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SECTION I
Section I
Logical Reasoning
1. (A) Assumption
For questions that center on everyday topics,
remember to judge answers based strictly on
what’s in the passage—don’t bring in outside
knowledge.
The physician predicts an increase in heart attacks
from the new health program. What causes heart
attacks? According to the physician, it’s an
increase in exercise. So, it follows that the
physician is anticipating an increase in exercise
from the new health program.
(B) certainly sounds reasonable, but the physician
never mentions the strenuousness of exercise as a
heart attack risk factor—only the amount of exercise.
(C) and (E) also introduce new, out-of-scope
information. Nowhere does the physician’s
argument discuss different levels of health among
the company’s employees.
(D)—We know that the health policy is new
because it’s described as such. We don’t know
whether this is a sudden change—maybe the
company had another exercise program before—but
in any case, that doesn’t affect the argument. We
just need to know that the amount of exercise has
increased, and (D) doesn’t clearly establish that.
2. (C) Inference (Main Point)
When searching for the conclusion of an
argument, beware of choices that are too specific
or too general.
The conclusion is summed up in a single sentence:
“The similarities are too fundamental to be mere
coincidence, however.” The information that comes
before is factual background, and the information
that follows provides evidence for the conclusion.
Choice (C) effectively restates the conclusion, and
thus describes the argument’s main point.
(A) is true, but doesn’t go far enough. The author
is not just saying that the products are similar; they
are so similar that (in his or her opinion) it can’t be
coincidence.
(B)—The author seems to imply that one of the
companies copied the other, but there is no
evidence about which company did the copying.
(D) is a 180 wrong answer choice. The author
believes that believes that it was not simply parallel
evolution, but something more which caused
the similarities.
(E)—The products don’t appear to be at all unique,
even at first glance.
3. (E)
Strengthen
Often, something that didn’t happen is the key to
an argument.
What’s the chemist’s evidence that the
anthropologist committed fraud? The
anthropologist thought the powder would contain T,
found out it didn’t, and then didn’t report the
findings. So the chemist seems to believe that
fraud can be committed by not reporting findings.
(A) and (D)—The anthropologist never reported any
findings, so the charge can’t be that the reported
findings were false.
(B) doesn’t fit the bill, since the anthropologist
never reported the findings that disconfirmed her
hypothesis.
(C)—The chemist believes the anthropologist is
guilty, not innocent, of fraud.
4. (C) Strengthen
To avoid traps like (E), read the question stem
carefully, and answer exactly what it’s asking.
The anthropologist says that the results were
invalid because the testing solution was acidic.
This is only relevant if an acidic solution makes
T undetectable.
(A) helps to strengthen the anthropologist’s original
hypothesis, but doesn’t address the chemist’s
claims of fraud.
(B) introduces the new and irrelevant question of
storage time—we have no idea how long the tested
powder was stored, so this doesn’t bear on the
argument.
(D)—So the test could have been performed again.
So what? This doesn’t bear at all on the anthologist’s
counterargument about the acidity of the test solution.
(E) is tempting, since it indicates that the test may
have missed a small amount of T present. Two
problems: the hypotheses was that a significant
amount of T was present, and, more importantly,
the question asks you to find a strengthener for the
anthropologist’s counterargument involving the
solution’s acidity. (E) doesn’t bear on that
counterargument at all.
1
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
5. (E)
Inference (Point at Issue)
To identify the point at issue, it’s often helpful to
first identify the points on which the parties agree.
Nakai never denies that the new system will work
better than the present one, and Naima doesn’t
deny that it will be expensive and difficult to
implement. Also, Nakai doesn’t debate that it must
eventually be implemented. The only question is
when, and that’s the point at issue here.
(A) and (C) are not debated—Nakai never denies
that new system will have benefits, or that it’s
possible to implement.
(B) and (D) are too extreme. Naima is arguing for
an improved system—not the best system
possible—and she never denies that the present
system does what it’s supposed to. She just thinks
that the new one would be better.
6. (E)
Faulty Logic
On many flaw questions, there are several possible
flaws, though of course only one will show up as
an answer choice.
The author argues that, since different reports
mention both positive and negative effects of
coffee, the reports should simply be ignored. This
is a pretty simplistic conclusion, and there are a
number of flaws here. For example, it could be that
the reports are not referring to the same aspects of
health. Coffee might raise blood pressure, while
combating certain allergies. In this case, the
reports can provide valuable health information,
and your decisions about coffee depend on which
health aspects you deem most important.
(A)—We have no way of knowing if the author
believes coffee is dangerous or not.
(B) is a 180—the argument works to establish that
expert guidance is actually useless.
(C) is out of scope. The entire argument is limited
to the topic of health, so expert opinions outside of
this area are irrelevant.
(D)—The author doesn’t seem to trust expert
opinion in any case, much less in all cases.
2
7. (D) Principle
On test day, look closely at any seemingly unusual
question—it’s almost certainly very similar to a
familiar type.
This is an unusual principle question in that it
presents the abstract principle in the stimulus, and
the correct answer choice provides a specific
example. (Much more common is a specific
stimulus and abstract answer choices.) The
stimulus points out that it’s much easier to spot
the mistakes of others than one’s own, so it’s a
good idea to have someone else check your work.
(D) provides a excellent example—in writing, it’s a
difficult to see your own mistakes, so it’s a good
idea to have someone else proofread.
(A) may be true, but it doesn’t embody the principle
of enlisting an outside party to catch your mistakes.
(B), (C), and (E) all leave out the idea of finding
mistakes, and so don’t closely match the principle
from the stimulus.
8. (E)
Faulty Logic
Watch out for ad hominem attacks—attacks on
those who present arguments rather than on the
arguments themselves.
The pundit’s brand of reasoning might be very
effective in a public debate or newspaper editorial,
but it won’t hold water on the LSAT. The town
officials didn’t follow their own advice, but that
doesn’t mean that the advice wasn’t sound.
(A) may be true, but it doesn’t address the pundit’s
argument about the actions of the town officials.
(B) analyzes the possible courses of action for the
airlines, but ignores the pundit’s criticism of the
town officials.
(C) seems to further incriminate the town officials
(they’re hypocrites and thieves), but is certainly not
a flaw in the reasoning of the pundit who criticizes
the officials.
(D) might help to explain why the town officials took
the steps they did, but doesn’t weaken the pundit’s
argument that we should ignore the advice of those
officials.
SECTION I
9. (E)
Paradox
11. (E) Faulty Logic
For paradox questions, be on the lookout for
alternative explanations.
Subtle out-of-scope answer choices appear often in
flaw questions.
The scientists have established that an asteroid
strike could have thrown debris into the
atmosphere. The same scientists believe that such
a strike caused the extinction of dinosaurs, even
though debris would have settled before it could kill
plants and lower the temperature. There must be
another way that the strike could have caused the
extinction, and (E) provides just such an alternate
explanation—maybe the debris caused respiratory
problems.
(A) doesn’t help the scientists’ cause, since we
haven’t established that the plants or herbivorous
dinosaurs would die.
(B)—A 180. It makes the asteroid theory even
more unlikely, if it has any bearing.
(C) provides some numbers for a possible cooling
scenario, but the scientists have already dismissed
cooling as inadequate to have killed the dinosaurs.
(D) might account for the deaths of many near the
impact, but we’re trying to explain a world-wide
extinction.
The argument seems sound until you closely
examine the categories of student discussed. Only
students “with intense interest” and those “lacking
all interest” are mentioned. Surely many (most?)
students fall somewhere in between. These more
moderate students may be spurred on by grades,
and would otherwise fall behind.
(A)—The argument never assumes that what
students need to learn is a fixed set of information.
The argument functions the same whether the
learning objectives are set or change with time.
(B) directly contradicts part of the argument, which
states that some students are indifferent to both
grades and the information taught in schools.
(C), while perhaps true, has nothing to do with the
argument’s conclusion that grades serve “no
essential academic purpose.”
(D) moves outside the scope of the argument—the
proposal advanced in (D) is not a flaw in the
argument, but rather an entirely separate possible
course of action.
10. (A) Weaken
12. (D) Assumption
As you get towards the middle of the LR section,
be careful of tempting distracters like (B).
In assumption questions, look for key terms to
identify the gap between the evidence and
conclusion.
Even before you got to the answer choices, you
might have spotted the flaw in Bernard’s statement.
Many people are accustomed to existing typewriter
keyboards, and have no interest in learning a new
keyboard layout, even if it might eventually be more
efficient.
(B) points out that word processors inherited their
keyboards from typewriters, but doesn’t explain
why, and so doesn’t counter Bernard’s argument.
(C) only points out that it’s possible to become
skilled at the standard keyboard, but doesn’t
address the fact that people might be even more
efficient with an improved keyboard.
(D) and (E) are both 180s. If people could easily
learn a new keyboard arrangement, or if keyboards
can accommodate different arrangements, this
would substantiate rather than counter Bernard’s
objection.
If we accept that retraining can only be efficient if it
meets individual companies’ needs, and then
conclude that large governmental retraining cannot
be efficient, then we must assume that this
governmental retraining won’t meet individual
companies’ needs. That’s the missing link between
the evidence and conclusion.
(A) and (B) are out of scope, since the argument is
only concerned with what is efficient under the
present rate of growth.
(C)—The economist’s argument does not rely on
whether there is or is not one most efficient type
of training.
(E) moves far outside the scope of the argument.
Nowhere does the author discuss how likely trained
workers are to move.
3
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
13. (B) Inference
Be sure to thoroughly understand any cause-andeffect relationship before looking at distracting
answer choices.
Before we attack the answer choices, we need a
good understanding of the argument. The
conclusion is that fruits and vegetables might help
reduce the risk of stroke. Why? Work out the
cause and effect: fruits and vegetables have lots of
folic acid. Low levels of folic acid correlate with
high levels of homocysteine, which leads to blocked
arteries (which leads to stroke). So, low folic acid
and high homocysteine are bad, while high folic acid
and low homocysteine are good. This correlation
between folic acid and stroke is summed up in (B).
(A) and (C) say pretty much the same thing (which
is a tipoff that neither one can be correct). They
both are 180 choices—low levels of homocysteine
lead to a decrease, not an increase, in the risk
of stroke.
(D) is also a 180 choice—high levels of folic acid
lead to a lower risk of stroke.
(E) is on the right track, but is too extreme. We
can’t be sure that the lower levels of homocysteine
will definitely prevent stroke.
14. (D) Assumption
Difficult Assumption questions will have wrong
answer choices that subtly distort the information
given in the passage.
Is it true that British people must have more money
now, just because they travel abroad more now?
No, it could well be that foreign travel has simply
become a more popular way to spend vacation
money that it used to be. The argument is
assuming that Britons 30 years ago would have
spent any available vacation money on foreign travel
rather than, say, domestic travel.
(A) is a complex 180—if people had not taken
advantage of less expensive foreign travel 30 years
ago, then we might infer that foreign travel was not
popular then. If foreign travel wasn’t popular 30
years ago, then we would attribute the increase to
taste rather than economic conditions.
(B) is off-topic—we care about travel of the British
to foreign lands, not the travel of foreigners to
Britain.
(C) is another 180—the argument wants us to
conclude that people have more money to spend on
4
foreign vacations, not that the money used to be
spent on other things like domestic vacations.
(E) is tempting, but takes us out of scope with the
term “wealthier.” The argument is not attempting
to prove that British people are now wealthier, only
that they have more money to spend on vacation.
Maybe they have the same amount of money, but
the cost of living has decreased, leaving more
money for vacations.
15. (C) Inference
Beware of qualifiers like “most” and “some.”
Difficult questions may hinge on a single word.
We know that the reader has “a chance to solve
the mystery,” so at least some mysteries must
give enough clues to allow the reader to infer
the solution.
(A) is an extremely tempting wrong answer choice,
but note that the question stem simply says
“often,” while (A) says “most.” Often could be less
than half the time, but most implies a majority.
(B)—Although the dull companion serves as a
distracter, we don’t have enough information to
conclude that simply spotting his or her mistakes
will lead to the solution.
(D)—We know that the dull companion often
distracts us from the detective, but we don’t know
that the detective doesn’t also distract us from the
dull companion.
(E)—Although the dull companion offers a
misleading interpretation of clues, it is this
interpretation, and not the clues themselves,
that is misleading.
16. (D) Parallel (Faulty) Reasoning
Two arguments are parallel when they use the
same kind of logic to reach the same kind of
conclusion.
The overall logic is that since a course of action
(call it Y) cannot solve problem X at its base, then Y
shouldn’t be done at all. That’s directly paralleled in
(D). Both the stimulus and (D) fail to realize that
while the stopgap measure (more police / taking
the drug) may not solve the problem (crime / the
disease), it may very well have the effect of
improving the situation.
(A), (C), and (E)—Since the conclusion (signaled by
“Therefore”) is that the city should not engage in a
certain behavior, choices (C) and (E) can be quickly
SECTION I
eliminated because of their positive
recommendations. (A), too, is in a different form,
suggesting that societies should not set up “overly
demanding” rules; there’s no such vague
qualification in the original, which is categorical:
“Do not try to fix X by doing Y.”
(B) fails because the original didn’t say (as (B)
does) that the imposition of behavior Y will make
matters worse.
17. (B) Weaken
Occasionally, an argument can be weakened by
attacking the evidence rather than an assumption.
The argument is that premiums should increase as
driving time increases. The evidence for this is that
the likelihood of an accident increases in proportion
to driving frequency. This is a pretty solid argument,
but what if the evidence is incorrect? It’s possible,
as (B) points out, that people who drive less often
are actually more likely to get in accidents. That
would make the conclusion untenable.
(A) starts out in the right direction in discussing the
likelihood of accidents for infrequent drivers, but
gets off track in distinguishing between small road
and highway accidents. The argument only deals
with accidents in general.
(C) and (E) are both 180s. If infrequent drivers
speed less or are less likely to be distracted, this
supports the argument that frequent drivers are
more likely to have accidents.
(D)—Since we have no evidence about whether
these long-distance trips are more or less safe than
local trips, (D) is out of scope.
18. (B) Method (Role of a Statement)
When two questions focus on a single stimulus,
your work on the first question often comes in
handy as you attack the second.
As we saw in solving question 17, the entire
argument is designed to support the
recommendation that premiums should be tied to
driving time. In other words, this statement is the
conclusion of the argument.
(A) and (C)—The premise, or main underlying
concept, of the argument is that insurance
premiums are tied to the likelihood of an accident,
and the evidence of this premise is the effect of
drivers’ ages and driving history on premiums.
(D) and (E) are out of scope—there is no hint of an
anticipated objection or unclear key term in this
argument.
19. (C) Inference (Conclusion)
Much like tough Reading Comprehension
passages, some Logical Reason questions require
you to work hard to find the author’s opinion.
The first sentence clues us into the essayist’s
opinion—all value can be understood in terms of
happiness. The rest of the argument should be
understood in that light. One objection to this
premise is that we don’t like to see bad people
happy, so perhaps we only value deserved
happiness. In other words, happiness is not always
the deciding factor in what we value. The essayist
counters that the reason we don’t like to see bad
people happy is that those bad people do not bring
happiness to others. So, happiness is the ultimate
measure of value after all.
(A)—We might infer that the essayist agrees that
bad people do not deserve to be happy, but this
hardly means that no one deserves to be happy.
(B) is a 180. The essayist very much believes that
happiness is the only thing that people value.
(D)—The author is only concerned with the extent
to which we value happiness and never speculates
on how we can assure this happiness.
(E)—The author never suggests that these people
cannot be happy, only that we don’t like it when
this happens.
20. (C) Inference
An inference may follow directly from only a small
part of the stimulus.
The stimulus presents a number of statements, but
it’s not immediately obvious what conclusion we are
to draw. The correct answer turns out to be related
to only a small part of the argument. Since “Drastic
shifts in climate always result in migrations,” it
must be true that a population remains settled only
when the climate is fairly stable. The rest of the
stimulus is irrelevant here!
(A) is too extreme. We know that climate can cause
migration, but that doesn’t mean that it’s the
primary cause of migration.
(B) and (E)—Watch out for necessity versus
sufficiency. These migrations are necessary for
5
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
rapid advances in civilization, but that doesn’t mean
that they are sufficient to guarantee this advance.
(D)—Again a case of necessity versus sufficiency.
Climate and geology determine where human
industry can be established, but a suitable climate
doesn’t guarantee that human industry will be
established.
21. (D) Inference
On challenging Inference questions, tempting
wrong answer choices like (E) seem reasonable,
but are neither confirmed nor contradicted by the
stimulus.
The entire passage presents the viewpoint of a
group of educators who believe that schools should
limit education to an in-depth study of basic
concepts and techniques. This will then equip
students with the understanding and investigative
tools to study further on their own. (D) provides a
specific example of this very premise—in-depth
study of a few examples of Greek tragedy will
provide students with the tools and knowledge to
understand all Greek tragedies.
(A) suggests that an understanding of the practical
applications of knowledge make it easier to acquire
that knowledge. Though some people might agree,
this is not directly related to the opinion of the
educators that in-depth study is ideal.
(B) may be true, but the liveliness of lectures is
never addressed in the stimulus, which is limited to
the depth and breadth of study.
(C) suggests that we learn better from teachers
than on our own, but the educators actually believe
that proper education with a teacher can enable us
to later learn very well on our own.
(E) neither agrees with nor contradicts the passage.
It could be, as (E) suggests, that it’s easier to
learn many simple ideas, but we only know what
the educators think is best, not easiest.
22. (C) Parallel Reasoning
Discard any choice whose conclusion isn’t in the
same form as that of the stimulus.
The stimulus’s conclusion is that a course of action
(call it Y) will not yield an overall benefit. So (A) and
(D), which both conclude “so Y is better than Z,”
can be eliminated, as can (E), whose form “Only Y
can solve X” has no parallel in the stimulus.
6
Both (B) and (C) have conclusions in the proper
form. What of the evidence? The stimulus argues
that Y’s gain in productivity in one area would be
offset by a loss in productivity in another. Well,
correct choice (C) uses the very words “will more
than offset,” conveying the same idea: the
assertion that a course of action will have one
salutary action that’s offset by a corresponding
disadvantage. (B) utterly lacks the sense of an
action’s having both positive and negative
consequences.
23. (A) Faulty Logic
For Flaw questions, don’t bend over backwards to
make a choice like (E) fit the question.
We know that the studies were flawed, so what
does that tell us about the safety of irradiated
food? Nothing. Since we can’t believe the study, it
could well be that the food is unsafe, as the activist
claims, but it could just as well be true that the
food is safe. The flaw in the activists reading is
assuming that, just because the study is flawed,
that the conclusion of the study must be untrue,
and (A) points out exactly this.
(B)—The activist says that the study is flawed, but
never says that a better study is not possible.
(C)—Since the activist is only discussing this study,
which is flawed, we know nothing about his or her
opinions of the possibilities of unflawed studies.
(D)—Because the study was flawed, we don’t know
that the irradiated food is actually safe for animals.
Therefore, the activists needn’t consider the
differences between safety for animals and safety
for humans.
(E)—The activist is perfectly reasonable in claiming
that the study is questionable. The study could
eventually be vindicated, but the opinion of a panel
of scientists is enough to at least call the study into
question. The major flaw in the activists argument,
is concluding that calling the study into question
must then mean that the conclusion of the study
must be wrong.
SECTION I
24. (A) Assumption
For tough Assumption questions, use the Denial
Test on complex answer choices.
After a year of exposure to salty foods, a one-yearold may prefer salty foods. This only matters if the
child would not have developed a preference for
salty foods otherwise. In other words, if all twoyear-olds prefer salty foods anyway, then the year
of salty foods can’t be said to have had an effect.
(A) takes care of this loophole.
(B) is a 180. In order for this argument to be
effective, we must assume that a child’s taste
would not naturally change between one and two.
Otherwise, the children in the experiment may not
have been affected by the foods to which they
were exposed.
(C) is tricky to decode, so it’s a good place to use
the Denial Test. An assumption is a statement
necessary for an argument to function, so if we
deny that assumption, the argument falls apart. If
we deny that (C) is true and state instead that twoyears olds do naturally hate salty foods so much
that they wouldn’t pick them, then the argument
doesn’t fall apart. In fact, it is strengthened, since
(C) says the conditioning is what caused the kids to
pick the salty foods. So we know that (C) is not an
assumption of the argument.
(D) and (E)—It doesn’t matter (for this argument) if
the kids found the food tasty or not or whether the
food was nutritious, only that the exposure to the
salty foods changed the kids’ preferences.
7
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Rule Four allows us to add S as yet another clown
who follows V:
SECTION II
LOGIC GAMES
S
Game One: “Circus Clowns”
Situation: A car in the center ring of a circus.
Entities: A group of clowns. Action: To sequence
the clowns in terms of their exit order from the
clown car. Limitations: The twist here is that all of
the rules relate clowns to each other (e.g. “Q gets
out after Z”) rather than to the specific eight slots
(e.g. “V gets out exactly two slots before so-and-so”
or “So-and-so is 4th or 6th”). This is what Kaplan
calls a loose sequencing game, and the sketch
needs to be somewhat loose as well.
You want to build a loose sequence rule upon rule,
keeping your sketch flexible even as you try to
define all the relationships as precisely as possible.
Let’s see how the process works in this time
sequence (which we’ll work horizontally).
Rules One and Two, in tandem, tell us that V gets
out of the car before Q, who gets out after Z; they
also specify that V precedes Y, so the sketch so
far is:
V
Y
Q
Rule Five, finally, mandates the insertion of W
like so:
S
R—T—V
Y
Q
W
Z
In the course of Step Four of the Kaplan Method we
should explore exactly what we know from the
master sketch. The first clown out of the car must
be either R or Z, since each of the others is listed
as following someone else. Contenders for slot #8
are S, Y, Q, and W; all have no one listed as
following them.
Acceptability
Use the rules to knock out the choices—and
don’t rush.
Z
Note that we keep the “Z” flexible so that we
don’t make unwarranted assumptions: We need
to remember that (relative to V and Y) Z can
appear anywhere in the sequence, so long as Q
follows him.
Rule Three first ties right into what we have so far,
by specifying that T precedes V, and then specifying
that R precedes T. So far, then, we’ve got:
Y
Q
Z
Y
Z
1. (E)
Q
R—T—V
R—T—V
If you go to the choices saying to yourself “I need
V...Y and V...Q” (Rule One, in other words), you
cross out (B), in which Q precedes V. If you look for
“Z...Q,” Rule Two, you knock out (C). (And if you
look for “Q...Z,” then you’ve mixed up Rule 2 and
you end up throwing out the right answer. Go
carefully here!)
Rule Three tells us we need “R...T...V,” and of the
remaining choices (A) violates that. Neither (D) nor
(E) violates Rule Four, but (D) violates Rule Five by
putting R after W.
(E) is the only choice left over, and so must be the
correct one.
2. (D) Could be true
It’s perfectly fine to skip a question with no ifclause, in search of a more concrete question.
Many students skipped past this one to work with
the more concrete questions 3-7. To attack it, we
remember that four of the choices are impossible
8
SECTION II
and only one is possible, and compare each choice
to the master sketch.
(A) is impossible because Y is clearly preceded by
at least three clowns: R, T, and V.
(B) won’t do because R precedes everyone except
(maybe) Z; the latest slot R can take is slot #2.
(C) won’t fly because Q is preceded by at least
three clowns—R, T, V, and Z—meaning that the
earliest slot Q can occupy is #5.
(D) will work. Given that S’s only requirement is to
fall later in the sequence than “R...T...V,” S can be
clown #5 readily. For instance: “RWTVSYZQ.”
(E) must be impossible because (D) is possible,
and indeed, since at least three clowns follow V in
the sequence (S, Y, and Q), the latest V can depart
the car is fifth.
3. (C) Could be true
Create a new sketch for a question whenever it
gives you concrete information to build upon.
With Z in slot #7, R is left as clown #1 and Q must
be in slot #8 (Rule 2):
R _ _ _ _ _ Z Q
This seems like little information but it’s enough to
knock out (A) and (E). And if we recall our work on
question 2 we can throw out (D) readily as well.
Back then we saw (with regard to (E), above) that
the latest V can depart the car is fifth. Now that Z
as well as S, Y, and Q come after V, the latest V
can depart is fourth. So (D) is impossible.
Of the remaining choices, (B) is impossible
because T must occupy slot #2 or 3; with Z at the
end of the sequence, there aren’t enough clowns
available to allow T to be fourth. But W is certainly
possible, as in “RTVSWYZQ,” so (C) is correct.
4. (D) Must be true
With T fourth, the only clowns available for the first
three slots are R and W (in that order) and Z.
Meanwhile, to the right of T we will have V, plus the
three clowns that bring up the rear behind V. That
means that V must take slot #5 (since three others
must follow V), so (D) is correct.
(A) and (B) are both false if the first three slots
are “ZRW.”
(C) is false if the first three slots are “RWZ.”
(E) is possible but not necessarily so. The order
of S, Y, and Q among the last three slots is
totally random.
5. (D) All could be true EXCEPT
With Q fifth, the clowns who have to take slots 1-4
are R, T, V, and Z, all of which (the master sketch
reveals) precede Q in the sequence. That means
that W—whose position is wide open except for the
fact that W follows R—must leave the car after Q,
rendering (D) impossible. The earliest slot W can
occupy here is #6.
6. (E) Must be true
With R in slot #2, Z must take slot #1—there’s no
one else—and as such, (E) is a definitively true
statement. Indeed, Z has to exit the car before
everyone else, not just W. The other choices are
possible, but not necessarily so.
7. (E)
Additional rule / Could be true
When a new rule is added to a “loose sequence”
your best bet is to redraw the entire thing... or
skip the question.
The if-clause deals with the V/Z relationship, which
in the original master sketch is unclear. All we
know is that both precede Q. But once we’re told
that V precedes Z, we can be sure that the relative
order is “R...T...V...Z...Q,” with W coming after R
somewhere and Y and S coming after V
somewhere. Your new sketch for question 7 should
so illustrate.
(A)—R is definitely #1 here.
(B)—T is #2 or #3, definitely not #4.
(C)—Here, the earliest Q can leave the car is fifth.
(D)—Here, the latest V can leave the car is fourth.
(E) is correct. If exactly two of the “W, Y, S” trio
precede Z in the sequence, then Z can be sixth,
with Q and the third member of that trio bringing up
the rear.
9
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Game Two: “Farm Task Demonstrations”
Situation: A farm exhibition Entities: The three
volunteers, and the six tasks. Action: To match up
the task with the volunteer, and then to sequence
the order in which the demonstrations occur. This
is a classic matching + sequence “hybrid.”
Limitations: There’s some exactitude here, with
exactly two demos per volunteer. So it’s essentially
a matter of arranging the six tasks in a row (h, m,
p, s, t, w) and matching each to the capital letter F
for Frank, G for Gladys, or L for Leslie. Two of each
capital letter will appear.
The first two rules lay a solid foundation for the
sequencing of the volunteers. If, as Rule One says,
Frank does one demo before Gladys’s first one,
then somewhere in the sequence we’ll need to see
“F…G…G,” with the second F falling after the first
G or both G’s.
Keep in mind that we only have three volunteers –
so if two of them are ruled out for a particular
position or task, the third gets it by default. For
example, if Frank isn’t the first presenter, as Rule
Two says, then who is? Can’t be Gladys, whose
two demos follow Frank’s first one. Must be Leslie.
And so the sequence so far is:
// L … F … G … G
Rule Two also tells us that Frank isn’t the last
presenter, but here’s it’s a bit more ambiguous:
slot #6 will go to Leslie or Gladys, no way to tell. In
any case, we need to note that the second “F” falls
after the first G slot, and that there’s one “L” yet
to place:
F
// L … F … G … G
+L
Now we can attend to the sequencing and matching
of the tasks. Note that harvesting is out of the
question for both Gladys and Leslie according to
Rules 3 and 4. If we’ve ruled out two volunteers,
who must it be? The third one. In this case it
means that Frank demonstrates harvesting (though
we can’t be sure whether it’s the single demo he
10
does before both of Gladys’s, or the second one).
We should also note that milling = Frank or Leslie,
and threshing = Frank or Gladys. Always turn a
negative rule into a positive one.
Finally, Rule 5 specifies that somewhere in the
sequence we need “threshing | milling”—those two
tasks in that order, back to back. And that’s it:
Other than the realizations that Leslie is the first
presenter and that Frank demonstrates
harvesting—both of which will turn into quick
points—Step 4 of the Kaplan Method yields little
more than:
F
// L … F … G … G
harv
F
thresh mill
F/G F/L
+L
plow
spin
weave
}
?
We should always use different notation for
different types of entities. We can use capital
letters for one type and lower case for the other; or
better yet, single letters for one type, and
abbreviations for the other.
8. (C) Acceptability
Check each rule against the choices. Rule One is
violated in (B), where both of Frank’s demos
precede both of Gladys’s.
Rule Two is violated in (A), where Frank is
listed first.
Rule Three is broken by (D): Gladys may not
demonstrate harvesting.
Rule Four is broken by no choice, but (E) breaks
Rule Five by placing spinning between threshing and
milling. (C) must be correct.
9. (A) Must be true
This straightforward right answer is arrived at
through the combination of Rules Three and Four.
Neither G nor L can do threshing, so it falls to F.
10. (B) Could be true
If Leslie takes slot #4, then Gladys must take slot
#6 (forbidden to Frank by Rule 2). We already know
that Leslie is in slot #1. The only way for exactly
one Frank slot to precede Gladys’s first slot is
through the following order: “L-F-G-L-F-G.” Now:
SECTION II
since Frank for sure is the one who demonstrates
harvesting, the harvesting slot will be #2 or #5.
The latter is not one of the answer choices, so we
go with the former, which is choice (B).
11. (A) Must be true
The only way a Gladys demo can precede a Frank
demo is if it’s Frank’s second slot. So somewhere
in the sequence we need:
harv
plow thresh
// L … F … G
F
L?
G?
Note that the sketch includes the other known
facts: Leslie in slot #1; Frank’s first slot preceding
Gladys’ first (and it’s harvesting, as we know from
question 11); and the floating “L” and “G” yet to
place. Now, remember Rule Five: Right after
threshing comes milling. But milling is forbidden to
Gladys (Rule 3), so Leslie takes that milling slot:
harv
plow thresh mill
// L … F … G
F
L
12. (D) Must be true
We deduced this long ago (but even if we hadn’t,
we could figure it out when we got to this question).
Since Frank’s first slot must precede Gladys’s, and
since slot #1 is forbidden to Frank, the first slot
must go to Leslie.
13. (E) Could be true
(A) is patently impossible. Harvesting is a Frank
assignment and he cannot take slot #1.
(B) and (C) can be discarded together. From Rule 5
we know that “threshing | milling” occupy adjacent
slots. But Leslie—the volunteer in slot #1—doesn’t
demonstrate threshing (Rule 4). And if threshing
can’t be first (C), then milling can’t be second (B).
(It’s possible to rule both of these out just by using
Rule 5: if one is true, the other must also be true,
but since we can never have two correct answers,
both must be false.)
(D), meanwhile, is impossible because of the very
same “threshing | milling” requirement. How could
milling follow threshing, if threshing took slot #6?
(E) is left over, and in fact we know nothing about
weaving, so there’s no reason why Leslie can’t kick
off the exhibition with it.
The remaining Gladys slot will fall either just before,
or just after, the “G-F-L” bloc we’ve set up. Either
way Frank’s harvesting slot is revealed to be #2,
and that makes (A) correct.
(B)—Gladys can demo spinning, but in slot #3 or 6,
not #5.
(C) is possible but not certain. Leslie can kick off
the sequence with spinning.
(D) and (E) are either both true (if the sequence is
L-F-G-G-F-L), or both false (if it’s L-F-G-F-L-G).
11
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Game Three: “Job Applicants”
Situation: Chroma, Inc. is hiring. Entities: The
seven applicants and the three types of positions
available. Action: To distribute the applicants (or
hirees, if you prefer) into groups by department.
This is a pretty standard “grouping game of
distribution.” Limitations: The distribution goes
1 / 3 / 3, for management / production / sales:
mgmt
______
prod
__ __ __
sales
__ __ __
Rule One tells us that we will place H+Y together in
the same department (production or sales, of
course), while Rule Two tells us never to have F
and G together. Notes off to the side can act as
reminders of both.
Rule Three, like any if/then rule, needs to be
understood as both itself and its contrapositive.
Should we place X in the sales department, we
must place W in production. And should W be
somewhere other than production, X cannot be
placed in sales.
Rule Four is the most concrete of all and allows us
to build. If we place Feng in the production
department permanently, then we can combine that
fact with Rule One to set up two options:
OP I
mgmt
______
prod
F __
H __
Y
__
sales
__ __ __
OP II
______
F __ __
__
H __
Y __
__
G
s)
(I float
Xsales → Wprod
Wnot prod → Xnot sales
In the sketch, of course, we’ve included the
disposition of G now that F is definitively placed.
And in option 1, we can deduce more: the
contrapositive of Rule Three means that, since W
isn’t going to production (there’s no room left), then
X isn’t going to sales — nor to the full-up
production department). So X gets bumped to
management, because he can’t do anything else
(some would say that’s exactly how it works in the
12
real world, too). G and I must take the two
remaining slots in sales.
14. (E) Acceptability
Compare the rules to the choices.
Rule 1 is violated by (C) and (D), each of which
separates Herrera and Yates.
Rule 2 is violated by (C), although we threw out
that choice already.
Rule 3 knocks out (A), which has Xavier in sales
and hence should have Weiss in production…but
doesn’t.
Rule 4 allows us to throw out (B). Feng must be
in production, not sales. (E), the only non-violator,
is correct.
15. (D) CANNOT be true / Complete and accurate
This one can be approached in several ways, but
the simplest is to check the master sketch to see
that given Feng in production and the requirements
of Rule 2, Garcia is certainly on the “no production”
list, meaning that the right answer is (B) or (D).
And then, since Option I clearly places Herrera and
Yates together in production, (B) can be eliminated,
leaving (D) as correct.
16. (C) Backwards Reasoning
The right answer is a fact which, when combined
with the rules, creates one and only one
distribution. Most students need to work with each
choice, using the pencil and abandoning the choice
once more than one possibility is confirmed.
(A)—If Feng and Weiss go into production, we’d be
in Option II, where several possibilities emerge for
the remaining entities. (You chose (A) if you read
Rule 3 backwards—thinking that with Weiss in
production then Xavier must go into sales, and
hence that Garcia must be the management
person. But you may not read if/then statements
from right to left.)
(B)—Even with Garcia joining Yates (and Herrera) in
sales in Option II, more than one distribution is
possible.
(C) places Ilias and Weiss in sales, which means
Option I, and the contrapositive of Rule 3 kicks in:
since Weiss is not in production, Xavier can’t be in
sales, meaning that Xavier must be the
management person. Garcia, forced by Rule Two
not to interact with Feng, goes into sales, with two
SECTION II
slots in production remaining to the two applicants
Herrera and Yates. The distribution is complete and
(C) is correct.
(D)’s placing Ilias and Weiss in production (Option
II) still leaves Garcia and Xavier ambiguous, with
one in management and the other in sales.
(E), like (D), leaves two placements ambiguous;
this time it’s Garcia and Weiss.
17. (B) Acceptability (Partial)
Use previous work whenever possible.
In correct choice (E) for question 14 we saw (C)’s
pair in sales, and in correct choice (C) for question
16 we saw (A)’s pair. So those choices can be
discarded: they’re clearly possible partial lists for
the sales department.
(B), when tried, yields the right answer. With Xavier
in sales, Rule Three forces Weiss into production,
and now we must separate Herrera and Yates in
violation of Rule One. Unacceptable.
(D) and (E) can quickly be seen as possible, for
example: “G management; F, X, I, production; H, W,
Y sales” confirms (D), and merely switch Weiss and
Xavier in that distribution and you confirm (E).
18. (B) Could be true EXCEPT
Feng and Xavier can share a department, the
production department of course (Rule Four), only in
Option II, where Herrera and Yates are in sales...
and that makes (B) correct. It’s impossible for
Herrera to be in production here.
19. (C) Could be true
Turn negatives into positives whenever possible,
and work out possibilities with your pencil.
If Xavier doesn’t work production, then where does
he work? Management or sales, of course. Work
out each possibility, remembering that Feng is
always in production.
If Xavier is the management person, then Garcia
goes into sales (Rule Two), and the remaining slots
go to two interchangeable pairs: “Herrera + Yates”
(Rule One) and “Ilias + Weiss” (the two left over). If
the arrangement is “X management; F, H, Y
production; G, I, W sales,” then (C) is confirmed as
possible and your work is over.
We don’t even have to work out what happens if
Herrera and Yates go into sales; or if G goes into
management.
If necessary, we can solve this question by working
out each answer choice till we find a rule violation.
(A) is clearly wrong, since F can’t leave the
production department. If we put H and W in sales,
as in (B), we need to accommodate Y in sales
also… but then there’s no room for either G or X,
one of whom also must go to sales. (D) puts G in
production with F, who’s always there – thus
violating Rule 2. (E) puts H and W in production
with F… leaving no room for Y to tag along with H.
13
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Game Four: “Musical Pieces”
Situation: A performance is being arranged.
Entities: The five pieces, and the instruments
performing them. Action: We don’t have to match
the instruments to the pieces—note that that’s
done for us in that long second sentence of the
opening paragraph. What we do have to do is
sequence the pieces—but it’s a double sequence,
hence a kind of hybrid, in that we have to follow
rules about the sequencing of pieces (e.g. Rule
Two) as well as the sequencing of instruments (e.g.
Rule One). A very unusual, hence high-difficulty,
“double-sequence hybrid” game. Limitations:
Everything is set out for us:
N
O
S
T
V
f,l
h,m
g,h
f,g
l,m
In fact, when we lay it out visually we may more
readily see that each instrument is used exactly
twice. This will have an impact on our work, surely.
Rule One, while abstract (and virtually impossible to
jot down in shorthand), will clearly have the greatest
impact on our work. In concrete terms, it means
that a piece cannot be surrounded by two pieces
with which it has nothing in common. (We will
never see pieces “N-O-T” in that order, for instance,
or “N-S-V.”) The end pieces (i.e. slots #1 and #5)
are even more restricted; each will have to have an
instrument in common with the piece next to it.
We could spend a lot of time “what-iffing” the game
and working out all such possibilities, but doing so
is futile: there are only two rules and only five
questions, but many, many possibilities. Let’s
move on.
Rule Two presents the basis for limited options,
since we know that slot #2 will be filled either by
Nexus (fiddle + lute) or Tailwind (fiddle + guitar). You
can set them up as two separate Op. I and II
sketches, or just take note that slot #2 must be a
piece that uses fiddle.
The possibilities for slots #1 and #3 are now
somewhat reduced, but only somewhat. An
opportunity for a deduction arises if you notice that
Onyx, the harp + mandolin piece, has nothing in
common with either Tailwind or Nexus. Hence Onyx
cannot be piece #1. But it can be piece #3 (it’s OK
that Onyx have nothing in common with piece #2 so
long as it shares an instrument with piece #4) so
we can’t do much more with this deduction
up front.
14
When there’s little more to do with a set of rules,
you have to press on.
20. (D) Acceptability
Checking the choices against Rule Two, we can put
a line through (A), which unacceptably schedules
Synchrony second. After that, there’s no alternative
but to think (or draw) your way through each choice,
checking it for at least one overlap per adjacent
pair, and abandoning it as soon as you see a
violation of Rule One.
(B)—Synchrony and Tailwind share the guitar, but in
the sequence “T-O-N” Onyx is surrounded by pieces
with which it shares no instruments.
(C) is fine till the end. Tailwind (slot #1) and Nexus
(slot #2) share the fiddle, and Onyx (#3) and Virtual
(#4) share the mandolin. But Synchrony (#5)
shares nothing with Virtual (#4).
(D) works: slots #1 and #2 share the fiddle, #3
and #4 the harp, and #4 and #5 the mandolin.
(E), which must be unacceptable since (D) is
correct, fails where (C) fails. Slots 4 and 5 must
share an instrument, and here, Onyx and Tailwind
do not.
21. (A) CANNOT be true
Some questions are answerable from a perusal of
the Master Sketch alone.
Whichever piece is second, Nexus or Tailwind, slot
#2 will be a fiddle piece. There are only two fiddle
pieces, and therefore fiddle, choice (A), cannot be
used in pieces #3 and 4.
22. (A) Could be true
A question with a lengthy and confusing “if”
clause is a good one to skip if time is tight.
We must make its abstract rule into concrete
reality. It says that the piece in slot #1 shares an
instrument with slot #2’s piece, and #2’s with
#3’s, and so on down the line. This limits our
options, but not by much. So since the right
answer “could be true”—and the other four are
impossible—the best approach is to try out the
choices until the possible one emerges.
(A) posits Virtual (lute + mandolin) as #1. Virtual
has nothing in common with Tailwind, so Nexus—
which like Virtual uses a lute—must be second
(Rule 2). 3rd must be Tailwind, sharing the fiddle
SECTION II
with Nexus. Tailwind uses a guitar, and 4th would
be the other guitar piece, Synchrony; and Synchrony
shares a harp with the #5 piece, Onyx. V-N-T-S-O
satisfies all conditions, so (A) is possible,
and correct.
(B)—Always impossible, based on Rule 2.
(C)—Onyx, as we’ve noted before, has nothing in
common with either piece scheduled for slot #2, so
Onyx can’t be third here.
(D)—Putting Nexus 4th would leave Tailwind 2nd
(Rule 2), and that would mandate a guitar+lute
piece for the 3rd slot, but none exists.
(E)—Similar problem. Tailwind in slot #5 leaves
Nexus in slot #2 (Rule 2) and there’s no possible
way to complete the connection in line with the
question stem.
23. (B) All could be true EXCEPT
This one could benefit from previous work. We’ve
already seen slot #1 occupied by Tailwind (question
20) and Virtual (question 22). So (D) and (E)
respectively can be eliminated. But beyond that,
we’ve already discussed the fact that Onyx (harp +
mandolin) shares no instrument with either possible
occupant of slot #2—Nexus or Tailwind—so (B)
is correct.
(A) and (C) can be confirmed as possible after
some quick trial and error: for instance, N-T-S-O-V
and S-T-N-V-O respectively.
24. (D) Could be true
As in question 22, your best bet here is to insert
Synchrony (guitar + harp) into slot #5, and try out
each of the choices, knowing that one is possible
and the other four not. (Note that (E) is impossible
under any circumstances, under Rule 2.)
(A)—Making Nexus 3rd leaves Tailwind 2nd (Rule
2). Virtual and Onyx are left for slots #1 and 4, but
whichever way you assign them, Rule 1 is violated.
(B) separates the two mandolin pieces, Onyx and
Synchrony, into slots #3 and 5 respectively.
Whether you slot Nexus or Tailwind into slot #2,
there’s no way to avoid violating Rule 1.
(C), like (A), leaves the interchangeable Virtual and
Onyx as mandating a rule violation. Tailwind 4th
makes Nexus 2nd (Rule 2), and the remaining slots
cannot be properly filled.
(D) can be constructed acceptably from left to right.
With Virtual 1st, Nexus would take slot #2 so that
both share the lute. Tailwind, the other fiddle
piece, takes slot #3. Onyx in slot #4 shares the
harp with Synchrony in slot #5, and all’s well.
15
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Section III
Reading Comprehension
Passage One: “ Native American Forest
Burning”
The Topic of this Natural Science passage is the
alteration of Western Hemisphere forests, once
thought to have begun with European settlers but
actually engaged in by native populations for
centuries, “especially by means of burning” (line 8).
The Scope, then, is the nature and extent of native
populations’ burning of the forests. Paragraph 1 is
devoted to downplaying the extent of forest change,
but the author’s Purpose becomes clear with
paragraph 2’s summary of the “large body of
evidence” from both North and South America:
Clearly the author wants to rebut paragraph 1’s
scholars. The wise critical reader will note the
Keyword phrases “for example” (line 18), “Other
evidence shows that” (lines 21-22), and “Burning
also promoted” (line 29) as the milestones between
which s/he can search for whatever examples are
asked for in the questions. The main thrust of
paragraph 2 is the effect of routine controlled
burning on the land, with (lines 21-27) a rebuttal of
the argument (lines 13-15) that natural fires were
the main culprit.
Paragraph 3 turns its attention to the positive
effects of all this burning—notably the changes in
forestation seen in both the U.S. and Central/South
America—and more Keyword phrases like “for
example” and “An example is” help us keep track
of the large amount of detail provided. (Not
surprisingly, 50% of the passage questions are
detail-oriented). Your Roadmap might look
something like this:
Paragraph 1—Natives burned forests pre-1492
Paragraph 2—Burning was routine; changed both
Americas
Paragraph 3—Mixed U.S. forests became
homogenous; succession at work in Nicaragua etc.
1. (C) Global (Main Idea)
Any Global question answer choice that fails to
reflect Topic, Scope, and Purpose must be
rejected immediately.
The only choice properly reflecting Topic, Scope,
and Purpose is (C), which correctly characterizes
16
the passage as presenting—in rebuttal to
paragraph 1’s scientists—”evidence of the
frequency and impact of” native Americans’
forest burning.
(A) presents the main body of the text (44 lines) in
a subordinate “Despite” clause, and gives pride of
place to paragraph 1 only, as if the author were in
sympathy with the “persistent scholars.”
(B) and (D) both fail because they fail to even
mention the passage’s Scope (forest burning),
falling back on weaker, broader words like
“alteration” and “cultivation.” Also, “unanimously
agree” (B) and “general agreement” (D) both
contradict the “persistence of the myth” (line 1)
that the pre-Columbian wilderness was untamed.
(E) focuses on a small question that the author in
fact answers quite convincingly—yes, it was
deliberate—as he goes on to his broader interest in
the burnings’ impact.
2. (A) Inference
When prowling the passage in search of answer
choices, use the Hot Words in the choices to drive
your search.
Since burning “converted mixed [forest] to
homogeneous forest” (lines 37-38), (A)’s mixed
forest would be a highly unlikely result of the
burning process. The other five choices all pick up
on explicit “Hot Words” from the text:
(B)’s “herbaceous undergrowth” was “another
result of…burning” (lines 33-34).
(C)—”Controlled burning created conditions
favorable to…fire-tolerant…foods” (lines 35-37).
(D)—”Burning…creat[ed] forests in many different
stages of ecological development” (lines 29-31).
(E)—”Controlled burning created grassy openings
such as meadows and glades” (lines 27-28).
3. (E)
Detail
Use the Hot Words in the question stems as well.
The Hot Words here are “in recent times.” Most of
the passage deals with pre-Columbian forest
burning. But in line 50 we see “Today,” and that’s a
signal of the detail that the question is after. We
know that Nicaragua has low elevation because it’s
contrasted with Guatemala and Mexico at “higher
elevations” (lines 46-48), and we know that
Nicaragua’s extensive pine forests (unusual for its
SECTION III
temperature and heavy rainfall) “occur where there
has been clearing followed by regular burning”
(lines 50-51). So (E) is correct.
(A) and (B) describe the results of burning in preColumbian times (lines 37-40), but there’s no
reference to such burning as a recent occurrence.
(C) and (D) describe pine forests that are inferably
the natural result of the two countries’ cool, dry,
high elevations. The only Central American and
Mexican forest burning that the passage describes
happens at low elevation (lines 57-59).
4. (B) Detail
Read every question carefully; don’t rush.
This one focuses on pre-Columbian burning, not
that of the modern day, but our work on questions
2 and 3 comes in handy. The same phenomenon
described with regard to question 3 “is likely to
have occurred in the past” (lines 52-53), and it’s a
low-elevation “succession…evident elsewhere” (line
57). In sum, the conversion of mixed forest to
homogeneous forest seems to depend upon
burning, and that’s (B).
(A)—Guatemala and Mexico have huge pine forests
(i.e. homogeneously pine) at high elevations with no
talk of burning. Apparently high elevation favors
homogeneity.
(C) and (D) focus on heterogeneous or mixed
forests, but burning doesn’t lead to those. Indeed,
on the evidence of the passage, heterogeneity
comes about either because of climatic conditions
or because the people have left; cf. lines 44-46
and 55-57.
(E) distorts lines 18-21. The passage’s only
reference to sedentary charcoal is with regard to
the northeastern U.S.—not the tropics—with
elevation unspecified.
5. (D) Inference
When the right answer is an idea with which the
author would agree, the wrong choices will be
points of disagreement or outside the scope.
(A) is a 180. The whole thrust of the passage is to
debunk the idea that natural fires could have
caused all of the observed effects.
(B), too, is a 180. See lines 31-34:
Herbaceousness is associated with maturity.
(C) goes too far. In pointing to native populations’
pre-Columbian alteration of the ecosystem the
author does not seek to absolve the European
settlers from all responsibility. The myth he wants
to debunk is that nothing happened before 1492;
he’s not arguing that everything happened before
that date.
(D)—The thrust of lines 35-37, that burning created
favorable conditions for certain plants, suggests
that (D) is dead on: Indeed, the likelihood is that
those plants might not have done as well in the
absence of burning. That’s our winner.
(E) contradicts the thrust of lines 50-55, where
population is cited as a likely necessary condition
for a homogeneous forest like the Nicaraguan
pines. Given that fact, the author would hardly
agree that natural fires were just as likely a cause
as controlled burning.
6. (A) Detail
Look for connections between questions on the
same passage.
We’ve been here before—we’ve already plowed
through the details about the impact of controlled
burning. (A) has it exactly wrong: Lines 21-27 make
it clear that there are few similarities across
geographical reasons in terms of fires set by
humans. All of the other choices are supported in
ways we’ve seen before:
(B)—Lines 29-31.
(C)—Lines 31-34.
(D)—Lines 18-21.
(E)—Lines 27-28.
7. (D) Detail
When a question focuses on a specific line
reference, always rely on that line’s context.
The question concerns line 57, but the entire
context is lines 50-57, where the chain of events is
described: large population [arrow pointing right]
homogeneous forest appears [arrow right]
population disappears [arrow right] mixed forest
returns” is described. (D) has it right.
(A)—Clearing followed by burning is the process
that creates the Nicaraguan pines (lines 50-52), but
the description of the “succession” follows several
lines later.
(B) is even further removed from the “succession”
than (A) is. And there’s no sense of anything
17
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
cyclical in the rain forest [arrow right] pine forest
process.
(C) focuses on the causes of the changes in
forestation, not the results.
(E)—If anything, the relationship would be just the
reverse: Settlements led to pine forests. In any
case, the succession is one of a movement from
heterogeneity to homogeneity; “pine forests” are
but one example of homogenous woodland.
8. (A) Global (Primary Purpose)
Get familiar with the strong active verbs generally
applicable to passages, “debunk” or “rebut” being
among the most common.
As noted above, the author’s purpose is to debunk
(A) the notion of scholars that no ecosystem
alteration occurred pre Columbus.
(B)—The belief in native American forest burning is
not nearly as “common” as the author would like:
That’s why he wrote the passage.
(C)—No evidence on the part of the skeptics
(paragraph 1) is countered. Instead, the author
provides his own counterevidence.
(D)—No such synthesis takes place. This is a
“them vs. me” situation.
(E) is a distortion. It would be more correct to say
the author wants to “correct the common
interpretation of the geographical record.” But
that’d be (A).
18
SECTION III
Passage Two: Intellectual vs. Institutional
Authority
In this very challenging law passage, the Topic is
the contrast between intellectual and institutional
concepts of authority, while the Scope is the
conflict between those ideas of authority within the
legal system. The author’s Main Idea is not at all
clear in the first paragraph. (In fact, it doesn’t
become clear until the very end of the passage.)
Instead, the author explains the basic distinction
between the two types of authority, and then closes
the first paragraph by noting that one critic “went so
far as to” postulate that all judicial authority is
intellectual.
Paragraph two notes that some critics have claimed
that there is no such thing as intellectual
authority—and that all authority comes from
recognition by an established institution. This
extreme position is also rejected, however, on the
grounds that some institutionally-recognized ideas
are later overturned—that is, something endorsed
by an institution is later dismissed because it’s not
a good idea. That means intellectual authority can
override institutional authority. Most striking to the
savvy test taker is that we still don’t know what the
author thinks. So far, we only have a detailed but
impartial report of a debate.
Paragraph three takes a bit of a detour with a rather
involved example using musicology. A musicologist
might argue that a composer who hasn’t been
recognized as a genius for several decades
probably is not a genius. Much like the argument
in the previous paragraph about the time-tested
nature of intellectual authority in law, we might say
that this consensus about the composer shows a
basis for intellectual authority in music—everyone
agrees after a period of time if music is good or
not. However, the author then points out that that
this time period—several decades—is rather
arbitrary. Maybe we should wait a longer or shorter
period to make this decision. According to the
author, the entire notion of using longevity over
decades to judge the value of music (or law) is
itself an institutional convention. Institutional
authority has set up the very rules by which we
judge the value of music.
The fourth paragraph gets us back on track by
making explicit the connection between music and
law. In legal systems, precedent becomes law. In
other words, the mere fact that a judge made a
decision effectively shapes the law. That seems
like a clear indicator that legal systems are based
on institutional authority. But wait—we’re still not
finished. A judge’s decision can be revised if it’s
no longer a good idea or is outdated. Here,
intellectual authority is asserting itself. Finally, in
the last sentence, we get to the Main Idea! We
read that “legal systems contain a significant
degree of intellectual authority, even if the thrust of
their power is predominantly institutional.”
9. (D) Global (Main Idea)
Incorrect Main Idea answer choices often focus
too narrowly on a small part of the entire passage.
Unlike most LSAT passages, the Main Idea for this
passages is located in the final paragraph (and
primarily in the last sentence). There we read that
the authority in legal systems is mostly institutional,
but the fact that precedents can be revised means
that there is also some intellectual authority. This
is summed up nicely by (D).
(A) implies that legal authority is primarily
intellectual with some institutional basis. This is
the opposite of the author’s true point: that legal
authority is primarily institutional, with some
intellectual basis.
(B) sums up the viewpoint of the critic at the end of
the first paragraph, but ignores everything that
follows.
(C) seems to take the viewpoint indicated by the
musicology example, that all intellectual authority is
actually institutional. This ignores the concluding
paragraph, however.
(E) goes too far is saying that legal authority is
“exclusively” institutional. The author says that
there is a “significant” degree of intellectual
authority.
10. (A) Inference
Don’t rely strictly on your memory or vocabulary to
answer questions like this one—go back and
reread the sentence in which the word or phrase
appears.
Even if you’ve never heard the word imprimatur, you
can reread the sentence in which it appears and
use context: “Not all arguments stand the test of
time, and some well-reasoned arguments never
receive institutional imprimatur.” The author is
saying that some officially-recognized arguments
aren’t actually very well reasoned, and some well19
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
reasoned arguments aren’t officially recognized.
So, imprimatur must mean recognition, and (A)
paraphrases this quite well.
(B), (C), (D), and (E) may all seem like possibilities
for the meaning of imprimatur, but none of them
make sense in the context of the author’s argument
that institutional authority alone can’t explain the
legal system.
11. (E) Logic
Just as in Logical Reasoning, Reading Comp
questions about weakening an argument require
you to identify the evidence and conclusion.
As we read in the final sentence of the passage,
the author feels that basis for intellectual authority
is evidenced by the reconsideration and revision of
previous decisions. If, as (E) postulates, it turns
out that the judges are actually quite reluctant to
revise decisions, then the primary evidence for the
author’s position is called into question, weakening
the argument considerably.
(A) suggests that judges sometimes make bad
decisions, but this doesn’t weaken the author’s
premise that such decisions can later be revised.
(B) and (D) state that some legal systems have
more faulty reasoning than others, or revise
systems more often than others. The author only
establishes that this revision of bad decisions
takes place, and never states that this revision is
evenly distributed, so (B) and (D) don’t affect the
author’s argument.
(C) confirms that judges sometimes revise bad
decision (albeit under community pressure), so this
strengthens, rather than weakens, the author’s
argument.
12. (B) Inference
For some Reading Comprehension passages,
understanding the question and characterizing the
answer choices is half the battle.
Although you certainly can’t prephrase here, be
sure to fully understand the question before you
look at the answer choices. Fours of the five
answer choices will be something that the author
would probably agree with, and only the credited
answer will be something not in accord with the
passage. Only (B) doesn’t match the passage,
because it’s too extreme. It may be that
20
institutional authority sometimes rejects wellreasoned arguments, but it’s far too extreme to
state that such authority always rejects these
arguments.
(A) and (C) follow directly from the definitions of
intellectual and institutional authority given in the
first paragraph. “Intellectual authority . . . [does]
not depend on coercion or convention,” while
institutional authority “refers to the power . . . to
enforce acceptance.”
(D)—Since precedent is sometimes revised, we
know that intellectual authority can challenge
institutional beliefs. It also follows that institutional
authority cannot challenge institutional beliefs,
since any belief not endorsed by this authority is, by
definition, not institutional.
(E)—By the reasoning stated directly above, we
know that intellectual authority can challenge
precedent. In lines 42-46, we read that precedent
is “a pure example of institutional authority,” so we
can conclude that this authority doesn’t challenge
precedent.
13. (D) Logic (Author’s Purpose)
If a long, involved example is developed in the
passage, expect to see a question about why the
example was used.
Why did the author go to all the trouble to develop
that long example about musicology in the middle of
a passage on legal systems? As we saw in
analyzing the passage as a whole above, the
musicology example serves to illustrate that what
first appears to be an example of intellectual
authority (letting the quality of music speak for
itself) actually involves using a yardstick
established by institutional authority (the passage
of several decades). (D) sums up this idea
quite nicely.
(A)—The author distinguishes between the two
kinds of authority in the first paragraph. The
passage is an investigation into which kind of
authority characterizes legal systems, but the
distinction between the types is quite clear by the
time we reach the musicology example.
(B) is quite a distortion. The musicology example
is not an argument at all—it’s simply an example
used as evidence in a much larger argument.
(C)—Although we can certainly imagine that such a
thing may happen, no example is given in this
SECTION III
passage of a proclamation of musical genius later
being rescinded.
(E) goes too far. The ascription of musical genius
does play by institutional rules (the convention of
using several decades as a yardstick), but that
doesn’t preclude the possibility that there are
“intellectual” criteria as well, such as the quality of
the music.
14. (C) Inference
“Based on the passage” is a signal to take what
the author has said, and then evaluate which new
idea in the answer choices follows from it.
Since the entire fourth paragraph centers of the
concept of precedent, we have a pretty good idea of
the author’s attitude towards this topic—sometimes
old decisions need to be overturned later because
they were bad, or have become outdated. (C)
expresses this fact, while still acknowledging that
precedent can be a useful tool.
(A) is distorted and extreme. Judges sometimes
must revise or reject precedent in order to maintain
intellectual authority. (The word only is a clue that
the answer choice may be extreme.)
(B) and (D) miss the author’s point that precedent
can in fact be revised or rejected, thus maintaining
the intellectual integrity of the law.
(E) is far too extreme. Although precedent does not
by itself establish intellectual authority, the author
never indicates that we should abandon it, since
precedent can be revised or rejected.
21
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Passage Three: Abrams and Historical
Sociology
The first paragraph clues us into the Topic,
historical sociology. The author tells us that in this
field, many scholars have focused almost
exclusively on the nature by which people are
shaped by society, while other scholars have
considered instead how people shape societies.
This leads us to the Scope of the passage,
Abrams’s view that historical sociologists should
consider both of these related processes, which
Abrams groups under the term “structuring.”
In the second paragraph, we learn that Abrams also
sees structuring at work in the making of history.
In other words, people’s actions are described and
interpreted, and that is what we call history.
Abrams’s notion of structuring comes into play
when we consider that the people who make history
are themselves shaped by historical conditions.
Abrams refers to these conditions and
“contingencies,” and they include factors such as
economic and political conditions, ideas and belief
systems to which one is exposed, and so on. All of
these “conditions” of history influence the
development of people, who in turn influence the
development of history.
In the third paragraph, we find a description of the
kind of events which Abrams considers ideal for
analysis. These are the points when “action and
contingency meet”—that is, these events allow us
to see people taking action to change history, but
also let us note the forces which shaped the people
taking action. The passage closes with a
description of a fourfold method that Abrams
recommended for analyzing these key points. Savvy
test takers won’t get bogged down in lists of details
like this fourfold method. If a question requires it,
we can easily go back for the specifics. Note that
nowhere do get a clear notion of the author’s ideas.
The entire passage is a fairly neutral description of
the methods and philosophies of Philip Abrams.
For that reason, there are no inference questions
about what the author might agree or disagree with.
15. (D) Global (Main Idea)
When the entire passage centers on the viewpoint
of one thinker, beware of answer choices that
assume too much about what others in the
field think.
Since the passage is so dense, this Main Idea
22
question is especially challenging . In paragraph 1,
we read that Abrams suggests combining two
approaches employed by many scholars—studying
how people influence society, and studying how
society influences people. The other paragraphs
investigate how these methods apply to the study
of history. (D) includes both of these aspects.
(A)—We have no indication that anyone has
asserted that “structuring” cannot be applied to
historical analysis, so we certainly can’t say that
Abrams is rejecting such an assertion.
(B) and (C) likewise assume without justification
that someone is disagreeing with Abrams. We
don’t know that sociologists would disagree with
the theories advanced in the passage, because the
entire passage centers on Abrams’ views.
(E) is too strong. Abrams argues for applying
sociological methods to history, but we have no
indication that he would describe traditional
methods as possessing “shortcomings.”
16. (E) Logic
When you have narrowed the field down to two
choices—like (E) and (D) here—read very carefully
to find the chink in the armor of the wrong choice.
The passage centers on the concept of
“structuring”—the complex influence of people on
history (and society), and vice versa. The final
paragraph describes a fourfold structure for
studying this interaction, so (E) follows well to sum
up both the paragraph and the passage.
(A) is rather one-sided, and leaves out the critical
concept of individuals being influenced by history.
(B)—We know from the first paragraph that most
historical sociologists believe that history shaped
individuals or vice-versa, so we certainly can’t say
that these sociologists feel there is no connection.
(C) is far too defensive—we have no reason to
believe that historical sociology is not recognized as
legitimate in the academic world.
(D) is rather subtly wrong, but is wrong
nonetheless. The phrase “chosen to ignore”
makes (D) too extreme, since we don’t have any
evidence from the passage that previous
sociologists have actually “ignored” any issues
intentionally. Also, this answer choice seems to be
pitting historical sociology against traditional
sociology, while the fourfold structure that Abrams
is advancing is intended more to improve
historical—not sociological—analysis.
SECTION III
17. (B) Detail
For Detail questions, use “Hot Words,” like
contingency to guide you back to the right place
in the passage to refresh your memory.
Structuring is the interaction of historical
contingencies and conditions with individuals. The
contingencies themselves are just part of the
equation, and so cannot alone be described as “a
form of historical structuring,” as we see in (B).
(A)—See line 21.
(C)—See line 26.
(D)—See lines 21-22.
(E)—See line 29.
(A)—Actually, the author of the passage never
discusses the merits of the Abrams’s concept, and
never reveals whether he feels the system has
merit at all.
(B)—The details, if they are revealed at all, come in
the second and third paragraphs, not the first.
(C)—We never hear anything about how other might
respond to Abrams’s conception, so we certainly
can’t say that the author anticipates these
challenges.
(D)—Although we first hear the key term structuring
in the first paragraph, we don’t examine its role in
historical sociology until the second and third
paragraphs. The first paragraph simply defines
the term.
18. (A) Logic
20. (C) Logic
Just as in Parallel Reasoning in the Logical
Reasoning section, the correct answer on
questions like this one will show an exact
correspondence with the original structure.
What would be an ideal example of historical
sociology, according to Abrams? It would follow the
fourfold structure he outlines at the end of the
passage. Each clause of (A) corresponds to one
aspect of this structure: “A report on the
enactment of the bill” = “description of the event
itself.” “Why the need for the bill arose” =
“discussion of the social context.” “Sketched a
brief biography” = “summary of the life history of
the individual agent.” “Ponders the effect the bill
will have both on society and on the legislator’s
career” = “analysis of the consequences of the
event both for history and for the individual.”
(B), (C), (D), and (E) all fail to show the neat oneto-one correspondence with the fourfold structure
that we see in (A).
19. (E) Logic
A quick scan of the answer choices can help you
quickly see where they agree and disagree.
When a question asks for the LEAST illustrative
example, don’t bend over backwards to make a
choice fit. Here, the four incorrect choices will all
be clear examples of how contingencies affect
individuals. The one correct choice will not be.
First we need to refresh our memories about what
contingencies are. They are social phenomena that
shape individuals, such as one’s upbringing, or the
belief systems to which one is exposed. All of the
answer choices discuss the effect of an individual’s
background on a decision made by that individual.
(C) is unique because the decision in question is a
fairly trivial one: “to visit friends in another
community.” How would one’s living in a particular
community affect one’s decision to visit friends
somewhere else? It’s not at all clear, and we might
well conclude it has very little effect at all. (C) is
not at all a clear example of environment shaping a
person’s actions.
(A), (B), (D), and (E) all illustrate situations in
which a person’s upbringing or environment could
have helped shape major decisions in that
person’s life.
A quick scan reveals that all of the answer choices
center on Abrams’s conception of historical
sociology. So, how does the first paragraph
function in relation to this topic? It sets the stage,
and tells us the basics of Abrams’s theory of
structuring, which in turn become the basis for
Abrams’s conception of historical sociology, as
indicated by (E).
23
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Passage Four: “Med School Ethics Training”
The Topic is the teaching of ethics to med
students, and the Scope is the idea of studying
ethics through narrative literature. The passage is
an argument for such a process—that’s the
passage’s Purpose—and it’s constructed through
four key blocks of text that roughly (but not exactly)
correspond to the four paragraphs:
Lines 1-12: The problem. Med students are learning
so many facts that they can lose sight of their
patients: the human element, the ethical element,
of medicine.
Lines 12-27: The weakness of the current
approach. Current ethics training is too abstract
and philosophical, too far removed from everyday
human experience. (One perhaps wishes that in
criticizing excessive abstraction the author would
mention a concrete example of a novel or two that
he’d use in ethical training, just to break up the
passage and make it less…um…abstract and
philosophical; but what can you do?)
Lines 27-46: Why literature is best suited to the
purpose. It’s concrete and human. It engages the
reader. It challenges the reader’s personal sense of
“absolute morality.” It requires one to walk in the
characters’ shoes.
Lines 47-62: Qualifications. Using literature can
keep a student from taking a dogmatically absolute
moral view while not necessarily leading to a wholly
relativistic one. Fundamentally, literature provides
(lines 57-62) the “deeper understanding of human
nature” that the author believes is necessary for
dealing with medical ethics.
necessarily trying the literature-based approach yet.
This may be a manifesto designed to lead to a pilot
project, for all we know.
(E)’s rejection of “general moral principles” runs
counter to the author’s beliefs. See lines 47-55.
22. (D) Detail
Context is critical for Detail questions.
The sentence in which “moral imagination” appears
is in the context of “the development of…flexible
ethical thinking” one sentence earlier. (D) reflects
the idea that , as a reader, one “engage[s] oneself
with the story not as one’s own,” thus requiring one
to imagine the moral issues and consequences of
others’ behavior.
(A) describes, lengthily, a simple idea in lines 3435. But grasping character development requires
“moral imagination”; it doesn’t define that phrase.
(B) brings up the issue of multiple points of view
that only comes up after line 38. Besides, the
author would hardly favor (B)’s description of a
reader choosing sides as an example of “flexible
ethical thinking.”
(C)—”Moral imagination,” in line 38, is presented
in the context of what happens when one reads
literature, not how one solves moral dilemmas
whether real or fictional.
(E)—The author would not agree that sheer
“variety” is the reason to empathize with others’
moral viewpoints. In any case one doesn’t “act
upon” anything when one exercises “moral
imagination.” One reads and ponders.
21. (A) Global (Main Point)
23. (E) Inference
Most of the time a Global question comes first.
Even when one doesn’t, you should seek out the
Globals at once.
Prediction is futile for many Inference questions,
especially when the question offers no hints. Look
swiftly and rigorously, remembering that one and
only one choice has to be true based on the text.
The only choice that echoes the author’s advocacy
of literature as a tool for studying medical ethics is
(A), and (A) is improved by tipping its hat to the
counter-position found in lines 15-27.
(B) focuses only on the weakness of traditional
training and utterly ignores the argument for the
literature-based approach.
(C) lumps narrative in with abstraction and
“situation” (whatever that means). The author is
asserting the primacy of narrative in ethical training,
not trying to construct some sort of delicate balance.
(D)—As far as we can tell, no medical school is
24
(E)—Yes, paragraphs 1 and 2 describe the
inadequacy of, respectively, immersion in science
and traditional philosophical study to the ethical
needs of future doctors. (E) is the very reason for
the author’s overall proposal.
(A)—No, the author believes that ethics is widely
taught (lines 15-16), albeit incorrectly. And to
complain about students’ complete immersion in
facts is an indictment not of a too-heavy course
load, but rather a misplaced emphasis.
(B)—No, there’s no comparison of fiction vs.
SECTION III
nonfiction. “Narrative literature,” as the author uses
the term, could encompass both.
(C)—No. “The traditional method of ethical
training…should be supplemented…by” the ethical
study of narrative literature. That’s the whole point.
If there’s a need for more interaction with real-life
patients, the author never says so.
(D)—No. A purely narrative-based approach is far
from the author’s recommendation; narrative is to
be “incorporated” (line 55), not to reign triumphant.
have to go that far back: Lines 27-31 support (C)
just as well. (So do 21-23, for that matter.)
(D) is supported by lines 23-26 as well as line 36;
cf. our discussion of question 22’s correct answer.
(E) runs counter to lines 26-31 and is the correct
answer, the “odd man out.” Quite the opposite of
(E), literature doesn’t “insulate” future doctors for
ethical dilemmas, but rather makes it easier for the
doctors to deal with them.
26. (C) Detail (All/EXCEPT)
24. (D) Global (Overall Purpose)
You can seek out and tackle Global questions up
front; you don’t have to wait for one to come along.
While (D) doesn’t mention narrative literature,
that’s the “approach” that the author does indeed
“propose” in order to bring the human element
back into medical school.
(A) has the Topic right but not the Scope. How to
institute such an approach is far too practical and
down-to-earth for this passage.
(B)—To accuse the author of simply complaining
about the current teaching of ethics is to ignore the
more than 2/3 of the passage that’s devoted to a
proposal for fixing things.
(C)—The “pitfalls of situational ethics,” discussed
in lines 47-57, do not go hand in hand with the
ethical content of literature. Indeed, the latter
“need not lead,” or so we’re told, “to the former.”
(E), like (A), recognizes the Topic but loses sight of
the author’s specific interest. That med students
need to study ethics is a given. How to do so is the
question at hand.
25. (E) Detail (All/EXCEPT)
Use the clues in the question stem to identify the
appropriate part of the text.
Paragraph 3, where we read of the opportunities
inherent in studying ethics through literature, is surely
the source of most of the wrong answers here, though
the argument continues in paragraph 4 as well.
(A) is the thrust of lines 47-57. Reading literature
is not an abandonment of all moral principles and
the assumption of an utterly relativist stance.
(B)—”A wide array of relationships” (line 25)
underlies (B), as do the “varied world of human
events” (lines 30-31) and several other references.
(C) essentially sums up lines 11-14, but you don’t
Not every statement with which the author
wouldn’t agree is a 180. Sometimes, it’s an idea
about which s/he’s taken no stance—outside the
scope, in other words.
(C) is correct because it seriously distorts the
passage’s first sentence. There is no sense that
the more complex modern world has made ethical
dilemmas more prevalent. It’s just that future
doctors have a greater obstacle in handling such
dilemmas—namely, the vast array of knowledge
that they have to master, an array that disconnects
them from the ethical problems that, inferably,
doctors have always had to handle and always will.
(A) explicitly paraphrases line 22.
(B) is almost word-for-word lines 9-10.
(D) picks up lines 19-21 almost exactly.
(E) is lines 27-29, almost verbatim.
27. (E) Other (Author’s Attitude)
For an Author’s Attitude question, first decide on
whether the author is pro or con; then, to what
extent.
We know from paragraph 2 that the traditional
(abstract; philosophical) approach to teaching ethics
“contributes little to the understanding of everyday
human experience”, though it “can be valuable” for
its “conceptual clarity.” That duality is reflected in (E).
(A) is way too negative. It “can be valuable.”
(B) is not quite as negative as (A), but almost
as much.
(C) is pretty negative too; “clinical indifference”
hardly qualifies as an endorsement.
(D) gets it backward. The author never mentions that
which he “approves” of in the traditional method,
only that which he disapproves of. And the effect of
traditional teaching—the “conceptual clarity” that it
provides—is something that the author applauds.
25
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
Section IV
Logical Reasoning
“irrelevant facts about the incident.” And of course
the principal is attempting to clarify, not confuse.
1. (B) Inference
3. (E)
An inference (that which must be true) must stay
close to the stimulus in topic and scope.
When asked for an argument’s conclusion, don’t
assume that it’s unstated; first look for a
sentence that fills that role.
For the son’s situation to be analogous to that of a
driver caught in a traffic jam, the principal must be
seeing the son as someone “not involved” who
“nevertheless [has] to suffer.” If the principal were
convinced that the boy had been a raisin-thrower his
comments would surely deal with the boy’s guilt.
(A)—The principal mentions no number of raisinthrowers; just as a traffic jam can be caused by one
car, so the cafeteria incident could have been
caused by one misbehaving student.
(C) departs from the topic: The conversation is
about the cafeteria, not the freeway. The principal
is interested in the relationship of bystander to
accident, not with the role of the authorities.
(D) and (E) depart from the scope. Each implies,
without evidence, that the punishment relates to
the issues of trying to ferret out the guilty (D) or
preventing future incidents (E).
2. (C) Faulty Logic
The weakness of arguments-by-analogy is that the
specifics of one case don’t precisely match those
of the other.
The principal could, if so inclined, try to identify and
punish only the guilty and run no risk of punishing
the innocent. But everyone unavoidably suffers in a
traffic pileup irrespective of guilt. The availability of
a way to avoid denying recess to everyone is what
makes (C) correct.
(A)—At most, the principal generalizes about those
children who didn’t throw raisins (that they must be
punished along with the guilty)
(B)—The principal makes no generalizations,
factually supported or otherwise. He never
addresses the class directly, but rather young
Smith’s place in it (and indirectly at that).
(D) implies that the principal is sure of young
Smith’s guilt, when in fact he treats the child as a
likely innocent bystander (but one who must be
punished anyhow).
(E)—The analogy of the traffic jam may be
appropriate or not, but it does not constitute
26
Inference (Conclusion)
Following the assertion of an “obvious” fact about
the plant/animal relationship, the author throws in a
“but”: “the dependence is mutual.” The rest of the
stimulus provides evidence of that alleged mutuality.
(E) states at length what sentence 2 states tersely.
(A) brings photosynthesis (sentence four) to center
stage, but that sentence begins the continuation
Keyword “Also,” meaning that sentence four cannot
be the argument’s conclusion. (And the stimulus
never says that animals are directly needed for
photosynthesis in plants.)
(B) reasserts sentence one’s point, ignoring the
“but” of sentence two and the relationship of the
remaining evidence to sentence two. Sentence
one’s function is to introduce the topic.
(C) and (D) each misstate the mutual dependence,
i.e. that between plants and animals. (C) leaves
out plants altogether to focus on animals and Earth
chemistry, while (D) brings in the unmentioned
topic of oxygen in a train wreck of an answer.
4. (A) Principle
In Principle questions, sometimes wrong answers
support exactly the opposite of what the author
believes.
The speaker is arguing that the publicly-owned gas
company “is within its rights” in competing with
private merchants to sell appliances. And why?
Because a private gas company would be justified in
doing likewise. In short, the speaker relies on (A).
(B), by supporting merchants’ complaints, works
against the speaker’s justification of the
government-owned company. It’s a 180.
(C) is outside the scope of the argument: the
speaker is not concerned with government
monopolies.
(D), like (B), works against the speaker’s intent.
Private companies are complaining.
(E) cannot justify the speaker’s logic because it
doesn’t mention the government’s activities, which
are at the heart of the argument.
SECTION IV
5. (B) Strengthen the Argument
In “all strengthen EXCEPT” questions, the right
answer either weakens the evidence/conclusion
connection, or has no impact on it.
The prediction of a rash of medical complaints once
MBTE-treated gas is widely purchased is based on
the correlation between those who work with MBTE
and the complaints. (B), by merely supporting the
seriousness of the complaints (and by not
mentioning MBTE at all) fails to make a connection
between the ingredient and people’s health.
(A) supports the correlation from behind, as it
were: If the same kind of workers lack those
medical complaints when they don’t work with
MBTE, then it’s even more likely that MBTE is
the culprit.
(C) points to the example of several cities where
the very phenomenon that the author predicts has
already occurred.
(D), like (A), supports the correlation by showing
that when MBTE is not present, there are
significantly fewer medical complaints.
(E) supports an assumption made by the
toxicologist but not yet discussed here. To predict
that MBTE will react on the general public in the
same way as it reacts on the refinery workers,
requires that the workers’ health be roughly
equivalent to that of people generally. By asserting
just that, (E) makes the prediction more likely.
6. (B) Assumption
If an assumption is false, then the argument is
weakened; that’s the “Kaplan Denial Test” that
helps you determine whether you have located the
right answer.
(C) is unlikely to be correct, since it appears to be
contradicted by the last sentence of the stimulus
(which says that “the knowledge of human
experts…is not stored within their brains in the
form of rules and facts”).
(D)—Even if this prediction comes true, it simply
will add more facts to the computer database and
hence won’t challenge human superiority as the
author defines it. And the future of computing is
outside the scope of the argument.
(E) seems to echo something that the author
believes about human experience, but it doesn’t
speak of computers at all, and so it doesn’t
connect this evidence to this conclusion.
7. (B) Principle
When assessing the choices in an “all EXCEPT”
question, look for the commonality among four,
remembering that it’s an 80% chance that a
choice is one of the four related ones.
The stimulus boils down to the idea that sleepdeprived drivers are poor judges of whether they’re
capable of driving. In more general terms, people’s
self-perception can get in the way of making a wise
decision about themselves. But in (B), the kids’
dislike of arithmetic creates a bias against
arithmetic, and that’s different. Because (B)
focuses on bias about an intellectual idea, rather
than on a misconceived perception of one’s own
proper behavior, it’s the “odd man out” here.
(A), (C), (D), and (E) all mention people whose
personal situation is such that they are in a
fundamental way less than capable of making the
right decision for themselves.
8. (D) Faulty Logic
To arrive at his value judgment that a human expert
will always be superior to a computerized “expert,”
the author draws a clear distinction between the
intuition of humans and the factual data stored by
computers. This assumes, of course, that
computers cannot store equivalent kinds of intuitive
experience within their electronic circuits. If (B) is
false, then by the author’s own logic the superiority
of humans over computers is wiped away.
(A) speaks to a limitation of computers, but even if
(A) is false and computers show an equal amount
of “originality” of response, the author’s value
judgment could still hold true.
The testmakers like to see whether you recognize
the weakness of personal attacks: arguments
founded on impugning opponents’ motives or
character.
The opponent’s lifestyle may well “contradict his
own argument,” but that contradiction, true or not,
has absolutely zero effect on whether the opponent
is right about the need to encouraging apartment
housing. (D) describes a classic logical flaw: the
strength of one’s argument does not hinge on
one’s own behavior with respect to the ideas
in question.
27
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
(A)—The politician is “prejudiced” against what he
sees as hypocrisy; he makes no comment on
apartment house construction.
(B)—He does neglect this “fact,” but so what?
No suburbs/urban distinction is made by either
politician.
(C)—If the opponent’s personal lifestyle is
irrelevant to the argument (which it is), then
mentioning the politician’s own lifestyle wouldn’t be
any more effective.
(E)—The allegation of hypocrisy might or might not
be ameliorated by the opponent’s previous
apartment lifestyle. Either way it has nothing to do
with the logic.
9. (C) Paradox
When a paradox is “explained,” it means that that
which was startling and self-contradictory
becomes unsurprising and logical.
Four of the choices tend to make it unsurprising
and logical that 1/3 of all container glass is
recycled while less than 1/10 of all plastic is
recycled, despite a push to recycle the latter. You’d
attack them in order, most likely, but here we’ll deal
with the correct answer first. (C) explains why
environmentally-conscious manufacturers might
make more new glass than new plastic, but the
issue here is recycling and (C) sidesteps that, so
it’s the choice we want.
(A) explains a greater demand for recycled glass (it
can be more readily reused), which in turn explains
why there’s more of it.
(B) speaks to the greater ease and efficiency of
recycling glass. If it’s easier, who can be surprised
that it happens more often?
(D) and (E) both provide different but plausible
reasons for the low rate of plastic recycling: Plastic
can’t be sterilized and the process tends to weaken
the resulting product, respectively.
10. (D) Inference
To attack fill-ins, use the Keywords provided and
recognize whether the blank is meant to be a
conclusion or evidence (or whatever).
“Clearly, then” means that the filled-in blank must
pull together the entire paragraph, and (D) does
that. If a necessary condition for workers’
28
satisfaction is their sense of having unique skills,
but technological progress cancels out that
condition, then such progress must decrease
workers’ satisfaction.
(A)—Product quality is never mentioned; we have
no reason to believe that dissatisfied workers make
lower-quality goods.
(B)—The benefits of technological progress outlined
in sentence 1 would inferably accrue to everyone,
even to those whose on-the-job satisfaction was
reduced.
(C)—Dissatisfied workers’ opposition to
technological progress might seem understandable,
but their opposition is never mentioned so it can’t
be inferred.
(E)—That a worker’s skills are “less crucial to
production” doesn’t mean that s/he will be let go,
and in any case (E) has no connection to worker
satisfaction. The right answer must link the two
sentences together.
11. (E) Inference
Remember, the conclusion you’re being asked for
may already be right there in the stimulus.
The environmentalist begins with a problem and
ends with a solution, and the recommendation of
that solution is his point. (E) sums up the final
sentence, the suggestion that we can restore the
prairie’s “complex ecosystem” without endangering
the meat supply.
(A)—Nowhere is the use of any specific farming
techniques addressed, nor is there justification for
the prediction of the magnitude of decrease in meat
production.
(B)’s distinction between domesticated and wild
animals has no support in the text.
(C)—Since the author is firmly in favor of restoring
biodiversity, (C)’s suggestion that that might not be
a proper course of action is entirely unsuitable as a
conclusion.
(D) may be tempting in that the author does see
increased eating of bison meat as an important
part of the process he envisions, but the focus of
the paragraph is on repairing the prairie damage
alluded to in sentence 1, not on the bison’s fate
per se.
SECTION IV
12. REMOVED
This is interesting. After the test administration
(October 5, 2002), the question that appeared as
number 12 on this exam was found to be faulty in
some way; the question was removed from scoring,
and the booklet of released questions sent to all
October examinees had a big blank space where
question 12 appeared. Yet when LSAC published
the exam as PrepTest XXXVIII, somehow the actual
question showed up (albeit with a * in the answer
key). Curious.
When questions are removed, it’s usually because
the question has not performed as expected: that
is, a lot of high-scoring test takers selected an
answer that was supposed to be uncredited, while
too many low scorers chose the credited one. When
this imbalance occurs, an imbalance that should
have been ironed out when the question was in its
experimental stage, doubt is cast on the viability of
the intended credited choice.
The credited answer for the question about Morris’s
underlying assumption was almost certainly meant
to be (E) because if (E) is false—if affecting higher
intellectual functions (something that computers can’t
do) is not a necessary condition for “an appreciable
impact”—then the author’s dismissal of computers’
impact is highly suspect. So give yourself a pat on
the back if you chose (E). But somehow, when the
question appeared in October, 2002, one or more
choices were seen by examinees to be plausible, so
don’t kick yourself if you chose any of the others.
The fact that faulty questions are removed even after
a test is administered should reassure you about
the testmaker’s commitment to the integrity of the
LSAT, and build your confidence in the test overall.
13. (A) Weaken the Argument
An argument is weakened when a wedge is drawn
between its conclusion and its evidence.
The argument that kids’ choice of cereal isn’t much
influenced by TV ads, based on the evidence that
kids went for the same cereal whether or not they
watched TV, presupposes that the influence of TV is
restricted solely to those who watch it. But if (A) is
true, then its influence is more pervasive than that.
(A) suggests a second-hand influence that TV has
on non-watchers, thus weakening the conclusion’s
certainty about TV’s impotence.
(B) is too far removed from the argument’s terms to
make much of a difference. TV ads are but one way
of making people want sweets, and in any case that
has nothing to do with the similarity in preference
between the two groups—watchers vs. non-watchers.
(C) deals only with the TV watchers among
the children.
(D) is a 180 in that it tends to support the notion
that kids’ cereal preferences are immune to the
siren song of TV ads.
(E)—Adults are manifestly outside the scope of
the argument.
14. (D) Faulty Logic
An argument with multiple conclusions has
multiple flaws, and not every one of them has to
be described by the correct answer.
Sentence 1 announces two indictments of a lower
speed limit: no lives saved, and no environmental
protection. The evidence of the latter is that a car
sends more pollutants into the atmosphere during a
longer car trip, which assumes that the amount of
pollution is a function of time. (D) rightly points out
the weakness of that assumption: Just because a
car trip takes longer, it doesn’t necessarily do more
environmental damage (perhaps a longer trip and
slower-moving vehicle emits fewer pollutants). (D)
weakens the argument by countering that link, even
though it fails to address the other issue, the lifesaving issue.
(A)—The argument concerns those who obey the
speed limits, not those who don’t, so “neglecting”
the latter counts as a minor strength of the
argument, not a weakness.
(B)—The conclusion is not a recommendation that
speed limits be lowered, but rather a value
judgment that lower speed limits lack two key
positive effects. All that’s relevant here is evidence
about saving lives or protecting the environment.
Thus, additional benefits are outside the scope.
(C)’s prediction of more cars on the road would
only intensify the allegedly deleterious effect on the
environment of lower speed limits.
(E)—The argument does not state or imply that
there’s no other source of collision other than slowmoving vehicles.
29
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
15. (D) Weaken the Argument
Establishing an equally plausible, alternative
hypothesis to the one advanced by the argument
is a great way to weaken that argument.
The “new evidence” that the Baja turtles hatch in
Japanese waters is the DNA match of 95% of them
with Japanese turtles. But if the Baja turtles match
up equally well with Atlantic turtles, as (D) asserts,
then it’s a 50/50 shot as to whether the Baja
turtles hatch in Japan or the Atlantic—the evidence
is equivalent either way.
(A), (B), (C), and (E) can all be quickly eliminated
for one simple reason: None of them deals with the
DNA match-up evidence, the one and only support
provided for the initial claim that the Baja turtles
hatch in Japan.
16. (C) Assumption
Formal logic questions are often best attacked by
rearranging the terms in the most helpful order,
and by seeing what term appears in the
conclusion but not in the evidence.
Rearranging the terms in a more logical order
should reveal that which is missing:
Those who don’t believe others distrust them are
self-confident (clause #1).
Those who are self-confident regard tough tasks as
challenges (clause #3).
So [conclusion], those who trust others regard
tough tasks as challenges (clause #2).
Seen this way, it’s pretty clear that the term absent
from the evidence but present in the conclusion is
“those who trust others.” And to start a chain of
logic that leads to that conclusion, it has to be true
that those who trust others—(C)—don’t believe
others distrust them. If you read (C) and follow it
with the three clauses above, you’ll readily see
the chain.
(A) is the exact opposite of what we need. With the
terms reversed as in (A), we’d still be left to
wonder whether all those who trust others are
necessarily self-confident—an inference required en
route to the conclusion.
(B) merely reverses, while slightly rewriting, clause
#1, a feat that gets us no closer to a solid chain
of logic.
(D) and (E) fail to cite the unmentioned term—
30
”those who trust others”—and hence are no
help here.
17. (B) Parallel Reasoning
When you use abstract language to characterize
an Parallel Reasoning argument, you can more
readily find the choice that matches it.
As wacky arguments go, this one is wackier than
most. The author has no use for Mullen’s plan to
raise taxes on the rich, only because Mullen is
wealthy himself. Say what? You’d think Mullen
deserved applause for unselfishly working against
his own self-interest, but no. Anyway, Dr. Han in (B)
is similarly criticized for working against his own
self-interest, by trying to ban smoking despite his
own smoking habit.
(A)’s Smith is criticized for working in his own selfinterest: a working parent looking to have his kind
subsidized.
(C) disdains the witness’s testimony on no grounds
of self-interest, but because he’s a bad guy. No
parallel to the stimulus here.
(D), like (A), attacks a proposal because of some
personal bias toward a proposal. (True, Timm is
looking to line his daughter’s pockets rather than
his own, but still.) The right answer must attack
someone for advocating the opposite of what that
person ought to favor.
(E)’s rationale for dismissing Wasow’s analysis is
the latter’s lack of experience. Again, no parallel to
the stimulus.
18. (B) Method of Argument
Keywords are the most easy-to-consult source of
information as to the role of a statement.
The statement in question is preceded by “So,”
which signals a conclusion. But it’s in a context in
which the next sentence contains “therefore,” so
the latter must be the main conclusion and the
previous sentence a subsidiary one, as (B) states.
Indeed, Yang predicts (in sentence 3) the probable
failure of one type of “thinking machine” en route
to recommending (in sentence 4) a more
promising type.
(A) is wrong because of the pattern of conclusion
Keywords, as noted. The final sentence’s
recommendation is the main conclusion.
SECTION IV
(C) and (D)—The sentence in question is a
prediction (“are…likely to fail”), not a “principle” of
research or an “example.”
(E)—If there’s any “background information” to
Yang’s argument, it comes in sentences 1 and 2,
which introduce and embroider the analogy to birds.
19. (A) Strengthen/Weaken
When a question requires you to identify an issue
needed to “evaluate an argument,” the right
answer will be something that will strengthen
or weaken the argument, depending on what
is discovered.
Yang’s belief about the foolishness of a thinking
machine modeled on brain structure is based upon
an analogy to the design of flying machines, which
weren’t (she says) modeled on bird structure. That
argument would lose force if the answer to (A) were
“yes, looking at bird structure did contribute
materially to aircraft design,” and gain force if the
answer were “no, it didn’t.”
(B)’s phrase “common sense and factual
knowledge” echoes Anders’ definition of a “thinking
machine,” one that Yang seems to accept tacitly, so
(B) gives no insight into Yang’s logic.
(C) misrepresents the analogy between aircraft
design and thinking machine design. The issue isn’t
“How long did each take?” but “What is each one
based upon?”
(D) distorts the analogy even more, implying we
should care about the professional background of
thinking-machine designers, but that’s hardly
relevant here.
(E)—Yang’s argument hinges on the notion that
workable aircraft design did not make use of birddesign principles. That unworkable aircraft design
may not have made use of bird-design principles is
doubly removed from the logic.
20. (B) Assumption
If you can’t predict the right answer to an
Assumption question, attack the choices in search
of the one that must be true if the argument is
to work.
The conclusion that an all-consuming hobby is “not
a successful strategy for” an adolescent’s
loneliness is based on the view that, through such
a hobby, the kid can become even more lonely. That
presupposes that becoming even more lonely
cannot coexist with “a successful strategy for
loneliness,” the idea stated by (B). If (B) is false—
if there is a way in which an overall successful
strategy can admit some greater loneliness—then
the author’s pessimism about the hobby strategy is
unjustified.
(A)—The basis of the “exacerbated loneliness” is
not a frustrated desire to make more friends, but
rather the loss of the existing friends that may
accompany a kid’s loss of interest in his hobby.
(C)—The author doesn’t predict why a kid might
lose interest in his hobby, nor does he predict that
the kid will do so, only that the kid’s loneliness may
be increased should the loss of interest occur.
(D)—One would hope that, having argued against a
hobby as a loneliness cure, the author would have
an alternative cure in mind, in line with (D). But if
he does, he fails to share it with us.
(E) contradicts the author. The argument explicitly
states that the reason shy kids develop hobbies is
for distraction; friend-building is an occasional side
benefit but not the main reason.
21. (D) Faulty Logic
Predicting the answer to a “flawed argument”
question is the quickest route to finding
that answer.
The author’s indictment of democratic government
as not promoting freedom stems from examples of
oppression at the hands of some democracies
(thus proving that democracy isn’t sufficient to bring
about freedom), as well as examples of freedom in
the face of repressive governments (meaning that
democracy isn’t necessary for freedom, either). But
necessity and sufficiency aren’t the only conditions
that operate in the world; and since it is still
possible, in the face of the counterexamples, for
democracy to promote freedom generally, (D) states
the flaw correctly.
(A)—There is no necessity vs. sufficiency confusion
here, merely a failure to recognize that a force like
democracy can tend to lead toward general freedom
even though it may not assure freedom or even be
needed for it.
(B)’s concern is for the effect of freedom on
democracy. (B) has reversed matters.
(C) is wrong to imply that the political scientist is
reacting to a “causal claim.” (If anything, he’s
mistaking the assertion of a tendency for causality.)
Moreover, the examples are quite relevant to any
31
PREPTEST 38 EXPLAINED
consideration of the democracy/freedom
relationship.
(E)—A “personal point of view” is the basis of most
arguments, whether weak or strong. It certainly
doesn’t in and of itself bring about a logical flaw.
22. (D) Assumption
When a term appears in the conclusion but not in
the evidence, the author must be assuming some
connection between that term and the evidence
that is presented.
The assertion that sugar can elevate moods comes
at the end of a chain of chemical cause-and-effect
that, alas, never mentions mood elevation at all.
(Check it out: Sugar → insulin → tryptophan →
serotonin. No mention of mood elevation.) But the
argument works if the end product, serotonin, does
in fact result in mood elevation, as (D) says.
(A) has the relationship exactly backwards.
(B)—That (to the author) ingesting sugar raises
one’s mood does not at all imply that not ingesting
sugar lowers one’s mood. This is akin to taking “If
X, then Y” and deciding that “If not X, then not Y.”
We can’t just negate both terms and leave their
arrangement the same—that’s only half of the
contrapositive.
(C)—To argue that sugar can help improve one’s
mood in the manner described, it need not be true
that the only way to produce serotonin is through
tryptophan. It merely must be true that sugar kicks
off a process that leads to mood improvement.
(E)—”Protein-rich foods”? This is an argument
about the role of sugar on moods. There is
evidently a role for the amino acids (or, at least, the
isolated tryptophan) that ingested protein provides,
but the author is in no way assuming that a diet
rich in protein will lead to any effect on moods
whatsoever.
23. (D) Principle
The right answer to a Principle question must
match up, piece by piece, to the principle itself.
After defining civil disobedience as willful
lawbreaking done in aid of reform, the author
asserts a necessary condition for justification (i.e.
the motive must transcend self-interest), and then a
sufficient one (i.e. if the lawbreaking is an act of
conscience, it’s justified). Compare each choice to
32
the terms and remember that there is a difference
between sufficient and necessary conditions. Only
(D) fits the bill in all particulars, though you
might’ve been put off by the reference to Maria’s
self-interest as a publisher. Justification doesn’t
require a total lack of self-interest but must include
some selflessness, and Maria certainly shows that
in her act of conscience on behalf of all publishers.
So she meets the conditions sufficient for
justification and doesn’t violate the necessary one.
(A) doesn’t illustrate the principle because Keisha’s
act, however selfless, doesn’t explicitly involve
lawbreaking. A mere protest does not qualify as civil
disobedience under the definition.
(B) has the same problem: Janice breaks no law.
(C)’s “illegal protest” seems to qualify as
lawbreaking under the definition, but where’s
conscience? Since Georgette’s having acted “out
of concern for her fellow inmates” doesn’t
necessarily qualify as an act of conscience, she’s
not necessarily justified under the principle.
(E)—Notwithstanding the absence of conscience on
Louise’s part, her violation of the law might qualify
as justified civil disobedience, contrary to (E). A
conscience-based violation of law is sufficient for
justification but need not be necessary for it.
24. (E) Inference
The right answer to an Inference question can’t be
broader than the statements in the stimulus.
Each piece of the correct choice (E) matches up to
part of the stimulus. The “certain… characteristics”
are the rotating, digit-possessing limbs; the aquatic
animals that possess them are Acanthostega
(remember that “some” means “at least one”); and
the land survival advantage is as sentence 1
states, “useful[ness] for land movement.”
(A) and (D)—The stimulus discusses only two
anatomical features, not “many” (A) or “all” (D).
Moreover, the argument’s scope merely covers
land-dwelling vertebrates and Acanthostega, not
“most land animals” or “most aquatic animals.”
(B), too, goes beyond the scope in discussing
“most aquatic animals.” Indeed, the stimulus
is dealing with those whose predecessors
were aquatic.
(C) both contradicts the argument (in that its
“predecessors were exclusively aquatic,” yet (C)
asserts that its ancestors dwelled on land) and
SECTION IV
goes beyond the scope (in that the author is
concerned with Acanthostega’s evolutionary legacy,
not its own evolution).
25. (D) Inference
When two statements are “compatible” it
doesn’t mean that they agree. It means that
they don’t disagree.
The proper approach here is to put each choice
against the stimulus, confident that four can coexist
with it and that one is in disagreement with it.
(D) is the culprit. How can it assert that the most
sophisticated music is the music that can’t be
understood outside of its original function? The
stimulus just got through telling us that the
sophistication of European music is precisely based
on the coherence (or “intelligibility”) that permits
the music to stand on its own beyond its original
context of dance or worship. (D)’s point of view
flies in the face of the author’s.
(A) and (C)—Neither (A) nor (C) contradicts the
stimulus because the author is concerned with
European music only, and hence need not disagree
with any statement about the music of Africa or
China, respectively.
(B) can coexist comfortably with the stimulus. That
European music’s world influence is partly based
on its ability to stand alone, as the author states,
doesn’t deny the possibility that other factors may
have had an impact, including expansionism.
(E)—While European music seems to gain rather
than lose appeal outside of its original context,
other art works may not, so (E) doesn’t contradict
the author’s assertions either.
26. (A) Inference
When the right answer mentions a point of
disagreement, the four wrong choices are points
on which the speakers might, or do, agree.
Tony is a champion of the novel over the short
story: “only novels” can portray “human lives
accurately,” through a gradual development over
time. In championing the short story, Raoul claims
that life is not linear but rather disjointed. Thus (A),
which reflects Raoul’s view, is their point of
disagreement in that Tony would deny it vigorously.
(B) is a tempting choice, but since Raoul makes no
assertion about the techniques of the short story
writer, we can’t assume that he would take issue
with Tony as to whether the two prose forms employ
similar strategies.
(C)—By the same token, Raoul says nothing about
what happens in novels, so he need not disagree
with Tony’s statement that (C) echoes.
(D)—Both men might disagree with this assertion.
It’s possible that a third prose form might strike
both as “a novelist’s sketch pad.”
(E) seems to reflect Raoul’s view, but Tony need
not disagree: He might well concede that short
stories possess the virtue (E) claims, while
continuing to insist that “only novels…depict human
lives accurately.”
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