Generic 1NC
Engagement with China does represent diplomacy but relies on discursive
constructions of China as foreign and threatening to American identity
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices
can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of
policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of
identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis
they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and
how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies
could legitimately be advanced. US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’
between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the
understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then,
US China policy itself works to construct China’s identity as well as that of the United States. As the case
study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental
acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a
way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity
when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f ]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the
process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent
upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30 In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First,
throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in
terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of
American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that
China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have
always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response.
Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could
Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the
identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from
which the ‘threats’ have been produced.
be discarded.
Belief in the China threat produces the conditions for an actual spiral into conflict –
multiple barriers prevent conflict in the status quo but aggressive representations and
policies will tip the scale
Glaser, 11
(Charles - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China’s Rise
Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 2011, arc)
REALIST ANALYSES of how power transitions will play out are based on the assumption that states accurately perceive and respond to
the international situations they face. Realist optimism in this case thus rests on the assumption that U.S. leaders appreciate,
and will be able to act on, the unusually high degree of security that the United States actually enjoys.
Should this assumption prove incorrect, and should the United States exaggerate the threat China
poses, the risks of future conflict will be greater. Unfortunately, there are some reasons for worrying that the
assumption might in fact be wrong. For example, the popular belief that a rising China will severely threaten
U.S. security could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Should Washington fail to understand that
China's growing military capabilities do not threaten vital U.S. interests, it may adopt overly
competitive military and foreign policies, which may in turn signal to China that the United States has
malign motives. Should China then feel less secure, it will be more likely to adopt competitive policies that
the United States will see as more threatening. The result would be a negative spiral driven not by
the international situation the states actually faced but by their exaggerated insecurities . Moreover, states
have often overestimated their insecurity by failing to appreciate the extent to which military capabilities favored defense. Before World War I,
Germany exaggerated the ease of invasion and therefore believed that Russia's growing power threatened its survival. As a result, Germany
launched an unnecessary preventive war. During the Cold War, the United States exaggerated the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union,
failing to appreciate that large improvements in Soviet forces left the key aspect of the American deterrent-a massive retaliatory capabilityentirely intact. This did not lead to war, thankfully, but it did increase the risks of one and led to much unnecessary tension and expenditure.
Washington will have to guard against making similar errors down the road as China's conventional and nuclear forces grow and as clashes over
secondary issues strain relations. There has been no U.S. overreaction to the growth in China's military capabilities yet, but the potential for
one certainly exists. The current U.S. National Security Strategy, for example, calls for the United States to maintain its conventional military
superiority, but it does not spell out why this superiority is required or what forces and capabilities this requires. For the foreseeable future,
China will lack power-projection capabilities comparable to those of the United States, but its military buildup is already reducing the United
States' ability to fight along China's periphery. This will soon raise questions such as precisely why the United States requires across-the-board
conventional superiority, what specific missions the U.S. military will be unable to perform without it, and how much the inability to execute
those missions would damage U.S. security. Without clear answers,
the United States may well overestimate the
implications of China's growing military forces. The danger of an exaggerated security threat is even
greater in the nuclear realm. The Obama administration's 2olo Nuclear Posture Review holds that "the United States and China's
Asian neighbors remain concerned about China's current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization
There is no
prospect that any conceivable nuclear modernization in the foreseeable future will enable China to
destroy the bulk of U.S. nuclear forces and undermine the United States' ability to retaliate massively. The most
of its nuclear arsenal." The NPR, however, does not identify just what danger China's military modernization poses.
such modernization might do is eliminate a significant U.S. nuclear advantage by providing China with a larger and
more survivable force, thereby
reduc ing the United States' ability to credibly threaten China
with nuclear
escalation during a severe crisis. The NPR says that the United States "must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and
China," but China has always lacked the type of force that would provide stability according to U.S. standards. If the United States decides that
its security requires preserving its nuclear advantage vis-i-vis China, it will have to invest in capabilities dedicated to destroying China's new
nuclear forces. Such an effort would be in line with the United States' Cold War nuclear strategy, which placed great importance on being able
to destroy Soviet nuclear forces.
This kind of arms race would be even more unnecessary now than it was then. The
United States can retain formidable deterrent capabilities even if China modernizes its arsenal, and a
competitive nuclear policy could well decrease U.S. security by signaling to China that the United States is hostile, thereby increasing Chinese
insecurity and damaging U.S.-Chinese relations. There is no question that China's conventional and nuclear buildups will reduce some U.S.
capabilities that Washington would prefer to retain. But the
United States should not rush to impute malign motives
to those buildups and should instead be sensitive to the possibility that they simply reflect China's
legitimate desire for security. When Donald Rumsfeld was U.S. secretary of defense, he said, apropos of China's increased defense
spending, that "since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding
arms purchases?" The answer should have been obvious. If China were able to operate carrier battle groups near the U.S. coast and attack the
U.S. homeland with long-range bombers, Washington would naturally want the ability to blunt such capabilities, and if the United States had a
strategic nuclear force as vulnerable and comparatively small as China's (now somewhere between a tenth and a hundredth the size of the U.S.
force), it would try to catch up as quickly as it had the resources to do so. Those actions would not have been driven by any nefarious plan to
subjugate the world, and so far there are strong reasons to believe that the same holds true for China's course. In sum, China's rise can be
peaceful, but this outcome is far from guaranteed. Contrary
to the standard realist argument, the basic pressures
generated by the international system will not force the United States and China into conflict. Nuclear
weapons, separation by the Pacific Ocean, and political relations that are currently relatively good
should enable both countries to maintain high levels of security and avoid military policies that
severely strain their relationship. The United States' need to protect its allies in Northeast Asia complicates matters somewhat,
but there are strong grounds for believing that Washington can credibly extend its deterrent to Japan and South Korea, its most important
regional partners. The challenge for the United States will come in making adjustments to its policies in situations in which less-than-vital
interests (such as Taiwain) might cause problems and in making sure it does not exaggerate the risks posed by China's growing power and
military capabilities.
The alternative is a pre-requisite: representations create the reality of China and our
relationship to China – we need to interrogate our discursive understanding of China
before developing policy
Pan, 2012
(Chengxin, senior lecturer in IR @ Deakin University, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western
Representations of China’s Rise,” 2012, vii-viii, arc)
Despite or precisely because of the vast amount of literature on this issue, I feel compelled to join the chorus. However, in
doing so this book does not, as do many other books seek to examine whether China is rising or not, or what its rise means. This
is not because I believe such questions are unimportant or have already been settled; I do not. Rather, I believe what China’s
rise means cannot be independently assessed in isolation from what we already mean by China’s rise.
Though tautological it may sound, the latter question draws attention to the meaning-giving subject
of China watchers. It turns the spotlight on our thoughts and representations of China’s rise, which
constitutes the main focus of this book.¶ Though it may appear that way in the eyes of some, going along this
path is not a cunning attempt of finding a literary niche in an increasingly crowded field to score some
cheap points all the while dodging the heavy lifting of tackling complex ‘real-world’ issues surrounding
China. Nor is it to deliberately court controversy or strike an affected pose of malaise about an other-wise vibrant field of
study. To me, this book is a necessary move justified on both theoretical and practical grounds.
Theoretically, the book rejects the prevalent assumption about the dichotomy between reality and
representation. Contra positivism, we cannot bypass thoughts and representations to come into direct
contact with China as it is. What we see as ‘China’ cannot be detached from various discourses and
representations of it. Works that purport to study China’s rise, as if it were a transparent and empirically
observable phenomenon out there, are always already inextricably enmeshed in representations. In all
likelihood, those works will then become themselves part of such representations, through which still later studies will gaze at
‘China.’ In this sense, my
focus on representation is less an expedient choice than an ontological and
epistemological necessity . ¶ On practical grounds, given the inescapable immanence of
representation and discourse in the social realm, a proper study of discursive representation is not a
retreat from the real world but a genuine engagement with it in the full sense of the words. Perhaps
with the exception of sleepwalking or unconscious twitching, no human action (let alone social action) can do
without thought and representation. Constructivists are right in saying that words have consequences. But we may
add that all social domains and human relationships are mediated through and constituted by thoughts
and representation. China’s relationship with the West is certainly no exception. With regional
stability, prosperity and even world peace at stake, there is now an urgent, practical need to
understand how the various strains of representation and discourse pervade and condition this
critical and complex relationship.
Links
Topic links
“China conflict will determine the future”
The affirmatives rhetoric posits China as a static and pre-determined actor – this
ignores cultural and political nuances an obfuscates the role the US and others play in
shaping Chinese policies and responses
Wick, 2013
(Shelley, was a PhD candidate at Florida International University at the time this was written, “Constructing Threat:
How Americans Identify Economic Competitors,” 18 March 2013, arc)
While the stakes are high enough to warrant the continued pursuit of accurate information about
Chinese intentions, there is a great deal of theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that it is
unlikely if not impossible that we can ever achieve that goal. Even if decision makers had unlimited
access to information about China we would not be able to simply “discover” the “truth” of Chinese
motivations. Contrary to the assumptions implicit in much of the China threat literature, motives are
dynamic and China’s position as a revisionist or status quo state is not simply a static given waiting to
be understood. The role that a powerful China will play in international politics is far from decided
and is rather a point of contestation within Chinese national discourse. In addition, what role China
ultimately chooses to play will not be decided by China alone but will be shaped in part by how
others perceive and react to China as it transforms from a minor to a major power on the world stage. Various
sections of the Chinese populace imagine and articulate national identity in competing ways and
advocate different roles for an increasingly powerful China. Much attention in the West has been paid to the popular nationalist
images of China that 22 call for China to resume its rightful place as the center of the universe, but this is just one of the
national images that are popular in China today. Many Chinese see their country as a stakeholder in the current system and
assume that they are seeing the dawning of an era of multi-polarity with China as one power among
many equals. Others see China’s identity as intrinsically tied to its relationship with other East Asian
countries. Still others continue to see China as a developing state and suggest that China’s role has been, and
should continue to be, the champion of the Global South (Van Ness 1993; Shambaugh 2011). Which of these national
identities becomes dominant has yet to be decided and will not be determined by China alone. Most
China threat theorists emphasize the role that China will play in future conflict. The implication being
that it is up to China whether or not such a conflict arises . Some even say this explicitly. Robert Kagan (2005) for
example, has stated that “we need to understand that the nature of China's rise will be determined largely by the Chinese and
not by us. The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can
do to change that.” Andrew Small, (U.S. Congress 2011b, 80) asserts that the question in need of answering is “whether the
Chinese leadership is willing, or even fully able, to go through a deeper process of revisiting its strategy, adding that, if they are
not, the result will be increasing degrees of “competition” and “confrontation” between China and the United States. The
American Deputy Secretary of State, Jim Steinberg, told the Economist in 2010 That China’s choice of role is “the great question
of our time. The peace and prosperity of the world depends on which path it takes” (“Brushwood and Gall,” 4).
This widely
held view erroneously assumes that the possibility of conflict with China is solely dependent on
Chinese 23 behavior. In fact, “the peace and prosperity of the world” is also partly dependent on how
others perceive China’s behavior. An equally important question therefore is: What role are we likely
to assign China? Both pessimists and optimists tend to share the conviction that China has an intrinsic character that may be
discovered and understood by American analysts. Constructivists argue, on the other hand, for a more supple approach to state
differences or identities. Constructivists suggest that relations among states are the result of interactions in which each state
constructs and enacts its own (national) identity in direct reference to what it perceives to be the identities of the others in the
system. While much of the China threat literature assumes that China’s motives are static and
formulated in isolation from international interaction, constructivists argue that state’s identities and
interests are dynamic and are constantly being shaped through interaction with others (Campbell 1992;
Neumann 1999; Hopf 2002; Copeland 2006; Odysseos 2007). As Peter Hays Gries and Thomas J. Christensen (2001, 157) notes
“metaphorically putting China ‘on the couch,’ safely debating from afar whether China is strong or
weak, benign or malign, dangerously dismisses the role that other nations play in shaping Chinese
behavior.” If we acknowledge that the Chinese role in international relations is not just chosen by China but is also partly
chosen by the states that interact with China, then we must acknowledge that the “truth” of Chinese intentions is
not an objective condition to be discovered. These intentions are, rather, evolving through
interactions with other players in the system. Even as the United States is constructing policy, based in part on its
interpretations of China’s role as a revisionist or status quo power, China’s inclination 24 toward one role or the
other is being shaped in part by its interpretation of the motives behind American foreign policy. The
current American ambivalence toward China has serious implications for the future of Sino-American relations. American
attitudes toward China shape American perceptions of Chinese motives and actions. These
perceptions, in-turn, shape American policy towards China. American ambivalence, whether it is expressed as
cautious optimism or wary skepticism, colors the current environment in which Sino-American relations take place. These
attitudes toward China create current conditions of possibility which shape the kinds of policy
responses that are possible and prohibit those which are inconceivable. While the current attitudinal environment
allows the United States to vacillate between reacting to China as a “strategic partner,” or as a “competitor,” it is currently
difficult for decision makers to react to China as an “enemy” or as a “friend.”
Changes in US perceptions of China are not based on reality, but a false a belief that
engagement will result in both economic and political liberalism in China resulting in
global democracy & peace
Wick, 2013
(Shelley, was a PhD candidate at Florida International University at the time this was written, “Constructing Threat:
How Americans Identify Economic Competitors,” 18 March 2013, arc)
The link between American attitudes toward an economic competitor and perception of that competitor’s political culture is
most easily demonstrated in the case of China. Because of the historical nature of the Japan case, it is impossible to design
survey methods to accurately test this relationship.57 However, this was possible for the China case and was done in part three
of the social psychological experiment discussed in chapter four. This analysis demonstrates a significant
correlation between a subject’s preoccupation with the illiberal nature of China’s political culture and
a subject’s negative attitudes toward China. While, the findings discussed in chapter four do help to explain why
changes in Chinese capabilities are not clearly reflected in changing American attitudes, they beg the question: why have
American attitudes changed so dramatically over a period in which the Authoritarian nature of the
Chinese government has changed very little? In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that China’s political
culture has remained fairly stable over the entire twenty-six years under investigation. Two organizations
monitor the globe for trends in liberal political changes. The first, Freedom House, is an American nongovernmental
organization that calls itself an “independent watchdog…dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world.” Freedom
House rates countries according to two different indicators: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) and also gives 57 Since
Japan is not currently seen as an economic competitor, current subject attitudes toward Japan would not be relevant. Even if
subjects were old enough to remember the period of extreme economic competition between Japan and the United States
(1977-1993), it would be highly unlikely that they would accurately remember their perceptions of Japan at that time. 157
countries a ranking of Free (F) or Not Free (NF). Following Deng’s 1978 reforms, Freedom House gave China a bump in both the
PR and CL scores raising China from the most autocratic score of 7 to the still far from liberal score of 6. The scores again hit
bottom after the events of June 3-4, and while China’s Civil Liberties score once again improved to a six after 1998, its Political
Rights score has remained a seven since 1989. China has been stamped clearly NF for the entire period (“Freedom in the
World” n.d.). The second organization, the Polity IV Project, which measures political regime characteristics for all countries
annually, has shown even more stability in China’s political culture over time. The Project measures political regime
characteristics on a twenty-one point scale ranging from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (fully institutionalized
democracy). The Project has given China a score of -7 every year since 1978 (Marshall and Jaggers n.d.). It must be
acknowledged, therefore, that it is not changes in the reality of China’s domestic political institutions
or behavior that affect American attitudes, but rather the evolution in American perceptions of
China’s political culture as becoming more or less liberal. Other studies have demonstrated the importance of
perception when it comes to the influence of regime type on relations between states. John Owen (1994, 95-97), argues that it
is not the fact of democracy within two countries that ensures peaceful relations between them, pointing out that the
democratic peace phenomenon only works when citizens in one democratic country (the United States) recognize the political
culture of the other country as liberal. Owen points to several cases where American liberals felt animosity toward other
purported democracies simply because they perceived their political culture as not democratic. These situations ultimately
culminated in the 158 War of 1812, the American Civil War, and the Spanish-American War (95-97). Additional evidence
suggests that when gauging the liberal credentials of an Other, Americans look beyond the existence (or
lack there-of) of liberal institutions and instead respond strongly to events that indicate an
authoritarian Other is moving towards or away from liberal values. For example, Mark Haas (2007, 169) has
demonstrated that the United States changed its policy towards the Soviet Union in response to
Gorbachev’s proposal to adopt institutional changes rather than the existence of any actual liberal
institutions, which would take years to become a reality. Therefore, the question becomes how, and why, have
American perceptions of China’s political culture followed the course that they have. Following this line of
inquiry, the investigation leads to a textual analysis of American representations of China over an extended period of time.
First, coding a sample of New York Times articles over a twenty-six year period reveals a close parallel between national
attitudes toward China and media representations of China. Second, content analysis—extensively covering the discourse of
America’s general elite (the New York Times), business elite (the Wall Street Journal), and political elite (the Federal News
Service)—shows the extent to which a preoccupation with the illiberal nature of China’s political culture in the 1990s, mirrored
negative attitudes toward China during that time, while an absence of this preoccupation mirrored the more positive attitudes
toward China in the late 1980s, and a lessening of this preoccupation mirrored the improvement of attitudes toward China in
the early 2000s. Lastly, through discourse analysis, my study more closely analyzes a smaller sample of texts, spanning
all three sources and covering the entire twenty six-years, in 159 order to better understand the different trends in American
discourse that have shaped American representations of China over that time period. This analysis uncovered the
presence of four assumptions that run like a thread through American discourse on China and that
reflect and shape how Americans perceive China’s political culture, as well as the general Sino-American relationship,
over time: (1) It is generally assumed that it is the American responsibility, as champions of democracy and
liberal values, to actively promote the observation of those values in China. (2) There is an assumed
linkage between domestic political actions taken by the PRC and American foreign policy actions
taken toward China—particularly in regards to the Sino-American trade relationship. (3) It is generally accepted,
despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary, that successful economic liberalism will ultimately
result in political liberalism in China and that active American “engagement,” is necessary to sustain
the former and thus guarantee the latter. (4) It is also assumed that the U.S. can and must obtain and
maintain cooperation from China on numerous issues of strategic importance to the United States. Not
only do these results further support the conclusion that perceptions of political culture is the dominant factor shaping
American attitudes toward China, but they also illuminate the way that this shaping occurs. The first and second assumptions
ensure that China’s political culture will remain an aspect of American discourse on China for the foreseeable future. It also
ensures that perceptions that the PRC is becoming more or less repressive will have an important effect on images of China in
general. This explains 160 the dramatic impact that the events of June 4th 1989 had on American attitudes toward China and
the persistence of negative attitudes toward China throughout the 1990s.
China Rise
Fear of China’s rise is rooted in a dislocation and distancing of China from the US –
despite the fact that China is of little material threat to the US, they are constructed as
dangerous based on perceived threats to American identity. This process has
influenced every stage of China policy – absent critical analysis, the aff guarantees
policy failure.
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an
imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a
significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an
increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose
how ‘threats’ from
China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective
interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at
which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The
nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the
nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most
effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed
phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of
external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China’s ability to assert material force or of the
manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be
manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that
the individual sources of ‘danger’ – whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign
immigrants – have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be
ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the
early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China
‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms . As
ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless
of Beijing’s intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been
complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their
primary purpose has been to dislocate China’s identity from that of the United States and introduce
opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of
separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American
identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US
China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that
the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a
50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively
discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to
Assessments such as
those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be
considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent
authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material
create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded.
capabilities he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to
build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a
peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of
Washington’s early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy,
American interpretations of China must be
acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their
relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular
American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable
realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities
of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for
American representations of the PRC – and indeed Chinese representations of the United States – to become the focus
of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more
satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might
somehow be avoided in the future.
Discourses about China’s rising power ignore questions about power itself: the
assumes power is zero-sum and can be quantitatively measured. This ignores other
forms of power, denies the ontological character of power, and perpetuates Western
discourse that construct power itself.
-the aff is a quantitative, zero-sum approach to power
-assumes all power is state power – ignores other power (discourse, consumers, transnational actors)
-impossible to quantify, socially constructed,
-power is ontological, ideologically, discursively constructed
Pan, 2014
(Chengxin, “Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the “Power Shift” Narrative,” Asian
Perspectives, 38, 2014, http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/107046.pdf, arc)
The now-familiar narrative on a power shift comprises a wide range of literature and centers on at
least four concepts: whether there has been a power shift; how far-reaching this shift has been, and
whether it can be slowed down or even reversed; in what areas (e.g., economic power, military power, or soft
power) the 388 Rethinking Chinese Power shift is most evident; and what this shift means for great-power
relations as well as how to best respond to it. In this vast literature, opinions have ranged, for example, from
assertions that we are already in the “Chinese century” to claims that China still has a long way to go (Nye 2002;
Chan 2008; Gurtov 2013), and from the “power transition” thesis that a more powerful China is more likely to challenge the international status
quo (Tammen and Kugler 2006) to a more sanguine belief that socializing China into the international community is still possible (Steinfeld
2010). Hotly
debated as these power-shift questions are, what is missing is a more reflective analysis of
the concept of power itself. As Shaun Breslin argues, in the study of China’s IR, “The concept of ‘power’
is often left undefined, with an assumption that size and importance is the same as power” (2007, 6). In a
similar vein, Jeffrey Reeves and Ramon Pacheco Pardo note that “the study of modern Chinese power remains largely underdeveloped” (2013,
450). This conceptual underdevelopment is certainly not unique to the study of China. According to Martin Smith (2012, 1), IR analysts
in
general are often “more comfortable thinking and writing about who has power and what they do
with it, rather than about the core issue of what it is.” There may be a good reason for this general unease. Though
power is a central political concept in the study of IR, it has been widely recognized as notoriously “elusive,” “slippery,”
“essentially contested,” and “most troublesome” (Keohane and Nye 2001, 1; Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2; Gilpin 1981, 13). This
conceptual minefield notwithstanding, some audacious efforts at theorizing power have been made. As demonstrated in many different typologies of power, social
and political theorists as well as scholars from international political economy and constructivist perspectives have made some noteworthy contributions to our
thinking about power. The introduction of the concept “soft power” by Joseph Nye (1990), for example, has generated a vibrant new research program in IR,
including the subfield of Chinese IR (Li 2009). The division of power into coercive, normative, and remunerative power by sociologist Amitai Etzioni has been aptly
applied to the study of Chinese power (Lampton 2008). In addition to the conventional understanding of power as Chengxin Pan 389 resources or capabilities,
scholars have added motivation, desire, and will to the mix, thereby helping differentiate actual power from potential power (Baldwin 1980; Strange 1996).
Furthermore, informed by Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power as well as the “faces of power” debate (Dahl 1957; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005),
Barnett and Duvall (2005) and Guzzini (2013) have begun theorizing power from a constructivist perspective. To be sure, this theoretical debate on power is far from
settled or completed, and my intention is not to engage directly with it. But the various efforts at theorizing and conceptualizing power have added more nuanced
understandings to the question of what power is. Surprisingly, however, these
different understandings have been largely absent
from the power-shift narrative. Indeed, the two bodies of literature are marked by conspicuous mutual neglect. Except
at the most general level, few theorists of power seem interested in the current power-shift debate with the possible exception
of Nye (2010). Meanwhile, few power-shift analysts pay close attention to what theorists have to say about
the complexities of power in international relations. Even as the word “power” figures prominently in the titles of
many publications on power shift, as a concept it rarely receives any in-depth discussion. True, in the debate there is “a shared
understanding about what makes a state powerful” (Chan 2008, 2), but there has been no explicit self-reflection on this
understanding. Reconceptualizing Power: Beyond the State-Centric, Quantitative, and Zero-Sum Model Examining the Model
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that the “shared understanding” of power implied in the power-shift
narrative is itself derived from a particular theoretical position on power that is commonly associated with realism and the
“first face” of power (Dahl 1957). This point is evident in the wide (if only implicit) use of the definition that power is “the ability
of an actor to get 390 Rethinking Chinese Power others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable
cost to the actor)” (Keohane and Nye 2001, 10). When the “actor” denotes the state, as it often does in IR
literature, a state-centric, quantitative, and zero-sum mode of thinking on power becomes evident.
According to this model, first of all, power is seen as a crucial property of the state, which is the sovereign
owner or wielder of all resources within its territory. John Mearsheimer’s (2001, 55) notion that “power is based on the
particular material capabilities that a state possesses” is a case in point. In fact, the state and power in international relations
are considered so closely linked that “power” has been metonymically used to signify the state per se (as in the terms “great
powers” and “status quo powers”). Second, defined in terms of state-owned capabilities, power is believed
to be quantitatively measurable. Hindess (1996, 1–2) notes that, in modern Western thought, a strong tradition takes
“power as a simple quantitative phenomenon.” This tradition has certainly continued in the power-shift narrative. Indeed, “to
make sense of the idea of systemic power shifts or the very ‘balance’ of power,” “a measure of power” has to be assumed
(Guzzini 2013, 114). A good example can be found in Hugh White’s (2012, 32) understanding of power: “Economic primacy is
ultimately just a question of arithmetic, not an index of national character. GDP is determined by a simple sum: the amount
produced by each worker, multiplied by the number of workers.” In a more sophisticated but still largely quantitative fashion,
Chestnut and Johnston (2009) similarly treat the evaluation of US-China power relations as a matter of mathematical
calculation of each country’s capabilities. Third, with this materialist notion of power as a measurable state property, power
relations are often seen as zero-sum. A greater power, with the possession of more resources, will
prevail over a lesser one, a view that can be traced back to Thucydides (1972, 402): “The strong do what
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” In this sense, power is
viewed as “an instrument of domination” and control (Hindess 1996, 2). 1 Not only does a loss of
power mean a loss of control, but one’s loss is seen as another’s gain. Given this state-centric, Chengxin Pan
391 quantitative, and zero-sum model, little wonder that much is at stake in the power-shift debate. I do not, however, suggest
that every analyst in the debate shares the same carbon-copy understanding of power. In fact, there are always different
emphases on different aspects of power, and when it comes to both measuring power and the indicators and data they use to
measure it, divergences are the rule rather than exception, yet in most cases these differences have been empirical and datarelated rather than conceptual in nature. Even when analysts subconsciously draw on different conceptualizations of power,
often such conceptual variations are not the focus of contention. Rethinking “Power” In this article, my main purpose is to offer
a conceptual corrective to this neglect of explicit critical engagement with the concept of power in the power-shift literature.
While there is no single alternative way of conceptualizing power, power may be rethought at least
along the following dimensions. First, although the state does hold power, it is not a neatly bounded
property coterminous with state boundaries. Rather, it has always been “exercised” by or through a
diversity of actors, agents, and social structures alongside the state. Among them, for example, are consumers,
investors, transnational corporations, credit rating agencies, markets, global supply chains, nongovernmental
organizations, the media, the Internet, and even the ruled and the powerless. Such agents and structures often
transcend national borders and are not necessarily beholden to state power. Nor can their power be readily
mapped onto the state in which they happen to reside. All these considerations undermine “the possibility of seeing power as
solely a spatial monopoly exercised by states” (Sassen 2006, 222). Thus, upon a closer look, the complex geographies of power
in global politics defy a state-centric conception. Second, power is always relational and contextual (Barnett and
Duvall 2005; Hagström 2005; Piven 2008; Guzzini 2013). As Guzzini (2013, 24) notes, “Any power instrument becomes a
potential power resource only if its control is seen to be valued by 392 Rethinking Chinese Power other actors in the
interaction. Power comes out of this relation, not from the power holder alone.” Relational and contextual power may
be best understood not in terms of its quantifiable capabilities but within its specific social contexts. The “same
amount” of capability may not translate into the same degree of power or achieve the same effect within different
relationships or domains. With the acceleration of globalization and expansion of global production
networks, even the state rarely stands still. As the state becomes more internationalized or globalized, its power
may change in “quality” as well as quantity (Cox 1987; Agnew 2003, 78–79). As a consequence, “national” power is not
only less receptive to objective measurement but is also less national in nature. Certainly this does not imply
the end of the nation-state, nor is the world quite as flat as Thomas Friedman (2005) has famously asserted. Nevertheless, the national
boundaries of power, if such things exist, are becoming more blurred and flattened. In short,
it has become problematic to
invoke the sharpedged notions of national economy and state power—or, for that matter, the
perceived congruence between the two. If power has no independently verifiable quantity, then
power relations are rarely zero-sum, unless they are imagined as such and acted upon accordingly. In reality, power takes
on an interdependent dimension, which, among other things, means that “what some have lost,
others have not gained” (Strange 1996, 14). Moreover, power cuts both ways, a phenomenon Anthony Giddens calls the “dialectic of
control in social systems” (1986, 16; emphasis in original). This point holds true even in seemingly asymmetric relationships, such as those
between landlords and tenants, state elites and voting publics, priests and their parishioners, and masters and slaves (Piven 2008). Given that
power is not always neatly distributed in proportion to the distribution of capabilities, a shift in the latter may not necessarily mean a
corresponding shift in the former. Furthermore, a state’s relational power is not merely a reflection of its position in the distribution of
capabilities across states (Waltz 1979); it also bears the imprint of global political economic structures. In this sense, a small country’s power
against potential aggression may be greater than its defense capabilities might indicate, thanks to its intersubjectively recognized
soverChengxin Pan 393 eignty in the international system. Meanwhile, with structurally derived relational power also comes structural
vulnerability. As we know well in domestic politics, independent members who hold the balance of power in parliament gain power primarily
because of their contingent structural position; by the same token, their power is susceptible to changes of that structure. Power in the
international system is no exception. Third, power
is socially constructed. If “our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is
also owe its meaning
and existence to how we conceptualize it. Thus, a fuller understanding of power needs to take seriously its normative and
discursive constructions. In the eyes of many power transition theorists, a country’s power status is
ontologically independent of ideational factors such as intentions and norms (even though these may be
seen as relevant variables in states’ power behavior). Yet, as John Allen notes, power “as an outcome cannot and should not
be ‘read off’ from a resource base” (2003, 5). Likewise, Guzzini (2013, 115) argues that “what counts as a power
resource in the first place cannot be assessed ex ante independently from general norms, the actors’
particular value systems, and the specific historical context of the interaction.” In other words, power
depends on its social recognition within a community (Ashley 1986). Consequently, in power analysis a focus on
given for us in the language that we use” (Winch 1958, 15), power as a central phenomenon in reality must
the (material) distribution of power is not enough (Hindess 1996); it must also, according to Barnett and Duvall, “include a
consideration of the normative structures and discourses” (2005, 3). If diverse discourses are at play in the construction of
power, then “a considerable indeterminacy in the patterning of power” may result (Piven 2008, 4). Power indeterminacy has
always been compounded by the evolving normative context in which power is constructed, legitimized, and exercised .
Realists insist that country A with more material capabilities than country B has more control over the
latter, but in reality a clear-cut correlation between capabilities and control is rare (Hoffmann 1967).
Scholars, including some notable neorealists, acknowledge that military primacy does not always pay, at least not as much as is
commonly 394 Rethinking Chinese Power assumed (Waltz 1979; Drezner 2013). At the root of this nonalignment
between power as resources and power as effects are not just some power conversion problems, but more
importantly the intrinsic factor of norms and discourses. By helping legitimize or delegitimize power,
discourses construct as well as constrain power.
Threats of a rising China create a self-fulfilling prophecy where the US secures itself
against China and then China actually rises in response to it
Pan, 2014
(Chengxin, “Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the “Power Shift” Narrative,” Asian
Perspectives, 38, 2014, http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/107046.pdf, arc)
China may be the most complex and “paradoxical” rising power in modern international history, as
reflected in various paradigms and lenses employed to try to make sense of it (Pan 2012). The powershift narrative is one such lens;
it provides a seemingly convincing identity statement about a China that, while still lacking in superpower status, no longer quite fits into the
category of developing countries. This narrative also allows us to reduce the many complex transnational issues and challenges that do not
have a single national origin to the familiar problems associated with international power transition. Overall it reflects
a particular
spatial mindset and geopolitical imagination that keeps recycling the age-old metanarrative of a
realist world where power struggle is a constant reality and where the rise and fall of great powers
not only unsettles the balance of power but more often than not results in “the tragedy of great
power politics” (Mearsheimer 2001). In doing so, the power-shift narrative betrays the lack of serious
reconceptualization of power. Given the inherently social and relational nature of power itself as well
as the changing global political, economic, and normative structures, we must understand the alleged
power shift from the United States to China through a more complex and nuanced perspective of
power. By assuming that power continues to be attached to the state as measurable capabilities, and that today’s
power shift necessarily resembles shifts of the past, we risk employing old tools to tackle new problems. Here it is
appropriate to invoke Chinese history and recent US foreign policy to illustrate how a failure to
reconceptualize power can lead to grave strategic calamities. For more than a millennium, Chinese rulers closely
watched their interior continental frontiers for signs of a challenge to their power. The fact that such a challenge could come from a new
direction (the coast) and in a different form (naval power) never occurred to them. Yet when that new form of power arrived on its shores, the
Qing dynasty found itself vastly ill-equipped to cope with it. The rest is history. The recent example is the false “unipolar moment” assessment
of US power and its attendant neoconservative policy during the George W. Bush period (Reus-Smit 2004). If the neoconservative faith in the
unipolar moment of US power is misguided, the US decline and power-shift discourses may be equally mistaken. Yet,
to the extent that
power is socially constructed, the powerful conventional discourse of a classic power transition from
the United States to China could have profound practical implications for this important relationship.
As Breslin (2009, 818) notes, “A key source of Chinese power is the assumption by others that it either has it
. . . or, maybe more correctly, that it will have this power and influence some time soon.” Whether this
discursively constructed Chinese power matches reality is beside the point, for China and other
powers both may act on the basis of such a projected power shift (Hagström 2012). In China, it might well
play into popular nationalism or encourage arrogance and assertiveness in its foreign policy, or both. In the West, it would
justify a policy of hedging against an ostensibly rising Chinese power, a polChengxin Pan 405 icy that in turn
could harden China’s resolve to further amass power. In this sense, the conventional construction of Chinese power
could well create a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.
Expansionism
They portrayal of China as an expansionist regime is securitization of nationalism –
their political positivism is the root of mistrust
Lieberthal and Jisi 2012
(Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is
Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is Director of the
Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking
University. March 2012, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” Brookings Institution,
http://yahuwshua.org/en/Resource-584/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf) //Snowball
U.S. leaders believe that democracies are inherently more trustworthy than are authoritarian systems. This
stems in part from an analytical conclusion that authoritarian systems naturally worry more about their own
domestic stability and are therefore more willing to bolster nationalism and create international crises in order to
secure stability at home. This in turn makes expressions of strong nationalism and indications of national level concern
about domestic stability in China worrisome indicators of potential anti-American efforts keyed to (or stemming from)
domestic pressures. This is particularly the case when China, as is often the case in domestic propaganda, blames the United
States for its own domestic discontents and social instability. Authoritarian political systems are also viewed as inherently less
trustworthy because they are less transparent. The Chinese system takes particular care to conceal its core political
processes—such as selection of top leaders and civil-military interactions—from outside view. American leaders do not, therefore,
understand how well coordinated with the civilian/ diplomatic side are such things as PLAN actions in the
South China Sea or the first test flight of a stealth fighter. The latter, for example, occurred just as Secretary Gates arrived in Beijing in January
2011 to reestablish high level U.S.-China military dialogue and was regarded by many on the U.S. side as a direct insult to the U.S. Secretary of
Defense. More broadly, in
succession politics, it is very difficult for outsiders to understand what pronouncements and
actions are shaped more by internal political considerations than by external intentions. This lack of
transparency enhances uncertainties about China’s strategic intentions toward the U.S.
China Threat/Opportunity Dichotomy
Characterizing China as EITHER a threat OR an opportunity for development is a
reflection of a Western imagination pursuing certainty and identity in an inevitably
unpredictable world.
Pan, 2012
(Chengxin, senior lecturer in IR @ Deakin University, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics:
Western Representations of China’s Rise,” 2012, viii, arc)
For these reasons, this book turns to Western representations of China’s rise. In particular, it focuses on two influential
paradigms: the ‘China threat’ and the ‘China opportunity’. Commonly held by their respective exponents as
objective truth about the implications of China’s rise, both paradigms, despite their seemingly contrasting views,
are reflections of a certain Western self-imagination and its quest for certainty and identity in an
inherently dynamic, volatile and uncertain world. While understandable, such a desire often proves elusive in the
social world. With no lasting law-like certainty in sight, the desire for certainty then often comes full circle to two
subsets of desire: namely, fears and fantasies. For these forms of desire can provide some emotional substitutes for
the holy grail of certainty and truth. In this book, I will argue that the two China paradigms are, respectively,
discursive embodiments of these two popular types of emotional substitutes. As such, they are not
objective China knowledge, but are closely linked to habitual Western self-imagination and power
practice. By probing into the interrelationship between knowledge, desire and power, this book aims to deconstruct
contemporary Western representations of China’s rise. Although it will tentatively point to some methodological openings for
what one might call ‘critical China watching’, due to its scope and ontological stance as well as limits of space, it promises no
ready-made alternative toolkit through which to better understand china as it is. Alas, the ‘China as it is’ simply does
not exist except in our ingrained desire and conventional imagination.
China Threat Generic
Representations produce China as a racial and ideological threat to American identity
– discourses of a China threat are not objective but a reflection of an American
identity crisis
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
In his analysis of the China Threat Theory Chengxin Pan argues that the ‘threat’ is an imagined construction of American observers.15 Pan does
not deny the importance of the PRC’s capabilities but asserts that they appear threatening from understandings about the United States itself.
‘[T]here is no such thing as ‘‘Chinese reality’’ that can automatically speak for itself’, Pan argues. ‘[T]o fully understand the US ‘‘China threat’’
argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature’.16 The geographical territory of China, then, is not separate from or external
to, American representations of it. Rather, it is actively constitutive of those representations.17 The analysis which follows demonstrates that
China ‘threats’ to the United States have
to some extent
always been established and perpetuated
through representation and discourse . Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’,
constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 American
discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or
as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory. Ultimately, American representations of China
are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence. The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests
that dangers
in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The
mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different
identities are possible . . . is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result,
interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from
one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular
American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates
that nineteenth century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a
United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War
ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These
types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political
performance’.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have
emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity . In consequence, they
have always existed as dangers to that identity.
In this analysis it is argued that
a key purpose of depicting
China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and
ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being . As such, representations of a threatening China
have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to
defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking
circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also
exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which
supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before,
this discursive
process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity . Crises of
identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over
how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments
were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in
the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today’s China ‘threat’ to US
security is yet to generate such a crisis, we
must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of
consequences they have previously facilitated. As Director Clapper unwittingly confirmed then the capabilities and intentions
of a ‘rising’ China are only part of the story. International relations are driven by forces both material and ideational and the processes
by which China is made foreign from, and potentially dangerous to, the United States are inseparable
from the enactment of US China policy . This is because, to reaffirm, American discourses of China
have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose or intent. Their dis-semination is
a performance of power , however seemingly innocent or benign.23 This is not to claim causal linkages between
representation and foreign policy. Rather, it is to reveal the specific historical conditions within which policies have occurred,
through an analysis of the political history of the production of truth.
Ideology and cultural understandings of China determine whether or not we consider
China a “threat” resulting in manufactured threats – focus on representations is key
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
Director Clapper’s assertions are reflective of the so-called China Threat Theory which now attracts considerable Western attention, especially
within the United States. In the International Relations (IR) literature authors including John Mearsheimer examine US policy options towards a
real or potential China threat.
Mearsheimer argues that China’s growth will almost inevitably cause tensions
with the United States, presenting a ‘considerable potential for war’.3 Warren Cohen predicts that China will
continue to ‘brutaliz[e] the weak’, and follow great powers of the past by seeking regional dominance before expanding its
influence further.4 Certainly, much of the recent literature is less foreboding of China’s ‘rise’ and authors question the extent to
which it endangers international security. Gordon Chang, for example, argues that China’s economic model – and hence its
capacity to become a true global superpower – is flawed.5 Brown et al. are broadly positive about China’s development, with
engagement rather than containment the preferred US policy response.6 Others reject the conflation of a ‘rising’ China with a
‘dangerous’ China.7 What protagonists of both sides of the argument demonstrate in equal measure, however, is the
tendency to assume that a single physical reality about China can be determined. This aim of
classifying China as a threat (or indeed a non-threat) is a legacy of the historical dominance within IR of the
overtly positivist neorealist and neoliberal schools.8 Positivist approaches to the discipline rely upon testable theory and
empirical analysis with the expectation that the world can be definitively understood. The traditional influence of these
approaches has precluded a more widespread appreciation of how, in fact, a single authoritative
understanding about China is unachievable. The inherent contestability and subjectivity of judgments about that country was
once noted by John King Fairbank who argued that ‘[a]t any given time the ‘‘truth’’ about China is in our heads’.9
From this understanding the existence (or absence) of a China threat cannot be satisfactorily explained with
reference to material forces alone. The ‘threat’ described by Director Clapper can never be dispassionately observed through
assessments of an external world, as he seemingly claimed to be able to do. The purpose of this article is not to speculate as to whether China
‘is’ or ‘is not’ a threat to the United States. It does not concern itself with China’s nuclear arsenal nor dispute the existence and expansion of its
capabilities, or the possibility of there being a cause of future violence. It argues that while
the material realities of China are
important, the nature and extent of their importance is, and has always been, regulated by ideas. Of
course, the understanding that international affairs are guided by more than the distribution of state capabilities is not original; it has long been
a primary contestation of the ‘critical’, or post-positivist, IR movement that the world is mutually constitutive of material and ideational
forces.10 Moreover, authors including Evelyn Goh emphasise the centrality of ideas within Sino-US relations and to the formulation of US China
policy at key moments.11 Chengxin Pan specifically examines the China ‘threat’ as a discursive construction and its importance to Washington’s
relations with Beijing.12 Beyond these important works the
discipline remains relatively quiet on the salience of
ideational forces in producing a fantasised China ‘threat’ and in enabling US policies in response.13 It
also broadly fails to explain how those policies themselves reinforce the understandings which make
them possible in the first place. This is the arena of enquiry towards which the article is directed. It contributes to a small but
growing literature which challenges the contours of the modern day China Threat Theory, exposing it as fundamentally flawed and even
potentially dangerous. It does this by demonstrating that, in many respects, today’s
China ‘threat’ to US security conforms
to those which have emerged before. It shows how, across the duration of Sino-US relations, China
‘threats’ have always emerged in part from representation and interpretation and thus how fears
about that country today continue to be manufactured and engineered in a way not unique from
those of the (sometimes distant) past. In late 2011 the Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus from Afghanistan and Iraq
to the Asia Pacific.14 To a significant extent this ‘pivot’, as it is commonly described, is motivated by the growth of China. Accordingly, as
increasing concentrations of US political, economic, and military recourses are diverted to the Asian
region, American perceptions of China and their significance to the enactment of Washington’s
foreign policies there have once more become increasingly pertinent.
Generic Engagement
Engagement with China does represent diplomacy but relies on discursive
constructions of China as foreign and threatening to American identity
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
Accordingly, this analysis shifts from a concern with ‘why’ to ‘how’ questions. ‘Why’ questions assume that particular practices
can happen by taking for granted the identities of the actors involved.25 They assume, for instance, the availability of a range of
policy options in Washington from the self-evident existence of a China threat. ‘How’ questions investigate the production of
identity and the processes which ensure that particular practices can be enacted while others are precluded.26 In this analysis
they are concerned with how and why China ‘threats’ have come to exist, who has been responsible for their production and
how those socially constructed dangers have established the necessary realities within which particular US foreign policies
could legitimately be advanced. US China policy, however, must not be narrowly conceived as a ‘bridge’
between two states.27 In fact, it works on behalf of societal discourses about China to reassert the
understandings of difference upon which it relies.28 Rather than a final manifestation of representational processes, then,
US China policy itself works to construct China’s identity as well as that of the United States. As the case
study analyses show, it perpetuates discursive difference through the rhetoric and actions (governmental
acts, speeches, etc.) by which it is advanced and the reproduction of a China ‘threat’ continues. In such a
way it constitutes the international ‘inscription of foreignness’, protecting American values and identity
when seemingly threatened by that of China.29 As Hixson asserts, ‘[f ]oreign policy plays a profoundly significant role in the
process of creating, affirming and disciplining conceptions of national identity’, and the United States has always been especially dependent
upon representational practices for understandings about its identity.30 In sum, this article advances three principal arguments. First,
throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have never been explicable in
terms of material forces alone. They have in part been fantasised, socially constructed products of
American discourse. The physical contours of Sino-American relations have been given meaning by processes of representation so that
China has repeatedly been made threatening no matter its intentions. Second, representations of China ‘threats’ have
always been key to the enactment and justification of US foreign policies formulated in response.
Specifically, they have framed the boundaries of political possibility so that certain policies could be enabled while potential alternatives could
Third, US China policies themselves have reaffirmed discourses of foreignness and the
identities of both China and the United States, functioning to protect the American identity from
which the ‘threats’ have been produced.
be discarded.
The affirmative engages China in hopes that China will conform to Western political
and human rights norms – instead they perceive aggression from the US and increase
their aggression in response – creates the conditions for escalation
Jerden, 2014
(Bjorn, Associate Research Fellow @ The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “The Assertive China
Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” Chinese Journal of International
Politics, 7.1 2014, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/1/47.full, arc)
The assertiveness narrative fulfilled popular predictions of behavioural change by rapidly rising powers in
general and China in particular. The narrative was ‘cognitively congruent’ with the background knowledge of many people, that
is, it was a close fit with what they ‘believed and “knew” before they heard it’.175 In particular, two fairly straightforward
popular theories about rising powers are relevant here. Power transition theory predicts an increased risk of
great power war as the capability of the rising power approaches that of the dominant power,176 and offensive
realism predicts that the rising power will seek regional hegemony by aggressively challenging the
dominant power.177 Both theories foresee that China’s capability will grow in tandem with increased aggressiveness, and
as a consequence both could readily account for a more confrontational China. Power transition theorists and
offensive realists have a track record of confirmation bias when interpreting great power politics in
East Asia.178This is also likely to have played a role in their acceptance of the assertiveness argument. It is important to note
that acceptance of the theoretical assumption under discussion here (i.e. that increased capability makes a great power more
confrontational) is far from limited to self-recognized proponents of the above-mentioned theories. It is a bedrock belief in a
great deal of ostensibly non-realist writings on China’s rise.¶
There are also China threat notions that have no
basis in any universal logic about the behaviour of rising powers. China is instead identified as a
security threat for reasons related to its political system or national identity. These ideas, however, can be
as deterministic as the realism-based theories described above, since neither China’s political system nor its national identity
are expected to change anytime soon.179Contemporary Japan is one context in which we would expect to find this
phenomenon. Japan’s political discourse has long contained much insecurity about China’s rise, a sentiment that has become
more politicised in the past 15 years.180 Moreover, China’s alleged ‘aggressive’, ‘irrational’, and ‘modern’ mode of foreign
policy is frequently contrasted with what is seen as Japan’s ‘peaceful’, ‘rational’, and ‘postmodern’ international conduct.181 In
this way, representing China as a threat has taken on an important role in the construction of Japan’s own identity.182Japanese
representations of China are thus closely tied in with social, political, and psychological mechanisms largely unrelated to China’s
actual behaviour. This could be expected to increase the predisposition among some Japanese scholars to resort to flawed
ideas that stress threatening Chinese behaviour, such as the assertiveness argument. In spite of the popularity of the ‘China
threat’ in some circles, the more policy-influential side of the China debate in most countries, including the United
States, has long been the ‘engagement’ camp.183 The policy of engaging with China can cause a blowback effect that
triggers recurrent hard-line turns in US China policy. Pan Chengxin argues that
the engagement strategy is partly
based on a dubious supposition that China will eventually converge with Western political and
human rights standards . When this US ‘fantasy’ recurrently hits the hard wall of Chinese reality it
gives rise to mass-disillusionment among China engagers, which dilutes their bargaining power with
the hard-line camp and thus brings about a tougher US policy.184 The latest outbreak of disillusionment
probably coincided with the rise of the assertiveness narrative. There were a number of cases of suppression of dissent within
China in 2008–2009 that were well publicised internationally, including riots in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009, as well as
increased censorship of the Internet and mass media.185 These developments, understandably disturbing in the eyes of many,
may have spurred renewed disillusionment among China engagers. For our analytical purposes, disillusionment with China’s
lack of domestic and international change is hypothesised as having reduced the willingness of engagers to put up with
assertive Chinese behaviour, which of course existed before 2009 as well. This in turn led to less care in questioning the factual
basis of the assertiveness narrative.¶ One further development could have encouraged this tendency. Both the 2008 Beijing
Olympics and the global financial crisis in different ways thrust China into the international limelight. Various aspects of China’s
behaviour suddenly received more mainstream attention. Routine and occasional assertiveness thus became more apparent to
casual observers, such as pundits and journalists, who actively disseminated it in the mass media. A US non-specialist on China,
suddenly aware of Chinese assertiveness after 2008, might possibly criticise the US government’s China policy for being too
lenient. Proponents of engagement, on the other hand, might stress the novelty of China’s assertiveness as a defence against
this kind of criticism: denouncing engagers for being too soft on China was inaccurate because the assertiveness was a recent
development.
Changes in US perceptions of China are not based on reality, but a false a belief that
engagement will result in both economic and political liberalism in China resulting in
global democracy & peace
Wick, 2013
(Shelley, was a PhD candidate at Florida International University at the time this was written, “Constructing Threat:
How Americans Identify Economic Competitors,” 18 March 2013, arc)
The link between American attitudes toward an economic competitor and perception of that competitor’s political culture is
most easily demonstrated in the case of China. Because of the historical nature of the Japan case, it is impossible to design
survey methods to accurately test this relationship.57 However, this was possible for the China case and was done in part three
of the social psychological experiment discussed in chapter four. This analysis demonstrates a significant
correlation between a subject’s preoccupation with the illiberal nature of China’s political culture and
a subject’s negative attitudes toward China. While, the findings discussed in chapter four do help to explain why
changes in Chinese capabilities are not clearly reflected in changing American attitudes, they beg the question: why have
American attitudes changed so dramatically over a period in which the Authoritarian nature of the
Chinese government has changed very little? In fact, there is much evidence to suggest that China’s political
culture has remained fairly stable over the entire twenty-six years under investigation. Two organizations
monitor the globe for trends in liberal political changes. The first, Freedom House, is an American nongovernmental
organization that calls itself an “independent watchdog…dedicated to the expansion of freedom around the world.” Freedom
House rates countries according to two different indicators: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) and also gives 57 Since
Japan is not currently seen as an economic competitor, current subject attitudes toward Japan would not be relevant. Even if
subjects were old enough to remember the period of extreme economic competition between Japan and the United States
(1977-1993), it would be highly unlikely that they would accurately remember their perceptions of Japan at that time. 157
countries a ranking of Free (F) or Not Free (NF). Following Deng’s 1978 reforms, Freedom House gave China a bump in both the
PR and CL scores raising China from the most autocratic score of 7 to the still far from liberal score of 6. The scores again hit
bottom after the events of June 3-4, and while China’s Civil Liberties score once again improved to a six after 1998, its Political
Rights score has remained a seven since 1989. China has been stamped clearly NF for the entire period (“Freedom in the
World” n.d.). The second organization, the Polity IV Project, which measures political regime characteristics for all countries
annually, has shown even more stability in China’s political culture over time. The Project measures political regime
characteristics on a twenty-one point scale ranging from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 (fully institutionalized
democracy). The Project has given China a score of -7 every year since 1978 (Marshall and Jaggers n.d.). It must be
acknowledged, therefore, that it is not changes in the reality of China’s domestic political institutions
or behavior that affect American attitudes, but rather the evolution in American perceptions of
China’s political culture as becoming more or less liberal. Other studies have demonstrated the importance of
perception when it comes to the influence of regime type on relations between states. John Owen (1994, 95-97), argues that it
is not the fact of democracy within two countries that ensures peaceful relations between them, pointing out that the
democratic peace phenomenon only works when citizens in one democratic country (the United States) recognize the political
culture of the other country as liberal. Owen points to several cases where American liberals felt animosity toward other
purported democracies simply because they perceived their political culture as not democratic. These situations ultimately
culminated in the 158 War of 1812, the American Civil War, and the Spanish-American War (95-97). Additional evidence
suggests that when gauging the liberal credentials of an Other, Americans look beyond the existence (or
lack there-of) of liberal institutions and instead respond strongly to events that indicate an
authoritarian Other is moving towards or away from liberal values. For example, Mark Haas (2007, 169) has
demonstrated that the United States changed its policy towards the Soviet Union in response to
Gorbachev’s proposal to adopt institutional changes rather than the existence of any actual liberal
institutions, which would take years to become a reality. Therefore, the question becomes how, and why, have
American perceptions of China’s political culture followed the course that they have. Following this line of
inquiry, the investigation leads to a textual analysis of American representations of China over an extended period of time.
First, coding a sample of New York Times articles over a twenty-six year period reveals a close parallel between national
attitudes toward China and media representations of China. Second, content analysis—extensively covering the discourse of
America’s general elite (the New York Times), business elite (the Wall Street Journal), and political elite (the Federal News
Service)—shows the extent to which a preoccupation with the illiberal nature of China’s political culture in the 1990s, mirrored
negative attitudes toward China during that time, while an absence of this preoccupation mirrored the more positive attitudes
toward China in the late 1980s, and a lessening of this preoccupation mirrored the improvement of attitudes toward China in
the early 2000s. Lastly, through discourse analysis, my study more closely analyzes a smaller sample of texts, spanning
all three sources and covering the entire twenty six-years, in 159 order to better understand the different trends in American
discourse that have shaped American representations of China over that time period. This analysis uncovered the
presence of four assumptions that run like a thread through American discourse on China and that
reflect and shape how Americans perceive China’s political culture, as well as the general Sino-American relationship,
over time: (1) It is generally assumed that it is the American responsibility, as champions of democracy and
liberal values, to actively promote the observation of those values in China. (2) There is an assumed
linkage between domestic political actions taken by the PRC and American foreign policy actions
taken toward China—particularly in regards to the Sino-American trade relationship. (3) It is generally accepted,
despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary, that successful economic liberalism will ultimately
result in political liberalism in China and that active American “engagement,” is necessary to sustain
the former and thus guarantee the latter. (4) It is also assumed that the U.S. can and must obtain and
maintain cooperation from China on numerous issues of strategic importance to the United States. Not
only do these results further support the conclusion that perceptions of political culture is the dominant factor shaping
American attitudes toward China, but they also illuminate the way that this shaping occurs. The first and second assumptions
ensure that China’s political culture will remain an aspect of American discourse on China for the foreseeable future. It also
ensures that perceptions that the PRC is becoming more or less repressive will have an important effect on images of China in
general. This explains 160 the dramatic impact that the events of June 4th 1989 had on American attitudes toward China and
the persistence of negative attitudes toward China throughout the 1990s.
The U.S. shift to engagement is oscillation rooted in threat-logic – their fear of China is
a constructed realist logic
Xia 2006
(Ming Xia is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Staten Island and a doctoral faculty member
at the CUNY Graduate Center, 3-24-2006, "China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?," New York
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html) //Snowball
Will China become a threat to the United States, Japan, and surrounding countries? The reason for American concern
mainly arises from its hegemonic status in the world politics and the ideological incompatibility of China with the
Western value system. China's stunning economic growth has convinced the West that it is just a matter of
time until China becomes a world superpower. But its ideological orientation makes China a revolutionary
power that is threatening both to the United States' status and global structure. Three different logics have been
constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis. First, ideological and cultural factors make China a
threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration, the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes view
it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilizations, the "unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian
civilizations" is the most fundamental threat to the West. For people using this logic, the sensible response from the U.S. is,
in the short run, a containment policy, and confrontation is possible if needed; in the long run, the promotion of a peaceful transformation
within China. Second, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. For many realists, even China has shed off its ideological
straitjacket, as a great power in size (territory, population, and economy), China has to pursue its own interest and respect.
Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash with the United States, if the latter refuses to accommodate or
share the leadership with China as a rising power. Some scholars fear that democracy can unleash strong nationalism and popular nationalism
can make China even more aggressive toward the United States. Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives,
some people are concerned that if China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of
control, it can create an even worse scenario. The sheer size of the population makes refuge problem, the failed state and the
followed crises (warlordism, civil war, crime, proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to deal with. Due to these
three different considerations, the United States often oscillates from demonization to romaticization of China,
from containment to engagement. The U.S.-China relationship has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to
competition and back to conflict, but so rarely features with cooperation. One American China specialist
characterizes the bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American relationship."
China Policy/Taiwan
China policy is based on representations of China as an anti-democratic anti-capitalist
other – threats are produced to justify policy, not the other way around
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
In addition, and just as they did throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth century and the early Cold War period, acts of US
China policy continue to protect the identity from which the ‘threat’ is produced. This is most evident
in the sustained commitment to the defence of Taiwan, by which China’s identity is affirmed as
foreign to that of the United States and a threat to the core values of capitalism and democracy. This
policy strategy constitutes a ‘neocontainment’ approach designed to manage and control China’s
apparently threatening behaviour.117 Indeed, as Washington announced its intention in late 2011 to
station an additional 2,500 American troops on the north coast of Australia, Beijing interpreted the
move as part a wider policy of ‘hostile encirclement’.118 To paraphrase Campbell, the presence of an
opposing identity which challenges understandings about the self can be enough to produce
assumptions of a threat.119 Today, China’s (particularly nondemocratic) identity continues to be dislocated
from that of the United States, so that ‘almost by its mere geographical existence China has been
qualified as an absolute strategic ‘‘other’’ [of the United States], a discursive construct from which it cannot escape’.120 Once
again, these are the processes which explain how particular courses of American foreign policy are enabled,
towards a particular type of manufactured China ‘threat’. During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and the early Cold
War period China had the potential to endanger US security. However, in both cases the ‘threats’ perceived were products of American
imaginations. For the most part they were produced with the intention of legitimising policy strategies which
could protect the socially constructed (white and democratic-capitalist) American identity. Material
forces, while not insignificant, were insufficient to explain both the extent to which China was
perceived as a danger and the policy procedures implemented in response. Today’s China ‘threat’ does not yet
pose a comparable crisis to American identity. However, assessments of material forces alone remain inadequate explanatory factors of the
‘dangers’ it is understood to present.
China remains the subject of an American lens, interpreted by many as a
threat through representations of its status as a necessarily dangerous foreign other.
Aggression/Engagement/Heg
US engagement with China is not a product of a material threat but rather is an result
of broader US interests in the region – Chinese aggression has only increased
discursively, to serve US interests
Jerden, 2014
(Bjorn, Associate Research Fellow @ The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “The Assertive China Narrative:
Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7.1 2014,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/1/47.full, arc)
The assertiveness narrative provides a cogent argument for the continued existence of significant US
power in East Asia. The narrative was naturalised as a social fact, which was conducive to the
rebalancing policy and thus benefited US interests. This process amounts to an effect of US ‘structural power’—how
actors’ social capacities and interests are produced through social processes.188 This observation holds regardless of whether or not the origin
of the narrative can be traced back to agents associated with the US state apparatus, or whether or not its spread was intentional. Such
considerations become irrelevant if we adhere to a non-intentional and impersonal understanding of power. What is of interest is the
‘production of systemic effects’,189 of which the naturalisation of the narrative is an example. What is more, the naturalisation of an incorrect
representation of reality is, all else being equal, a greater effect of structural power than the naturalisation of a correct representation, because
we can expect reality to offer resistance to false beliefs. This has an important implication for structural power analysis. The naturalisation of an
The transformation of the flawed assertiveness argument
into a social fact is accordingly strong evidence of US structural power in East Asia. ¶ Power is not ‘fungible’ in
incorrect belief is a least likely case of structural power.190
the same way as, for example, money is.191Hence, one kind of power resource, for example, military capability, cannot straightforwardly be
translated into another kind, for example, influence over intersubjective beliefs about international security. The development outlined above
If US influence in East Asia were only or mostly based on military might or
economic resources we would have expected it to have waned in the years after the outbreak of its
economic crisis. Instead, the opposite has happened—the United States was able to successfully
launch the rebalancing, with China’s ‘new assertiveness’ as the main reason, and thus boost its
regional influence. This suggests that US influence cannot be fully traced back to a material basis. To
solely focus on relative changes in material resources between the great powers, and ignore the
crucial link between influence over knowledge production and international policy, restricts our
understanding of the so-called East Asian ‘power shift’.¶ To describe the behaviour of rising powers correctly is
provides a good illustration of this.
absolutely central to many IR theories; a general framework for FPC, such as the one employed in this article, aids theory
evaluation. A partial or total belief in the assertiveness idea led analysts to draw unwarranted lessons
for strands of balancing theory,192 identity theory,193 and other more or less elaborate theories on China’s making of
foreign policy, including misperceptions of the senior leadership,194 the relative influence of the
armed forces,195 and nationalism.196 It is useful to consider one approach in more detail: power transition theory, which Jack
Levy describes as ‘probably the most widely used by scholars seeking to understand the likely dynamics and consequences of the rise of China
in the contemporary international system’.197 A sudden upsurge in Chinese assertiveness in the wake of the US economic crisis aligns with
China’s new assertiveness existed only as a social
fact within the bounds of the intersubjective knowledge of a particular discourse, and not as an
objectively true phenomenon external to this discourse. Thus, China’s new assertiveness as a
behavioural fact evidently did not cause the rebalancing, which suggests that the rebalancing was a
proactive policy.199 This corresponds better with prospect theory’s understanding of power transitions. According to this
view, the hegemonic power (i.e. the United States) is more likely than the upstart (i.e. China) to try to
alter a status quo that is perceived as more conducive to the interests of the latter.
expectations of the mainstream application of the theory.198 However,
Assertiveness/policy-making
Fears of Chinese assertiveness exacerbate the US-China security dilemma, create
dogmatism about Chinese behavior, and narrow the options available to policymakers
-china threat con influences policy – contributes to US-China security dilemma
-creates bandwagoning, dogmatism, and narrows options available to policymakers
Johnston, 2013
(Alastair Iain, Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Dept at Harvard, “How New and
Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, 37.4,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115, arc)
In recent years,
it has become increasingly common in U.S. media, pundit, and academic circles to describe the diplomacy
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as newly or increasingly assertive.1 Some observers have even suggested that this new
assertiveness reºects a fundamental shift in Chinese diplomacy away from Beijing’s more status quo–oriented behavior of the previous thirty
years.2 Many believe that it reºects a conscious decision by the top leadership in the wake of the 2008–09 ªnancial crisis to be much more
proactive in challenging U.S. interests in East Asia and, indeed, elsewhere around the world. The
new assertiveness meme has
“gone viral” in the U.S. media, the blogosphere, and in scholarly work. This article argues, however, that
the new assertiveness meme underestimates the degree of assertiveness in certain policies in the
past, and overestimates the amount of change in China’s diplomacy in 2010 and after. Much of China’s diplomacy in
2010 fell within the range in foreign policy preferences, diplomatic rhetoric, and foreign policy behavior established in the Jiang Zemin and Hu
Moreover, the claims about a new assertiveness typically do not provide a deªnition of
assertiveness, are unclear about the causal mechanisms behind this shift toward assertiveness, and
lack comparative rigor that better contextualizes China’s diplomacy in 2010. Why should policymakers and scholars
Jintao eras.
worry about a problematic characterization of Chinese foreign policy ? Putting aside the intellectual
importance of accurately measuring the dependent variable in the study of a major power’s foreign
policy, there are two good reasons. First, if it persists, the new assertiveness meme could contribute to an emerging
security dilemma in the U.S.-China relationship. “Talk” is consequential for both interstate and intrastate politics during
intensifying security dilemmas and strategic rivalries. How adversaries are described reverberates in the domestic
politics of both sides.3 The effect is often the narrowing of public discourse. As public discourse narrows and as
conventional wisdoms become habituated, it becomes more difªcult for other voices to challenge policy orthodoxies.4 Similar to the
“containment” meme in China,5
the new assertiveness meme or others similar to it in the United States could, in the
future, reduce the range of interpretations of Chinese foreign policy, potentially narrowing policy options
available to decisionmakers (assuming this discourse becomes accepted by national security decisionmakers). Second,
the new assertiveness meme may reºect an important but understudied feature of international relations going forward—that is, the
speed with which discursive bandwagoning (or herding, to use a different metaphor) in the online media and the pundit
blogosphere creates faulty conventional wisdoms. As I show later, a growing literature on the intensive and extensive agendasetting interaction between the online media and the blogosphere has emerged in U.S. political discourse. The implications of this interactivity
for interstate conºict, however, remain unexplored.
Discourse from policy elites about Chinese aggression spreads rapidly, reducing time
and incentives for rigorous research and debate – the result is ineffective policy and
intensification of any future security dilemma with China
Johnston, 2013
(Alastair Iain, Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Dept at Harvard, “How New and
Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security, 37.4,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115, arc)
seven events in Chinese diplomacy in 2010 that observers point to most frequently to support the
new assertiveness argument did not constitute an across-the-board new assertiveness or a
The
fundamental change. Much of the media, pundit, and academic analysis glosses over crucial evidence,
decontextualizes Chinese diplomacy, or relies on poorly speciªed causal arguments. This does not mean there
was nothing newly assertive about Chinese diplomacy in this period. As noted, the one area where Beijing’s rhetoric and behavior did threaten
to impose substantially higher costs on states with disputes with China concerned maritime claims in the South China Sea. Perhaps triggered by
more proactive efforts by other claimants to legalize their claims through dec larations and actions relating to the United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea, PRC presence activities have generally increased in the last few years (e.g., more frequent patrols by various maritimerelated administrative agencies, more risk-acceptant action to defend Chinese ªshing activities, the encouragement of tourism, and more
vigorous diplomatic pushback against other state’s claims). Judging from the responses of other countries in the region, these activities clearly
contributed to an escalation of tension in the East Asian maritime space. Still, one
should be cautious about generalizing
from these maritime disputes to Chinese foreign policy writ large. During the 2000s, China pursued a mix of tough,
often coercive, military and diplomatic policies toward Taiwan to deter and punish pro-independence forces, yet few serious analysts
generalized from this behavior to China’s approach to international institutions, major bilateral and multilateral relations, or international
norms. Similarly,
in the wake of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq it would have been too
simplistic to conclude that these actions reºected the emergence of a wholly “revisionist” and
unilateralist United States. In other words, it is possible for a state to be newly assertive on some
limited range of issues while leaving other major policies unchanged. Why, then, does it matter whether PRC
diplomacy as a whole in 2010 can or cannot be characterized as “newly assertive”? It may matter because language can affect
internal and public foreign policy debates. There is a long-standing and rich literature on the role of the
media in agenda setting. What does agenda setting mean in concrete terms? It means focusing
attention on particular narratives, excluding others, and narrowing discourse. In the agendasetting
literature, it refers to the power of information entrepreneurs to tell people “what to think about” and
“how to think about it.”109 It can make or take away spaces for alternative descriptive and causal
arguments, and thus the space for debates about effective policy. The prevailing description of the
problem narrows acceptable options.110 The conventional description of Chinese diplomacy in 2010
seems to point to a new, but poorly understood, factor in international relations—namely, the speed with which new
conventional wisdoms are created, at least within the public sphere, by the interaction of the internet-based traditional media
and the blogosphere. One study has found, for instance, that on some U.S. public policy issues, the blogosphere and the traditional media
interact in setting the agenda for coverage for each other. Moreover, on issues where this interaction occurs, much of the effect happens
within four days.111 Other research suggests that political bloggers, for the most part, do not engage in original reporting and instead rely
heavily on the mainstream media for the reproduction of alleged facts.112 The media, meanwhile, increasingly refers to blogs as source
material. The result is, as one study put it, “a news source cycle, in which news content can be passed back and forth from media to media.”113
Additional research suggests that the thematic agendas for political campaigns and politicians themselves are increasingly inºuenced by
blogosphere-media interaction.114 Together, this research suggests that the
prevailing framework for characterizing
Chinese foreign policy in recent years may be relevant for the further development (and possible
narrowing) of the policy discourse among media, think tank, and policy elites. As the agenda-setting
literature suggests, this is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is the speed with which
these narratives are created and spread—a discursive tidal wave, if you will. This gives ªrst movers with strong
policy preferences advantages in producing and circulating memes and narratives in the electronic media or in high-proªle
blogs, or both. This, in turn, further reduces the time and incentives for participants in policy debates to
conduct rigorous comparative analysis prior to participation.115 This is ironic, of course, given the proliferation of
easier-to-access data and original information sources on the internet with which to conduct such rigorous comparative analysis. In security
dilemmas, discourses about Self and Other tend to simplify and to polarize as attribution errors
multiply and ingroup-outgroup differentiation intensiªes.116 The newly assertive China meme and
the problematic analysis on which it is based suggest that the nature of the media-blogosophere
interaction may become an important factor in explaining the speed and intensity of future security
dilemma dynamics between states, including those between the United States and China.
Regional conflict/Taiwan conflict
The affirmative is a subjective interpretation of China created to justify intervention in
the region to defend Taiwan – which represents American values and identity in the
region
-US interests in Taiwan – subjective interpretations of China justify intervention in the region in order to
defend Taiwan – based on US vulnerabilities/identity crisis
-China is perceived as biggest danger even though Russia is the most materially dangerous
-Re: Kaplan
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
China’s military and economic strengths are far greater today than at any point in the history of SinoUS relations. Yet, the ‘threat’ it presents to American security is no less a social construction than in
the past. The modern day proliferation of popular and academic ‘China threat’ literatures in particular is reflective of the increasingly
widespread conviction that a ‘rising’ China inevitably constitutes a real or potential danger.97 Robert Kaplan explains that ‘the American
military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty first century’.98 He does not question if or even when China might become a
threat. He emphasises its inevitability. Babbin and Timperlake provide a fictional narrative of future Sino-American tensions in which, among
other things, China uses cyber warfare to shut down American defence systems. The hostile scenario they present, it is argued, ‘could easily
become fact . . . The Verdict: China means war.’99 Certainly, and as has been the case throughout history, China is not uniformly perceived in
these terms. Among a significant proportion of the American population, however,
the China ‘threat’ is an accepted and
relatively unproblematic phenomenon. China now has the world’s largest population, the fastest
growing economy, the largest army, the largest middle class, a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council, a manned space program and a nuclear arsenal.100 Yet, all of these things do not necessarily
make China a threat. Countries which share variations of these, notably the possession of nuclear weapons, a
permanent presence in the Security Council and significant standing armies are not perceived in this way. Indeed, and as
Director Clapper revealed in the Senate in early 2011, states like Russia with far greater stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and significant additional military hardware can be viewed in less threatening terms, even when capability is cited
as the critical factor.101 Furthermore, the PRC has had a large population and a substantial army since its
founding in 1949, nuclear weapons since 1964 and a seat on the Security Council since 1971 without
consistently being interpreted as a threat. Accordingly, forces additional to those of China’s capabilities must still be
implicated in understandings about the dangers it is said to present. Today’s China ‘threat’ is yet to provoke a crisis of American identity as it
has done in the past. In the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries representations of the ‘threat’ were often far more hyperbolic. The
realities of the dangers posed by China were more acute and, accordingly, the existing order was perceived as less stable and more liable to
rupture. In part, this is because China has historically been less well understood and less familiar to Westerners. In the nineteenth century
China and its people were an enigma to the majority of Westerners so that representations of the ‘dangers’ they posed could more readily
appear convincing, be less frequently challenged and were less constrained in the production of fantasy. In the early years of the Cold War the
PRC was newly formed and still a comparatively mysterious entity whose future intentions were inevitably less well understood. In short,
discourses of separation and difference were more effective than in the modern information age where cross cultural contact is deeper and
where China appears fundamentally less alien. In addition, we must also consider that for many there is less incentive today to construct an
immediate China threat to US security. The Cold War was a period of intense and passionate debate over how to contain global communism.
During the late nineteenth century many Americans argued vehemently for a cessation of Chinese immigration. As we have seen, at both of
these moments the crises served relatively well defined policy strategies which required the existence of a threat. Today, the benefits of a
China ‘threat’ are perhaps less widely acknowledged. More than ever, China and the United States share complex and often mutually beneficial
99 Jed Babbin and Edward Timperlake, Showdown: Why China Wants War With the United States (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2006),
pp. 23–4. 100 William Callahan, ‘How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power’, Review of International
Studies, 31:4 (2005), p. 701. 101 CBS News, ‘Mortal Threat?’. ‘Threatening’ China and US security 17 political and economic relations which are
generally managed with care. While tensions between Beijing and Washington exist and the China ‘threat’ is often misrepresented, the reality
of danger is less useful in an era when a corresponding policy response is less immediately desirable.
Despite this, certain realities
are still able to be created within which policies are made possible and justified, primarily for those
who continue to make China’s identity foreign from that of the United States. This can be seen for
example in Washington’s enduring commitment to defend its core values in Taiwan. Between 1995
and 1996 the PRC conducted a series of provocative missile tests in the Taiwan Strait. Their purpose was
to influence presidential elections on the island and deter voters from appointing a pro-independence
candidate. The United States’ Cold War policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan at the
expense of the PRC was partly enabled by representations of the former as a threatened bastion of
American values. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s intention to ‘preserve the vital stake of the free
world in a free Formosa’ was shared by President Clinton four decades later when he ordered more
American vessels into the Strait than had been assembled in East Asia since the Vietnam War.102
Clinton’s aim was to defend America’s material interests in the region. However, those interests remained constitutive
of discourses which gave them a particular meaning and which were framed by understandings of an
identity still present and vulnerable in the region. Once more they were a boundary producing performance and
the goal, as Clinton confirmed, was to encourage the long term process of ‘deepening the roots of democracy in Asia’.103 Of
course, efforts to lessen the possibility of conflict are rarely to be condemned. The key point is that these events allude
to the familiarly autobiographical nature of the China ‘threat’ within American imaginations today,
and to the centrality of fantasised representations of that threat to policy processes in Washington.104
Specifically, the incident exposes how pervasive, subjective truths about China (as well as of Taiwan and the
United States) could still formulate a reality within which US intervention in the region could be
legitimised in defence of American identity. Indeed, those truths ensured that anything other than intervention was
implausible. In July 1996 the Clinton administration declared that ‘the United States has a continuing interest and a continuing
presence in the Asia-Pacific region and . . . we’re not going anywhere’.105
Econ/Bejing consensus
China’s state led development is seen as a threat to American democracy and free
market values – the threat is not objective, but a product of American design
Turner, 2012
(Oliver –Research Associate @ Brooks World Poverty Institute @ U of Manchester, “’Threatening’ China and US
Security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, 2012,
https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-manscw:206471&datastreamId=POST-PEER-REVIEW-PUBLISHERS.PDF, arc)
The contemporary China ‘threat’ to the core American values of democracy and free markets has
many parallels with, and in many respects is a continuation of, that which became so pervasive during the Cold War. Indeed, the
endurance of this understanding is found elsewhere, such as in articulations about the so-called Beijing
Consensus.109 The Beijing Consensus is understood to represent a model of political and economic development
increasingly advanced within developing regions like Africa and South America.110 Observers consider that its
approach challenges that traditionally associated with the United States and the wider West, the so-called
Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus cites the importance of such policy instruments as free market forces and
private property ownership as vital components of development. The Beijing Consensus, in contrast, promotes stateled development.111 Stefan Halper argues that while China’s ‘market-authoritarian model’ provides high
rates of growth and stability and promises of improved living conditions, it is devoid of the norms and values
expected in the West. ‘Absent are the freedoms we believe essential – freedoms of speech, belief and
assembly, and the notion of the loyal opposition’.112 Anxieties generated by the Beijing Consensus do not result
primarily from that which it prescribes. They arise from the challenges it appears to present to the
West. Indeed, the Chinese themselves refrain from promoting the Beijing Consensus to avoid provoking tensions with the
United States.113 The aim in Beijing has been to project the image of a responsible new power but China’s development is
itself less stable, organised, and coherent than many assume.114 A clear consensus, in short, has never existed. Moreover,
China’s broad global approach to international politics is often misinterpreted as targeted directly at
the West, when it is actually intended for multiple audiences.115 Today, selected American fears
about China are accurate, rational, and logical. However, ‘myopia and fantasy’ also ensure that they
can be more problematic than they seem.116 As it has been repeatedly throughout history, the China
‘threat’ to US security is not objectively observable. It is a product of power/knowledge and a
subjective interpretation of American design.
Advantage Links
Climate change
Discourses of climate security seek to secure certain lives at the expense of others –
only formulating a discussion outside of contemporary geopolitics solves
Dalby, 2013
(Simon – Balsillie School of International Affairs, researches political economy of climate change, “Biopolitics and
climate security in the Anthropocene” Geoforum 49, 2013, arc)
The Anthropocene makes it clear that at least the industrial decision makers within humanity are now determining the future
geological circumstances of the planet, and in the process perhaps opening up possibilities for new forms of human life while
radically endangering the conditions that make most human life possible. But as the rest of this paper suggests, who gets to
decide what kind of life will be lived in what biospheric conditions matters greatly now that we are have come
belatedly to realise that we are living in times of climate and geomorphological change encapsulated by the debate in the geological sciences
concerning the Anthropocene. This is a political and economic question that goes to heart of the geography disciplinary concern with the planet
as humanity’s home, and as O’Brien (2011) emphasises, raises fundamental questions for how human geography might respond to these new
circumstances. Not least this matters given the dangers of invoking universal emergency and a post political technocratic rationale for eliding
political discussion in the face of new potentially dangerous circumstances (Swyngedouw, 2013). While much debate about politics, governance
and contemporary political economy within geography now takes place under the loose rubrics of the discussions of biopolitics (Coleman and
Grove, 2009), climate change themes also link up with the two decade long discussion of the environmental dimensions of security (Dalby,
1992, 2002). The more recent discussions of both the political dangers of invoking climate change as a matter of military security, not least
because of the unreconstructed geopolitical imaginary frequently invoked while doing so (Gilbert, 2012) emphasise the importance of the
climate and security linkages. So too do the discussions of the inappropriateness of either contemporary notions of international security or the
military technologies currently in vogue for dealing with climate (Dalby, 2009). The focus in what follows is on biopolitics and on one particular
formulation of all this in terms of risk rather than the militarization of climate change, but in doing so it complements Gilbert’s (2012) analysis
of the dangers of such formulations in a world where so much has been militarized in the last decade.
Given the frequent
invocation of emergency in the arguments about climate change, not least by James Lovelock (2009), and by
environmentalists drawing on his earlier formulations (Spratt and Sutton, 2008), and the invocation of numerous biological
formulations in the war on terror (Cooper, 2006), thinking carefully about these matters is a pressing
necessity for geopolitical analysis. Numerous military organisations are paying attention to climate as a security issue, and while
part of this is a concern to speed up mitigation actions, much of it is also about how to deal with matters of adaptation, and what are portrayed
as threats due to migration and political instabilities (Brzoska, 2012). But writing off military institutions as simply part of the problem isn’t
sensible either, as the reading of the E3G (2011) ‘‘Degrees of Risk’’ report in the latter stages suggests;
contesting specific
invocations of risk and security is both a political argument against the post-political assumptions and
a critical geographical task that challenges the militarization of climate security (Dalby, 2013). This paper
suggests that an important reading of one form of biopolitics, that provided by Mick Dillon (2008) and Melinda Cooper (2006), concerned to
understand security in terms of fears of emergence, should be turned on its metaphorical head to suggest that carboniferous capitalism, the
new life form that has changed so many things that we now effectively live in a new geological era, is the emergence that threatens to
transform all life quite dramatically. This involves an obviously gross over-simplification of Cooper’s and in particular Dillon’s work, but invoking
his phrasing and linking it to the discussion of the Anthropocene suggests some clear limitations concerning the appropriation of the biopolitics,
unless that is, it is delinked from the specific form it takes in discussions of liberal notions of war and the task of securing the ‘biohuman’ (Dillon
and Reid, 2009). While such an inversion may in danger of what Neil Smith long ago called the ideology of nature (1984, 2008), that is the
promise of a certainty outside humanity as the benchmark for judgement, the epistemological source, as it were for humanity, the inversion is
useful in so far as it poses the problem of how security might now be formulated if something more than the ‘biohuman’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009)
liberal consumer is considered within the ambit of contemporary politics. The theme of the Anthropocene is part of the answer to both the
limits of the biohuman and the dangers of the ideology of nature.
Crucially, and contrary to much popular pessimism
about the Anthropocene as ‘‘end times’’, the Anthropocene suggests very clearly that the future of
the biosphere is an open question; what kind of nature gets produced is now the political question of
our times. The Anthropocene in this sense extends Smith’s (1984, 2008) insistence that nature and space are produced
simultaneously by global capitalism. Given this new context the questions of what kind of politics making what kinds of
life are ever more pressing. Decisions concerning what kind of biosphere will exist for future generations of
humanity, and at least some of the species that manage to adapt to the radical changes that are
wrought, are now being made whether contemporary political elites realise it or not (Webersik, 2010).
This is about much more than biopolitics in the sense of the recognition that ‘‘the basic biological features of the human species
[have become] the object of a political strategy’’ (Foucault, 2007: 1). It is about securing the future, and doing so in
terms of managing risk and contingency as Dillon (2008) suggests. But on the big scale that now means inquiring quite
literally into what kind of planet carboniferous capitalism is making, and the risks and contingencies that emerge from this
remaking of the biosphere.
This is an eminently geographical question that puts the materialities of
geopolitics at the heart of contemporary deliberations.
The disruptions set in motion are likely to suggest to many
people that we are indeed in Zizek’s (2010) terms, living in the end times. The political pessimism in such formulations is precisely what
Wallerstein (1999) warns against but the political vocabulary for thinking creatively about new forms of biopolitics, or perhaps even more
importantly a politics after biopolitics, is as yet unclear. Geographers in particular, given the transformation of the planetary home of our
species, are now engaging with this theme as the extended discussion of the ‘‘Anthropos’’ at the 2013 annual convention of the Association of
American Geographers makes clear.
The discourses of climate security and the numerous modes of governing
climate capitalism that are emerging require our attention urgently because they pose the key
questions of what life is being at least notionally secured by these practices, and whether it is
possible to shift the parameters of traditional geopolitics to formulate a ‘‘political geoecology’’ that
engages much more than the perpetuation of contemporary injustices and the violence of the
present order
(Brauch et al., 2011; Dalby, 2010).
The militarization of climate change
The rhetoric of policy to address climate change ignores the intersection of climate
change and military initiatives – climate threats are just another part of the grand
security strategy
Dalby, 2013
(Simon – Balsillie School of International Affairs, researches political economy of climate change, “Biopolitics and
climate security in the Anthropocene” Geoforum 49, 2013, arc)
Despite the distractions of the war on terror, gradually climate change
has emerged as one of the biggest risks to
contemporary biopolitical strategies, but one that hasn’t at least yet, challenged the contemporary geopolitical
strategies of extending biohumanity to all parts of the planet. The risk of a dramatic disruption of the climate system suggests
that in fact it is carboniferous capitalism, the dominant emergent life-form in the biosphere that is now risking precisely the
conditions that gave rise to it. ‘‘Put bluntly, while the rhetoric of policy is to reduce emissions in line with
avoiding dangerous climate change, most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely
dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and immediate emission reductions’’ (Anderson
and Bows, 2011: 40). In biopolitical terms the possibilities of adaptation are the key question in many places; this has become a major theme in
security discussions (Brzoska, 2012). Mitigation, and the reduction of carbon outputs from contemporary economies are also important, but
much of this is still caught in the traditional discussions of aid and development, albeit sometimes reinvented in the terms of climate justice.
Now fears
of rogues and population displacements are linking this to the agenda of wars on terror,
ungoverned peripheral places and ‘‘national security’’ (Moran, 2011). All of which is part of the new focus on
security and specifically in Oels’ (2012) terms, the climatization of security discourse. The formal security apparatuses of a number
of ‘‘Northern’’ states concerned to ‘secure’ their states against the risks of climate change are paying attention. Most notably the United
Kingdom has devoted considerable diplomatic resources to the theme given the vulnerability of the island state to rising sea levels, and the
notable urban vulnerabilities to both flooding and simultaneously to fresh water scarcity (Ashton, 2011). Nonetheless in the British case it is
worth noting that the institutional debate about the 2010 security review and the discussion of priorities for the British forces largely ignores
climate matters (Codner and Clarke, 2011). Brzoska (2012) has traced discussions of climate and security in key planning documents in twentyfive states. The US military has been developing strategies to green its operations, and as of March 2011 US
Federal agencies are required to incorporate climate change considerations into their planning due to Presidential Executive Order 13514.
Scenario exercises and planning for extreme contingencies are part of military life, and now too these
are beginning to incorporate environmental issues and climate change into strategic planning (Briggs,
2010). Cooper (2010) goes so far as to suggest that climate change has become just one more factor in
calculations of American grand strategy.
Cyber security
The rapid pace at which technology develops both a) makes cyber threats inherently
hypothetical and b) requires the reliance on “expert knowledge” that serves elites
and papers over the political agenda behind securitizing cyber space
-Epistemology/control over knowledge production link
-cyber threats, hypothetical, expert knowledge that is inherently inconclusive -> exaggerated threats
-aura of neutrality when in reality only serves elites
-technology/expertise allows those claiming cyber threats to hide their political agenda
Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009
(Lenke and Helen, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies
Quarterly 53, https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/digital%20disaster.pdf)
The strong emphasis on the hypothetical in cyber securitizations create a particular space for
technical, expert discourse. As Nissenbaum (2005:72) points out, the knowledge required to master the field of
computer security is daunting and often not available to the broader public, including Security Studies scholars.
The breathtaking pace at which new technologies and hence methods of attacks are introduced (Denning 1999:xvi)
further adds to the legitimacy granted to experts and the epistemic authority which computer and
information scientists 1166 Cyber Security and the Copenhagen School hold allow them the privileged role as those
who have the authority to speak about the unknown. In the case of cyber security, experts have been capable of defying
Huysmans (2006:9) description of the invisible role of most security experts as they have transcended their specific scientific locations to speak
to the broader public in a move that is both facilitated by and works to support cyber securitizations claimed by politicians and the media. As in
most academic fields, computer
scientists have disagreed on the likelihood of different forms of attacks, and
since the field is also cloaked in military or business secrecy, the ‘‘normal’’ follower of these debates
learns ‘‘that much is withheld or simply not known, and estimates of damage strategically either
wildly exaggerated or understated’’ (Nissenbaum 2005:72). These fluctuations also facilitate a coupling of radical threats with
techno-utopian solutions.11 The National Strategy (2003:35) for instance couples a series of securitizations with an exuberant faith in the
development of ‘‘highly secure, trust-worthy, and resilient computer systems. In the future, working with a computer, the Internet, or any
other cyber system may become as dependable as turning on the lights or the water.’’ Leaving aside that for the majority of the world’s poor,
and even for the impoverished American, turning on the light or water may not be entirely dependable,
this echoes a technological
utopianism that sidesteps the systemic, inherent ontological insecurity that computer scientists
consistently emphasize . It also invokes an inherent tension between disaster and utopia as the future of cyber security. The
constitution of expert authority in cyber technifications invokes furthermore the tenuous relationship between
‘‘good’’ knowledge and ‘‘bad’’ knowledge, between the computer scientist and the hacker. The hacker,
argues Nissenbaum (2004), has undergone a critical shift in Western policy and media discourse, moving from a previous subject position as
geeky, apolitical, and driven by the boyish challenge of breaking the codes to one of thieves, vandals, and even terrorists.12 Although ‘‘hackers’’
as well as others speaking on behalf of ‘‘hacktivista’’—the use of hacking for dissident, normatively desirable purposes—have tried to reclaim
the term (Deibert 2003), both official and dissident discourse converge in their underscoring of the general securitization of the cyber sector
insofar as past political hacker naivety is no longer possible.
The privileged role allocated to computer and information
scientists within cyber security discourse is in part a product of the logic of securitization itself: if cyber
security is so crucial it should not be left to amateurs. Computer scientists and engineers are however not only experts,
but technical ones and to constitute cyber security as their domain is to technify cyber security. Technifications are, as securitizations,
speech acts that ‘‘do something’’ rather than merely describe, and they construct an issue as reliant upon technical, expert
knowledge, but they also simultaneously presuppose a politically and normatively neutral agenda
that technology serves. The mobilization of technification within a logic of securitization is thus one that allows for
a particular constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy (Huysmans 2006:6–9). It constructs the
technical as a domain requiring an expertise that the public (and most politicians) do not have and this in turn allows ‘‘experts’’
to become securitizing actors while distinguishing themselves from the ‘‘politicking’’ of politicians and
other ‘‘political’’ actors. Cyber security discourse’s simultaneous securitization and technification work to prevent it from being politicized in
that it
is precisely through rational, technical discourse that securitization may ‘‘hide’’ its own political
roots.13 The technical and the securitized should therefore not be seen as opposed realms or disjunct
discursive modalities, but as deployable in complex, interlocking ways; not least by those securitizing
actors who seek to depoliticize their discourses’ threat and enemy constructions through linkages to
‘‘neutral’’ technologies. A securitization by contrast inevitably draws public attention to what is done in the name of security and this
provides a more direct point of critical engagement for those wishing to challenge these practices than if these were constituted as technical.
Cyber security discourse relies on exaggerated disaster scenarios because there are no
major prior disasters to rely on – this creates an ambiguity that is misleading and
difficult for dissenters to argue against =hyeprsecuritization
Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009
(Lenke and Helen, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies
Quarterly 53, https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/digital%20disaster.pdf)
The first concept, hypersecuritization, has been introduced by Buzan (2004:172) to describe an
expansion of securitization beyond a ‘‘normal’’ level of threats and dangers by defining ‘‘a tendency
both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures.’’ This definition has an objectivist ring to
it in that to identify ‘‘exaggerated’’ threats implies that there are ‘‘real’’ threats that are not exaggerated. Moreover, the question of whether a
securitization is seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’ concerns the degree to which it is successful (unsuccessful securitizations are seen as ‘‘exaggerating’’)
and is not part of the grammatical specificities of sectors. Thus we
hypersecuritization and to
suggest to drop the ‘‘exaggerated’’ from the definition of
apply it to the cyber sector to identify the striking manner in which cyber security
discourse hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe threats
into a monumental cascading sequence
and the fact that neither of these scenarios has so far taken place. All securitizations
do of course have an element of the hypothetical in that they constitute threats that must be countered, and thus mobilize an ‘‘if-then’’ logic,
but what
distinguishes hypersecuritizations from ‘‘mere’’ securitization is their instantaneity and interlocking effects (Denning 1999:xiii). This combination draws critically from the securitization of the network (Deibert 2002), yet the power
of hypersecuritization stems not only from a securitization of the network itself, but from how a damaged network would cause societal,
financial, and military break-down hence bringing in all other referent objects and sectors. Securitizations
always mobilize the
specter of the future to some extent, but most nevertheless articulate the past as a legitimating
reference that underscores the gravity of the situation. Looking to the Cold War, the logic of nuclear deterrence relied
upon projections of a nuclear exchange that had not taken place, yet there were the devastations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to be used as a
Cyber securitizations on the other hand have no similar history of founding
incidents to base themselves on but try to conjure historical analogies such as ‘‘electronic Pearl
Harbors’’ (Bendrath 2003:50).7 The combination of cascading disasters and the absence of a prior
incident of that magnitude creates a crucial ambiguity within cyber security discourse. The extreme
reliance on the future and the enormity of the threats claimed at stake makes the discourse
susceptible to charges of ‘‘exaggeration,’’ yet the scale of the potential catastrophe simultaneously
raises the stakes attached to ignoring the warnings.8 Turning the absence of prior incidences in the opposite direction, the
difficulty of saying that it could not happen also creates a powerful space for the projection of the (im)possible. The
hypersecuritization of the entire network in cyber security creates an obvious resemblance to
environmental security discourse where the fate of the planet is claimed at stake. Both discourses also
emphasize irreversibility: once a species is extinct or a digital system gone, they can never be
recreated in full. Yet, there are also crucial differences between the two discourses. First, the speed of the threat scenarios
differ with cyber security gaining its power from the instantaneity of the cascading effects whereas
yardstick for what nuclear war would imply.
environmental security usually allows for a gradual accumulation of threats and dangers until a certain threshold may be reached and events
accelerate. This establishes different modalities of urgency and hence different spaces for political intervention.9 Second, there is a crucial
difference in terms of the possibility of visualizing threats, and hence for how securitizing actors communicate to their audiences (Williams
2003). The digital, networked character of cyber security—and the absence of prior disasters—is hard to represent through images, whereas
environmental security discourse may mobilize for example endangered and extinct species as well as melting ice caps and forests devastated
by acid rain or clear-cutting.
Cyber insecurity is constituted discursively – these threats then become politicized
and dispersed
Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009
(Lenke and Helen, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies
Quarterly 53, https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/digital%20disaster.pdf)
This academic and policy discourse articulates in sum a wide array of threats to government, business, individuals,
and society as a whole perpetuated by hackers, criminals, terrorists, commercial organizations, and nations
that adopt cyber strategies for financial, ideological, political, or military gain (Hundley and Anderson 1995 ⁄ 1996:232).
Yet obviously not all political or societal actors concur with the manner in which official American
cyber security discourse has attempted to keep the public-private and individual-state resolutions in
place. As Ronald J. Deibert (2002) and Diana Saco (1999) have argued, cyber security is a terrain on which multiple discourses
and (in)securities compete.6 Privacy advocates and cyber libertarians point to governmental violations of personal security
(Saco 1999), and authoritarian (and not so authoritarian) regimes securitize transborder information flows as threats to regime
⁄state security and national (societal) identity in a way that expands the threat-referent object constellation considerably
(Deibert 2002). The question is therefore how we incorporate this complexity into our theoretical
framework without loosing the sense of cyber security discourse as a distinct phenomenon? Deibert
(2002) argues that
cyber security is constituted through
four separate
discourses
with distinct referent objects,
threats, policy options, and world orders: national security, state security (comprising external threats to state sovereignty as well as internal
threats to regime security), private security, and network security, and Saco holds that national and personal security compete (Saco 1999:270,
286). We agree with Deibert that cyber security should be theorized as a sector where multiple discourses may be found, yet we think that
understanding this multi-discursivity as arising from competing articulations of constellations of
referent objects, rather than separate referent objects, better captures the securitizing and political dynamic of
the field. To see cyber security discourse as fragmenting along the lines of distinct referent objects downplays the ways in which cyber
security discourse gains its coherence from making connections between referent objects
rather than
operating at separate tracks. Particularly crucial in the case of cyber security is the linkage between ‘‘networks’’ and ‘‘individual’’ and human
collective referent objects. Thus it is not the case that a private security discourse constitutes the individual as its referent object, but rather
that ‘‘the individual’’ of this discourse is linked to societal and political referent objects. Take the example of post-September 11 battles
between governmental discourses legitimizing digital surveillance and data-mining through securitizing reference to the War on Terror and
citizen groups fighting this legislation through reference to basic civic liberties and privacy issues. These are not two separate discourses with
unrelated referent objects, but competing articulations of the appropriate individual-state contracts of the liberal state (Saco 1999:271).
Moreover, it is not fully clear from Deibert’s and Saco’s accounts whether private security discourse operates through the political rather than
the semantic modality of security. This does not mean that cyber ‘‘privacy’’ cannot be securitized, but this has to be mediated through a
collective referent object, either a political-ideological one, questioning the appropriateness of the individual-state balance, and⁄ or a nationalsocietal one, mobilizing the values held to be the core of the community’s identity. Similarly,
a securitization of the network
cannot, and does not, stop at the network itself: it is the implications of network break-downs for
other referent objects, ‘‘society,’’ ‘‘the regime,’’ or ‘‘the economy’’ (which is, again, in turn linked to ‘‘state’’ and
‘‘society’’) that makes cyber securitization a plausible candidate for political and media attention.
Securitization works in short by tying referent objects together, particularly by providing a link
between those that do not explicitly invoke a bounded human collectively, such as ‘‘network’’ or
‘‘individual,’’ with those that do. Contestation and multidiscursivity is thus found between competing articulations of linked
referent objects as well as by tracing the potential internal instability of each discourse.
The aff characterizes cyberspace as a static space and thing that needs to be
controlled – in reality it is constantly evolving network of things, actors, and ideas
Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010
(Ronald Deibert is associate professor of political science and director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk
School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. Rafal Rohozinski is a principal with the SecDev Group and
former director of the Advanced Network Research Group of the Cambridge Security Programme.
“Liberation vs. Control: The Future of Cyberspace,” Journal of Democracy 21.4, 2010, arc)
This social complexity is a universal characteristic of all technological systems, but it is especially marked in the communications
arena for several reasons. Processes of globalization, which are both products of and contributors to
cyberspace, intensify the mix of actors, cultures, interests, and ideas in the increasingly dense pool of
communications. Although it may seem clichéd to note that events on one side of the planet can ripple back at the speed
of light to affect what happens on the other side, we must not underestimate the proliferation of players whose
actions help to shape cyberspace and who in turn are shaped by their own interactions within
cyberspace. This “dynamic density” also accelerates the pace of change inherent in cyberspace,
making it a moving target.4 Innovations, which potentially may come from any of the millions of actors in cyberspace, can occur
daily. This means that rather than being a static artifact, cyberspace is better conceptualized as a constantly
evolving domain—a multilevel ecosystem of physical infrastructure, software, regulations, and ideas. The social
complexity of cyberspace is compounded by the fact that much of it is owned and operated by
thousands of private actors, and some of their operations cross national jurisdictions. Guided by commercial principles, these
enterprises often make decisions that end up having significant political consequences. For example, an online chat service may handle or share
user data in ways that put users in jeopardy, depending on the jurisdiction in which the service is offered. Such considerations are especially
relevant given the current evolution toward “cloud computing” and software-as-a-service business models. In these models, information and
the software through which users interact are not physically located on their own computers but are instead hosted by private companies,
often located in faraway jurisdictions. As a result, we have the curious situation in which individuals’ data are ultimately governed according to
laws and regulations over which they themselves have no say as citizens.
This also accelerates existing trends toward the
privatization of authority.5 Although the decisions taken by businesses—the frontline operators in cyberspace—play a
critical role, cyberspace is also shaped by the actions of governments, civil society, and even individuals.
Because corporations are subject to the laws of the land in which they operate, the rules and regulations imposed by
national governments may inadvertently serve to carve up the global commons of information. According to the
OpenNet Initiative research consortium, more than forty countries, including many democracies, now engage in Internet-content filtering.6 The
actions of civil society matter as well. Individuals, working alone or collectively through networks, can create software, tools, or forms of
mobilization that have systemwide implications—not all of them necessarily benign. In fact, there is a hidden subsystem of cyberspace made up
of crime and espionage.
Danger/Fear
Threat projection and fear of death are essential to the state and legitimize violence enacted
on the outside other
Wirth 16 [Christian, Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute in Brisbane, 2016, “Securing the seas,
securing the state: Hope, danger and the politics of order in the Asia-Pacific”]
Danger in the form of officially defined threats is inseparable from the state: ‘when one confronts
the fear of early and violent death, one becomes willing to regulate oneself and to accept external
regulations that will secure life against its dangers. The fear of death pulls the self together ’ (Connolly in
Campbell, 1992, p. 65). Danger transposed to the outside of a political community helps its members to differentiate themselves and to form a coherent group. The
clear distinction between inside and outside also determines the strength and nature of authority .
Following the Foucauldian conception of discipline,
danger enables the state to define the norms and rules that regulate
members’ behaviour and underpin the community’s social and political structure . As a consequence, ‘[i]ronically,
then,
the overcoming of fear requires the institutionalisation of fear’
(Campbell, 1992, p. 65)
in the form of
both external threats2 and the institutions that identify , that is, first define these threats and then defend the
national community against them . Thus, state legitimacy requires what Ashley (1988) termed ‘double exclusion’. To justify state
authority, it is first necessary to separate the domestic from the international domain . Asserting that
different norms apply to the two domains legitimizes violence by the police and coercion by the
judicial system to maintain a particular social order in the domestic realm . In other words, ‘differences,
discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and times must be converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society,
understood as an identity, and a domain of anarchy, understood as at once ambiguous, indeterminate, and dangerous’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 257, original emphasis).
The inside is projected as a world of progress and peace, the outside as one of never ending chaos
and war
(Walker, 1993).
If the arbitrary nature of this imposed differentiation between inside and outside,
and with it the indeterminate construction of society, enters the awareness of its members the
political community’s coherence weakens, bringing the legitimacy of the state in its current form into
question . Therefore, state legitimation requires a second practice of exclusion, which prevents the public from becoming aware of and critically reflecting on
the arbitrary practices of exclusion in the first place. This is achieved through erecting discursive and material boundaries – in extreme cases through walls and
hermetically sealed borders.
Practices of boundary construction function as a means of structuring human
interaction and they exist simultaneously on various spatial and ideational scales
(Mansfield, 2005; Paasi, 1999).
With this understanding it becomes possible to define political communities, and the order constituted by their interaction, as particular configurations or sets of
boundaries. To substantiate the argument that it is a particular form of order characterized by modern ideas of society, nation and civilization and built around the
postwar era state rather than the territorial integrity or material power of states that is being challenged, the cases seek to demonstrate that: The
perceived
threats are not objectively given but relational productions of danger; the effects of danger
transcend the dualism of ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ politics, and that discourses of danger reinforce
particular ideational and institutional structures while excluding ways of thinking and courses of
action that go beyond established conceptualizations of society, nation and civilization . To the extent that the
Chinese, Japanese and South Korean governments similarly and increasingly feel the need to apply ‘material practices of coercion or bribery’ (Reus-Smit, 2007, p.
158) as means to reinforce these boundaries, it can be concluded that socio-economic change, the very change induced by state-led modernization projects, is
challenging the established ideas and institutions that underpinned the postwar order.
Disease
The affirmative focus on disease is representative of the disease securitization
mindset where persons are only included or excluded based on their ability to offer
meaningful participation.
Gomel 2000 (Elana, Head of Eng Dept @ Tel Aviv, 20th Cent. Lit V 46//)
In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien
invasions, climactic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the
eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaboration fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its
ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. On
the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less
importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone,
tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent
corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque
and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless—and lifeless—millennium. The apocalyptic body is
perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic
“bloodletting on the cross,” trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a
text written in the script of stigma, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first
symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one
whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travail of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one,
Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same
time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of
“apocalyptic terror”, and “millennial perfection” (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does
not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease,
along the lines of Susan Sontag’s classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather,
my focus is on
the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall
a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such
diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of “radical desperation” (Quinby 4-5). Thus, I consider both real
plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is
and imaginary disease, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than a precise epidemiology of the contagion. All
apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering.
But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it
may be approrpriated to the
standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned
from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in
Camus’s The Plage. [2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a
potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment
of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body
politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of living. The finality of
mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the
one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers
such as Pierre Quellette’s The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On
the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and
the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the buregeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses:
acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities.
In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of
indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora
points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used “in order to validate violence done to others” while it may also function as
a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between “good” and “bad”
apocalypses (is total extinction “better” than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the
apocalyptic body.¶
Energy – China specific
Energy risks are impossible to objectively measure. The aff is a psychological ploy to
raise energy risks “above politics” and justifies extreme and sovereign state action
Leung et al, 2014
(Guy CK Leung – Geography Dept @ Durham U & Beijing Institute of Technology, Aleh Cherp – Chinese U of Hong
Kong & International Institute for Industrial Environmental Politics @ Lund U, Jessica Jewell – Int Inst for Applied
Systems Analysis @ Laxenburg, Yi-Ming Wei – Beijing Institute of Technology, “Securitization of energy supply
chains in China, Applied Energy 123, 2014, arc)
Our analysis shows a complex relationship between vulnerability of energy supply chains, the institutions that govern these supply chains and
political discourses on energy security. There are several overarching observations arising from this illustrated in Fig. 6. The first observation is
that energy
realities do matter in shaping policy focus on a specific energy system/supply chain. This
occurs through two interrelated mechanisms locked in a positive feedback loop. Initially, a vital energy system/supply chain
captures the attention of policy makers through a combination of its importance and vulnerability. For
example, oil plays a unique role in China (and most other emerging economies) for at least three ‘objective’
reasons [10]: (a) it both dominates and lacks substitutes in defense, transportation, and food production; (b) its use is rapidly and steadily
growing primarily due to the growth in demand for mobility services; (c) its national (and global) resources are limited, regionally concentrated,
and often perceived as insufficient to provide for this growth in demand.
Due to these characteristics of the oil sector, it is
natural that the state established powerful institutions to govern and secure oil supply chains. Setting
up such institutions triggers the second mechanism, the emergence of powerful interests vested in the
oil sector, which potentially become securitization agents. These interests (in China’s case represented by NOCs) are
naturally keen to amplify both the vitality and vulnerability of oil supply, in other words, ‘securitizing’ oil supply chains. Securitization of
oil supply chains, in turn, lifts them ‘above politics’ and gives the state (and by extension the NOCs) the right
to treat them by extraordinary means, which further strengthens the power of securitization agents4 . Such a positive
feedback loop reinforcing the importance of oil is lacking in the case of another key energy supply chain associated with
electricity supply and coal extraction in China. Although electricity is essential for many functions of Chinese society, it can be
produced from different fuels, by different means and by multiple actors, so that it appears less vulnerable. The electricity-coal
supply chain is governed at the local and the regional levels. As a result, this supply chain lacks powerful institutional advocates
able to securitize it at the national level. Our second observation is that securitization agents may exploit the
ambiguities always surrounding the vulnerabilities of vital energy systems. Most risks are difficult if
not impossible to assess objectively (e.g. the questions ‘‘how large is the probability that a foreign power will blocade
the straits of Malacca?’’ or ‘‘what is the future price of shale gas?’’ do not have easy answers).
In order to securitize a
particular issue, it is advantageous to emphasize the risks that are more easily perceived as ‘critical’ and
‘ existential ’. Due to their psychological ‘availability’, painful memories of oil embargoes in China have served as easy prompts to portray
future risks to oil supply chains as significant. To paraphrase Kahneman (2011), the difficult question about future risks has been substituted by
an easy question about past disruptions conveniently ignoring the fact that the present oil market are very different from the ones in the
1960s.
Psychologically it is much easier to solicit a response to risks associated with hostile actions and
potentially high-profile one-off events than it is to mundane and creeping problems caused by natural
and technological factors such as electricity blackouts. Our analysis shows that the process of securitizing oil import
supply chains has also been reinforced by behavior and attitudes of external actors ranging from the CET rhetoric to the Gulf wars. Once the
securitization agents ‘proved’ that the U.S. treats oil supplies as a ‘strategic’ security commodity, it was not difficult to argue that these deserve
the same treatment in China. We have observed that it is easier to represent something that arises outside of national borders as a ‘security’
issue, since traditionally, security has always been a national-level matter, even the raison d’être of the modern nation state. Although many
developed countries have somewhat departed from this narrow view of security and scholars have pointed out that the notion and scale of
‘‘national’’, is socially constructed, constantly evolving and shaped by ‘‘trans-local’’ dynamics [89,90], the Chinese government remains rigid
with equating ‘security’ with ‘national security’. In this view, risks to national energy security are something that affects the nation as a whole
and is likely to originate externally, from other nations. This policy paradigm explains why it is much easier to cast a highly hypothetical oil
embargo or an attack on oil trade routes as a national security issue (guojia anquan wenti) than to securitize widespread domestic electricity or
coal shortages which are considered merely ‘‘socio-economic issues’’ (shehui jingji wenti). This is not to say that policy-makers are totally
dominated by perceptions when it comes to identifying risks to vital energy systems. In fact, at least some of the risks to the oil supply system
are rationally highlighted in China’s energy security policy. These include the scarcity of national oil endowments, the unabated rise of demand,
low diversity of suppliers, the concentration of trade flows through the straits of Malacca and the dysfunctional price formation mechanisms.
All in all, it seems that policy making is more ‘rational’ (i.e. responsive to issues) when it comes to stresses and more ‘ideational’ (i.e. guided by
perceptions and ideas) when it comes to shocks. This is no surprise since cognitively
it is extremely difficult to deal with
shocks ‘rationally’ since it requires assessment of probability and magnitude of consequences of rare
future events, a task humans are not very good at. As a result, the sovereignty dimension of
insecurity, such as oil blockades imposed by other states and ‘‘resource wars’’, is understood as ‘‘high
politics’’ and has received more ‘‘national’’ attention. The robustness and resilience dimension of insecurity [20], such as
power grids failure, are considered ‘‘low politics’’ and are thus seldom portrayed as a vital part of ‘‘(national) energy security’’.
Environment
Securitization of the environment is a barrier to effective policy-making – the focus is
always on the state and the military, masking the underlying socioeconomic inequality
at the root of the problem
Talkin, 12
(Jared, “The securitization approach: a desirable option for future climate change policies?” Consilience,
http://www.consiliencejournal.org/blog/2012/05/17/the-securitization-approach-a-desirable-option-for-futureclimate-change-policies/, arc)
The role of securitization in responding to the threat of GCC has had mixed results; moves at the
global level have resulted in considerable politicization but ultimately change has been limited.
Securitizing GCC can help constitute a solution to the threat of environmental degradation, by attempting to place the problem on the
international agenda. “Security is the language that states understand” (Barry and Eckersley, 2005) and the framing of GCC as a threat to
national security indicates the imperative to action and the gravity of the issue, gaining the attention of high-level international politics and
Securitization has promoted the use of the military in
protecting national security and has contributed to a discourse of environmental conflict. It can be
argued that this framing justifies military interventions, most likely in the global South where the
impacts of GCC will be worst felt (Detraz and Betsill, 2009), forming ego-imperialist relations and
exacerbating existing political inequalities in the North /South divide. Differing state interests and power
opening the door for increased mobilization of resources.
inequalities present a major constraint to the success of securitization, as international cooperation on environmental policy will be difficult.¶
Considering GCC is a collective action problem where “No one nation, no matter how much power or political will it possesses, can succeed
alone” (Rice, 2007), cooperation and common shared values are crucial in creating effective policy. There has been some success in broadening
security to include environmental issues, however,
the failure to deepen the issue to include human security, rather than
just state security, promotes ignorance of the root socioeconomic inequalities and the underlying
need for broader social change in tackling environmental degradation. The lack of representation held
by Southern states in the UNSC further exacerbates inequalities in the distribution of power and
highlights the contentions over values and framing of GCC. Securitization consequently becomes a
barrier to effective policy making and prevents successful action dealing with the root causes of
environmental degradation.
Environmentalism is fetishized within neoliberal institutions. Capitalism and
environmentalism are fundamentally incompatible – the aff is a piecemeal reform that
a) fails and b) is a form of militarization and control
Chis, 2014
(Ioana Cerasella, “Framing Environmental Degradation as a Security Issue: A Theoretical Inquiry,”
https://thegwpost.com/2014/02/04/framing-environmental-degradation-as-a-security-issue-atheoretical-inquiry/, arc)
The framing of environmental degradation as a security issue started with the Bruntland Report in 1987, followed by national, international and
private bodies. For instance, in 1995 the US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, declared that his department has “an aggressive
environmental program because it is critical to the defense mission”[2]. As a response to the rapidly changing discourse on the international
arena, academics later to be known as ‘the Copenhagen School’ set up the task of analyzing the change of international approaches and
strategies with regards to securitization, including the securitization of environmental degradation. Securitization is a concept which has been
historically formulated within the utilitarian framework, claiming to measure and preserve individual happiness, but ignoring the powerrelations within society which make security and happiness often contradictory[3]. The power of the state as protector of security and rights,
within utilitarianism, is given ontological pre-existence. Such ideas are shared by the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools that present the
events on the ground as facts; they see security as ‘always-already’ real, trying to ‘read the future as a “past future” already known’[4].
¶
Although the meaning of securitization has received extensive attention, there has been much less
unpacking of the nature and causes of ‘environmental degradation’ by security scholars or international
organizations. In Dalby’s[5] words: “(…) simple degradation explanations frequently do not take history or
ecological complexity into account, nor the specifics of particular environments, much less the microlevel contestations of property relations, gender and cultures that are crucial to explaining either
crises or everyday practices.”¶ The change of meaning of ‘environmental degradation’ through its
framing as a security issue has been highly contested in the past two decades. The causes of degradation have
¶
been identified as due to resource curse (or the ‘paradox of the plenty’)[6]; resource scarcity[7]; wars, migration[8];
capitalism[9]; state control[10]; eco-imperialism[11] and so on. However, distinguishing between types of securitization is, for
the purpose of this paper, counterproductive, as securitization imposes the same negative limitations to its referent objects.
Nonetheless, as neoliberal institutions fail to show the incompatibility of capitalism and
environmentalism, they fetishize ‘sustainable development’ as the only solution for a possible future
of life on Earth. Through the tactic of universalizing environmental destruction, neoliberal countries
make their control and destruction invisible, proposing behavioral changes[12] which do not challenge
structural oppression and the hierarchy in society, which ultimately impact the environment.
Consequently, the resource scarcity approach has received the most attention by liberal actors, meaning that war, economy
and nature ”collapse into a single problematic of security”[13], requiring more militarization and
control. The broad consensus within the academic literature is related to the securitizing agents: ‘”security is articulated
only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites”[14].¶ The divergence in approaches arises in
relation to the nature of the effects of securitization: they are seen as either positive, negative, or contextually-based[15]. The
challenge for International Security scholars is to offer valuable conceptual tools and alternatives for
praxis from outside of the securitization logic. There is a need for interruption and opposition to the
apparent urge (constructed by states and institutions) of focusing exclusively on ‘survival, urgency,
and emergency’[16] which offer a mere description of the powerful agent’s ability to take exceptional
measures. The UN World Commission on Environment and Development (hereafter ‘WCED’s) report provides an illustrative
example in this context. The analysis of the report will allow us to later discuss the sociological and political implications of the
institutionalized bureaucracy of emergency, and how the ‘iron cage’ of instrumental rationality can be
dismantled through emancipation and (environmental) politics.
Securitization of the environment is a technology of surveillance – only by
interrogating and exposing regimes of truth can we accurately assess environmental
degradation
-Link/alt solvency
-expose regimes of truth
Chis, 2014
(Ioana Cerasella, “Framing Environmental Degradation as a Security Issue: A Theoretical Inquiry,”
https://thegwpost.com/2014/02/04/framing-environmental-degradation-as-a-security-issue-atheoretical-inquiry/, arc)
Whereas the Copenhagen School is right to emphasize the importance of speech acts, it is necessary to go beyond this
purely linguistic method of analysis and explore the power-knowledge relations and the socially-embedded
practices which enable certain entities to securitize. The Paris School adds a sociological enquiry (inspired by
Foucault and Bourdieu) to securitization by problematizing the Realist conception of security. They attempt to address the
conceptual limitations of CSS and bring into the security discussion the question of the kind of politics we want, and what
can be done to replace securitization altogether. Security, according to the Paris School is inherently
negative, and can be defined as a ‘technique of government’ with routinized practices, articulations
and performances[40]. They oppose biopolitics, which is nothing else than a ‘dispositif de sécurité’, developed as an
extension of geopolitical security[41]. Through biopolitical technologies of surveillance, the human as such
(e.g. the immigrant; the dissenter) can be reached. For instance, the micro-politics of everyday life can
be affected and policed through the portrayal of environmental activists as ‘eco-terrorists’[42].¶ The
task of the security analyst is to “‘expose the experts’ “regime of truth”’[43] . By exposing these
regimes of truth we can analyze the way in which the framing of environmental degradation as a
security issue represents a ‘state of exception’[44] . This exception symbolizes the overarching power
of a state to suspend laws and exploit nature and democracy. For a beginning of a politics of
emancipation, one has to:¶ doubt the production of ‘truth’ as staged by powerful bodies;¶
acknowledge the equality of all to be engaged in the process of democracy;¶ reconsider the
relationship between humans and nature.¶ In the next section we will analyze a case study by using the Paris School
approach.
Food Security
Fears about food security cause states to take drastic measures to secure their food
supply, increasing the risk of conflict – the link turns the advantage
Van Heukelom, 2011
(Tim Siegenbeek – PhD candidate in International Security Studies @ The U of Sydney, “The emerging
securitization of food,” 28 Feb 2011, http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/A-new-agriculture-for-foodsecurity/The-emerging-securitisation-of-food, arc)
When we speak of ‘food security’ we generally refer to 'a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life' (The State of
Food Insecurity 2001). Yet
the very fact that we speak of security in relation to food also evidences a more
fundamental, and perhaps even intuitive understanding of the link between hunger and conflict. Namely, when it comes to
humankind’s survival, food and water are our most rudimentary needs to stay alive. Failure to peacefully satisfy these needs is historically
known to see us draw upon less peaceful means to acquire food and water – especially in situations of marginalisation where neighbouring
countries, communities, tribes or individuals are affluent. Thus food insecurity and conflict, in one form or another, seem to go hand in hand.
Even though not every chronically hungry person automatically resorts to violence, events in the last couple of years have increasingly
evidenced a correlation between food insecurity and (violent) conflict. The 2008 global food price crisis saw food riots spread across the world
and demonstrations over high food prices turn violent. The turmoil in 2008 was a direct effect of sky-rocketing food prices, causing unrest and
¶
¶
conflict in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The more recent
revolts in Tunisia and Egypt as well as the growing
protests in countries like Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Algeria may not have been directly sparked by
high food prices or strained food supply streams, yet many argue that food had a significant role in
relation to the poverty, unemployment, and relative deprivation these populations experienced.¶ The
problems relating to ‘food security’ are multi-disciplinary and know many dimensions, covering wide areas like
development studies, agricultural research, nutrition, public health, economics and security – amongst many others. Interestingly though, many
International Security scholars, mostly drawing from the Political Realists school of thought, or those working in the realms of Military and
Strategic security, continue to resist accepting that food has a national – and international security dimension. Food is often seen as an
environmental – and human security issue, but as Tolentino points out here, it becomes increasingly difficult to deny that food
is entering
the realm of national security.¶ The argument is far from new. Back in the Cold War days some scholars already explored
the link between food and national security. Christensen, for example, argued in 1977 that 'under conditions of increasing
scarcity, food-importing countries have several reasons for considering their international food position as a matter of national
security.' Fast-forwarding to 2008, we indeed notice that a number of wealthy food-importing countries
started to classify food as a matter of national security and invoked policies of self-sufficiency to avert potential
future food shortages for their populations. Especially Gulf and Asian states became so-called ‘new
imperialists’ in Africa and South-East Asia, leasing vast amounts of foreign agricultural land to produce
and secure their own food supply.¶ Thus, while there may be an intuitive link between hunger and
conflict, it remains the question whether securitisation of food is a favourable outcome. On the one hand
one could argue that elevating food into the national security realm may be a powerful way to unlock vast amounts of funding
for agricultural research, sustainable solutions and increased food production. Yet, at the same time it allows states to
utilise security – and military resources to compete over scarce resources such as agricultural land,
fresh water, fertilisers and fish stocks – increasing the risk for conflict.
Heg-context links
United States engagement with China is a tactic to sustain American hegemony- Asia
Pivot proves
Saunders 13
(Phillip C., Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic
Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University and a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for
Strategic Research at INSS, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Institute
for International Strategic Studies, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF281.pdf)
One of the clearest articulations of the rationale and strategic logic behind the rebalance is the November 2011 Foreign Policy article by thenSecretary Clinton.5 In the context of withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, she argued that the United States needs “to be smart and
systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests,
and advance our values.” The Secretary described
the Asia-Pacific region’s importance as “a key driver of global
politics” that spans the Pacific and Indian oceans, boasts half the world’s population, includes vital
engines of the global economy, and is home to several major U.S. allies and “important emerging powers like China,
India, and Indonesia.” She argued that “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and
strategic interests” and that the United States has an opportunity to help build “a more mature security
and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity.” Given the importance of the AsiaPacific region to America’s future, “a strategic turn to the region fits logically into our overall global
effort to secure and sustain America’s global leadership .” She drew an explicit parallel with U.S. efforts
after World War II to build a “comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and
relations.”
China perceives U.S. engagement as a strategy of containment and securitization of
their geostrategic interests
Saunders 13
(Phillip C., Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic
Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University and a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for
Strategic Research at INSS, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Institute
for International Strategic Studies, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF281.pdf)
Obama administration officials devoted significant early efforts to broadening and deepening U.S.-China
relations to better address regional and global challenges. Although the political need to rebrand policy precluded the
use of the Bush administration’s “responsible stakeholder” language, the Obama administration’s view of China
as a rising power, with expanding global interests, that was succeeding within the existing international
system was very similar. Administration officials sought to engage China in cooperation on regional and global issues, including efforts
to deal with North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, address climate change, and mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. Their
expressed goal was a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship” with China that allowed the two countries to work together on
an expanded set of common interests. One of the instruments used to build this relationship was the bilateral U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which is designed to address a wider range of issues, improve U.S. policy coordination, and bring the right actors to
the table. Other mechanisms included holding regular meetings and communications at the Presidential level, highlighting areas of cooperation
and praising positive Chinese contributions, encouraging a greater Chinese role in global governance, seeking continuity in military-to-military
relations to help avoid crises and increase cooperation, and trying to avoid embarrassing Chinese leadership when taking actions such as
meeting with the Dalai Lama or arms sales to Taiwan. These efforts to build
a deeper partnership with China produced
relatively meager results. Despite formal engagements through the S&ED, reciprocal summit visits, and
periodic meetings on the margins of multilateral forums, Chinese leaders remained suspicious and
reluctant to expand cooperation with Washington or take on more international responsibilities. For many
Obama administration officials, integrating China more fully in international institutions was a means of giving Beijing a greater voice and
spurring Chinese leaders to make more international contributions. A more prominent Chinese role could strengthen both the legitimacy and
potential effectiveness of international institutions, albeit at the cost of reduced U.S. dominance. In this sense, U.S. endorsement of greater
Chinese representation was a signal of trust and confidence. Chinese
leaders, however, viewed enhanced multilateral
cooperation as an effort to sustain a U.S.-dominated global order and to lock China into binding
commitments on issues such as carbon emissions and a revalued currency in ways that might hinder
future Chinese growth. While Beijing now participates in most major international and regional organizations, Chinese leaders tend to
view these as vehicles for pursuing or defending Chinese national interests and remain wary of taking on international “costs, risks, and
commitments.”9 Chinese
scholars spoke of “China responsibility theory” as a Western plot to blame China
for global economic problems and to force it to take on international commitments beyond its limited
capacity.10 Moreover, in the context of the unfolding financial crisis that damaged the U.S. (and then the global) economy, Chinese leaders
may have initially misinterpreted Obama administration efforts to increase cooperation as a sign of U.S. weakness and an opportunity to press
Washington for concessions. The net result was intensified bilateral engagement that was characterized by extensive process and relatively few
tangible results.
U.S. rationale for China engagement is to secure its interest in the global order
Saunders 13
(Phillip C., Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic
Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University and a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for
Strategic Research at INSS, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Institute
for International Strategic Studies, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF281.pdf)
These concerns found political expression in the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, when 12 states
joined Secretary Clinton in expressing concerns about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, despite the best efforts of Chinese
diplomats to discourage them from raising the issue. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi gave an angry speech during the meeting in which he
wagged his finger at the Singapore representative and pointedly stated that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and
that’s just a fact.”14 Public and private pleas from countries in East and Southeast Asia urged the United States to take a more active role in
Asian security, including speaking out against efforts to use threats and intimidation in territorial disputes. Countries also expressed a
willingness to engage in deeper security cooperation with the United States via participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises and by
providing access to U.S. forces for common security goals. This political context—heightened
and regional demands for a stepped up U.S. security role—is also a
concerns about Chinese behavior
significant part of the political
rationale for the U.S. strategic rebalance to Asia . However, this does not mean that the United States has
abandoned efforts to cooperate with China or to build a more stable Sino-U.S. relationship. The broad
U.S. strategy of seeking to integrate China more fully within the current global order, while discouraging any
efforts to reshape that order by the use of force or intimidation, remains in place. A key implementation challenge is making
the rebalance robust enough to reassure U.S. allies and partners of its capability and will to maintain a
presence in Asia over the long term while not alarming Chinese leaders to the point where they forgo
cooperation with Washington in favor of a more confrontational approach. Finding and maintaining this sweet spot
in U.S. policy poses a difficult challenge.
Economic engagement with China is part of the United States strategy for maintaining
and demonstrating its hegemonic power
Saunders 13
(Phillip C., Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic
Studies (INSS), at the National Defense University and a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for
Strategic Research at INSS, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Institute
for International Strategic Studies, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF281.pdf)
Economic Engagement. Asia’s economic dynamism and rapid economic growth are important to the wellbeing
of almost all countries in the region, and therefore to the stability and legitimacy of their governments. Asia’s booming
market is also important to the United States, whose economy is still recovering from recession. Fulfilling
President Obama’s commitment to double U.S. exports between 2010 and 2015 requires greater
access to Asian markets . Enhanced economic engagement is therefore a critical element of the U.S.
rebalance. American allies and partners in the region have advocated enhanced U.S. economic
engagement with Asia as a key means of demonstrating U.S. staying power . The Obama administration has
faced a number of obstacles in increasing trade and investment ties with Asia. In addition to the demands placed on senior economic officials
by the global financial crisis, these obstacles include the loss of U.S. jobs in the manufacturing sector, criticism of China’s undervalued currency,
concern about labor conditions and environmental pollution in Asia, and the current lack of trade negotiating authority (that is, Trade
Promotion Authority, formerly called “fast track”). Trade expansion is always a difficult issue for Democratic Presidents whose coalition includes
significant support from labor unions and other groups seeking protection from what they view as “unfair” competition. Moreover, in the U.S.
system most economic activity is performed by the private sector; the U.S. Government cannot create a favorable business environment in
Asia-Pacific countries. Attracting more
U.S. trade and investment requires Asian governments to speed up the
pace of domestic economic reform, which is often politically difficult. What the U.S. Government can do
with Asia-Pacific countries is to enter into bilateral and regional economic agreements that facilitate
trade and investment. The Obama administration succeeded in securing congressional approval of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (“KORUS”), the most significant agreement of its kind since the North American Free Trade Agreement. Several other bilateral trade
agreements dating from the Bush administration were also approved.
Heg – theory links
Panic over hegemonic decline is informed by expansive political ideology – threats are
constructed to justify military operations that can never succeed in establishing
control.
Maher, 2011
(Richard, a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, “The Paradox of
American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”)
At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political
ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process,
the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very
the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its
period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and
to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal
universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but
founding,
they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its
own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive
domain of the president—who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests—the
policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions,
miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the
unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of
preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values.
Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United
States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the
Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define
its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even
The U.S. military has permanent
bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics
when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the
considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or
multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single
hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in
fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests,
preeminence provides an opportunity to mix
ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been
susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own
(liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem
manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated
risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States
and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of
Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their
preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and
psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and
immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of
threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take
unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has
not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to
overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate
and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand
atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and
purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive
policymakers’ control.
approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The
invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both
of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years
of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of
dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to
dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S.
troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent
states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in
fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As
resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are
necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in
international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly
specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any
The result is taking on commitments on an
expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its
ambition to shape the post- Cold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep;
waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic
principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against
transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear
programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a
missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United
Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so
involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United
changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests.
States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a
superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S.
attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central
to U.S. interests.
United States hegemony is used to define threats and justifies securitization as
anything act that is perceived as challenging hegemony is labeled a global threat
Noorani, 2005
(Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of
Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005)
The U.S. government's rhetoric of global security draws its power from simultaneously instantiating Schmitt's vision of the political as
non-normative national self-preservation and the liberal vision of the political as normative civil relations. The consequence is not that
this rhetoric disavows political antagonism within the nation, as Schmitt would have it (though there is an element of this), but that it
disavows political antagonism on the global level. I argued above that the positing of a non-normative situation of national selfpreservation, the same as that of a person being murdered, is insupportable due to the inescapable presence of a moral ideal in defining
The U.S.
rhetoric of security, however, lifts the paradox to a global level, and illustrates it more
forcefully, by designating the global order's moral ideal, its "way of life" that is under threat,
as civil relations, freedom and peace, but then making the fulcrum of this way of life an
independent entity upon whose survival the world's way of life depends—the United States.
Just as an aggressor puts himself outside of normativity by initiating violence, so is the victim
not bound by any norms in defending his life. As the location of the self of the world order
that must be preserved, the United States remains unobligated by the norms of this order as
long as it is threatened by terrorism. So long as it struggles for the life of the world order,
therefore, the United States remains external to this order, just as terrorism remains external to the
the nation's self and deciding what threatens it. This applies to all justifications of action grounded in national security.
world order so long as it threatens a universal state of war. Without the United States everyone is dead. Why should this be?
The reason is that the United States fully embodies the values underlying world peace—"freedom, democracy, and free enterprise"
(National Security 2002, i)—and is the key to their realization in the global domain. These values are [End Page 30] universal, desired
by all and the standard for all. "[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all
people everywhere" (National Security 2002, 3). The fact that the United States "possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength
and influence in the world" (1) cannot therefore be fortuitous. It cannot but derive from the very founding of the United States in
universal principles of peace and its absolute instantiation of these principles. This results in "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations,
the United States as a nation stands, by virtue of its internal
constitution, at the forefront of world history in advancing human freedom. It is the subject of
and opportunity" (1). In other words,
history. Its own principle of organization is the ultimate desire of humanity, and the development of this principle is always
at its highest stage in and through the United States. For this reason, the values of the United States and its interests always coincide,
and these in turn coincide with the interests of world peace and progress. The requirements of American security reflect "the union of
our values and our national interests," and their effect is to "make the world not just safer but better" (1). The United States therefore
is uniquely charged by history to maintain and advance world peace and universal freedom. America is a nation with a mission, and
that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic
peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our
side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. (Bush 2004a) America can lead the
cause of freedom because it is the cause of freedom. "American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for
human liberty" (Bush 2003b). For this reason, it has no "ambitions," no private national interests or aspirations that would run contrary
to the interests of the world as a whole. It undertakes actions, like the invasion of Iraq, that further no motive but the cause of
humanity as a whole. "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of [End Page 31] that country to its
own people" (Bush 2003a). In this way, the United States is distinct from all other nations, even though all of humanity espouses the
same values. Only the United States can be depended upon for ensuring the endurance of these values because they are
the sole basis of its existence. "Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and flow of the campaign against terrorism. But
Any threat to the existence of the United States is
therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this order possible.
the American people will not" (NSCT 2003, 29).
It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending it. It is rather
that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is the world
Without the United States, freedom, peace,
civil relations among nations, and the possibility of civil society are all under threat of
extinction. This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States
for their schemes and attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal
values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the survival of the United States, its sheer
existence, becomes the content of liberal values. In other words, what does it mean to espouse liberal values in
order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation .
the context of the present state of world affairs? It means to desire fervently and promote energetically the survival of the United
When the world order struggles to preserve its "self," the self that it seeks to
preserve, the primary location of its being, is the United States. Conferring this status upon the United
States of America.
States allows the rhetoric of security to insist upon a threat to the existence of the world order as a whole while confining the nonnormative status that arises from this threat to the United States alone. The United States—as the self under threat—remains external
The United States is both a specific
national existence struggling for its life and normativity itself, which makes it coextensive with
the world order as a whole. For this reason, any challenge to U.S. world dominance would be
a challenge to world peace and is thus impermissible. We read in The National Security Strategy that the
to the normative relations by which the rest of the world continues to be bound.
United States [End Page 32] will "promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (National Security 2002, 1). And later, we find out
what is meant by such a balance of power.
Humanitarianism/Human Rights
Descriptions of humanitarian crimes are intended to garner a strong affective
response and used to justify security policy and intervention
Lazer and Lazar, 4
(prof at the Lancaster University and National University of Singapore, Disocourse and Society, “The
Discourse of the New World Order: 'Out-Casting'the Double Face of Threat)
The representation of the political criminal is further shown vis-à-vis
characterizations of their (civilian) victims. The word ‘innocent(s)’ appears
frequently, both as noun and as adjective, with the additional meaning of
civilians/noncombatants’: thus, the murder of innocents (Bush, 2002c; Clinton, 1998a);
violence against innocents (Bush, 2002c); the loss of innocent life/lives (Bush, 2002a; Bush
Senior, 1990b). A similar effect can be achieved through reference to size – a small and helpless neighbor [Kuwait]
(Bush Senior, 1991a); or to traditionally vulnerable people – civilians, including women and children (Bush, 2001d); or
to the ordinariness of the targets – the victims were in airplanes or in their offices. Secretaries, business men and women,
military and federal workers. Moms and dads. Friends and neighbors (Bush, 2001d). Victims are found not
only outside the enemy’s borders, but also include internal civilian populations, which
goes to show that nobody is safe from the tyranny. This enables the rallying of
international support against a morally decrepit enemy: Afghanistan’s people have been
brutalized – many are starving and many have fled (Bush, 2001d) [Saddam] . . . firing Scud missiles at the citizens of
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran; and not only a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish
civilians in Northern Iraq (Clinton, 1998b) The horror of these crimes is heightened through a
strategy that van Dijk (1995) terms ‘concretization’, which emphasizes the enemy’s
negative acts by describing them in overly specific, graphic and visualizable terms.
The purpose is not so much to describe or explain as to incite a strong affective response (Fortin,
1989) – especially effective where children are among the victims: Iraq . . . a regime that has already
used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers
huddled over their dead children (Bush, 2002a) Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait has been
a nightmare . . . homes, buildings and factories have been looted. Babies have been
torn from incubators; children shot in front of their parents. Disappearances and
graphic accounts of torture are widespread. (Bush Senior, 1990b).
Oil- China specific
Fears of Chinese oil grabs causes the US to intervene in Africa and results in massive
human rights violations, instability, and environmental harm ****(same as African HR
card)
Power 14 [Lucy, Trade Policy Officer at New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2014, “Oil,
terrorism and China: is there a new securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa?”
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3445/thesis.pdf?sequence=2]
The third securitizing factor at play in the U.S .-Nigeria relationship (and also in wider U.S.-Africa relations) is the rise of China.
As China’s economic weight and international influence has increased, it has become more heavily
involved in Africa , particularly in countries like Nigeria which can provide the natural resources it needs to maintain its economic growth. Chinese
investment in Nigeria’s energy industry, combined with its willingness to sell arms and provide
military training, has engendered a sense of threat in the U.S. The threat is that China may be
attempting to “lock-in” resources like oil for its own use and potentially use these resources as an
“oil weapon”,
as the OPEC states did in the 1970s. Given the importance of oil not only to the U.S. but its allies, this is deemed a threat
which
justifies the expansion of military activity in Nigeria and other African states in order to protect U.S.
interests and counter China’s influence . Why should we care about these developments? Why does it matter if the U.S. military is exerting
greater control over U.S. Africa policy? The reasons we should care can be divided into three main categories:
development and governance
issues, human rights concerns, and environmental problems . A focus on security issues rather than
development or governance problems only serves to prolong underdevelopment and in the case of
many countries, worsen the situation by diverting much-needed resources into the security sector .
Furthermore, most would agree that the
United States’ involvement in the Middle East has done little to promote
human rights values or build politically stable regimes : most would in fact argue that it has been counterproductive in these
respects.
A similar outcome is to be expected if U.S. policy follows the same path in Africa . Furthermore, the
overwhelming focus on oil as an energy resource makes it hard to develop alternative clean energy
solutions that would be better for the environment . This point will be returned to in section 2.
Organs
The organ trade exemplifies the politics of disposability characteristic of post-modern
biopolitics.
Scheper-Hughes, 3
(Nancy, “Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism, Human Values and Global Justice in Organs Trafficking,
Journal of Human Rights, 2.2, arc)
Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South, we are experiencing today a rapid depletion, an ‘emptying
out’ even, of traditional modernist, humanist and pastoral ideologies, values and practices. New relations between
capital and labor, bodies and the state, belonging and extra-territoriality, and between medical and
biotechnological inclusions and exclusions are taking shape. But rather than a conventional story of the lamentable
decline of humanistic social values and social relations, our discussion is tethered to a frank recognition that the material grounds on which
those modernist values and practices were based have shifted today almost beyond recognition. What the Comaroffs (2001) refer to as
millennial or ‘second coming’ capitalism has facilitated a rapid dissemination to virtually all corners of the world of advanced medical
these have incited new tastes and
desires for the skin, bone, blood, organs, tissue and reproductive and genetic material of others.
Nowhere are these processes more trans- parent than in the field of organ transplant, which now takes place in
procedures and biotechnologies alongside strange markets and ‘occult economies’. Together,
a transnational space with both donors and recipients following new paths of capital and medical technology in the global economy. The spread of transplant
capabilities created a global scarcity of transplantable organs at the same time that economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and a voracious
appetite for foreign bodies to do the shadow work of production and to provide ‘fresh’ organs for medical consumption. The ideal conditions of an ‘open’ market
economy have thereby put into circulation mortally sick bodies traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs (encased in their human packages) in another
direction, creating a bizarre ‘kula ring’ of international body trade. The emergence of strange markets, excess capital, renegade surgeons,1 local ‘kidney hunters’
with links to an international Mafia (Lobo and Maierovitch 2002) (and thereby to a parallel traffic in slave workers, babies, drugs and small arms) has produced a
small but spectacularly lucrative practice of transplant tourism, much of it illegal and clandestine. This confluence in the flows of immigrant workers and itinerant
kidney sellers who fall into the hands of ruthless brokers and unscrupulous, notorious, but simultaneously rewarded, protected and envied outlaw transplant
surgeons is a troubling sub-text in the story of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalization, one that combines and juxtaposes elements of pre- and
postmodernity. These new transplant transactions are a strange blend of altruism and commerce; consent and coercion; gifts and theft; science and sorcery; care
and human sacrifice. On the one hand, the phenomenal spread of transplant technologies, even in the murky context of black markets in medicine, has given the
possibility of new, extended or improved quality of life to a select population of mobile kidney patients from the deserts of Oman to the rain forests of the Amazon
Basin.2 On the other hand, new developments in ‘transplant tourism’ have exacerbated older divisions between North and South, core and periphery, haves and
have-nots, spawning a new form of commodity fetishism in demands by medical consumers for a quality product: ‘fresh’ and ‘healthy’ kidneys purchased from living
bodies. In
these radical exchanges of body parts and somatic information, life-saving measures for the
one demands a bodily sacrifice of self-mutilation by the other. And one man’s bio- sociality (Rabinow 1996) is another
woman’s biopiracy, depending on whether one is speaking from a Silicon Valley biotech laboratory or from a sewage-infested banguay in
Manila.
Commercialized transplant, a practice that trades comfortably in the domain of post- modern
biopolitics with its values of disposability, individuality, free and transparent circu- lation, exemplifies
better than any other biomedical technology the reach and the limits of economic liberalism. In
transplant gifts of life and death (Parsons et al. 1969) promise to surpass all previous ‘natural’ limits
and restrictions. And the uninhibited circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal
episteme, a political discourse based on juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject,
equality (at least equality of opportunity), radical freedom, accumulation and universality (the expansion
of medical rights and medical citizenship3). The commodified kidney is, to date, the primary currency in transplant tourism; it represents the
gold standard of organ sales worldwide. In the past year, however, markets in part-livers and single corneas from living vendors are beginning
to emerge in Southeast Asia. This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant
practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new
context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘
suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human
sacrifice.
The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations
– excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found
almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients,
organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is
known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.
Organ transplantation is the calculated and technological management of life and thus
also the decision on death. This biopolitical exploitation is one way the sovereign
makes decisions about what lives are worthy and what lives can be done away with.
Ewart, 2010
(Chris, “Kidney’s to Go: Dis-Ordering the Body in a Pretty Dirty Economy,” Queen’s Journal of Visual & Material
Culture, arc)
Organ transplant narratives operate as metaphor for the biopolitical exploitation of many poor and
illegal workers worldwide and show how the extraction from the body of the body brings fear, bodily
damage, and for some, a stable (but different) identity. In “Organs without Bodies: Transplant Narratives in the Global
Market” 5 Michael Davidson discusses stories of organ harvesting and their relationship to bodies under capital and how representing such
physical, bodily transference generates tangible and disturbing results. He writes,
Narratives about organ transplants
reinforce the links between the body and the global space of capital, between a body regarded as a totality of parts
and a communicational and media space in which those parts are sold, packaged in ice chests, and
shipped around the world. And organ trafficking is a discursive matter. Rumours of children stolen, soldiers’ bodies
“looted,” hospital patients misdiagnosed for their organs add a gothic element to the organ sale
narrative.6 That the live organ trade and its stories – from urban myth, to news services to cinema – necessitates discussion helps
illuminate its often risky, behind-closed-doors status as an act. Organ trafficking implies means and destinations for its material – with variously
motivated participants along the way. Dirty Pretty Things’ seldom-discussed spaces represent such movement. The film’s main characters –
Okwe, from Nigeria and Senay, from Turkey – signify a critique of global capital exploiting those without legal identification to travel and work
freely. Ironically, the film’s portrayal of problematic identities and bodies7 relies on a mythical and very real “phenomenon” of organ extraction
and sale to make its point as the act itself can limit movement and place its donors in peril just as it can provide them with various forms of
capital. If, as Davidson suggests, narratives of the trade in human organs operate as “the allegory of globalization”8 then how did the act gain
such metaphorical significance? The
commodification of the body begins with its labour, and ironically,
capitalist-utopic lip-service regarding globalization as opening up economic opportunities for all
return to disrupt the body as a site to strip-mine.9 Why must the body pay the cost for the fair request of “a social wage
and a guaranteed income for all”10 under social capital? Must the gap between rich and poor mean some bodies11
pay with more body parts than others to make up the difference? The separation of the body from its
respective parts results from (a) labour(er) leaving home and his or her physical labour becoming a
means of productive property owned by the boss, rather than the worker. Okwe – whose role of perpetual labourer is also emblematic of the film’s critique of immigrant exploitation – declares bosses “are all the same”12 in their continual demand of
more work for less benefit. This separation process also involves various bodily and work identities that the film
(which I discuss in greater detail in the next section) explores. For example, Okwe’s adoption of a new name and religion during the times he
drives a taxi, and Senay’s sexual abuse in an illegal sweatshop reflects their existence as physical commodities in markets of labour, sex, and
more recently under globalization, physical parts – central to the film’s narrative. In “The Right of Death and Power Over Life” Michel
Foucault situates the shift from a sovereign power deciding who dies (and by the process of
elimination, who lives) to people deciding upon issues of life and death. More specifically, death was
“carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life.”13 How
bodies have been “administered” as a means to manage life within a system of capital production
over the past 200 years of various socio-technological revolutions allows biopower to control life
through work. Foucault continues, This bio-power was without question an indispensible element in the
development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion
of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to
eco nomic processes . . . [T]he growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the
differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many
forms and modes of application.
Soft Power
Soft power is a projection of US hegemony, aiding images of a dangerous China
Dynon 13 [Nicholas, academic and former diplomat specializing in Chinese media and soft power,
6/19/13, “Soft Power: A U.S.-China Battleground?” http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/soft-power-a-u-schina-battleground/]
Strip away the ostensibly benign surface of public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and language
instruction , and it becomes clear that the U.S. and China are engaged in a soft power conflagration
– a protracted
cultural cold war. On one side bristles incumbent Western values hegemon, the U.S. On the other is China, one of the non-Western civilizations that Samuel
Huntington noted back in 1993 “increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”¶ But to shape the world in nonWestern ways means engaging in a soft power battlespace against an incumbent who already holds the high ground. Liu comments that in regions deeply
influenced by Western cultures, political systems and values, the “latecomer” China is considered a “dissident force." Under such circumstances, “it is rather difficult
for China to attract Western countries with its own political and cultural charisma, let alone to replace their positions.Ӧ According to this and similar viewpoints,
China’s difficulty in projecting soft power across the world is in part due to the way the U.S.
leverages its own soft power . Wu Jianmin, the former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University, puts the point well when explaining that
U.S. soft power is driven by the imperative of “maintaining US hegemony in changing the world, of
letting the world listen to the United States.Ӧ
Thus,
the state of global post-colonial, post-communist
ideational hegemony is such that large swathes of the earth’s population see the world through
lenses supplied by the West. Through these lenses, perceptions of China are dominated by such
concepts as the “China threat theory,” which portrays China as a malevolent superpower upstart .
US soft power poses a serious threat to Chinese culture – it’s a tool of ethnocide
Edney 15 [Kingsley, University of Leeds, 2015, “Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A
Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China,” Politics: 2015 Vol. 35(3-4), 259–272]
Although Chinese analysts do not generally identify a direct link between the threat of foreign soft power and the potential for the CCP to lose its legitimacy, their
references to the undermining of socialist ideology, values and national cohesion make it clear that they are concerned that certain
elements of
foreign soft power, particularly the attraction of Western-style democratic systems and values, pose
a threat to regime security in China . Some scholars argue there is a deliberate soft power strategy on the
part of the US to target China . Han(2004, p. 11) refers to a ‘major soft power offensive’ by the US to spread Western capitalist
ideology that, along with American cultural hegemony, poses a serious threat to China’s cultural
security . Han (2004, pp. 10–111) is particularly concerned about the US incorporating culture into its national security strategy and cites Nye’s views on soft
power to argue for the importance of culture for contemporary international competition. Jiang (2010, p. 89) argues that
American soft power, in
the form of American-style democracy and values, poses a particularly pressing challenge for China.
He claims that Western countries are aware of the increasing importance of culture in the
international competition over comprehensive national power and aim to use soft power to achieve
‘peaceful evolution’ in China . Jiang(2010, p. 89) reels off a list of complaints against Western countries, including using human rights to interfere
in China’s internal affairs, referring to Chinese patriotism as nationalism, denigrating Chinese collectivist values as closed and backward, and promoting degenerate
thought and culture – such as materialism, hedonism, extreme individualism and pornogra-phy and violence – to China’s youth, and sees this as all being driven by a
strategic objective: ‘
to destroy our common ideals and spiritual pillars
[jingshen zhizhu], to eliminate Chinese national cohesion,
[and] to confuse our thinking’. Similarly, Han (2004, p. 12) argues that the US specifically targets China in a struggle over ideology and values and that this has consequences for national cohesion.
Even when American soft power is not seen as a deliberate plot, Chinese analysts
can still identify it as a source of insecurity for developing countries . Sun and Wang (2014, p. 108)specifically rebut Nye’s
claims that soft power is not threatening to others when they write: As far as developing countries in the process of modernization are concerned, despite scholars
such as Nye (especially American scholars) repeatedly emphasizing in their articles that soft power development is ‘non-zero-sum’ and of global mutual benefit, this
kind of language corresponds to a specifically Western (or American) political system and cultural environment;
this will inevitably create a
major conflict with other countries, which will be unable to avoid being profoundly concerned about
‘cultural security’.
Space
The Aff’s positioning of China allows securitization of space through survival rhetoric
and dominance claims – makes militarization inevitable
Peoples 2010
(Dr. Columba Peoples, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Security, International Technology,
2010, “The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control,” School of Sociology, Politics and
International Studies University of Bristol Working Paper No. 02-10*, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/spais/migrated/documents/peoples0210i.pdf) //Snowball
Such programmes with possible space weapons applications (beyond ground-to-space ASAT capabilities) are still in their
relative infancy, and the technical prospects for such technologies, as with the more “exotic” missile defence proposals outlined
above, are far from certain.68 Yet much of the rhetoric emanating from the US in recent years has made expansive claims
to „space dominance‟, and has often tended to lead reality in terms of the capabilities that are claimed. In short,
rather than seeking to control the means of violence in and from space, much of the military discourse on space has
generally cast the US as a “trailblazer” in this regard, with exotic systems cited as a necessity for future military
dominance in and from space.69 Historically these claims have tended to emanate primarily from the Air Force and Air Force Space
Command. In 1998, Space Command defined the control of space („space control‟) as „The ability to assure access to space,
freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others use of space, if required‟70, and space was also
considered as part of the remit for „full spectrum dominance‟ in Joint Vision 2020.71 Space warriors within and beyond
the US military also make frequent reference to „…importance of dominating space in peace and war.‟72 Yet,
„The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking shortterm military advantage in support of
national security) but at the higher-level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and
worldwide legitimacy of US constitutional values).‟73 Instances of the securitization of outer space within military circles are
hardly surprising, given vested interests and the perceived utility of space support for US forces74; what is more
significant though is the extent to which national policy, though stopping short of explicit advocating space weapons, has
tended to similarly maintain the centrality of space for national security. As Moore‟s „biography‟ of the idea of unilateral
space dominance in the US attests to, this line of thinking has long held a prominent place in American strategic
thinking.75 Of significance, though, is the extent to which this type of thinking has migrated into official policy,
portraying US access to, and dominance of, outer space as key to national survival in the process. The tenure of
the George W. Bush administration in particular saw military and policy discourse move much closer in terms of goals and language used,
entrenching securitization within US space policy as a whole. In the terms used above, the views of „space warriors‟ made
much greater inroads in recent times into US space policy, and this has had a significant bearing on how the US has positioned
itself in terms of arms control and how other states – particularly China and Russia – have defined their own
positions.76
Link – U.S.-China Space Co-op
Their cooperative mindset manifests ideological insecurity from geopolitical
vulnerability - that makes militarization and dominance inevitable
Zhang, 2013
(Yongjin Zhang, Professor of International Politics, 25 April 2013, School of Sociology, Politics and
International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol, 11 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK, “The eagle eyes
the dragon in space - A critique,” Elsevier) //Snowball
Tellis is, of course, not alone in speculating on China’s military space strategy and its purpose. What he and others have done is to
extend the US geopolitical gaze at China in space as the fourth battle arena beyond the three conventional ones of
land, sea and air. This amounts to an effective ‘scripting’ of space as a new geopolitical territorydwhere global rivalry
between great powers is seen as unfolding. It would be a mistake to claim, however, that China’s 2007 ASAT
test is a ‘Sputnik moment’ for the USA, although such a comparison was made. In the words of Frederick Stakelbeck Jr., ‘Not since the
October 4, 1957 launch of Russia’s Sputnik has the US felt as threatened by another country’s space activities’. 32 What China’s ASAT test
did was to prompt a particular discourse on space security in the USA that attempts to establish ‘an
ideological space from which to dominate, exclude and delegitimize other discourses’. 33 Under the US
strategic gaze in space emerges a potential permanent adversary - China - as a threat in and from space to the
national security of the USA. Three aspects of the discursive practice are worth further elaboration. First, as a discursive
practice, the US strategic gaze both produces and constitutes identity politics. ‘Holding and widely publicizing a space
war game with China as the obvious “enemy”’ is perhaps the most brazen display of identity politics.34 Explicit claims of China as a
threatening other in and from space can be traced back to the (in)famous Rumsfeld Commission report in 2001.
In sketching out existential threats to the American way of life in and from space, claiming that ‘the USA is
an attractive candidate for a ‘space Pearl Harbor’, the report alleges that ‘China’s military is developing
methods and strategies for defeating the United States military in a high-tech and space-based future war’. 35
With China’s 2007 ASAT test, according to Ian Easton, ‘The notion that the US could be caught off-guard in a “space Pearl
Harbor” and quickly reduced from an information-age military juggernaut to a disadvantaged industrial-age
power in any conflict with China is being taken very seriously by US war planners’. 36 As ‘China is rapidly becoming a
space-age superpower’, Easton further claims, ‘China is arguably altering the status quo in outer space, a realm that has
been viewed as a domain of unchallenged US dominance and defined by international cooperation since
the end of the Cold War.’ 37 This play of identity politics is otherwise found in many statements by Pentagon officials
and in US national space security and policy documents. The 2011 National Security Space Strategy stipulates
that, ‘With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and
objectives that in particular, endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and
conflict’. 38 As space becomes a domain shared by ‘both close allies and potential adversaries’ and is
increasingly ‘contested’, China is ranked with Iran, Libya (under Gaddafi), Ethiopia and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, as an
American concern, whereas France, Japan, Germany, Italy and Australia are explicitly listed as allies of the United States.39 ‘Our
priority in space’, Donald Mahley asserts, ‘is pursuing American interests within cooperative relationships,
particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies.’ 40 More recently, the United States has ‘a renewed commitment to
share capabilities with allies and partners.maintain our strategic advantage’ and should exercise ‘active US
leadership of alliance and coalition efforts in peacetime, crisis, and conflict’.
Terrorism
State identity is constructed through the creation and labelling of the terrorist – the
other posited against the state must be continuously recreated for the state to exist
Cole 13 [James, writer for E-International Relations, 2013, “Terrorism: Realities, Constructs, and
Theatre,” http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/03/terrorism-realities-constructs-and-theatre/]
Therefore, what may be clear now is: the threat of terrorism may come from the FATA of Pakistan, but it similarly emerges from the need to put on a performance, as to not expose the lack of
foundations knowledge has. Simply put, to remain employed, the
actors in the GWoT seek to make the audience believe that their
performance is in fact reality .¶ This denial of a secure ontology raises problems for international relations as,¶ ‘ how can international
relations speak of such foundational concepts such as the state, security, war, danger, sovereignty
so on? [and] After all,
and
isn’t security determined by the requirements of a pre-existing sovereignty state and war
conducted in its name as a response to objective danger? ’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 111).¶ Recognising the arbitrary
nature of many Western concepts could undermine the project of modernity, the conception of the
international system being occupied by sovereign states would be destroyed. The Western state,
therefore, needs to constantly practice representation as, to cease ‘would be to expose its lack of
prediscursive foundations [and] stasis would be death’ (Campbell, 1992, p. 12). The GWoT thus
comes from the fear of death; not of individuals from an actual terrorist attack, but the death of the
state.¶ To escape death, the modern state utilises the heroic practice, rather than having to recognise
it has no stable identity. It therefore creates an “other” to situate itself against . Ashley’s conception of the heroic
practice involves placing competing terms in hierarchical opposition where:¶ ‘[one] term is privileged as a higher reality, a regulative ideal, and the [other] term is understood only in a
derivative and negative way, as a failure to live up to this ideal and as something that endangers this ideal’ (Ashley, 1988, p. 230).¶ It is further argued that without boundaries,¶ ‘”we” cannot
say for sure who “we” are because “we” cannot decide what must be the exclusionary boundaries of the remembered inheritance to which “we” … must pay respects’ (Ashley & Walker, 1990,
p. 387).¶
Boundaries are created between the inside/outside . Therefore, ‘the disciplinary practice of creating boundaries and dichotomous
relationships is practiced in order to reaffirm the reality of the inside and ‘constitutive of our modern understanding of political space’ (Walker, 1993, p. 174).
In the context of
the GWoT, this is most apparent in Bush’s declaration of ‘you are with us or you are against us’
almost immediately after 9/11. The heroic practice in terms of the GWoT has simultaneously
portrayed the state and liberal ideals in a hierarchy, with the non-state associations and the religious
motives of fourth wave terrorism.
However, this practice has allowed the ‘higher reality’ to continue unquestioned.¶ As a consequence of the heroic practice,
identity is created in relation to difference (Campbell, 1992, p. 9). Due to the hierarchy imposed, ‘difference’ often means ‘danger’. International relations, therefore, ‘involves little more than
an endless parlaying of representation of danger’ (Ashley, 1989, p. 311), and as Campbell argues, ‘
danger’
state identity is secured through discourses of
(Campbell, 1992, p. 51). The concept of the non-state terrorist is, therefore, used as the opposite to the state. This need to represent the “other” helps explain why the macro-
securitizations explored later, work best when they are structured in binary opposites.
When terrorism became the biggest threat in
international relations within 10 years of the end of the Cold War, it filled a void that, if left unfilled,
could have seen the demise of the project of modernity . After the Cold War, there was no shortage of potential candidates for new
discourses of danger, such as drugs, the environment or humanitarian crises (Campbell, 1992, p. 170). Simply put,
the GWoT was not only in the right
place at the right time, but also fulfilled the criteria of being able to create an “other”. This may
explain why the environment has not been as successfully securitized, despite presenting a more
obvious and irreversible danger
(Brown & Oliver, 2004).
the security concern that displaces terrorism
This equally explains why China may present itself as
(Buzan, 2006).
There is no way to determine how probable a terrorist attack is – this causes the
affirmative to overdramatize the impact of terrorism to justify security policy.
Daase and Kessler, 7
(Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger
CHRISTOPHER DAASE & OLIVER KESSLER* Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich,
Germany & Bielefeld University, Germany)
In this context, the question of how big the threat of international terrorism
currently is can be conveniently answered by pointing to the next possible act. The
rationale behind many counter-terrorist acts is the constant threat of a subsequent act – which is indubitably anticipated
for some point in the future. Within such a point of view, the current calm is only the calm
before the next storm. Taken seriously, this statement is both true and trivial. However, it is
exactly the triviality of this insight – that is, that a next terrorist ‘attack’ will happen – that allows
proponents to structure and shape the contemporary security policy discourse. There
are a couple of reasons for this. Most basically, there are two standard models for examining the
risk of terrorism – which are, however, both inadequate (Falkenrath, 2001). First, there is the
inquiry into the motivational structure and the extrapolation from past terrorist
activities. Second, there is the attempt to calculate the possible risks from the
expected losses and the probability of a certain state of the world occurring. The
former is preferred by terrorist and regional experts, the latter by security practitioners and security experts.
The problem of the first method is that it cannot trace new developments and
spontaneous changes in the motivational structure. There is always a first time, one could argue.
Even the act of hijacking planes in order to destroy skyscrapers was not ‘predictable’. Such behaviour was simply not
on the screen; it was unimaginable. These methods of explorations are thus inherently conservative, and they
systematically underestimate the associated risks. The problem with the second method is that nobody can actually
‘calculate’ the loss of thousands of lives.17 If the risk of terrorism is defined in common terms of
probability and potential loss, then the focus on terrorist ‘world events’
consequently leads to a reduced importance of probabilities. The improbability of
the risk’s manifestation becomes irrelevant, as the costs would reach infinity
(Jenkins, 1999). The classic calculation of risks from terror thus tends to
overestimate and to dramatize terror. This overestimation of risks is not only directed at
the level of risk assessment but includes the formulation of a prudent ‘risk policy’: if one
factor of the risk equation goes to infinity, a fair representation being a terrorist
attack with nuclear weapons, then there is no rational measure for anti-terrorist
measures.
Terrorism - Africa Specific
The terror threat justifies foreign intervention and increases militarism
Power 14 [Lucy, Trade Policy Officer at New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2014, “Oil,
terrorism and China: is there a new securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa?”
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3445/thesis.pdf?sequence=2]
This thesis has attempted to answer the question as to whether there has been a new securitization of U.S. policy in Africa ,
using the example of Nigeria as a test case. I have argued that a degree of securitization has taken place since 2001, enough to make a noticeable difference from
U.S. engagement prior to this. I have further argued that this has been
due to
three securitizing factors: concerns about oil security,
fears about the
potential disruption caused by terrorism and insurgency, and the rise in China . To research this question I first
examined the general trend of U.S. engagement with Africa as a whole before turning a more detailed analysis of U.S. engagement with Nigeria from 1960 (when
Nigeria became an independent country) to the present day. I looked at sources such as official statements, development aid, economic relations and military
cooperation, and compared the type of engagement that took place from 1960 to 2001 to that which took place from 2001 to the present. I found that
prior
to 2001, U.S. engagement with Nigeria was primarily concerned with trade, particularly oil. There
was very little political or military engagement , especially in the 1990s when Nigeria was ruled by a military dictatorship. After
2001 and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, however, U.S. engagement with Nigeria
noticeably intensified and took on a militaristic overtone.
It has taken the form of
increased military aid (such
as training programmes, joint missions and the provision of military equipment) as well as the
founding of AFRICOM in 2007 . The securitization of Africa has been slow but steady, especially since 2001, and increased in intensity in 2007. By
2014 it is expected that the number of U.S. troops in Africa will reach 5000, which is brigade level strength, and will be active in “38 out of Africa’s 54 nations”
(Stewart, 2014).
Impacts
Self-fulfilling prophecy – China specific
Belief in the China threat produces the conditions for an actual spiral into conflict –
multiple barriers prevent conflict in the status quo but aggressive representations and
policies will tip the scale
Glaser, 11
(Charles - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China’s Rise
Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 2011, arc)
REALIST ANALYSES of how power transitions will play out are based on the assumption that states accurately perceive and respond to
the international situations they face. Realist optimism in this case thus rests on the assumption that U.S. leaders appreciate,
and will be able to act on, the unusually high degree of security that the United States actually enjoys.
Should this assumption prove incorrect, and should the United States exaggerate the threat China
poses, the risks of future conflict will be greater. Unfortunately, there are some reasons for worrying that the
assumption might in fact be wrong. For example, the popular belief that a rising China will severely threaten
U.S. security could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Should Washington fail to understand that
China's growing military capabilities do not threaten vital U.S. interests, it may adopt overly
competitive military and foreign policies, which may in turn signal to China that the United States has
malign motives. Should China then feel less secure, it will be more likely to adopt competitive policies that
the United States will see as more threatening. The result would be a negative spiral driven not by
the international situation the states actually faced but by their exaggerated insecurities . Moreover, states
have often overestimated their insecurity by failing to appreciate the extent to which military capabilities favored defense. Before World War I,
Germany exaggerated the ease of invasion and therefore believed that Russia's growing power threatened its survival. As a result, Germany
launched an unnecessary preventive war. During the Cold War, the United States exaggerated the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union,
failing to appreciate that large improvements in Soviet forces left the key aspect of the American deterrent-a massive retaliatory capabilityentirely intact. This did not lead to war, thankfully, but it did increase the risks of one and led to much unnecessary tension and expenditure.
Washington will have to guard against making similar errors down the road as China's conventional and nuclear forces grow and as clashes over
secondary issues strain relations. There has been no U.S. overreaction to the growth in China's military capabilities yet, but the potential for
one certainly exists. The current U.S. National Security Strategy, for example, calls for the United States to maintain its conventional military
superiority, but it does not spell out why this superiority is required or what forces and capabilities this requires. For the foreseeable future,
China will lack power-projection capabilities comparable to those of the United States, but its military buildup is already reducing the United
States' ability to fight along China's periphery. This will soon raise questions such as precisely why the United States requires across-the-board
conventional superiority, what specific missions the U.S. military will be unable to perform without it, and how much the inability to execute
those missions would damage U.S. security. Without clear answers,
the United States may well overestimate the
implications of China's growing military forces. The danger of an exaggerated security threat is even
greater in the nuclear realm. The Obama administration's 2olo Nuclear Posture Review holds that "the United States and China's
Asian neighbors remain concerned about China's current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization
There is no
prospect that any conceivable nuclear modernization in the foreseeable future will enable China to
destroy the bulk of U.S. nuclear forces and undermine the United States' ability to retaliate massively. The most
of its nuclear arsenal." The NPR, however, does not identify just what danger China's military modernization poses.
such modernization might do is eliminate a significant U.S. nuclear advantage by providing China with a larger and
more survivable force, thereby
reduc ing the United States' ability to credibly threaten China
with nuclear
escalation during a severe crisis. The NPR says that the United States "must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and
China," but China has always lacked the type of force that would provide stability according to U.S. standards. If the United States decides that
its security requires preserving its nuclear advantage vis-i-vis China, it will have to invest in capabilities dedicated to destroying China's new
nuclear forces. Such an effort would be in line with the United States' Cold War nuclear strategy, which placed great importance on being able
to destroy Soviet nuclear forces.
This kind of arms race would be even more unnecessary now than it was then. The
United States can retain formidable deterrent capabilities even if China modernizes its arsenal, and a
competitive nuclear policy could well decrease U.S. security by signaling to China that the United States is hostile, thereby increasing Chinese
insecurity and damaging U.S.-Chinese relations. There is no question that China's conventional and nuclear buildups will reduce some U.S.
capabilities that Washington would prefer to retain. But the
United States should not rush to impute malign motives
to those buildups and should instead be sensitive to the possibility that they simply reflect China's
legitimate desire for security. When Donald Rumsfeld was U.S. secretary of defense, he said, apropos of China's increased defense
spending, that "since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding
arms purchases?" The answer should have been obvious. If China were able to operate carrier battle groups near the U.S. coast and attack the
U.S. homeland with long-range bombers, Washington would naturally want the ability to blunt such capabilities, and if the United States had a
strategic nuclear force as vulnerable and comparatively small as China's (now somewhere between a tenth and a hundredth the size of the U.S.
force), it would try to catch up as quickly as it had the resources to do so. Those actions would not have been driven by any nefarious plan to
subjugate the world, and so far there are strong reasons to believe that the same holds true for China's course. In sum, China's rise can be
peaceful, but this outcome is far from guaranteed. Contrary
to the standard realist argument, the basic pressures
generated by the international system will not force the United States and China into conflict. Nuclear
weapons, separation by the Pacific Ocean, and political relations that are currently relatively good
should enable both countries to maintain high levels of security and avoid military policies that
severely strain their relationship. The United States' need to protect its allies in Northeast Asia complicates matters somewhat,
but there are strong grounds for believing that Washington can credibly extend its deterrent to Japan and South Korea, its most important
regional partners. The challenge for the United States will come in making adjustments to its policies in situations in which less-than-vital
interests (such as Taiwain) might cause problems and in making sure it does not exaggerate the risks posed by China's growing power and
military capabilities.
Self-fulfilling prophecy generic
These hyperbolized accounts of threats produce an endless politics of war and fear
thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Dillon and Reed, 9
(IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing:
Killing to Make Live”)
There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add
governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary
liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the
nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and
its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the
biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is
preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds
its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species
life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to
make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For
allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of
continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular,
such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously
becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself,
here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies
such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this
explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to
construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point
regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have
observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But
they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and
economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites
themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an
emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The
leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative
principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to
regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More
importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’ ) in the
permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for
rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of
the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms
of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and
other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course,
the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life
exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its
very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in
virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of
politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when
emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given .
Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of
war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by
abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the
emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong
together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the
willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative
scrutiny. You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the utile demand it makes on
you, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to
know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of
emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western
tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the
self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view
in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only
culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental
technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western
tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The
emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics
globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the
more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a
governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency
Self-fulfilling prophecy
Their internal link chain commits a fallacy that results in a self-fulfilling prophecy – their impact claims
are the only thing that make it true
Gross Senior Associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies and a former State Department Official 3-19-13
(Donald, “Seizing the Opportunity to Improve US-China
Relations,”http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/us-chinarelations_b_2891183.html, Mike)
A primary obstacle to sustaining stability and cooperation between the U.S. and China can be found
in two fallacies that continue to unduly shape U.S. public opinion: 1) China and the United States are headed on
a collision course toward inevitable war; and 2) China's economic rise is occurring at America's expense. A war
with China is no more inevitable than was war with the Soviet Union. Thanks to farsighted political leaders, both
Republican and Democratic, the United States reached arms control agreements with the USSR during the Cold War that curtailed
the arms race in nuclear weapons, conventional forces and missile delivery systems. Through a process of negotiated mutual threat
reduction, those agreements helped prevent a nuclear holocaust. In the case of China, of course, the U.S. faces far less of
a security threat than it did from the Soviet Union. Today, America dwarfs China militarily in both nuclear and
conventional forces. The U.S. nuclear arsenal now exceeds 5,000 warheads and includes approximately 450 ICBMs and 300
submarine-launched missile delivery systems. China possesses a "minimal deterrent" of about 240 warheads and up to 65
land-based ballistic missiles, according to Pentagon figures. On the conventional side, the U.S. similarly holds
overwhelming superiority. To take just one example, the U.S. Navy deploys eleven aircraft carrier battle groups,
each equipped with more than 55 advanced fighters and ground-attack aircraft. China, by
contrast, has refurbished for training purposes a single Ukrainian-made carrier built in 1984 that it originally
purchased as a floating casino. Despite this reality of American dominance, hawkish politicians, academics and
journalists in the United States, over the past decade, have succeeded in hyping the Chinese threat to U.S.
security. They typically exaggerate the dangers now posed by China's military forces and cite future, potential
capabilities to give credence to their views. Almost always, hawksobscure several key aspects of the large
disparity in military power between the two countries: the U.S. poses a far greater military threat to China than
China does to the United States; the U.S. outspends China more than three to one on defense; and
advanced U.S. military technology is highly likely to remain well ahead of China for the foreseeable future.
The prognostications of China hawks have nevertheless increased the possibility that the widespread belief in a
coming war with China could become aself-fulfilling prophecy. As each country "hedges" and ramps up preparations for
war, its actions stimulate greater military modernization and more aggressive actions by the other side, magnifying the risk of
conflict. On economic issues, American protectionists who press for measures to block or impede Chinese products, services and
investments from entering the U.S. reinforce the widespread fallacy that China's rise is occurring at the expense of the United
States. Just the opposite is true. China is today the largest growth market in the world for U.S. goods and services.
Trade with China - the third-largest U.S. export market and leading market for agricultural products -- has aided America's
recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. Looking to the future, the U.S. stands to benefit from billions of dollars in
incoming Chinese investment that will reduce production costs for American companies and prices for
American consumers, enhance consumer welfare, spur the development of innovative products, and most
importantly, result in "in sourcing" -- the creation of hundreds of thousands more American jobs. Secretary of State
John Kerry has emphasized the importance of U.S.-China cooperation. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
he argued convincingly: "...the simple fact is that we need China, and China needs us. We have to get this relationship right. After
all, we are talking about our connection to one-sixth of humanity. The most serious problems we face today, from nuclear
proliferation to climate change, can't be solved alone. And, economically, our futures are deeply intertwined and will remain so."
Kerry warns that "the tendency to demonize China, to consider it the next great threat, just isn't based in reality."
He believes "there is incredible potential for cooperation, even as we have to deal with certain disagreements
now."
VTL
Securitization creates the conditions for the devaluation of life – certain lives are
deemed valuable while others are marginalized. This is a precursor to their extinction
level claims and destroys value to life.
Dillon, 99
(MICHAEL DILLON, UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER, “ANOTHER JUSTICE” POLITICAL THEORY VOL. 27, NO. 2,
APRILL 1999, JSTOR)
Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives
from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a
particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not
sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject
lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the
dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less
a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to
secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The
very indexicality
required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the
expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the
singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the
standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.
They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and
global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no
mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily
submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can
extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either.
There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of
holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the
invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself.
For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another
Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is
integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.
Structural violence
Security threats are a ploy to keep subjects complicit in state power – this complicity
perpetuates structural violence, which is a more likely, and larger, impact than their
war scenarios
Jackson, 12
(Richard, “The Great Con of National Security,” 5 August 2012,
https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/)
It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true
that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however,
most
of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you
is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty,
inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among
others. The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than
you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from
¶
illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the
misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords.
And yet, politicians and the servile media spend
most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international
drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of
China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and
your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on
security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of
‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every
public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a
thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious. And while all this is going on, the rulers
of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing
underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds
of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures
thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every
¶
year. In other words,
they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the
world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign
wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic
violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that
underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for
decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and
Politicians are a part of the
system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist
inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society
developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate. Of course, none of this is surprising.
¶
based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they
are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of
inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming
it is
clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of
terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of
colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. Viewed from this vantage point,
national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to
will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election,
¶
distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and
wellbeing of you and your family,
and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce
to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial
complex ticking along . Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk
¶
posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking
about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The
truth is, if
you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your
safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype:
you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are
from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.
Extinction
Securitization imposes itself as the nexus of state activity causes worldwide wars in
the name of security, leading to extinction.
Agamben, 2002
(Giorgio, Prof of Aesthetics @ U of Verona, Security and Terror, Theory and Event 5:4, Muse)
Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or
the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their
consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an
opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to
intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security
wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and
individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of liberal
ideology.
Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm
of security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender
of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity.
What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first
half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation.
Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and
source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself
terroristic. We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de
l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was
convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the
way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the
difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a
single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions. The risk is not merely the
development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide
civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form
of war between sovereign states -- security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new
planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger.
Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work
towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.
Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic
principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the
catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies
should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of
political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror.
Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and
not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies
(ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say
that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of
democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror,
and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.
We control i/l to their impacts
We control the internal link to war – the only reason massive wars can ensue is
because human beings have been reduced to utilitarian instruments to be used by the
war machine.
Burke, 7
(Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations @ The University of New South
Wales Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, War as a Way of Being: Lebanon 2006)
This essay describes firstly the ontology
of the national security state (by way of the political
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of
strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually
reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This
creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises
because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and
because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology
and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and
destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as
a 'power to hurt'. The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces
neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we
could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral
of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian
terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs
Neither, however, explored what occurs
when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war
persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them
betray not only commitments but their own substance'.
arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance.
Africa Human Rights
Fears of China causes the US to intervene and results in massive human rights
violations, instability, and environmental harm
Power 14 [Lucy, Trade Policy Officer at New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2014, “Oil,
terrorism and China: is there a new securitization of United States foreign policy in Africa?”
http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10063/3445/thesis.pdf?sequence=2]
The third securitizing factor at play in the U.S .-Nigeria relationship (and also in wider U.S.-Africa relations) is the rise of China.
As China’s economic weight and international influence has increased, it has become more heavily
involved in Africa , particularly in countries like Nigeria which can provide the natural resources it needs to maintain its economic growth. Chinese
investment in Nigeria’s energy industry, combined with its willingness to sell arms and provide
military training, has engendered a sense of threat in the U.S. The threat is that China may be
attempting to “lock-in” resources like oil for its own use and potentially use these resources as an
“oil weapon”,
as the OPEC states did in the 1970s. Given the importance of oil not only to the U.S. but its allies, this is deemed a threat
which
justifies the expansion of military activity in Nigeria and other African states in order to protect U.S.
interests and counter China’s influence . Why should we care about these developments? Why does it matter if the U.S. military is exerting
greater control over U.S. Africa policy? The reasons we should care can be divided into three main categories:
development and governance
issues, human rights concerns, and environmental problems . A focus on security issues rather than
development or governance problems only serves to prolong underdevelopment and in the case of
many countries, worsen the situation by diverting much-needed resources into the security sector .
Furthermore, most would agree that the
United States’ involvement in the Middle East has done little to promote
human rights values or build politically stable regimes : most would in fact argue that it has been counterproductive in these
respects.
A similar outcome is to be expected if U.S. policy follows the same path in Africa . Furthermore, the
overwhelming focus on oil as an energy resource makes it hard to develop alternative clean energy solutions that would be better for the environment. This point
will be returned to in section 2.
War
Chinese securitization perpetuates threats & makes nuclear war likely, anti-space
weapon empirics prove
(William J. Broad, 1/21/2007, “Look Up! Is It a Threat? Or a Plea for a Ban?, science journalist and senior writer at The New York Times.
He shared two Pulitzer Prizes with his colleagues, as well as an Emmy Award and a DuPont Award. He joined The Times in 1983 and writes
about everything from exploding stars and the secret life of marine mammals to the spread of nuclear arms and the inside story on why the
Titanic sank so rapidly., The New York Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/william_j_broad/index.html)/AS
THE nation's star warriors, frustrated that their plans to arm the heavens went nowhere for two decades despite more than $100 billion in blue-sky research, felt a shiver of hope last week with news that China had conducted its first successful test of an antisatellite weapon.
Having long warned of the Chinese threat
which range from new kinds
of defensive satellites to flotillas of space weapons and orbital battle stations able to shatter all kinds of
enemy arms
begun to erode American space dominance
both
lasers and missiles capable of destroying satellites
, they now said their fears were vindicated and expressed optimism for their own projects,
. China, a group of 26 "Star Wars" supporters warned in a recent report, has "
" and will accelerate that slide with "
." H. Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative research group in Washington, said in an interview that the cost to the United States of
new arms and defensive measures would most likely run to "billions or tens of billions of dollars a year, pretty much year in and year out," and added, "I don't think that's excessive." But the prospect of a new arms race in space is also energizing an opposition, including arms control
supporters and fiscal conservatives alarmed at the rising costs of the Iraq war. Treaties could short-circuit the costly game of measure-countermeasure on the high frontier before it expands any further, they say. Currently, no international treaty or domestic law forbids such
developments. An unfettered arms race could hurt the United States more than any other nation,
arms control advocates argue
. The United States owns or operates 443 of the 845 active satellites that now orbit the planet, or 53
percent. By contrast, China owns just 4 percent. "We not only have the most satellites but they are more integrated into our economy and our way of making war than any other country," said Laura Grego, a staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, a private group in
Cambridge, Mass., that takes liberal positions on arms issues and environmental issues. "We have the most to lose in an unrestrained arms race." But that logic has not persuaded the Star Wars advocates, who say the United States needs to protect its huge investment in space satellites
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space, which would ban space weapons. Arms control supporters say China and Russia have backed the
process, while the United States has dragged its feet.
John Mohanco,
told
"our government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons
may play in protecting our assets."
Work on public opinion in the United States to make moral
arguments against weapons in space develop international coalitions to limit the way that the United
States can use space and develop China's own weapons systems and tactics to destroy American
satellites and space-based weapons." But Theresa Hitchens a critic of the administration's space arms
research who is director of the Center for Defense Information
said that China's
antisatellite test might be "a shot across the bow" meant to prod the Bush administration into serious
negotiations. In the test, a Chinese missile pulverized an aging Chinese weather satellite more than 500
miles above Earth on Jan Hitchens warned that an arms race in space could easily spin out of
experts in that country are openly calling for antisatellite arms A global competition
that produced armadas of space weapons
could raise the risk of accidental nuclear war if, for
instance, a whirling piece of space junk knocked out a spy satellite. "How do you know it's not a
precursor to a nuclear attack?" she asked. "Do you have an itchy trigger finger? If you've got a lot of
satellites out there, you probably do." The Bush administration has conducted secret research that
critics say could produce a powerful ground-based laser meant to shatter enemy satellites. The project,
parts of which were made public through Air Force budget documents submitted to Congress last year,
appears to be part of a wide-ranging administration effort to develop space weapons
by being ahead of anyone else in shooting such devices out of the sky. Diplomats from around the globe have gathered in Geneva for many years to hammer out a treaty on the "
Last year,
a State Department official,
the diplomats in Geneva that as long as
attacks on satellites remained a threat,
A Heritage Foundation analysis of such diplomacy says China is charging ahead to build space arms while "seeking to block the United States from developing its own anti-satellite weapons
and space-based ballistic missile defense systems." China's strategy, the analysis says, is clear: "
,
,
,
, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs,
. 11. Ms.
control, noting that
India has been "rattling its sword" and some
.
, she added,
, both defensive and offensive. John E. Pike, who is
the director of GlobalSecurity.org, a group in Washington that conducts research on military and space topics, said that treaties and defensive measures were the smart, cheap way to counter antisatellite threats, and that the star warriors in the wake of the Chinese tests were playing a
This says nothing about space-based weapons
the
Space Relationship and the 21st Century
called the
military development of the high frontier vital to the nations protection from a wide variety of threats including Chinese arms
false card. "They're trying to piggyback on a totally unrelated topic," he said. "
, star wars or any of that. "" But a report, "Missile Defense,
, researched by a group of organizations that focus on national security issues and published late last year by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
. "Without the means to dissuade, deter and defeat the growing number of strategic adversaries now arrayed against it," the group warned, "the United States will be unable to maintain its status of global leadership."
Alt
Paradigm shift - best for environment affs
The alternative is to reject the securitizing logic of the affirmative in favor of a
paradigm shift that privileges emancipation and debate where all voices are
represented. Breaking down social hierarchies is the only way to effectively solve
environmental issues
Chis, 2014
(Ioana Cerasella, “Framing Environmental Degradation as a Security Issue: A Theoretical Inquiry,”
https://thegwpost.com/2014/02/04/framing-environmental-degradation-as-a-security-issue-atheoretical-inquiry/, arc)
As seen above, securitization has its own internal rationality which privileges specialist knowledges
and speech acts. In this section we shall focus on critiquing security from outside of this logic, by
proposing a paradigm shift. To start with, securitization is not compatible with democracy, as it is
inherently exclusionary[61]. Hence, Aradau argues for politicizing that which is called ‘securitization’,
and contesting it with a new rationale, that of ‘emancipation’, as understood by Jacques Rancière and
Étienne Balibar. According to Rancière, emancipation “is not secession, but self-affirmation as a jointsharer in a common world”[62]. The term, taken from both philosophers’ writings, “is informed by the
principles of universality and recognition”[63]. In an open democracy, environment-related policies
should be open to contestation, and not be taken by global institutions on behalf of a constructed
‘mass population’.¶ We shall now discuss about how emancipation is analytically different from
securitization, and why they should be thought of in dialectical terms. As mentioned earlier, a
progressive desecuritisation approach needs to start by undoing securitization. Emancipation is
precisely that: the unmasking of securitization and the de-subjectification of humans as constructed by
security apparatuses. One of its main tools is equality (in a material sense), as a tool for verification. Put
simply, one needs to presuppose equality between humans in order to verify its existence, disrupting
the “orderly, hierarchical inequality”[64]. When environmental degradation is framed as a security
issue (which is usually based on a presupposition of scarcity and risk) by security professionals,
democracy and the relationship humans-nature are impeded. Slow processes of debating, as opposed
to speedy decisions increase the possibility of reaching a consensus through dissensus, leaving always
open the possibility for newcomers to make contributions. The exclusionary logic of securitization can
this way be successfully rejected, inasmuch as emancipation provides us with a plurality of voices which can at any time
make visible the limitations of previous policies and practices.¶ Although the Paris School’s project is indeed radical, it does not
put enough emphasis on including nature within its political process of emancipation. To solve this gap, I propose that what
Bookchin calls non-lineal organic thinking[65] can offer valuable contributions to the transformative
project ofdesecuritisation. By problematizing the established forms of hierarchy and exploitation
within human societies, Bookchin advocates for a radical democracy of a ‘post-scarcity’ society, which
entails a metabolism between humans and nature. Hence, the Rancièrian praxis of equality would take the form of
‘direct action’[66]. All these actions have the liberating potential of dismantling hierarchy and the domination of nature by
humans. This can be done by taking into consideration both ecology, emancipation and the social and political dynamics within
and between societies. Indeed, “the way human beings deal with each other as social beings is crucial to
addressing the ecological crisis”[67].
Pan Alt/Pre-req
The alternative is a pre-requisite: representations create the reality of China and our
relationship to China – we need to interrogate our discursive understanding of China
before developing policy
Pan, 2012
(Chengxin, senior lecturer in IR @ Deakin University, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western
Representations of China’s Rise,” 2012, vii-viii, arc)
Despite or precisely because of the vast amount of literature on this issue, I feel compelled to join the chorus. However, in
doing so this book does not, as do many other books seek to examine whether China is rising or not, or what its rise means. This
is not because I believe such questions are unimportant or have already been settled; I do not. Rather, I believe what China’s
rise means cannot be independently assessed in isolation from what we already mean by China’s rise.
Though tautological it may sound, the latter question draws attention to the meaning-giving subject
of China watchers. It turns the spotlight on our thoughts and representations of China’s rise, which
constitutes the main focus of this book.¶ Though it may appear that way in the eyes of some, going along this
path is not a cunning attempt of finding a literary niche in an increasingly crowded field to score some
cheap points all the while dodging the heavy lifting of tackling complex ‘real-world’ issues surrounding
China. Nor is it to deliberately court controversy or strike an affected pose of malaise about an other-wise vibrant field of
study. To me, this book is a necessary move justified on both theoretical and practical grounds.
Theoretically, the book rejects the prevalent assumption about the dichotomy between reality and
representation. Contra positivism, we cannot bypass thoughts and representations to come into direct
contact with China as it is. What we see as ‘China’ cannot be detached from various discourses and
representations of it. Works that purport to study China’s rise, as if it were a transparent and empirically
observable phenomenon out there, are always already inextricably enmeshed in representations. In all
likelihood, those works will then become themselves part of such representations, through which still later studies will gaze at
‘China.’ In this sense, my
focus on representation is less an expedient choice than an ontological and
epistemological necessity . ¶ On practical grounds, given the inescapable immanence of
representation and discourse in the social realm, a proper study of discursive representation is not a
retreat from the real world but a genuine engagement with it in the full sense of the words. Perhaps
with the exception of sleepwalking or unconscious twitching, no human action (let alone social action) can do
without thought and representation. Constructivists are right in saying that words have consequences. But we may
add that all social domains and human relationships are mediated through and constituted by thoughts
and representation. China’s relationship with the West is certainly no exception. With regional
stability, prosperity and even world peace at stake, there is now an urgent, practical need to
understand how the various strains of representation and discourse pervade and condition this
critical and complex relationship.
Alt solvency - Desecuritization
Desecuritization solves
Šulović, 10
(Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization, http://www.ccmrbg.org/Occasional+Papers+and+Analysis/3855/Meaning+of+Security+and+the+Theory+of+Securitization.shtml)
Treating something a security issue is always a matter of choice – political choice (Waever, 2000:
251). This choice is being actualized through securitizing discursive practice of labelling something a security threat.
However, the power of constructing the security issue through speech act shouldn’t be put in
the single person’s hands. Should that be the case, there would be no difference between the speech act and the
subjective perception and interpretation of the security threat, and the framework of the dichotomy of the
subjective/objective definition of security would remain largely intact. Securitization is “essentially
intersubjective process” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 30). It is the course of the
ongoing negotiations between securitizing actor, who puts the issue on the agenda, and the
audience, who has a choice of either accepting or declining given agenda. Securitization
cannot be imposed. Only the audience’s consent justifies the application of extraordinary
measures, which include breaching of regular political procedures, all in order to neutralize the threat.
“Thus, security (as well all politics) ultimately rests neither with objects nor with subjects but among
the subjects” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 31). Finally, contrary to normative viewpoint of most of security
theoreticians – traditional and alternative-criticising – who assume that security is something both positive and
desirable, the Copenhagen School proponents suggest that security shouldn’t be idealized. Securitization of a certain
issue leads to the downfall of the regular political process and liberal democratic procedures and therefore
securitization should be perceived negatively and as a necessary evil. As an optimum long-term option they
suggest the opposite process – desecuritization, ergo returning certain issues from the domain
of urgency, extraordinary, securitized to the domain of regular, public sphere. In that sense, they
do not regard their own theory a politically neutral analytical tool. Moreover, whenever possible, they strive to aid
desecuritization processes by deconstructing the ongoing securitization discourses.
Alt solvency – critique alone solves
The China rise narrative in policymaking can be disrupted through critique
Wu, 2007
(Chengqiu, “Barking up the Wrong Tree? The Master Narrative of ‘China Threat Theory Examined,”
published in Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development,
http://www.sirpalib.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/99/db/0e5d91cd45a0b8fce4e7c74aa2e3/9919d70d3a97-4eb6-a0c4-528abee333b8.pdf, arc)
This chapter understands “China threat theory” as a master narrative that claims that China’s rise will
lead to military and economic threats to its neighbors and the United States. Particularly, the essential argument
of “China threat theory” is that a rising China will challenge the United States, regionally or globally. Reviewing the U.S. debates on the strategic
implications of China’s rise and the Chinese responses to these debates, this chapter shows that “China threat theory” exists in the U.S.
intellectual discourse as one of the positions rather than the only U.S. position or a systematic project with a hidden agent. In fact, many
American scholars disagree with the “China threat theory,” and there are diverse understandings of what a possible China threat will be among
proponents of the “China threat theory. This chapter also finds that while focusing on a few articles in the popular press and on certain events,
the Chinese criticisms have largely ignored many other major works in the U.S. debates on China. Therefore, while the Chinese critics have not
been barking up the wrong tree, they have failed to see other trees in the woods. Yet, does “China threat theory” deserve the criticisms that it
has received? This chapter examines the master narrative of “China threat theory” − that China’s economic growth will lead to an economic
threat as well as power growth that will lead to a military threat to East Asian countries and the United States − and outlines the theoretical and
empirical challenges that the master narrative faces. China
has not been an economic threat to the United States, and
its power growth will not make China a threat to the United States and its East Asian neighbors. The
“China threat theory” exists in people’s minds as a master narrative, which is similar to an “ideal
type.” While it faces many challenges theoretically and empirically, it can exert its dominance over
scholars, pundits, and 136 Chengqiu Wu policymakers by excluding other interpretations of China’s economic
and social changes. Therefore, it should be critiqued so that its dominance can be disrupted. In fact,
by proposing such concepts as “peaceful rise,” “peaceful development” (heping fazhan), and
“harmonious world” (hexie shijie), the Chinese government has been groping for ways to disrupt the
dominance of the master narrative of “China threat theory.”
Link/alt card
A non-realist understanding of China is necessary to prevent conflict - avoiding
exaggerating is key to preventing conflict
Glaser, 11
(Charles - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China’s Rise
Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 2011, arc)
So far, the China debate among international relations theorists has pitted optimistic liberals against pessimistic realists. The liberals argue that
because the current international order is defined by economic and political openness, it can accommodate China's rise peacefully. The United
States and other leading powers, this argument runs, can and will make clear that China is welcome to join the existing order and prosper
within it, and China is likely to do so rather than launch a costly and dangerous struggle to overturn the system and establish an order more to
its own liking. The standard realist view, in contrast, predicts intense competition. China's growing strength, most realists argue, will lead it to
pursue its interests more assertively, which will in turn lead the United States and other countries to balance against it. This cycle will generate
at the least a parallel to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, and perhaps even a hegemonic war. Adherents
of this view point to China's recent harder line on its maritime claims in the East China and South China seas and to the increasingly close
relations between the United States and India as signs that the cycle of assertiveness and balancing has already begun. In fact, however, a more
nuanced version of realism provides grounds for optimism. China's
rise need not be nearly as competitive and
dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, because the structural forces driving major
powers into conflict will be relatively weak. The dangers that do exist, moreover, are not the ones
predicted by sweeping theories of the international system in general but instead stem from
secondary disputes particular to Northeast Asia-and the security prevalent in the international system
at large should make these disputes easier for the United States and China to manage. In the end,
therefore, the outcome of China's rise will depend less on the pressures generated by the
international system than on how well U.S. and Chinese leaders manage the situation. Conflict is not
predetermined-and if the United States can adjust to the new international conditions, making some
uncomfortable concessions and not exaggerating the dangers, a major clash might well be avoided.
AT: Alt won’t solve war
Good representations do create peace – post-Sino-Soviet War China proves
Tunsjø 2008
(Øystein Tunsjø, Professor for Centre for Asian Security Studies, Routledge, Feb 19, 2008, “US Taiwan
Policy: Constructing the Triangle,” Google Books,
https://books.google.com/books?id=ATp8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59&dq=threat+representations+
and+policy+making+u.s.china&source=bl&ots=5mhhNIn38w&sig=gKH6IP8ONMKEENcqG6nmCbdmerQ&
hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0mryY9LzNAhXo6IMKHVBaBl4Q6AEITTAH#v=onepage&q=threat%20repres
entations%20and%20policy%20making%20u.s.china&f=false) //Snowball
As Goh has observed. the reversal of US China policy 'illuminates the indeterminacy of realist power-balancing
logic as applied to this apparently clear- cut-case. In response to the Sino-Soviet war of I969, the Nixon administration
had four options, all of which would have been consistent with realist reasoning. It could have (1) done nothing and allowed
the two communist rivals to weaken each other; (2) supported the Soviet Union against China; (3) improved relations with both Beijing and
Moscow; or (4) supported the Chinese against the Soviets.'" In contrast to the existing literature and far front constituting a drastic departure,
Goh situates the prevailing realpolitik account of US rapprochement within the context of other ideas about
reconciliation with China covering the landscape from 1961 to 1974.43 Second, as Goh's thoughtful analysis
shows, traditional accounts have paid insufficient attention to how discursive representations affect the
policymaking process and how the rapprochement could have happened. Put differently, traditional
approaches have characteristically been occupied with explaining why but not how reconciliation was
achieved. Thus. Goh asks, '[h]ow was it possible that under Nixon. China shifted from being the United States' worst enemy
to being its friend and even tacit ally?' According to Goh, this is a process with which available accounts do not engage in a
sustained manner and she directs our attention to a serious alteration in representations of China in US China
policy.48
Discourse/Reps first
Discursive analysis is a prior question – policy is a reflection of linguistic constructions
Sun, 2015
(Jisheng, Professor and Dean of the Department of English and International Studies at China Foreign Affairs
University, Responding to Chinas rise, Chapter 4 The Construction of Uncertainty and Threat: Theoretical Debates
on China’s Rise, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, p. 77-97)
Language is a critical factor in international analysis, since it reveals how discourse, identity, and policy are
mutually constructed. In the field of international relations, language studies have gained momentum over the past 20 years due to
post-positivism, which brought the issue of language and deliberate linguistic application to the forefront of international relations theoretical
development. The post-positivist interest in language, which began in the 1980s, considers a rhetori- cal or linguistic turn in international
relations.2 So far, language studies have been concentrated mainly in constructivism and post-structuralism. In their view, language
is not
a mechanism to construct identity, rules,
context, and social reality. It also serves as the critical channel for interpretation and meaning creation. In addition to this
ontological significance, language also carries an epistemological element. We can learn and understand
a country’s foreign policy from its relevant linguistic tenden- cies. Finally, particular linguistic practices also
impact individual agency in diverse ways.∂ Language plays a largely constructive role, reflecting and realizing
the language user’s intentions. Constructivism is a good approach to understand changes and processes in international relations.
only an instrument of communication representing objective reality, but also
Alexander Wendt’s constructivist work, Social Theory of International Politics, asserts that the ideational structure of the global system shapes
the actor’s identity, and subsequently the actor’s interests and behavior.3 However, Wendt’s theory neglects the
role of
language during the inter- action between actors; actors are assumed to be silent. In 1989, Nicholas Onuf used
“constructivism” for the first time in his book, The World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory, emphasizing the central role of
language in international analysis from the ontological perspective.4 For Onuf, speaking is doing: language is both performative and social. As
people speak with one another, they always follow certain rules and gradually these rules of speech develop into social rules for the rest of
society. K.M. Fierke has also conducted research on the constructive role of lan- guage in international relations, using Wittgenstein’s language
games as theoretical guidance.5 According to Fierke, language constructs rules, rules shape context, and context further determines the
significance of the objects, actions, and behaviors. Janice Bially Mattern develops the post-constructivist theory by combining lan- guage,
identity, and the world order.6 She considers
language and identity as central to understanding the world order
and the creation of international institutions.7 In her theory, the main concepts related to language are language power and
representational force. Social linguistic construction produces identities and how these identities are
represented to the international community influences the dynamic outcomes of global affairs and
world order.8∂ Because language is both performative and capable of creating dominant dis- course, discourse and social reality are
mutually constructed. A society’s dominant discourse inevitably influences people’s thinking process and
subsequent behavior. Jennifer Milliken and Lene Hansen, among others, focus on the role of language from the perspective of
discourse.9 Their post-structuralist theories maintain that language is ontologically significant, for only through language
construction are objects, subjects, states, living beings, and material structures given meaning and a
certain identity.10 Language is therefore much more than a medium or a tool; it is a form of social and political
practice. One of the most important topics that post- structuralism addresses is the interdependence among language, discourse, identity,
and policy. Foreign policy relies largely on the identities that language constructs on the global stage, and
in turn, policy further reproduces identity. Therefore, as Hansen argues, identity is discursive in addition to being relational,
political, and social.11 In short, identity and policy are mutually constructed through language.∂ In sum, language
choice shapes the way countries narrate, frame, and define particular issues; this influences the creation
and interpretation of meaning. Research from the perspective of language helps us better understand
different national and international phenomena and puzzles and provides helpful suggestions for foreign
policymakers. Through discourse analysis, we can see how language constitutes and produces meaning, how discourse forms a structure of
signification and con- structs social realities, and how it defines subjects and their relational positions within the system of signification.
Discourse analysis can help reveal the results of linguistic representation, of adopting one mode of
representation over another. In short, discourse not only reflects the power relations in a society but can also help to construct
social reality.12
Representations are uniquely important in the context of China
Krolikowski, 2008
(Alanna, “State Personhood in Ontological Security Theories of International Relations and Chinese Nationalism: A
Sceptical View,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2008,
http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/1/109.full.pdf+html, arc)
This inconsistency between China’s putative maladapted type and its conduct towards other actors is further indicated
by changes in China’s self representations, in other words, in the discourses through which China
describes and explains itself and its circumstances to other actors. As we saw above, the capacity to self-monitor
reflexively and engage in reconstruction, re-ordering and development of their ‘biographical’ narrative, including relationships with others is
characteristic of actors in the high modern period, according to Giddens’s original formulation of ontological security.53 While these means of
producing and reproducing self identity and identification are typical of individuals in the contemporary epoch, healthy basic trust is a
precondition for them: actors with low basic trust are unable to engage in this type of self-identity development.54 Giddens regards this
inability as a form of neurosis that leaves individuals paralyzed and entrapped within their identity-affirming routines. Extending the analogy
with the individual suggests that states with rigid basic trust are not capable of reflexive identity change.
China,
however,
provides
one of the most striking examples of a state’s deliberate attempt to change its self-identity
and its
to other states . Yong Deng describes in great depth the processes through which
China endeavours to counter ‘China Threat theory’ by articulating alternative representations of its
identity, reputation and role in the international system.55 China threat theory refers to ‘Foreign attributions to China of a harmful,
destabilizing, and even pernicious international reputation’.56 Beijing has taken stock of realist theories of international
relations, which posit the tragedy of the security dilemma, specifically those emphasizing the
probability of war when rising powers challenge established hegemons.57 China is therefore aware of the security
dilemma it will confront ‘if its threat image abroad and material capabilities grow simultaneously’. 58
relationships of identification
Deng cities findings from the literature on the democratic peace and on security communities suggesting that social identification is one of the
processes through which threat image can be altered or overcome.59 States that are able to identify with each other are less likely to perceive
each other as threatening. They are therefore less susceptible to the constraining effects of the security dilemma. The opposite is true of states
that share no sense of identification. Such
consideration lies at the source of Beijing’s hypersensitivity to China
threat theory, and its consistent efforts to contest and undermine it.60 China’s ‘strategy’ to reduce the influence of
China threat theory includes several representational and other tactics particularly evident in China’s official statements to external audiences.
Probably chief among these is that of equating China threat theory with the outdated ‘mentality of Cold Warstyle power politics’ and
advocating that great powers take a less alarmist approach that is more suited to current realities in their statements to external audiences.61
A second tack involves repeated reassurances to foreign listeners of China’s peaceful intentions and
its satisfaction with the status quo world order.62 The clearest example of this type of representation
is Beijing’s ‘peaceful rise’ discourse, a series of pronouncements on the unique phenomenon of China’s growing influence on
global economic and political processes that serves specifically to differentiate China from earlier rising powers that provoked wars.63 Jing
Huang’s survey of official ‘assessments and policy designs’ since the late 1990s finds this discourse indicative of a new understanding of the
international environment. He concludes that it is supported by substantial changes in practices which exhibit a more actively engaged,
‘cooperative and patient’ China.64 Deng and Huang’s accounts of Beijing’s strategies find support in Chih-yu Shih’s analysis of Chinese academic
responses to China threat theory, in which he finds that
‘the introduction of IR theories to China one after another –
first realism, then liberalism and most recently constructivism – has directly affected how Chinese
represent themselves, internally as well as externally’ .65 Shih argues that ‘the self-representation of China
in terms of ‘peaceful rise’ suggests the influence of liberal theory and ideology as an alternative to
realism’ in Chinese thought.66
Discourse key to relations
A change is discourse is key to relations, trust, and bilateralism
Feng and He 2014
(Dr Huiyun Feng is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Utah State University. She is a former
Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at United States Institute of Peace, and Dr Kai He is an Associate
Professor of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. He was a postdoctoral fellow in the
Princeton–Harvard China and the World Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore 17 September 2014, “Examining China’s Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR
Scholars,” https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/WP281.pdf) //Snowball
In other words, due to the negative concerns about U.S. policies in Asia, Chinese leaders are more likely to choose
assertive policies as a response that is independent of China’s rise in power. It is reasonable to believe that U.S.
policymakers may also well justify the pivot or rebalancing strategy as a reaction to China’s assertiveness and the
Obama administration has continued the “rebalancing” efforts during the second term (Pempel, 2013). Although we do not want to get into a
discussion over who made the first move, one thing is clear: this
dynamic may lead to a vicious circle in bilateral relations
with China’s assertiveness on one hand and the U.S. pivot policy on the other. If building mutual trust is
the foundation of U.S.-China relations in the future, the leaders of both countries should consider how to
correct their negative images in each other’s eyes (Leiberthal and Wang, 2012). Second, the United States does not
need to exaggerate the danger of Chinese power. Our research suggests that the more confidence China‟s “America
watchers” have in China‟s power, the weaker the preference they have for an assertive diplomacy. On the other hand, when Chinese IR
scholars are pessimistic about China‟s power, they tend to have a stronger preference for an assertive diplomacy. Still, if we can extend Chinese
the United States should welcome a China that is
confident and powerful, rather than desperate and weak. Interestingly, our research does not find a significant effect of China‟s power
IR scholars‟ attitudes in our survey to represent Chinese leaders‟ perceptions,
perception on its policy attitudes toward the United States. This result reinforces the “policy reaction” hypothesis in explaining China‟s
assertive diplomacy. It seems time for U.S. policy makers to reconsider the “problems of the pivot” (Ross, 2012).
Language structures reality
Language is an institution that creates reality
Stoica, 15 (Dan S. Stoica, 12/29/15, A Professor in journalism, human relations, and communication
sciences at University “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” at Iasi in Romania, Communication and Natural Logic
International Society, Mind formatting institutions,
http://www.trajethos.ca/files/1014/5108/4763/STOICA_DAN_TrajEthos41.pdf, 6/24/16, CEJ)
All the examples chosen to discuss the role of language in shaping what we call here as “mind formatting
institutions” lead to the fact that we live in a permanently and discursively negotiated world. Our
individual and social representations of the world are built by linguistic activity through communicative
discourse. Language can be seen as the most powerful human tool, as the primary “institution’ that
culturally format our minds. Because all human social institutions function upon a discursive basis, they
all rely, consequently, on the use of language. We are smoothly shaped by the society we live in, and
there are institutions taking care of this. We chose to discuss examples related to the most common ones, highlighting some
shared features, namely that of the possibility of acting through manipulation. We also tried to make the case that the most important and
discrete is language, understood here as the mother tongue, the “mother of the institutions”. It moulds the information we receive about the
language shapes our way of thinking
and interacting socially with the others, shapes social representations. The other institutions – family,
church, school, press – were presented as stances that use language to manipulate. Manipulation is a
key word for us because humans exercise communication by willing to format minds (or persuade
others of the appropriateness of their messages), to influence the subconscient, and sometimes to
create stereotypes and implement ideas. As we tried to argue, manipulation is not an ethical issue. It is not always morally bad
world we live in, although structuring the reality we have to deal with. More importantly,
and, in fact, it should not be judged in terms of ethics and morality. We argue here, following Borţun’s ideas (2006) – that manipulation is jus a
tool that is simply amoral. It can be acceptable or not, efficient or not, like any other instrument. Starting from this idea, we had the intent to
present mind formatting institutions as (generally) good from the moral point of view, as they work to reproduce societies and to ensure that
the intercommunion that holds communities together could be seen as social representations.
Language creates institutions and social reality
Stoica, 15 (Dan S. Stoica, 12/29/15, A Professor in journalism, human relations, and communication
sciences at University “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” at Iasi in Romania, Communication and Natural Logic
International Society, Mind formatting institutions,
http://www.trajethos.ca/files/1014/5108/4763/STOICA_DAN_TrajEthos41.pdf, 6/24/16, CEJ)
Everywhere in the world, societies – acting as communities – set up institutions or just use already
existing ones, leading to their own reproduction. This reality relies on the use of language, which not
only influence people, but also socio-culturally shapes their minds. This paper has the goal of discussing
mind formatting institutions that smoothly “manipulate” people into being “good citizens”, from their
early ages to the end of their lives, thanks to language, understanding manipulation as a amoral tool.
The most prominent mind formatting institutions are the family, the school, the church, the press and,
crossing them all, language, understood as the mother tongue of a given community. Because it is about
smooth influence, about manipulation, a possible new perspective over this instrument is presented.
Cultural differences are also discussed, based upon differences between languages, highlighting them as
instances of social representations.
AT: Generic 2AC answers
AT: Positivism – China Specific
Positivism assumes an objective reality that can be measured and accurately reported
–this prevents self-refection in research, promotes bias, and is epistemologically
bankrupt
Pan, 2012
(Chengxin, senior lecturer in IR @ Deakin University, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics:
Western Representations of China’s Rise,” 2012, p. 3-5, arc)
A key suspect for the conspicuous absence of healthy self-reflection in China watching has to be the
ever-appealing positivism, an epistemological glue which helps hold an otherwise ‘argumentative
China watching community’ together. As an extremely influential theory of knowledge, positivism presupposes
the existence of an objective reality ‘out there’, independent of our thought but ultimately amenable
to scientific analysis. Crucially, claiming to have reached ‘the end of the theory of knowledge’, positivism performs ‘the
prohibitive function of protecting scientific inquiry from epistemological self-reflection. In this way, the
epistemological question of how we know what we know seems no longer necessary. Insisting on a clear distinction between
‘observable facts and often unsustainable “speculations about them”’, David Martin Jones is irritated by the postcolonial effort
of ‘exposing representation in literary “texts” or in film and music rather than addressing the empirical realm of social facts’. ¶
Rallying around the positivist tradition, most China watchers in the IR field treat China as something made
up of such observable facts. However complex those facts may be, and however difficult for China
watchers to completely detach themselves from personal biases, it is believed that there is an
ultimately knowable Chinese reality. The main task of China watching, by definition, should be about watching China. If China
knowledge is indeed objective, scientifically testable, and professionally cumulative, then it would seem meaningless, if not self-indulgent, to
it is no surprise
that few in the China-studies community have shown interest in such philosophical reflections and
still fewer are keen on epistemological debates on China watching; such debates, standing apparently in the way of
dwell on questions such as what China knowledge is, who is producing it, how and for what purposes. Consequently,
accumulating further knowledge on China, would appear not only unhelpful but needlessly polemic and divisive. A CASE FOR WATCHING CHINA
¶
Critical epistemological reflection on the field of China’s international relations is anything
but trivial. At one level, some measure of self-reflexivity is not only necessary but also unavoidable. It pervades all literary
works, as literature is always implicitly a reflection on literature itself. All forms of knowledge contain within themselves
some conscious or unconscious, direct or indirect, autobiographical accounts of the knowing/writing
self at either individual or certain collective levels. As evidenced in the self-image of positivist knowledge in
general, the very absence of critical self-reflection in China watching already denotes a particular way
of speaking about itself, namely, as a cumulative body of empirical knowledge on China. The problem
is that this scientistic self-understanding is largely uncritical and unconsciously so. If Pierre Macherey is
right that what a work does not say is as important as what it does say, then this curious and
WATCHING
¶
unconsciousness in the writing of China’s rise needs to be interrupted and made more conscious, a
it seems impossible for China watching to only watch
China. Aihwa Ong notes that “When a a book about China is only about China, it is suspect’. We may add
that it is also self-delusional.. China as an object of study does not simply exist in an objectivist or empirical
process which Jurgen Habermas calls reflection. ¶ Besides,
fashion ,
like a free-floating, self-contained entity waiting to be directly contacted, observed, and
analyzed . That is not to say that China is unreal, unknowable or is only a ghostly illusion constructed entirely out of literary representation.
Of course China does exist: the Great Wall, the Communist Party, and more than a billion people living there are all too real. And
yet, to say something is real does not mean that its existence corresponds with a single, independent
and fixed meaning for all to see. None of those aforementioned ‘real’ things and people beam out their meaning at us directly, let
alone offer an unadultered, panoramic view of ‘China’ as a whole. China’s existence, while real, is better understood, to use Martin Heidegger’s
term, as a type of ‘being-in-the-world’. The ‘in-the-world-ness’ is intrinsically characteristic of
China ’s being, which always needs to
be understood in conjunction with
representation.
its world, a world which necessarily includes China-bound
discourse and
AT: Realism
Realism establishes a logic of conflict – their “offensive rationality” only results in
militarization and war
Dalei and McKinney 2015
(Jie Dalei is an assistant professor at the School of International Studies of Peking University. Jared
McKinney is a dual-degree graduate student at Peking University and the London School of Economics,
The Diplomat, 5-18-2015, "Balancing China and the Realist Road to War," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/balancing-china-and-the-realist-road-to-war/) //Snowball
The Realist Road to War What is so frustrating, and perhaps paradoxical, about the growing chorus singing that the
U.S. should lead a balancing coalition against China is that it fits flawlessly into prominent political science
explanations for how major war occurs. According to the respected empirical scholarship of John Vasquez, for example, war is
the outcome of a process, not a random or inexplicable event. Nations go down a “road to war” by making certain
specific decisions. Each decision makes war more likely and reinforces the logic of conflict. Once you travel
down this road for a while, war becomes difficult to prevent and easy to cause. According to Vasquez, the “realist road
to war” begins with a dispute, typically over territory. The U.S. has no direct territorial disputes with China, but by intervening
in the disputes of others (from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea to Taiwan and the rocks of the South
China Sea), this first condition is met. Next, one state “balances” against the other by building up its military and
forming or strengthening regional adversarial alliances. The justification for this step along the road to war can vary,
but it generally involves the language of deterrence, standing up to bullying, peace through strength, or in the case of Blackwill
and Tellis, maintaining American primacy Advocates of this stage two balancing tend not to peer too intently at the future, preferring to
comfortably assume their nation’s stronger military position will dampen the dispute in question. But this is not what typically happens.
Instead, the state balanced against responds with its own military buildup, which seeks to cancel out the first state’s
relative gains. Following America’s fireworks show in Iraq in 1991 and threatening display of force against China during the 1996 Taiwan Straits
Crisis, the
Chinese government has pursued rapid military modernization for just this reason. Balancing and
counterbalancing, in turn, result in three new elements of competition: increasing polarization – e.g., other states in the region
are increasingly forced to choose between America or China – arms races, and deepening rivalry. In this context, both sides are
likely to make threats or demonstrations of resolve in order to strengthen the credibility of their deterrent or demonstrate the gravity
of their position. From such actions crises develop. In the U.S.-China relationship the most serious of these was the 2001 EP-3 Incident in which
Chinese and American military planes collided, but since then a whole series of incidents has occurred between Chinese and American naval
forces – for example, the 2009 Impeccable incident in which a collection of Chinese vessels harassed the U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable
as it was gathering intelligence off the coast of Hainan Island. These
crises, even when resolved peacefully, vindicate the hawks of
both sides, reinforcing visions of the other’s aggressiveness and, even more importantly, granting them additional
influence among decision makers. This stage of the process has not yet been reached in the U.S., but the 2016 presidential election, in which
every contender other than Rand Paul is likely to take a more hawkish position on China than President Barack Obama has, would provide a
perfect opportunity for such a new resolution against compromise to congeal, perhaps concluding with the appointment of scholars like
Blackwill and Tellis to top government posts. In
the final stage on the path to war, a new crisis develops – call it Senkaku,
side backs down as opinions of hawks now dominate the
intellectual decision-making process, and war is the outcome. A version of this process happened in 1914. It is not
Scarborough, or a South China Sea ADIZ – neither
unthinkable that it would happen in 2015. Suicide for Fear of Death The way to avoid a U.S.-China conflict is to step off the road to war. The first
step off this road should be the admission that a concerted effort to balance against or contain China is a sure recipe for inviting a forcible
response from Beijing and bringing conflict closer to the region. The prescriptions of Blackwill and Tellis are a call for suicide for fear of death, or
more specifically, they risk suicide for fear of a world in which the U.S. is not the dominant power. But this fear is misplaced.
Realism inevitable does not apply to china
China’s identity and our interpretation of it is always in flux – a realist approach is not
inevitable or effective
Yaqing, 2010
(Qin, “International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise,” The Chinese Journal of
International Politics, 2010, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/2/129.full.pdf+html, arc)
Identity in process means that an actor’s identity is constructed and re-constructed by processual forces which
come from relations in motion. If we follow Buzan’s categorization, any state could be called a revisionist,
including the United States, the UK, or France, for in their identity revisionist elements can be easily detected. This is essentially
the concept of ‘identity in fixity’, static and non-transformable. The reality is that any identity is identity in process. In
the past three decades, China’s success in peaceful rise has been mainly due to its own change, which
comes from interaction with and practices in international society.45 We did not have another cold war because, to
a large extent, China changed and brought the change as well as itself into international society. It is often argued over the question that such
change is tactical or fundamental, or as a result of calculation or of ideational reshaping.46 It is a false question, for the two again are
inseparable.47 Change includes behavior change and identity change, which are inter- and correlated. Action starting from interest calculation
leads an actor into a process and once inside the process mere interest calculation will not work, for the process has its own dynamics and the
complex relations may entangle the actor in endless intersubjective practices.
The intensive interaction among the actor and
other actors and between the actor and the process is powerfully transformative.48 Bian thus is the key to
understanding such processes. Continuity through change and change through intersubjective practices is
the key to the process-oriented interpretation of society as well as of identity. Buzan argues that it will be
extremely difficult for China to accept the primary institutions of international society. We may use one example to illustrate the opposite. Even
China has
accepted the institution of market economy and together with it how China has gradually changed its
identity from a most rigidly planned economy to largely a market economy. The process is a difficult, gradual,
if we take a brief look at the case of the market institution, we may see how the process approach works. The story tells us how
and through all the ups and downs, but it is not necessarily violent. Market economy has been long a primary institution of the Western
international society. China’s acceptance of the institution of market economy was extremely difficult and painful at the beginning. For thirty
years since 1949, China adopted the planned economy model and practiced it to the extreme during the Cultural Revolution. Market
was
not a mere economic issue. Rather it was related to China’s identity as a socialist state and to the
Chinese Communist Party’s identity as a revolutionary party. The first serious test for China’s reform and opening up
was therefore whether China would accept the market institution. Using the three steps in the process approach we argue that the key to this
test was how to look at the two opposites: market and planning.
AT: Mearsheimer/Offensive Realism
Yes, offensive realism is bad and wrong – bidding for hegemony is a path to
destruction
Kirshner 2012
(Jonathan Kirshner, Professor of International Political Economy in the Department of Government at
Cornell, European Journal of International Relations March 2012 vol. 18 no. 1 53-75, “The tragedy of
offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China,”
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/18/1/53.full.pdf+html) //Snowball
Realists are thus inescapably pessimistic about and wary of a rising China. But what does this suggest for policy? One realist
offers quite a clear answer to this question. John Mearsheimer (2001: 401–2; see also 2005c), drawing conclusions from a
structural realist theory he derives and labels ‘offensive realism,’ states plainly that ‘China cannot rise peacefully.’ Instead,
as its capabilities increase, China will become ‘an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’
The inevitability of this is such that the current US policy of engaging China is ‘misguided,’ and ‘doomed to failure.’ A powerful China will seek
‘to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the western hemisphere.’ Given these conclusions, Mearsheimer
urges the US
to ‘reverse course and do what it can to slow the rise of China.’ Mearsheimer starts out on shaky
ground; although offering a theory of how states must behave (and he reads his theory to conclude that the US will be irresistibly drawn to
confront and to try and prevent the rise of China), he is forced from the start to make ad hoc appeals to variables his
model otherwise rejects. In his model, states are rational; but sometimes they ‘do foolish things.’ In his model, states ‘act as
realists’ and things like domestic politics and ideology are irrelevant; but Americans are ideologically
predisposed to ‘dislike realism,’ which usually just results in a hypocritical divergence between America’s
rhetoric and its behavior, but in some cases (like current policy toward China) this disposition can cause problems for foreign
policy. This problem is elided by Mearsheimer’s fallback that while offensive realism is primarily a predictive theory, it is also a normative
one. As he explains, ‘offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory … but it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the
dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world.’ Or, even more plainly, ‘if states want to survive,
they should always act like good offensive realists’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 11–12). But Mearsheimer is
wrong — analytically wrong
in the logic of his predictions and dangerously wrong in his prescriptions. Many (but not all) of the errors of
offensive realism are rooted in its structuralism, and, as such, it productively illustrates the pathologies that
can result from an over-reliance on structural variables. I first consider the problems with offensive realist analysis; I then
turn to a re-evaluation of the relevant questions from a classical realist perspective that exposes the problematic nature of an exclusively
structural analysis. Mearsheimer (2001: 30) builds his theory on five ‘bedrock assumptions.’ Each of these are, indeed, good realist
assumptions, although some classical realists would find the fifth, and especially the fourth, overly restrictive. Nevertheless, they are all well
and good as reasonable points of departure, for realists of any stripe: 1) anarchy — that is, it is a self-help system with no guaranteed limits on
how others will behave; 2) states inevitably possess some offensive capability — therefore, they are potentially dangerous; 3) intentions are
uncertain — that is, you can never know for sure what other states are going to do, especially in the future; 4) the survival goal — this is crucial:
‘survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic
political order’; 5) rationality — this is also vitally important: the ‘fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors.’ From these
assumptions, Mearsheimer
concludes that states, motivated to ensure their own security, will recognize
that the safest position in the system is one of regional hegemony. (Global hegemony would be safer but is essentially
unattainable. Here the classical realist agrees — as George F. Kennan argued, ‘no people is great enough to establish world hegemony’ [Lukacs,
2007: 48].) Only a regional hegemon is secure in the knowledge that it will not be conquered by others. Thus, given the anarchic nature of the
international system, states that can plausibly make bids for regional hegemony will do so, as a matter of their own assessment of their best
chances for survival. ‘States quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system’; ‘only a
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 2, 3, 33, 55). The
fatal flaw in
Mearsheimer’s argument, however, is in his failure to distinguish between being a hegemon and bidding
for hegemony. It may indeed be that ‘the ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system.’ But according to his theory,
‘survival is the number one goal of great powers’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: 34, 46). The central question for a great
power mulling a bid for hegemony, therefore, is not ‘If I was the hegemon, will I be more likely to
survive?’ It is, ‘If I make a bid for hegemony, will I be more likely to survive?’ And here the answer should
be obvious to any rational great power (and, again, assumption five assumes great power rationality) — bidding for
hegemony is one of the few and rare paths to destruction for a great power. Most great powers are extremely
likely to survive; most great powers that bid for hegemony do not.
AT: Predictions
the Affirmative’s linear logic is rooted in cognitive bias and obfuscates the dynamic
politics of China – restructuring rhetoric solves
Kerbel 2007
(Josh Kerbel is an analyst/synthesist in the Strategic Assessments Group in the Directorate of
Intelligence, Apr 14, 2007, “Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China,” CIA, Studies
in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol48no3/pdf/v48i3a03p.pdf) //Snowball
Of the axioms, dictums, and mantras echoing through the US foreign policy and intelligence debates in the wake of
controversy over estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, none reverberates more than: be wary of mind-set and bias and
constantly reexamine assumptions. The fact is, however, that genuine wariness and thorough reexaminations
have been rare and attention has tended to focus on the more easily recognizable non-cognitive biases, the “lowhanging fruit,”
that eclipse much more ingrained cognitive biases and the flawed assumptions they engender.1
Nowhere is this tendency more clearly evident than in the continuing US debate over China, which has long
been conducted as if single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future are possible and that the
United States is capable of promoting or altering a predicted outcome. I will argue here that these two
assumptions are largely the result of an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias
that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality
behaves “nonlinearly.”2 In making my case, I will explain how cognitive bias fosters this misapplication, discuss the
illusions of certainty—especially of predictability and influence— that this misapplication promotes, and examine the complementary nonlinear perspectives that might correct the imbalance. Finally, I will suggest how such nonlinear
perspectives might be cultivated
and applied to—in the words of Sherman Kent—“elevate the level of debate.”3
The impact is policy failure – their representations result in a flawed predictive model
and misrepresentations of China
Kerbel 2007
(Josh Kerbel is an analyst/synthesist in the Strategic Assessments Group in the Directorate of
Intelligence, Apr 14, 2007, “Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China,” CIA, Studies
in Intelligence Vol. 48, No. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kentcsi/vol48no3/pdf/v48i3a03p.pdf) //Snowball
In addition to additivity, linear systems also have identifiable cause-and-effect relationships, repeatability and
proportionality between inputs and outputs—the properties that make linear systems susceptible to prediction
and manipulation, the hallmarks of America’s China debate.10 In the recent argument, predictions of China’s future
have tended to fall on a broad spectrum bounded by extremes that might best be characterized as
“rising China” and “doomed China.”11 If one can get beyond the ominous images those characterizations
evoke, what really needs to be seen is the severe contrast and enormous uncertainty they represent.
Given this evident uncertainty, how is it that individual predictors feel confident enough to make firm, singleoutcome predictions—with all the certainty implicit in them? A clue is to be found in the prevalence of one (little
thought about) linear term/concept: trajectory. The Newtonian term “trajectory” almost invariably accompanies American discussion of
futures; it is typically a manifestation of the misapplication of a linear, behavioral template. Formally defined, the
term describes smooth, evolutionary, continuous—and predictable—movement over time, such as those of the planets in accordance with
Newton’s laws of motion. By contrast, the
term does not apply to the abrupt, revolutionary, or discontinuous perturbations
that inevitably—but unpredictably— occur in nonlinear systems. In other words, the use of the word “trajectory” is really just
another way of predicting continuity or evolutionary change. In common practice these terms are often used together, as the following
quotation both illustrates and explains: …knowledge
years naturally inclines
of why and how things have gone as they have day after day for
the analyst to estimate that developments will continue along the same trajectory. It
is always a safer bet to predict that the situation tomorrow will be like it has been for the past dozen years than to say that it will change
abruptly.12
Power predictions fail – the Aff’s alarmism is exactly what we did with Japan
Nye 2013
(Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard and author of the
forthcoming Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the American Era, 2-12-2013, "Our Pacific
Predicament," American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/02/12/our-pacificpredicament/) //Snowball
It is difficult to remember that a little over two decades ago, many Americans feared being overtaken by Japan after
Japanese per capita income surpassed that of the United States. A 1989 Newsweek article put it succinctly: “In boardrooms
and government bureaus around the world, the uneasy question is whether Japan is about to become a
superpower, supplanting America as the colossus of the Pacific and perhaps even the world’s No. 1
nation.” Books predicted a Japanese-led Pacific bloc that would exclude the United States, and even an
eventual war between Japan and the United States. Futurologist Herman Kahn forecast that Japan would become a nuclear superpower,
and that the transition in Japan’s role would be like “the change brought about in European and world affairs in the 1870s by the rise of
Prussia.” These
views extrapolated an impressive Japanese record, but today they serve as a useful reminder about the
danger of linear projections based on rapidly rising power resources.
Predictions bad -SCS specific
Linear argumentation over the SCS is flawed and makes the impact inevitable through
scenario planned militarization and China’s response
Qi 2015
(Haotian Qi is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University, 6-18-2015, "The Line
That America Shouldn't Cross in the South China Sea," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-line-america-shouldnt-cross-the-south-china-sea13138?page=2) //Snowball
There are many issues one can address when considering Chinese domestic politics. One factor is more
widely discussed than others: nationalism. The impact of nationalism on Beijing’s security policies, as well as the
interactions between the party-state and the public are frequently condensed into an oversimplified linear argument.
This argument dictates that the party-state's manipulation makes nationalism dominant in public emotion leading to
aggressive foreign policy. The reality is more complex. Australian scholars conducted a survey in 2014 on Chinese public opinion on
the East China and South China Seas. They found that "the Chinese public appear to be less war-hungry on these disputes
than commonly assumed. Only two policies failed to receive majority approval, one was the official shelve dispute policy, the other was
send in the troops." Significantly fewer Chinese respondents support using military force, while the majority supported compromise and UN
arbitration in territorial and maritime disputes. From the perspective of crisis management, this is all good news. U.S. military planners may be
pleased to see that public opinion hinders Beijing's potential assertiveness. However, this is not the whole story. To better put this survey in the
context of the party-state’s relationship with public opinion, we need to consider two other issues. First, this
study was conducted
during a period of time when China was the primary challenger of the status quo in SCS. There were
different ways of conceptualizing and contextualizing what the status quo was. Nevertheless, there was little doubt that
China's rising assertiveness challenged the rules of the game or other parties' understandings of the rules. One crucial
difference today, however, is that the status quo would be further challenged by the United States if its military stepped
into the 12-nm line. It is thus not a stretch to expect that the respondents would be more sympathetic to assertive
Chinese options if the study were conducted again.
AT: Util
Utilitarianism and deontology function from the same flawed logic – we desire to selfpreserve yet we desire also to prevent the death of the other – it is out of this conflict
that ethics can survive and psychoanalysis meets its limits
Butler 2004.
(Judith. Professor of Philosophy and Rhetoric at Berkeley. Precarious Life. Pp. 136-137)
Of course, it is unclear still why Levinas would assume that one of the first or primary responses to
another's precariousness is the desire to kill. Why would it be that the spring of the shoulder blades, the
craning of the neck, the agonized vocalization conveying anther's suffering would prompt in anyone a
lust for violence? It must .be that Esau over there, with his four hundred men, threatens to kill me, or
looks like he will, and that in relation to that menacing Other or, indeed, the one whose face represents
a menace, I must defend myself to preserve my life. Levinas explains, though, that murdering in the
name of self-preservation is not justified, that self-preservation is never a sufficient condition for the
ethical justification of violence. This seems, then, like an extreme pacifism, an absolute pacifism, and it
may well be. We may or may not want to accept these consequences, but we should consider the
dilemma they pose as constitutive of the ethical anxiety: "Frightened for his own life, but anxious he
might have to kill." There is fear for one's own survival, and there is anxiety about hurting the Other, and
these two impulses are at war with each other, like siblings fighting. But they are at war with each
other in order not to be at war, and this seems to be the point. For the nonviolence that Levinas seems
to promote does not come from a peaceful place, but rather from a constant tension between the fear
of undergoing violence and the fear of inflicting violence. I could put an end to my fear of my own death
by obliterating the other, although I would have to keep obliterating, especially if there are four hundred
men behind him, and they all have families and friends, if not a nation or two behind them. I could put
an end to my anxiety about becoming a murderer by reconciling myself to the ethical justification for
inflicting violence and death under such conditions. I could bring out the utilitarian calculus, or appeal to
the intrinsic rights of individuals to protect and preserve their own rights. We can imagine uses of both
consequentialist and deontological justifications that would give me many opportunities to inflict
violence righteously. A consequentialist might argue that it would be for the good of the many. A
deontologist might appeal to the intrinsic worth of my own life. They could also be used to dispute the
primacy of the interdiction on murder, an interdiction in the face of which I would continue to feel my
anxiety. Although Levinas counsels that self-preservation is not a good enough reason to kill, he also
presumes that the desire to kill is primary to human beings. If the first impulse towards the other's
vulnerability is the desire to kill, the ethical injunction is precisely to militate against that first impulse. In
psychoanalytic terms, that would mean marshaling the desire to kill in the service of an internal desire
to kill one's own aggression and sense of priority. The result would probably be neurotic, but it may be
that psychoanalysis meets a limit here. For Levinas, it is the ethical itself that gets one out of the
circuitry of bad conscience, the logic by which the prohibition against aggression becomes the internal
conduit for aggression itself. Aggression is then turned back upon oneself in the form of super-egoic
cruelty. If the ethical moves us beyond bad conscience, it is because bad conscience is, after all, only a
negative version of narcissism, and so still a form of narcissism. The face of the Other comes to me from
outside, and interrupts that narcissistic circuit. The face of the Other calls me out of narcissism towards
something finally more important.
AT: Perm
AT: Perm/new data on China
Can’t include any part of the aff – new data is still problematic & claims to objectivity
prevent us from actually challenging dominant epistemological assumptions
Pan, 2012
(Chengxin, senior lecturer in IR @ Deakin University, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics:
Western Representations of China’s Rise,” 2012, p.7, arc)
Understanding representations as ‘something more’ than an empirical matter is crucial, though this does
not mean that empirical analysis has become irrelevant; it has not and will not. But if our critique of Western representations
stays at the empirical level, it will ultimately be ineffective, if not misleading itself. For one thing, there
is no compelling reason to suggest that our newer empirical data can serve as a more reliable base on
which to build China knowledge. Moreover, as will be made clear in the book, the overall function of Western
representations is self-imagination. For all their claims to scientific objectivity, they have not been
primarily about presenting an empirically accurate picture of China in the first instance. As such, no
amount of ‘accurate’ empirical facts or logical reasoning contrary to Western assumptions of China is
likely to succeed in challenging those assumptions.
Perm fails – only an epistemological interrogation allows us to understand the socially
constructed nature of threats
Šulović, 10
(Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization, http://www.ccmrbg.org/Occasional+Papers+and+Analysis/3855/Meaning+of+Security+and+the+Theory+of+Securitization.shtml)
The other school of thought, so-called “wideners” with Barry Buzan in front, has challenged this conception of security
by widening and deepening security studies agenda, both horizontally and vertically. Having in mind the horizontal
dimension, the wideners think that in reality the security concept has expended from exclusively military onto political,
economic, societal and environmental sectors. Vertically, the altered security concept should also be
open to referent objects[ii] other than the state (individuals, social groups, humanity as a whole).
Ontological standpoint of traditional understanding of security critics is that “social
relations and security threats are actually the result of an intersubjective ideational
social construction and that they do not exist objectively, independently” (Ejdus 2007).
This is, in essence, anti-essentialist ontological standpoint. Responding to the question on whether
the truth about social reality has one, unique, unchanging, essential meaning, or there are more versions of its
interpretation, proponents of this school of thought undoubtedly opt for the latter solution. Complete and
perfect knowledge does not exist. The truth about reality is a socially constructed
interpretation. Therefore, it is clear that the method used in their analysis can’t be positivist method, but a kind
of “empathic interpretation” (Ejdus 2007) of the facts. Methodological interpretive (post-positivism) assumption is that
there is an unbreakable unity between subject and object of cognition, therefore the facts are relative and dependent
upon the observer.[iii] Constructivist’s majority opinion is that “the theory does not take place after the
fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in constructing and defining what the facts
are” (Enloe and Zalewski, 1995: 299). Having that kind of attitude in mind , relevance of distinction
between “real” and “perceived” threats seizes to exist. Corollary of such epistemological
approach is that the main goal of security studies is to understand social reality, not
its explanation. To understand certain social phenomenon means to grasp and
interpret its meaning given by the social actors.
AT: FW
Their conception of knowledge is securitized; they think knowledge is that which
grounds the possibility of a human relationship to truth.
Dillon, 96
(Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of
Security, pp. 17-18)
The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics, is what excites my suspicion most,
and generates my sympathy for the genealogist.9 ‘Look,’ insisted the first genealogist , ‘isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this
need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?’
‘Is it not the instinct of fear’, he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—‘that
bids us to know?’: And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security.10
security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge
(surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will
to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence
to render all aspects of life transparent (totality). All these constitutive elements of
our contemporary manifold politics of security excited my suspicion because they comprise a
monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to
consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the
political, but of what it is to be human. Rather, and by first noting and questioning the already hypertrophic
register of security, I want to call the entire scheme of security into question . For that way lies a modest
contribution to making ‘our way back from the world to the life already betrayed by
knowledge; knowledge that delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the
point of losing its soul and its name there, of becoming mute and anonymous’.11
Hence:
‘Foucault’s genius is evidenced not in the pasting together of unrelated anecdotes’, a recent Foucault commentator noted, but in
illustrating that historical coherences are formed from the confluence of multiple strategies and tactics of power and knowledge.
History, he shows, is not the product of grand narratives with teleological movements but of diverse struggles that nonetheless become
organised into coherent (that is to say, more or less continuous) patterns of domination, subjectification, and government. 12 One of
those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For
whatever politics is allowed or taken to be—how it is captured, fixed and determined in its foundations; in short secured—is a decisive
element in all power struggles. And yet I think that the very surfeit of information about politics which academic and media
technologies create has made us so ignorant of the political, and the way that it is secured, that we are hardly even capable of
formulating, much less posing and pursuing, the question of the political itself.
Case Defense
US-China War
No US-China war
China lacks military expertise, doctrine and equipment
-army and navy are only capable of defensive operations
-they have no allies & no overseas bases
-US has 2-3x their capabilities in every area
Axe, 2015
(David, Why China is far from ready to meet the US on a global battlefront, Reuters, 22 June 2015,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/21/why-china-is-far-from-ready-to-meet-the-u-s-on-a-globalbattlefront/, arc)
China is not a global military power. In fact, right now it doesn’t even want to be one. But that doesn’t mean
¶
the world’s most populous country doesn’t pose a threat to the planet’s wealthiest and most powerful one. Yes, the United
States and China are at odds, mostly as a result of China’s expanding definition of what comprises its territory in the western
Pacific, and how that expansion threatens U.S. allies and the postwar economic order Washington was instrumental in
creating.¶ China, however, still could not meet and match the U.S. military on a global battlefront. Beijing
lacks the expertise, military doctrine and equipment to do so. The Chinese military has no recent
combat experience and, as a consequence, its training regimens are unrealistic.¶ Beijing’s army, navy
and air force may be flush with new equipment, but much of it is based on designs that Chinese
government hackers and agents stole from the United States and other countries. Most of it has never been
exposed to the rigors of actual combat, so it’s unclear how well it would actually work. But that might not matter.
China has no interest in deploying and fighting across the globe, as the United States does. Beijing is preparing
¶
to fight along its own borders and especially in the China seas, a far easier task for its inexperienced troops. ¶ Because, with all its
military handicaps, in its own region China could be capable of beating U.S. forces in battle. ¶ The critical question is just how
much the Pentagon should care.¶ Active defense¶ The brutal Japanese invasion and occupation of China during the 1930s and
1940s had a profound effect on modern China’s development. Prior to the mid-1980s, China’s military strategy was focused on
one great fear — another invasion, in this case an overland attack by the Soviet Union. ¶ Commensurate with the threat, Beijing’s
military organization emphasized short-range, defensive ground forces. In essence, a Great Wall of men and metal.¶ The danger
from the Soviet Union ebbed and, in 1985, the Chinese Communist Party revised its war strategy. The “active defense” doctrine
sought to move the fighting away from the Chinese heartland. It shifted attention from China’s western land border to its
eastern sea frontier — including Taiwan, which in the eyes of Beijing’s ruling Communist Party is a breakaway province.¶ But the
new strategy was still largely defensive. “We attack only after being attacked,” the Chinese navy asserted in its contribution to
the official active-defense doctrine. It’s worth noting that, in the party’s view, a formal announcement of full independence by
Taiwan would be an “attack” on China’s integrity, justifying a retaliatory attack on the island nation.¶ Thirty years later, Beijing
is still pursuing its offshore defense, if at a greater distance. It now encompasses island territory that China dared not
actively claim until recently. Still, the strategy remains the same.¶ Which is why, for all the hundreds of billions of
dollars Beijing has spent on its armed forces since the Chinese economy really took off in the late
1990s and 2000s — and even taking into account equipment optimized for an amphibious assault on
Taiwan — Beijing still acquires mostly short-range, defensive weaponry.¶ Which is how China can
possess the world’s second-biggest fleet of jet fighters after the United States — 1,500 jets versus Washington’s
2,800 — but only a mere handful of the aerial tankers that refuel fighters in mid-air, allowing them to
fight battles far from their bases.¶ The U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps together operate more than 500 tankers.
Because America fights all over the world. Similarly, China’s navy is huge. With some 300 warships, it is second in
¶
strength only to the 500 vessels in service with the U.S. Navy and Military Sealift Command, which operates America’s transport
and spy ships. But the Chinese navy, like its air force, is a short-range force. Beijing’s fleet includes just six
logistics ships capable of refueling and resupplying other ships at sea, extending their sailing range.¶ America’s fleet includes
more than 30 such vessels.¶ The upshot of Beijing’s emphasis on short-range forces is that the farther its troops fight
from the Chinese mainland, the less effective they will be. It doesn’t help that Beijing has few close allies,
which means virtually no overseas bases it can count on during conflicts . The Pentagon, by contrast,
maintains many hundreds of overseas facilities.¶ Chinese forces simply cannot cross the ocean to confront the U.S. military in
America’s own backyard. Nor does Beijing even want to do so. Meanwhile, U.S. forces routinely patrol
within miles of China’s airspace and national waters, and Washington has taken it on itself to be the decisive if
not dominant military power on every continent.
Even under the most strained circumstances, there won’t be a US-China war
Glaser, 11
(Charles - Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and
Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China’s Rise
Lead to War?, Foreign Affairs, 2011, arc)
Current international conditions
should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large
threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly
effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the
road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack
and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S.
homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the
Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large
enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive
advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon
be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States'
massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and
support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security
dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to
superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which
What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good.
should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have
the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does
not want to threaten its security-and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.
China rise/ Regional Heg
Low probability of both China rise and conflict – best way to prevent war is to take a
step back – the plan creates the only risk for conflict
Dalei and McKinney, 2015
(Jie and Jared, Jie Dalei is an assistant professor at the School of International Studies of Peking University. Jared
McKinney is a dual-degree graduate student at Peking University and the London School of Economics. “Balancing
China and the Realist Road to War,” 18 May 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/balancing-china-and-therealist-road-to-war/, arc)
The way to avoid a U.S.-China conflict is to step off the road to war. The first step off this road should
be the admission that a concerted effort to balance against or contain China is a sure recipe for
inviting a forcible response from Beijing and bringing conflict closer to the region. The prescriptions of
Blackwill and Tellis are a call for suicide for fear of death, or more specifically, they risk suicide for fear
of a world in which the U.S. is not the dominant power. But this fear is misplaced.¶ There is good news
and bad news for analysts who fear China’s rise. The bad news is that whether China will rise or not
ultimately depends on its own domestic development and much less on what others do. To use one of
Joseph Nye’s favorite phrases, “only China can contain China.” The good news is that even without U.S.
primacy in Asia, it would still be very difficult, and most likely impossible, for China to dominate the
region given the presence of multiple major powers, nuclear weapons, and the high tide of
nationalism. To put it another way, Blackwill and Tellis’ report calls for expending enormous resources
and running grave risks to prevent something that is not likely to happen. Needless to say, this does not
sound like a very auspicious “revision” to U.S. grand strategy.
China is not pursuing regional dominance – prefer statistics to their hasty
generalizations
Dalei and McKinney, 2015
(Jie and Jared, Jie Dalei is an assistant professor at the School of International Studies of Peking University. Jared
McKinney is a dual-degree graduate student at Peking University and the London School of Economics. “Balancing
China and the Realist Road to War,” 18 May 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/balancing-china-and-therealist-road-to-war/, arc)
More fundamentally, the authors have an unsound view of China’s grand strategy, which for them is crystal clear:
to replace U.S. hegemony in Asia. Although growing assertiveness in some aspects of Chinese foreign policy has
unsettled certain Asian countries and lent some validity to this interpretation, it is premature to conclude that China
is actually seeking to “dominate” the region. According to a recent survey of Asian strategic elites
done by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, although only 11 percent of Chinese respondents
favored a U.S.-led regional order, a similarly small number (17 percent) wanted a Sino-centric order. More than 40
percent desired to see “a new community of nations based on strengthened multilateral institutions
and cooperation.” Moreover, more than half of Chinese respondents expect to see continued U.S.
leadership in Asia over the next decade. In short, China’s future strategic orientation is still in flux, but
Blackwill and Tellis see it as preordained.
AFF cards
Securitization good
China
US-China war is likely – so is escalation – new tech alters the way we should think
about securitization
*this is a defense of epistemology/discourse
Singer and Cole, 2015
(P.W. Singer – strategist @ New America & August Cole – fellow @ the Atlantic Council, “This is what
world war III will look like,” Time, 30 June 2015, http://time.com/3934583/world-war-3/, arc)
U.S. and Chinese warships battle at sea, firing everything from cannons to cruise missiles to lasers. Stealthy Russian and American fighter jets
dogfight in the air, with robotic drones flying as their wingmen. Hackers in Shanghai and Silicon Valley duel in digital playgrounds. And fights in
outer space decide who wins below on Earth. Are theses scenes from a novel or what could actually take place in the real world the day after
tomorrow? The answer is both. Great power conflicts defined the 20th century: Two world wars claimed tens of millions of lives, and the Cold
War that followed shaped everything from geopolitics to sports. But at the start of the 21st century, the ever-present fear of World War III
seemed to be in our historic rearview mirror. Yet that risk of the past has made a dark comeback. Russian land grabs in Ukraine and constant
flights of bombers decorated with red stars probing Europe’s borders have put NATO at its highest levels of alert since the mid 1980s. In the
¶
¶
Pacific,
the U.S. and a newly powerful and assertive China are engaged in a massive arms race. China
built more warships and warplanes than any other nation during the last several years, while the Pentagon
just announced a strategy to “offset” it with a new generation of high-tech weapons. Indeed, it’s likely China’s alleged recent hack of
federal records at the Office of Personnel Management was not about cyber crime, but a classic case of what is known as
“preparing the battlefield,” gaining access to government databases and personal records just in case. The worry is that the brewing
21st century Cold War with China and its junior partner Russia could at some point turn hot. “A U.S.-China war is inevitable”
¶
recently warned the Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper after recent military face-offs over rights of passage and artificial
islands built in disputed territory. This may be a bit of posturing both for U.S. policymakers and a highly nationalist domestic audience: A 2014
poll by the Perth U.S.-Asia center found that 74%
of Chinese think their military would win in a war with the U.S. But
Many Chinese officers have begun to lament out loud what they call
“peace disease,” their term for never having served in combat.¶ Wars start through any number of pathways: One
world war happened through deliberate action, the other was a crisis that spun out of control. In the coming decades, a war might
ignite accidentally, such as by two opposing warships trading paint near a reef not even marked on a
nautical chart. Or it could slow burn and erupt as a reordering of the global system in the late 2020s, the period at which China’s
military build up is on pace to match the U.S.¶ Making either scenario more of a risk is that military
planners and political leaders on all sides assume their side would be the one to win in a “short” and
“sharp” fight, to use common phrases. It would be anything but.¶ A great power conflict would be
quite different from the small wars of today that the U.S. has grow accustomed to and, in turn, others think reveal a new
it points to how the global context is changing.
American weakness. Unlike the Taliban or even Saddam’s Iraq, great powers can fight across all the domains; the last time the U.S. fought a
peer in the air or at sea was in 1945. But a 21st century fight would also see battles for control of two new domains. The lifeblood of military
¶
communications and control now runs through space, meaning we’d see humankind’s first battles for the heavens. Similarly,
we’d learn
“cyber war” is far more than stealing Social Security Numbers or e-mail from gossipy Hollywood executives, but the takedown of
the modern military nervous system and Stuxnet-style digital weapons. Worrisome for the U.S. is that last year,
the Pentagon’s weapons tester found nearly every single major weapons program had “significant vulnerabilities” to
cyber attack.¶ A total mindshift is required for this new reality. In every fight since 1945, U.S. forces
have been a generation ahead in technology, having uniquely capable weapons like nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. It has
not always translated to decisive victories, but it has been an edge every other nation wants. Yet U.S. forces can’t count on that
“overmatch” in the future. These platforms are not just vulnerable to new classes of weapons like long-range missiles, but China, for
example, overtook the EU in R&D spending last year and is on pace to match the U.S. within five
years, with new projects ranging from the world’s fastest supercomputers to three different longrange drone-strike programs. And now off-the-shelf technologies can be bought to rival even the most advanced tools in the U.S.
arsenal. The winner of a recent robotics test, for instance, was not a U.S. defense contractor but a group of South Korea student engineers.¶
An array of science-fiction-like technologies would likely make their debut in such a war, from AI
battle management systems to autonomous robotics. But unlike the ISIS’s of the world, great powers can also go after
high-tech’s new vulnerabilities, such as by hacking systems and knocking down GPS. The recent steps taken by the U.S. Naval Academy illustrate
where things might be headed. It added a cybersecurity major to develop a new corps of digital warriors, and also requires all midshipmen
While many leaders on
both sides think any clash might be geographically contained to the straights of Taiwan or the edge of
the Baltic, these technological and tactical shifts mean such a conflict is more likely to reach into each
side’s homelands in new ways. Just as the Internet reshaped our notions of borders, so too would a war waged partly online. The civilian
learn celestial navigation, for when the high tech inevitably runs into the age old fog and friction of war.
¶
¶
players would also be different than those in 1941. The hub of any war economy wouldn’t be Detroit. Instead, tech geeks in Silicon Valley and
shareholders in Bentonville, Ark., would wrestle with everything from microchip shortages to how to retool the logistics and allegiance of a
multinational company. The new forms of civilian conflict actors like Blackwater private military firms or Anonymous hacktivist groups are
unlikely to just sit out the fight. A Chinese officer argued in a regime paper, “We must bear a third world war in mind when developing military
forces.” But there is a far different attitude in Washington’s defense circles. As the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations worried last year, “If you talk
about it openly, you cross the line and unnecessarily antagonize. You probably have a sense about how much we trade with that country, it’s
astounding.” This is true, but both the historic trading patterns between great powers before each of the last world wars and the risky actions
and heated rhetoric out of Moscow and Beijing over the last year demonstrate it is no longer useful to avoid talking about the great power
¶
¶
rivalries of the 21st century and the dangers of them getting out of control.
We need to acknowledge the real trends in
motion and the real risks that loom, so that we can take mutual steps to avoid the mistakes that
could create such an epic fail of deterrence and diplomacy . That way we can keep the next world war where it
belongs, in the realm of fiction.
Chinese security threat real, alliances, regional conflicts, and history
(Richard N. Rosecrance and Steven E. Miller, 2014, “The Next Great War?”, Richard N. Rosecrance is Director of the U.S.-China
Relations Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, where
he is also adjunct professor of public policy. Steven E. Miller is director of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center., Intro pg-XXI,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8UCFBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=US+china+war&ots=k9RF0VrH0j&sig=yPULGJEVHBpSVK
dqXt211eFsD4#v=onepage&q=Furthermore%2C%20one%20of%20the%20most%20troublesome%20aspects%20of%20the%20international%20order%20in%
20&f=false)/AS
one of the most troublesome aspects of the international order in 1914 is partially reproduced
today
one warning that particularly leaps
is the danger of entrapping alliances
alliance dynamics are singled out as one of the most toxic elements
China does not have an
extensive network of allies, but its one link in East Asia, North Korea, clearly has the potential to drag
China into trouble. The U S network of bilateral alliances in Asia connect Washington to the interests
of a number of states in the region, including some that have long had bad relations with China and
some that have ongoing disputes with China There is the potential for the United States to be drawn
into disputes with China in support of its allies This is, of course, what allies would want and expect,
local conflicts can escalate into great power a Hence to support allies can
undermine Cooper's warning: beware third countries. The most likely route to war with China is via a
dispute involving one or more of the United States' Asian allies. This is not a purely hypothetical
Furthermore,
. If there is
out from the pages of this volume, it
. As noted above,
in the picture in 1914.
nited
tates'
.
.
and failure
credibility. The risk, as Rudd cautions in his chapter, is that
danger Asia's many territorial disputes,
, are potential flashpoints
the welter of maritime boundary disputes in Southeast Asia as constituting a "maritime
Balkans?" Confrontations and crises have already happened and more are likely There could well
emerge a pattern of recurrent crises
such crises could gradually
grow more malignant, more difficult to handle; mistakes could be made; and complacency could turn
out to be a glide path to war
.
on both land and sea
. Japan and China are feuding over disputed North Pacific islands. Taiwan and China
remain stalemated. Rudd describes
.
, as was true in the decade before 1914. If crises are handled without escalation, complacency could set in. But
. Rudd vividly puts it, "One of the profound lessons of 1914 is the rapidity with which circumstances can change from utterly benign to utterly catastrophic within the space of months."
US China War has happened before- Taiwan Key
(Ted Galen Carpenter, 2015, “America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan”, Senior fellow for defense and foreign
policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for
defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011. He is the author of 10 books and the editor of 10 books on international affairs Carpenter
is contributing editor to the National Interest and serves on the editorial boards of Mediterranean Quarterly and the Journal of Strategic
Studies, and is the author of more than 600 articles and policy studies. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, World Policy Journal,
and many other publications. He is a frequent guest on radio and television programs in the United States, Latin America, Europe, East Asia, and
other regions., pg 13, Palgrave, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=UHKWBgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=US+china+war&ots=sKT7R8IS3&sig=zBbFWAg_uPw-DlTe3u9s7cuOj8c#v=onepage&q=US%20china%20war&f=false)/AS
The war that erupted between the United States and China in 2013 was a classic case of miscalculation
by both parties Beijing nor Washington thought that the other side would escalate the long-standing
tensions over Taiwan to the point of armed conflict Yet armed conflict was the result
the world's two leading powers have been locked in a cold that has been at least as intense as
the earlier surly confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Unio
Policymakers have undoubtedly asked themselves many times whether the
brief but intense conflict that
in July 2013 could have been avoided. They probably have asked
themselves at least as many times whether defending Taiwan was worth the price.
. Neither
.
, and the world has been paying the price ever since.
For a quarter century,
n. The prospects for global peace and prosperity that looked so promising
in the 1990s following the end of the first cold have turned to ashes.
broke out
Cyber
Geopolitical battles are being waged in cyberspace – the state is necessary to regulate
and combat threats
-not just “western perception of a threat” – china and Russia
Ishii, 2016
(Andre, “Geopolitics, the State, and Cybersecurity in a Globalized World,” 13 March 2016,
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-the-state-and-cybersecurity-in-a-globalized-world/)
Since the end of the Cold War and the alleged “End of History,” there have been numerous arguments proposed to the effect that due to
interconnectedness of the humanity via the Internet, the traditional concept of the state and the geopolitical notions underpinning it have been
rendered obsolete. As a parallel phenomenon to the growth of globalization of material goods and ideas, the proponents of the idea argue that
the IT revolution grounded in the expansion of the Internet will connect ever more users and level the playing field for all, creating a certain
form of global commons that’s rooted in a system of common values, buttressed by economic interdependence on a global scale. Although
¶
international and interstate cooperation is needed and admirable effort to combat internationally pressing issues,
this supposed
erosion of the state has been asserted many times but rarely supported with substantial facts. It
seems that this perspective has gone far ahead of reality on the ground. This is even more so true in
the area of national security strategy, under which cybersecurity is most often classified. Researchers T.V. Paul and
Norrin M. Ripsman conclude in their work Globalization and the National Security State that many of the assertions
regarding the obsolescence of national borders have been hyped, especially in the area of national security.
They point out that though globalization has influenced the national security apparatus of differing states in differing ways,
great power states have in many ways maintained or even consolidated their domestic powers as
opposed to delegating more authority to international organizations.¶ Geopolitics, in which national security and strategy
are often rooted, is just as relevant as ever in the face of threats related to cybersecurity. According to
¶
Marshall Institute Fellow, John B. Sheldon, there are numerous reasons to believe that geopolitics still remain fundamental in the face of the
Internet revolution. Sheldon points out that infrastructures from satellites to routers to cables are placed in specific points of geography (most
of which have been placed by private companies), and geopolitical considerations are taken into account for their placements (such as not
placing cables too closely to sea lanes.) In a thesis paper produced in 2014, he concludes that “Wherever geopolitical rivalries and tensions are
present and wherever the physical locus of power resides, cyber exchanges occur. Terrorist use of cyberspace also has a geopolitical
dimension… Last, it might even be claimed that the criminal use of cyberspace can have a geopolitical aspect… [who], taking advantage of
countries with cyberspace infrastructure but weak governance, use cyberspace to further their geographic reach and take advantage of global
financial networks.” In 2009, the GhostNet spy system based in China infected computers of over a hundred locations of strategically significant
political and economic interests, many of them embassies. One such target included the office of the Dalai Lama, who is regarded as Beijing’s
¶
nemesis. These
various savvy actors implement their geopolitical ambitions not only on the surface web,
but also on the dark web, which requires professional knowledge and resources to combat.¶ In
November 2012, anti-Israel hacker group Parastoo hacked into the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United
Nations, releasing the names of the agency’s nuclear experts on its website. The motivation of the disclosure, according to the
Parastoo website, was to persuade the nuclear scientists to urge the IAEA to launch investigation into the Israeli nuclear
program. Parastoo, as noted by various reports, is a common girl’s name in Iran. Iran and Israel, needless to say, are regional
rivals. What can be glimpsed from this case also is that cyberspace is functioning as a virtual space for various
actors to play out their geopolitical strategies rooted in the three-dimensional, physical realm that we
inhabit.¶ The state is a durable institution, and it is flexible enough to accommodate societal changes,
regional or global. It is not just the US government that is taking an initiative in cybersecurity. The Brazilian government has taken
measures against the surveillance programs of the US National Security Agency. In 2008 the Swedish government enacted anti-terror
legislation to monitor Internet traffic passing through its territory. The Chinese government – known for its Golden Shield project and itself
targeted by domestic hackers – arrested late last year several hackers at the request of the United States government. The US government had
threatened Beijing – an entity alleged to have sponsored the hacking of Anthem Inc. database – with a round of economic sanctions (which, of
course, is implemented through state institutions). The
role of the state, for good or for bad, will be expected to endure in
the fight against threats rising out of cyberspace for the foreseeable future. There should be efforts for greater
public-private cooperation on the issue of cybersecurity and no great ideas should be wasted because of bureaucratic preconceptions, red tape,
and blinders. Additionally, the effort to counter threats from cyberspace may not only be a purely domestic operation; it can have an
international scope as well. For instance, there has been deeper cooperation between the US Department of Homeland Security and the Israel
National Cyber Bureau, and more recently a partnership was struck between New York City and Jerusalem to combat infrastructural
cyberattacks. During the first week of March this year, the RSA Conference 2016 was held in San Francisco. RSA is the world’s largest
¶
cybersecurity conference, annually hosting various experts in the IT field. RSA President Amit Yoran emphasized that it is creativity that is the
anchor of cybersecurity. Yoran noted that “the problem isn’t a technology problem. Adversaries aren’t beating us with better tech. They’re
beating us because they’re being more creative, more patient, more persistent.” Yoran also expressed that more
steps need to be
taken to prevent attacks rather than just focusing on incident response, and this can be done by infusing creativity into those at the
forefront of cybersecurity.¶ Each and every Internet user has a part in protecting against cybersecurity
breaches while engaging in day-to-day activities. But as the importance of geopolitics remains, so too
will the importance of the state. And no matter how imperfect that state response may be, it will
continue to be part of the cybersecurity architecture meant to mitigate political risks rising out of the
Internet. What is needed is a collaboration of experts and an open environment for the exchange of tactics and ideas. Only then can we
truly meet the challenges that will continue to emerge from cyberspace.
Experts agree – cyber war is a legitimate threat
Killalea, 6/24/16
(Debra, “South China Sea conflict: China cyber war that is the real story,
http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/south-china-sea-conflict-china-cyber-war-that-isthe-real-story/news-story/d451255be80fa2fb9c18c0aaf121b5f9, arc)
In fact one expert warns China’s cyber war capabilities will in the future be more dangerous than
anything else currently taking place across the region.¶ By the next decade, Beijing’s cyber war
capabilities could change the strategic balance in Asia, eclipsing the potential danger of rising tensions
in the South China Sea.¶ That is the view of cyber security expert Greg Austin who predicts new
technologies will “redefine both war and politics across East Asia”.¶ The professor of cyber security,
strategy and diplomacy in the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of NSW told news.com.au that while
tensions were simmering in the South China Sea, the biggest threat to peace in the region was yet to come.¶ “Today, China is
struggling to integrate cyber weapons and information dominance into its military strategies,” he said. “By 2030, China will
have acquired a total war capability in cyber space against Taiwan.¶ “This will alter the strategic
balance in the Western Pacific more than anything that is happening around the coral reefs in the
South China Sea today.Ӧ Prof Austin, who addressed a two-day conference with a presentation on Shaping the Cyber
Arms Race of the Future, yesterday also warned Australia was lagging behind.¶ Prof Austin said warfare in East Asia today could
be described as cyber-enabled but this would change very quickly.¶ “After 2030, it will become ‘cyber-dominant’ and Australia
will have to build systems that can survive in that environment of electronic torpedos and logic bombs,” he warned. ¶ He said it
was vital Australia’s military and naval technology could withstand any potential cyber threats in future.
Soft power
Soft power decreases China threat construction and makes US-China war less likely
Machida 10 [Satoshi, University of Nebraska at Kearney, 2010, “U.S. Soft Power and the “China
Threat”: Multilevel Analyses,” Asian Politics & Policy 2:3 p351-370]
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has been undergoing a significant transformation.
While the United States has
enjoyed overwhelming influence on global politics, China is claiming more voice in the international
arena by utilizing its growing capabilities in various fields . Recognizing the potential threat from China against the dominant
status of the United States, this
study has analyzed the factors that can shape threat perceptions of China .
Specifically, the focus of this study has been on the impact of American soft power , which refers to a range of
noncoercive forces including values, cultures, ideas, and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). The statistical analyses have dissected individual threat perceptions of China,
focusing on the nature of U.S.-China relations in the international system. By relying on the analytical framework developed by Rousseau (2006), I have examined
two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis envisages a conflictual relationship between the United States and China. Assuming that American and Chinese
interests are not compatible in the international system, I have hypothesized that American soft power amplifies threat perceptions of China. On the other hand,
the second hypothesis assumes a more peaceful relationship between the two states.
Recognizing the peaceful intentions of China
and the interdependent relationship between the United States and China, I have hypothesized that
American soft power and favorable opinions of China can be compatible.
competing hypotheses by relying on the Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007. Findings from the
This study has examined these two
analyses lend support for the second
hypothesis: the diffusion of U.S. soft power in a state reduces threat perceptions of China. Those who
are closely attached to American values, customs, and technologies are less likely to perceive China
as a grave threat . In the situation in which the United States and China have developed significant degrees of interdependence in various fields, people’s
feelings toward the United States and those toward China tend to converge. Consequently,
the diffusion of U.S. soft power tends to
render individuals more open to the idea of a growing China, thus curbing threat perceptions of
China.
In this way, this study has revealed a novel picture regarding how people perceive China in the international system. These findings provide important
implications for U.S.-China relations. In recent years, Western scholars have emphasized the urgency of the “China threat,” warning that China may seriously
destabilize the international system. Inevitably, the main concern in this debate is whether China challenges the dominant status of the United States in the
international system (Friedberg, 2005). The implications from the analyses do not seem to support the view that emphasizes the incompatibility between the United
States and China. Rather, the results from the analyses are consistent with the view based on the interdependent relationship between the United States and China.
The finding that
U.S. soft power actually reduces threat perceptions of China highlights the presence of
close interdependence between the two states. The recognition of mutual interests between the
United States and China is likely to foster more accepting attitudes toward China.
Considering these findings, it
seems to be the case that the “China threat” argument is significantly exaggerated by scholars, journalists, and policy makers (Al-Rodhan, 2007).
Accordingly, the United States can avoid a future confrontation with China by implementing a
prudent foreign policy in the international system (see Lake, 2006). The effective use of soft power
should be one of the most important policy tools in dealing with the growing influence of China (Nye,
2002, 2004). Specifically, as the results from the statistical analyses indicate, it is imperative that the
United States promote its soft power so that the diffusion of American values, ideas, and customs do
not instigate major conflict with China . Highlighting the differences between the United States and China would not be a wise policy;
rather, it is essential that U.S. policy makers emphasize the compatibility between these two states in utilizing American soft power. In order to establish a peaceful
relationship between the United States and China, American soft power has to carry conciliatory messages.
Perm
Criticisms of security need to be engaged with actual policy discourse
Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009
(Lenke and Helen, “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,” International Studies
Quarterly 53, https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/digital%20disaster.pdf)
Constituting something as a ‘‘security problem’’ while simultaneously defining something as not has
significant consequences in that it endows ‘‘the problem’’ with a status and priority that ‘‘non-security
problems’’ do not have. Normatively it is therefore crucial that Security Studies engage the
conceptualizations of security that are mobilized within policy discourse—be those environmental,
health, or cyber security—even if the conclusion is to argue that the implications of such security
discourses are problematic (Deudney 1990; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998:29; Huysmans 2006:124–44). Yet, in spite
of the widespread references to cyber insecurities in policy, media, and Computer Science discourses, there has been
surprisingly little explicit discussion within Security Studies of what hyphenating ‘‘security’’ with ‘‘cyber’’ might imply. To take a
recent example, the broadly conceived textbook, Contemporary Security Studies, edited by Alan Collins, has no entries for
‘‘cyber security,’’ ‘‘computers,’’ ‘‘critical infrastructure,’’ ‘‘information security,’’ or ‘‘networks’’ (Collins 2007). Those Security
Studies scholars who do address cyber-related themes employ ‘‘adjacent concepts’’—‘‘cyber war’’ (Der Derian 1992; Arquilla
and Ronfeldt 1993), ‘‘netwar’’ and ‘‘network security’’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996, 2001; Deibert and Stein 2002; Der Derian
2003), ‘‘critical infrastructure protection’’ (Bendrath 2003), ‘‘information security’’ and ‘‘information warfare’’ (Denning 1999;
Deibert 2003; Der Derian 2003:453; Latham 2003)—terms that overlap, but also have distinctive meanings that separate them
from cyber security.
Criticicism of legal sphere works best when combined with advocacy for specific legal
change.
Lobel, 2007
(Orly Lobel ‘7 -- Professor of Law @ University of San Diego, “The Paradox of Extralegal Activism Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 120, 2007)
At first glance, the idea of opting out of the legal sphere and moving to an extralegal space using alternative modes of social
activism may seem attractive to new social movements. We are used to thinking in binary categories, constantly carving out
different aspects of life as belonging to different spatial and temporal spheres. Moreover, we are attracted to declarations about
newness — new paradigms, new spheres of action, and new strategies that are seemingly untainted by
prior failures.186 However, the critical insights about law’s reach must not be abandoned in the process
of critical analysis. Just as advocates of a laissez-faire market are incorrect in imagining a purely private
space free of regulation, and just as the “state” is not a single organism but a multiplicity of legislative,
administrative, and judicial organs, “nonstate arenas” are dispersed, multiple, and constructed. The focus on action in a
separate sphere broadly defined as civil society can be self-defeating precisely because it conceals the
many ways in which law continues to play a crucial role in all spheres of life. Today, the lines between private and
public functions are increasingly blurred, forming what Professor Gunther Teubner terms “polycorpora- tist regimes,” a symbiosis between
private and public sectors.187 Simi- larly, new economic partnerships and structures blur the lines between for-profit and nonprofit
entities.188 Yet much of the current literature on the limits of legal reform and the crisis of government action is built upon a
privatization/regulation binary, particularly with regard to social commitments, paying little attention to how the background conditions of a
privatized market can sustain or curtail new concep- tions of the public good.189 In the same way, legal scholars often em- phasize sharp shifts
between regulation and deregulation,
overlooking the continuing presence of legal norms that shape and inform
these shifts.190 These false dichotomies should resonate well with classic co- optation analysis, which
shows how social reformers overestimate the possibilities of one channel for reform while crowding out
other paths and more complex alternatives. Indeed, in the contemporary extralegal climate, and contrary to the conservative
portrayal of federal social policies as harmful to the non- profit sector, voluntary associations have flourished in mutually bene- ficial
A dichotomized notion of a shift between spheres — between law and
informalization, and between regulatory and nonregulatory schemes — therefore neglects the ongoing possibilities
within the legal system to develop and sustain desired outcomes and to eliminate others. The challenge for
relationships with federal regulations.191
social re- form groups and for policymakers today is to identify the diverse ways in which some legal regulations and formal structures
Community
empowerment requires ongoing gov- ernment commitment.192 In fact, the most successful communitybased projects have been those which were not only supported by pub- lic funds, but in which public
administration also continued to play some coordination role.193
contribute to so- cially responsible practices while others produce new forms of exclu- sion and inequality.
AT: Alt
Their account of security is too sweeping – vote aff to limit conflict
Elshtain 5 (Jean Bethke, was the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics in
the Divinity School, Political Science, and the Committee on International Relations at the University of
Chicago, “RESPONSE TO “AGAINST THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM” Against the New Utopianism,” Ethics
& International Affairs , Vol. 19, No. 2, 2005)
KANT'S FANTASY So I, pace Burke, have not forgotten "the vision of the great cosmopolitan" Immanuel Kant. Instead, I profoundly disagree with
it. Perpetual
peace is a fantasy of at-oneness, as I have called it, of a world in which differences have all
been rubbed off and sameness invites "the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war" (p. 83). For
Kant, all hostilities must be concluded without any "secret reservation of material for a future war" (4) Otherwise, one has a mere--mere--truce,
not authentic peace. Here, and elsewhere, we find
Kant downgrading the humanly possible work and the arduous tasks of
diplomats, statespersons, international organizations of citizens, and so on, in favor of a utopian fantasy of eternity-the ability of human beings to, in effect, freeze a particular vision or arrangement and for that arrangement to continue undisturbed in
perpetuity. To reduce soldiering, as Kant does, to
hiring men "to kill or be killed" is stunningly reductionist, and it
mocks those who have died to fight fascism, slavery, and other evils. Kant may enjoin the destruction of standing
armies until he is blue in the face, but that is not going to happen. It is not going to happen because eliminating human
fear, envy, jealousy, anger, rage--including rage at injustice--is not possible. What Burke calls
"dismantl[ing] security dilemmas, brick by terrible brick" (p. 85) also requires the dismantling of human
beings as we know them. His positive vision runs contrary to the entirety of the historic and even
paleontological record; there has never been an epoch in which armed conflict has been altogether
absent. The challenge is not to eliminate--presumably if that could be done it would by now have been
done--but rather to limit the occasions for war and the destructiveness of war. (And, contrary to
Burke, modern warfare such as the United States fights is less, not more, destructive, capable of realizing the
ideal of discrimination better than ever before; consider whether it would have been better to be in Baghdad in 2003 or in
Berlin in 1944.) People fight for good reasons and for bad ones. It is the obligation of citizens and responsible
statespersons to distinguish good and bad reasons to engage in armed conflict and--here I agree with
Burke--to find ways to chasten overambitious and enthusiastic recourse to the use of force. This can only
be done if particular citizens in particular places act politically to tame their own states when they find them in the wrong. require
some sort of workable set of principles that places limits on the use of force and animates realistic
and hopeful possibilities in a way that abstract models cannot. Those who endorse utopian visions of
perpetual peace neglect the hard, nitty-gritty political and ethical work. I hope Burke turns his
considerable intelligence and learning to a concrete account of how a Kantian vision can be realized
and, when he does so, I believe he will realize that the dualistic contrast between "perpetual peace"
and "perpetual war" is a chimera that ignores ambiguity, nuance, the smudginess of real human lives
and history--the very things he accuses me of downplaying when they form the very background
assumptions out of which I work.
Rejection of securitization leads to instability and international intervention – turns
their impact
McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics
Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in
International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The
political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129
The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security
framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin
to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which
is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national
interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of
ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak
or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary
role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might
have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems
associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear
demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and
allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or
unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of
contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that
we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing
world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates
about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a
coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts,
away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are
often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the
Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive.
For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of
nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to
an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the
governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good
development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in
Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from
modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away
from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states
industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and
insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant,
we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to
teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world
populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course
means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically,
although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend
for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable
development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern
capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the
contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of
Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to
support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a
human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield
technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third
world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as
Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all
driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally.
Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human
rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in
agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be
empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why
these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have
political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states.
In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework
proposed by critical and
Securitization is psychologically engrained – the alternative can’t solve
Stein 13 – Professor of Political Science and IR @ U of Toronto
Jance, “THREAT PERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,” The Oxford Handbook of Political
Psychology, 2 nd ed. Edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy
Related evidence suggests the concerning proposition that policy makers are predisposed to believe
advisers who are hawks rather than doves. Scholars constructed a comprehensive list of
psychological biases identified in the last forty years of research and, in a remarkable result, found
that all the biases predisposed leaders to believe the hawks. Basic psychological impulses incline
national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries. Exaggerated threat perception is
not random, but both systematic and deeply embedded in psychological processes (Kahneman
and Renshon, 2007:36). These processes take leaders far beyond prudential reasoning and
reasoned assessment of threat.
Micro-politics radical focus on new alternatives makes us incapable of producing real
change
Lobel, 2007
(Orly Lobel ‘7 -- Professor of Law @ University of San Diego, “The Paradox of Extralegal Activism Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 120, 2007)
Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform. Although the new extralegal frames
present themselves as apt alternatives to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the
social map, in practice they generate very limited improvement in existing social ar- rangements. Most
strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be ex- plained in terms of the most profound risk of the typology — that of legitimation. The common
pattern of extralegal scholarship is to de- scribe an inherent instability in dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots
This
celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate approach — an idea that the
multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial. In fact, the myth of engagement obscures the actual lack
of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform
produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few in- stances of meaningful reordering of social and economic
strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities translate into a more complete transformation.
arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as though the scholarly narrative has the
Unrelated efforts become related and part of
a whole through mere re- framing. At the same time, the elephant in the room — the rising level of
economic inequality — is left unaddressed and comes to be under- stood as natural and inevitable.225
This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers’ self-mystification, through which
marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus
power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224
on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed reality.
AT: Impact
Their impact just as exaggerated as the aff and is the exception, not the rule
Abrahamsen 5 (Rita, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Blair's Africa: The
Politics of Securitization and Fear, Alternatives 30:1, AG)
The war on Iraq can be seen to demonstrate the willingness of the British government to engage in illiberal acts to defend the liberal values of
the "international community," but it is important to note that the process of securitization
does not automatically dictate
responses. As argued above, the process of securitization is gradual and incremental, and an
issue can move along a continuum of risk/fear without ever reaching the stage of "existential threat"
where it merits "emergency action" (as with Iraq). Instead, most security politics is concerned with the
more mundane everyday management and containment of risk, and the securitization of Africa is thus
entirely compatible with the feeble response to the brutal and prolonged conflict in the DRC or the Sudan. Rather than
spectacular emergency politics or military action, securitization is more likely to give rise to policies of
containment or policing.
such spectacular