Criminal Procedure Outline 4th Amendment The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Key Language Reasonableness clause, warrant clause, warrantless searches 4th Amendment Analysis Questions Who was conducting the search? What were they searching for? Did they have suspicion? Did they have a warrant? Where were they looking? Key/Initial Questions Who does the Amendment apply to? - Only to the Government Has there been a search or seizure? o 4th Amendment Values - (any test to determine if there is a search will weigh these values) Privacy Freedom to be left alone Protection from government abuse Property rights - weighing used to be primarily property based, this changed with the Katz case Exclusionary Rule Weeks v. United States Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions. Did the search and seizure of Weeks' home violate the Fourth Amendment? In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the seizure of items from Weeks' residence directly violated his constitutional rights. The Court also held that the government's refusal to return Weeks' possessions violated the Fourth Amendment. To allow private documents to be seized and then held as evidence against citizens would have meant that the protection Criminal Procedure Outline of the Fourth Amendment declaring the right to be secure against such searches and seizures would be of no value whatsoever. This was the first application of what eventually became known as the "exclusionary rule." Mapp v. Ohio Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Were the confiscated materials protected from seizure by the Fourth Amendment? The majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule. o Exclusionary Rule is a fundamental part of the privacy rights of the 4th Amendment applicable to the States through the 14th Amendment. Has There Been A Search Or Seizure? Katz v. United States Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari. Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public payphone? o Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection. o Test - Privacy based, not property based (Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test) Did the government's activity violate the defendant’s right to privacy on which he justifiably relied? A search for 4th Amendment purposes occurs if the person searched had a subjective expectation of privacy and if the expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Criminal Procedure Outline California v. Greenwood – Application of the Katz test Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges. Did the warrantless search and seizure of Greenwood's garbage violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantee? Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public." California v. Ciraolo – Deals with Examination of Property Adjacent to a Home Open Fields v. Curtilage o Factors Distance from the home structure Is the area enclosed Use to which the area is put Precautions taken to exclude others Others? Open fields: Area beyond the curtilage, does not enjoy any 4th Amendment protections. Curtilage: Some portion of the area outside but adjacent to the home such as a patio, garage, or backyard. Enjoys the same degree of 4th Amendment protection as does the home. The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction. Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment? The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this Criminal Procedure Outline airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims. What is a reasonable expectation of privacy? A search for 4th Amendment purposes occurs if the person searched had a subjective expectation of privacy and if the expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable - Katz test United States v. White – Voluntary Disclosure to 3rd Parties o A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence. o Does the 4th Amendment bar from evidence the testimony of government agents relating certain conversations that occurred between a defendant and an undercover government informant, which the agents overheard while monitoring the frequency of a radio transmitter concealed on the body of that informant? o No. The testimony of government agents, relating conversations between a defendant and an undercover informant, overheard via electronic surveillance, is admissible, despite the informant's unavailability at trial. This case expanded the principle announced in Katz v. United States. o Add to Katz Test When people voluntarily disclose information to 3rd parties, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and they assume the risk of discloser to the cops. Smith v. Maryland – Looks at 3rd Party Doctrine in the Context of Private or Quasi-Private Entities On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call Criminal Procedure Outline from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her. In pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement. Did the use of a pen register without a warrant violate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are only relevant if the individual believes that the government has infringed on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to the numbers recorded by a pen register because those numbers are used in the regular conduct of the phone company's business, a fact of which individuals are aware. Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information that is voluntarily given to third parties, the telephone numbers that are regularly and voluntarily provided to telephone companies by their customers do not gain Fourth Amendment protections. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that a person who uses a telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of call. Because the telephone numbers dialed also contain information relating to the content of the call, that information is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority opinion's analysis depends on an individual's choice to voluntarily turn over information, but that choice is not valid if no practical alternative exists. He wrote that no citizen should be forced to accept government monitoring of the phone numbers he dials simply by registering a phone with a telephone company. Such government intrusion on telephone records could impede the exercise of free speech or political affiliation. Therefore phone records should be subject to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Justice Brennan also joined in the dissent. Carpenter v. United States – Cell Phones/Technology In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain "transactional records" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications Criminal Procedure Outline records when "specific and articulable facts show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers—"cell site" location information (CSLI). Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Does the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, which include the location and movements of cell phone users, violate the Fourth Amendment? The government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into existing precedents, but tracking person's movements and location through extensive cell-site records is far more intrusive than the precedents might have anticipated. The Court declined to extend the "third-party doctrine"—a doctrine where information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy—to cell-site location information, which implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS tracking does. One consideration in the development of the third-party doctrine was the "nature of the particular documents sought," and the level of intrusiveness of extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held narrowly that the government generally will need a warrant to access cell-site location information. Kyllo v. United States – Technology Enhanced Searches A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal Criminal Procedure Outline the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall." Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and were, thus, "information in the public domain." United States v. Knotts – Technology Enhanced Searches Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab. Knotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights. Does police planting and tracking of a radio transmitter violate the Fourth Amendment? No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the use of the radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radio transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knotts’ right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier. United States v. Karo – Technology Enhanced Searches Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the Criminal Procedure Outline police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants. Does the installation of a tracking device into a container, with the permission of the original owner, constitute a seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the tracking device? No. The Court found that although the cans of ether may have contained an unknown and unwanted object, no meaningful interference with the defendants' interest in their possessions occurred, as the tracking device was installed before the defendants obtained the ether. This case was an expansion of the holding announced in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). (Abstract by Blaine Schmidt.) United States v. Jones – Technology Enhanced Searches Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant. Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights? Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property. Probable Cause For a search to be reasonable, the search must be based upon probable cause and must be accompanied by a warrant. What is probable cause? → a standard of proof, lowest one. PC to Arrest PC to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to Criminal Procedure Outline warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person arrested. Certain quantum of evidence that: o A particular individual o Is committing or has committed a crime PC to Search PC to search exists if the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an item subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched. Certain quantum of likelihood that: o Property subject to seizure o Is presently o In the place to be searched How to determine the existence of probable cause, what information should be considered and how should that information be weighed? Possible Factors in Evaluating PC Source of information o Reliability o Motive o Ability to observe Method of obtaining information (Eyewitness, hearsay, rumor, etc.) Quantum of information Quality of information Timeliness of information Agular v. Texas – Affidavit A Texas justice of the peace issued a warrant to search for narcotics in defendant's home; the warrant was based on an affidavit filed by two municipal police officers and reciting that affiants received reliable information from a credible person, and that affiants believed, that narcotics were being kept at defendant's premises for illegal sale and use. Over defendant's objection, heroin seized under the warrant was introduced in evidence at his trial in a Texas state court. Defendant was convicted of illegal possession of heroin, and his conviction was affirmed by the appellate court holding that the evidence obtained as a result of the search was properly admitted as evidence. Did the affidavit of the police officers provide sufficient basis for finding probable cause and issuance of a search warrant? No. The United States Supreme Court held that the search violated U.S. Const. amend. IV because the affidavit did not provide any basis for the determination that probable cause existed. The complaint contained no affirmative allegation that the affiant or the affiant's Criminal Procedure Outline unidentified source spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein. Additionally, the affidavit did not indicate any sources for the affiant's belief and did not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made. The "mere conclusion" that defendant possessed narcotics was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only "contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein," it does not even contain an "affirmative allegation" that the affiant's unidentified source "spoke with personal knowledge." For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in defendant's possession. The magistrate here certainly could not "judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on . . . to show probable cause." He necessarily accepted "without question" the informant's "suspicion," "belief" or "mere conclusion." Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was "credible" or his information "reliable." Otherwise, the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached magistrate, as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, or by an unidentified informant. Spinelli v. United States – Affidavit & Other Corroborating Evidence Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to "local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker." The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they "had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136." Did the affidavit included in the warrant application afford probable cause sufficient to issue the search warrant? No. The informant's tip, even when corroborated with the FBI's observations from their surveillance, was not sufficient to provide a basis for a finding probable cause when using the two-pronged test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). (Abstract prepared by Blaine Schmidt.) Two Prong Test: Criminal Procedure Outline Illinois v. Gates – Overruled Agular & Spinelli Test replaced with the Totality of Circumstances Test The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons. Did the search of the Gates's home violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case. Totality of the Circumstances Test o Source of Information Reliability Motive Ability to observe o Method of obtaining information (Eyewitness, hearsay, rumor, etc.) o Quantum of information o Quality of information o Timeliness of information o Other Whren v. United States – Subjective intent of police officers Criminal Procedure Outline Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Did the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment? No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop. Warrant Requirement For a search to be reasonable, the search must be proceeded by a warrant, a warrant based on probable cause. Johnson v. United States – Search not based upon a warrant Based on the information of a confidential informant and drug user, a Seattle detective went to the Europe Hotel. The confidential informant stated he could smell opium in the hallway. The detective contacted and returned to the hotel with four federal narcotics agents. They too, smelled opium, and followed it to the defendant’s room. They did not know who was in the room. When a voice inside asked who was at the door, the detective identified himself. After a period of time, during which noises could be heard from inside the room, the door opened and the defendant appeared. The detective said they wanted to speak to her, and that she allowed them to enter. He then told her: “I want you to consider Criminal Procedure Outline yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room.” They found opium and a recently used smoking device. “Whether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner and to search her living quarters.” No. “At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant,” specifically, the odor of opium coming from the room and the informant’s testimony. The Fourth Amendment’s “protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” While there are certain circumstances “in which a magistrate’s warrant for search may be dispensed with,” they were not present here. Moreover, much of the grounds of the arrest are “not on the informer’s tip and the smell the officers recognized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was alone in the room, gained only after, and wholly by reason of, their entry of her home. It was therefore their observations inside of her quarters, after they had obtained admission under color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest.” Police officers must “have [a] valid basis in law” for the entry into private homes. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT: Analytical Template: What is the underlying rational for the exception? What must be shown to invoke the exception? What is the scope of authority conferred by the exception? Public Arrest United States v. Watson – Several conditions must be met first On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted. Did the arrest and following search of the respondent’s car violate his Fourth Amendment rights? Criminal Procedure Outline No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal agencies, not just the postal service. Because Watson’s arrest was constitutional, the search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no evidence that Watson was coerced into agreeing to the car search. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority’s decision in this case does not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a warrantless arrest in a private place. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests. Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses? No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Criminal Procedure Outline Search Incident to Arrest Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness." Payton v. New York New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed. Does New York statute authorizing warrantless arrests and searches violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures? Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. Justice Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissented. White maintained that common law and practice prior to and at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted did not limit a police officer's inherent power to arrest or search. Chimel v. California – What areas the police an search under the exception Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction. Criminal Procedure Outline Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?" In a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary bulwarks against government abuse. United States v. Robinson – The search of a person as part of a lawful arrest A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket. Did the officer's search violate the Fourth Amendment? The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate. Arizona v. Gant – The search of a car incident to a lawful arrest Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts. Is a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures? Criminal Procedure Outline Yes, under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court held that police may search the vehicle of its recent occupant after his arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that "warrantless searches are per se unreasonable" and subject only to a few, very narrow exceptions. Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions did not apply to his case. Reily v. California – A search incident to an arrest involving cell phones David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches? Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with Criminal Procedure Outline Exigent Circumstances massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Missouri v. McNeely – Various categories of exigency, totality of the circumstances approach On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. Does the Fourth Amendment prevent the taking of a warrantless blood sample under exigent circumstances? Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent circumstances exist. Because each case must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in which the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against bodily intrusions outweighs the state’s interest in gaining evidence quickly. Mincey v. Arizona – State wanted to create a broad exigency for all homicide cases On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine Criminal Procedure Outline other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later. The other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant. The state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds. Did the admission of evidence taken during a four-day long warrantless search of Mincey’s residence constitute an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Did the admission of Mincey’s responses to police questioning made while he was a patient in the intensive care unit of a hospital violate his privilege against self-incrimination, rights to counsel and due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes and yes. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that the extensive, warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart wrote that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable with a few specific exceptions, and rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of a homicide scene was one of these exceptions. Welsh v. Wisconsin A witness observed a car being driven erratically and then swerving of the road. The driver left the car and walked away. Police officers responding to the scene checked the car's registration. Without Criminal Procedure Outline obtaining a warrant, the police went to the home of the registered owner, gained entry and found defendant Edward G. Welsh lying in bed. Welsh was then arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. After a hearing on his refusal to take a breathalyzer test, a Wisconsin trial court concluded that the arrest was lawful and that Welsh's refusal to take the test was unreasonable; his license was suspended. The suspension order was vacated by the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, which concluded that the warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the court of appeals, holding that there were exigent circumstances in the case. Welsh was granted a writ of certiorari. Did the warrantless arrest at Welsh's home violate his Fourth Amendment right? Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated U.S. Const. amend. IV because the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. Absent exigent circumstances, the Court ruled, a warrantless nighttime entry into the home of an individual to arrest him for a civil, non-jailable traffic offense was prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry was rarely appropriate when there was probable cause to believe that only a minor offense had been committed. Brigham City v. Stuart – Immediate harm or risk of serious injury, subjective believe of police Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the "emergency aid doctrine" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave Criminal Procedure Outline weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man. What objectively reasonable level of concern is necessary to trigger the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement? In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Kentucky v. King – Exigency created by the police Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police. Does the exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally seized evidence except in emergency situations, apply when the emergency is created by lawful police actions? The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. " Criminal Procedure Outline Mobility Exceptions Chambers v. Maroney – Warrantless search of a car After the second armed robbery within a week had occurred, the police were given a description of the robbers' car and of the clothing worn by two of the four men seen in the car. Within an hour the police stopped a car that met the description and which was carrying four men and the described clothing. Petitioner Frank Chambers was one of the four men in the car. The police conducted a warrantless search of the car at the station and found two revolvers, ammunition, and property stolen in the robberies. They also searched Chambers' home and found more ammunition of the same type as that found in the car. Chambers was tried for both robberies in Pennsylvania state court, but his first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the materials found through the searches were admitted in evidence, the victim of each robbery identified the Chambers as one of the robbers, and Chambers was convicted and given consecutive sentences for the two robberies. After the state courts denied his request for habeas corpus relief, he petitioned for habeas corpus in federal district court, which denied the petition. The court of appeals affirmed. Chambers was granted a writ of certiorari. Did the warrantless search of the car after Chambers' arrest violate the Fourth Amendment? No. The Court held that the warrantless search of the suspects' car at the police station after Chambers and the other occupants were arrested for robbery did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The police had probable cause to stop the vehicle and to search it immediately at the time and place of arrest. The requirement of probable cause still applied at the police station, and it was reasonable for police to take the car there before making the search. The Court also ruled that the district court properly denied Chambers a hearing on his claim pertaining to his right to the effective assistance of counsel. California v. Carney – Warrantless search of car/home On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell. Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Criminal Procedure Outline Does the warrantless search of a motor home violate the Fourth Amendment? No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied a lesser degree of protection to motor vehicles based on the ability to easily and quickly move them before a warrant can be obtained. Also, the regulation surrounding automobiles affords them a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore less protection under the Fourth Amendment. Since Carney’s motor home was not in an area traditionally used for residence and was licensed to operate as a vehicle on public streets, the Court held that it should receive the level of constitutional protection of a motor vehicle rather than a residence. The Court also held that the officers had probable cause and that the search itself was reasonable. United States v. Chadwick – Footlocker placed in the car After a footlocker had been lawfully seized by federal agents from the open trunk of a parked automobile during the arrests of those who were in possession of the footlocker at the automobile's location outside a train terminal, it was transported by federal agents to the federal building in Boston, Massachusetts. Federal agents, acting without a search warrant and without the consent of the arrested persons, but with a probable cause belief that the footlocker contained contraband, broke the lock and opened the footlocker in the federal building over an hour after the arrests and discovered large amounts of marijuana. Before their trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on charges of, among other things, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, those from whom the footlocker had been seized moved to suppress marijuana found during the search. The District Court granted the motion to suppress, holding that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless they fell within some established exception to the warrant requirement, and that the search of the footlocker without a warrant was not justified under either the exception for searches of automobiles or for searches incident to lawful arrests. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Defendants petitioned for further review by the United States Supreme Court. Was a search warrant required to open a locked footlocker that was seized during arrest, when there is probable cause to believe that the footlocker contains contraband? Yes. The Court held that by placing personal effects inside a doublelocked footlocker, defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would have remained free from public examination. The Court held that the expectation of privacy was no less than one who locked the doors of his home to intruders and that defendants were due the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV's Warrant Clause. The Criminal Procedure Outline Court held that there being no exigency it was unreasonable for the government to have conducted a search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provided. The Court held that the search was too remote to have been considered incident to arrest. The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court. California v. Acevedo California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition. Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence? Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Wyoming v. Houghton After pulling Sandra Houghton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for Criminal Procedure Outline drugs, the officer searched the car and Houghton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Houghton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari. May police officers, with probable cause to search a car, inspect personal items belonging to its passengers without violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches? Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search. Collins v. Viginia On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property. At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property. Does the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property in order to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house? No. The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception does not permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property to search Criminal Procedure Outline a vehicle parked a few feet from the house. In an 8–1 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the home and the "curtilage" of one's home (the area immediately surrounding it) clearly prevents officers from entering and searching without a warrant, even if the object searched is an automobile. The Court found that the area searched (the back of the driveway) was indeed the curtilage of the defendant's home, and thus the Fourth Amendment's highest degree of protection applies there. Although warrantless searches of automobiles are permissible in limited circumstances, the warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of one's home is not permissible. Criminal Procedure Outline Inventory Searches United States v. Edwards – Immediacy does not matter, confinement On May 31, 1970, at around 11 PM, the defendant Edwards was lawfully arrested, taken to the local jail and placed in a cell. The next morning trousers and a shirt were purchased for him to substitute for the clothing which he had been wearing at the time of and since his arrest. His clothing was then taken from him, examined, and held as evidence. At his trial, which resulted in conviction, this evidence was received over his objection that neither the clothing nor the results of its examination were admissible because the warrantless seizure of his clothing was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. His conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that although the arrest was lawful, the warrantless seizure of the clothing, carried out after the administrative process and mechanics of arrest had come to a halt, was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Did the warrantless seizure of the defendant’s clothing violate the Fourth Amendment? No. The Court held that the search and seizure of Edwards' clothing did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled that the search and seizure of the defendant’s clothing was a normal incident of custodial arrest and that it was reasonable because of the existence of probable cause linking the clothes to the crime. Furthermore, it was held that once an accused has been lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even after a substantial time lapse between the arrest and later administrative processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for use as evidence, on the other. South Dakota v. Opperman – Don’t need probable cause under inventory exception, need to show its part of standard operating procedures The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Does the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause prohibit police from inventorying a vehicle that is lawfully impounded for traffic violations, without first obtaining a warrant? No. Mr. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger delivered opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that police can inventory a vehicle that Criminal Procedure Outline has been lawfully impounded, even without a warrant. Inventory procedures for impounded vehicles are taken in order to protect the owner’s property and to protect police from claims of stolen items as well as potential danger. Therefore, the search of an impounded vehicle is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the Constitution allows inventory searches, as long as the search is not done in order to find evidence that could lead to criminal charges. Criminal Procedure Outline Searches Based on Consent Schneckloth v. Bustamonte A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent. Did the court of appeals err when it held that the search of the car was invalid because the state failed to show consent given with knowledge that it could be withheld? Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question. United States v. Drayton Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to Criminal Procedure Outline the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused. Must police officers, while searching buses at random to ask questions and to request passengers' consent to searches, advise passengers of their right not to cooperate? No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The Court reasoned that, although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Moreover, the Court noted, the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary. Illinois v. Rodriguiez A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal. Is a police officer's good faith reliance on a third party's apparent authority to consent to a search a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment? Did the woman possess actual authority to permit a consensual entry? Yes, No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the authority to do so. The case was remanded for consideration of whether the police officers reasonably believed that the woman had authority to consent to their search of the residence. United States v. Matlock Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct Criminal Procedure Outline a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash. At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed. Does a third party with control over a space have authority to consent to a search? Were the woman’s statements that she lived with Matlock inadmissible hearsay? Yes, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that police can obtain consent for a search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises. The woman’s statements should not have been excluded at the suppression hearing because evidentiary burdens are lower for suppression hearings than the actual trial. On remand, the court must determine whether the woman had authority to consent to the search. Georgia v. Randolph Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents. Can police search a home when one physically present resident consents and the other physically present resident objects? No. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two cooccupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very Criminal Procedure Outline The Plain View Doctrine good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Fernandez v. California On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented. Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit warrantless searches when the defendant has previously objected but is no longer present and the cotenant consents? No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, although a warrant is generally required for a search of a home, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is whether the search was reasonable. Although warrantless searches are unreasonable when two co-tenants are present and one objects to the search, the Court has held that the same search is reasonable when the objecting tenant leaves. In this case, because the objecting tenant was arrested and no longer present, the Court held that the search was reasonable because the consenting tenant had the authority to allow the police into her home. Arizona v. Hicks A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done Criminal Procedure Outline without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct. Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution. Horton v. California On January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella. Sergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton’s home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching Horton’s house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime. The evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s request for review. Criminal Procedure Outline Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight if the discovery of such evidence was not inadvertent? No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to prohibit. Once an officer has a warrant to search a suspect’s house, that officer may seize any obviously incriminating evidence that the officer finds in plain view. The Court also held that the “inadvertent” limitation does not limit the scope of the search further than the warrant itself does. In this case, since the warrant was specifically for the stolen property, the officer had to limit his search to the likely places where the property might be kept. Since the officer also had probable cause to believe that certain types of weapons were used in the commission of the crime, he could legally seize the weapons if they were found in the course of that search. Balancing Approach to 4th Amendment reasonableness, its constitutional underpinnings, and its relationship to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the 4th Amendment. Terry v. Ohio – Balancing Test Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail Was the initial stop of the suspects and pat down of their outer clothing a search/seizure under the 4th Amendment? If the stop and frisk was a search/seizure, was a warrant required? Can the police conduct a stop and search on a degree of suspicion less than probable cause? In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. Balancing Question – Was the State’s actions justified an its inception and was the search reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified that action? Stop and Frisk Criminal Procedure Outline What Constitutes a Terry Stop? Start with the Terry Balancing Test Question – Was the State’s actions justified an its inception and was the search reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified that action? United States v. Mendenhall (Part 1) – Terry Stop Test Defendant arrived in Detroit on a flight from LA She was watched by two DEA agents assigned to conduct drug interdictions. Defendant fit the profile of a drug runner because she was the last one to get off the plane, she came from LA, she appeared nervous, she did not claim any bags, she scanned the entire area when she got off the plane, and she changed her flight at Detroit. DEA agent approached her, identified themselves as federal agents and asked to see her ID. Her license did not match the name on the ticket and she had no good explanation. She became nervous when the cops told her they were DEA. The agents asked her to come with them to an office 50 feet away. The agents asked if the could search her bag and she consented to a strip search by a female DEA agent. Two bags of heroin were found in her underwear. Was the agents' conduct in initially approaching Mendenhall and asking to see her ticket and identification a permissible investigative stop? Yes, The Court ruled that that Mendenhall was not seized when she was approached by the DEA agents who asked to see her ticket and identification, even though Mendenhall was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. The Court held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. Terry Stop Test that was applied – A person is seized only when, by mean of force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained in such a way that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave. Florida v. Bostick – Terry Stop Enclosed Space Test In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Criminal Procedure Outline Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure? No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence. Terry Stop Enclosed Space Test was applied – Whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the cops request or terminate the encounter. California v. Hodari – Terry Stop Test When Suspects Runs Cops in a unmarked vehicle see a group of youth gathered around a car in a high crime area. As they approach, the youth scatter. One cop chases the defendant. Defendant looks ahead, sees the cop coming and then ditches a bag of crack before the cop tackles and cuffs him. Terry Stop Test When Suspect Runs was applied – seizure can be accomplished by force or show of authority but show of authority not enough. There must be: o Physical touching; or o A show of authority that should make a reasonable person feel that they were not free to leave AND actual submission to that authority. United States v. Place – Person items seized v. a person A traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a "sniff" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege. Was the ninety minute seizure of the traveler's luggage a valid investigative stop under Terry? Did the "sniff test" by the dog constitute a search? No and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The "sniff" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Criminal Procedure Outline What is Reasonable Suspicion? Less than Probable Cause, test is s totality of the circumstance focus. United States v. Mendenhall (Part 2) – Court did not expressly determine if DEA agents had Reasonable Suspicion Defendant arrived in Detroit on a flight from LA She was watched by two DEA agents assigned to conduct drug interdictions. Defendant fit the profile of a drug runner because she was the last one to get off the plane, she came from LA, she appeared nervous, she did not claim any bags, she scanned the entire area when she got off the plane, and she changed her flight at Detroit. DEA agent approached her, identified themselves as federal agents and asked to see her ID. Her license did not match the name on the ticket and she had no good explanation. She became nervous when the cops told her they were DEA. The agents asked her to come with them to an office 50 feet away. The agents asked if the could search her bag and she consented to a strip search by a female DEA agent. Two bags of heroin were found in her underwear. United States v. Sokolow – Court found DEA agents had reasonable suspicion Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine. Did the search violate the Fourth Amendment? The Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing." Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the "totality of the circumstances," (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking. Illinois v. Wardlow – Factors Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to "specific reasonable inferences" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow Criminal Procedure Outline was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way." Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person? Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding. Factors: o Location o Time of day o Behavior of the individual o Clothing? o Known criminal associates? o Age o Gender? o Race? o Demeanor of cops and what they were wearing/doing Alabama v. White – Close call case in assessing reasonable suspicion An anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attaché case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and White’s future movements. Following that tip, police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Doby’s Motel Court, where they pulled her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attaché case found in the car. Police found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3 milligrams of cocaine in White’s purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and search White’s car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Does an anonymous tip alone provide a reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop and search an individual’s car? Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority, reversing the lower court. The Court held that the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficiently Criminal Procedure Outline reasonable suspicion that White possessed illegal drugs. Even though police had no way to confirm the credibility of the caller, police verified many allegations made by the caller about White’s car and movements. Because the police had a reasonable suspicion, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, stating that the majority’s standard allows anyone with enough knowledge of a person’s routine to cause police to search that person. The standard also gives officers too much freedom to claim that they received an anonymous tip to justify any search. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Florida v J.L. – Close call case in assessing reasonable suspicion On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence. Did searching J.L. solely on the basis of the anonymous tip received by the Miami-Dade police violate his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure? Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate level of reliability, including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had inside information." Navarette v. California – Close call case in assessing reasonable suspicion On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. Criminal Procedure Outline At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who received information regarding drunken or reckless driving to independently corroborate the behavior before stopping the vehicle? No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which justified the traffic stop. Because the reasonable suspicion standard allows an officer to rely on information beyond what that officer personally observed, a stop based on an anonymous tip does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had reason to believe the information contained in the tip was reliable. In this case, the information came in the form of a call from the driver who had been run off the road, which means that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge of the incident. Additionally, the timeline of the events suggest that the call was made almost immediately after the incident, so the caller presumably would not have had sufficient time to concoct a story. The Court held that, because the anonymous tip had these indicators of reliability and reported driving behavior consistent with reports of drunk driving that resulted in a car being run off the road, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion and did not need to observe the alleged behavior at length. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the aspects of the anonymous tip that the majority opinion argues make it reliable do not in fact make the information trustworthy enough to stand uncorroborated. Justice Scalia argued that the supposed eyewitness status of the caller could be afforded to anyone who saw the truck and wanted the driver to be pulled over and that any time at all between the alleged incident and the phone call allowed the caller to create a false story. Since the caller only reported a specific instance of unsafe driving—forcing another car off the road—there was no reason for the police officer to suspect ongoing drunk driving. When the officers observed the car and still did not see any indication of impaired driving, the reliability of the anonymous tip was further undermined, and there was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a traffic stop. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. Permissible Scope of Stop and Frisk Always keep in mind the Terry Balancing Question o When does police conduct disrupt this balance and become unreasonable? Criminal Procedure Outline United States v. Place – Police arguably had reasonable suspicion for the stop, did it exceed a permissible Terry Stop? A traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a "sniff" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege. Was the ninety minute seizure of the traveler's luggage a valid investigative stop under Terry? Did the "sniff test" by the dog constitute a search? No and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The "sniff" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. Buie – Protective sweep without warrant On February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather’s Pizza in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the men was wearing a red running suit. Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie’s house under surveillance. On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement. Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence. The trial court denied Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit evidence, and he was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed. Does the Fourth Amendment prevent police officers from making a “protective sweep” at the site of an in-home arrest if they do not believe themselves or others to be in immediate danger? No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the potential risk to police officers of another person on the arrest site must be weighed against the invasion of privacy. Because the arrest in this case happened in the suspect’s home, the officer was put at even greater risk because of the possibility of an ambush. This risk justified the protective sweep. The Court also held that a protective sweep was meant to be a cursory one, and not an in-depth search of the premises that would require a specific warrant. Minnesota v. Dickerson – Distinct from United States v. Robinson Criminal Procedure Outline On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. When a police officer detects contraband through his or her sense of touch during a protective patdown search, does the Fourth Amendment permit its seizure and subsequent introduction into evidence? Was the police officer who frisked Dickerson adhering to the Fourth Amendment when he formed the belief, through his sense of touch, that the lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket was cocaine? Yes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation. Michigan v. Long – Frisk of a car David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution. Can a protective search for weapons extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest? The search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Criminal Procedure Outline The Court held that a protective search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible during an investigative detention if the police officer reasonably believes that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. Protection of police officers justified protective searches when the officers had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a danger, especially during roadside encounters. Moreover, the articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile were within the area into which a suspect might reach in order to grab a weapon. Rodrieguez v. United States - Drug dogs sniff exceeding scope of a traffic stop On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Is the use of a K-9 unit, after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures? Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful. Special Needs Terry balancing analysis applied beyond the specific issues of stick law enforcement Keep in mind several points o What is the claim special needs for the states action? o What degree of individualized suspicion, if any, is needed before the state can engage in the activity? o How intrusive into personal privacy are these actions? o Can any of the information obtained by the state be used for law enforcement purposes? Michigan v. Sitz – Special Needs Balancing at Checkpoints Criminal Procedure Outline In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety roving checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts. Did the drunk driving checkpoints violate motorists' privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that "no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." The Court then found that "the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." The Court also found that empirical evidence supported the effectiveness of the program. Indianapolis v Edmond – Special Needs Balancing at Checkpoints In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcoticsdetection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment? No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," wrote Justice O'Connor. Skinner v. Railway Association – Special Needs Balancing in Drug Testing Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules. Did the regulations violate the Fourth Amendment? No. The Court held that the government's interest in assuring safety on the nation's railroads constituted a "special need" which justified a departure from standard warrant and Criminal Procedure Outline probable-cause requirements in searches. Preventing accidents, the goal of most railroad regulations including the one in this case, argued Justice Kennedy, was such a significant concern that it warranted reduced "expectations of privacy" for railroad employees. United States v. Flores - Montano – Special Needs Balancing at the Boarders When Manuel Flores-Montano approached the U.S.-Mexico border, U.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank. Flores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. FloresMontano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case). Does the Fourth Amendment require customs officers at the international border to have reasonable suspicion in order to remove, disassemble, and search a vehicle's gas tank for illegal material? No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at the border without suspicion. Though the Fourth Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,'" interference with a vehicle owner's gas tank "is justified by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border." The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of suspicion for highly intrusive searches of people be carried over to cars (especially at the border): "Complex balancing tests...have no place in border searches of vehicles." Maryland v. King – Special Needs Balancing in Jails The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes? Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a location. The Criminal Procedure Outline Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should be set on his/her release from custody. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington – Special Needs Balancing in Jails Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey. Does the Fourth Amendment permit a jail to conduct a suspicion-less strip search whenever an individual is arrested, including for minor offenses? Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the lower court, holding that the strip searches for inmates entering the general population of a prison do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that a prisoner's likelihood of possessing contraband based on the severity of the current offense or an arrestee's criminal history is too difficult to determine effectively. The Court pointed out instances, such as the arrest of Timothy McVeigh, in which an individual who commits a minor traffic offense is capable of extreme violence. Correctional facilities have a strong interest in keeping their employees and inmates safe. A general strip search policy adequately and effectively protects that interest. The Court did note that there may be an exception to this rule when the arrestees are not entering the general population and will not have substantial contact with other inmates. New Jersey v. T.L.O. – Special Needs Balancing in the School Context T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools? After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for re-argument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse. The Court heard re-argument on October 02, 1984. The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to Criminal Procedure Outline searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances. 5th Amendment No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Key language Compelled self-incrimination, due process Confessions Confessions and Due Process Brown v. Mississippi – Confession was a product of physical intimidation and torture, was a violation of 5th Amendment Due Process Clause, confession was unreliable The Petitioners were indicted for a murder that occurred on March 30, 1934. The Petitioners were indicted on April 4, 1934, arraigned thereafter and then pleaded not guilty. The Petitioners were found guilty after a trial solely on the basis of their confessions. During the trial, the Petitioners testified that the confessions were untrue and procured after physical torture. The Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi arguing that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Did the use of defendants' confessions at trial violate Due Process? Yes. A complaint that a conviction was obtained by confessions procured through the use of torture is not of the commission of mere error, but of a wrong so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and renders the conviction and sentence wholly void. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment convicting defendants. The state's freedom to regulate the procedure of its courts was limited by the requirements of due process and did not include the freedom to obtain convictions that rested solely upon confessions obtained by violence. The use of defendants' confessions at trial was a clear denial of due process, rendering the convictions and sentences void. The failure of defendants' counsel to move to exclude the confessions did not prevent a reversal because the trial court was fully advised of the coerced nature of the confessions. The proceedings were vitiated by the lack of the essential elements of due process and could be challenged in any appropriate manner. Ashcraft v. Tennessee – Psychological intimidation was a violation of due process clause Criminal Procedure Outline Victim Zelma Ashcraft was found dead on the side of the road and later that night, officers talked to the petitioner husband. On a Saturday nine days later, the petitioner was taken by police to an office at their jail where they sat him at a table with a light overhead, and proceeded to question him in relays until the following Monday morning. The petitioner was never given the opportunity to rest during this interrogation and claimed that after much suggestion that he was to confess, the state ended up admitting into evidence a statement by Ashcraft that he had paid the other petitioner Ware to murder his wife. The petitioners were convicted of murder and accessory before the fact and the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed. The petitioners were granted certiorari claiming that their confessions had been extorted from them in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Are confessions obtained after police question a subject for more than 36 hours straight without rest violative of the Fourteenth Amendment as made involuntarily, and thus inadmissible? Yes. The confessions obtained in this case were made involuntarily under the totality of the circumstances test used in evaluating due process violation claims. He was held for a day and a half straight without sleep or rest, or the ability to talk with anyone. His conviction, having been based on this coerced confession, is faulty and must be reversed and remanded. Spano v. New York – Court expressly adopted test for voluntariness (voluntariness = due process) After petitioner, Vincent Joseph Spano, a foreign-born man of 25 with a junior-high-school education and no previous criminal record, had been indicted for first-degree murder, he retained counsel and surrendered to police. He was then subjected to persistent and continuous questioning by an assistant prosecutor and numerous police officers for virtually eight hours. Ultimately, Spano confessed, after he had repeatedly requested, and had been denied, an opportunity to consult his counsel. At his trial in a New York state court, his confession was admitted in evidence over his objection, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. Was the trial court's admission of Spano's involuntary confession inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment under traditional principles? Yes. The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. The Supreme Court of the United States found that Spano's involuntary confession had been wrongly admitted into evidence over appropriate objection at trial. The confession was inconsistent with U.S. Const. amend. XIV under traditional principles. Spano was subjected to questioning by several men for nearly eight hours. The questioning was not conducted during normal business hours, but began in early evening, continued into the night, and did not bear fruition until morning. The questioners persisted in the face of Spano's repeated refusals to answer on the advice of his attorney. The Court found another Criminal Procedure Outline factor that deserved mentioning was the use of Spano's "childhood friend," now a police officer, to play upon his sympathy. The Court concluded that Spano's will was overcome by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely aroused in a post-indictment setting. The police were only concerned in securing a statement from Spano on which they could convict him. Totality of the circumstances to determine if the suspect will was overborne. Colorado v. Connally – Source of the corrosive pressure, whether the confession violated due process In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily. Did the taking of Connelly's statements as evidence violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? The Court held that because the taking of Connelly's statements as evidence did not involve any element of governmental coercion, no violation of the Due Process Clause occurred. The Court argued that suppressing statements in cases where suspects were not coerced would have no deterrent effect on future violations of the Constitution by the police. The Court noted that "Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that." Confessions and The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Miranda v. Arizona – Miranda Warnings Defendants were arrested by the police, who later obtained confessions from them while they were confined in interrogation rooms. The trial court, where each of the defendants was charged, admitted the confessions into evidence, and thereafter convicted each defendant. Defendants sought a review of the trial court's judgment. Should the confessions obtained from a defendant who was subjected to custodial police interrogation be admitted as evidence at trial? No. According to the Court, when an individual was taken into custody and subjected to questioning, the U.S. Const. amend. V privilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized. To protect the privilege, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. The Court held that evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless Criminal Procedure Outline the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Effective waiver required that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Presuming waiver from a silent record was impermissible. In the context of custodial interrogation, once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. Dickerson v. United States – Congress Petitioner was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence. Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The district court granted his motion to suppress. The court of appeals reversed the suppression order, holding that 18 U.S.C.S. § 3501, which made admissibility turn solely on whether the statement was made voluntarily, had been satisfied. Petitioner appealed from the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the grant of his motion to suppress his custodial statement. May Miranda, being a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress? No. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that Miranda was a constitutional decision of the court, and therefore could not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Further, following the principles of stare decisis, the court declined to overrule Miranda itself. The court held that Miranda and its progeny governed the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. New York v. Quarles – Public Safety After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights. Should the Court suppress Quarles's statement about the gun and the gun itself because the officer had failed at the time to read Quarles his Miranda rights? Criminal Procedure Outline No. The Court held that there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that officers issue Miranda warnings to suspects. Since the police officer's request for the location of the gun was prompted by an immediate interest in assuring that it did not injure an innocent bystander or fall into the hands of a potential accomplice to Quarles, his failure to read the Miranda warning did not violate the Constitution. There are two prongs that trigger Miranda. Custody and Interrogation. 1. Miranda Custody Berkemer v. McCarty – Do warnings apply to misdemeanor offenses, did the prearrest traffic stop trigger the custody prong of Miranda? An officer observed a vehicle swerving in and out of lanes on the highway and initiated a traffic stop. The officer asked if the driver had been using intoxicants, to which the driver replied in the affirmative. The driver was arrested, asked again about the use of intoxicants, and again answered in the affirmative. The driver was never advised of his constitutional rights, and he was convicted of driving under the influence. He appealed, asserting that the incriminating statements were not admissible as he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The Court vacated the driver’s conviction. Is roadside questioning of a motorist stopped pursuant to a routine traffic stop considered a custodial interrogation when the motorist is not yet arrested or placed into custody? No. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody, he will be entitled to the protections prescribed by Miranda. However, the initial stop of a vehicle by an officer does not amount to being in custody. The initial stop of the driver’s vehicle, by itself, did not render the driver in custody. Therefore, at that point in time, the driver was not entitled to a recitation of constitutional rights. However, after the driver was arrested, any statements made were inadmissible against him without a reading of his constitutional rights. Because it could not be determined which statements were relied upon in convicting the driver, the conviction was properly vacated. J.D.B. v. North Carolina – Custody is generally an objective test, Court adds subjectivity here A uniformed police officer removed the 13-year-old, seventh-grade student from his classroom and escorted him to a closed-door conference room, where he was questioned by police for at least half an hour regarding home break-ins. Prior to the commencement of questioning, the student was not given Miranda warnings. The student confessed. Thereafter, two juvenile petitions were filed against the student, alleging breaking and entering and larceny. The state trial court denied the student's motion to suppress his statements, and adjudicated him delinquent. The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the decision. In denying the student's motion to suppress, the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to find the student’s age relevant to the determination whether he was in police custody. Criminal Procedure Outline Does a child’s age properly inform a Miranda custody analysis? Yes. The Court held that a child's age properly informs Miranda's custody analysis since a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go, and courts can account for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis. Furthermore, the Court posited that a child's age differed from other personal characteristics that, even when known to police, have no objectively discernible relationship to a reasonable person's understanding of his freedom of action. Whether a suspect is "in custody" is an objective inquiry. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. The court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. 2. Miranda Interrogation Rhode Island v. Innis – Conversation between police officers After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. Did the police "interrogation" en route to the station violate Innis's Miranda rights? No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," noting that the term "interrogation" under Miranda included "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis. Test created to see if interrogation took place for Miranda purposes: o Express questioning and words or actions on the part of the police (other than those attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Illinois v. Perkins – Undercover cop An informer told the police that a particular suspect might be responsible for an unsolved Illinois murder, and the suspect was traced to an Illinois jail in which the suspect was being Criminal Procedure Outline held pending trial on an aggravated-battery charge unrelated to the murder. The police placed an undercover agent in the jail with the suspect. Eventually, the agent, without giving the suspect Miranda warnings, engaged in conversations with the suspect, who made incriminating statements about the murder. The suspect was then charged with the murder, but the circuit court of St. Clair County (Illinois) granted the suspect's pretrial motion to suppress the statements made to the agent in the jail. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District, affirmed, expressing the view that Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, prohibited all undercover contacts which were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from incarcerated suspects. Petitioner, the State of Illinois, was granted certiorari. Should an undercover law enforcement officer, posing as a fellow inmate, be required to give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before engaging in a conversation that could elicit incriminating response from the incarcerated suspect? No. Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. The Court held that Miranda warnings were not required when the suspect was unaware that he was speaking to a law enforcement officer and gave a voluntary statement. The Court found that conversations between suspects and undercover agents did not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. According to the Court, the essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion were not present when an incarcerated person spoke freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. Coercion was to be determined from the perspective of the suspect. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that did not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak were not within the concerns of Miranda warnings. The Court averred that Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities. Miranda Warning and Waivers Waiver Test – First, the waiver has to be a product of free and deliberate choice. Second, the waiver must be made with full awareness of the right and the consequences of the waiver. The court looks to the totality of the circumstance. Colorado v. Spring – Charges The defendant was suspected of being involved in a murder. He was also the subject of an ATF investigation involving the sale of illegal firearms. When he was questioned by ATF agents, he was given his Miranda warnings but not what crimes he was being investigated for. Defendant waived his rights and initially answered questions about the firearm sales but eventually answered questions about the murder. Was Spring’s waiver of his Miranda rights invalid under U.S. Const. amend. V on the ground that the agents failed to disclose all possible charges against Spring or all the possible consequences of the waiver? No. The United States Supreme Court overruled the judgment of the state supreme court. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not require ATF agents to warn Spring of a possible murder charge before he waived his Miranda rights. The Court found that Spring Criminal Procedure Outline knowingly waived his Miranda rights since he knew what his right were, including the right to discontinue talking at any time. Thus, his waiver of his Miranda rights was valid. Berghuis v. Tompkins – Implied waiver Thompkins was given his complete Miranda warnings and said virtually nothing for the next three hours and he never expressly waived his Miranda rights. After this almost three hours of silence the police asked him if he believed in God and if he prayed to God to forgive him for shooting the victim. To this questions the defendant answered “yes” and this statement was admitted against him at trial. Did Thompkins waive his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made an uncoerced statement to police? Yes. If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver. The Court found that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police. First, the lack of any contention that he did not understand his rights indicated that he knew what he gave up when he spoke. Second, his answer to the question about God is a “course of conduct indicating waiver” of that right. Third, there was no evidence that his statement was coerced. He did not claim that police threatened or injured him or that he was fearful. The fact that Thompkins made the statement about three hours after receiving a Miranda warning did not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver. Davis v. United States – Vague invocation Defendant was investigated for the murder of another sailor. NCIS Agents read him his Article 31 rights and Miranda warnings. Defendant his rights and agreed to talk. During the interrogation, at one point, the defendant said “maybe I need a lawyer.” NCIS stopped the questioning clarified his request, re-read him his rights and then continued questioning until he unequivocally asked for a lawyer. When a suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel during a custodial interrogation, must the interrogator cease questioning until the suspect is provided with counsel? No. The Supreme Court held that, assuming Edwards applies in military proceedings, investigators do not need to cease questioning when an accused makes an ambiguous statement like “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The Court noted that, while it was proper for the investigators to clarify Davis’ intentions, the Court does not require investigators to adopt that practice in future interrogations. Michigan v. Mosley – Invoking the right to silence Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he Criminal Procedure Outline did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. Does the re-initiation of interrogation after a suspect has invoked his right to silence under Miranda v. Arizona violate the suspect’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to silence and the presence of counsel? The re-initiation of interrogation after a suspect has invoked his right to silence is not a per se violation of Miranda rights, as long as the suspect’s invocation of his rights is honored. The Court held that the Miranda rule, which requires an immediate cessation of questioning if the individual in custody wishes not to speak, does not clearly establish the circumstances under which questioning may be resumed. The Miranda rule could bar the police from questioning the individual again in regards to any subject, or it could require a complete break from any current questioning but allow for re-initiation of another round of questioning at a later time. The Court held that Miranda only required that the suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions be honored. In this case, the Court held that Mosley’s invocation of his right to silence had been honored because the interrogation ceased as soon as he stated he did not wish to continue, he was read his rights again before interrogation was re-initiated, and a significant amount of time passed between the two interrogations. Test – the police must scrupulously honor a suspect’s right to silence. If they have done so they can reinitiate questioning. o Factors: Time Different location Different offense Different police officers Continuous confinement of the suspect Willingness of the suspect to engage in another round of questioning Other? Edwards v. Arizona – Invoking the right to council After being arrested on a state criminal charge, and after being informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, petitioner Edwards was questioned by the police on Jan. 19, 1976, until he said that he wanted an attorney. Questioning then ceased, but on Jan. 20 police officers came to the jail and, after stating that they wanted to talk to him and again informing him of his Miranda rights, obtained his confession when he said that he was willing to talk. At trial in Arizona state court, the trial court ultimately denied Edwards' motion to suppress his confession, finding the statement to be voluntary. Edwards was Criminal Procedure Outline convicted, and he appealed. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that during the Jan. 20 meeting Edwards waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel when he voluntarily gave his statement after again being informed of his rights. Edwards filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted. Did the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation? Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the use of Edwards' confession against him violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that he had asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, and the police, without furnishing him with counsel, returned and secured a confession. The Court averred that Edwards did not validly waive his right to counsel, where there was no finding that he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. Moreover, the Court opined that having requested counsel, Edwards was not subject to further interrogation until counsel had been made available to him, unless Edwards himself initiated further communication with the police. Hence, the Court reversed the state supreme court's judgment. Test – voluntary and knowing/intelligent abandonment or relinquishment of a known right or privilege – unless an attorney is made available to speak with the suspect, the police cannot reinitiate questioning (Edwards Bar) Maryland v. Shatzer – How long the Edwards Bar stays up In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child. Does Edwards v. Arizona prohibit the re-interrogation of a suspect, who has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, after a substantial amount of time has elapsed between the invocation of rights and the subsequent interrogation? No. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland, holding that because Mr. Shatzer experienced a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks between the first and second attempts at interrogation, Edwards does not mandate suppression of his 2006 statements. Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority reasoned that when a suspect has been released from custody and returned to normal life before the police later attempt interrogation, there is little reason to believe that the suspect's change of heart was Criminal Procedure Outline coerced. The Court then stated that the appropriate period of time for a person to be reacclimated to normal life was 14 days. Here, even though Mr. Shatzer was released back into the general prison population, he entered back into his normal life and was free of the pressures of investigative custody; thus, the Edwards presumption was no longer warranted. 6th Amendment In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. Key language Assistance of counsel Massiah v. United States – Critical Stage is the trigger, indictment and anything after is a critical stage After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Are a defendant’s incriminating statements made without the presence of counsel after a criminal proceeding has begun admissible as evidence? No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents in the absence of counsel after the proceeding has begun violate the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution could not use these statements as evidence against Massiah. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the statements should be admitted because they were voluntarily made and not coerced. The absence of counsel was only one factor among many the court should consider in this situation. United States v. Henry – Deliberate Elicitation After Defendant Billy Gale Henry was indicted for armed robbery of a bank, and while he was in jail pending trial, Government agents contacted a confidential informant (CI), an inmate confined in the same cellblock as Henry. An agent instructed the CI to be alert to any statements made by federal prisoners but not to initiate conversations with or question Criminal Procedure Outline Henry regarding the charges against him. After the CI had been released from jail, he reported to the agent that he and Henry had engaged in a conversation in which that Henry made incriminating statements about the robbery. The CI was paid for furnishing the information. At Henry's trial, which resulted in a conviction, the CI testified about the incriminating statements that Henry had made to him. Henry moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that the introduction of the CI's testimony interfered with and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Government's actions impaired Henry's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah v. United States. Was Henry's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by Henry to his cellmate, an undisclosed government informant, after indictment and while Henry was in custody? Yes. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce a defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the government violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court held that Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time he made the statements. Further, the Court held that the government's specific mention of Henry to the undercover informant, who was paid on a contingency fee basis, constituted the type of affirmative steps to secure incriminating information from Henry outside the presence of his counsel prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. Had there been an official questioning in volition of the suspects 6th amendment right to council? o The test asks whether the police’s actions deliberately elicited an incriminating response from the defendant. 6th Amendment right to council is offense-specific, only attached for those crimes that have reached a critical stage. Brewer v. Williams – Deliberate Elicitation Robert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother’s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two “skinny and white” legs in it. The next day, police found Williams’ abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl’s family wanted to give her a “Christian burial” and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl’s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Criminal Procedure Outline judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Was Williams denied counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment? Did Williams waive his right to counsel when he led the detective to the girl’s body? Yes, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held police denied Williams his Sixth Amendment rights because the adversary proceeding had already began. The detective’s statements eliciting incriminating statements amounted to an interrogation, entitling Williams to counsel. The Court also held that Williams had not waived his right to counsel. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred, writing that the detective who gave the "Christian burial" speech knowingly set out to violate Williams’ constitutional rights. The nature of the crime was not an excuse for the detective’s behavior. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the record clearly showed that Williams had not waived his rights. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the state had promised not to question Williams before he reached Des Moines, and the state could not dishonor that promise made to Williams’ lawyer. 14th Amendment – Section 1 All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.