Why communism came to power and GMD fled to Taiwan
The Aftermath of the Japanese war: Preparations for
Civil War
Key Question: Why did the end of the Japanese war lead to a renewal of GMD-CCP
hostilities
Summary:
❏
Situation at the end of Sino-Japanese war: CCP possessed liberated areas Chiang want to recover
❏
Failure of US attempt at brokering peace
❏
GMD-CCP mutual distrust too deep to resolve
❏
Consequence: end of Japanese war meant a renewal of civil war
●
Patrick Hurley sponsored intermittent talks between GMD-CCP 1944-5 → Mao willing to
compromise but March 1945 Chiang broke off
●
US saw Communists to be a real social force, unable to ignore → GMD-CCP coalition
was desirable
●
August 1945: Further talks held in Chongqing. Mao and Chiang accepted a truce but
were preparing for civil war. Hurley's mission returned and blamed Chiang.
●
Truman sent George Marshall who by March 1946 also gave up
●
2 complimentary fears that prevented agreement between Chiang and Mao
○
GMD's concern the Communist while publically willing to recognise Chiang, are
not willing to co-operate in practice and were planning to overthrow him
○
Communist's past experience, the Nationalist would not honour the promise to
allow them to retain liberated areas they held.
6
. The Chinese civil war 1946-9
●
The civil war 1946-9
●
Reasons for the Communist victory in 1949: Nationalist weaknesses
●
Reasons for the Communist victory in 1949: CCP strengths
1.The civil war 1946-9
June 1946: GMD-CCP truce broke down and Chiang began a campaign to recover
Manchuria
●
US disregarded expert assessment of political reality because it already committed too
much (lead-lease, transportation of 500,000 GMD troops to Japanese surrender areas,
55,000 US marines sent as “military advisors") → Continued to support Chiang despite
Nationalists having lost people's support
●
Chiang had superior troops and resources, NRA outnumbered Communists 4:1 but his
mistakes and GMD military, political and economic weaknesses undid initial advantages
The Character of the war
Key Question: What form did the Chinese civil war take?
●
Complicated: CCP-GMD struggles often became confused with local feuds and rivalries.
Most peasants viewed NRA and PLA the same
Main Phases of the war
●
1946-7: Nationalists attempt to crush main Communist bases in Manchuria and
Northeastern China
●
Communists' successful resistance to attacks
●
1947-9: Communists offensive, moving south to take Nationlsit areas
Chaing's main error was to send GMD forces into Manchuria without secured supply lines
Major campaigns which determined outcomes of the war:
a. 1946-7: the struggle for Manchuria
b. 1947: Strong point offensive
c. Sep-Nov 1948: Liaoshen campaign
d. Nov 1948 - Jan 1949: Huaihai campaign
e. Nov 1948-Jan 1949: Pingjin campaign
a.Struggle for Manchuria
●
Chiang's reasons for wanting to retake Manchuria: An early knockout blow to CCP,
speed up war & return most industrially advanced region to Nationalists
●
NRA moved in and applied pressure, but soon faced a heavy counterattack
●
Nationalist imposed administrators disregarded the local people who increasingly sided
with Communist who presented themselves as defenders of the people
Communist resistance
●
Determined defence gained CCP the advantage: overcame superior GMD airpower by
bombing NRA airstrips, sabotage of 10,000 miles of rail lines, telegraph and phone lines
destroyed by 1947 primarily by local people
●
Chiang's initial advantages were balanced by higher morale and the superior strategy of
CCP. CCP also captured large stocks of NRA American weapons.
Mao's strategy
Key Question: What style of warfare did Mao employ?
●
“When the enemy advances, we retreat. When the enemy escapes, we harass. When
they retreat, we pursue. When they tire, we attack.”
The importance of the PLA taking Manchuria
●
Chiang's failure to recover Manchuria, a main objective, threw him into the defensive.
Armies weakened by desertion and top-level moles
●
CCP by holding onto Manchuria turned the region into a consolidated base to launch
attacks
●
Before Nationalist vulnerabilities were exposed, Mao might have settled, as urged by
Stalin, for a partitioned China, now Mao's considered winning the whole of China.
b.The ‘strong point offensive' 1947
Key Question: What led launch the ‘strong point offensive'
●
Despite Manchuria, Chiang still believed he could win: NRA held onto Shenyang, capital
of Liaoning province, part of Manchuria, control of Northern China below Manchuria, and
in March 1947, gained a symbolic victory in Yanan.
The NRA taking of Yanan
●
Capture of Yanan proved shallow victory: a top-level informant in NRA passed details
of attack to PLA → when NRA arrived in Yanan, it was a ghost city
●
Mao's willingness to abandon positions not worth defending was part of strategy to leave
NRA only empty successes
●
Yanan = beginning of ‘strong-point offensive’ → Chiang believed taking Yanan gave
GMD control of Hubei and Shanxi province, once again overstretched resources to
attack Communists in Shandong and Shaanxi provinces
●
PLA unleashed counter-attack → by late 1947, GMD had lost north-eastern China, and
afterwards never won another victory
The results of the strong-point offensive
●
Convinced Mao the PLA was capable of waging direct frontal war (rather than mobile
defence) and gaining outright victory → adopted strategy of ‘total destruction
c.The Liaoshen campaign, Sep-Nov 1948
Key Question: What was the significance of the Liaoshen campaign?
●
Mao's new target: Changchun and Shenyang, the last remaining GMD bases in the
Manchurian → Liaoshen campaign was the climax to the struggle over Manchuria
●
As a prelude, PLA felt necessary to control Jinzhou, a vital Nationalist-held railway
junction linking Beijing to Changchun and Shenyang → Chiang had sent 250,000 NRA
troops to defend it
●
Jinzhou fell, Chanchung followed (26 Oct) with many NRA dissertations bringing the
city's weakest points to PLA - who shelled them.
The fall of Shenyang
●
‘Catastrophe' → NRA :
○
suffered 3 major defeats
○
lost 400,000 through casualties and desertions
○
lost Manchuria
○
conceded north-east China to Communists
●
Confirmed strategic shit: NRA on retreat, PLA on the offensive
●
Chaing tried for renewed GMD-CCP negotiations, but Mao no longer interested in
compromise.
D. Huaihai campaign, Nov 1948-Jan 1949
Key question: What was at stake in the Huaihai campaign?
●
Struggle for central provinces “heart" of China
Results
●
GMD’s loss of central provinces
●
Southern China now open to the PLA
E.Nov 1948-Jan 1949: Pingjin campaign
●
The struggle for Beijing
Results
● PLA’s taking of Beijing broke Nationalist morale
The end of the civil war
●
Final year of war a mopping-up exercise for PLA
●
Mao declared People's republic of China, October 1949
●
Chiang's flight to Taiwan marked effective end of war
2. Reasons for the Communist Victory in 1949: Nationalist
failings
Key Question: Why were the Nationalists unable to win the civil war
Nationalists had no major victory between 1947-49:
●
Increased desertions
●
Moles in high ranks
Chiang could never wholly rely on supposed supporters, unlike Mao and increasingly resorted
to coercion :
●
seized properties, money expropriated, enlistment enforced
●
Protestors arrested in large numbers, summary executions commonplace
●
1948: Shanghai
Atrocities alienated Nationalists' diminishing supporters and foreign sympathisers, Americans. A
split occurred in GMD with rival factions opposed to Chiang: Kuomintang Revolutionary
Alliance and the Democratic league → This background made it increasingly difficult for
Chiang to sustain the war effort
Chiang's strategic errors
Key Quesiton: What were Chiang's Major mistakes?
Lack of patience at a critically early juncture:
●
Rushed his armies to Manchuria, where the nationalists were at their least influential for
quick win instead of consolidating position in central & southern China as advised.
●
‘Strong-point offensive' intended to secure north-eastern provinces → overstretched his
armies when regrouping and consolidating needed
Struggle for the heart of the people
Key Question: How did Mao aim to win the struggle for the hearts of the people?
●
Communists, though no saints, could offer involvement in the aspirations of the
nation and sympathy with the peasantry, contrasted against Chiang's corruption,
factionalism, detachment from China's fundamental needs and dependence on
American aid
●
In ‘liberated areas' Communists created the first effective administration, peasant
associations encouraged peasants to participate. But CCP also used brutality in
uncooperative regions, there were few genuine popular uprisings → fear brought recruits
●
Popularity of CCP explained by the license the party gave peasants to seize their
landlord's property. But CCP land policy was also expedite, in areas local gentry paid,
it was moderate, otherwise, peasants were encouraged to appropriate land and degrad
owners (eg. 1 million landlords murdered 1945-9)
The Nationalists' political and economic failings
●
After 1945, GMD's political weakness was the 10 years they had to prove they could
govern was characterised by administrative inefficiency & self-weeking, Achievements
were small
●
Through the CCP's initial willingness to co-operate with GMD, despite GMD's murderous
intentions, it suggested a high degree of selflessness.
Inflation
Single most important failure: inflation despite Mao's military and political victory
●
1941: mild increase in prices experienced throughout Republican period soared.
●
Initially caused by Japanese occupation of China's prosperous provinces.
●
After 1945: Cost of maintaining 5 million army accounted for 80% of government's
expenditure, to meet revenue needs:
●
○
Imposed severe taxes
○
Nationalised China's private banks
○
Borrowed heavily from abroad
○
Increased issue of paper currency
Effects of this
○
Drastic fall in the value of money, intensified by huge military expenditure
○
Government attempted to pay increasing domestic and foreign debts with
increasingly worthless money
○
Rate of inflation reached astronomical heights after 1945. By 1949, China's
monetary system collapsed
○
Government prevented by financial bankruptcy from addressing the social
problems of China
Financial failure demoralised the people and discredited the GMD government economically
and politically
Chaing Kaishek's explanation for Nationalists' failure
Key Question: What factors did Chiang regard as being responsible for his defeat?
●
Personal rivalry among Chiang's generals → put personal interest before NRA
●
Willingness of key officers to become informants, disclosing Nationalist positions and
movements
●
Appointing commanders according to personal loyalty rather than military skills
Chaing offered 5 explanations for why the war went wrong for him:
●
“Our commanders fight muddle-headed battles and lack tactical skill' →
Commanders did not study PLAs troop dispositions and disregarded local conditions,
careless planing, issued orders thoughtlessly
●
“Our soldiers' combat skills are so poor that they cannot fight" → Badly led by
officers, poorly trained and lacking knowledge of their weapons, not taught basics of
reconnoitring and maintaining lines of communication
●
“The spirit of most commanders is broken" → Nationalist morale was cripplingly low.
High-level officers began as complacent and ended defeatists.
●
“The GMD's work is done carelessly and perfunctorily.” → The party needed
organisation, discipline and effective propaganda, and “lacked unity at critical times'
●
“Soviet interference and American irresolution" → The USSR and USA dabbled in
civil war to GMD's disadvantage .
The limited base of the GMD's support
Key Question: How did the Character of the GMD support weaken its claim to be a
national party?
●
GMD relied for fundings on bankers and commercial interest s of urban china →
represented not the masses, but a small elite with little interests in impoverished
peasants or city workers
●
GMD entered into shady deals with a clique that had little concern for people → tainted
Chiang's party and government, associated with underhand dealings and nepotism
●
Made a mockery of ‘New Life Movement' that GMD was a moral force in society:
Chiang published ‘China's destiny' in 1943 appealed to all chinese to abandon selfish
thoughts → hypocritical
The GMD's failure to win localities
Key Question: Why was Chiang unable to gain the support of the Chinese regions
●
All chinese leaders had difficulty maintaining authority in localities, China was large and
communication slow → Custom was to do a deal with those who had power in the
region: central government would not interfere with local power structure, local leaders
recognised ultimate authority.
●
Chiang disregarded this conventionL after 1945, trying to re-establish authority in
province the Japanese too, he gave little thought to local power structures, Tried to
impose GMD rule by replacing officials there with Nationalist appointees, ignorant of
prevailing conditions → alienated local communities, grudgingly support or outright
oppose → China responded with coercion.
The NRA's conscription and training methods
Key Question: Why was the NRA so brutal in its treatment of its own troops?
●
●
●
Nationalist policy of enforced conscription was especially damaging → lost respect
and popularity
Desperate for manpower but unable to raise enough volunteers, Chiang's government
rounded up peasants by vicious armed recruitment squares
They were treated with condept and barbarity by the officiers
3.Reasons for Communist Victory in 1949: CCP strengths
Key Question: Why were the Communists ultimately successful in the civil war?
●
Mao describe CCP victory as having come in 3 main stages:
○
Success holding Manchuria
○
defeat of GMD in ‘strong-point offensive' 1947-8
○
PLA's counter offensiveness in 1948-9
●
But communist overthrow was also a triumph of policis, PR and propaganda
●
Official CCP line: Mao followed a carefully planned path to victory, disregarding
half-hearted USSR support and US meddling, by enlightened countryside policies, he
formed unbreakable bond with the chinese people and led a great social revolution
●
Modern historians: Critical factor was not long-term planning but opportunism: when
civi lwar renewed 1946, hope was only to retain bases squared in Japanese struggle, did
not forsee the communists would take the whole of China in 3 years - Naitoanalist
allowed that by throwing away initial superiority
Mao's dominance of the CCP and PLA
●
Mao's self-belief and conviction of his own correctness inspired PLA commanders and
men
●
Strength of will that won political and military struggles → ruthlessness he suppressed
opposition within his own party, rectification programme of early 1940s
●
Absolute domination allowed him last words in PLA civil war campaigns: overcome
doubts of many commanders on a change from defensive to offensive strategy
Mao's leadership
GMD failures more significant because although Mao was skilled, considering the wide disparity
they had at the beginning in terms of man-power, resources (US support), Chiang's heavily
flawed strategy of overextending supply lines and the moles from within lost him all of that initial
advantage (4:1 soldier ratio). It was not only the short term military failures but also in the long
term political ones , the corruption and coercion of his party as well as unwillingness to do local
deals failed to win the majority of the chinese population onto his side.
It was only with the GMD's abject failure that Mao found an outlet for his opportunism and
seized the day - but even Mao himself at the start though he would be lucky to make it out
retaining his occupied zones, neither the US or USSR really believed the Communist could win
given the initial advantage Chiang had until the end of the war.
Role of Communist ideology → appeal, association with liberation