of the Manchu dynasty when China was badly debilitated
and very
much torn by internal dissension. In spite of her weakness at the time the Chinese government
never ratified the treaty.
188
entered into a
Shortly after 1950 the Chinese and Indian governments
on the border question. The late Premier Chou
whole series of negotiations
En-lai even went to New Delhi for this. What transpired
was that, after overabout inheriting
all privithrowing her own British yoke, India was adamant
leges secured by her once colonial masters, even those at the expense of China.
The outbreak of Indo-Chinese
hostilities in 1962 led to widespread
outcry in
America against Chinese aggression. Even the usually astute Walter Lippman
saw this as the inevitable
revolution.
It was not
spilling over of Communist
of the British reporter
until the publication
Neville Maxwell's
eye-witness
that we obtained a
account, India's China War in 1970 (New York: Pantheon),
clearer picture of the reality. The Chinese took military action only after the
Indians forcibly occupied the disputed
territories.
But the Chinese did not
advance beyond such territories after the Indian forces were routed.
Life magazine, in a review of the Maxwell book, said rightly of the whole
Indo-Chinese
affair that the Chinese simply got a case of bad press.
Furthermore
control over Tibet and repudiation
of the McMahon
Line are
two of the subjects on which any Chinese government,
or CommuNationalist
nist or whatever, are in complete agreement.
IV
That the Indo-Chinese
dispute was no indication of Chinese expansionism
is also supported by the historically centripetal
orientation
(or inward-looking)
of the Chinese as distinguished
from Westerners'
centrifugal
historically
(or
orientation.
outward-looking)
With a long history of proselytization
and crusades, Westerners
tend to
project their own psychology onto the Chinese. They cannot but see Chinese
relations with their Asian neighbors as a case of cultural and military domination much as Europeans have done vis-a-vis the rest of the world during the
colonial era.
was quite
The reality of Chinese relations
with their Asian neighbors
different.
Instead of wanting to expand her cultural and political influences
China frequently acted in the opposite direction. For example, it is a matter of
historical record that quite a few Japanese,
and Siamese represenVietnamese
tatives and students had to overcome all sorts of Chinese "Unwelcome"
signs
when they arrived in China.1 In spite of this, these non-Chinese
peoples volunancestor worship
tarily and assiduously imported Chinese art, poetry, literature,
and Buddhism,
written
ethics and philosophy,
institutions,
craftsmanship,
language and literary concepts, building and clothing styles and even manners.
1 Readers who want to know more about the Japanese case should consult Ennin's Diary The Recordof a Pilgrimage to China in Searchof the Law, translated and annotated by Edwin
O. Reischauer, Professor of Japanese History at Harvard University, and former U.S.
Ambassador to Japan (N.Y. Ronald Press, 1955). In a companion volume Reischauer
explains in his own words the Japanese monk's travels and times (Ennin's Travels in T'ang
China, N.Y. Ronald Press, 1955).
189
It was considered highly prestigious for these and other non-Chinese
states
to be related to the Chinese court by the Chinese tribute system. Most Westerners, scholars and others alike, have confused the Chinese tribute system, which
does not accord with their psychology, with the Western colonial system, which
too well.2 The Chinese tribute system involved principally
they understood
of tributary status on the part of a given government
to the
acknowledgement
of gift-bearing
from
Chinese court, and dispatching
it
to
the
Chinese
envoys
court at regular intervals.
this arrangement
was not
However, as far as the Chinese were concerned,
necessarily good business, even when they were recipients of tribute, which was
often the case. To begin with the envoys and their entourages had to be properly
and ceremonially
taken care of by the local governments
from the time they
reached Chinese soil. In the case of tributary
missions from countries situated
south of China, this involved Chinese hospitality
and transportation
for the
and
extensive
often
bulky
tributary
including pairs of live elephants, all
gifts,
the way from Kwangtung
province in the extreme south to Peking in the far
north. The speediest transit would require at least six months. Furthermore,
the Chinese emperors not only had to entertain the tributary envoys and their
entourages
lavishly at the court but, being in the superior's position, had to
with gifts often even more expensive than the ones received.
reciprocate
in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644),
for example, the Chinese
Consequently,
in whose domain
once asked the King of Siam (now Thailand),
emperor
Chinese soldiers never set foot, not to send any more tribute delegations, at least for
a while. But even then the Siamese rulers did not oblige by stopping their tribute
missions. It is in this context that we can understand
why the rulers of Siam, of
Japan and of Okinawa at one time or another each requested of the Chinese
of his
emperor to confer upon him an Imperial Seal of Office for sanctification
rule. The earliest such seal conferred upon Japan was discovered in 1784 in
Fukuoka Ken, Kyushu. It is made of pure gold, square, weighing 3.8 ounces
and bearing five-word inscription :
"King of Wo Nu under Han."
These facts fit in well with another one. The Chinese as a whole have not
or in the immediate
historically
past shown any great propensity for moving
from
China.
The
Chinese
away
simply do not have the tradition, so characteristic of the West, of finding a new world, by separation from the past and from
the land of their ancestors. Indeed, the Chinese tendency has always been to
to
return to his homeland
even if he had been compelled
by circumstances
make his fame and fortune elsewhere. This homeward-looking
tendency was in
fact used as a reason for anti-Chinese
acts in the U.S. West. And Chinese
Chinese settlements
even in the coastal
have always discouraged
governments
islands.
Now it is perfectly true that there are today sizeable Chinese communities
2
One exception in this regard among Western scholars is John K. Fairbank (see his
"China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, April, 1969, pp. 449463). He also points out that some states entered the tributary system because of the profit
motive.
190
is
in many Southeast Asian countries. Forty percent of Malaysia's population
as
is
some
of
the
Thai
But
in
this
as
in
ten
other
Chinese,
population.3
percent
aspects of human affairs we must see the facts in perspective.
The reality is that, in spite of famine and poverty, turmoil due to dynastic
changes and invasion of tribal peoples from the north and northwest, very few
to the total Chinese population have ever left China.
Chinese - in proportion
in Southeast Asia was overwhelmingly
The Chinese population
of Fukien and
Kwangtung
origin, only two of 28 Chinese provinces.
the ancestors of the overseas Chinese did not even come from
Furthermore,
the whole of these two provinces. The ancestors of ninety percent of the Chinese
in Hawaii came from one district in Kwangtung
Chung Shan, the
province born.
Dr.
Sun
Yat-sen
was
More
than
where
eighty percent of the foreplace
U.S. were from four districts located next to
bears of the Chinese in mainland
Chung Shan.
Chinese people simply did not follow their rulers' military
Historically,
and even Jews learned in
other hand quite a few Vietnamese
On
the
conquests.
Vietnamese
holdConfucian classics took the Chinese Imperial Examinations.
ers of Chinese degrees served as high officials in the Annamese court even after
the latter was freed of Chinese eontrol. But the Chinese never sent out missionaries or armies to foreign lands to spread Confucianism
or any other
Chinese ideology. Once upon a time Arab missionaries
went as far as Scandinavia. But today nearly all the world's missionaries are European or American,
not Chinese. On the contrary, during the Sui and T'ang dynasties about 3,000
devout Chinese monks went separately over a period of many decades to India
in search of the true teachings of Buddha to bring them back to China.44
V
A final consideration
is the distance between words and deeds. In 1950 no
less a person than former U.S. Navy Secretary Dan Kimball said of the scientist
Ch'ien Hsueh-Shen
who wanted to leave the U.S. for mainland
China:
If we count part-Chinese in Thailand the estimates vary from fifty to eighty percent of
all Thai.
4 Under Western influence and changing circumstances we can expect a few more Chinese
to come out of China, as we can expect more Africans, Koreans, Japanese and other
Asian individuals to find their permanent places in the West. In fact, some Hindu religious
sects, notably the Vedanta Society began by Ramkrishna, and the Hari Krishna believers,
have missions in some parts of the U.S. Before World War II the Japanese Imperial
Government attempted to spread Shintoism in the Carolinas and Manchuria. More
recently some Japanese Buddhist groups have sent missionaries abroad. But these and
other similar activities are imitations of and reactions to the West, in the same sense most
Africans and Asians today have some sort of democratic governments and talk about the
ideals of freedom and equality, all of which are also of Western origin. The extent to
which the incoming influences (including Christianity, democracy and communism can
take root and be perpetuated in the future is very much dependent upon the nature of the
indigenous culture in each case.
3
191
"'I'd rather shoot that guy than let him out of the country,' Kimball said. 'He knows
too much that is valuable to us. He's worth five divisions anywhere."' (reported in
Honolulu Advertiser,April 27, 1970).
But the U.S., after persecuting
and detaining
Ch'ien for five years, did not
commit the atrocity of shooting the man and did allow him to return to China.
Ever since 1949 there had been plans to invade China and many Americans
in high places had talked about it one way or the other. But we have not
invaded China.
The fact is every nation, like every individual,
entertains thoughts or makes
utterances which it never acts on either because of inability or force of circumstances, or because the words are intended to substitute for the action in the first place.
Ever since its beginning the Communist
of China was and is
government
in
words.
Some
of
have
its
leaders
certainly belligerent
openly spoken of "wars
5
as
of liberation"
non-Chinese
nations
necessary steps to world socialism.5
among
But how many nations and peoples outside of China have the Peking government liberated?
How frequently has it sent its armed forces abroad?
The record shows that Peking has been extremely
in military
prudent
involvements.
The Chinese did not enter the Korean War till General MacArthur's forces were close to the Yalu and the general threated to cross it. Once
the truce was signed the Chinese forces left North Korea while a sizeable
of U.S. forces remained in South Korea. The Chinese did no more
contingent
than some arms supply and road building during the Vietnam War. In spite of
the fact that Americans dropped more bombs than they unloaded in Europe
during entire World War II and fielded some half a million men in tiny Vietnam,
China did not respond militarily by sending in "volunteers."
Those who are preoccupied
with military superiority as the all determinant
of individual
behavior and national conduct should look at history and the
record of the immediate
past.
both Chinese and Europeans
have spread as their numbers
Historically
But
the
while
former
into
all
multiplied.
spread
parts of the globe the Chinese
have largely stuck to their original home base. Today persons of Chinese
ancestry abroad, including those in South Asian countries, come to no more
than two or three percent of the Chinese population
at home. That is why
people can observe that China is the world's most populous country. She is the
world's most populous country because most Chinese stayed close together and
did not wish to go far away from home. In absolute numbers persons of white
European
origin occupy first place in the world.
Finally had the Chinese been interested in expansionism
along the SinoIndian frontiers they would not have to dispatch armed forces at all. They could
Assam where Naga
waters of north-east
easily have fished in the troubled
rebellion and demand for independence
had long been festering. Following the
well-beaten
path of other expansionist
powers China could have first sent in
5 These words echo Dr. Sun Yat-sen's call earlier for a united front of all the weak and
small nations of the world against colonial imperialism.
192
"advisors," then trained Naga guerrillas, followed by military aid to the Nagas,
and finally contrived
to sign a bilateral
treaty with Naga leaders in which
is treated as an "independent"
state. There is no evidence that she
Nagaland
did any of these.
There is then a curious contrast. The Chinese leaders say they want to
liberate the world, but they make few or no military excursions abroad. The
American leaders say they have no territorial
ambition and wish nothing but
and
all
for
and
freedom
peace,
happiness
peoples, but they have permanent
armed
bases
and
all
recalsemi-permanent
everywhere
systematically
destroy
American
and knuckle
citrant Asians who refuse to acknowledge
supremacy
down under American might. In the latter process many innocent Asian civilians
But then Americans can simply say, as many of them
are, of course, butchered.
have done, "That's war!"
VI
If the facts are so blatantly contrary to the notion of Chinese expansionism,
I think
why do many Americans cherish the myth of Chinese expansionism?
the answers are not obscure.
and Western men still deeply fear
First, China is ruled by Communists
no
matter
of
Communism
it is.
what
brand
Communism,
is
Asian
an
A weak and helpless
China
with
immense
Second,
population.
Asian nation of such immense size was a nuisance but tolerable. But when she
turned from a hapless weakling to a self-reliant and defiant giant, freed from
famine and regional warlords, and Communist
to boot, it was just too much
for those Americans
or
consciously
unconsciously
steeped in the notion of
Western supremacy.6
6 A few years ago Robert L. Heilbroner asked the intriguing question, "Is the U.S. fundamentally opposed to economic development?" ("The Revolution of rising expectations:
rhetoric and reality," in N. D. Houghton, ed., StruggleAgainst History, N.Y., 1968, p. 106.)
This question, which must seem fantastic to some readers, cannot be easily dismissed.
The Cambridge economist Joan Robinson answers it in the affirmative: "It is obvious
enough that the United States crusade against Communism is a campaign against
development." ("Contrasts in economic development: China and India," in N. D.
Houghton, ed., ibid., p. 134.) We may not be able to endorse Dr. Robinson's view
entirely, but the weight of her logic is considerable. Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura, Senior Specialist at the East-West Center and formerly Director of Research and Planning, Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East, UN ECAFE Secretariat, Bangkok, Thailand,
explains the question by noting the basically revolutionary nature of the development
process. "Development is much more than a matter of increasing national product within
a given social structure; it is rather a process of ideational, social, economic and political
change that affects the basic structure of society. If the struggle of ideologies is used to
suppress popular movements aiming at such changes everywhere in the world, there is
an obvious danger that the well-intentioned containment policy may degenerate into a
simple maneuver to maintain status quo. From an economist's point of view, this is the
basic weakness of the Cold War strategy, as has been applied against China in Asia."
("Asia's Future in Asian Perspective," paper lead at a "Conference on 'After Vietnam,
What?" May 22, 1970, on the occasion of the Inauguration of Dr. Harlan Cleveland as
President of the University of Hawaii.
193
Third, and I think this is the most basic reason, for many Americans,
and proselytizing
belief in and
because of their own expansionist
psychology,
is a necessity. This necessity has two aspects.
fear of Chinese expansionism
of their
Those who have been given to expansionism
must fear expansionism
former victims. That is why South African Whites fear Black improvements
because they know what they themselves would do to their former oppressors
once the table is turned. The other aspect is that expansionist
powers need to
enemies to justify their own expansionist
acts and designs.
create expansionist
The tragedy is that even those who would like to see a genuine improvement
in our chances for peace are liable to be led by the myth of Chinese expansionism into support of measures that only escalate tension and increase rather than
decrease our chances for further conflict.
There are, of course, some Asian rulers who also believe in, or profess the
fear of, Chinese expansionism.
The reasons for that are not obscure either.
Smaller nations are likely to be suspicious of nations much larger than they.
Given a human history of power politics, that is perhaps natural. But that does
not mean that some larger nations cannot live in peace with the smaller nations.
The extent to which the smaller nations are fearful of the larger nations is
to hear
dependent
upon how they have fared in the past. It is ridiculous
Americans assert with all seriousness how the Vietnamese and other Asians hate
China because they were politically vassalized by the Chinese imperial court
many centuries ago. That is Western projection and wishful thinking pure and
simple. Following that line of reasoning we should expect the Egyptians to love
their more recent English overlords but hate the Arabs who, under Mohammed,
them nine centuries ago. We should also expect the Hungarians
to
conquered
the
under
Kublai
about
the
Russians
and
brood
over
Mongols who,
forget
Khan, ruled them some seven centuries ago. Such fantasies may be satisfying
to their creators, but they do not remotely resemble the reality.
A basic reason why some Asian rulers join this fear of a Chinese bogeyman
of Western creation is surely economic necessity. Having seen many undemocratic and dictatorial regimes in Europe and Latin America successfully milking
the United States for years under the pretext of fear for Russian Communism,
many Asian leaders know a good thing when they see one. Another reason is
for the privileged
few. The more problem ridden and the more
protection
the common men are exploited the more ardent the rulers' belief in
blatantly
In this way the privileged few
and profession of fear of Chinese expansionism.
of the wretched
masses can be
can keep their privileges and the attention
of
their
rulers
and
the privileged
diverted from the real sources
misery: the
themselves.
It is sad that some well-known
for
reporters are unwitting propagandists
this Asian subterfuge. Not so long ago I saw a report by Robert S. Elegant of
Los Angeles Times Service (carried in Honolulu Advertiser, April 30, 1970),
entitled "Asian Scores U.S. `Unconcern."'
The American
met in
newsman
Vienna an unnamed high official whom he called "Malik" from an unnamed
used to be
Asian country. Here is the gist of the newsman's
story. "Malik"
194
in the East, when he was a student in a great
opposed to American intervention
Midwestern
in
the
U.S.
But a tour of Europe convinced
"Malik"
university
that the Chinese menace to his country is great and that American presence in
his country and Asia is absolutely necessary, because it "makes for stability and
gives hope" to "tens of millions" of peoples "who would otherwise despair."
"Malik"
was now anti-American
because of projected American withdrawal
from Asia.
I think I know "Malik" and his kind. I have seen so many of them in so
universities
and social
many high places in Asia and in Western conferences,
Those
us
know
human
scene
of
who
about
the
of the
gatherings.
something
Vietnam War (the brutality,
the burned villages and the daily body counts)
would certainly
not agree with his assessment of the benefits of American
to
Asians.
And it is difficult for those of us who know something of
presence
Asian peasantry
to see how a man who loves his people could wish what
"Malik" wished on his people.
I also am pretty certain that "Malik" was not a Japanese,
even if the reBeing the most
porter had given him some pseudo name like "Yamashita."
and comparatively
the most democratic
Asian nation today, the
prosperous
Japanese and their leaders have no need to use the fear of Chinese expansionism
as a way of getting American aid. In fact, many Japanese cannot wait to visit
China and to do business with the Chinese, even though that trade be conducted through the Chinese government.
Americans who really want to understand
what Asians think and how they
feel should not rely on the views of high Asian officials such as "Malik." If they
have no direct channels of communication
with Asian common men, they at
and
least should make an effort to examine the endless devastation,
brutality
massacres perpetrated
on Asians in the name of universal freedom and dignity
of man with the same yardstick that they would apply to themselves.
They
should search their souls and then ask themselves the honest question:
How
would we like it if these same acts were perpetrated
on us by Asians in the
name of universal freedom and dignity of man? Would we support them with
enthusiasm?
VII
Those who prefer to use the Maoist saying "Political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun" as proof of the threat of Chinese expansionism
should
realize that it is probably not very original. In fact Mao could be accused of
like that long ago.
here. I remember
said something
Clausewitz
plagiarism
did
God
and
not
Americans
to
Also,
keep your powder
pioneering
say, "Pray
dry?" It is true that Mao did not enjoin the Chinese to believe in God but he
did encourage
into Americanism,
them to read his own sayings. Translated
could Mao's advice not have been, "Read the Red Book and keep your powder
what major international
actions taken by the United
dry?" Furthermore
States before and since World War II give us reason to believe that our leaders
disagree with Mao?
195
On the other hand those who regard the aforementioned
Maoist saying as
should realize that Mao also said and authoreason for Chinese expansionism
rized a good many other guidelines for the Chinese to follow. Here is an example.
"Following the invasion of Hungary, China began to take certain initiatives to strengthen
relations with Eastern Europe. The Chinese role at first seems to have been one of mediation between the Soviets and their European satellites to strengthen Bloc unity. No public
criticism of Soviet leadership was uttered, but the Chinesedid support the principle of the right
of a nation to determineits own course,and People'sDaily went so far as to state that the association of countriesin the Bloc was possible only as long as it was understoodthat no memberof the
Bloc could be allowed to dominateother members.It has been speculated that China was not
seeking at this time to challenge Soviet leadership of the Bloc, but was trying to establish
a precedent for a certain freedom of action for national Communist parties which might
be useful for China in the future." (Italics mine)
This paragraph is from an article on "China's Initiatives in Eastern Europe"
Hemen
1, 1969 issue of Current Scene: DevelopRay, published in December
by
financed and circulated free
ments in Mainland China, a bi-monthly
produced,
in
States
Information
Services
the
United
Hong Kong.
by
Will the death of Mao change in some way the non-expansionist
approach
of the Peking government?
The new chairman is yet an unknown quantity but
in view of the known facts, deeply rooted historical trends and cultural perspectives are unlikely to be seriously deflected by any change on the top.
POSTSCRIPT
This article was written before Teng Hsiao-P'ing
assumed the position of
Vice-Premier.
The facts of his official visit to the U.S.A. and Chinese governideas and capitalistic
ment's apparent welcome to Western democratic
usages
I
are well reported.
But, as far as the main thesis of this article is concerned,
see no need for significant revision.