PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw Reviewer Law on Public Officers Administrative Law Election Law Local Governments National Economy & Patrimony Social Justice & Human Rights Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture & Sports Public International Law Personal Copy of Ni!i Sia CompiledbyRehneGibbN.Larena|JD-NT-4|AY2020-21|UniversityofSanCarlos PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver TABLEOFCONTENTS I. The1987Constitution 2 II. BasicConcepts 4 III. NationalTerritory 21 IV. Citizenship 22 V. LegislativeDepartment 26 VI. ExecutiveDepartment 41 B.PartsofaConstitution D.MethodsofInterpretingtheConstitution A.NatureandConceptofaConstitution (1) ConstitutionofLiberty—consistsofaseriesofprescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizensandimposinglimitationsonthepowersofgovernment asameansofsecuringtheenjoymentofthoserights; (2) Constitution of Government—seriesofprovisionsoutlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration, and definingtheelectorate;and 62 IX. 64 a) prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, X. LawonPublicOfficers 111 b) assigns to the different departments their respective powersandduties,and XI. AdministrativeLaw 127 c) establishes certain fixed principles onwhichgovernment isfounded. 146 XIII. LocalGovernments 163 XIV. NationalEconomyandPatrimony 181 DoctrineofConstitutionalSupremacy XVII. PublicInternationalLaw 187 (3) Constitution of Sovereignty — consists of the provisions pointing outthemodeorprocedureinaccordancewithwhich formalchangesinthefundamentallawmaybebroughtabout. C.AmendmentsandRevisions Thefundamentalconceptioninotherwordsisthatitisasupreme Article XVII. Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this law to which allotherlawsmustconformandinaccordancewith Constitutionmaybeproposedby: whichallprivaterightsmustbedeterminedandallpublicauthority administered. 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its XII. ElectionLaw XVI. Education,Science,Technology,Arts,Culture andSports 186 B.PartsofaConstitution A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority fromwhichitemanates. VIII. ConstitutionalCommissions 184 c) Rigid — amended only by a formal andusuallydifficult process. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount lawofthe nation.It SocialJusticeandHumanRights b) Conventional —enacted,formallystruckoffatadefinite timeandplacefollowingaconsciousanddeliberateeffort takenbyaconstituentbodyorruler;and C.AmendmentsandRevisions 56 XV. a) Written—whosepreceptsareembodiedinoneorasetof documents; A.NatureandConceptofaConstitution VII. JudicialDepartment BillofRights TheConstitutionofthePhilippinesis I.THE1987CONSTITUTION 2. ManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whetherpromulgatedbythelegislativeorbytheexecutivebranchor enteredintobyprivatepersonsforprivatepurposesisnullandvoid and without anyforceandeffect.Thus,sincetheConstitutionisthe fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemedwrittenineverystatuteandcontract. Members;or Ac onstitutionalconvention. Section2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectly proposedbythepeoplethroughi nitiativeu ponapetitionof a. at least twelve per centum of the total number of registeredvoters, b. of which every legislative district must be represented by at leastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 2of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver No amendment shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyears thereafter. Section3.TheCongressmay, a. by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutionalconvention,O R b. by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electoratethequestionofcallingsuchaconvention. Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown"tothepeople"b efore"theysignsuchproposal. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people throughinitiativeuponapetition"isthattheentireproposalon its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elementsmustbepresent. a. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.Noagentorrepresentativecansignontheirbehalf. b. Second, as an initiative uponapetition,theproposalmust beembodiedinapetition. Section4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionshallbe valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite whichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydaysnorlater thanninetydays a. b. aftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision;(Constituent AssemblyorConstitutionalConvention)OR after the certification by the Comelec of thesufficiencyof thepetition.(People’sInitiative) Santiagov.COMELEC R.A.No.6735isincomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitutionisconcerned.Itslacunaeonthissubstantivematterare fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgatesuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessarytocarry outthepurposesoftheAct. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirementsinsubordinatelegislation.Thedelegationofthepower totheCOMELECistheninvalid. Lambinov.Comelec The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirementsoftheConstitutionforconductingapeople'sinitiative. 1. The full text of theproposedamendmentsmaybeeitherwrittenon the face of the petition, or attached toit.Ifsoattached,thepetition muststatethefactofsuchattachment. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII Disallowing RevisionthroughInitiatives Apeople'sinitiativetochangetheConstitutionappliesONLYtoan amendment of the Constitution and NOT to its r evision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention canproposeboth amendmentsandrevisionstotheConstitution. Revisionb roadlyimpliesachangethat a. alters a basic principleintheconstitution,likealtering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. Thereisalsorevisionifthechange b. alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to achangethat adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provisionbeingamended. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Atwo-parttestisthusused:thequantitativetestandthequalitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed changeis "so extensive in itsprovisionsastochangedirectlythe'substantial entirety'oftheconstitutionbythedeletionoralterationofnumerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisionsaffectedanddoesnotconsiderthedegreeofthechange. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposedchangeintheconstitution.Themaininquiryiswhetherthe change will "accomplish such far reaching changes inthenatureof ourbasicgovernmentalplanastoamounttoarevision.". DoctrineofFairandProperSubmission Tolentinov.Comelec The Court holds that there is, and itistheconditionandlimitation that all the amendments to be proposed by thesameConven­tion must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. The minimum requirementthatmustbemetinorderthattherecan be apropersubmissiontothepeopleofaproposedconstitutional amendment is that amendments must be fairly laid before the peoplefortheirblessingorspurning. Thepeoplearenottobemere rubberstamps. Theyarenottovoteblindly. Theymustbeafforded ample opportunity to mull over the original pro­visions, compare them with theproposedamendments,andtrytoreachaconclusion as the dictates of theirconsciencesuggest,freefromtheincubusof extraneousorpossiblyinsidiousinfluences. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every ins­trumentality or agency within its structural frame­work to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. One thing is sub­mission and another is ratification. Theremustbefairsubmission,intelligentconsentor rejec­tion. D.MethodsofInterpretingtheConstitution (1) TheConstitutionshouldbeinterpretedinsuchawayastogive effecttotheintendmentoftheframers. (2) Incaseofdoubt,theconstitutionshouldbeconsidered BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 3of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver (a) self-executingratherthannonself-executing; (b) mandatoryr atherthandirectory;and (c) prospectiver atherthanretrospective. ManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomesoperative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rulebymeansofwhichtherightitgrants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutionalprovisioniss elf-executing 1. ifthenatureandextentoftherightconferredand 2. theliabilityimposedarefixedbytheconstitutionitself, 3. so that they can be determined by an examination and constructionofitsterms,and 4. thereisnolanguageindicatingthatthesubjectisreferredto thelegislatureforaction. Unless it is expressly provided thatalegislativeactisnecessaryto enforceaconstitutionalmandate,thepresumptionnowisthatall provisionsoftheconstitutionareself-executing. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enactlegislationto 1. facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, 2. furthertheoperationofsuchaprovision, 3. prescribeapracticetobeusedforitsenforcement, 4. provideaconvenientremedyfortheprotectionoftherights securedorthedeterminationthereof,or 5. placereasonablesafeguardsaroundtheexerciseoftheright. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in onepartandnon-self-executinginanother. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and whichneedsnofurtherguidelinesorimplementinglawsorrulesfor itsenforcement.Fromitsverywordstheprovisiondoesnotrequire any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforcesuchrightnotwithstandingtheabsenceofanylegislationon the subject; consequently,ifthereisnostatuteespeciallyenactedto enforcesuchconstitutionalright,suchrightenforcesitselfbyitsown inherent potency and puissance. Where there is a right there is a remedy.U bijusibiremedium. national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoke the provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies underArticleII.PetitionersalsoinvoketheprovisionsoftheNational EconomyandPatrimonyunderArticleXII. But, as the CourtexplainedinTañadav.Angara,theprovisionsof ArticleIIofthe1987Constitution,thedeclarationsofprinciplesand state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue suchpoliciescannotgiverisetoacauseofactioninthecourts. While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectivelycontrolledbyFilipinoentrepreneurs,itdoesnotimpose apolicyofFilipinomonopolyoftheeconomicenvironment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are givenpreferenceinallareasofdevelopment. ComparewithTanadav.Angara It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions”oftheWTOAgreement“placenationalsandproductsof member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectivelycontrolledbyFilipinos.” TheseprinciplesinArticleIIarenotintendedtobeself-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.Theyareused by the judiciary as aids or as guides intheexerciseofitspowerof judicialreview,andbythelegislatureinitsenactmentoflaws. ItistruethatintherecentcaseofManilaPrinceHotelv.GSIS,etal., this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitutionisamandatory,positivecommandwhichiscompletein itselfandwhichneedsnofurtherguidelinesorimplementinglawsor rules for its enforcement. However, as the constitutional provision itselfstates,itisenforceableonlyinregardto“thegrantsofrights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce.It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraphofSec.10ofArt.XIIisself-executingornot. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that thereare. ReiteratedinE spinav.Zamora Petitioners mainly argue that R.A. 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000, violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent II.BASICCONCEPTS A.DeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies B.Sovereignty C.Stateimmunity D.SeparationofPowers E.ChecksandBalances F.DelegationofPowers G.FundamentalPowersoftheState PolicePower EminentDomain Taxation A.DeclarationofPrinciplesandStatePolicies TheStateasParensPatriae Mayniladv.SENR2019EnBanc BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 4of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Hand-in-handwithpolicepowerinthepromotionofgeneralwelfare isthedoctrineofparenspatriae.Itfocusesontheroleofthestate as a "sovereign" and expresses the inherent powerandauthorityof thestatetoprovideprotectionofthepersonandpropertyofaperson nonsuijuris. Underthedoctrine,thestatehasthesovereignpowerofguardianship over persons of disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protectionto persons nonsuijurisandtomakeandenforcerulesandregulations asitdeemsproperforthemanagementoftheirproperty. Parenspatriaemeans"fatherofhiscountry",andreferstotheState asalast-ditchproviderofprotectiontothoseunabletocareand fend for themselves. It can be said that Filipino consumers have becomesuchpersonsofdisabilitydeservingprotectionbytheState, as theirwelfarearebeingincreasinglydownplayed,endangered,and overwhelmedbybusinesspursuits. While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is stateregulationthroughlegislation,and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look afterthe defenseless,thereremainsalimboonaflexiblestatepolicybringing these doctrines into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of the people, rights, and resourcesfromgeneralneglect,privategreed,andevenfromtheown excessesoftheState. WefillthisvoidthroughtheP ublicTrustDoctrine. The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing supervision over the takinganduseof appropriated water. Thus, parties who acquired rights in trust property only hold these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, couldassertnovestedrighttousethoserightsinamannerharmful tothetrust. Thedoctrinefurtherholdsthatcertainnaturalresourcesbelongtoall andcannotbeprivatelyownedorcontrolledbecauseoftheirinherent importance to each individual and society as a whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiorityofpublicrightsoverprivaterightsforcriticalresources. Itimpressesuponstatestheaffirmativedutiesofatrusteetomanage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies key principles of environmental protection:stewardship,communalresponsibility,andsustainability. In this framework, a relationship isformed—thestateisthe trustee,whichmanagesspecificnaturalresourcesandthetrust principal—forthetrustprincipalforthebenefitofthecurrent andfuturegenerations—theb eneficiaries. Thepublicisregardedasthebeneficialowneroftrustresources,and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine even against the governmentitself. Itisinthissamemannerthattherighttodistributewaterwasgranted by the State via utility franchises to Maynilad and Manila Water, under express statutory regulation through its delegated representative, the MWSS.TheStateconferredthefranchisetothese concessionaires, working underthefirmbeliefthattheyshallserve as protectors of the public interest and thecitizenry.Inthisregard, water rights must be secured to achieve optimal use of water resources, its conservation, and its preservation for allocative efficiency. DepEdv.RizalTeachersKilusangBayanforCredit2019 May the DepEd be compelled by writ of mandamus to collect, by salary deductions, the loan payments ofpublicschoolteachersand remitthemtotheRTKBCI? RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its collectingandremittingagent.Toreiterate,thisisnotoneofDepEd's power,duties,andfunctions. Teachers have no one else to turn to forprotectionoftheirwelfare except the State itself. Foritspart,theStateisdutyboundtorender such protection in observance of its duty under the doctrine of parens patriae. In implementing the payroll deduction system, DepEd performed a function only secondarily tofavorRTKBCIasa private lending institutionandprimarilytoprotectandpromotethe welfareofteachersandinstitutionsofbasiceducation. AdherencetoInternationalLaw PhilipMorrisv.CA Followinguniversalacquiescenceandcomity,ourmunicipallawon trademarksregardingtherequirementofactualuseinthePhilippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparentclashisbeingdecidedbyamunicipaltribunal. The fact that international lawhasbeenmadepartofthelawofthe land does notbyanymeansimplytheprimacyofinternationallaw over national law in the municipal sphere. Under thedoctrineof incorporationasappliedinmostcountries,rulesofinternational lawaregivenastandinge qual,notsuperior,tonationallegislative enactments. Tanadav.Angara While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictionsandlimitationsvoluntarilyagreedtobythePhilippines, expresslyorimpliedly,asamemberofthefamilyofnations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolationofthecountryfromtherestoftheworld.InitsDeclaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallawaspartofthe law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,freedom,cooperationandamity,withallnations."Bythe doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles ofinternationallaw,whichareconsideredtobe automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamentalrulesininternationallawisp actasuntservanda— internationalagreementsmustbeperformedingoodfaith. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in factandinrealitybe consideredabsolute.Certainr estrictionse nterintothepicture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in thefamilyofnationsand (2) limitationsimposedbytreatystipulations. SOJv.Lantion The rule of pactasuntservandarequiresthepartiestoatreatyto keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legaldutiesunderatreatyisalsocompelledbySection2, Article II of the Constitution. Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part ofthelawof the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rulesapplicableinthedomesticsphere. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 5of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunalsareconfrontedwithsituationsinwhichthereappearstobe a conflict between a rule of internationallawandtheprovisionsof the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should firstbe exertedtoharmonizethem,soastogiveeffecttobothsinceitisto be presumedthatmunicipallawwasenactedwithproperregardfor the generally accepted principlesofinternationallawinobservance oftheIncorporationClause. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipallaw,jurisprudencedictatesthatmunicipallawshouldbe upheld by the municipal courtsforthereasonthatsuchcourtsare organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.Thefactthatinternationallawhasbeenmadepartof the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Intheabsenceofalaworprincipleoflaw,wemustapplytherules offairplay.Anapplicationofthebasictwindueprocessrightsof noticeandhearingwillnotgoagainstthetreatyortheimplementing law.NeithertheTreatynortheExtraditionLawprecludestheserights fromaprospectiveextraditee. AngLadladv.Comelec2 010EnBanc We explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relatestotherighttoelectoralparticipation,enunciatedintheUDHR andtheICCPR. The principle of non-discrimination requires thatlawsofgeneral application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opinedthatthereferenceto"sex"inArticle26shouldbeconstruedto include"sexualorientation."Additionally,avarietyofUNbodieshave declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibitedundervariousinternationalagreements. At this time, we are not prepared to declare that the Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles whicharenotreflectiveofthecurrentstateofinternationallaw,and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumeratedunderArticle38(1)oftheStatuteoftheICJ. TheYogyakartaPrinciples,consistingofadeclarationformulatedby variousinternationallawprofessors,are—atbest-delegeferenda — and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so muchofcontemporaryinternationallawischaracterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaningdesires,withoutthesupportofeitherStatepracticeor opiniojuris. CompareD octrineofTransformationinU Sv.Purganan SeparateopinionofVitug,J.InthePhilippines,whilespecificrules on how to resolve conflicts between a treaty law and an act of Congress, whether made prior or subsequent to its execution, have yettobesuccinctlydefined,theestablishedpattern,however,would show a leaning towards the dualist model. The Constitution exemplified by its incorporation clause, as well as statutes, would exhibit a remarkable textual commitment towards "internalizing" internationallaw. The principle being that treaties create rights and duties only for thosewhoarepartiesthereto—pactatertiisnecnocrenecprodesse possunt — it isconsiderednecessarytot ransformatreatyintoa national law in order to makeitbindinguponaffectedstateorgans, likethecourts,andprivateindividualswhocould,otherwise,beseen asnon-parties. The US-RP Extradition Treaty in particular, undoubtedly affects not onlystateorgansbutalsoprivateindividualsaswell.Itissaidthat, intreatiesofthisnature,itshouldbehoovethestatetoundertakeor adopt the necessary steps to make the treaty binding upon said subjectseitherbyi ncorporationo rtransformation. Existinglegislationcontrarytotheprovisionsofthetreatybecomes invalid,butlegislationisnecessarytoputthetreatyintoeffect. The constitutionalrequirementthatthetreatybeconcurredinbynoless than two-thirds ofallmembersoftheSenateis,forlegalintentand purposes, an equivalent to the required transformation of treatylawintomunicipallaw. In preserving harmony between treaty law and municipal law, itis submitted— 1) Thattreatylawhastheeffectofamending,orevenrepealing aninconsistentmunicipalstatute,alaterenactmentbeing controlling, 2) but that an inconsistent municipal statute subsequently passedcannotmodifytreatylaw,withouttheconcurrenceof the other state party thereto, following the generally acceptedprincipleofp actasuntservanda. ProceedtoR elationshipbetweenInternational andPhilippinedomesticlaw CivilianSupremacy Art. II, Section 3. Civilian authority is,atalltimes,supremeoverthe military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the peopleandtheState.ItsgoalistosecurethesovereigntyoftheStateand theintegrityofthenationalterritory. Governmentasprotectorofthepeople,andpeopleas defendersoftheState Section4.TheprimedutyoftheGovernmentistoserveandprotectthe people. The Government may call upon the people todefendtheState and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditionsprovidedbylaw,torenderpersonal,militaryorcivilservice. SeparationofChurchandState Section6.TheseparationofChurchandStateshallbei nviolable. Aglipayv.Ruiz WhatisguaranteedbyourConstitutionisreligiousliberty,notmere religioustoleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibitionofprofoundreverenceforreligionandisnotadenialofits influence in human affairs. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminatelyaccordedtoreligioussectsanddenominations. Here, the stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the RomanCatholicChurch.Norweremoneyderivedfromthesaleofthe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 6of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver stampsgiventothatchurch.Onthecontrary,itappearsthattheonly purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officialsconcernedmerelytookadvantageofaneventconsideredof internationalimportance"togivepublicitytothePhilippinesandits people." Righttolifeoftheunborn Imbongv.Ochoa2014 ThepetitionersassailtheRHLawbecauseitviolatestherighttolife andhealthoftheunbornchildunderSection12,ArticleII. The Philippine national population program has always been groundedtwocornerstoneprinciples:“principleofno-abortion” andthe“p rincipleofnon-coercion.” The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitutioninprotectingthelifeoftheunbornfromconceptionwas to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. The Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abusedtheirofficewhentheyredefinedthemeaningofabortifacient. It allows “contraceptives” and recognizes as “abortifacient” only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus insidethemother’swomborthepreventionofthefertilizedovumto reachandbeimplantedinthemother’swomb. Evidently,theadditionoftheword“primarily,”inSection3.01(a)and (j)oftheRH-IRRisindeedultravires.ItcontravenesSection4(a)of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier “primarily” will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives whichmayharmordestroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.Withsuchqualificationin the RH-IRR, it appearstoinsinuatethatacontraceptivewillonlybe considered as an “abortifacient” if its soleknowneffectisabortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilizedovum. Thus, the word “primarily” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRRshouldbedeclaredvoid. Righttobalancedandhealthfulecology InternationalServicefortheAcquisitionofAgri-Biotech Applicationsv.GreenpeaceSoutheastAsia2015 Greenpeace, et al alleged that the Bttalongfieldtrialsviolatetheir constitutionalrighttohealthandabalancedecology. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. signaled anevenmoreliberalizedpolicyon locus standi in public suits. Insaidcase,werecognizedthe"public right" of citizens to "abalancedandhealthfulecologywhich,for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of i ntergenerational responsibility insofar as the righttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyi sconcerned. Whenindoubt,casesmustberesolvedinfavoroftheconstitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Parenthetically, judicial adjudication is one of thestrongestforainwhichtheprecautionary principlemayfindapplicability. Mosquedav.PilipinoBananaGrowers&ExportersAssociation 2016 In terms of the right of the citizenstohealthandtoabalancedand healthful ecology,theLGUtakesitscuefromSection15andSection 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisionsof the LGC and the Constitution, the acts of the localgovernmentunit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the LGU. Accordingly, the Sangguniang BayanofDavaoCityisvestedwiththerequisiteauthoritytoenactan ordinance that seeks to protect the health and well-being of its constituents. Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges that do not onlyadvancethe interestsofagroupofindividuals.Thebenefitsofprotectinghuman health and the environment transcend geographical locations and evengenerations.ThisistheessenceofSections15and16,ArticleII of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. we declared that the righttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyunderSection16isanissue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that thequestionedordinance shouldbeappreciated. ResidentMarineMammalsv.Reyes2015 In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibilityinsofarastherighttoabalancedandhealthfulecology is concerned." Furthermore,wesaidthattherighttoabalancedand healthfulecology,arightthatdoesnotevenneedtobestatedinour Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairingtheenvironment. In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward ofnature,tobringasuitto enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetaceanspecies.TheStewards,having shownintheirpetitionthattheremaybepossibleviolationsoflaws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are thereforedeclaredtopossessthelegalstandingtofilethispetition. RighttoQualityEducation ⭐CouncilofTeachersandStaffofCollegesandUniversitiesofthe Philippinesv.SecretaryofEducation2018 While the ConstitutionindeedmandatestheStatetoprovidequality education, the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with thepoliticaldepartmentswhohave the necessary knowledge, expertise, andresourcestodeterminethe same. InMariño,Jr.v.Gamilla,theCourtrecognizedthatRANo.6728was enactedinviewofthedeclaredpolicyoftheState,inconformitywith the mandate of the Constitution, to promote and make quality education a ccessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the State of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions in the educational system and the invaluable contribution thattheprivateschoolshavemadeandwill maketoeducation.Theestablishmentandexpansionofthevoucher system is the State's way of tapping the resources of the private educationalsysteminordertogiveFilipinosequalaccesstoquality education. The Court finds that this manner of implementing the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 7of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver grantofequalaccesstoeducationisn otconstitutionallyinfirm. RightofIndigenousCulturalCommunities ⭐Tawahigv.Lapinid2019Leonencase The Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never intended and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Individuals belongingtoindigenousculturalcommunitieswhoarechargedwith criminal offenses cannotinvoketheIndigenousPeoples'RightsAct of1997,toevadeprosecutionandliabilityundercourtsoflaw. TheprovisionsunderChapterIXofIPRA donotonlylendlegitimacy to and enable the continuing efficacy and viability of customary laws and practices to maintain order and dispense justice within indigenous cultural communities. They also work to segregate customarylawsandpracticesintwo(2)respects. First, they makecustomarylawsandpracticesstructurallyand operationally distinct from enactmentsofthelegislatureandof those upon whomlegislativepowerhasbeendelegated,aswell asregulationsofgeneralapplication. Second, they distinguish disputants belonging to the same indigenous cultural communitiesastheexclusiveobjectsofthe applicationofcustomarylawsandpractices. With respect to dispensing justice, resolving conflicts, and peace-building, the application ofcustomarylawsandpractices ispermissibleonlytotheextentthatitisinharmonywiththe national legal system. A set of customary laws and practices is effectiveonlywithintheconfinesofthespecificindigenouscultural communitythatadoptedandadherestoit. The IPRA does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and dutiesinsupportofpetitioner's cause.Thus,awritofmandamuscannotbeissued. Familyassocialinstitution ⭐FalcisIIIv.CivilRegistrarGeneral2019LeonenEnBanc TheConstitutiondoesnotdefineorrestrictmarriageonthebasisof sex,gender,sexualorientation,orgenderidentityorexpression. ArticleXVofthe1987Constitutionconcernsthefamilyandoperates in conjunction with Article II, Section 12. Article XV, Section 1 pertains to thefamilyingeneral,identifyingit"asthefoundationof the nation," and articulates the State's overarching commitment to "strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development." ArticleXV,Section2concernsmarriage,inparticular, andarticulatesabroadcommitmenttoprotectingitsinviolabilityas asocialinstitution. Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous understanding of sexualorientation,genderidentityandexpression, and sex characteristics(SOGIESC).Theplaintextandmeaningof ourconstitutionalprovisionsdonotprohibitSOGIESC. To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples,whetheropposite-sexorsame-sex, whodonotfitintothatmold.Itrendersinvisiblethelivedrealitiesof familiesheadedbysingleparents,familiesformedbysterilecouples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certaingenderstereotypeswithinthefamily. factwhichenabledVPArroyotoassumethepresidencywasthefact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the executive leadership whichmadethegovernmentrifeforseizurebylawlesselements.The presidency was up for grabs, anditwasimperativethattheruleof successionintheConstitutionbeenforced. DissentingOpinionofJusticePunoinT olentino,etal.vComelec An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitutionistheexpansionof thedemocraticspacegivingthepeoplegreaterpowertoexercisetheir sovereignty. Thus, the people can directly exercise their sovereign authoritythroughthefollowingmodes,namely: (1) elections; the people choose the representatives to whom they will entrusttheexerciseofpowersofgovernment. (2) plebiscite; the people ratify a ny amendment t o or revision of t he Constitution and m ay introduce a mendments to the constitution. (3) initiative; B.Sovereignty ConcurringOpinionofJusticeMendozainE stradav.Arroyo,supra. While Art. II, §1oftheConstitutionsaysthat"sovereigntyresides in the people and all government authority emanates from them," it also says that "the Philippines is a democratic and republicanstate." This means that ours is a representative democracy — as distinguished from a direct democracy — in which the sovereign will of the people is expressed through the ballot, whether in an election, referendum,initiative,recallorplebiscite.Anyexerciseof thepowersofsovereigntyinanyotherwayisunconstitutional. Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A constitution to provide for the right of the people to revoltwillcarrywithittheseedsofitsowndestruction.Rather,the righttorevoltisaffirmedasanaturalright.Eventhen,itmustbe exercisedonlyforweightyandseriousreasons. What took place at EDSA from January 16 to 20, 2001 was not a revolutionbutthepeacefulexpressionofpopularwill.Theoperative legal process whereby the registered votersofanLGUmay directlypropose,enact,oramendanyordinancethroughan electioncalledforthepurpose. (4) recall;and amethodofremovingalocalofficialfromofficebeforethe expirationofhistermbecauseoflossofconfidence. (5) referendum. thepeoplecanapproveorrejectalaworanissueofnational importance. The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because it is through the act of voting that government by consent is secured. Through the ballot, people expresstheirwillonthedefiningissuesofthedayandtheyareable tochoosetheirleadersinaccordancewiththefundamentalprinciple ofrepresentativedemocracythatthepeopleshouldelectwhomthey pleasetogovernthem. The electorate’s right to information on public matters BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 8of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver occupiesahigherlegaltierinthePhilippinescomparedtothe United States. While therighttoinformationinU.S.jurisdiction is merely a statutory right, it enjoys constitutional status in Philippine jurisdiction. The1987Constitutionnotonlyenlargedthe democratic space withprovisionsontheelectorate’sdirectexercise of sovereignty, but also highlighted the right of the people to informationonmattersofpublicinterestasapredicatetogood governance and a working democracy. The Bill of Rights sanctifies the right of the people to information under Section 7, ArticleIII. Inourjurisdiction,itisalsotherulethattheexerciseoftherightof suffrage should be anenlightenedone,hence,basedonrelevant facts, data and information. It is for this reason that the choice of representatives in a democracy cannot be based on lottery or any form of chance. The choice must be based on enlightened judgment for democracy cannot endure the rule and reignof ignorance. C.StateImmunity Section 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution. The State may not be sued withoutitsconsent. SuitagainstState Arigov.Swift2014 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it isalsoapplicabletocomplaintsfiledagainst officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the dischargeoftheirduties. Theruleisthatifthejudgmentagainstsuchofficialswillrequirethe stateitselftoperformanaffirmativeacttosatisfythesame,suchas theappropriationoftheamountneededtopaythedamagesawarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself althoughithasnotbeenformallyimpleaded.Insuchasituation,the state may move to dismiss the complaint on thegroundthatithas beenfiledwithoutitsconsent. This traditional rule of State immunity which exemptsaStatefrom beingsuedinthecourtsofanotherStatewithouttheformer’sconsent orwaiverhasevolvedintoarestrictivedoctrinewhichdistinguishes a) sovereignandgovernmentalacts(j ureimperii)from a. AsuitagainstitisnecessarilyagainsttheState. b. Suabilitythendependsonthenatureofthefunctionit isperformingeithergovernmentalorproprietary. b) private,commercialandproprietaryacts(j uregestionis). Under the restrictive rule of state immunity, state immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activitiesoreconomicaffairs. The doctrine of immunity from suit will notapplyandmaynotbe invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personalcapacityasanordinarycitizen. Inthiscase,theUSrespondentsweresuedintheirofficialcapacityas commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The allegedactor omissionresultingintheunfortunategroundingoftheUSSGuardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment againstsaidofficialswillrequireremedialactionsandappropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one againsttheUSitself.TheprincipleofStateimmunitythereforebars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondentsSwift,RiceandRobling. Consent 1. Where suit is filed NOT against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities,itmustbeascertained whetherornottheStatehasgivenitsconsenttobesued. 2. This ascertainment will depend in the first instanceonWON theagencyimpleadedisincorporatedorunincorporated. 3. Anincorporatedagencyhasacharterofitsownthatinvestsit with a separate juridical personality.Thetestofsuabilitylies initscharter: a. 4. It is suable if its charter says so; regardless of the natureofthefunctionsitisperforming. Unincorporated agencies have no separate juridical personalityastheyaremergedinthegeneralmachineryofthe government. 5. Suability vs. Liability. — Waiver of immunity by the State doesnotmeanconcessionofitsliability. a. Suability is the result of the express or implied consentoftheStatetobesued. b. Liability is determined after hearing on the basis of relevantlawsandestablishedfacts. PhilippineTextileResearchInstitutev.CA2019Division PTRI,etal.aren otimmunefromsuit. Being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from suit. Further, the employees of PTRIactingintheirofficialcapacity likewiseenjoythisimmunityfromsuit,as"publicofficialsmaynot besuedforactsdoneintheperformanceoftheirofficialfunctionsor withinthescopeoftheirauthority." However,needlesstosay,theruleonStateimmunityfromsuitisnot absolute. The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consenttobesuedmaybegiveneithere xpresslyo rimpliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. The general law waivingtheimmunityofthestatefromsuitis found in Act No. 3083, wherethePhilippinegovernment'consents andsubmitstobesueduponanymoneyclaiminvolvingliability arising from contract, express orimplied,whichcouldserveasa basisofcivilactionbetweenprivateparties. PTRI entered into a Contract of Works with B.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A. Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the subject Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunityfromsuitfindsapplication. Furthermore,thereisimpliedconsentonthepartoftheStatetobe subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. In this situation,thegovernmentisdeemedtohavedescendedtothelevelof theothercontractingpartyandtohavedivesteditselfofitssovereign immunity.However,notallcontractsenteredintobythegovernment BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 9of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be madebetweenonewhichisexecutedintheexerciseofitssovereign functionsandanotherwhichisdoneinitsp roprietarycapacity. D.SeparationofPowers The separation of powers is a fundamentalprincipleinoursystemof government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual divisioninourConstitution. SeparateOpinion,JusticePuno,Macalintalv.Comelec,etal. The principleofseparationofpowerspreventstheconcentration of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of governmentbydeftlyallocatingtheirexercisetothethreebranchesof government. Itisnowbeyonddebatethattheprincipleofseparationofpowers (1) allowsthe“blending”ofsomeoftheexecutive,legislative, orjudicialpowersinonebody; (2) does not prevent one branchofgovernmentfrominquiring intotheaffairsoftheotherbranchestomaintainthebalance ofpower; (3) butensuresthatthereisnoencroachmentonmatterswithin theexclusivejurisdictionoftheotherbranches. InRe:ProductionofCourtRecords TheIndependenceoftheJudiciary The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential componentofourdemocraticandrepublicansystemofgovernment. ThedoctrineinuresnotbyexpressprovisionoftheConstitution,but asanunderlyingprinciplethatconstitutesthebedrockofoursystem ofchecksandbalancesingovernment.Itdividesthegovernmentinto three branches, each with well-defined powers. In its most basic concept,thedoctrinedeclaresthatthelegislatureenactsthelaw,the executiveimplementsit,andthejudiciaryinterpretsit. Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within its own sphere, under the legal and political reality of one overarching Constitution that governs one government and one nation for whose benefit all the three separatebranchesmustactwithunity. A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of separationofpowers—deemedwrittenintotherulesbyestablished practice and rendered imperative by the departments' inter-dependence and need for cooperation amongthemselves—is the p rinciple of comity or the practice ofvoluntarilyobserving inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutionaldutiesfortheharmoniousworkingofgovernment. OrderoftheFirstDivisionoftheCommissiononElections Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three major branches of government — the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial—arecoequalandcoordinatewitheachother.Butnonemay interfere with, review or pass upon the exclusive powers vestedin eachofthembytheConstitution.Specifically,noteventheothertwo great branches of governmentmayreverseormodifydecisionsand orders of the Supreme Court in givencase—notthePresident,not CongressmuchlesstheCOMELEC. E.ChecksandBalances SeparateOpinion,JusticePuno,Macalintalv.Comelec,etal. For its part, this Court checks the exercise of power of the other branchesofgovernmentthroughjudicialreview.Itisthefinalarbiter of disputes involving the proper allocation and exercise of the different powers under the Constitution. Since then, the Court has used its expanded power to check acts of the House of Representatives,thePresident,andevenofindependentbodiessuch astheElectoralTribunal,theCommissiononElectionsandtheCivil ServiceCommission. 1. fixes the main linesofsubstantivepolicyandisentitledto seethatadministrativepolicyisinharmonywithit; 2. it establishes the volume and purpose of public expendituresandensurestheirlegalityandpropriety; 3. itmustbesatisfiedthatinternaladministrativecontrolsare operatingtosecureeconomyandefficiency;and 4. it informs itself of the conditions of administration of remedialmeasure. Congress exercises supervision over the executiveagenciesthrough its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a “right” to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become alawafter the expiration of a certainperiodoftime,onlyifCongressdoesnot affirmativelydisapproveoftheregulationinthemeantime. F.DelegationofPowers The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestasdelegatanondelegaripotest. Therecognizede xceptionst otherulearedelegation: (1) OftariffpowerstothePresidentunderSection28(2)ofArticle VIoftheConstitution; (2) OfemergencypowerstothePresidentunderSection23(2)of ArticleVIoftheConstitution; Congress checks the other branches of government primarily (3) Tothepeopleatlarge; through its law making powers. Congress cancreateadministrative agencies,definetheirpowersandduties,fixthetermsofofficersand theircompensation.Itcanalsocreatecourts,definetheirjurisdiction and reorganize the judiciary so long as it does not undermine the security of tenure of its members. ThepowerofCongressdoesnot end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant with its principalpowertolegislateistheauxiliarypowertoensurethatthe lawsitenactsarefaithfullyexecuted.Aswellstressedbyonescholar, thelegislature (4) Tolocalgovernments;and (5) Toadministrativebodies. Empoweringanadministrativebodyexercisingquasi-judicialfunctions, topromulgaterulesandregulationsisaformofdelegationoflegislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation,theremustbeashowingthatthedelegationitselfisvalid.It isvalidonlyifthelaw (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein thepolicytobe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 10of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver executed,carriedout,orimplementedbythedelegate;and G.FundamentalPowersoftheState (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conformintheperformanceofhisfunctions. ➔ Inherent and do not need to be expressly conferred by constitutionalprovisions. ➔ DeemedinvestedinaStatethemomentitcomesintobeing. Asufficientstandardisonewhichdefineslegislativepolicy,marksits limits,mapsoutitsboundariesandspecifiesthepublicagencytoapply Briefly it.Itindicatesthecircumstancesunderwhichthelegislativecommand (1) PolicePower regulateslibertyandpropertyforthepromotion istobeeffected. ofthegeneralwelfare. ⭐ProvincialBusOperatorsAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DOLE (2) Eminent Domain enables the State to forcibly acquire 2018LeonenEnBanc property, upon payment of just compensation, for some Our governmental structure rests ontheprincipleofseparationof intendedpublicuse. powers.Underourconstitutionalorder,thelegislativebranchenacts (3) Taxationistheabilitytodemandfromthemembersofsociety law, the executive branch implements the law, and the judiciary theirproportionateshareorcontributioninthemaintenanceof construes the law. Inreality,however,thepowersarenotasstrictly thegovernment. confined or delineated to each branch. The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws require the delegation of powers traditionally belonging to the legislativetoadministrativeagencies. Similarities (1) Inherent in the State and may be exercised without express constitutionalgrant. Allthatisrequiredforthevalidexerciseofthispowerofsubordinate legislationisthat (4) Presuppose an equivalent compensation for theprivaterights interferedwith. 2) that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformitywith,thestandardsprescribedbythelaw. (5) Exercisedprimarilybythelegislature. The Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amountsforthe monthly salary credits. It is within the scopeoftheSocialSecurity Commission'spowertofixthem,asclearlylaidoutinthelaw. Compensation Intangible altruistic feelingthathe has contributedto thegeneral welfare Afullandfairequivalentofthe propertyexpropriatedor protectionandpublic improvementsforthetaxespaid PolicePower 1. Powerofpromotingthepublicwelfarebyrestrainingandregulating theuseoflibertyandproperty. 2. In a positive sense, it is the power to prescribe regulations to promotethehealth,morals,peace,education,goodorderorsafety, andgeneralwelfareofthepeople. Innegativeterms,itisthatinherentandplenarypowerintheState whichenablesittoprohibitallthingshurtfultothecomfort,safety andwelfareofsociety.(A gustinv.Edu,G.R.No.L-49112) (3) MethodsbywhichtheStateinterfereswithprivaterights. 1) theregulationmustbegermanetotheobjectsandpurposes ofthelaw;and The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determinetheboundariesofthedelegate'sauthorityandpreventthe delegationfromrunningriot. Intendedforpublicuseor purposeandistherefore wholesome (2) Not only necessary but indispensable. The State cannot continueorbeeffectiveunlessitisabletoexercisethem. ⭐KilusangMayoUnov.AquinoIII2 019LeonenEnBanc Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be completeinallitstermsandconditionswhenitleavesthe legislature such that when it reachesthedelegate,theonlythinghe willhavetodoistoenforceit. Propertytaken Destroyed becauseitis noxious Limitation Subject at all times to the limitations and requirements of the Constitution and may in proper cases be annulled by the courts of justice. PolicePower EminentDomain Taxation Regulates Bothliberty andproperty Onlypropertyrights Exercisedby Government Governmentand privateentities Government 3. The most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extendingasitdoes“toallthegreatpublicneeds.” 4. Itoperatesfromthewombtothetomb,protectingthepersoneven beforeheisbornandprescribingstructuresandrequirementsasto thedispositionofhisbody,andhisestate,ifany,whenhedies. 5. May not be bargained away through the medium of contract or even a treaty. The impairment clause must yield to the police power whenever the contract deals with a subject affecting the publicwelfare. ★ In Inchong v. Hernandez, the enforcement of the RetailTrade Nationalization Law was enjoined as it was alleged to be inconsistent with the treaty of amity betweenthePhilippines and China, the UN Charter, and the UDHR. The SC saw no conflict and decreed that “the treaty is always subject to qualificationoramendmentbyasubsequentlaw,andthesame BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 11of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ★ Administrativeboards; may never curtail or restrict the scopeofthepolicepowerof theState.” ★ Itmustbenotedthoughthat,inBayanMunav.Romulo,theSC distinguished atreatyandanexecutiveagreementasfollows: “atreatyhasgreater“dignity”thananexecutiveagreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty havingbehindittheauthorityofthePresident,theSenate,and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takesprecedenceoveranypriorstatutoryenactment. ★ In Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, citing Tanada v. Angara, SC pronounced that a “state thathascontractedvalid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillmentoftheobligationsundertaken.” 6. Isdynamic,notstatic,andmustmovewiththemovingsocietyitis supposedtoregulate. 7. May sometimes use the taxingpowerasanimplementforthe attainmentofalegitimatepoliceobjective. ★ In Lutz v.Araneta,theSCsustainedasalegitimateexerciseof the police power the imposition of a special tax on sugar producersforthepurposeofcreatingaspecialfundtobeused fortherehabilitationofthesugarindustry. ★ In Gerochi v. DOE, the Universal Chargewasconsideredasan exactionintheexerciseoftheState’spolicepower,imposedto ensuretheviabilityofthecountry’selectricpowerindustry. 8. Powerofeminentdomaincouldalsobeusedasanimplement. 9. When the conditions so demand asdeterminedbythelegislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yieldtogeneralwelfare.Policepowerasanattributetopromotethe commongoodwouldbedilutedconsiderablyifonthemerepleaof petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questionedprovisionisinvalidated..(C arlosSuperdrugv.DSWD) Exercise 1. Lodgedprimarilyinthenationall egislature. 2. Byvirtueofv aliddelegation,maybeexercisedby: ★ ThePresident; ★ Lawmakingbodiesonallmunicipallevels,includingthe barangay. 3. Quasi-legislativepower—authoritydelegatedbythelawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislativepolicy. 4. Municipalgovernmentsexercisequasi-legislativepowersunderthe generalwelfareclause,Sec16,LocalGovernmentCode. 5. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power.Itsexerciseisuponthediscretionofthelegislature. 6. The question of validity of legislation as determined by the criterionoftheirconformitytotheConstitutionisj usticiable. police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is incidentally generated. Inotherwords,ifgenerationofrevenueis theprimarypurpose,theimpositionisataxbut,ifregulationis theprimarypurpose,theimpositionisproperlycategorizedas aregulatoryfee. A cursoryreadingofthewhereasclausesmakesitapparentthatthe purpose of the ordinance is to regulate the construction and maintenanceofelectricandtelecommunicationspostserectedwithin Cagayan de Oro City.Thus,itisclearthattheordinanceinthiscase serves a regulatory purpose and is, hence, an exercise of police power. Tests (1) RationalRelationship/BasisTest (a) Appliedmainlyina nalysisofequalprotectionchallenges; Evasco,Jr.v.Montañez2018 Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installationofbuildingandotherstructuressuchasbillboards within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. The Davao City ChartervestedthelocalSangguniangPanlungsodwiththelegislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboardsandsimilarstructures. This direct and specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in anotherlawofgeneralapplication,inthis casetheNationalBuildingCode. Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the former. Even iftheNationalBuildingCodeimposesminimumrequirements as to the construction and regulation of billboards, the city governmentmayimposestricterlimitationsbecauseitspolice power to do so originates from its charter and not from the NationalBuildingCode. CityofCagayanDeOrov.CagayanElectricPower&Light2018 Thepurposeofanimpositionwilldetermineitsnatureaseitheratax orafee.Ifthepurposeisprimarilyrevenue,orifrevenueisatleast oneoftherealandsubstantialpurposes,thentheexactionisproperly classifiedasanexerciseofthepowertotax.Ontheotherhand,ifthe purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an exercise of (b) Laws and ordinances are upheld if they rationallyfurthera legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interestisextensivelyexaminedandthe availabilityoflessrestrictivemeasuresisconsidered. (c) Tworequisitesmustconcur: (i) The interests of the public generally, as distinguishedfromthoseofaparticularclass,require itsexercise;and (ii) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressiveuponindividuals. (2) StrictScrutinyTest (a) Focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, government interest and on the absence of less restrictivemeansforachievingthatinterest. LawfulSubject Subject of the measure is within the scope of police power, i.e. the activityorpropertysoughttoberegulateda ffectsthepublicwelfare. ★ In Taxicab Operators of MetroManilav.BoardofTransportation, an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old was held a valid police measure to protecttheriding publicandpromotetheircomfortandconvenience. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 12of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ★ In Velasco v. Villegas, an ordinance prohibiting barber shop operatorsfromrenderingmassageservicesinaseparateroomwas likewise sustained, to prevent immorality and enable the authoritiestoproperlyassesslicensefees. ★ InBautistav.Junio,toconserveenergy,prohibitionofheavyand extra-heavy vehicles from using public streets on weekends and legalholidayswassustained. Private matters in which the public interest is not at all involved are beyondthescopeofpolicepower. ★ InOplev.Torres,anadministrativeorderestablishingtheNational Computerized Identification Reference System for the expressed purpose of facilitating transactions with the government, particularly those providing basic services and social security benefitswasstruckdownasaninvasionofpeople’sprivacy. orrestrictingthepoliticalprocess. Rationalbasis standard Reviewofeconomiclegislation Heightenedor Evaluatingclassificationsbasedongender immediatescrutiny andlegitimacy ★ InTiov.VideogramRegulatoryBoard,thecreationoftheVRBwas ★ However, in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director General, NEDA, the sustained“toanswertheneedforregulatingthevideoindustry, Court upheld EO 420 prescribing for allgovernmentagenciesand Overbreadth Astatuteneedlesslyrestrainseven particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant GOCCs a “uniform data collection and format fortheirexistingID doctrine constitutionallyguaranteedrights violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of systems”f ortheirrespectiveemployees. pornographicvideotapes.” LawfulMeans Void-for-vagueness Apenalstatuteencroachesuponthefreedom ★ In the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, the SC upheld the ofspeech. 1. Bothendsandmeansmustbelegitimate.Otherwise,thepolice doctrine validity of BP 22 as it preserves the integrity of the banking measureshallbestruckdownasanarbitraryintrusionintoprivate systembypreventingworthlesschecksfromfloodingthesystem. rights. 4. In fine, the meansemployedfortheaccomplishmentofthepolice ★ InDepartmentofEducationv.SanDiego,aregulationdisqualifying objective must pass the test of reasonableness and, specifically, 2. There should be reasonable relation between the means and any person who has failed the NMAT three times from taking it conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights for the theend. again was reinstated by the SC as the measure was intended to protectionofprivaterights. protectthepatients. ★ InYnotv.IAC,anEOprohibitingthetransportofcarabaosand carabeef across provincial boundaries without government EminentDomain ★ In Sangalangv.IAC,theSCsustainedtheopeningoftwoerstwhile clearance, was invalidated as the purpose of indiscriminate private roads due to the demands of the common good, namely, slaughterwasnotsatisfactorilymetbythemeansemployed. Definition,NatureandFunction trafficdecongestionandpublicconvenience. ★ A lawlimitingthecapacityofcommoncarriers,oroftheaters Also called the power of expropriation, it is described as “the ★ In Del Rosario v. Bengzon, the Generics Act was sustained to as in the case of People v. Chan, is valid as this would be a highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the “promoteandrequiretheuseofgenericdrugproductsthatare reasonablemethodforpromotingthecomfort,convenienceand government”thatmaybeacquiredforsomepublicpurposethrough therapeuticallyequivalenttotheirbrand-namecounterparts.” safetyofthecustomers. amethod“inthenatureofacompulsorysaletotheState.” ★ InTelecommunicationsandBroadcastAttorneysofthePhilippines ★ InCityGovernmentofQCv.Ericta,ininvalidatinganordinance, Sec 9 Art III of the Constitution, providing that “private property v. COMELEC, Sec 92 of BP Blg 881 requiring radio and television theSCsaid“thereisnoreasonablerelationbetweenthesetting shallnotbetakenforpublicusewithoutjustcompensation”,serves stations to give free airtime to respondent for broadcasting aside of at least 6% ofthetotalareaofprivatecemeteriesfor as a limitation, not a grant, of such power. It should be strictly information regarding the candidates in the 1998 elections was charityburialgroundsofdeceasedpaupersandthepromotion interpreted against the expropriator and liberally in favor of the validated. According to Justice Mendoza, “Radio and television of health, morals, good order, safety,orthegeneralwelfareof propertyowner. broadcastingcompanieswhicharegivenfranchises,donotownthe the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without just airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast WhenexercisedbyLGUorotherdelegates compensation.” signalsandimages.Theyaremerelygiventhetemporaryprivilege 1. Congress; of using them. The exercise of the privilege may reasonably be ★ In OSG v. Ayala Land, Inc., the SC rejected petitioner’s burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of contention that malls, inasmuch as they are required by the 2. ThePresidentofthePhilippines; publicservice.” National Building Code to provide parking spaces for their 3. Variouslocallegislativebodies; customers,shouldprovidesuchforfree. ★ InSocialJusticeSocietyv.Atienza,azoningordinanceoftheCityof 4. Certainpubliccorporations,liketheNHAandwaterdistricts; Manila reclassifying “certain areas of the city from industrial to 3. TheSChasinvariablyappliedcertainstandardsforjudicialreview: commercial”wasupheldbytheSCcitingitsimplementationforthe 5. Quasi-public corporations like the Philippine National Strictscrutiny Lawsdealingwiththefreedomofthemind protectionandbenefitoftheresidents. Railways,PLDT,Meralco. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 13of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver EssentialrequisitesfortheexercisebyanLGU 1) Enactmentofano rdinance,notjustaresolution; 2) Mustbeforapublicuse,purposeorwelfare,orforthebenefit ofthepoorandthelandless; 3) Paymentofj ustcompensation;and 4) Exercisemustbeprecededbyavalidanddefiniteoffermade totheowner,whorejectsthesame. Conditionsprecedenttotheissuanceofawritofpossession 1) Complaintforexpropriationsufficientinformandsubstanceis filedinthepropercourt;and 2) Deposit with said court at least 15% of the property’s fair marketvalueb asedonitscurrenttaxdeclaration. CityofManilav.Prieto2019 TheCityCouncilofManilaenactedanOrdinancethatauthorizedthe City Mayor to acquire certain parcels of land belonging to respondentstobeusedforthecity’sLand-For-The-LandlessProgram. Initially, petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiatedsalewhichrespondentsrefusedtoaccept. The SC adopted the ruling of the CA wherein the latter found the following circumstances to invalidate the expropriation done by petitioner: 1. Therecordslackanyevidencetosupportpetitioner'sclaim thatanon-sitedevelopmentprogramisthemostpracticable and advantageous for the beneficiaries, to justify the non-applicability ofthelistofprioritiesinlandacquisition underSection9ofR.A.No.7279. Petitioner failed to take into consideration the legal definitionofano n-sitedevelopmentunderR.A.No.7279. 2. 3. Petitioner failed to exhaust other modes of acquisition beforeitresortedtoexpropriationinviolationofSection10 of R.A. No. 7279. Failure to renegotiate the offer to purchase the property before filing the expropriation case warrantsthedismissalofthecomplaintforexpropriation. Theintendedbeneficiariesofpetitioner'ssocializedhousing program are not "underprivileged and homeless," in violationofSection8. The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involvesaderogationoffundamentalright.Theexerciseofthepower of eminent domain drastically affectsalandowner'srighttoprivate property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary forthepreservationandenhancementofpersonaldignity andintimatelyconnectedwiththerightstolifeandliberty.Therefore, theexerciseofsuchpowermustundergopainstakingscrutiny. Sec 19 of the LGC also states that the exercise of such delegated power should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws. R.A. No. 7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the local expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land reformandhousing. ThecaseofEstateorHeirsoftheLateEx-JusticeJoseB.L.Reyesv. City of Manila emphatically ruled that the provisions are strict limitationsontheexerciseofthepowerofeminentdomainbylocal governmentunits,especiallywithrespectto: (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing;and Stages 1) Determinationofthev alidityo ftheexpropriation; Necessityofanexpropriationisajusticiablequestion. 2) Determinationofj ustcompensation. ➔ OncetheStatedecidestoexerciseitspowerofeminentdomain, thepowerofjudicialreviewbecomeslimitedinscope,leaving thecourtstosettleonlythesecondstage. ➔ Onlywhenjustcompensationhasnotbeengivenortheamount thereof not agreed upon may the remedy of prohibition becomeavailable. ➔ Acourt’sdeterminationofjustcompensationmaybesetaside iftaintedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion. PrivateProperty ➔ Anythingthatcancomeunderthedominionofman,including:(1) real and personal, (2) tangible and intangible properties. Except moneya ndchosesinaction. (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means of acquiringit. ➔ Property already devoted to public use is still subject to expropriation, provided this is done (1) directly by the legislature, or (2) under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. Compliancewiththeseconditionsismandatory.Ascorrectlyfound by the CA, nothing intherecordsindicatesthatpetitionercomplied withSection19oftheLGCandSections9and10ofR.A.No.7279. ★ In NHA v. DARAB, land, whether tenanted ornot,acquiredby theNHAforitshousingandresettlementprogramsareexempt fromlandreformunderPD1472. ➔ Servicesa reconsideredembracedintheconceptofproperty. NecessityofExercise ➔ Essentiallyp oliticalinnaturewhenexercisedbythelegislature. ➔ Incasesofdelegatedauthority,thejudiciaryhasassumedthepower to inquire whether the authority conferred has been correctly or properly exercised. Thisinvolveslookingintothenecessityofthe expropriation. ★ In Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, the order of the President of the Philippines to expropriate a portion of the property of the defendant for the extension of now Recto St. was dismissed, with the Court declaring that courtshavethepowertoinquireintothelegalityoftherightof eminent domainandtodeterminewhetherornotthereisa genuinenecessitytherefor. ★ In Republic v. PLDT, the SC upheld the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand the interconnection between the Government Telephone System and PLDT, so that the formercouldmakeuseofthelinesandfacilitiesofPLDT. ★ Similarly, in PLDT v. NTC, the petitioner was required to interconnectwithaprivatetelecommunicationscompany. ➔ Mustbewholesome,asitisintendedforpublicuse. PNOCAlternativeFuelsv.NGCP2019 Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp. held that when the subject property is classified by the government as an industrial zone, the subject property therein had been declared BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 14of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver patrimonial.Further,itisapparentfromR.A.No.10516anditsIRR that the industrial estate isbeingowned,managed,andoperatedby the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its private capacity. It is apparent from P.D. No. 949, asamendedbyR.A.No. 10516, that the Petrochemical Industrial Park is intended and accordinglydevotedbylawasacommercialandbusinessventure. Thus, NGCP has theauthorityunderSection4ofR.A.No.9511 toexpropriatethesubjectproperty. Taking smokefromanexhaustfanblewdirectlyintothehouseofthe petitioner,andwasthusdulyawardedwithjustcompensation. ➔ Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of thecommonand necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawfulmanner, lesseningordestroyingitsvalue. ➔ Itisneithernecessarythattheownerbewhollydeprivedoftheuse ofhisproperty,normaterialwhetherthepropertyisremovedfrom thepossessionoftheowner,orinanyrespectchangeshands. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetaryequivalentofthelandtaken. NPCv.SpsAoquecitingNPCv.Tiangcoheldthatiftheeasementis intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietaryrights a) throughtheimpositionofconditionsthataffecttheordinary use,freeenjoymentanddisposalofthepropertyor b) through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent Requisites of Taking in Eminent Domain (according to Republicv. withtheexerciseoftheattributesofownership,or ➔ Mayincludetrespasswithoutactualevictionoftheowner,material Castellvi) c) when the introduction of structures or objects which, by impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the 1) The e xpropriator m ust e nter a p rivate p roperty ; their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, ordinaryusesforwhichthepropertywasintended. death uponordestructionoflifeandpropertyfoundonthe 2) Theentrymustbeformorethanamomentaryperiod; ★ In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, the imposition of an landisnecessary, easementovera3-meterstripoftheplaintiff’spropertycould 3) Theentrymustbeunderwarranto rcoloroflegalauthority; then the owner should be compensated for the monetary notbelegallydonewithoutpaymenttoitofjustcompensation. 4) The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise equivalentoftheland. ★ In People v. Fajardo, a municipal ordinance prohibiting informallyappropriatedorinjuriouslyaffected; In this case, considering that the installation of the power lines constructionofanybuildingthatwoulddestroytheviewofthe 5) The u tilization o f t he p roperty f or p ublic u se m ust b e i n s uch a would definitely deprive Spouses Taglao of the normal useoftheir plaza from the highway was considered a taking under the way a s t o o ust t he o wner a nd d eprive h im o f b eneficial property, they are entitled to the payment of a just compensation, powerofeminentdomain. enjoymentoftheproperty. which is neither more nor lessthanthemonetaryequivalentofthe ★ The right-of-way easement, resulting in the restriction or subjectproperty. limitation on property rights over the land traversed by ➔ Mere notice of the intention to expropriate a particular property does not bind its owner and inhibit him from disposing or transmission lines is also an exercise of expropriation, as in Publicuse otherwisedealingwithit. NPCv.Aguirre-Paderanga. ➔ Anyusedirectlyavailabletothegeneralpublicasamatterofright ★ In NPC v. Ileto, the prohibition imposed by the transmission ➔ AnOrdinanceauthorizingexpropriationwillnotsuffice. andnotmerelyofforbearanceoraccommodation. lines,i.e.constructionofanyimprovementsorplantingofany ➔ The expropriator can only enter said property after expropriation ➔ There will also be public use involved even if the expropriated treesthatexceed3meterswithintheaerialrightofway,clearly proceedings are actually commenced and the deposit required by property is notactuallyacquiredbythegovernmentbutismerely interfereswiththelandowners’righttopossessandenjoytheir lawisdulymade. devotedtopublicservicesadministeredbyprivately-ownedpublic properties. utilitiessuchastelephoneorlightcompanies. ➔ Theownerdoesnotneedtofiletheusualclaimforrecoveryofjust ➔ Noteverytakingiscompensable,asitmaybejustifiedunder compensation with the COA if the government takes over the ➔ Important thing is that any member of the general public can thepolicepower. property and devotes it to public use without benefit of demand,forfreeorforafee,therighttousetheconvertedproperty expropriation,aswasheld inthecaseofA migablevCuenca. ★ Thus, losses sustained are in the nature of damnum absque forhisdirectandpersonalconvenience. injuria. The onlyrecompenseavailabletotheaffectedowners NationalTransmissionCorp.v.SpsTaglao2020 ➔ Broadened to include those that will redound to the indirect is the altruistic feeling that they somehow contributed tothe advantageorbenefitofthepublic. greatergood. True,aneasementofarightofwaytransmitsnorightsexceptthe ➔ Complianttothepublicuserequirement: easement itself, andtherespondentswouldretainfullownershipof ★ This rule is only validaslongastheprejudicesufferedbyan the p roperty t aken. N onetheless, t he a cquisition o f s uch e asement i s individualissharedincommonwiththerestaswasillustrated ★ Agrarianreform; not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an in Richards v. Washington Terminal. In thatcase,mostofthe ★ Slumclearanceandurbandevelopment; indefiniteperiodwoulddepriveitsownerofthenormalusethereof. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 15of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ★ Urbanlandreformandhousing,orsocializedhousingprogram. MCIAAv.Lozada,etal. The condition not havingmaterializedbecausetheairporthadbeen abandoned, the former owner should then be allowed to reacquiretheexpropriatedproperty. Fery v. Municipality of Cabanatuan was not decidedpursuantto ournowsacredlyheldconstitutionalrightthatprivatepropertyshall not be taken for public use without just compensation. It is well settled that the taking of privatepropertybytheGovernment's power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) thatitisforaparticularpublicpurpose;and (2) thatjustcompensationbepaidtothepropertyowner. These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions thatshouldbecompliedwithtoenablethecondemnortokeepthe propertyexpropriated. More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the purposestatedinthepetitionforexpropriationfiled,failingwhich,it shouldfileanotherpetitionforthenewpurpose.Ifnot,itisthen incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its privateowner,ifthelatterdesirestoreacquirethesame. ⭐We now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily,ifthisparticularpurposeorintentisnotinitiatedor not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they sodesire,mayseekthereversionofthe property, subject to the return of theamountofjustcompensation received.Insuchacase,theexerciseofthepowerofeminentdomain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Justcompensation ➔ Thedeterminationofjustcompensationisajudicialfunction whichcannotbecurtailedorlimitedbylegislation,muchless byanadministrativerule.( LBPv.Manzano) ➔ Full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private ownerbytheexpropriator. ➔ Mustbefairnotonlytotheowner,butalsototheexpropriator. ➔ According to De Knecht v. CA,ownerreferstoallthosewhohave lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee,alessee,andavendeeinpossessionunderanexecutory contract. finaldecisionofthepropercourt. Howdetermined ➔ Toascertainjustcompensation,thecourtshoulddeterminefirstthe actualorbasicvalueoftheproperty. IfConsequentialDamages>ConsequentialBenefits ★ However, in LBPv.AMSFarmingCorporation,SCrejected respondent’sclaimforjustcompensationasitwasamere J .C. = Actual V alue + (Damages − B enef its ) lessee.TheCourtruledthatithadnorightundertheCARL to demand from LBP just compensation for the Otherwise: J ust Compensation = Actual V alue improvements it had introduced to the leased land. Its rights are conferred by the provisions of the MOA it ➔ Thebasicormarketvalueofthepropertyisthepricethatmaybe executed with TOTCO in relationtotheCivilCode.(Thus, agreed upon by parties willing but not compelled to enter into a AMSmaydemandfromTOTCO,andnotfromLBP.) contracto fsale. ⭐LBPv.Manzano2018LeonenDivisioncase Indeterminingjustcompensation,whetherornottheRTCcansimply adopttheConsolidatedCommissioners'Report,andwhetherornotit ismandatedtofollowtheformulaprescribedunderRepublicActNo. 6657,Section17. NO.TheRTChasthefulldiscretiontomakeabindingdecisiononthe valueoftheproperties. ThefinaldeterminationoftheRegionalTrialCourtsittingasaSpecial AgrarianCourtmustberespected. RA6657,Section57givestotheSpecialAgrarianCourtsthe"original and exclusivejurisdictionoverallpetitionsforthedeterminationof justcompensationtolandowners."Thefinaldecisiononthevalueof just compensation lies solely on the Special Agrarian Court. Any attempt to convert its original jurisdiction into an appellate jurisdiction is contrary to the explicit provisions of the law. Thus, aggrieved landowners can go directly to the Special Agrarian Court that islegallymandatedtodeterminejustcompensation,evenwhen noadministrativeproceedingasconductedbeforeDAR. The SpecialAgrarianCourtmustensurethattheamountdetermined attheendoftheproceedingsisequivalenttothefairmarketvalue of the property at the time of the taking, and not based on a strict adherence to a particular setorseriesofrulesimposed by agricultural reform laws or administrative orders. While Section 17 requires due consideration of theformulaprescribedby DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the ➔ Justcompensation“simplymeanstheproperty’sfairmarketvalue at the time of the filing of the complaint, or that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to but, andanowner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as price to be givenandreceivedtherefor.” ➔ Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value: ★ Costofacquisition; ★ Currentvalueoflikepropertiesatthetimeoftaking; ★ Actualorpotentialuses; ★ In case of land, their size, shape or location and the tax declarationsthereon. ➔ Themeasureisnotthetaker'sgain,buttheowner'sloss. ➔ Expropriationisnotlimitedtotheacquisitionofrealpropertywith a corresponding transfer of title or possession. Theright-of-way easement resulting inarestrictionorlimitationonproperty rightsoverthelandtraversedbytransmissionlinesalsofalls withintheambitofthetermexpropriation.(NPCv.Ibrahim) CityGovernmentofValenzuelav.SpsAbacan2019Resolution In Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, the Court held thatwhere the issue is determining the amount of just compensation in an expropriation suit, a trial before the commissioners is indispensable. However, while the appointmentofcommissioners BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 16of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ismandatoryinresolvingtheissueofjustcompensation,courtsare notboundbytheirfindings.Courtsmaysubstitutetheirestimateof thevalue,a slongasitissupportedbytheevidenceonrecord. Damagesandinterestaspartofjustcompensation ➔ ConsequentialDamagesconsistofinjuriesdirectlycausedonthe residueoftheprivatepropertytakenthroughexpropriation. ★ In Republic v BPI, SC clarified that no actual taking of the buildingisnecessarytograntconsequentialdamages. ★ InHeirsofBanaagvAMSFarmingCorporation,itwasstressed that just compensation for the crops and improvements is inseparable from the valuation oftherawlandsastheformer are partandparcelofthelatter.Thesemustbeawardedtothe landowner irrespective of the nature of ownership of said crops. ExportProcessingZoneAuthorityv.Dulay It is violative of due process to deny the owner theopportunityto provethatthevaluationinthetaxdocumentsisunfairorwrong.And it is repulsive to the basic conceptsofjusticeandfairnesstoallow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissionershaveactuallyviewedtheproperty,afterevidenceand argumentsproandconhavebeenpresented,andafterallfactorsand considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciouslyevaluated. ➔ Thus, the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Anydeterminationbyanadministrativebody,isatbest, preliminary. ➔ Justcompensationmustbepaidinmoney.Thiswasnotfollowedin the CARP cases, where the SC adopted a more pragmatic stance noting the enormity of the amount needed vis-a-vis the financial capacity of the expropriator.Thus, modesofcompensationunder Sec 18 of RA 6657 (CARP Law) were validated asitsinvalidation wouldverilymeanthedeathoftheentirelaw. ➔ Thepropertytakenshouldbeassessedduringthetimeofthetaking which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriationproceedings. ➔ Whereentryprecededthefilingofthecomplaintforexpropriation, theassessmentshouldbemadeatthetimeoftheentry. ◆ As a general rule, Rule 67 Sec 4 provides that just compensation is computed at the time of taking of the property or at the time the complaint is filed, whichever comesfirst. ★ InRepublicv.Castellvi,propertywasdeemedtakenonlywhen expropriationproceedingswerecommencedin1959,notasof the time of commencement of the lease in 1947. Thus, just compensationwasascertainedin1959. ★ InCityofCebuv.Dedamo,thefilingofthecomplaintpreceded thetakingofthepropertybutSCsaidthatthevaluationshould becomputedatthetimeoftakingnotnecessarilyatthetimeof the filing of complaint which was done earlierthereasonfor that is there is a provision under Section 19 of RA 7160 whichprovidesinessencethatthevaluationtakenbytheLGU shouldbereckonedasofthedateofactualpossession. ➔ Wheretheinstitutionoftheactionprecedesentryintotheproperty, thejustcompensationistobeascertainedasofthetimeofthefiling ofthecomplaint. ➔ Valueofthelandanditscharacteratthetimeitwastakenby the government are the criteria for determining just compensation. ➔ Theownerisentitledtopaymentofinterestfromthetimeofthe takingu ntiljustcompensationisactuallypaidtohim. ApoFruitsv.LBP Tobejust,thecompensationmustnotonlybethecorrectamountto bepaid;itmustalsobepaidwithinareasonabletimefromthetime the land is taken from the owner. If not, the State must pay the landownerinterest,bywayofdamages,fromthetimetheproperty wastakenuntiljustcompensationisfullypaid.Thisinterest,deemed a part of just compensation, has been established by prevailing jurisprudencetobe1 2%perannum. NBByvirtueofBSPCircularNo799Seriesof2013,rateofinterestis peggedat6%perannum,asofJuly1,2013. ➔ Neither laches nor prescription may bar a claim for just compensationforpropertytakenforpublicuse. ➔ Title to the property shall not betransferreduntilafteractual paymentofjustcompensation. Republicv.Lim Incaseswherethegovernmentfailedtopaythecompensationwithin five years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owner concerned shall have the right to recover possessionoftheirproperty.xxxx In Coscolluela v CA, we defined just compensation as not only the correctdetermination oftheamounttobepaidtothepropertyowner butalsothepaymentofthepropertywithinareasonabletime. xxxx LBPv.Rivera The formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5,seriesof 1998shouldbeappliedincomputingjustcompensation,thus: LV=(CNIx0.6)+(CSx0.3)+(MVx0.1) Where: LV=LandValue CNI=CapitalizedNetIncome CS=ComparableSales MV=MarketValueperTaxDeclaration AsheldinRepublicv.CA, ifpropertyistakenforpublicusebefore compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over thecase,thefinalcompensationmustincludeinterestonitsjust valuetobecomputedfromthetimethepropertyistakentothetime when compensationisactuallypaidordepositedwiththecourt. In fine,betweenthetakingofthepropertyandtheactualpayment,legal interestsaccrueinordertoplacetheownerinapositionasgoodas thepositionhewasinbeforethetakingoccurred. Republicv.DelaCruz2019Resolution Interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and followsasamatterofcoursefromtherightofthelandownertobe placedinasgoodapositionasmoneycanaccomplish,asofthe dateoftaking." BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 17of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ➔ Every expropriation case has this built-in condition that the itfollowingtheprevailingjurisprudence. propertyshouldbedevotedfortheverysamepurposeforwhichit ExportProcessingZoneAuthorityv.EstateofJimenez was expropriated as stated in the complaint. Such that: if the Distinguishedf rompolicepower propertywasnotutilizedinthesaidpurpose,thenrecoverymaybe TheCourthasheldthatcompensationcannotbejusttotheowner allowedwithorwithouttheexpresscondition.TheStateshallhave Agan,Jr.v.PIATCO in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is toinstituteaseparateexpropriationcaseforthatnewpurpose. prompt payment, consideringthattheownertherebyimmediately Sec 17 Art XII pertains to the right of the State intimesofnational suffersnotonlythelossofhispropertybutalsothelossofitsfruits emergency,andintheexerciseofitspolicepower,totemporarilytake NTCv.BermudaDevelopment2019Divisioncase orincome.Thus,inaddition,theownerisentitledtolegalinterest overtheoperationofa nybusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest. A case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or from the time of the taking of the property until the actual In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national ejectment against a public utility corporation, endowed with the paymentinordertoplacetheownerinapositionasgoodas,butnot emergency" was defined to include threat from external powerofeminentdomain,whichhasoccupiedthelandbelongingto betterthan,thepositionhewasinbeforethetakingoccurred. aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes theformerintheinterestofpublicservicewithoutprioracquisition "unless it is of such proportion that would paralyze government RemedyofDispossessedOwner of titletheretobynegotiatedpurchaseorexpropriationproceedings, service." willnotprosper.Anyactiontocompelthepublicutilitycorporation ➔ If a landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking ofhispropertyby to vacate such propertyisunavailingsincethelandownerisdenied Thedurationoftheemergencyitselfisthedeterminingfactorasto thegovernmentforpublicuse,hewaiveshisrighttotheinstitution the remedies of ejectment and injunction for reasons of public howlongthetemporarytakeoverbythegovernmentwouldlast.The ofaformalexpropriationproceeding. policyandpublicnecessityaswellasequitableestoppel. temporary takeover by the government extends only to the ➔ Owner’s failure to question for a long period of time the operation of the business and not to theownershipthereof.As Thep roperrecourseisfortheejectmentcourt: government’s failure to institute expropriation proceedings such the governmentisnotrequiredtocompensatetheprivate constitutes a waiver of his right to regain possession of his entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of (1) todismissthecasewithoutprejudicetothelandownerfiling property. His only remedy is an action for payment of just ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private the proper action for recovery ofjustcompensationand compensationandmaynotsueforejectment. entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, consequentialdamages;or claim just compensation for the use of the said business and its ➔ AmounttobeDeposited: properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in (2) todismissthecaseanddirectthepublicutilitycorporation ◆ Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court: Upon filing of the exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation expropriation case, the expropriator is required to deposit an domain. proceedings and to pay the just compensation and amount which is equivalent to the full assessed value of the consequentialdamagesassessedtherein;or Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable property as appearing in the tax declaration in order for the compensationforthereasonableuseofthepropertypursuant courttoissueawritofpossessionallowingtheexpropriatorto (3) tocontinuewiththecaseasifitwereanexpropriation totheoperationofthebusinessc ontravenest heConstitution. take actual possessionofthepropertyduringthependencyof case and determine the just compensation and thecase. consequentialdamagespursuanttoRule67,iftheejectment ManilaMemorialPark,Inc.v.SecretaryoftheDSWD courthasjurisdictionoverthevalueofthesubjectland. ◆ If the expropriator is an LGU, the amount to be deposited is G.R.No.175356,3Dec2013,711SCRA302 only15%oftheassessedvalueoftheproperty. Whiletheawardofrentalinarrearsisproperinanunlawfuldetainer action, its award in the present case cannot be upheld since an ◆ In RA 8974, if the purpose of the expropriation is to In the exercise of policepower,xxxxexamplesoftheseregulations unlawfuldetaineractionisnotasanctionedremedyincaseapublic implement a national government infrastructure project,what are serviceorutilitycorporationhasoccupiedprivately-ownedproperty needs to be done is notadepositbutpaymentofBIRZonal 1) property condemned for being noxious or intended for without first acquiring title thereto by negotiated purchase or valuation of the property. This amount deposited or paid is noxiouspurposes(e.g.,abuildingonthevergeofcollapseto expropriationproceedings. NOTthejustcompensation. be demolishedforpublicsafety,orobscenematerialstobe The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation ★ InNPCv.Pobre,theexpropriatorisnotallowedtounilaterally destroyedintheinterestofpublicmorals); proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful detainer withdraw because d amages may have already been causedto 2) zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in theproperty. purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the proceedingwiththeunlawfuldetainercaseandnotdismissing Rental BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 18of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory intoresidential andindustrialareas). delegatedtocondemnprivatepropertytopublicuseuponpaymentof justcompensation.Intheexerciseofpolicepower,propertyrightsof privateindividualsaresubjectedtorestraintsandburdensinorderto securethegeneralcomfort,health,andprosperityofthestate. Ontheotherhand,intheexerciseofthepowerofeminentdomain, xxxx,examplesincludethe The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supportedbyavalidobjectiveorpurposeasaforementioned.Ithasa valid subjectconsideringthattheconceptofpublicuseisnolonger confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymouswithpublicinterest,publicbenefit,publicwelfare, and public convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefitenjoyedbythegeneralpublictowhichthesecitizensbelong. The means employed in invoking the active participation of the privatesector,inordertoachievethepurposeorobjectiveofthelaw, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs arereasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a formofreimbursement,thediscountextendedtoPWDsin the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowabletaxdeductionspursuanttoSection32ofR.A.No.9442. 1) acquisitionoflandsfortheconstructionofpublichighways; 2) agricultural lands acquired by the government under the agrarian reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction of the property is not essential for “taking” under the powerofeminentdomaintobepresent.Examplesoftheseinclude 3) establishmentofeasementssuchaswherethelandowneris perpetuallydeprivedofhisproprietaryrightsbecauseofthe hazards posed by electric transmission lines constructed abovehispropertyor 4) the compelled interconnection of the telephone system betweenthegovernmentandaprivatecompany. Inthesecases,althoughtheprivatepropertyownerisnotdivestedof ownership or possession, payment of just compensation is warrantedbecauseoftheburdenplacedonthepropertyfortheuseor benefitofthepublic. Peoplev.Fajardo Anordinancewhichpermanentlysorestrictstheuseofpropertythat itcannotbeusedforanyreasonablepurposegoes,itisplain,beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the ownersubjecttothe burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscationandisadeprivation. DrugstoreAssociationofthePhilsv.NationalCouncilonDisability Affairs2016 Policepoweristhepowerofthestatetopromotepublicwelfareby restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domainistheinherentrightof the state andofthoseentitiestowhichthepowerhasbeenlawfully Taxation ➔ Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons andproperty,leviedbytheStatebyvirtueofitssovereignty,forthe supportofgovernmentandforallpublicneeds. ➔ Obligationtopaytaxesisn otbasedoncontract. ➔ Exceptonlyinthecaseofpolltaxes(Sec20ArtIII),nonpaymentof ataxmaybethesubjectofcriminalprosecutionandpunishment. ➔ Taxesarethenation’slifebloodthroughwhichgovernmentagencies continue to operate and with which the State discharges its functionsforthewelfareofitsconstituents. ➔ Taxes = levied to raise revenues; Licenses = imposed for regulatorypurpose. ➔ Imposition ofavehicleregistrationfeeisnotanexerciseofpolice power,butoftaxation,asitsmainpurposeistoraisefundsforthe constructionandmaintenanceofhighways. ➔ On theotherhand,theUniversalChargeisnotataxasitsprimary purpose is to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry. ★ InAngelesUniversityFoundationv.CityofAngeles,SCheldthat the paymentofbuildingpermitfeeisaregulatoryimposition, andnotachargeonproperty,andisthereforenotanimposition fromwhichpetitionerisexempt. Purposes 1) Revenue–Thepurposeoftaxationistoprovidefundsorproperty withwhichtheStatepromotesthegeneralwelfareandprotectionof itscitizens.Raisingtherevenuesistheprincipalobjectoftaxation. 2) Non-Revenue a) Regulation – Taxes may also be imposed for a regulatory purpose as for example, in the promotion, rehabilitation,and stabilizationofindustrywhichisaffectedwithpublicinterest. b) Promotion of General Welfare – If objectives and methods arealikeconstitutionallyvalid,noreasonisseenwhythestate may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made to implement the state’s policepower. c) Reduction of Social Inequality – made possible through progressivesystemoftaxationwheretheobjectiveistoprevent the undue concentration of wealth in the hands of few individuals (that is why, the bigger theincomeoftheperson, thebiggertheincometax). d) Promote Economic Growth–intherealmoftaxexemptions andtaxreliefs,thepurposeoftaxation(thepowertotaxbeing thepoweralsonottotax)istograntincentivesorexemptions in order to encourage investments and thereby promote the country’seconomicgrowth. e) Protectionism – in some important sectors of the economy, taxes sometimes provide protection to local industries like protectivetariffandcustomsduties. Characteristics 1) Inherent – the power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availedoftoassuretheperformanceofvitalstatefunctions. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 19of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 2) Legislative–taxingpowerispeculiarlyandexclusivelylegislative ➔ Where the tax to be collected is based onthevalueofthetaxable in character and remains undiminished in the legislative in property, the taxpayer is entitled to be notified oftheassessment character. proceedingsandtobeheardthereinonthecorrectvaluation. 3) Constitutionally limited – the power to tax is an attribute of EqualProtectionandTaxation sovereignty.Itisthestrongestofallthepowersofthegovernment. ➔ Sec 2 8(1) Art VI, the rule of taxation shall be uniform and TheConstitutionsetsforthsuchlimits. equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of Twoopposingviews,butequallycorrect taxation. Taxationasincludingthe powertodestroy Taxationasnotincludingthe powertodestroy ProferredbyChiefJusticeJohn MarshalloftheUSSC RefutedlaterbyJusticeHolmes Iftaxationisusedasimplement ofpolicepower Iftaxationisusedsolelyfor raisingrevenues Exercise ➔ InherentintheState,primarilyvestedintheLegislature. ➔ MaybedelegatedtothePresidentpursuanttoSec28(2)ArtVIof theConstitution. ★ SECTION 28. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the nationaldevelopmentprogramoftheGovernment. ➔ Uniformitydoesnotforfendclassificationaslongas: 1) The standards thatareusedthereforaresubstantialand notarbitrary; 2) The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose; 3) The law applies, all things being equal, to both present andfutureconditions;and 4) The classification applies equally well to all those belongingtothesameclass. ➔ Equitable taxation connotes that taxes should be apportioned amongthepeopleaccordingtotheircapacitytopay. DoubleTaxation ➔ Notconstitutionallyprohibited. TaxExemptions ➔ Construedstronglyagainsttheclaimant. ➔ Sec28(3)ArtVI.Charitableinstitutions,churchesandparsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, andalllands,buildings,andimprovements,actually,directly,and exclusively usedforreligious,charitable,oreducationalpurposes shallbeexemptfromtaxation. ★ However, in Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a donation ofP10Kfortheconstructionofachurchwassubject todonee’staxasitwasnotanadvaloremtaxonthechurchbut an excise tax imposed on the priest for the exercise of the privilegetoacceptthedonation. ★ InLungCenterofthePhilippinesv.QuezonCity,thoseportions leased to private properties and individuals are not exempt fromrealpropertytaxes. ➔ Sec4(3)ArtXIV.Allrevenuesandassetsofnon-stock,non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. xxxx ➔ Sec 4(4) Art XIV. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educationalpurposesshallbeexempt fromtax. ➔ Occurs when additional taxes are laid on the samesubjectbythe same taxing jurisdiction duringthesametaxingperiodandforthe ➔ Statutoryexemptionsaregrantedatthediscretionofthelegislature. samepurpose. However,asprovidedinSec28(4)ArtVI,nolawgrantinganytax exemption shall be passed withouttheconcurrenceofamajority ➔ Despite thelackofprohibition,itwillnotbeallowedifitviolates ofalltheMembersoftheCongress. ➔ Pursuant to direct authority conferred by Sec 5 Art X of the theequalprotectionclause.(S ec1ArtIII) Constitution,locallegislativebodiesmayalsoexercisethepowerof ➔ Whereataxexemptionwasgrantedgratuitously,thesamemaybe PublicPurpose taxation. validlyrevokedatwill,withorwithoutcause. ➔ GR:TheremustbealawgrantinganLGUtolawfullyimposeatax. ➔ Revenuesreceivedfromtheimpositionoftaxesorleviescannotbe ➔ Iftheexemptionisgrantedforvaluableconsideration,itisdeemed used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of Not applicable where what is involved is the regulatorypowerof to partake of a contractandobligationthereofisprotectedagainst privatepersons. theLGUwhichisexpresslyaccompaniedbythetaxingpower. impairment.S ec10ArtIII. ★ In Planters Products Inc v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court DueProcessandTaxation ★ In Casanova v.Hord,theSpanishGovernment,inexchangefor declaredthatataxlevyonthesaleoffertilizersforpurposesof certain obligations assumed by the plaintiff, decreed to him ➔ Taxesshouldnotbeconfiscatory,exceptwhentheyareintendedas benefiting a private corporation, Philippine Planters Inc., is certain mines in accordance withaRoyalDecree,whichinter animplementofpolicepower. invalid.Itmaynotbejustifiedevenasavalidexerciseofpolice aliaimposedanumberoftaxes. power. ➔ Dueprocessdoesnotrequirepreviousnoticeandhearingbeforea ★ In PAGCOR v. BIR, SC rejected petitioner’s assertion that the law prescribing fixed or specific taxes on certain articles may be removal of its statutory exemption from the payment of enacted. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 20of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver corporate income tax is violative of the equal protection and non-impairmentclauses. ➔ Sec 11 Art XII. xxxx Neither shall any such franchiseorrightbe granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the commongoodsorequires. ★ In MERALCO v. Province of Laguna, the Court held that a franchise partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the purviewofthenon-impairmentclause. OtherConstitutionalLimitations Sec29ArtVI. (1) NomoneyshallbepaidoutoftheTreasuryexceptinpursuance ofanappropriationmadebylaw. (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,oremployed,directlyorindirectly,fortheuse,benefit,or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister,orotherreligiousteacher,ordignitaryassuch,except whensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassignedto the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanageorleprosarium. (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shallbetreatedasaspecialfundandpaidoutforsuchpurpose only. If the purpose for which a special fundwascreatedhas been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferredtothegeneralfundsoftheGovernment. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardlessoftheirbreadthanddimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (archipelagicdoctrineofterritoriality) UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory.Itisamultilateraltreatyregulating,amongothers,sea-use rightsovermaritimezones,i.e., cessionand 4. prescription, NOT by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-userightsorenactingstatutestocomplywiththetreaty'sterms todelimitmaritimezonesandcontinentalshelves.Territorialclaims tolandfeaturesareoutsideUNCLOSIII,andareinsteadgovernedby therulesongeneralinternationallaw. RA9522asdiscussedinMagallonav.Ermita RA9522isNotUnconstitutional.RA9522isaStatutoryToolto DemarcatetheCountry'sMaritimeZonesandContinentalShelf UnderUNCLOSIII,n ottoDelineatePhilippineTerritory. 3. IV.CITIZENSHIP A.KindsofCitizenship B.Whoarecitizens 1. the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], 2. contiguouszone[24nauticalmilesfromthebaselines], D.Modesofacquiringcitizenship 3. exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]),and E.Modesoflosingandreacquiringcitizenship 4. continentalshelves thatUNCLOSIIIdelimits.Ontheotherhand,baselineslawssuchas RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting pointstomeasurethebreadthofthemaritimezonesandcontinental shelf. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international communityofthescopeofthemaritimespaceandsubmarineareas withinwhichStatespartiesexercisetreaty-basedrights,namely, 1. theexerciseofsovereigntyoverterritorialwaters(Article2), 2. thejurisdictiontoenforcecustoms,fiscal,immigration,and sanitationlawsinthecontiguouszone(Article33),and 3. therighttoexploitthelivingandnon-livingresourcesinthe exclusive economic zone (Article 56)andcontinentalshelf (Article77). C.Whocanbecitizens F.Dualcitizenshipanddualallegiance A.KindsofCitizenship 1. ArticleI.Thenationalterritory 1) comprises the Philippinearchipelago,withalltheislands andwatersembracedtherein,andallotherterritoriesover whichthePhilippineshassovereigntyorjurisdiction, 2) consistingofitsterrestrial,fluvialandaerialdomains, 3) including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insularshelves,andothersubmarineareas. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.Undertraditionalinternationallawtypology,Statesacquire (orconversely,lose)territorythrough 1. occupation, 2. accretion, a. citizensofthePhilippinesfrombirth b. without having to perform any act to acquire or perfecttheirPhilippinecitizenship. ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reachingtheageofmajority shallbedeemedn atural-borncitizens. III.NATIONALTERRITORY Natural-born.—Natural-borncitizensarethosewhoare 2. Naturalized. — those who have become Filipino citizens throughnaturalization,generallyunderCANo.473,otherwise knownastheRevisedNaturalizationLaw,andbyR ANo.530. Leev.DirectorofLands The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in thehandsofnon-Filipinos. Inthiscase,however,there BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 21of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the handsofFilipinosqualifiedtoacquireandownsuchland.Thus,the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our landsinFilipinohandshasbeenachieved. B.Whoarecitizens ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoptionofthe1987Constitution; 2. ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines; 3. ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,ofFilipinomothers,who elect PhilippineCitizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority; and 4. Thosewhoaren aturalizedi naccordancewithlaw. ChildrenofFilipinoParents Republicv.Sagun Itisasettledrulethatonlylegitimatechildrenfollowthecitizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate childofFilipinaneednotperformanyacttoconferuponhimallthe rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automaticallybecomesacitizenhimself. Vilandov.HRET OneborntoafatherwhohasbeennaturalizedasaFilipinohimselfis tobeconsidered“aFilipinocitizenborntoaFilipinofather.” Even on the assumption thatthenaturalizationproceedingsandthe subsequent issuance of certificate ofnaturalizationwereinvalid,he can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenshipwhenhereachedmajorityage. Election ReApplicationofChing Canalegitimatechildbornunderthe1935ConstitutionofaFilipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 yearsafterhehasreachedtheageofmajority?NO. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippinecitizenshipshouldnotbeunderstoodashavingacurative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition ofcitizenshipforthose covered by the1935Constitution.Ifthecitizenshipofapersonwas subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challengeunderthenewcharterevenifthejudicialchallengehadnot beencommencedbeforetheeffectivityofthenewConstitution. C.A.No.625whichwasenactedpursuanttoSection1(3),ArticleIVof the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in ordertomakeavalidelectionofPhilippinecitizenship. UnderSection1thereof,legitimatechildrenbornofFilipinomothers mayelectPhilippinecitizenshipby a) expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworntobythepartyconcerned b) beforeanyofficerauthorizedtoadministeroaths,and c) shallbefiledwiththenearestcivilregistry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. (1) astatementofelectionunderoath; (2) anoathofallegiancetotheConstitutionandGovernmentof thePhilippines;and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath withthenearestcivilregistry. Where, as in petitioners'case,theelectionofcitizenshiphasinfact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe,theregistrationofthedocumentsofelectionbeyond theframeshouldbeallowedifinthemeanwhilepositiveactsof citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship,foroverhalfa centurybythehereinpetitioners,isactualnoticetothePhilippine public which is e quivalent to formal registration of the electionofPhilippinecitizenship. Registrationistheconfirmationoftheexistenceofafact.Inthe instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. Itisnottheregistrationoftheactofelection,although a valid requirement under CA. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenshiponthepetitioners. Itisonlyameansofconfirmingthe factthatcitizenshiphasbeenclaimed. Cov.HRET However,the1935ConstitutionandC.A.No.625didnotprescribea time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election shouldbemade"uponreachingtheageofmajority." Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the ConstitutionaccordsnaturalbornstatustochildrenbornofFilipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reachingtheageofmajority. Ching'selectionwasclearlybeyond,byanyreasonableyardstick,the allowableperiodwithinwhichtoexercisetheprivilege. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. Thereasonisobvious. Hewasalreadyacitizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but hisfatherhadbeen naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure foronewhohadbeenacitizen sincehewasnineyearsold. Ma,etal.v.Fernandez,Jr Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother andanalienfather,whoexecutedanaffidavitofelectionof Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?N O. ThestatutoryformalitiesofelectingPhilippinecitizenshipare: The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.HehasestablishedhislifehereinthePhilippines. For those in thepeculiarsituationoftherespondentwhocannotbe expected tohaveelectedPhilippinecitizenshipastheywerealready BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 22of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver e) HavingbeenborninthePhilippines. citizens,weapplytheInReMallarerule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those whostillhavetoelectcitizenship.Forthose alreadyFilipinoswhenthetimetoelectcameup,thereareacts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenshipisaqualification,votingduringelectiontime,runningfor public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselvesformalmanifestationsforthesepersons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electingisanalien;orhisstatusisdoubtfulbecauseheisanational of two countries. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a d irect action for its nullity. 3. 4. 1. 2. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less thanfivethousandpesos,ORmusthavesomeknownlucrative trade,profession,orlawfuloccupation; 5. He must beabletospeakandwriteEnglishorSpanishAND anyoneoftheprincipalPhilippinelanguages; 6. Hemusthaveenrolledhisminorchildrenofschoolage,inany ofthepublicschoolsorduly-recognizedprivateschoolswhere Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribedaspartoftheschoolcurriculum. C.Whocanbecitizens Anypersonhavingthefollowingqualificationsmaybecomeacitizenof thePhilippinesbynaturalization He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must haveconductedhimselfinaproperandirreproachablemanner inhisrelationwiththeconstitutedgovernmentaswellaswith thecommunityinwhichheisliving. D.Modesofacquiringcitizenship ⭐Jus sanguinis. — conferred by virtue of blood He must be not less than 18yearsofageonthedayofthe hearingofthepetition; 1. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous periodofnotlessthant enyears; 2. Jussoli.—conferredbyplaceofbirth. This shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitionerhavinganyofthefollowingqualifications: 3. Naturalization. 4. Resjudicata. a) HavinghonorablyheldofficeundertheGovernmentof the Philippines or underthatofanyoftheprovinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof; b) Having established a new industry or introduced a usefulinventioninthePhilippines; c) BeingmarriedtoaFilipinowoman; d) HavingbeenengagedasateacherinthePhilippinesin a public or recognizedprivateschoolnotestablished forti»eexclusiveinstructionofchildrenofpersonsof aparticularnationalityorrace,inanyofthebranches of education or industry foraperiodofnotlessthan twoyears; relationship. administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generallynotconsideredasresjudicata;hence,ithastobethreshed outagainandagainastheoccasionmaydemand.Resjudicatamay beappliedincasesofcitizenshiponlyifthefollowingconcur: 1. aperson'scitizenshipmustberaisedasamaterialissueina controversywheresaidpersonisaparty; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took activepartintheresolutionthereof;and 3. thefindingofcitizenshipisaffirmedbythisCourt. E.Modesoflosingandreacquiringcitizenship Vallesv.Comelec Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipinocitizenmaylosehis citizenship: (1) Byn aturalizationi naforeigncountry; (2) Bye xpressr enunciationofcitizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of aforeigncountryuponattaining21 yearsofageormore; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air serviceofaforeigncountry; (5) Byc ancellationo fthecertificateofnaturalization; ⭐Go,Sr.v.Go Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenshipofanindividualisputintoquestion,itnecessarilyhasto be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Comelec,wesaidthatdecisionsdeclaringtheacquisitionordenialof citizenshipcannotgovernaperson'sfuturestatuswithfinality.This is because a person may subsequentlyreacquire,orforthatmatter, losehiscitizenshipunderanyofthemodesrecognizedbylawforthe purpose. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own,inthat,unlikeother cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a longlineofdecisions,thisCourtsaidthateverytimethecitizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or (6) Byhavingbeendeclaredbycompetentauthority,adeserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:and (7) Incaseofawoman,uponhermarriagetoaforeigner,if,by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquireshisnationality. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciationmustbee xpress. In the case of Aznar v. Comelec, the Courtruledthatthemerefact that respondent was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, andthatan applicationforanaliencertificateofregistrationwasnottantamount torenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship. And, in Mercado v. Manzano, it was held that the fact that BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 23of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver respondent was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of ImmigrationandDeportationandwasholdinganAmericanpassport were just a ssertions of his American nationality before the terminationofhisAmericancitizenship. Thus,themerefactthathereinprivaterespondentwasaholderofan Australianpassportandhadanaliencertificateofregistrationarenot acts constituting an effective renunciationofcitizenshipanddonot militateagainstherclaimofFilipinocitizenship. BengsonIIIv.HRET Tobenaturalized,anapplicanthastoprovethathepossessesallthe qualificationsandnoneofthedisqualificationsprovidedbylaw to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgationwhenthecourtissatisfiedthatduringtheintervening period,theapplicanthas (1) notleftthePhilippines; (2) hasdedicatedhimselftoalawfulcallingorprofession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Governmentpromulgatedrules;or (4) committedanyactprejudicialtotheinterestofthenationor contrarytoanyGovernmentannouncedpolicies. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63, enumeratesthethreemodesbywhichPhilippinecitizenshipmaybe reacquiredbyaformercitizen: (1) byn aturalization, (2) byr epatriation,and (3) byd irectactofCongress. Naturalization is a mode for BOTH acquisition and reacquisitiono fPhilippinecitizenship. 1) As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalizationisgovernedbyC ANo.473,asamended. 2) Ontheotherhand,naturalizationasamodeforreacquiring PhilippinecitizenshipisgovernedbyCANo.63. Underthis law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none ofthedisqualificationsmentionedinSection4of C.A.473. ➔ RANo530 ➔ RANo9139orTheAdministrativeNaturalizationLawof2000 1. Itisaprocessbywhichaforeigneracquires,voluntarilyorby operation of law, the citizenship of another state. It may be directo rderivative. 2. Directn aturalizationiseffected: Repatriation,ontheotherhand,maybehadundervariousstatutes bythosewholosttheircitizenshipdueto: (1) desertionofthearmedforces; (2) serviceinthearmedforcesofthealliedforcesinWorldWar II; a. Byindividualproceedings,usuallyjudicial; b. Byspecialactoflegislature; (3) serviceintheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStatesatanyother time; c. By collective change of nationality, en masse as a resultofcessionorsubjugation; d. ByadoptionoforphanminorsasnationalsoftheState wheretheyareborn. (4) marriageofaFilipinowomantoanalien;and (5) politicalandeconomicnecessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriationsimplyconsistsof 3. 1) the takingofanoathofallegiancetotheRepublicofthe Philippinesand 2) registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the placewherethepersonconcernedresidesorlastresided. 4. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.ThismeansthatanaturalizedFilipinowho lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalizedFilipinocitizen.Ontheotherhand,ifhewasoriginallya natural-borncitizenbeforehelosthisPhilippinecitizenship,hewill berestoredtohisformerstatusasanatural-bornFilipino. HavingthustakentherequiredoathofallegiancetotheRepublicand having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with theaforecitedprovision,respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-borncitizen,astatuswhichheacquiredatbirthastheson ofaFilipinofather. 5. Derivativen aturalizationisconferred: a. Onthewifeofthenaturalizedhusband; b. Ontheminorchildrenofthenaturalizedparent;and c. Onthealienwomanuponmarriagetoanational. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenshipthrougheither a. judicialn aturalizationunderCA473or b. administrative naturalization under RA No.9139or the“AdministrativeNaturalizationLawof2000”. c. Athirdoption,calledderivativenaturalization,which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbandsisfoundunderSection15ofCA473. Inourjurisdiction,analienwomanmarriedtoaFilipinoshall acquire his citizenship only if she herself might be lawfully naturalized. Thus, derivative naturalization does not always followasamatterofcourse. MoyYaLimYaov.CommissionerofImmigration Naturalization Differentlawsonnaturalization ➔ CANo473 Grantingthevalidityofmar­riage,theCourthasruledinLyGiokHav. Ga­lang, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to aciti­zendoesnot suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Sec­tion 15 of the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 24of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipinomustshow,inaddition,thatshe'mightherselfbelawfully naturalized'asaFili­pinocitizen. Asconstruedinthedecisioncited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under Section 4 of the NaturalizationLaw. RANo8171 Coquillav.Comelec In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Orasby becomingaU.S.citizenafterenlistingintheU.S.Navyin1965.From thenonanduntilNovember10,2000,whenhereacquiredPhilippine citizenship,petitionerwasanalienwithoutanyrighttoresideinthe Philippines save as ourimmigrationlawsmayhaveallowedhimto stayasavisitororasaresidentalien. InCaasiv.CA,thisCourtruledthatimmigrationtotheUnitedStates byvirtueofa“greencard,”whichentitlesonetoresidepermanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Here, petitioner was repatriated not underR.A.No.2630,butunder R.A.No.8171,whichprovidesfortherepatriationof,amongothers, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. The fact is that, by having been naturalizedabroad,helosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwithithis residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner didnotreacquirehis legalresidenceinthiscountry. Tabasav.CA The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: 1. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriagetoaliens;and 2. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost theirPhilippinecitizenshiponaccountofpoliticalor economicnecessity. Inthecaseatbar,thereisnodisputethatpetitionerwasaFilipinoat birth.In1968,whilehewasstillaminor,hisfatherwasnaturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship.Petitionernowwantsustobelievethathe is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinoswholeftthecountryduetopoliticaloreconomicnecessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor atthetimeofhis "repatriation"onJune13,1996.TheprivilegeunderRA8171belongs tochildrenwhoareofminorageatthetimeofthefilingofthe petitionforrepatriation. Neithercanpetitionerbeanatural-bornFilipinowholeftthecountry due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippinecitizenshipbyoperationoflawandnotduetopolitical oreconomicexigencies. In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisitionActof2003bysimplytakinganoathofallegianceto theRepublicofthePhilippines. F.DualCitizenshipandDualAllegiance Section5.Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenationalinterest andshallbedealtwithbylaw. Mercadov.Manzano Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former ariseswhen,asaresultoftheconcurrentapplicationofthedifferent lawsoftwoormorestates,apersonissimultaneouslyconsidereda national by the said states. Forinstance,suchasituationmayarise whenapersonwhoseparentsarecitizensofastatewhichadheresto the principle of jus sanguinis is born in astatewhichfollowsthe doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntaryactonhispart,isconcurrentlyconsideredacitizenofboth states. Considering thecitizenshipclauseofourConstitution,itispossible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dualcitizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countrieswhichfollowtheprincipleofjussoli; (2) ThoseborninthePhilippinesofFilipinomothersandalien fathersifbythelawsoftheirfathers'countrysuchchildren arecitizensofthatcountry; (3) Thosewhomarryaliensifbythelawsofthelatter'scountry the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dualallegiance,ontheotherhand,referstothesituationinwhicha person simultaneously owes, by some positiveact,loyaltytotwo ormorestates.Whiledualcitizenshipisinvoluntary,dualallegiance istheresultofanindividual'svolition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dualallegianceofcitizensisinimicaltothenational interestandshallbedealtwithbylaw." In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countriesoforiginevenaftertheirnaturalization.Hence,thephrase "dualcitizenship"inR.A.No.7160,§40(d)andinR.A.No.7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenshipdonotfallunder this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore,besubjecttostrictprocesswithrespecttothetermination oftheirstatus,forcandidateswithdualcitizenship,itshouldsuffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippinecitizenshiptoterminatetheirstatusaspersonswith dualcitizenshipconsideringthattheirconditionistheunavoidable consequenceofconflictinglawsofdifferentstates. By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance totheothercountryofwhichtheyare also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.Thatisofnomoment. Torecapitulate,bydeclaringinhiscertificateofcandidacythatheis aFilipinocitizen;thatheisnotapermanentresidentorimmigrantof another country; thathewilldefendandsupporttheConstitutionof thePhilippinesandbeartruefaithandallegiancetheretoandthathe doessowithoutmentalreservation,privaterespondenthas,asfaras the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 25of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Americancitizenshipandanythingwhichhemayhavesaidbeforeas adualcitizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youthandadulthood,receivedhiseducation,practicedhisprofession asanartist,andtakenpartinpastelectionsinthiscountry,leavesno doubtofhiselectionofPhilippinecitizenship. RANo9225ortheCitizenshipRetention andRe-acquisitionActof2003 Nicolas-Lewisv.Comelec There is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "duals"toactuallyestablishresidenceandphysicallystay inthePhilippinesfirstbeforetheycanexercisetheirrighttovote.On the contrary, R.A. 9225, inimplicitacknowledgmentthat'duals'are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same rightofsuffrageasthatgrantedanabsenteevoterunderR.A.9189.It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to GeneralPlenaryPowers The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebythe provisiononinitiativeandreferendum.(Sec1ArtVI) Scopeandlimitations Principleofnon-delegability;exceptions B.ChambersofCongress;composition;qualifications ExpressLimitations Senate HouseofRepresentatives Districtrepresentativesandquestionsofapportionment 1. Sec 26. EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonly onesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof. 2. Sec28(4).Nolawgrantinganytaxexemptionshallbepassed withouttheconcurrenceofamajorityofalltheMembersofthe Congress. 3. Sec 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitutionwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence. 4. Sec 31. No law granting a titleofroyaltyornobilityshallbe enacted. Party-listsystem D.Quorumandvotingmajorities Onitsface,itdoesnotrecognizedualallegiance.Byswearingtothe supremeauthorityoftheRepublic,thepersonimplicitlyrenounces hisforeigncitizenship. Plainly,fromSection3,RANo.9225stayed clearoutoftheproblemofdualallegianceandshiftedtheburdenof confrontingtheissueofwhetherornotthereisdualallegiancetothe concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship wasnotmadeaconcernofRANo.9225. passlawsbutalsothepowertoalterormodifythem.Italsocovers the amendment of existing legislations and that would still be encompassedaslegislativepower. A.Legislativepower who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voterunderordinaryconditions,arequalifiedtovote. The intent of the legislature in drafting RA No. 9225 is todoaway with the provision in CA No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What RA No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizensofaforeigncountry. Legislative power has been defined not only as the power to V.LEGISLATIVEDEPARTMENT C.Legislativeprivileges,inhibitions,anddisqualifications Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violatesSection5,ArticleIVofthe1987Constitution. Scopeandlimitations enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos Calilungv.Datumanong A.Legislativepower Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declarationofapolicy anditisnotaself-executingprovision.Thelegislaturestillhasto enactalawondualallegiance. E.Disciplineofmembers F.Processoflaw-making G.ElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissiononAppointments Nature Fabianv.Desierto Powers Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appealtothisCourtfromdecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscriptioninSection30,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionagainstalaw whichincreasestheAppellatejurisdictionofthisCourt. H.PowersofCongress Legislativeinquiriesandoversightfunctions Non-legislative Informingfunction Prohibitiononpassageofirrepealablelaws Powerofimpeachment CityofDavaov.RTCBrXII-DavaoCity I.InitiativeandReferendum It is a basic precept thatamongtheimpliedsubstantivelimitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeedinglegislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in crafting laws BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 26of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver appropriatetotheoperativemilieu. ItmightbearguedthatSection33ofP.D.No.1146,asamended,does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exemptstatusofGSIS,butmerely imposesconditionsforsuchtovalidlyoccur.Yettheseconditions,if honored, have the precise effectoflimitingthepowersofCongress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws appliesinprohibitingrestraintsonfutureamendatorylaws. Kidav.SenateofthePhilippines Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisionstoRANo.9054violateSection1andSection16(2),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealablelaws? YES.Section1,ArticleXVIIofRANo.9054requiresavoteofnoless than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RANo.9054.Clearly,this2/3votingrequirement ishigherthanwhattheConstitutionrequiresforthepassageofbills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, reviseorrepealthelawsithadpassed. While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators' room for action and flexibility. ProceduralLimitations PhilJudgesAssociationv.Prado Thepurposesoftheo nesubject–onetitler uleare: (1) topreventhodge-podgeor"l og-rolling"legislation; (2) topreventsurpriseorfrauduponthelegislaturebymeans ofprovisionsinbillsofwhichthetitlegivesnointimation, andwhichmightthereforebeoverlookedandcarelesslyand unintentionallyadopted;and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through suchpublicationof legislativeproceedingsasisusuallymade,ofthesubjectof legislation that is being considered, inorderthattheymay have the opportunity of beingheardthereon,bypetitionor otherwise,iftheyshallsodesire. The title of thebillisnotrequiredtobeanindextothebodyofthe act, or tobeascomprehensiveastocovereverysingledetailofthe measure. It has beenheldthatifthetitlefairlyindicatesthegeneral subject,andreasonablycoversalltheprovisionsoftheact,andisnot calculatedtomisleadthelegislatureorthepeople,thereissufficient compliancewiththeconstitutionalrequirement. Whereastatuterepealsaformerlaw,suchrepealistheeffectandnot thesubjectofthestatute;anditisthesubject,nottheeffectofalaw, which is requiredtobebrieflyexpressedinitstitle.Asobservedin one case if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehenditwasneverclaimedthateveryotheractwhichitrepeals oraltersbyimplicationmustbementionedinthetitleofthenewact. AnysuchrulewouldbeneitherwithinthereasonoftheConstitution, norpracticable. Principleofnon-delegability ⭐Twotestsofvaliddelegationin Acostav.Ochoa2019LeonenEnBanc As an exception to the non-delegation of legislative power, Congresshashistoricallydelegatedtothechiefofthepoliceforcethe power to approve or disapproveapplicationsforlicensetopossess or deal with firearms. To validly exercise their quasi-legislative powers,administrativeagenciesmustcomplywithtwo(2)tests: (1) thecompletenesst est;and (2) thesufficientstandardtest. The completeness testrequiresthatthelawtobeimplementedbe complete and should set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. On theotherhand,the sufficient standard test requires that the law to be implemented contain adequate guidelines to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority. To be sufficient, the standard mustspecifythe limitsofthedelegate'sauthority,announcethelegislativepolicy,and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. Furthermore, the Administrative Code requires that administrative agencies file with the University of the Philippines Law Center the rulestheyadopt,whichwillthenbeeffective15daysafterfiling. RANo.10591setsforthasufficientstandardfoundinSection2.It lays down the State policy to "maintain peace and order and protect the people against violence" by providing "a comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture,dealinginandimportationoffirearms,ammunition,or parts thereof." As such, the Chief of the Philippine National Police incorporated provisions in the IRR to regulate the activities of gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders, gunsmithing, competitions, and indentors, which are related to the ownership, possession, and dealinginfirearms. ExceptionsundertheConstitution 1) DelegationtothePresident—Sec23[2].Intimesofwaror other nationalemergency,theCongressmay,bylaw,authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it mayprescribe,toexercisepowersnecessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawnbyresolutionoftheCongress,suchpowers shallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof. Sec 28[2]. TheCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresident to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,andotherdutiesor imposts within the framework of the national development programoftheGovernment. 2) Delegation to the People — Sec 32. TheCongressshall,as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum,andtheexceptionstherefrom,xxxx. 3) Delegation to LGUs — Sec5ArtX.EachLGUshallhavethe powertocreateitsownsourcesofrevenuesandtolevytaxes, fees and charges subjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsas the Congress mayprovide,consistentwiththebasicpolicyof localautonomy.xxxx B.ChambersofCongress Semav.Comelec TheofficeofalegislativedistrictrepresentativetoCongressisa national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 27of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver for aregionallegislativebodyliketheARMMRegionalAssemblyto createanationalofficewhenitslegislativepowersextendonlytoits regionalterritory. Senate Sec2.TheSenateshallbecomposedoftwenty-fourSenatorswho shallbeelectedatlargebythequalifiedvotersofthePhilippines, asmaybeprovidedbylaw. Sec3.N opersonshallbeaSenatorunlessheis 1. anatural-borncitizenofthePhilippinesand, 2. onthedayoftheelection,isa tleast35yearsofage, 3. abletoreadandwrite, 4. aregisteredvoter,and 5. aresidentofthePhilippinesfornotlessthantwoyears immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection. Sec 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shallcommence,unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,atnoononthe thirtiethdayofJunenextfollowingtheirelection.NoSenatorshall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be consideredasaninterruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthe fulltermofwhichhewaselected. HouseofRepresentatives Sec 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representativesunlessheisa 1. natural-borncitizenofthePhilippinesand, 2. onthedayoftheelection,isatleast25y earsofage, 3. abletoreadandwrite,and 4. except the party-list representatives, a registered voterin thedistrictinwhichheshallbeelected,and 5. a resident thereofforaperiodofnotlessthanoneyear immediatelyprecedingthedayoftheelection. Sec 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be electedforatermofthreeyearsxxx.NoMemberoftheHouseof Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.xxxx Districtrepresentativesandquestionsofapportionment AquinoIIIv.Comelec ThereisnospecificprovisionintheConstitutionthatfixesa250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The secondsentenceofSection5(3)ArticleVIsuccinctlyprovides:"Each citywithapopulationofatleasttwohundredfiftythousand,oreach province,shallhaveatleastonerepresentative." The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlementofacitytoadistrictononehand,andtheentitlementofa provincetoadistrictontheother.Forwhileaprovinceisentitledto atleastarepresentative,withnothingmentionedaboutpopulation,a citymustfirstmeetapopulationminimumof250,000inordertobe similarlyentitled. Plainlyread,Section5(3)requiresa250,000minimumpopulation onlyforacitytobeentitledtoarepresentative,butnotsofora province. Ourrulingisthatpopulationisnottheonlyfactorbutisjustone of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Aldabav.ComelecResolution The constitutionality of a legislativeapportionmentactisajudicial question,andnotonewhichthecourtcannotconsiderontheground thatitisapoliticalquestion. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI on the population requirement, thecreationbyRA9591ofalegislative district for Malolos City, carvingthecityfromtheformerFirst LegislativeDistrict,leavesthetownofBulacanisolatedfromthe restofthegeographicmassofthatdistrict.Thiscontravenesthe requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislativedistrict shall"comprise,asfaraspracticable,contiguous,compact,and adjacentterritory." Bagabuyov.Comelec The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the CityofCagayandeOroasanLGU,anddoesnotmerelyprovidefor theCity'slegislativeapportionment. Legislative apportionment is defined as the determination of the numberofrepresentativeswhichaState,countyorothersubdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and votingpower amongthedistricts. Reapportionment,ontheotherhand,istherealignmentorchange in legislative districts brought about by changes inpopulationand mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. ApronounceddistinctionbetweenArticleVI,Section5and,ArticleX, Section10isontherequirementofaplebiscite. TheConstitution and theLGCexpresslyrequireaplebiscitetocarryoutanycreation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of anLGU. In contrast,noplebisciterequirementexistsundertheapportionment orreapportionmentprovision. ThelegislativedistrictthatArticleVI,Section5speaksofmay,ina sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election ofamemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandmembers of the local legislative body. It is NOT, however, a political subdivisionthroughwhichfunctionsofgovernmentarecarriedout. Itcanmoreappropriatelybedescribedasarepresentativeunitthat may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike thelatter,itisNOTacorporateunit. Notbeingacorporate unit,adistrictdoesnotactforandinbehalfofthepeoplecomprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people whowillchoosearepresentativeintheirnationalaffairs. Alegislativeapportionmentdoesnotmean,anddoesnotevenimply, adivisionofanLGUwheretheapportionmenttakesplace. Thus,the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 28of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver plebisciterequirementthatappliestothedivisionofaprovince,city, municipalityorbarangayundertheLGCshouldnotapplytoandbea requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment. Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifyingofficer. Equalityofrepresentation. Third,intercensalpopulationprojectionsmustbeasofthemiddle ofeveryyear. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same questioninHerrerav.COMELEC.TheConstitutiondoesnotrequire mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gaugingequalityofrepresentation. Mariano,Jr.v.Comelec Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion astoits boundaries.Saiddelineationdidnotchangeevenbyaninchtheland areapreviouslycoveredbyMakatiasamunicipality.Section2stated thatthecity'slandarea“shallcomprisethepresentterritoryofthe municipality.” Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stoodat450K,itslegislativedistrictmaystillbeincreasedsinceit hasmettheminimumpopulationrequirementof250K.Infact, Section3oftheOrdinanceappendedtotheConstitutionprovidesthat a city whose population has increased to more than 250K shallbe entitledtoa tleastonecongressionalrepresentative. Aldabav.ComelecDecision Intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year.Inanyevent,acitywhosepopulationhasincreasedto250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately followingelection"aftertheattainmentofthe250,000population. First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National StatisticsCoordinationBoard(NSCB). Party-listsystem ➔ Shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives includingthoseunderthepartylist. VeteransFederationPartyv.COMELEC2000 RA No. 7941 mandates at least four inviolable parameters. Theseare: 1. 2. First, the twenty percent allocation — Section 5 (2), ArticleVIisnotmandatory.Itmerelyprovidesaceilingfor party-listseatsinCongress. BantayRA7941v.Comelec2007 Comelechasaconstitutionaldutytodiscloseandreleasethenames of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelecfromdisclosingorevenpublishingthroughmediumsother thanthe"CertifiedList"thenamesoftheparty-listnominees. CIBACv.Comelec2007 Indeterminingthenumberofadditionalseatsforeachparty-listthat has met the 2% threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstonetoascertainentitlementtoextraseats.S eeBANAT AngBagongBayaniv.Comelec2001 1. Second, the two percent threshold — as qualified by BANAT 3. Third,t hethree-seatlimit; 4. Fourth,p roportionalrepresentation. Inotherwords,itmustshow—throughitsconstitution,articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and trackrecord—thatitrepresentsandseekstoupliftmarginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The formula, therefore, forcomputingthenumberofseatstowhich thefirstpartyisentitledisasfollows: N umber of votes of f irst party T otal votes f or party −list system = P roportion of votes of 1st party Iftheproportionis ● Atleast6%,2additionalseats; ● Atleast4%butlessthan6%,1additionalseat; ● Lessthan4%,NOadditionalseat. The next step is tosolveforthenumberofadditionalseatsthatthe other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. Addt′l seat = N o. of votes of party N o. of votes of f irst party × N o. of additional seats of 1st party The political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identifiedinSection5ofRA7941. 2. Major political parties must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalizedandunderrepresentedsectorsxxxtobeelectedto theHouseofRepresentatives.” 3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. 4. DisqualificationsunderSec6ofRA7941: ➔ It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or associationorganizedforreligiouspurposes; ➔ Itadvocatesviolenceorunlawfulmeanstoseekitsgoal; ➔ Itisaforeignp artyororganization; BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 29of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ➔ It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitionsreceivingatleast two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list systemshallbeentitledtoo neguaranteedseate ach. ➔ Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization oneseat. 3. Thosegarneringsufficientnumberofvotes,accordingtothe ranking, shall be entitledtoadditionalseatsinproportion to their total number of votes until alltheadditionalseats areallocated. ➔ The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocationoftheguaranteedseats,shallbedistributedtothe party-list organizations including those that received less thantwopercentofthetotalvotes. 4. Eachparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbeentitledtonot morethanthree(3)seats. The continued operation ofthetwopercentthresholdasit applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-listseats. ➔ Itviolatesorfailstocomplywithlaws,rulesorregulations relatingtoelections; ➔ Itdeclaresu ntruthfulstatementsinitspetition; ➔ Ithasceasedtoexistforatleastone(1)year;or ➔ It fails toparticipateinthelasttwo(2)precedingelections or fails to obtain at leasttwopercentum(2%)ofthevotes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding electionsfortheconstituencyinwhichithasregistered. 5. The party or organization must NOT be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. 6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law;itsnomineesmustlikewisedoso. 7. 8. Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. Whilelackingawell-definedpoliticalconstituency,thenominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislationthatwillbenefitthenation asawhole. BANATv.Comelec2009Decision In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 ofR.A.No.7941,thefollowingprocedureshallbe observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked fromthehighesttothelowestbasedonthenumberofvotes theygarneredduringtheelections. Therearet wostepsinthesecondroundofseatallocation. First, the percentage is multipliedbytheremainingavailableseats, which is the difference betweenthemaximumseatsreservedunder theParty-ListSystemandtheguaranteedseatsofthetwo-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remainingavailableseats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of thepartiesnextin ranku ntilallavailableseatsarecompletelydistributed. BANATv.Comelec2009Resolution The additional seats shall be distributedtothepartiesina secondroundofseatallocation. ➔ Thethree-seatcapisconstitutional. PhilGuardiansBrotherhoodv.Comelec2010 The COMELECmaymotupropriooruponverifiedcomplaintofany interestedparty,removeorcancel,afterduenoticeandhearing,the registrationofanynational,regionalorsectoralparty,organizationor coalitionifit: (a) failstoparticipateinthelasttwo(2)precedingelections;or Thereisnoneedforlegislationtocreateanadditionalparty-listseat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically createssuchadditionalparty-listseats. The filling-up ofallavailableparty-listseatsisnotmandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participantsintheparty-listelection. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system: ➔ Twenty percent ofthetotalnumberofthemembershipof the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seatsavailabletoparty-listorganizations,suchthatthereis automatically one party-list seatforeveryfourexisting legislativedistricts. (b) fails toqualifyforaseatinthetwoprecedingelections fortheconstituencyinwhichitregistered. AtongPaglaumv.Comelec2013 1. Threedifferentgroupsmayparticipateintheparty-listsystem: a. nationalpartiesororganizations, b. regionalpartiesororganizations,and c. sectoralpartiesororganizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not needtoorganizealongsectorallinesand do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”sector. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 30of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 3. Politicalpartiescanparticipateinparty-listelectionsprovided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidatesinlegislativedistrictelections. A politicalparty,whethermajorornot,thatfieldscandidatesin legislativedistrictelectionscanparticipateinparty-listelections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wingisbyitselfan independent sectoral party, andislinkedtoapoliticalparty throughacoalition. 4. Sectoralpartiesororganizationsmayeitherbe a. “marginalizedandunderrepresented”or b. lackingin“well-definedpoliticalconstituencies.” Itisenoughthattheirprincipaladvocacypertainstothespecial interestandconcernsoftheirsector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” includeprofessionals,theelderly,women,andtheyouth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Same rule applies to sectorsthatlack“well-definedpoliticalconstituencies.” Thenomineesofsectoralpartiesororganizationseither a. mustbelongt otheirrespectivesectors,or b. must have a track record of advocacy for their respectivesectors. The nominees of national and regionalpartiesororganizations mustbebona-fidem embersofsuchpartiesororganizations. 6. National,regional,andsectoralpartiesororganizationsshallnot be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. C.Legislativeprivileges,inhibitions, anddisqualifications Privileges the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress was not in session, and defendant caused saidlettertobe publishedinseveralnewspapersofgeneralcirculation.Itisobvious that, in thus causingthecommunicationtobesopublished,hewas notperforminghisofficialduty,eitherasamemberofCongressor asofficerofanyCommitteethereof.Hence,saidcommunicationis notabsolutelyprivileged. TrillanesIVv.Pimentel,Sr. Freedomf romArrest Sect 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,beprivilegedfromarrestwhiletheCongressisin session. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has neverbeenanexcusetofreeapersonvalidlyinprison. Thedutiesimposedbythe"mandateofthepeople"aremultifarious. Never has the call of a particular dutyliftedaprisonerintoa different classification from those others who are validly restrainedbylaw. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other placeforanyspeechordebateintheCongressorinanycommittee thereof. Pobrev.Santiago TrillanesIVv.Castillo-Marigomen2018 The questioned statements in this case were admittedly made in response to queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings, thus, beyond the purview of privilegedspeechordebateunderSection11,ArticleVI An action for damages on account of defamatory statements not constituting protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a controversywellwithinthecourts'authoritytosettle. In fine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary non­accountability to insulate his statements, uttered outside the "sphereoflegislativeactivity,"fromjudicialreview. PrivilegeofSpeechandDebate Jimenezv.Cabangbang The determination of whether the publication in question is a privileged communication depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speechordebatetherein"—thatistosay,inCongress—usedin thisprovision. The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According tothecomplaintherein,itwasanopenletterto Courts do not interfere withthelegislatureoritsmembersin themannertheyperformtheirfunctionsinthelegislativefloor orincommitteerooms.Anyclaimofanunworthypurposeorofthe falsityandmalafidesofthestatementutteredbythememberofthe Congressdoesnotdestroytheprivilege.Thedisciplinaryauthorityof theassemblyandthevoters,notthecourts,canproperlydiscourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. Fortheabovereasons,thepleaofSenatorSantiagoforthedismissal ofthecomplaintfordisbarmentordisciplinaryactioniswelltaken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinaryproceedingundertheRulesofCourt. RestrictionsandProhibitions Sec 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosureoftheirfinancialandbusinessinterests. They shall notify the House concerned of apotentialconflictof interestthatmayarisefromthefilingofaproposedlegislationof whichtheyareauthors. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 31of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Sec13.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmay hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,includingGOCCsor their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. (Incompatibleoffice) Neither shall hebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeen created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for whichhewaselected.(F orbiddenoffice) Sec20.TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbe preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the COA which shall publish annuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesforeach Member. Adazav.Pacana,Jr. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the governmentduringhistenureisclearandunambiguous. In the case at bar, there is noquestionthatpetitionerhastakenhis oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutionalprovision,thisfactoperatedtovacatehisformerpost and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to dischargeitsfunctions. Libanv.Gordon Notbeingagovernmentofficialoremployee,thePNRCChairman,as such,doesnotholdagovernmentofficeoremployment.Weholdthat the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an officeinaGOCCforpurposesoftheprohibitioninSection13,Article VIofthe1987Constitution. Appearanceascounsel Sec14.NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmay personally appear as counsel before anycourtofjusticeorbefore the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and otheradministrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,beinterestedfinanciallyin any contract with, or in any franchiseorspecialprivilegegranted by theGovernment,oranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentality thereof, including any GOCC, or its subsidiary, during histermof office.Heshallnotinterveneinanymatterbeforeanyofficeofthe Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upontoactonaccountofhisoffice. Puyatv.deGuzman Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Inter­vention, Assemblyman Fernandezcannotbesaidtobeappearingascounsel. Ostensibly,he isnotappearingonbehalfofanother,althoughheisjoiningthecause oftheprivaterespondents. Evenamajorityofallthemembersconstitute"theHouse". There is a difference between amajorityof"allthemembersofthe House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number thanthefirst.Thereforeanabsolutemajority(12)ofallthe members of the Senate less one (23), constitutestheconstitutional majorityoftheSenateforthepurposeofaquorum.Mr.JusticePablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubtQuorumthen,andSenatorCuencowouldhavebeenelectedjust thesameinasmuchastherewouldbeelevenforCuenco,oneagainst andoneabstained. Votingseparately 1. Weareconstrainedtofindthattherehasbeenanindirect"appearance as counselbeforexxxanadministrativebody"and,inouropinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"wasanafterthoughttoenablehimtoappearactivelyin theproceedingsinsomeothercapacity. Arulingupholdingthe"intervention"wouldmaketheconstitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, ifhewantsto influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participationinthe"interest"oftheclientandthen"intervene"inthe proceedings. ThatwhichtheConstitutiondirect­lyprohibitsmay not be donebyindirectionorbyagenerallegislativeactwhichis intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. D.Quorumandvotingmajorities Sec 16(2). A majorityofeachHouseshallconstituteaquorumto do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day andmaycompeltheattendanceofabsentMembersinsuchmanner, andundersuchpenalties,assuchHousemayprovide. Sec11(4).IftheCongress,withintendaysafterreceiptofthe lastwrittendeclaration,or,ifnotinsession,withintwelvedays after it is required to assemble,determinesbyatwo-thirds vote ofbothHouses,votingseparately,thatthePresidentis unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;otherwise,thePresident shallcontinueexercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. 2. Sec 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate andtheHouseofRepresentativeswho shall assume office upon confirmationbyamajorityvoteof ALL the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. Votingjointly 1. ArtVIISec18.xxxxTheCongress,votingjointly,byavoteof at least a majority of ALL its Members in regular orspecial session, may revoke suchproclamationorsuspension,which revocationshallnotbesetasidebythePresident.xxxx Avelinov.Cuenco WhentheConstitutiondeclaresthatamajorityof"eachHouse"shall constitute a quorum,"theHouse"doesnotmean"all"themembers. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 32of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver E.Disciplineofmembers Sec 16(3). Each House may xxxx punish its Members for F.Processoflaw-making enactmentshallbelimitedinitsoperationtotheappropriation towhichitrelates. SubjectandTitle A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which itisintended,andshallbesupportedbyfundsactually availableascertifiedbytheNationalTreasurer,ortoberaised byacorrespondingrevenueproposaltherein. disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirdsof Section 26. EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyone ALLitsMembers,suspendorexpelaMember. subjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthetitlethereof.xxxx A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. DelaCruzv.Paras Alejandrinov.Quezon Nocourthaseverheldandweapprehendnocourtwilleverholdthat itpossessesthepowertodirecttheChiefExecutiveortheLegislature orabranchthereoftotakeanyparticularaction. Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its membersfordisorderlybehaviordoesnotauthorizeittosuspendan appointivememberfromtheexerciseofhisofficeforoneyear. Osmenav.Pendatun TheHouseisthejudgeofwhatconstitutesdisorderlybehaviour,not onlybecausetheConstitutionhasconferredjurisdictionuponit,but alsobecausethematterdependsmainlyonfactualcircumstancesof whichtheHouseknowsbestbutwhichcannotbedepictedinblack andwhiteforpresentationto,andadjudicationbytheCourts.Forone thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeñ a'sconductconstituteddisorderlybehaviour,itwouldthereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intendedtoconferuponacoordinatebranchoftheGovernment. Thetitlewasnotinanywayaltered.Itwasnotchangedonewhit.The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of nightclubswouldgive rise to aconstitutionalquestion.TheConstitutionmandates:"Every bill shall embrace only onesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthe titlethereof."Sincethereisnodisputeasthetitlelimitsthepowerto regulating,notprohibiting,itwouldresultinthestatutebeinginvalid if,aswasdonebytheMunicipalityofBocaue,theoperationofanight clubwasprohibited. Astospecificlaws 1. Art VII Sec 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, withinthirtydaysfromtheopeningofeveryregularsessionas the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts fromexistingandproposedrevenuemeasures. 2. Art VI Sec 24. All appropriation, revenue ortariffbills,bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in theHouseofRepresentatives,buttheSenatemayproposeor concurwithamendments. Santiagov.Sandiganbayan The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspensionofanincumbentpublicofficialchargedwithviolationof the provisions of RA No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. RA No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeingtheassailedpreventivesuspensionorder. 3. Sec 25. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Governmentasspecifiedinthebudget.Theform,content,and mannerofpreparationofthebudgetshallbeprescribedbylaw. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, thePresidentofthe Senate, the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives,theChief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads ofConstitutional Commissionsmay,bylaw,beauthorizedtoaugmentanyitem in the general appropriations law for their respective offices froms avingsi notheritemsoftheirrespectiveappropriations. Discretionaryfundsappropriatedforparticularofficialsshall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriatevouchersandsubjecttosuchguidelinesasmaybe prescribedbylaw. If,bytheendofanyfiscalyear,theCongressshallhavefailedto passthegeneralappropriationsbillfortheensuingfiscalyear, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. Tolentinov.SOF It is not the law – but the revenue bill – whichisrequiredbythe Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating intheHousemayundergosuchextensivechangesinthe Senatethattheresultmaybearewritingofthewhole. Toinsistthatarevenuestatute–andnotonlythebillwhichinitiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially be the same as theHousebillwouldbetodeny theSenate'spowernotonlyto"concurwithamendments"butalsoto "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislativepowerofthetwohousesofCongressandinfactmakethe HousesuperiortotheSenate. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 33of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,solongasactionbytheSenateasabodyiswithheldpending receiptoftheHousebill. Demetriav.Alba The prohibition totransferanappropriationforoneitemtoanother was explicit and categorical underthe1973Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branchesofthegovernmentand those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, theconstitutionallowedthe enactment ofalawauthorizingthetransferoffundsforthepurpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leewaygrantedwasthuslimited. Thepurposeand conditionsforwhichfundsmaybetransferredwerespecified,i.e. 1. 2. changesintheVATsystem. Toreiterate,thesectionsintroducedbytheSenatearegermanetothe subject matter and purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our country’s fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senateactedwithinitspowertoproposethoseamendments. LawyersAgainstMonopolyandPoverty(LAMP)v.Secretaryof BudgetandManagement transfer may be allowed for the purpose ofaugmenting anitemand In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, didtheimplementationofthePDAFprovisionundertheGAAof2004 violatetheConstitutionorthelaws?NO.Absentaclearshowingthat an offense to the principle of separationofpowerswascommitted, much less toleratedbyboththeLegislativeandExecutive,theCourt isconstrainedtoholdthatalawfulandregulargovernmentbudgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughouttheimplementationoftheGAAof2004. such transfermaybemadeonlyiftherearesavingsfrom anotheritemintheappropriationofthegovernmentbranch orconstitutionalbody. Please see full text for detailed discussion on government budgeting and appropriation process citing Guingona v. Carague,thatmainlyinvolvesthesephases: AbakadaGurov.Ermita Sincethereisnoquestionthattherevenuebillexclusivelyoriginated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporateincometaxes,percentage,exciseandfranchisetaxes.Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on theextentoftheamendmentsthatmay beintroducedbytheSenatetotheHouserevenuebill. As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of corporationsaregermanetothepurposeofthehousebillswhichis toraiserevenuesforthegovernment. Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to otherpercentage andexcisetaxesgermanetothereformstotheVATsystem,asthese sectionswouldcushiontheeffectsofVATonconsumers. TheothersectionsamendedbytheSenatepertainedtomattersoftax administration which are necessary for the implementation of the 1. Budgetpreparation; 2. Legislativeauthorization; 3. Budgetexecution;and 4. Budgetaccountability. Araullov.AquinoIII Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedlyimplementingtheDAPviolateSec.25(5),Art.VI ofthe1987Constitutioninsofaras: Unreleasedappropriationsandwithdrawnunobligated allotmentsundertheDAPwerenotsavings,andtheuseofsuch appropriationscontravenedSection25(5),ArticleVI Section 25(5)shouldbeinterpretedinthecontextofalimitationon the President’s discretionovertheappropriationsduringtheBudget ExecutionPhase. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5) must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,namely: (1) ThereisalawauthorizingthePresident,thePresidentofthe Senate, the Speaker, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respectiveoffices; (2) The funds to betransferredaresavingsgeneratedfromthe appropriationsfortheirrespectiveoffices;and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the generalappropriationslawfortheirrespectiveoffices. Section25(5)notbeingaself-executingprovisionoftheConstitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA ofagivenfiscalyear.Tocomplywiththefirst requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds. Inascertainingthemeaningofsavings,certainprinciplesshouldbe borneinmind. 1. Congresswieldsthepowerofthepurse; 2. The Executive is expected tofaithfullyexecutetheGAAand tospendthebudgetinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthe GAA; 3. InmakingthePresident’spowertoaugmentoperativeunder the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution.Insodoing,Congressdiminishesitsown powerofthepurse,foritdelegatesafractionofitspowerto theExecutive;and 4. Savingsshouldbea ctual. (a) They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as “savings”asthetermisusedinSec25(5); (b) They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department;and (c) They“augment”discretionarylumpsumappropriationsin theGAAs. The power to augmentwastobeusedonlywhenthepurposefor which the funds had been allocated werealreadysatisfied,or the needforsuchfundshadceasedtoexist,foronlythencould savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 34of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver ExecutivefromundulytransgressingCongress’powerofthepurse. According to Philconsa v. Enriquez, impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, tospendfundsmade available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authorityofanytype. The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmentedmustbedeficient. Weconcludethatthe“savings”pooled undertheDAPwereallocatedtoPAPsthatwerenotcoveredbyany appropriationsinthepertinentGAAs. ItisthePresidentwhoproposesthebudgetbutitisCongressthathas the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriationi nvolvestwogoverningprinciples,namely: (1) a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the governmentarepublicfunds;and (2) a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization. OnCross-borderaugmentations Section25(5)hasdelineatedbordersbetweentheiroffices,suchthat funds appropriated for one officeareprohibitedfromcrossingover toanotherofficeevenintheguiseofaugmentationofadeficientitem or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers orcross-borderaugmentations.Cross-bordertransfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5). Porkbarrelsystem Belgicav.Ochoa The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collectivebodyof rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionaryfunds,primarilyintendedforlocalprojects,areutilized throughtherespectiveparticipationsoftheLegislativeandExecutive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel Systeminvolvestwo(2)kindsoflump-sumdiscretionaryfunds: 1. TheCongressionalPorkBarrelwhichishereindefinedas akindoflump-sum,discretionaryfundwhereinlegislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,areabletoeffectivelycontrolcertainaspectsof the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measuresand/orpractices. 2. ThePresidentialPorkBarrelwhichishereindefinedasa kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the Presidenttodeterminethemannerofitsutilization. The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins.Soasnottoblurtheconstitutionalboundariesbetweenthem, Congressmust"notconcernitselfwithdetailsforimplementationby theExecutive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that from the moment the law becomeseffective,anyprovisionoflawthatempowersCongress oranyofitsmemberstoplayanyroleintheimplementationor enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powersandisthusunconstitutional. TheCourtmustthereforeabandonitsrulinginPhilconsawhich sanctionedtheconductoflegislatoridentificationontheguise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘relianceonthesamefaltersaltogether. TheCourtherebydeclaresthe2013PDAFArticleaswellasallother provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight,as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through whichlegislatorshaveeffectivelyintrudedintotheproperphasesof budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accordedthesameunconstitutionaltreatment. Procedureforpassageofbills Sec 26[2]. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, andprinted copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members threedaysbeforeitspassage,exceptwhenthePresident certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a publiccalamityoremergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,andthevotethereonshallbetakenimmediatelythereafter, andtheyeasandnaysenteredintheJournal. Tolentinov.SOF The presidential certificationdispensedwiththerequirementnot onlyofprintingbutalsothatofreadingthebillonseparatedays.The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediateenactment,etc."inArtVI,§26(2)qualifiesthetwostated conditionsbeforeabillcanbecomealaw: (1) thebillhaspassedthreereadingsonseparatedaysand (2) ithasbeenprintedinitsfinalformanddistributedthree daysbeforeitisfinallyapproved. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispensesonlywiththerequirementfortheprintingof thebillanditsdistributionthreedaysbeforeitspassagebutnotwith therequirementofthreereadingsonseparatedays,also. ArtVI§26(2)must,therefore,beconstruedasreferringonlytobills introducedforthefirsttimeineitherhouseofCongress,notto theconferencecommitteereport. G.ElectoralTribunalsandtheCommissionon Appointments NatureofElectoralTribunals 1. SoleJudge.Notsubjecttoappeal.Mayonlybequestionedvia CertioraripetitiontotheSC.Itsexerciseofpowerisintendedto beitsown—full,completeandunimpaired. 2. Contests. May only be filed by one who seekstoreplacethe protestee. 3. Members.Electoraltribunalacquiresjurisdictionupontaking of oath and assumption of office of the proclaimed winner. Priortoassumption,COMELEChasjurisdiction. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 35of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Composition Tanadav.Cuenco Wehold 1. That the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; 2. that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senatemaynominatenotmorethanthree(3)members; 3. that the partyhavingthesecondlargestnumberofvotesin theSenatehastheexclusiverighttonominatetheotherthree (3)members; 4. 5. that neither these three (3) Senators,noranyofthem,may benominatedbyapersonorpartyotherthantheonehaving the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representativetherein; that the Committee onRulesfortheSenatehasnostanding tovalidlymakesuchnomination. Powers Dueñas,Jr.v.HRET SolongastheConstitutiongrantstheHRETthepowertobethesole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualificationsofmembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives,anyfinal actiontakenbytheHRETonamatterwithinitsjurisdictionshall,as arule,notbereviewedbythisCourt. Itishornbookdoctrinethatjurisdiction,onceacquired,isnotlostat theinstanceofthepartiesbutcontinuesuntilthecaseisterminated. Thus,inRoblesv.HRET,theCourtruled: The mere filing ofthemotiontowithdrawprotestontheremaining uncontested precincts, withoutanyactiononthepartofrespondent tribunal,doesnotbyitselfdivestthetribunalofitsjurisdictionover thecase.Jurisdiction,onceacquired,isnotlostupontheinstanceof thepartiesbutcontinuesuntilthecaseisterminated. Barbersv.Comelec Theword“sole”inSection17,ArticleVIandRule12oftheRevised RulesoftheSETunderscorestheexclusivityoftheSET’sjurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categoricalandcomplete. Itis therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instantpetition. SinceBarberscontestsBiazon’sproclamationasthe 12th winningsenatorialcandidate,itistheSETwhichhasexclusive jurisdictiontoactonBarbers’complaint. In Pangilinan v. Comelec, we ruled that “where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressionalelections,the remedyofpetitioneristofileanelectoralprotestwiththeElectoral TribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives.” Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an availableandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseof lawtoannultheCOMELEC’sassailedproceedings. MemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,theCOMELEC’sjurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualificationsends,andtheHRET’sownjurisdictionbegins. From the f oregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrenceofthefollowingrequisites: (1) avalidproclamation, (2) aproperoath,and (3) assumptionofoffice. Here, thepetitionercannotbeconsideredaMemberoftheHouseof Representativesbecause,primarily,shehasnotyetassumedoffice. Beforethereisavalidorofficialt akingoftheoathitmustbemade (1) beforetheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,and Limkaichongv.Comelec;Biraogov.Nograles;Parasv.Nograles; Villandov.Comelec Once a winning candidatehasbeenproclaimed,takenhisoath, and assumed office as a Member of the HouseofRepresentatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunalofitsjurisdiction. Reyesv.Comelec2013 Contrary to petitioner’s claim the COMELEC retains jurisdictionfor thefollowingreasons: First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitionerhasnotaverredthatshehasfiledsuchaction. Second,thejurisdictionoftheHRETbeginsonlyafterthecandidate isconsideredaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,asstatedin Section17,ArticleVI. In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrerov.COMELEC,theCourtruledthatonceawinningcandidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a (2) inopensession. Here, although she made theoathbeforeSpeakerBelmonte,thereis noindicationthatitwasmadeduringplenaryorinopensessionand, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeedcompliedwith. CommissiononAppointments Guingona,Jr.v.Gonzales It has been established that the legality of filling up the membership of the Commission on Appointments is a justiciableissueandnotapoliticalquestion. Wedonotagreewithrespondents'claimthatitismandatorytoelect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments. TheConstitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarilyincludetwelve(12)senatorsandtwelve(12)membersof the House ofRepresentatives.WhattheConstitutionrequiresisthat therebea tleastamajorityoftheentiremembership. The election of Senator Romulo and SenatorTañ adaasmembersof theCommissiononAppointmentsbytheLDPmajorityintheSenate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nominationandelectionbytheLDPmajorityby sheer force of superiority in numbers was done in grave abuse of discretion. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 36of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Cosetengv.Mitra A political party musthaveatleasttwosenatorsintheSenateto beabletohavearepresentativeintheCommissiononAppointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membershipintheCommissiononAppointments. Dazav.Singson The legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution is justiciable,and,evenifthequestionwerepoliticalinnature,itwould still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessorlackofjurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. The contention of the petitioner is thathecannotberemovedfrom the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanentunderthedoctrineannouncedinC unananv.Tan. We resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointmentstoreflectatanytimethechangesthatmaytranspirein the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanentanddonotincludethetemporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance ofpolitical loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shiftsofallegiance fromonepoliticalpartytoanother. JudicialReview Cov.HRET The Court does not venture into theperilousareaoftryingto correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it hastovindicateadenialof dueprocessorcorrectanabuseofdiscretionsograveorglaringthat nolessthantheConstitutioncallsforremedialaction. In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar, the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyondjudicialinterference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvidentuseofpoweraswillconstituteadenialofdueprocess. Thedegreeofjudicialinterventionshouldnotbemadetodependon how many legislative members oftheHRETbelongtothispartyor that party. The testremainsthesame—manifestgraveabuseof discretion. Pimentelv.HRET TheConstitutionexpresslygrantstotheHouseofRepresentativesthe prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupytheseatsallottedtotheHouseintheHRETandtheCA. Section 18, Article VI explicitly confers on the Senate and on the Housetheauthoritytoelectamongtheirmembersthosewhowould fillthe12seatsforSenatorsand12seatsforHousemembersinthe CommissiononAppointments. Under Section17,ArticleVIeachchamberofCongressexercisesthe powertochoose,withinconstitutionallydefinedlimits,whoamong theirmemberswouldoccupytheallotted6seatsofeachchamber’s respectivee lectoraltribunal. Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficientnumberandhaveagreedtodesignatecommonnomineesto the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearlyrestswiththe HouseofRepresentativesandnotwiththisCourt.UnderSections17 and 18, Article VI, party-list representatives must first show tothe House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.OnlyiftheHousefailsto comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation ofpoliticalpartiesintheHRETandtheCAcanthe party-listrepresentativesseekrecoursetothisCourtunderitspower ofjudicialreview.Underthedoctrineofprimaryjurisdiction,prior recourse totheHouseisnecessarybeforepetitionersmaybringthe instantcasetothecourt.Consequently,petitioners’directrecourseto thisCourtispremature. ThediscretionoftheHousetochooseitsmemberstotheHRETand the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutionalruleonproportionalrepresentation. MartinezIIIv.HRET Whatneedstobestressedatthispointistheapparentfailureofthe HRETtogiveweighttorelevantcircumstancesthatmakethewillof the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretioninaffirmingthe proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth LegislativeDistrictofCebudespitethe final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor ofpetitionerandnotnullifiedasstrayvotes,afterconsidering allrelevantcircumstancesclearlyestablishingthatsuchvotescould nothavebeenintendedfor"EdilitoC.Martinez"whowasdeclareda nuisancecandidateinafinaljudgment. Sarmientov.Mison It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the Presidentshallappoint. Thesefour(4)groupsare: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, otherpublicministersandconsuls,officersofthearmedforcesfrom the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw; Third, those whom the President may be authorizedbylawto appoint; Fourth,officerslowerinrankwhoseappointmentstheCongress maybylawvestinthePresidentalone. Thefirstgroupofofficersisclearlyappointedwiththeconsent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second,thirdandfourthgroupsofofficersarethepresentbone of contention. By following the acceptedruleinconstitutionaland statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointmentstopositionsexpresslystatedinthefirstgrouprequire theconsent(confirmation)oftheCommissiononAppointments. Here,itisevidentthatthepositionofCommissioneroftheBureauof BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 37of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Customs(abureauhead)isnotoneofthosewithinthefirstgroupof appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointmentsisrequired. H.PowersofCongress Legislativeinquiriesandoversightfunctions QuestionHour Sec 22. The heads ofdepartmentsmay,upontheirowninitiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House,astherulesofeachHouseshallprovide,appearbeforeand be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. WrittenquestionsshallbesubmittedtothePresidentoftheSenate or the Speaker of the House ofRepresentativesatleastthreedays before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limitedtowrittenquestions,butmaycovermattersrelatedthereto. WhenthesecurityoftheStateorthepublicinterestsorequiresand the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conductedinexecutivesession. ⭐SenateofthePhilippinesv.Ermita Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. The required priorconsentunderSection1isgroundedonArticleVI,Section22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. Section22whichprovidesforthequestionhourmustbeinterpreted vis-á-visSection21whichprovidesforthepowerofeitherHouseof Congress to"conductinquiriesinaidoflegislation."Adistinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementarytoeachother,shouldnotbeconsideredaspertaining tothesamepowerofCongress.Onespecificallyrelatestothepower toconductinquiriesinaidoflegislation,theaimofwhichistoelicit informationthatmaybeusedforlegislation,whiletheotherpertains tothepowertoconductaquestionhour,theobjectiveofwhichisto obtaininformationi npursuitofCongress'oversightfunction. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuitoflegislation. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt bythemerefactthatthey are department heads. Only one executiveofficialmaybeexempted fromthispower—thePresidentonwhomexecutivepowerisvested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries inaidoflegislation.Congressisnotboundin suchinstancestorespecttherefusalofthedepartmentheadtoappear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made,eitherbythePresidentherselforbytheExecutiveSecretary. LegislativeInvestigations Section 21. The Senate or theHouseofRepresentativesoranyof its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rightsofpersonsappearingin,oraffectedby,such inquiriesshallberespected. Bengzonv.SenateBlueRibbonCommittee ThepowerofbothhousesofCongresstoconductinquiriesinaidof legislationisnot,therefore,absoluteorunlimited. Theinvestigation mustbe a) in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rulesofprocedureand b) that the rights of persons appearing in or affected bysuch inquiriesshallberespected. ItfollowsthenthattherightsofpersonsundertheBillofRightsmust berespected,includingtherighttodueprocessandtherightnottobe compelledtotestifyagainstone'sself. ThecontemplatedinquirybyrespondentCommitteeisnotreally"in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purposewithinthe juris­dictionofCongress,sincetheaimoftheinvestigationistofind outwhetherornottherelativesofthePresidentorMr.RicardoLopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct",amatterthatappearsmorewithintheprovinceofthe courtsratherthanofthelegislature. NegrosOrientalIIElectricCoopv.SPofDumaguete Theexercisebythelegislatureofthecontemptpowerisamatterof self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. Thecontemptpowerof the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, andlocallegislativebodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the nationallegislaturedoes. Thepowerattachesnottothedischargeof legislative functions per se but tothecharacterofthelegislatureas oneofthethreeindependentandcoordinatebranchesofgovernment. The same thing cannot besaidoflocallegislativebodieswhichare creationsoflaw. Arnaultv.Nazareno The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body makingit,mustbematerialornecessarytotheexerciseofapowerin it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before eitherHouse,unlesshistestimonyisrequiredinamatterintowhich thatHousehasjurisdictiontoinquire. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdictionofalegislativebodytomake,wethinktheinvestigating committeehasthepowertorequireawitnesstoansweranyquestion pertinenttothatinquiry,subjectofcoursetohisconstitutionalright againstself-incrimination. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obediencetoitsprocessmaybeenforcedbythecommitteeby imprisonment SenateBlueRibbonCommitteev.Majaducon BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 38of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondentFlavianotoappearandtestifybeforeitinconnectionwith its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiriesinaidoflegislation. Intheinstantcase,nocourthadacquiredjurisdictionoverthematter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the legislatureintothe exclusive jurisdiction of another branch of thegovernment.Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss the petitionforprohibitionamountedtograveabuseofdiscretion. IntheMatterofthePetitionforIssuanceofWritofHabeasCorpus ofCamiloSabio The1987Constitutionrecognizesthepowerofinvestigation,notjust ofCongress,butalsoof"anyofitscommittees." Thisissignificant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms whichthe Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functionarealsoavailabletothecommittees. Senate v. Ermita categorically ruled that "thepowerofinquiryis broadenoughtocoverofficialsoftheexecutivebranch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnaultthat"theoperationof government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a propersubjectforinvestigation"andthat"thepowerofinquiry isco-extensivewiththepowertolegislate." Thus,Section4(b)isdirectlyrepugnantwithArticleVI,Section21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. Gudaniv.Senga IfthePresidentortheChiefofStaffrefusestoallowamemberofthe AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicialactionshouldbedirectedattheheadsoftheexecutivebranch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control overtheactionsoftheofficersconcerned.Thelegislativepurposeof suchtestimony,aswellasanydefensesagainstthesame—whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns — would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of governmentmayberaised,assessed,andultimatelyweighedagainst eachother.Andoncethecourtsspeakwithfinality,bothbranchesof government have no option but to comply with the decisionofthe courts,whethertheeffectofthedecisionistotheirlikingordisfavor. Neriv.SenateCommitteeonAccountabilityofPublicOfficersand Investigation Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and JudicialWatch,somehowprovidethe elementsofpresidentialcommunicationsprivilege,towit: RomeroIIv.Estrada Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, itdidsopursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. And the CourthasnoauthoritytoprohibitaSenatecommitteefromrequiring personstoappearandtestifybeforeitinconnectionwithaninquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rulesof procedure. Oversight SeparateOpinion,JusticePuno,Macalintalv.Comelec,etal. 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessentialandnon-delegablepresidentialpower." Conceptandbasesofcongressionaloversight 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received"byacloseadvisorofthePresidentorthePresident himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operationalproximity"withthePresident. The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concernspost-enactmentmeasuresundertakenbyCongress: 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interest. In other words, confidentialityinexecutiveprivilegeisnotabsolutelyprotectedby theConstitution. (d) topreventexecutiveusurpationoflegislativeauthority,and StandardCharteredBankv.SenateCommitteeonBanks Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon was the C ourt’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. Indeed,themerefilingofacriminaloranadministrativecomplaint beforeacourtoraquasi-judicialbodyshouldnotautomaticallybar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremelyeasytosubvertanyintendedinquirybyCongressthrough the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. (b) todeterminewhetheragenciesareproperlyadministered, (c) toeliminateexecutivewasteanddishonesty, (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perceptionofpublicinterest. The power of oversight has beenheldtobeintrinsicinthegrantof legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherentinademocraticsystemofgovernment. Categoriesofcongressionaloversightfunctions TheactsdonebyCongresspurportedlyintheexerciseofitsoversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigationandsupervision. a. Scrutiny Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 39of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutionsforconsiderationoftheagencyinvolved. Legislativescrutinyisbasedprimarilyonthepowerofappropriation of Congress. Under the Constitution, the “power of the purse” belongstoCongress. Likewise, Congress exerciseslegislativescrutinythruitspower of confirmation. Through the power of confirmation, Congress sharesintheappointingpoweroftheexecutive. b. Investigation Congressionalinvestigationinvolvesamoreintensediggingoffacts. Asnowcontainedinthe1987Constitution,thepowerofCongressto investigateiscircumscribedbythreelimitations,namely: (a) itmustbeinaidofitslegislativefunctions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published rulesofprocedure,and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutionalrights. c. Supervision Thisconnotesacontinuingandinformedawarenessonthepartofa congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressionalsupervisionallowsCongresstoscrutinizetheexercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain partofthatdelegatedauthority. Non-legislative Informingfunction Thepowerofoversighthasbeenheldtobeintrinsicinthegrantof legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. John Stuart Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is “to watchandcontrolthe government;tothrowthelightofpublicityonitsacts;tocompela Grounds full exposition and justification of all of them which any one for,andc onvictiono f, considers objectionable; and to censure them if found 1. culpableviolationoftheConstitution, condemnable.” Wilson went one step farther and opined that the legislature’s informing function should be preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that “even more important than legislationistheinstructionandguidanceinpoliticalaffairswhich the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion.” (Separate Opinion,JusticePuno,Macalintalv.Comelec,etal.) Powerofimpeachment 2. treason, 3. bribery, 4. graftandcorruption, 5. otherhighcrimes,or 6. betrayalofpublictrust. Procedure Gutierrezv.TheHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonJustice 2011Decision Whomaybeimpeached 1. ThePresident, 2. theVice-President, 3. theMembersoftheSupremeCourt, 4. theMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,and 5. theOmbudsman. InreGonzales A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a MemberofthePhilippineBarasaqualificationfortheofficeheldby him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during theincumbencyof such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,cannotbechargedcriminallybeforetheSandiganbayan oranyothercourtwithanyoffensewhichcarrieswithitthepenalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amounttoremovalfromoffice. A Member of the Supreme Court must first beremovedfromoffice viatheconstitutionalrouteofimpeachmentunderSections2and3of ArticleXIofthe1987Constitution.ShouldthetenureoftheSupreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be heldtoanswereithercriminallyoradministratively(bydisbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven againsthiminappropriateproceedings. The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachmentcomplaintisanexponentoftheexpressconstitutional grant of rule-making powers oftheHouseofRepresentativeswhich committedsuchdeterminativefunctiontopublicrespondent. Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming theallegationsinthecomplaints.T histheCourtcannotdo. Franciscoinstructsthatthisissuewould"requiretheCourttomake a determination of what constitutes animpeachableoffense.Sucha determination is a purely political question which theConstitution haslefttothesounddiscretionofthelegislature. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same waythatthe Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. ItisnotforthisCourttotellaco-equalbranchofgovernmenthowto promulgatewhentheConstitutionitselfhasnotprescribedaspecific methodofpromulgation. TheCourtisinnopositiontodictatea modeofpromulgationbeyondthedictatesoftheConstitution. It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislationwheretherightsofwitnessesareinvolved,impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, andnotforthepunishmentoftheoffender. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 40of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Theone-yearbarrule Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same officialmorethanoncewithinaperiodofoneyear." Franciscostatesthattheterm"initiate"meanstofilethecomplaint andtakeinitialactiononit. Theinitiationstartswiththefilingofthe complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. TheinitialactiontakenbytheHouseonthecomplaintis thereferralofthecomplainttotheCommitteeonJustice. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting thematchstickalone,however,cannotlightup the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstickslightthecandleatthesametime. Whatisimportantis thatthereshouldonlybeONECANDLEthatiskindledinayear, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchstickscannolongerrekindlethecandle. Gutierrezv.TheHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonJustice 2011Resolution) Indubitably,animpeachmentisnotajudicialproceeding,butrathera political exercise. Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices andjudgeswhenit comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any provisionregardingthe inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thusdirectanyquestionofpartialitytowardstheconcernedmember only.Andanydecisiononthematterofinhibitionmustberespected, anditisnotforthisCourttointerferewiththatdecision. GonzalesIIIv.OfficeofthePresident2014 Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the PresidentovertheDeputyOmbudsmanviolatestheindependenceof theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandisthusu nconstitutional. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performanceoftheirduties. Effect c. 2. "Indirectinitiative"istheexerciseofinitiativebythepeople through a proposition senttoCongressorthelocallegislative bodyforaction. 3. "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approveor Art XI Sec 3[7]. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend furtherthanremovalfromofficeanddisqualificationto hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,trial,andpunishment,accordingtolaw. rejectalegislationthroughanelectioncalledforthepurpose.It maybeoftwoclasses,namely: Barcenasv.HouseofRepresentatives Section 3 (1) of Art XI speaks of initiating"casesofimpeachment" while Section 3 (5) pertains to the initiation of "impeachment proceedings." "Cases," no doubt, refers to those filed before the Senate. Its use and its sense are consistent throughout Section 3. Thus, Section 3(6) states, “The Senate shall have the solepowerto decide all cases [not "proceedings"] ofimpeachment."Section3(7) provides, "Judgment in cases [not "proceedings"] of impeachment shallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeanddisqualification toholdanyoffice...." a. Referendum on statutes whichreferstoapetitionto approveorrejectanactorlaw,orpartthereof,passed byCongress;and b. Referendumonlocallawwhichreferstoapetitionto approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. 4. "Proposition"isthemeasureproposedbythevoters. 5. "Plebiscite" is theelectoralprocessbywhichaninitiativeon theConstitutionisapprovedorrejectedbythepeople. 6. Toexercisethepowerofinitiativeorreferendum, a. atleasttenpercentum(10%)ofthetotalnumberof theregisteredvoters, b. ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyat leastthreepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoters thereof, c. shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the samewiththeComelec. I.InitiativeandReferendum RANo.6735ortheTheInitiativeandReferendumAct. 1. "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislationsthroughanelectioncalledforthepurpose. Therearethree(3)systemsofinitiative,namely: Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petitionproposingtoenactaregional,provincial,city, municipal,orbarangaylaw,r esolutionorordinance. 7. Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthave a. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petitionproposingamendmentstotheConstitution; a. at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total numberofregisteredvotersassignatories, b. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposingtoenactanationallegislation;and b. ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresented by atleastthreepercentum(3%)oftheregistered voterstherein. Garciav.Comelec BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 41of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Declarationofmartiallawandsuspensionoftheprivilege The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutionsasappropriatesubjectsofalocalinitiative. Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which alsodealt with local initiative did not change the scope ofitscoverage.More specifically,theCodedidnotlimitthecoverageoflocalinitiativesto ordinancesalone. This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedlyincludesresolutions. VI.EXECUTIVEDEPARTMENT A.Qualifications,election,andtermofthePresidentand Presidentialimmunity Presidentialprivilege Presidentialimmunity Executiveclemency ⭐DeLimav.Duterte2019 Natureandlimitations Powersrelativetoappropriationmeasures The concept of presidential immunity under our governmentaland constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature ofthesuit.Thelackofdistinctionspreventsus frommakinganydistinctions. Delegatedpowers SeparateconcurringofLeonen,J Residualpowers Presidential immunity fromsuitonlyextendstocivil,criminal,and administrative liability. A proceeding for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, as in this case, does not determine any such liability. TheRuleontheWritofHabeasDataonlyrequirescourtstoascertain the accountability and responsibility of the public official or employee.Thus,thePresidentcannotinvokeimmunityfromsuitina petitionforsuchwrit. Formsofexecutiveclemency Diplomaticpower Vetopowers D.RulesofSuccession Vice-President B.Privileges,inhibitions,anddisqualifications B.Privileges,inhibitions,anddisqualifications ofthewritofhabeascorpus;extension A.Qualifications,election,andtermofthe PresidentandVice-President Sec2.N opersonmaybeelectedPresidentunlessheis However, the proper respondent in a habeas data case for pronouncementsmadebythePresidentinhisofficialcapacityisthe ExecutiveSecretary,followingtherulinginAguinaldov.AquinoIII. This is in accord withthedoctrinethatthepresidentshouldnotbe impleaded in any suit during his or her incumbency, as recently reiteratedinK ilusangMayoUnov.AquinoIII. 1. anatural-bornc itizenofthePhilippines, Generalexecutiveandadministrativepowers 2. aregisteredvoter, Powerofappointment 3. abletoreadandwrite, Presidentialprivilege Ingeneral 4. atleast40yearsofageo nthedayoftheelection,and ⭐SenateofthePhilippinesv.Ermita Limitationsontheexercise/power 5. a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediatelyprecedingsuchelection. C.PowersofthePresident Typesofappointment Powerofcontrolandsupervision Doctrineofqualifiedpoliticalagency Executivedepartmentsandoffices Localgovernmentunits Emergencypowers Sec 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a termof6yearsxxx.ThePresident shalln otbeeligibleforanyre-election. NopersonwhohassucceededasPresidentandhasservedassuch for more than4yearsshallbequalifiedforelectiontothesame officeatanytime. NoVice-Presidentshallserveformorethant wosuccessiveterms. Commander-in-chiefpowers Callingoutpowers Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts,andtheCongress."Similarly,Rozelldefinesitas"theright of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withholdinformationfromCongress,thecourts,andultimately thepublic." Tribe comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executiveprivilege,"itmaybemoreaccuratetospeakofexecutive privileges. 1. One variety of the privilege is the statesecretsprivilege onthegroundthattheinformationisofsuchnaturethatits disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 42of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 2. Anothervarietyistheinformer'sprivilege,ortheprivilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers chargedwiththeenforcementofthatlaw. 3. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmentaldecisionsandpoliciesareformulated. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts,orthepublic,isrecognizedonlyinrelationtocertaintypes of information of asensitivecharacter.Whileexecutiveprivilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily againstexecutivesecrecyandinfavorofdisclosure. En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuseofthedoctrine.Executiveprivilegeisproperlyinvokedin relation to specific categories of information and not to categoriesofpersons. Secretarymuststatethattheauthorityis"ByorderofthePresident," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege beinganextraordinarypower,itmustbewieldedonlybythehighest officialintheexecutivehierarchy.Inotherwords,thePresidentmay notauthorizehersubordinatestoexercisesuchpower. ⭐Neriv.ExecutiveSecretary Therearetwo(2)kindsofexecutiveprivilege a) presidential communications privilege — pertains to communications, documents or other materialsthatreflect presidential decision-makinganddeliberationsandthatthe Presidentbelievesshouldremainconfidential. Thisappliestodecision-makingofthePresident. Rootedintheconstitutionalprincipleofseparationofpower andthePresident'suniqueconstitutionalrole. b) deliberative process privilege. — includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policiesareformulated. Appliestodecision-makingofexecutiveofficials. Rootedoncommonlawprivilege. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore,beclearlyasserted. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, andcoversfinalandpost-decisionalmaterialsaswell as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicialnegationofthepresidentialcommunicationsprivilegeis always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative processprivilege. Absent a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege,thereisnowayofdeterminingwhetheritfallsunderoneof the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executivetostatethereasonsforthe claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the informationwhichtheprivilegeismeanttoprotect. Theelementsofpresidentialcommunicationsprivilegeare,towit: In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court findsitessentialtolimittothePresidentthepowertoinvokethe privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive 1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessentialandnon-delegablepresidentialpower." 2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received"byacloseadvisorofthePresidentorthePresident himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operationalproximity"withthePresident. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualifiedprivilegethatmaybeovercomebyashowingof adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains important evidence" and by theunavailabilityof theinformationelsewherebyanappropriateinvestigating authority. TherightofCongressoranyofitsCommitteestoobtaininformation in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiryisanexerciseofthepeople'srighttoinformation. TheClaimofExecutivePrivilegeisProperlyInvoked Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, theremustbeaformalclaimofprivilege,lodgedbytheheadof thedepartmentwhichhascontroloverthematter.Aformaland proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason"forpreservingtheirconfidentiality. Prohibitions Sec13.ThePresident,Vice-President,theMembersoftheCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold ANY other office or employmentduringtheirtenure. Theys hallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectly, a) practiceanyotherprofession, b) participateinanybusiness,or c) be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege grantedbytheGovernment or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includingGOCCsortheirsubsidiaries. Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheir office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnot,duringhistenure,be appointedas a) MembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,or b) theOfficeoftheOmbudsman,or c) as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureausoroffices,includingGOCCsandtheirsubsidiaries. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 43of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver CivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically pro­hibiting the President, Vice-President,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. The prohibition imposed onthePresidentandhisofficialfamilyis therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private officeoremployment. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,whileSection13,ArticleVIIismeanttobetheexception ap­plicable onlytothePresident,theVice-President,Membersofthe Cabinet, theirdeputiesandassistants.Thephrase"unlessotherwise providedinthisConstitution"mustbegivenaliteralinterpre­tationto referonlytothoseparticularinstancescitedintheConstitutionitself, towit: 1. 2. the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par(2), Article VII; or acting as PresidentinthoseinstancesprovidedunderSection7,pars. (2)and(3),ArticleVII;and, the Secretary of Justicebeinganex-officiomemberofthe Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8(1), Article VIII. Toreiterate,theprohibitionunderSection13,ArticleVIIisnottobe interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in e x-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functionsoftheconcernedofficial'soffice. Thetermex-officiomeans"fromoffice;byvirtueofoffice."Itrefers toan"authorityderivedfromofficialcharactermerely,notexpressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any otherappointmentorauthoritythanthatconferredbytheoffice." Theterm“primary”usedtodescribe"functions"referstotheorder of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be requiredbytheofficial'sprimaryfunctions. If the functions required to be performed are merely inci­dental, remotelyrelated,inconsistent,incompatible,orother­wisealien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibitedb ytheConstitution. In orderthatsuchadditionaldutiesorfunctionsmaynottransgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 1. suchadditionaldutiesorfunctionsmustberequiredbythe primaryfunctionsoftheofficialconcerned, 2. who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as providedbylaw, 3. withoutreceivinganyadditionalcompensationtherefor. PublicInterestCenterv.ElmaD ecisionandR esolution The general rule contained in Article IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more thanoneofficeonlyif"allowedbylaworby theprimaryfunctionsofhisposition." InthecaseofQuimsonv. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, "there is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility." The crucial test in determining whether incompatibilityexistsbetweentwoofficeswaslaidoutinPeoplev. Green—whetheroneofficeissubordinatetotheother,inthesense thatoneofficehastherighttointerferewiththeother. Inthiscase,anincompatibilityexistsbetweenthepositionsofthe PCGGChairmanandtheCPLC. ThedutiesoftheCPLCincludegiving independentandimpartiallegaladviceontheactionsoftheheadsof various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, withoutquestion,anagencyundertheExecutiveDepartment. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGGChairmannortothe CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistantsecretary,eveniftheformermayhavethesamerankasthe latter positions. However, Elma remains covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments muststillcomplywiththestandardofcompatibilityofofficerslaid downtherein;failingwhich,hisappointmentsareherebypronounced inviolationoftheConstitution. Resolution The Court ruled that Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law ruleonincompatibilityofoffices,Elma had, in effect, vacatedhisfirstofficeasPCGGChairmanwhenhe acceptedthesecondofficeasCPLC. Funav.ExecutiveSecretary2 010 Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC,shewasthuscoveredbythestricterprohibitionunderSection 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position.NeitherwasshedesignatedOICofMARINAinanex-officio capacity,whichistheexceptionrecognizedinC ivilLibertiesUnion. Exceptionstotherule: ArtVIISec3par2.TheVice-President maybeappointedasa MemberoftheCabinet.Suchappointmentrequiresnoconfirmation. Art VIII Sec 8 (1). A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposedofxxx,the SecretaryofJustice,xxx. C.PowersofthePresident Generalexecutiveandadministrativepowers Section1.THEexecutivepowershallbevestedinthePresidentof thePhilippines. Marcosv.ManglapusD ecisionandR esolution Although the 1987 Constitutionimposeslimitationsontheexercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powersofthePresidentcannotbesaidtobelimited onlytothespecificpowersenumeratedintheConstitution. Inother words,executivepowerismorethanthesumofspecificpowers soenumerated. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 44of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Resolution The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scatteredprovisionsoftheConstitution.Thisisso,notwithstanding theavowedintentofthemembersoftheConstitutionalCommission of 1986—to limit the powers of the President, for the resultwasa limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to thecommander-in-chiefclause,butnotadiminutionof thegeneralgrantofexecutivepower. ExecutiveDepartment. WithConcurrenceofCA Art VII Sec 16. The President shall nominate and, WITH the consentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appoint a) theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments, b) ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsuls,or c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or navalcaptain,and Vinuyav.Romulo d) other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution. Officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfortwomenforcompensationhadalreadybeenfullysatisfiedby Japan's compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines andJapan. TheExecutiveDepartmenthasdeterminedthattakinguppetitioners' causewouldbeinimicaltoourcountry'sforeignpolicyinterests,and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the ExecutiveDepartment'sdeterminationwouldmeananassessmentof the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. Powerofappointment Ingeneral GovofPhilIslandsv.Springer Appointmentto officeisintrinsicallyanexecutiveactinvolving the exercise of discretion. We deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains,withminor exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the National Coal Company and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property belongs to the executive department; and that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the i) TheregularmembersoftheJBCshallbeappointedby thePresidentforatermoffouryearswiththeconsent oftheCA.(ArtVIIISec8[2]) Heshallalsoappoint a) all other officers of theGovernmentwhoseappointments arenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,and b) thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint. The Congress may, bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficers lowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheads ofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards. Rufinov.Endriga The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the powertoappoint,isfoundin Section16,ArticleVII.Here,thePresidentappointsthreegroupsof officers. 1. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. 2. The second group refers tothosewhomthePresidentmay beauthorizedbylawtoappoint. 3. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise providedbylaw. UnderthesameSection16,thereisafourthgroupoflower-ranked officerswhoseappointmentsCongressmaybylawvestintheheads ofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards.Thepresentcase involves the interpretation of Section 16 with respect to the appointmentofthisfourthgroupofofficers. ThePresidentappointsthefirstgroupofofficerswiththeconsent of the CA. The President appointsthesecondandthirdgroupsof officerswithouttheconsentoftheCA.ThePresidentappointsthe third group of officers if the law is silentonwhoistheappointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission,orboardtoappointisdeclaredunconstitutional.Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trusteesfallunderthethirdgroupofofficers. The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions,orboardsisamatteroflegislativegrace.Congresshas the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads ofagencies, commissions,orboardsthepowertoappointlower-rankedofficers. The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of governmentextendstoallexecutiveemployeesfromtheDepartment Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and doesnotrequireanyimplementing law.CongresscannotlimitorcurtailthePresident'spowerofcontrol overtheExecutivebranch. The CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised AdministrativeCodeof1987,anyagency"notplacedbylawororder creatingthemunderanyspecificdepartment"falls"undertheOffice ofthePresident." Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control ofthePresident.Suchapublic office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution. UponrecommendationofJBC (a) MembersofSCandallothercourts ArtVIIISec9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudges oflowercourtsshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 45of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. (b) Ombudsmananddeputies Art XI Sec 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointedbythePresidentfromalistofatleastsixnominees preparedbytheJBC,andfromalistofthreenomineesforevery vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three monthsaftertheyoccur. Limitations ProhibitionagainstNepotismandMidnightAppointments Sec 13[2]. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinitywithinthefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnot, duringhistenure,beappointedas a) MembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,or b) theOfficeoftheOmbudsman,or c) as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureausoroffices,includingGOCCsandtheirsubsidiaries. Sec 15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting Presidents hallnotmakeappointments,except a) temporaryappointments b) toexecutivepositions c) when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public serviceorendangerpublicsafety. Aytonav.Castilloonmidnightappointments This Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight"or"last-minute"appointments. As a rule, once an appointmentisissued,itcannotbereconsidered specially where the appointee has qualified. On theotherhand,the authorities admit ofexceptionalcircumstancesjustifyingrevocation suchaswhenmassad-interimappointments(350)issuedinthelast hours of an outgoing Chief Executive are to be considered by the Commission on Appointments that is different from that be submitted by an incoming Chief Executive who may not wholly approveoftheselectionsespeciallyifitisdoubtfulthattheoutgoing Presidentexerciseddoublecareinextendingsuchappointments. AftertheproclamationoftheelectionofanincomingChiefExecutive, the outgoing Chief Executive is no more than a "care-taker" administration. He is dutyboundtopreparefortheorderlytransfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which,heoughttoknow,wouldembarrassorobstructthepoliciesof hissuccessor. appointing aChiefJusticeonthepremisethatSection15,ArticleVII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. We reverseV alenzuela. GiventhebackgroundandrationalefortheprohibitioninSection15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointmentsintheJudiciary,becausetheirestablishmentoftheJBC and their subjecting the nominationandscreeningofcandidatesfor judicialpositionstotheunhurriedanddeliberatepriorprocessofthe JBCensuredthattherewouldnolongerbemidnightappointmentsto theJudiciary. Typesofappointment Interimorrecessappointments Jorgev.Mayor The fundamental issue is whether Administrative Order No. 2 of PresidentMacapagaloperatedasavalidrevocationofpetitioner'sad interimappointment.Wethinki thasnotdoneso. Jorge'sadinterimappointmentisdatedDecember13,1961,butthere isnoevidenceonrecordthatitwasmadeandreleasedafterthejoint session of Congress that ended on the same day. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointmentofJorgewasmadebeforethecloseofofficehours,that beingtheregularcourseofbusiness.Theappointment,therefore,was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, AO No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by theCA,andthereafter,theofficeneverbecamevacant. DeCastrov.JBC2010Decision Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointmentstofillavacancyintheSupremeCourtortoother appointmentstotheJudiciary Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section15,ArticleVIItotheappointmentofMembersoftheSupreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignoredthemeticulousorderingoftheprovisions.Theywouldhave easilyandsurelywrittentheprohibitionmadeexplicitinSection15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likelyin Section4(1).Consequently,prohibitingtheincumbentPresidentfrom Art VII Sec 16(2). The President shall have the power to make appointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whethervoluntary orcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntil disapprovedbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenext adjournmentoftheCongress. Guevarav.Inocentes TheadinterimappointmentextendedtopetitioneronNovember18, 1965 by the former Executive lapsed when the special session of Congressadjourneds inedieataboutmidnightofJanuary22,1966. It is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make a recessappointmenteffectiveonly (a) untildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointments,or (b) until t he next adjournment of Congress, and never a day longerregardlessofthenatureofthesessionadjourned. DeRamav.CA There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointmentsduringthelastdaysofhisorhertenure. Theconstitutionalprohibitiononso-called"midnightappointments," appliesonlytothePresidentorActingPresident. Matibagv.Benipayo BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 46of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Anadinterimappointmentisapermanentappointmentbecauseit takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Presidentoncetheappointeehasqualifiedintooffice.Thefactthatit is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its permanent character. The Constitutionitselfmakesanadinterimappointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapprovedby theCAoruntilthenextadjournmentofCongress. The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interimappointment,andthusanadinterimappointmenttakeseffect immediately. The appointee can atonceassumeofficeandexercise, asadejureofficer,allthepowerspertainingtotheoffice. Adistinctionisthusmadebetweentheexerciseofsuchpresidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in sessionandwhenitisinrecess. Intheformer,thePresidentnominates,andonlyupontheconsentof the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assumeoffice.Itisnotsowithreferencetoadinterimappointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen maythusqualifyand performhisfunctionwithoutlossoftime. Histitletosuchofficeis complete. An ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, thatis,itisnotindicativeofwhethertheappointment istemporaryorinanactingcapacity,ratheritdenotesthemanner in which the appointment was made. Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the Presidenti nthemeantimethatCongressisi nrecess. TheConstitutionalityofRenewalsofAppointments Thereisnodisputethatanadinterimappointeedisapprovedbythe CAcannolongerbeextendedanewappointment. Thedisapprovalis afinaldecisiononthemeritsbytheCAintheexerciseofitschecking power on the appointing authority of the President. Since the Constitutiondoesnotprovideforanyappealfromsuchdecision,the disapprovalisfinalandbindingontheappointeeaswellason theappointingpower. Inthisinstance,thePresidentcannolonger renewtheappointmentnotbecauseoftheconstitutionalprohibition onreappointment,butbecauseofafinaldecisionbytheCommission onAppointmentstowithholditsconsenttotheappointment. Anadinterimappointmentthatisby-passedbecauseoflackoftime or failure of the CA to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the meritsbytheCAatthecloseofthesessionofCongress. Thereisno final decision by the CA to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passedappointee. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renewtheadinterimappointmentsofby-passedappointees. TheprohibitiononreappointmentinSection1(2),ArticleIX-Cofthe Constitutionappliesneithertodisapprovednorby-passedadinterim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by anotheradinterimappointmentbecausethedisapproval isfinalunderSection16,ArticleVII,andnotbecauseareappointment is prohibited under Section 1(2), Article IX-C. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointmentbecausethereisnofinaldisapprovalunderSection16, ArticleVII,andsuchnewappointmentwillnotresultintheappointee servingbeyondthefixedtermofsevenyears. Thephrase“w ithoutreappointment”appliesonlytoonewho 1. hasbeenappointedb ythePresidentand 2. confirmedb ytheCommissiononAppointments, whetherornotsuchpersoncompleteshistermofoffice. (2) Thepersondesignatedshallreceivethecompensationattached totheposition,unlessheisalreadyinthegovernmentservice in which case he shall receive only such additional compensationas,withhisexistingsalary,shallnotexceedthe salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensationherebyauthorizedshallbepaidoutofthefunds appropriatedfortheofficeoragencyconcerned. (3) In no case shall a temporary designationexceedone(1) year. Powertoremove GonzalesIIIv.OP2012 Underthedoctrineofimplication,thepowertoappointcarrieswith it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointedbythePresidentarealsoremovablebyhim. Theexceptiontothisiswhenthelawexpresslyprovidesotherwise –thatis,whenthepowertoremoveisexpresslyvestedinanofficeor authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President'spowertoappoint. 1. There must beaconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments ofthepreviousappointmentbeforetheprohibitiononreappointment canapply. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges oflowercourts shallbeappointedbythePresident. a. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removedafterimpeachmentproceedingsinitiated byCongress(Section2,ArticleXI), b. whilejudgesoflowercourtsmayberemovedonly by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections6and11,ArticleVIII). Temporarydesignations AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIII,SECTION17.PowertoIssue TemporaryDesignation.— (1) The President maytemporarilydesignateanofficeralreadyin the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointmenttowhichisvestedinhimbylaw,when: 2. The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the Commission on Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removedonlybyi mpeachment(Section2,ArticleXI). 3. The Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed (a) the officer regularly appointed to theofficeisunable toperformhisdutiesbyreasonofillness,absenceor anyothercause;or (b) thereexistsavacancy; BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 47of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver onlybyi mpeachment(Section2,ArticleXI). In giving the President the power to removeaDeputyOmbudsman andSpecialProsecutor,Congresssimplylaiddowninexpressterms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutionalauthoritytoappointtheaforesaidofficialsintheOffice oftheOmbudsman. Powerofcontrolandsupervision Section 17. ThePresidentshallhavecontrolofalltheexecutive departments,bureaus,andoffices.Heshallensurethatthelawsbe faithfullyexecuted. ⭐PIDSv.COA2019LeonenEnBanc Here, unlike in Province of Negros, petitionerisnotanLGU,buta GOCC which sought the President's approval beforeestablishingits annualmedicalcheckupprogram.ItlikewisesoughttheOfficeofthe President's approval to continue the annual medical checkup program's implementation after Notice of Disallowance had been issued,whichthepetitionerinP rovinceofNegrosneverdid. There is noabsoluteorcategoricalrulestatingthataSeniorDeputy Executive Secretary has no power toactonhisownorindefaultof the Executive Secretary by authority of the President generally or specifically. Whilethismaybetrue,theauthoritytoissuetheexemptionmust nonetheless be done upon the express designation and delegation by the president through a presidential or executive issuance. Furthermore, it must be stressed that the Administrative Code explicitly grants the power to sign papers by authority of the presidenttotheexecutivesecretary.Itgrantsnosimilarauthority toaseniordeputyexecutivesecretary. In Planas, this Court emphasized that in the exercise of hisorher executive power, the president can act through the heads of the executive departments. Nevertheless, therearepowersvestedinthe President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercisedbyanagentoralteregoofthePresident. 1. Thedeclarationofmartiallaw, 2. thesuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpus,and 3. the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicialdeterminationofguiltoftheaccused, allfallwithinthisspecialclassthatdemandstheexclusiveexercise bythePresidentoftheconstitutionallyvestedpower.Thelistisby no means exclusive, but there mustbeashowingthattheexecutive powerinquestionisofsimilargravitasandexceptionalimport. In thiscase,thenExecutiveSecretaryErmita,asthePresident'salter ego, had the authority to let petitioner continue implementing its annual medical checkup program through enrollment with health maintenance organizations. Consequently, the exemptiongrantedby Executive Secretary Ermita, as the President's alter ego, isv alid.It willremainso,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbythePresident. Nacinov.OfficeoftheOmbudsman2019EnBanc Aquino’sactuationsdonotconstituteaparticipationintheplanning and implementation of Oplan Exodus since, as President of the Republic,hedoesnotexercisedirectcontroloverthePNPunder thedoctrineofqualifiedpoliticalagency. The Senate Report stated that as the PNP is under the DILG, the President,asChiefExecutive,exercisessupervisionandcontrolover the PNP. Given that the President gavethepolicydirectiontoarrest Marwan and Usman, and that he approved Oplan Exoduswithfull knowledgeofitsoperationaldetails,heisultimatelyresponsiblefor the success or failure of the mission. It suggests Aquino's accountabilityunderthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility. ThePresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesisNOTpartof the chain of command of the PNP. Under Section 26 of RA No. 6975,thecommandanddirectionofthePNPisvestedintheChiefof the PNP. That the PNP chain of command does not include the PresidentisfurtherconfirmedbythePNPBOIReportitself. The President's power over the PNP is subsumed in his general powerofcontrolandsupervisionovertheexecutivedepartmentof thegovernment.Infact,Carpiov.ExecutiveSecretaryheldthat"the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powerofthePresident.Thisisnecessarilysosincethepoliceforce, not being integrated with the military, is notapartoftheAFP.Asa civilianagencyofthegovernment,itisonlysubjecttotheexerciseby thePresidentofthep owerofexecutivecontrol." Command responsibility has a technical meaning. In Saez, We ruled that to hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility,thefollowingelementsmustobtain: a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior andtheperpetratorofthe crimeashissubordinate; b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime wasabouttobeorhadbeencommitted;and c) thesuperiorfailedtotakethenecessaryandreasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetratorsthereof. Inthiscase,sinceAquinoisconsideredasuperioroftheAFPbutnot thePNPwhichistheagencyinvolvedinthiscase,thefirstelementis notsatisfied.Likewise,evengrantingthatAquinomaybeconsidered a "superior" of the PNP, the lasttwoelementsarealsonotsatisfied since it was not shown by evidence that he kneworhadreasonto know thatacrimewasabouttobeorhadbeencommitted,andthat he failed to take steps to prevent the criminal act or punish its perpetrators. Doctrineofqualifiedpoliticalagency DENRv.DENREmployees It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified politicalagency,thus: Underthisdoctrine,whichrecognizestheestablishmentofasingle executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,and,exceptincaseswheretheChiefExecutiveisrequired by the Constitution or law to act in person ortheexigenciesofthe situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive andadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExecutiveareperformedby andthroughtheexecutivedepartments,andtheactsoftheSecretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of theChiefExecutive.This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as providedforunderArticleVII,Section17ofthe1987Constitution. In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 48of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver DENRbyorderingthetransferoftheDENRXIIRegionalOfficesfrom Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, asanalterego,ispresumedtobe the acts of the President for the latter hadnotexpresslyrepudiated thesame. In Chiongbian v.Orbos,thisCourtstressedtherulethatthepower ofthePresidenttoreorganizetheadministrativeregionscarrieswith it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective deliveryofthefieldservicesofgovernmentagencies. ⭐PIDSv.COA2019LeonenEnBanc The Court in Berdin v. Mascariñas expandedtheapplicationof thedoctrineofqualifiedpoliticalagency.Inthatcase,thedoctrine wasextendedtocovertheAssistantRegionalDirectorasanalterego of the Finance Secretary in fulfilling the latter's obligations under Sections49and50oftheLocalTaxCode. WhilethisCourthasattimesexpandedtheapplicationofthedoctrine of qualified political agency, the doctrine remains limited to the President'sexecutivesecretaryandotherCabinetsecretaries.Itdoes notextendtodeputyexecutivesecretariesorassistantdeputy secretaries. Executivedepartmentsandoffices Biraogov.PhilippineTruthCommission Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit ofthepowerto reorganize as expressed inSection31oftheRevisedAdministrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the followingfunctionalandstructurallines: (1) restructuring the internalorganizationoftheOfficeofthe President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; of offices,orabolitionthereofbyreasonofeconomyorredundancy of functions. These point to situations whereabodyoranofficeis already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the questionisinthenegative. Whilethepowertocreateatruthcommissioncannotpassmusteron thebasisofP.D.No.1416asamendedbyP.D.No.1772,thecreation of the PTCfindsjustificationunderS ection17,ArticleVIIof theConstitution,imposinguponthePresidentthedutytoensurethat thelawsarefaithfullyexecuted.(F aithfulExecutionClause) The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws — in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency — is inherent in the President's powers astheChiefExecutive.Thatthe authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.Thisflowsfromtheobviousneedtoascertainfactsand determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in DOH v. Camposano,theauthorityofthePresidenttocreateaninvestigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employeesoftheDOHfortheanomalouspurchaseofmedicineswas upheld. Localgovernmentunits Art X Sec 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise generalsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.xxx. (2) transferringanyfunction;or Section 16. The President shall exercise generalsupervision (3) transferringanyagency, over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. undertheOfficeofthePresidenttoanyotherDepartmentor Agencyorviceversa; Clearly,theprovisionreferstoreductionofpersonnel,consolidation Ganzonv.CA The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President, actingthroughtheSecretaryofLocalGovernment,tosuspendand/or removelocalofficials. TheCourtislayingdownthefollowingrules: 1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central governmentinthemannerthelawmayprovide; 2. ThenewConstitutiondoesnotprescribefederalism; 3. The change in constitutional language with respect to the supervisionclausewasmeantbuttodenylegislativecontrol over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislativeregulationprovidedregulationisconsistentwith thefundamentalpremiseofautonomy; 4. Sincelocalgovernmentsremainaccountabletothenational authority,thelattermay,bylaw,andinthemannersetforth therein,imposedisciplinaryactionagainstlocalofficials; 5. "Supervision"and"investigation"arenotinconsistentterms: "investigation" does not signify "control" which the Presidentdoesnothave. Dadolev.COA WhetherLBC55oftheDBMisvoidforgoingbeyondthe supervisorypowersofthePresident In administrative law, supervision means overseeing orthepower or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform theirduties. Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,theformermay takesuchactionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify ornullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinate officerhasdoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethe judgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter. Under our presentsystemofgovernment,executivepowerisvested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officialsaremerelyalteregos. Assuch,theyaresubjecttothepower of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspendedorreversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 49of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver whom theyaredirectlyaccountable. Byconstitutionalfiat,theyare subject tothePresident’ssupervisiononly,notcontrol,solongas theiractsareexercisedwithinthesphereoftheirlegitimatepowers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authorityorpowergiventhembytheConstitutionandthelaw. A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergencypowers.Tothefirst,Section18,ArticleVIIgrantsthe President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection canberaised.Buttothesecond,manifoldconstitutionalissuesarise. AnydirectivethereforebythePresidentoranyofhisorheralteregos seeking to alter the wisdom ofalaw-conformingjudgmentonlocal affairsofanLGUisapatentnullitybecauseitviolatestheprincipleof local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislativedepartmentsingoverningmunicipalcorporations. PresidentArroyocouldvalidlydeclaretheexistenceofastateof national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. DoesLBC55gobeyondthelawitseekstoimplement?YES. LBC 55providesthattheadditionalmonthlyallowancestobegiven byanLGUshouldnotexceedP1,000inprovincesandcitiesandP700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law thatsupposedlyservesasthelegalbasisofLBC55,allowsthegrant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the city government allow.” The said provision does notauthorizesettinga definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Emergencypowers Sec 23(2) Art VI provides that intimesofwarorothernational emergency,theCongressmay,bylaw,authorizethePresident,for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and propertocarryouta declarednationalpolicy.Unlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolution oftheCongress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournment thereof. Ampatuanv.PunoreMaguindanaoMassacre The President did not proclaim a national emergency invoking Sec 23(2) of Art VI, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized hertoexerciseextraordinarypowers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authoritytoexercisethesame. OndeclaringastateofnationalemergencyinD avidv.Arroyo But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally,Congressistherepositoryofemergencypowers.This is evident in the tenor of Section23(2),ArticleVIauthorizingitto delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not bepossibleorpracticablefor Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powerstothePresident,subjecttocertainconditions,thus: (1) Theremustbeaw arorotheremergency. (2) Thedelegationmustbeforal imitedperiodonly. (3) Thedelegationmustbesubjecttosuchrestrictionsasthe Congressmayprescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a nationalpolicydeclaredbyCongress. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generallyreposeduponCongress.InAranetav.Dinglasan, this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in timesofcrisis. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operationofanyprivately owned public utility or business affected with public interest withoutauthorityfromCongress. Aganv.PIATCO Temporarytakeoverofbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest. In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the term "national emergency"wasdefinedtoincludethreatfromexternalaggression, calamities ornationaldisasters,butnotstrikes"unlessitisofsuch proportion that would paralyzegovernmentservice."Theduration oftheemergencyitselfisthedeterminingfactorastohowlong the temporary takeover by the government would last. The temporarytakeoverbythegovernmentextendsonlytotheoperation of the business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the governmentisnotrequiredtocompensatetheprivateentity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the temporarytakeovercannot,likewise,claimjustcompensationforthe useofthesaidbusinessanditspropertiesasthetemporarytakeover by thegovernmentisinexerciseofitspolicepowerandnotofits powerofeminentdomain. ArticleXII,Section17ofthe1987Constitutionenvisionsasituation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to "temporarilytakeoverordirecttheoperationofanyprivatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest." It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount considerationindeterminingwhetherornottotemporarilytakeover a particular business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeoverisexercisingitspolicepower. Commander-in-chiefpowers Graduatedpowers Sec 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief,a“sequence”of “graduatedpowers.”Fromthemosttotheleastbenign,theseare: 1. thecallingoutpower, The only criterion is that ‘whenever itbecomesnecessary,’ thePresidentmaycallthearmedforces‘topreventorsuppress lawlessviolence,invasionorrebellion.’ 2. the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus It is only the privilege thatissuspended,notthewrititself. Thus, when a person is detained for an offense related to rebellion or invasion, the Judge need not inquire into the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 50of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver legalityofhisdetention. 3. thepowertodeclarem artiallaw. Forthelattertwopowers,theConstitutionrequires2requisites toconcur: (1) Anactualinvasionorrebellion;AND (2) Thatpublicsafetyrequiresit. Ondeclaringastateofrebellion Section 18, Article VIIdoesnotexpresslyprohibitthePresident from declaring a state of rebellion. The President’s authority to declareastateofrebellionspringsinthemainfromherpowersas chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chiefpowers. whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intenttogivethePresident fulldiscretionarypowertodeterminethenecessityofcallingoutthe armed forces, it is incumbent upon thepetitionertoshowthat thePresident’sdecisionistotallybereftoffactualbasis. Congressmayrevoketheproclamationofmartiallaworsuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may reviewthesufficiencyofthefactualbasisthereof.However,thereis no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or reviewofthePresident’sactiontocalloutthearmedforces.The distinction places thecallingoutpowerinadifferentcategoryfrom the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of thewritofhabeascorpus,otherwise,theframersofthe Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.Expressiouniusestexclusioalterius. In calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellionisanuttersuperfluity.Atmost,itonlygivesnoticeto the nation that such a state exists. Sanlakas v. Reyes finds that suchadeclarationisdevoidofanylegalsignificance. Foralllegal Declarationofmartiallawandsuspensionofthe intents,t hedeclarationisdeemednotwritten. privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus;extension Duringastateofrebellion,Lacsonv.Pereztellsusthatauthorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of Fortunv.ArroyoaffirmsthatalthoughSec18ArtVIIvestsinthe rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the Court. They should not be based on the declaration of a "stateof privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,hesharessuchpowerwith rebellion." Congress. Thus: Callingoutpowers 1. ThePresident’sproclamationorsuspensionistemporary, goodforonly60days; IBPv.Zamora ThepowerofthePresidenttokeepthepeaceisnotlimitedmerelyto exercisingthecommander-in-chiefpowersintimesofemergencyor to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also taskedwithattendingto theday-to-dayproblemsofmaintainingpeaceandorderandensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary powersolelyvestedinhiswisdom.TheCourt,thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substituteitsown. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or 2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person orinwritingto Congress; 3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspensionforthepurposeofr eviewingitsvalidity;and 4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congressdeemswarranted. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus isfirsta political question in the hands of Congressbeforeitbecomesa justiciableoneinthehandsoftheCourt. Lansangheldthatthefactualbasisofthedeclarationofmartiallaw andthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusis not a political question andiswithintheambitofjudicialreview. The phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers. It could be denominated as a complaint,apetition,oramattertoberesolvedbytheCourt. InLagmanv.Medialdea,theCourthadtheoccasiontoreexamine Fortun and clarify that the Court can simultaneouslyexercise its power of review with, and independently from, the powerto revokebyCongress.Corollary,anyperceivedinactionordefaulton thepartofCongressdoesnotdepriveordenytheCourtofitspower to review. In other words, the judicial power to review is not dependent on whether Congress exercised its own power to reviewtheactofthePresident. Lagmanestablishedthesufficiencyoffactualbasistestasbeing theonlytestforjudicialreviewofthePresident'spowertodeclare martiallawandsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus underSection18,ArticleVII. ➔ Itmustbebasedonlyonfactsorinformationknownby or available to the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension,whichfactsorinformationare found in the proclamation as well as the written Report submittedbyhimtoCongress. ➔ The Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. ➔ NeithershouldtheCourtexpectabsolutecorrectness of the facts stated in the proclamation and inthewritten ReportasthePresidentcouldnotbeexpectedtoverifythe accuracyandveracityofallfactsreportedtohimduetothe urgencyofthesituation. ➔ TorequireprecisioninthePresident'sappreciationoffacts would unduly burden him and therefore impede the processofhisdecision-making. The parameters for determiningthesufficiencyoffactualbasis areasfollows: 1) actualrebellionorinvasion; 2) publicsafetyrequiresit;thefirsttworequirementsmust concur;and 3) there is probable cause for the Presidenttobelievethat BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 51of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver thereisactualrebellionorinvasion. Public safety "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." Onextendingmartiallaw The only limitations to the exercise of congressional authorityto extends uchproclamationorsuspensionarethat: a) theextensionshouldbeuponthePresident'si nitiative; b) it shouldbegroundedonthepersistenceoftheinvasion orrebellionandthedemandsofpublicsafety;and c) it is subjecttotheCourt'sreviewofthesufficiencyofits factual basisuponthepetitionofanycitizen.(Lagmanv. Medialdea2019) The Court is not barred by the doctrine of conclusivenessof judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion. The Court's power to review the extension of martial law is limited solelytothedeterminationofthesufficiencyofthefactualbasis thereof. The manner in which Congress deliberated on the President'srequestforextensionisnotsubjecttojudicialreview. (Lagmanv.PimentelIII) Checksandbalancesontheexerciseofmartiallawandsuspension powers (a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege or the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or rebellion andpublicsafety requiressuchdeclarationorsuspension. (b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a periodnotexceeding60days. (c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the President must submit a Report in person or in writing to Congress. (d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can revoke theproclamationor suspension. (e) The President cannotsetasidetheCongress'revocationof hisproclamationorsuspension. (f) The President cannot, by himself, extend hisproclamationor suspension.Heshoulda sktheCongress'approval. (g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress,votingjointlyandbyavoteofatleastamajorityof all its Members, can extend theproclamationorsuspension forsuchperiodasitmaydetermine. (h) Theextensionoftheproclamationorsuspensionshallonlybe approved when the invasion or rebellion persistsandpublic safetyrequiresit. (i) The Supreme Court may review the sufficiency ofthefactual basis of the proclamation or suspension or the extension thereof,inanappropriateproceedingfiledbyanycitizen. (j) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 daysfromthefilingo ftheappropriateproceeding. (k) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution. (l) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts orlegislativeassemblies,norauthorizetheconferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians wherecivilcourtsareabletofunction. (m) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to personsjudiciallychargedforrebellionoroffensesinherent inordirectlyconnectedwithinvasion. (n) Finally, duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,any person thus arrested or detained shouldbejudiciallycharged withinthreedays,otherwiseheshouldbereleased. Executiveclemency Formsofexecutiveclemency Pardondistinguishedfromprobation Peoplev.Vera Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. Theyareactuallydistinctanddifferentfromeachother,bothinorigin andinnature. Thepowertosuspendsentenceandthepowertograntreprievesand pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different in their origin and nature. The former wasalwaysapartofthejudicialpower;thelatterwasalwaysapart of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment ofthecourttemporarilyorindefinitely,but the conviction and liability following it, and all civil disabilities, remainandbecomeoperativewhenjudgmentisrendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense andtheguiltoftheoffender.Itreleasesthepunishment,andblotsout ofexistencetheguilt,sothatintheeyeofthelaw,theoffenderisas innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, andgiveshimanewcreditand capacity. Pardondistinguishedfromparole Torresv.Gonzales The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive actswhich arenotsubjecttojudicialscrutiny. Natureandlimitations Sec19.Exceptincasesofimpeachment,orasotherwiseprovided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, Pardondistinguishedfromamnesty commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after convictionbyfinaljudgment. Barrioquintov.Fernandez Heshallalsohavethepowertograntamnestywiththeconcurrence ofamajorityofalltheMembersoftheCongress. Art IX-C Sec 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentenceforviolationofelectionlaws,rules,andregulationsshall begrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendation oftheCommission. 1. PardonisgrantedbytheChiefExecutiveandassuchitisa privateactwhichmustbepleadedandprovedbytheperson pardoned,becausethecourtstakenonoticethereof; whileamnestybyProclamationoftheChiefExecutivewith the concurrenceofCongress,anditisapublicactofwhich thecourtsshouldtakejudicialnotice. 2. Pardoni sgrantedtooneafterconviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 52of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecutionandsometimesafterconviction. 3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequencesofanoffenseofwhichhehasbeenconvicted, thatis,itabolishesorforgivesthepunishment,andforthat reasonitdoes"norworktherestorationoftherightstohold public office, or the right ofsuffrage,unlesssuchrightsbe expresslyrestoredbythetermsofthepardon,"andit"inno case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnityimposeduponhimbythesentence". Whileamnestylooksbackwardandabolishesandputsinto oblivion the offense with which he is charged that the personreleasedbyamnestystandsbeforethelawprecisely asthoughhehadcommittednooffense. Verav.People Whetherornotapersoninvokingthebenefitofamnestyshould first admit having committed the crime of which they were accused. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgivenessforanactwhich,accordingtohim,hehasnotcommitted. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accusedmaintainsthathehasnotcommittedacrime,hecannothave any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions,asinthiscase,itisincumbentupontheaccused toprovetheexistenceofsuchconditions.Theinvocationofamnesty isinthenatureofa.pleaofconfessionandavoidance,whichmeans that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.(s upersedingBarrioquinto) EffectofPardon Monsantov.Factoran Theabsolutedisqualificationorineligibilityfrompublicofficeforms part of the punishment prescribed by the RPC for estafa thru falsificationofpublicdocuments. Itisclearfromtheauthoritiesthat when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the Office which was forfeited by reason of herconviction. Andinconsideringherqualificationsand suitabilityforthepublicpost,thefactsconstitutingheroffensemust be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stateddifferently,thepardongrantedtopetitionerhasresulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment butitcannotgobeyondthat. Toregainherformerpostasassistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure requiredforanewappointment. Risos-Vidalv.COMELEC2015EnBanc FormerPresidentEstradawasgrantedanabsolutepardonthatfully restoredallhiscivilandpoliticalrights,whichnaturallyincludesthe righttoseekpublicelectiveoffice,thefocalpointofthiscontroversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former PresidentEstradais complete,unambiguous,andunqualified. The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remaintobein: (1) impeachmentcases; (2) casesthathavenotyetresultedinafinalconviction;and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, r ules and regulations in which there was no f avorable recommendationcomingfromtheCOMELEC. Therefore,itcanbearguedthatanyactofCongressbywayofstatute cannot operatetodelimitthepardoningpowerofthePresident.The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles36and 41 oftheRPCcannot,inanyway,servetoabridgeordiminish theexclusivepowerandprerogativeofthePresidenttopardon personsconvictedofviolatingpenalstatutes.. Whomayavailofamnesty Macaga-anv.People As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, under the very legislation authorizingtheamnesty,(a) Thecrimestobeamnestiedmusthave been for violations of subversion laws or those defined and proscribedundercrimesagainstpublicorderundertheRPC. In the instant case,thepetitionerswerechargedwithandconvicted of defrauding the Republic by diverting public funds from their intended public uses to private and personal use and gain, under Article315inrelationtoArticle171oftheRPC. Article315isfound in Title 10, Chapter 6, of that Code which defines Crimes against Property. The estafa was committed through the falsification of documentsdescribedinArticle171,entitled"FalsificationbyPublic Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclessiastical Minister '' found in Title4,entitledCrimesAgainstPublicInterest,oftheRPC. Clearly, petitioners fall underSection2(a)aspersonsexpresslydisqualified fromamnestyunderP.D.1182,asamended. Petitioners'applications for amnesty were also filed way beyond the time limitestablished underP.D.1182,asamended,sincepetitionerswereconvictedbythe Sandiganbayanon15July1981;theirapplicationsforamnestywere filedonlyin1984. Diplomaticpower Sec 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the MembersoftheSenate. Bayanv.ZamorareVFA Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements ingeneral.Thisprovisionlaysdownthegeneralrule on treatise orinternationalagreementsandappliestoanyform of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limitedto,extraditionortaxtreatiseorthoseeconomicinnature.All treaties or international agreements enteredintobythePhilippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases,troopsorfacilitiesinthePhilippines. Section 25, ArticleXVIIIdisallowsforeignmilitarybases,troops,or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficientlymet,v iz: (a) itmustbeunderatreaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurredinbytheSenateand, when so required by congress,ratifiedbyamajorityofthe votescastbythepeopleinanationalreferendum;and (c) recognizedasatreatybytheothercontractingstate. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 53of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver The phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contractingpartyacceptsoracknowledgestheagreementasa treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United Statestreatsthe VFAonlyasanexecutiveagreementbecause,underinternationallaw, anexecutiveagreementisasbindingasatreaty.Tobesure,aslongas theVFApossessestheelementsofanagreementunderinternational law,thesaidagreementistobetakenequallyasatreaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate islimitedonlytogivingorwithholding itsconsent,orconcurrence,totheratification. Pimentelv.ExecutiveSecretary The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification. Thetreatymaythenbesubmittedforregistrationand publicationundertheU.N.Charter,althoughthisstepisnotessential tothevalidityoftheagreementasbetweentheparties. Thesignatureisprimarilyintendedasameansofauthenticatingthe instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand,istheformal act bywhichastateconfirmsandacceptstheprovisionsofatreaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government. Althoughtherefusalofastatetoratifyatreatywhichhasbeensigned in its behalf is a serious step thatshouldnotbetakenlightly,such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannotbeencroachedbythisCourtviaawritofmandamus. Powersrelativetoappropriationmeasures Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirtydaysfromtheopeningofeveryregularsessionasthebasisof the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sourcesoffinancing,includingreceiptsfromexistingandproposed revenuemeasures. Vetopowers Pimentel,Jr.v.Aguirre The Constitution veststhePresidentwiththepowerofsupervision, notcontrol,overLGUs. SuchpowerenableshimtoseetoitthatLGUs andtheirofficialsexecutetheirtasksinaccordancewithlaw. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economicdifficulties,hecannotpreventthemfromperformingtheir tasks and using available resources to achievetheirgoals. Hemay not withholdoralteranyauthorityorpowergiventhembythelaw. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legallyduethemcannotbedirectedbyadministrativefiat. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot beupheld.Abasicfeatureoflocal fiscal autonomy is theautomaticreleaseofthesharesofLGUs intheNationalinternalrevenue.Thisismandatedbynolessthan the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directlytotheLGUconcernedwithinfive (5) days after every quarter of the yearand“shallnotbesubjectto any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national governmentforwhateverpurpose.”Asarule,theterm“SHALL”isa word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provisionis,therefore,I MPERATIVE. Delegatedpowers (1) TariffpowersunderSection28(2)ofArticleVI; (2) EmergencypowersunderSection23(2)ofArticleVI; Residualpowers Marcosv.ManglapusD ecisionandR esolution Admittedly,serviceandprotectionofthepeople,themaintenanceof peace and order, the protection of life liberty and property,andthe promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmentalaction. ThepowerinvolvedisthePresident's residualpower toprotect thegeneralwelfareofthepeople. Itisfoundedonthedutyofthe President, as steward of the people. It is a power borne by the President'sdutytopreserveanddefendtheConstitution. Italsomay beviewedasapowerimplicitinthePresident'sdutytotakecarethat thelawsarefaithfullyexecuted. Sec27.EverybillpassedbytheCongressshall,beforeitbecomesa law,bepresentedtothePresident.Ifheapprovesthesameheshall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated,whichshallenterthe objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirdsofalltheMembersofsuch Houseshallagreetopassthebill,itshallbesent,togetherwiththe objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,andifapprovedbytwo-thirdsofalltheMembersof that House, it shall become a law. xxxx The President shall communicate his veto ofanybilltotheHousewhereitoriginated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shallbecomealawasifhehadsignedit. Item-veto. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, ortariff bill,butthevetoshallnotaffecttheitemoritemstowhichhedoes notobject. BolinaoElectronicsv.Valencia Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items ofthe same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same timevetoingtheparticularitemoritemstowhichitrelates. WhetherthePresidentmaylegallyvetoaconditionattachedto anappropriationoritemintheappropriationbill. It was already declared that such action bytheChiefExecutivewas illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions,hasbeen adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Gonzalesv.Macaraig Paragraph (1) of Sec 27 refers to the general veto power of the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 54of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver President and ifexercisedwouldresultinthevetooftheentirebill, asageneralrule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as theitem-vetopowerorthe line-vetopower. Itallowstheexerciseofthevetooveraparticular itemoritemsinanappropriation,revenue,ortariffbill. Asspecified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an AppropriationsBill. Inotherwords,thepowergiventheexecutiveto disapproveanyitemoritemsinanAppropriationsBilldoesnotgrant the authority tovetoapartofanitemandtoapprovetheremaining portionofthesameitem. Thetermsitemandprovisioninbudgetarylegislationandpractice are concededly different. Aniteminabillreferstotheparticulars, the details, thedistinctandseverablepartsxxxofthebill. Itisan indivisiblesumofmoneydedicatedtoastatedpurpose. But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executivepowertoveto,weareoftheopinionthatSection55(FY'89) andSection16(FY'90)arenotprovisionsinthebudgetarysenseof the term. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some "particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fallshortofthisrequirement.Consequently,Section55(FY'89)and Section 16 (FY ‘90), although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriateprovisionsthatshouldbetreatedasitemsforthe purposeofthePresident'svetopower. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibita connectionwithmoneyitemsinabudgetarysenseinthescheduleof expenditures.Again,thetestisappropriateness. PHILCONSAv.Enriquez VetoofProvisiononDebtCeiling AstheConstitutionisexplicitthattheprovisionwhichCongresscan include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited initsoperationto the appropriation to which it relates," it follows thatanyprovision whichdoesnotrelatetoanyparticularitem,orwhichextendsinits operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" areunconstitutionalprovisionsandprovisionswhich areintendedtoamendotherlaws,becauseclearlythesekindsoflaws havenoplaceinanappropriationsbill.Thesearemattersofgeneral legislationmoreappropriatelydealtwithinseparateenactments. The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provisionoftheitemondebtservice,includingtheprovisosthatthe appropriation authorized insaiditem"shallbeusedforpaymentof theprincipalandinterestofforeignanddomesticindebtedness"and that"innocaseshallthisfundbeusedtopayfortheliabilitiesofthe Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisos are germaneto andhaveadirectconnectionwiththeitemondebtservice.Inherent in the power of appropriation is thepowertospecifyhowthe money shall be spent. The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence, the itemvetoof saidprovisionsisvoid. Vetoofprovisiononratioforroadmaintenance The Special Provision in questionisnotaninappropriateprovision whichcanbethesubjectofaveto.Itisnotalientotheappropriation forroadmaintenance,andontheotherhand,itspecifieshowthesaid item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditionstoitemsinanexpenditurebill,whichcannot be vetoed separately from theitemstowhichtheyrelatesolongas theyare"appropriate"inthebudgetarysense(ArtVII,Sec25[2]).The veto of the second paragraphofSpecialProvisionNo.2oftheitem fortheDPWHisthereforeu nconstitutional. VetoofprovisiononpurchaseofmedicinesbyAFP Beingdirectlyrelatedtoandinseparablefromtheappropriationitem onpurchasesofmedicinesbytheAFP,thespecialprovisioncannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item followingB olinaoElectronics. VetoofprovisiononpriorapprovalofCongressforpurchaseof militaryequipment Any provision blocking an administrative actioninimplementinga law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properlyvetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Fund for payment of the trainerplanesandarmored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violativeoftheConstitutionalprohibitiononthepassageoflawsthat impairtheobligationofcontracts(ArtIIISec10),moreso,contracts enteredintobytheGovernmentitself. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds. TheSpecialProvision,whichallowstheChiefofStafftousesavings to augment the pensionfundfortheAFPbeingmanagedbytheAFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)and29(1)oftheArticleVIoftheConstitution. ConditiononthedeactivationoftheCAFGU The PresidentdeclaredinhisVetoMessagethattheimplementation ofthisSpecialProvisiontotheitemontheCAFGUshallbesubjectto prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. ⭐This is the first case before this Court where the power of thePresidenttoimpoundisputinissue.Impoundmentrefers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budgetauthorityofanytype. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repealoramendotherlaws,inthiscase,P.D. No.1597andR.A.No.6758. D.RulesofSuccession (a) Atthebeginningoftheterm Secs 7, 10. xxxx If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-electshallactasPresidentuntilthePresident-electshall havequalified. If a President shall not havebeenchosen,theVicePresident-elect shallactasPresidentuntilaPresidentshallhavebeenchosenand qualified. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 55of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Presidentisunabletodischargethepowersanddutiesofhisoffice, theCongressshalldecidetheissue.Forthatpurpose,theCongress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordancewithitsrulesandwithoutneedofcall. If at the beginning ofthetermofthePresident,thePresident-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the VicePresident-electshallbecomePresident. Secs 8, 10. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall becomethePresidenttoservetheunexpiredterm.Incaseofdeath, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, thePresidentoftheSenateor,in case of his inability, the Speaker of the HouseofRepresentatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shallhavebeenelectedandqualified. (c) TemporaryDisability Sec 11.WheneverthePresidenttransmitstothePresidentofthe SenateandtheSpeakerhiswrittendeclarationthatheisunableto discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmitstothemawrittendeclarationtothecontrary,suchpowers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. WheneveramajorityofalltheMembersoftheCabinettransmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker their written declarationthatthePresidentisunabletodischargethepowersand duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume thepowersanddutiesoftheofficeasActingPresident. Judicialpower The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in suchlowercourtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is requiredtoassemble,determinesbya two-thirdsvoteofboth Where no President and Vice-President shall havebeenchosenor shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanentlydisabled,thePresidentoftheSenateor,incaseofhis inability, the Speaker of the HouseofRepresentatives,shallactas President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosenandqualified. (b) Duringtheterm A.Concepts Judicial power includes the duty of the courts ofjusticetosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableandenforceablexxx Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercisingthepowersanddutiesofhisoffice. Judicialreview andtodeterminewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuse ofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiononthe partofanybranchorinstrumentalityoftheGovernment. VII.JUDICIALDEPARTMENT Requisites A.Concepts Judicialpower Judicialreview Requisites 1. An actual case or controversy calling fortheexerciseof judicialpower;(R ipeness) 2. The person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must haveapersonalandsubstantialinterestin the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injuryasaresultofitsenforcement;(L ocusstandi) 3. Thequestionofconstitutionalitymustberaisedattheearliest possibleopportunity;and 4. Theissueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismotaofthe case. Operativefactdoctrine Politicalquestiondoctrine B.Judicialindependenceandautonomy C.Appointmentstothejudiciary Qualificationsofmembersofthejudiciary Ripeness JudicialandBarCouncil Tan v. Macapagal held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is aprerequisitethatsomethinghadbythenbeen accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may comeintothepicture." Composition Powers D.TheSupremeCourt KilusangMayoUnov.AquinoIII2 019LeonenEnBanc Composition Powersandfunctions Thereafter, when the President transmits his written declaration thatnoinabilityexists,heshallreassumethepowersanddutiesof his office.Meanwhile,shouldamajorityofalltheMembersofthe Cabinet transmitwithinfivedaystheirwrittendeclarationthatthe Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an ⭐actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an absolutenecessity. Thereisanactualcaseorcontroversyifthereisa"conflictoflegal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution." A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 56of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver establish that there is a legally demandable and enforceable rightundertheConstitution.Theremustbe (8) whenitwouldamounttoan ullificationofaclaim, 1. arealandsubstantialcontroversy, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 2. with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relationsoftheparties,and (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequateremedy, 3. admittingofspecificreliefthatcourtscangrant. (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicialintervention, Moreover,anactualcaseorcontroversyrequiresthattherightmust be enforceable and legally demandable. A complaining party's rightis,thus,affectedbytherestoftherequirementsfortheexercise ofjudicialpower. A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed action such that there is a direct, concrete,andadverseeffectonthepetitioner.Inconnectionwithacts ofadministrativeagencies,ripenessisensuredunderthedoctrineof exhaustionofadministrativeremedies.Oneotherconceptpertaining to judicial review is intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a casebeingmootandacademic. Both these concepts relate to the timing of the presentation of a controversy before the Court — ripeness relates to itsprematurity, whilemootnessrelatestoabelatedorunnecessaryjudgmentonthe issues. The Court cannot preempt the actions of the parties, and neither should it, as a rule, render judgment after the issue has alreadybeenresolvedbyorthroughexternaldevelopments. However, theprincipleofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies isnotanironcladrule.Itm aybedisregarded (12) whenn oadministrativereviewisprovidedbylaw, Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of primary administrative jurisdiction. This principle states that courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdictionoftheadministrativetribunalprior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialknowledge,experienceandservices of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, petitioners should have first filed their case before respondentSocialSecurityCommission. Asformootness,Courtscannotrenderjudgmentaftertheissuehas already been resolved by or through external developments. However,Courtswilldecidecases,otherwisemootandacademic,if: 1. thereisag raveviolationoftheConstitution; 2. (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramountpublicinterestisinvolved; 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulationof controlling principles to guidethebench,thebar,andthe public;and 4. thecaseiscapableofrepetitionyetevadingreview. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agencyconcerned, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies wouldbeu nreasonable, Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accordedstandingtosue,providedthatthefollowingrequirements aremet: (1) casesinvolveconstitutionalissues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedieshasbeenrenderedm oot. (2) whentheissueinvolvedispurelyalegalquestion, (6) whentherespondentisadepartmentsecretarywhoseacts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumedapprovalofthelatter, orlegalstandinghasbeendefinedasapersonalandsubstantial interest in thecasesuchthatthepartyhassustainedorwill sustain direct injuryasaresultofthegovernmentalactthat isbeingchallenged. (13) wheretheruleofq ualifiedpoliticalagencyapplies,and (1) whenthereisav iolationofdueprocess, (5) whenthereisi rreparableinjury, LocusStandi Three(3)circumstancesmustbepresentbeforethisCourtmayrule on amootissue.Theremustbeanissueraisingagraveviolation of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of paramount public interest that is capable of repetition yet evadingreview. (3) forvoters,theremustbeashowingofobviousinterestin thevalidityoftheelectionlawinquestion; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance whichmustbesettledearly;and (5) for legislators, theremustbeaclaimthattheofficialaction complainedofinfringesupontheirprerogativesaslegislators. ⭐ProvincialBusOperatorsAssociationofthePhilippinesv.DOLE 2018LeonenEnBanc ExpandedDiscussiononStanding Legalstandingor locusstandi isthe"rightofappearanceinacourt of justice on a given question." To possess legal standing, parties mustshow"apersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecasesuchthat they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmentalactthatisbeingchallenged." Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Whether a suitispublicorprivate,thepartiesmusthave"apresentsubstantial interest,''nota"mereexpectancyorafuture,contingent,subordinate, or consequential interest." Those who bring the suit must possess theirownrighttothereliefsought. Another exceptionistheconceptofthird-partystanding. Under this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties providedthefollowingcriteriaaremet: 1. first, the party bringing suit must have suffered an BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 57of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a sufficiently concreteinterest'intheoutcomeoftheissueindispute; 2. second, the party must have a close relation to the third party;and 3. third,theremustexistsomehindrancetothethirdparty's abilitytoprotecthisorherowninterests. The conceptwasfirstintroducedinourjurisdictioninWhiteLight Corp. et al. v. City of Manila. Based on third-party standing, this Courtallowedthehotelandmoteloperatorstosueonbehalfoftheir clients. According to this Court, hotel and motel operators have a close relation to their customers as they "rely on the patronage of their customers for theircontinuedviability."Preventingcustomers from availing of short-time rates would clearly injure the business interestsofhotelandmoteloperators. In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by the petitioner would have special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in the White Light case to bring the action themselves—i.e., the amount theywouldpay for the lease of the motels—will be too small compared with thecostofthesuit.Butviewedinanotherway,whoeveramongthe patrons files the case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial number of interested parties without recoveringtheircosts.Thisisthefreeriderproblemineconomics. It is a negative externality which operates asadisincentivetosue andassertatranscendentalright. Astoactualcontroversy Inadditiontoanactualcontroversy,specialreasonstorepresent,and disincentivesfortheinjuredpartytobringthesuitthemselves,there mustbeashowingofthetranscendentnatureoftherightinvolved. Only constitutional rights shared by many and requiring a groundedlevelofurgencycanbetranscendent.ThisCourtisnota forum to appealpoliticalandpolicychoicesmadebytheExecutive, Legislative,andotherconstitutionalagenciesandorgans. LisMota Itisawell-settledmaximofadjudicationthatanissueassailingthe constitutionalityofagovernmentalactshouldbeavoidedwhenever possible.Courtswillnottouchtheissueofconstitutionalityunless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or c rux of the controversy. Operativefactdoctrine LeagueofCitiesv.Comelec2 010Resolution Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects oftheunconstitutionallaw,priorto its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrineisanadmissionthatthelawisunconstitutional. The operative fact doctrineisaruleofequity. Assuch,itmustbe applied as an exception to the general rule thatanunconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional anunconstitutionalact.InPlantersProducts,Inc.v. FertiphilCorporation,theCourtstated: The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties andaffordsnoprotection.It hasnolegaleffect.Itis,inlegalcontemplation,inoperativeasifithas not been passed. The doctrine of operative fact,asanexceptionto the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fairplay.It nullifiestheeffectsofanunconstitutionallawbyrecognizingthatthe existence ofastatutepriortoadeterminationofunconstitutionality isanoperativefactandmayhaveconsequenceswhichcannotalways be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrineisapplicablewhenadeclarationofunconstitutionality will imposeanundueburdenonthosewhohavereliedonthe invalidlaw. Politicalquestiondoctrine ⭐Franciscov.HouseofRepresentatives The term “political question” refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,notlegality,ofaparticularmeasure. Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a DUTY, a duty whichcannotbeabdicatedbythemerespecterofthiscreaturecalled thepoliticalquestiondoctrine. Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gatheredthatthere aretwospeciesofpoliticalquestions: (1) "trulypoliticalquestions"and (2) thosewhich"arenottrulypoliticalquestions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. Ontheotherhand,byvirtueofSection1,ArticleVIIIof the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly politicalinnature. In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly actedwithinsuchlimits. Estradav.Arroyo The legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People PowerIIisclear.EDSAIinvolvestheexerciseofthepeople power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSAIIisanexerciseofpeoplepoweroffreedomofspeechand freedomofassemblytopetitionthegovernmentforredressof grievanceswhichonlyaffectedtheofficeofthePresident.EDSA Iisextraconstitutionalandthelegitimacyofthenewgovernment that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and thesuccessionoftheVicePresidentas Presidentaresubjecttojudicialreview.EDSAIpresentedpolitical question; EDSA II involves legal questions.Abriefdiscourseon freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance whicharethecuttingedgeof EDSAPeoplePowerIIi snotinappropriate. Needless to state, the cases at bar pose LEGAL and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretationofcertainprovisionsinthe1987Constitution,notably section1ofArticleII,andsection8ofArticleVII,andtheallocation of governmental powers under section 11ofArticleVII.Theissues likewisecallforarulingonthescopeofpresidentialimmunityfrom suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 58of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver petitioneragainstprejudicialpublicity. B.Judicialindependenceandautonomy To maintain the independence of the judiciary, the following safeguardshavebeenembodiedintheConstitution: 1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetingsbechangedbymerelegislation. Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,afterapproval,shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased. 1. 2) The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collectfees,fixratesofcompensationnotexceedingthehighest ratesauthorizedbylawforcompensationandpayplansofthe government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the dischargeoftheirfunctions. 3) The SC may not bedeprivedofitsminimumoriginaland appellatejurisdiction. 4) The appellate jurisdiction of the SCmaynotbeincreased bylawwithoutitsadviceandconcurrence. 5) AppointeestothejudiciaryarenownominatedbytheJBC andnolongersubjecttoconfirmationbytheCA. 6) TheSCnowhasadministrativesupervisionoveralllower courtsandtheirpersonnel. 7) The SC has exclusive power to disciplinejudgesoflower courts. 8) ThemembersoftheSCandalllowercourtshavesecurity of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizingthejudiciary. 9) They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicialoradministrativefunctions. 10) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their continuanceinoffice. 11) Thejudiciaryshallenjoyfiscalautonomy. 12) TheSCalonemayinitiaterulesofcourt. 13) OnlytheSCmayorderthetemporarydetailofjudges. 14) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. ThefiscalautonomyenjoyedbytheJudiciary,theCSC,theCOA, theComelec,andtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancontemplatesa guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. (Bengzonv.Drilon) 2. Anylawwhichprovidesforanexemptionfromsaidfeeswould beconstitutionallyinfirmforitimpairstheCourt’sguaranteed fiscalautonomyanderodesitsindependence.(A M12-2-03-0) InreNPC Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of therules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. The separation ofpowersamongthethreeco-equalbranchesofour governmenthaserectedanimpregnablewallthatkeepsthepowerto promulgaterulesofpleading,practiceandprocedurewithinthesole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative iftheyenactlawsorissueordersthateffectivelyrepeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grantofexemptionfromthepaymentoflegalfeesunderSection39of RA8291necessarilyfails. C.Appointmentstothejudiciary Sec 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a listofatleast threenomineespreferredbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforevery vacancy.Suchappointmentsn eednoconfirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment withinninetydaysfromthesubmissionofthelist. Qualificationsofmembersofthejudiciary Sec 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Courtoranylowercollegiatecourtunlessheisanatural-born citizenofthePhilippines.AMemberoftheSupremeCourtmustbe 1. atleastfortyyearsofage,and 2. must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. The Congress shall prescribe the qualificationsofjudgesoflower courts,butnopersonmaybeappointedjudgethereofunlessheisa citizenofthePhilippinesandamemberofthePhilippineBar. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,integrity,probity,andindependence. JudicialandBarCouncil Composition Sec 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervisionoftheSupremeCourtcomposedof ReGSIS May the legislature exempttheGSISfromlegalfeesimposedbythe CourtonGOCCsandLGUs?N O. 1. theChiefJusticea sexofficioChairman, 2. theSecretaryofJustice,and BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 59of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 3. arepresentativeoftheC ongressa sexofficioMembers, 4. arepresentativeoftheI ntegratedBar, 5. aprofessoroflaw, 6. aretiredM emberoftheSupremeCourt,and 7. arepresentativeofthep rivatesector. dutytosubmittothePresidentthelistofnomineesforeveryvacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, theremustbeanunjustifieddelayinperformingthatduty.For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary,thatis,insubmittingthelisttothePresident. treason case,isnothingshortofprotantodeprivingtheCourtitself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualificationofajudgeisadeprivationofhisjudicialpower. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the Aguinaldov.AquinoIII2017EnBancre President for a term of four years with the consent of the clusteringofnomineesbytheJBC Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve forfouryears, Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to theprofessoroflawforthreeyears,theretiredJusticefortwoyears, appointmembersoftheJudiciaryandtodeterminetheseniorityof andtherepresentativeoftheprivatesectorforoneyear. thenewly-appointedSandiganbayanAssociateJustices. NO.TheConstitutiondoesnotadmitanycompositionoftheSupreme Court other than by the Chief Justice and AssociateJusticestherein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court—asinthiscase—arereplacedbyjudgesoffirstinstance.Itis distinctly another SC in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only ONE Supreme Court. No temporary composition of the Supreme Court is authorized by the constitution. Powers DeCastrov.JBC Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nomineesbytheJBC? NO. Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancyintheJudiciary. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in thecaseofthelowercourts.The90-day periodisdirectedatthePresident,notattheJBC.Thus,theJBC shouldstarttheprocessofselectingthecandidatestofillthevacancy intheSupremeCourtb eforet heoccurrenceofthevacancy. UndertheConstitution,itismandatoryfortheJBCtosubmittothe PresidentthelistofnomineestofillavacancyintheSupremeCourt in order to enable the President toappointoneofthemwithinthe 90-day period from the occurrenceofthevacancy.TheJBChas no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the ConstitutionforthePresidenttomaketheappointment. ThedutyoftheJBCtosubmitalistofnomineesbeforethestartofthe President's mandatory 90-day period toappointisministerial,but its selection ofthecandidateswhosenameswillbeinthelisttobe submittedtothePresidentlieswithinthediscretionoftheJBC.The objectofthepetitionsformandamushereinshouldonlyrefertothe ItalsobearstopointoutthatpartofthePresident'spowertoappoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers.By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC wouldbeestablishingtheseniorityororderofpreferenceofthenew Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointmentby the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itselfavitalpartof thePresident'spowerofappointment. D.TheSupremeCourt Composition (b) WON a person may act as a Justice of theSupremeCourtwho has not been duly appointed by the President even only as a "designee";and (c) WON by the method of "designation" createdbytheaforecited section 14 a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, orCadastralJudge,designatedbythePresidentunder thesamesectioncanconstitutionally"sittemporarilyasJustice" oftheSupremeCourtbyvirtuethereof. NO.Wefindabsolutelynothinginthecontextwhichmaysoundlybe construed as authorizing, merely by legislation, any change in the constitutionalcompositionoftheSupremeCourt,ortheperformance ofitsfunctionsbyanybutitsconstitutionalmembers. USv.Limsiongco Sec4.TheSupremeCourtshallbecomposedofaChiefJusticeand fourteenAssociateJustices.Itmaysitenbancorinitsdiscretion,in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.xxxx Vargasv.Rilloraza (a) WON Congresshadpowertoaddtothepre-existinggroundsof disqualificationofaJusticeoftheSupremeCourt; NO. If, according to the Constitution, "the Supreme Court shall be composed"oftheChiefJusticeandAssociateJusticesthereinreferred to, its jurisdictioncanonlybeexercisedbyitasthuscomposed.To disqualify any of these constitutional component members of the Court—particularly, as in the instant case,amajorityofthem—ina Appellant's motion is based on thegroundthattheinstantdecision was rendered by a division of the court and not by the body constituted by law for the purpose, and hence the decision as rendered, was rendered by a body outside the law and having no power, authority or jurisdiction to render a final decision in the controversy. ThereisbutoneSupremeCourt. ItisthejurisdictionofthisSupreme Courtwhichcannotbediminished. TheSupremeCourtremainsa unitnotwithstandingitworksindivisions. Althoughitmayhave twodivisions,itisbutasinglecourt. Actionsconsideredinanyone of these divisions and decisionsrenderedthereinare, in effect,by the same Tribunal. The two divisions of this court are not to be considered as two separate and distinct courts but as divisions of oneandthesamecourt. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 60of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver The constitution of divisions has been permitted for convenience and the prompt dispatch ofbusiness. Theprovisioninnoway involvesthequestionofjurisdiction. procedure of specialcourtsandquasi-judicialbodiesshallremain effectiveunlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt. 6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordancewiththeCivilServiceLaw. Powersandfunctions 1. 2. Peoplev.MateoreintermediatereviewoftheCAofcasesrequiring Exerciseoriginaljurisdictionovercasesaffectingambassadors, automaticreviewbytheSC other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion corpus. perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspectionbeforethepenaltyofdeath,reclusionperpetuaorlife certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and judgmentsandordersoflowercourtsin: compellingtoprovideinthesecasesareviewbytheCourtofAppeals a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any beforethecaseiselevatedtotheSupremeCourt. treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. Procedural matters, regulationisinquestion. first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making b. Allcasesinvolvingthelegalityofanytax,impost,assessment, ortoll,oranypenaltyimposedinrelationthereto. c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposedisreclusion perpetuaorhigher. e. Allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved. 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignmentshallnot exceedsixmonthswithouttheconsentofthejudgeconcerned. 4. Orderachangeofvenueorplaceoftrialtoavoidamiscarriageof justice. 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutionalrights,pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplifiedandinexpensiveprocedureforthespeedydispositionof cases, shall be uniform for allcourtsofthesamegrade,andshall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediatereviewbytheCourtofAppeals,asubordinateappellate court,beforethecaseiselevatedtotheSupremeCourtonautomatic review,issuchaproceduralmatter. Carpio-Moralesv.CA2015EnBanc ontherule-makingpoweroftheSC While the power todefine,prescribe,andapportionthejurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,pleading, practice,andprocedureinallcourtsbelongsexclusivelytothis Court as per Section 5 (5), Article VIII. Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerningpleading,practice,andprocedure. The power of a court to issue provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.Agrantofappellatejurisdictionimpliesthatthereisincluded initthepowernecessarytoexerciseiteffectively,tomakeallorders that will preserve the subject of the action,andtogiveeffecttothe finaldeterminationoftheappeal. The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section14,RA6770and,insodoing,tookawayfromthecourtstheir power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisionalreliefsandauxiliarywritscreated under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedurewhichbelongexclusivelywithintheprovinceofthis Court. Estipona,Jr.v.Lobrigo2017EnBancrePlea-bargaining TheSChasrejectedpreviousattemptsonthepartoftheCongress,in the exercise of itslegislativepower,toamendtheRulesofCourt,to wit: 1. Fabianv.Desierto—AppealfromthedecisionoftheOffice of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case shouldbetakentotheCAundertheprovisionsofRule43of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as providedinSection27ofR.A.No.6770. 2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. —TheCooperativeCode provisionsonnoticescannotreplacetherulesonsummons underRule14oftheRules. 3. RE:PetitionforRecognitionoftheExemptionoftheGSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; BAMARVEMPCO v. Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the NPC from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Republic v. Hon. Mangotara,etal.—Despitestatutoryprovisions,theGSIS, BAMARVEMPCO,andNPCarenotexemptfromthepayment oflegalfeesimposedbyRule141oftheRules. 4. Carpio-Morales v. CA — ThefirstparagraphofSection14 ofR.A.No.6770,whichprohibitscourtsexcepttheSupreme Court fromissuingtemporaryrestrainingorderand/orwrit of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, Is unconstitutional as it contravenesRule58oftheRules. In determining whether a ruleprescribedbytheSupremeCourt,for thepracticeandprocedureofthelowercourts,abridges,enlarges,or BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 61of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver modifies any substantive right, the testiswhethertherulereally regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.Iftheruletakesawayavestedright,itisnotprocedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory dispositionofthecasesubjecttocourtapproval." Section23ofRepublicActNo.9165isdeclaredunconstitutionalfor being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court underSection5(5),ArticleVIII. Leonen,Jconcurring The prohibition found in Section 23 is unconstitutional not only because it contravenes the rule-making power of thisCourt,italso constitutes"cruel,degrading,andinhuman"punishmentforthe accused.Theaimistorehabilitate,notpunish,thosedrugoffenders. court employee had acted within the scope of their administrativeduties. 3) Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired termofthepredecessor. VIII.CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSIONS 4) In no case shall any Member be appointedordesignatedina temporaryoractingcapacity. 5) Commonqualifications.—Allmembersmustbe A.Commonprovisions B.Institutionalindependencesafeguards a) Natural-borncitizens; C.Powersandfunctions b) atleast35yearsolda tthetimeofappointmentand E.Prohibitedofficesandinterests ArticleVIII,Section6ofthe1987Constitutionexclusivelyvestsin the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and courtpersonnel.Byvirtueofthispower,itisonlytheSupremeCourt that can oversee the judges' and courtpersonnel'scompliancewith all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if theycommitanyviolationthereof. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner'scertificatesofservicetothisCourtfordetermination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination.TheOmbudsmancannotcompelthisCourt,asoneof the threebranchesofgovernment,tosubmititsrecords,ortoallow itspersonneltotestifyonthismatter. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsmanmustdeferactiononsaidcomplaintandreferthe same to this Court for determination whether said judge or B.Institutionalindependencesafeguards A.Commonprovisions Toensureindependenceofthesebodies,thefollowingguarantees Sec 1 . T he C onstitutional C ommissions, w hich shall b e areprescribed: independent,are 1) Thesebodiesmaynotbeabolishedbystatute. a) theCivilServiceCommission, 2) Eachofthemisexpresslydescribedasindependent. b) theCommissiononElections,and 3) Eachofthemisconferredcertainpowersandfunctionswhich cannotbewithdrawnorreducedbystatute. c) theCommissiononAudit. Macedav.Vasquezresupervisionoflowercourtsandpersonnel c) must not have been candidates for any elective position in the electionsimmediatelyprecedingtheir appointment. D.Compositionandqualificationsofmembers Sec 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularlyreleased. Sec7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallits Members,anycaseormatterbroughtbeforeitwithin60daysfrom thedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution. AdditionalCommonalities 4) The chairmen and members may not be removedfromoffice exceptbyimpeachment. 5) The chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of sevenyears. 6) Thetermsofofficearestaggeredinsuchamannerastolessen theopportunityforappointmentofthemajorityofthebodyby thesamePresident. 1) How appointed and term of office.—Allchairpersonsand commissioners are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of7 yearsw ithoutreappointment. 7) The chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointedinanactingcapacity. 2) Staggering of terms. — Of those first appointed, the Chairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerfor fiveyears(2forComelec),andanotherCommissionerforthree years(theremaining4forComelec),withoutreappointment. 9) TheCommissionsenjoyfiscalautonomy. 8) Thesalariesmaynotbedecreasedduringtheircontinuancein office. 10) EachCommissionmaypromulgateitsownrules. 11) The chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualificationsandinhibitionscalculatedtostrengthentheir integrity. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 62of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 12) Theyareallowedtoappointtheirownofficialsandemployees. instrumentalities,includingGOCCswithoriginal charters,andonap ost-auditbasis: C.Powersandfunctions CSC 1. AsthecentralpersonnelagencyoftheGovernment, shallestablishacareerserviceandadoptmeasuresto promotemorale,efficiency,integrity,responsiveness, progressiveness,andcourtesyinthecivilservice.It shall 1. strengthenthemeritandrewardssystem, 2. integrateallhumanresourcesdevelopment programsforalllevelsandranks,and 3. institutionalizeamanagementclimateconduciveto publicaccountability. Comelec 1. Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulations relativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite, initiative,referendum,andrecall. 2. Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverall contestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,and qualificationsofallelectiveregional,provincial, andcityofficials,andappellatejurisdictionoverall contestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficials decidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,or involvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedby trialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction. 3. Decisions,finalorders,orrulingsonelection contestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalandbarangay officesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable. 4. Decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote,all questionsaffectingelections,including determinationofthenumberandlocationof pollingplaces,appointmentofelectionofficials andinspectors,andregistrationofvoters. constitutionalbodies,commissionsandoffices thathavebeengrantedfiscalautonomyunderthis Constitution; 2. autonomousstatecollegesanduniversities; 3. otherGOCCsandtheirsubsidiaries;and 4. suchnon-governmentalentitiesreceivingsubsidy orequity,directlyorindirectly,fromorthroughthe Government,whicharerequiredbylaworthe grantinginstitutiontosubmittosuchauditasa conditionofsubsidyorequity. D.Compositionandqualificationsofmembers CSC Comelec Composition 1Chair+2 Comms 1Chair+6 Comms Term 7yearswithoutreappointment amajority thereof, includingthe Chair,shallbe withproven membersof Special capacityfor thePhilippine qualification public Barwhohave administration beenengaged inthepractice oflawforat least10 years. amongothers COA Shallhavethepower,authority,anddutytoexamine, audit,andsettleallaccountspertainingtotherevenue andreceiptsof,andexpendituresorusesoffundsand property,ownedorheldintrustby,orpertainingto,the Government,oranyofitssubdivisions,agencies,or constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointmentforalesserperiodisvoidandunconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full termofseven(7)yearsincaseoftheexpirationoftheterm as this will result inthedistortionoftherotationalsystem prescribedbytheConstitution. 2. Appointments to vacancies resultingfromcertaincauses shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggeringofterms. 3. Memberswhowereappointedforafulltermofsevenyears and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily,thefirstappointeesintheCommissionunderthe Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman fortheunexpired portionofthetermofthedepartingchairman. COA 1Chair+2Comms CPAswithnotless than10yearsof auditing experience,OR membersofthe PhilippineBarwho havebeenengaged inthepracticeof lawforatleast1 0 years. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,p rovided a) thattheaggregateperiodofthelengthofserviceas commissionerandtheunexpiredperiodoftheterm of the predecessor will notexceedseven(7)years and b) that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removalbyimpeachment. Atnotimeshallall Membersbelongto thesame profession. The Courtclarifiesthat“reappointment”foundinSec.1(2), Art.IX(D)meansamovementtooneandthesameoffice. On the other hand, an appointment involvingamovementtoa different position or office would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointmentbarredundertheConstitution. Funav.Villar2012EnBanc The Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,viz: 1. 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity. The appointment of members of any of the three BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 63of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver E.Prohibitedofficesandinterests Sec2.NomemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhis tenure, P.RightAgainstExcessiveFinesandCruel,Degrading,andInhuman Q.Non-imprisonmentforDebts a) holdanyotherofficeoremployment; R.RightAgainstDoubleJeopardy b) engageinthepracticeofanyprofessionor S.RightAgainstInvoluntaryServitude c) in the active management or control of any business which,inanyway,maybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhis office, T.ExpostfactolawsandBillsofAttainder d) be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilegegrantedby the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,includingGOCCsortheirsubsidiaries. IX.BILLOFRIGHTS A.ConceptofBillofRights B.DueProcessofLaw C.EqualProtectionofLaws D.RightAgainstUnreasonableSearchesandSeizures A.ConceptofBillofRights Natureofprovisions ManilaPrinceHotelvGSIS Thus,wehavetreatedasself-executingtheprovisionsintheBillof Rightsonarrests,searchesandseizures,therightsofapersonunder custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enablecourtstoeffectuateconstitutionalprovisions guaranteeingthefundamentalrightsoflife,libertyandtheprotection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding thetakingordamagingofpropertyforpublic usewithoutjustcompensation. Againstwhomenforceable F.FreedomofSpeechandExpression Peoplev.Domasian H.LibertyofAbodeandFreedomofMovement I.EminentDomain The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the government and its law-enforcementagenciesasalimitationonofficialaction. J.Non-impairmentofContracts Privacyandautonomy K.AdequateLegalAssistanceandFreeAccesstoCourts Oplev.Torres A.O.No.308fallsshortofassuringthatpersonalinformationwhich will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack ofpropersafeguards inthisregardofA.O.No.308mayinterferewiththeindividual's liberty of abode and travelbyenablingauthoritiestotrackdown his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave thewayfor"fishingexpeditions"by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searchesandseizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can bereadorplacedonhisID, much less verifythecorrectnessofthedataencoded.Theythreaten theveryabusesthattheBillofRightsseekstoprevent. Thethreestrandsoftherighttoprivacy,v iz: Theessenceofprivacyisthe"righttobeletalone." M.RightsofPersonsUnderCustodialInvestigation SpecificguaranteesintheBillofRightshavepenumbrasformedby emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.Variousguaranteescreatezonesofprivacy. O.RighttotheSpeedyDispositionofCases (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facilitytoconvenientlytransactbusinesswithbasicservice and social security providers and other government instrumentalitiesand (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basicservices. Vivaresv.STC L.RightAgainstSelf-incrimination N.RightsoftheAccused The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,hence,itistheburdenofgovernmenttoshowthatA.O. No.308isjustifiedbysomecompellingstateinterestandthatitis narrowlydrawn.A.O.No.308ispredicatedontwoconsiderations: E.PrivacyofCommunicationsandCorrespondence G.FreedomofReligion deserving of constitutional protection. Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we willfindthattherightofprivacyisrecognizedand enshrinedinseveralprovisionsofourConstitution.Zonesofprivacy arelikewiserecognizedandprotectedinourlaws. Punishments The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully 1) locational or situational privacy —referstotheprivacy that is felt in physical space, such as that which may be violatedbytrespassandunwarrantedsearchandseizure.; 2) informational privacy — usually defined as the right of individualstocontrolinformationaboutthemselves;and 3) decisional privacy — usually defined as the right of BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 64of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver individuals to make certain kinds of fundamental choices withrespecttotheirpersonalandreproductiveautonomy. 1. Relationtohumanrights Republicv.Sandiganbayan The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under theCovenantandtheDeclarationremained ineffectduringtheinterregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directivesandordersoftherevolutionarygovernment.Thus,during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitutionnoraBillofRightsduringtheinterregnum. Under Article 17(1) oftheICCPR,therevolutionarygovernmenthad the duty to insure that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence." The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, providesinitsArticle17(2)that"nooneshallbearbitrarilydeprived of his property." Although thesignatoriestotheDeclarationdidnot intenditasalegallybindingdocument,beingonlyadeclaration,the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.Thus,therevolutionarygovernmentwasalsoobligatedunder international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration. As the de jure government, the revolutionary governmentcouldnotescaperesponsibilityfortheState'sgoodfaith compliancewithitstreatyobligationsunderinternationallaw. (3) towidenthereachofone’scapabilities, Notes 2. According to Imbong v Ochoa, life commencesupon“conception, It continues to be dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every thatis,uponfertilization.” Justice Fernando describes it as“responsivenesstothesupremacy ofreason,obediencetothedictatesofjustice.” 5. Justice Frankfurter regards it as “the embodiment of the sporting ideaoffairplay.” 6. Due process isaguarantyagainstanyarbitrarinessonthepartof thegovernment. 7. Protects all persons, natural as well as artificial (juridical), citizenoralien. 8. Juridical persons are also covered but only insofar as their property is concerned. This narrower protection stems from the factthattheyareonlycreaturesoflaw,subjecttothecontrolofthe legislature. 9. To deprive is to “take away forcibly, to preventfrompossessing, enjoyingorusingsomething.” 10. Deprivationisdenialoftherighttolife,libertyorproperty. 11. It is per senotunconstitutional.Whatisprohibitedisdeprivation withoutdueprocessoflaw. Conceptofrighttolife,libertyandproperty B.DueProcessofLaw Section1.Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orproperty withoutdueprocessoflaw,xxxx. 4. 1. Lifeistheintegrityofthephysicalperson. 2. Includedthereinisthe (1) righttogivefullreintoone’sallnaturalattributes, (2) toexpandthehorizonsofone’smind, “Liberty is the freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright honorable conscience of the individual.” It is preferred to have the meaning of the phrase “gradually ascertainedbytheprocessofinclusionandexclusioninthecourse ofthedecisionsofcasesastheyarise.” 4. one’slifemoremeaningfulandrewarding. prevent the judiciary from adjusting it to the circumstances of 3. particularcases. situationcallingforitsapplication. 3. (4) to enhance those moral and spiritual values that can make There is no precise meaning as it might prove constricting and 5. A personisfreetodoashepleasessubjectonlytothereasonable restrictionsofthelaw. Agcaoili,Jr.v.Fariñas2018EnBanc InSecretaryofNationalDefenseetal.v.Manaloetal.,theCourt explainedtheconceptofr ighttolifeinthiswise: While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentiallytherighttobealive—uponwhichtheenjoymentofall other rights is preconditioned—the right to security of personisaguaranteeofthesecurequalityofthislife.Inabroad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legalanduninterruptedenjoymentofhislife,hislimbs,hisbody, his health,andhisreputation.Itincludestherighttoexist,and therighttoenjoymentoflifewhileexisting,anditisinvadednot only by a deprivation of life butalsoofthosethingswhichare necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament,andlawfuldesiresoftheindividual." Therighttoliberty, ontheotherhand,wasdefinedintheCityof Manila,etal.v.Hon.Laguio,Jr.,inthismanner: LibertyasguaranteedbytheConstitutionwasdefinedbyJustice Malcolm to include "the right to exist andtherighttobefree from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfedintomerefreedomfromphysicalrestraintoftheperson ofthecitizen,butisdeemedtoembracetherightofmantoenjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint asarenecessaryforthecommon welfare." ⭐Acostav.Ochoa2019LeonenEnBanc BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 65of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the government'stermsforitsuse. rightsofnoticeandhearing,aswellastheguaranteeofbeing heard by an impartial andcompetenttribunal.Theessence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending caseaffectingtheirinterests,anduponnotice,they mayclaimtherighttoappearthereinandpresenttheirside andtorefutethepositionoftheopposingparties. Thegrantoflicense,however,iswithoutprejudicetotheinviolability of the home. The right of the peopleagainstunreasonablesearches andseizuresremainsparamount,andthegovernment,intheguiseof regulation, cannot conduct inspections of applicants for firearm licensesunlessarmedwithasearchwarrant. With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the State, there could not have been a deprivation of petitioners' right to due process in requiring a license for the possession of firearms. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution is clearthatonly life, liberty, or property is protected by the due process clause. In Chavez, the Court held that there is no vested right in the continued ownership and possession of firearms. Like any other license,thelicensetopossessafirearmis"neitherapropertynor a property right." As a mere "permit or privilege to do what otherwisewouldbeunlawful,"itdoesnotactas"acontractbetween theauthoritygrantingitandthepersontowhomitisgranted." Property interests protected by theDueProcessClausedonotarise whenever a person has only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectationofabenefit.Truepropertyrightsarisefrom legitimate claims of entitlement defined by existing rules or understandingthatstemfromanindependentsource,suchaslaw. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the right to possess a firearm was considered a property right, it is doctrine that property rights are always subject to theState'spolicepower, defined asthe"authoritytoenactlegislationthatmayinterferewith personallibertyorpropertyinordertopromotethegeneralwelfare." Kindsofdueprocess Palaciosv.People2019Division Substantive 1. 2. 3. 4. b) procedural due process which consists of the two basic The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal ortechnical.Assuch,todenypetitioner'smotionfor reinvestigationonthebasisoftheprovisionsofA.M.No.11-6-10-SC would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due processonpurelyproceduralgrounds.Thus,thecourtsaquoshould allowpetitionertobeaccordedtherighttosubmitcounter-affidavits andevidenceinapreliminaryinvestigation. Requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the Procedural Our SC has held that “the twin requirements of notice and hearing rightsofthepersontohislife,libertyorproperty. constitute the essential elements of due process and neither of these Inquiryiswhetheritisaproperexerciseoflegislativepower. elementscanbeeliminatedwithoutrunningafouloftheconstitutional Thelawmusthaveavalidgovernmentalobjective. guaranty.” Thisobjectivemustbepursuedinalawfulmanner.Inotherwords, Judicial the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishmentofthepurposeandnotundulyoppressive. Requirementsareasfollows: (1) There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with 5. InKwongSingv.CityofManila,anordinancerequiringalllaundry judicialpowertohearanddeterminethematterbeforeit. establishments to issue their receipts in English or Spanish was sustained by the Court toprotectthepublicfromdeceptionsand misunderstandings that might arise with the receipts in Chinese charactersthatmostdon’tunderstand. 6. However,inYuCongEngv.Trinidad,alawprohibitingthekeeping of account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or anyotherlocaldialectwasi nvalidated. 7. TheRetailTradeNationalizationLawwassustainedinIchongv. Hernandezasavalidexerciseofpolicepowernotingthattheretail tradewasatthattimecontrolledbyaliens. 8. Decades later, the Retail Trade Liberalization Law, RA 8762, repealing RTNL, inEspinav.Zamorasustainedsuchrepealabsent anyblatantviolationoftheconstitution. Dueprocessi scomprisedoftwo(2)components— a) substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validityofthelawininterferingwiththerightsoftheperson tohislife,liberty,orproperty,and employmentwasconsideredaviolationofthepetitioner’srightto substantivedueprocess. 9. InSerranov.GallantMaritimeServices,Inc.,alawwhichprovides fora3-monthcaponclaimsofoverseasworkerswithanunexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other overseas or local workers with fixed-term (2) Jurisdiction mustbelawfullyacquiredoverthepersonofthe defendantandoverthepropertywhichisthesubjectmatterof theproceeding. (3) Thedefendantmustbegivenano pportunitytobeheard. (4) Judgmentmustberendereduponl awfulhearing. InreAbellanav.Paredes2019Division Jurisprudencehasrecognizedthatthewritofhabeascorpusmayalso beavailedofasapost-convictionremedywhen,asaconsequence sentence as to circumstance of a judicial proceeding, any of the followingexceptionalcircumstancesisattendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resultingintherestraintofaperson; 2) thecourthadnojurisdictiontoimposethesentence;or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentenceassuch excess. Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 66of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver enough. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to voidtheentireproceedings.This,petitionerfailedtoshow. Petitioner avers that he has been deprived of his right to due process because of lack of notice of the proceedings in the trial court. Evenifitweretruethatpetitionerorhiscounselwerenotnotifiedof the scheduled hearing, itisstillnotenoughtowarrantafindingof denial of due process. For in the applicationoftheprincipleofdue process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack ofprevious notice but thedenialoftheopportunitytobeheard.Petitioner was able to file several pleadings. Also, he was represented by counselwhenallprosecutionwitnessestestifiedandhiscounselwas alsoabletocross-examinethem.Lastly,hewasabletofileamotion for new trial or reconsideration of the Decision convicting him. A partywhowasgiventheopportunitytoseekareconsiderationofthe actionorrulingcomplainedofcannotclaimdenialofdueprocessof law. In view thereof, petitioner's claim of denial of due process is withoutmerit. Administrative Requisitesare: (1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’scaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof. (2) Thetribunalmustc onsidertheevidencepresented. proceeding can know the various issues involved,andthe reasonforthedecisionrendered. Angv.Belaro,Jr.2019Division Therighttobeheardisthemostbasicprincipleofdueprocess.It is a settled rule that thereisnodenialofdueprocesswhenaparty has been given an opportunity to be heard and to presenthiscase. There is only denial of due process when there is total absenceor lackofopportunitytobeheardortohaveone'sdayincourt. Technicalrulesofprocedurearenotstrictlyappliedinadministrative proceedings and administrative due process cannot be fully equatedwithdueprocessinitsstrictjudicialsense. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusationsagainsthimconstitutetheminimumrequirementsofdue process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the actionorrulingcomplainedof. Test Strict Scrutiny (4) Theevidencemustbes ubstantial. (5) The decisionmustberenderedontheevidencepresented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosedtothepartiesaffected. (6) Thetribunalorbodyoranyofitsjudgesmustactonitsorhis own independent consideration of the lawandfactsofthe controversy and notsimplyaccepttheviewsofasubordinate inarrivingatadecision. Governmentalinterestis extensivelyexamined andtheavailabilityof lessrestrictivemeasures considered. C.EqualProtectionofLaws Section1.xxxnorshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotection ofthelaws. Concept 1. Requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2. Itisdirectedprincipallyagainstunduefavorandindividualorclass privilege. 3. Substantive equalityisnotenough.Thelawmustalsobeenforced andappliedequally. Dealswith How? Freedomofthemind; restrictingthepolitical process;regulationof speech,gender,orrace, otherfundamentalrights suchassuffrage,judicial access,interstatetravel Focusisonthepresence ofcompelling,rather thansubstantial governmentalinterest andontheabsenceof lessrestrictivemeans forachievingthat interest. Intermsofjudicial reviewofstatutesor ordinances: Determinesthequality andtheamountof governmentalinterest broughttojustifythe regulationof fundamentalfreedoms. Reviewforeconomic legislation;equal protectionchallenges Rationallyfurthera legitimategovernmental interest (7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, Rational Basis Standard Classificationbasedon genderandlegitimacy LevelsofScrutiny (3) Thedecisionmusth avesomethingtosupportitself. render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the Heightened or Immediate Scrutiny 4. InPeoplev.Vera,theoldProbationLawprovidedthattheprobation system shall be applicable “only in those provinces in whichthe respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probationofficer.”Onitsface,itisasoundlaw.Butwhenapplied,it discriminatesagainstpersonsinoneprovincethatmaynotbeable to provide for the salary of a probation officer. Thus, they are deniedthebenefitsofprobation. 5. Itisarestraintonallthreedepartmentsofthegovernment,etc. 6. Significantly, in Yrasuegui v. PAL, the dismissal of an overweight flightattendantwasupheldastheequalprotectionclauseerectsno shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. In another case of International School Alliance of Educatorsv.Quisumbing,however,theequalprotectionclausewas appliedonaprivateentity. Requisitesforvalidclassification The grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particularsanddifferentfromallothersinthesesameparticulars. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 67of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver distinction between medical students andotherstudentswho arenotsubjectedtotheNMATandthethree-flunkrule. (1) Itmustbebasedupons ubstantialdistinctions. (2) Itmustbegermanet othepurposeofthelaw. (3) Itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly. 8. upper-level positions in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. (4) Itmustapplyequallytoallmembersofthesameclass. SubstantialDistinctions 1. Certainphysicaldifferencesofpersonscaninsomeinstancebe the basis of a valid classification, i.e. strength, height and weight,healthcondition,age. 2. Arecognizeddistinctionbetweencitizensandaliensisthatthe formerhavemoresolicitudeforthenationalinterest. 3. In Ceniza v. COMELEC, a law classifying cities as highly urbanizediftheyhadanannualrevenueofatleastP40million and all others as componentcitieswasupheldsinceitwould show whether a city is capableofexistenceanddevelopment independent from the province where it is geographically located. Being so, they are exempt from voting forprovincial officials. 4. There is also a substantial distinction between barangay officials and other elected public officials, in terms of term-limitandlengthofterm. 5. RA 6770 which authorizes the Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension, instead ofthecivilservice provisionsoftheAdminCode,whichlimitssuchsuspensionto notexceeding90days,doesnotviolateequalprotection. 6. InInternationalSchoolAllianceofEducatorsv.Quisumbing,it was ruled that there existsnosubstantialdistinctionbetween local-hire and foreign teachers, in light of the long honored legal truism, “equal pay for equal work.” Thus, rendering nugatory the better treatment of the foreign hires in terms of pay,andallowances. 7. InDECSv.SanDiego,thethree-flunkruleinNMATwasupheld There also exists between presidential appointees occupying 9. Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCIBank upheld Sec 47 RA 8791 that shortens the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and soldinaccordancewithActNo3135.Thereis substantial difference based on the nature of the properties foreclosed, residence for natural persons, as compared to industrialorcommercialpurposesforjuridicalpersonswhich necessitates a shorter redemptionperiodtoreducetheperiod of uncertainty intheownershipofsaidpropertiesandenable mortgagee-bankstodisposesooneroftheiracquiredassets. 10. Garciav.DrilonvalidatedRA9262ortheVAWCLawasthere is a need toemployprotectionuponwomenastheyaremore likelytobevictimsofabuses. 11. In Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, the law deregulating the oil industrywasdeclaredunconstitutionalonthegroundinteralia that it discriminated against the new players, insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditionsalreadybeingobservedbythelatter. 12. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. declared that there was suspect classification against overseas workers with an unexpiredportionofoneyearormoreintheircontractswhich burdensthemwithapeculiardisadvantage. 13. There is no substantial distinction between those tried and convicted by a military court vis-a-vis those tried and convictedinregularcourtsintermsoftheirrightsasaccused, asheldinGarciav.ExecutiveSecretary. andnotviolativeofequalprotectionastherewasasubstantial 14. EO No 1 of President Benigno Aquino III on his “Truth Commission” was invalidated as it zeroed-in on the past administrationofArroyo. 15. Also considered by the SCasdiscriminatorywasSec5.24of the IRR of the Reproductive Health Law. It nullified said law in Imbong v. Ochoa, saying that the conscientious objectionclauseshouldbeequallyprotectiveofthereligious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinctionwhytheyshouldnotbeconsideredexemptfromthe mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the privateorpublicsector. 16. IngrantingthepetitioninAngLadladLGBTPartyv.COMELEC, the Court further invokedtheprincipleofnon-discrimination, as provided foralsoundertheInternationalCovenantonCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of HumanRights(UDHR). PhilippinePlasticsIndustryAssociationv.SanPedro2018 Resolution ThesubjectOrdinancedidnotviolatetheequalprotectionclause of theConstitution,asthereissubstantialdistinctionbetweenthe primaryandsecondaryplasticpackagingmaterials,orevenbetween plastic packaging materials and plastic cutlery. To note, the frozen and wet goods require nonporousprimarypackagingtopreventthe seepageorspillageofliquidorfluidbutnosuchseepageorspillage can be had on dry goods that do not require refrigeration. For this reason, plastic as primary packaging materials for wet goods is allowed while the same is disallowed as primary packaging materials for dry goods. Further, plastic is also disallowed as secondarypackagingmaterialsforwetgoodssincenomoreseepage or spillage of liquid or fluid can behadastheirprimarypackaging alreadyservedthepurposeofpreventingthesame.Theuseofplastic assecondarypackagingmaterialsforwetgoodsismerelytoprovide supporttoanypackaginganditisintendedfortheconvenienceofthe handler. Thus, a reusable packaging material would be enough to serve that purpose. And as explained by the City Government of Muntinlupa, the prohibition covers only the sale and provision of BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 68of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver plasticbagsaspackagingmaterialsforwetanddrygoodsandnotthe plasticpackagingorwrappersofthesegoodsdonebytheproducers ormanufacturersthereof. RelevancetoPurposeofLaw 17. Classificationwillstillbeinvalidifnotrelevantorgermaneto thepurposeofthelaw. Duration 18. Classificationmustbeenforcednotonlyforthepresentbutas longastheproblemsoughttobecorrectedcontinuestoexist. 19. In People v. Cayat, the law prohibited members of the non-Christian tribes fromdrinkingforeignliquorastheyhave lowtoleranceofsuchdrink. 20. In Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, an ordinance imposing 1% tax per export sale to the US of said company was invalidated as it is restricted to the current condition that only one sugar mill exists in Ormoc. Should there be another sugar mill, it willnotbeimposedwithsuch tax as the ordinance specifically mentioned the petitioner therein. TheoryofRelativeConstitutionality 21. The constitutionality ofastatutecannot,ineveryinstance,be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicableprovisionsoftheConstitution,sincethestatutemay be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalidinitsapplicationtoanother. 22. A statute valid at one time may become voidatanothertime becauseofalteredcircumstances. 23. Thus,ifastatuteinitspracticaloperationbecomesarbitraryor confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication,isopentoinquiryandinvestigationinthelightof changedconditions. Levelsofscrutiny ApplicabilitytoAll 24. Substantive similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treatedequally. 25. InVillegasv.HiuChongTsaiPaoHo,anordinanceimposinga workpermitfeeofP50.00uponallaliensdesirousofobtaining employment in Manila was struckdownnotingthatthesame amount is being collected whether the alien is casual or permanent, part time or full-time, or whether he is a lowly employeeorahighlypaidexecutive. 26. InTatadv.SecretaryofEnergyandSecretaryofFinance,theSC struck down a law deregulating the downstream oil industry for violation of the equal protection clause as it favored the oligopoly of the 3 big players to the prejudice ofprospective investors that would be saddled with requirements already compliedwithbythethreeoilgiants. ⭐ZomerDevelopmentv.SpecialTwentiethDivisionoftheCA, CebuCity2020LeonenEnBanc InSamahanngProgresibongKabataanv.QuezonCity,thisCourt summarizedthethree(3)teststodeterminethereasonableness ofaclassification: Thestrictscrutinytesta pplieswhenaclassificationeither 1. interferes with t he exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution,or 2. burdenss uspectclasses. The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification doesnotinvolvesuspectclassesorfundamentalrights,butrequires heightenedscrutiny,suchasinclassificationsbasedongenderand legitimacy. DPWHRegionIV-Av.COA2019EnBanconSelectiveProsecution Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not coveredbythefirsttwotests. In People v. Dela Piedra, the Court declared that an erroneous performance of statutory duty — such as an apparent selective enforcement of the statute — could not be considered a violation of the equal protection clause, unless the element of intentionalorpurposefuldiscriminationisshown. A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment,orrelegatedtosuchapositionofpoliticalpowerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian politicalprocess." In that case, the Court ruled that there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws in prosecuting only oneofthemanyequally guilty persons. This lone circumstance would not be sufficient to uphold the claim of denial of the equal protection clause.Absenta clearshowingofintentionaldiscrimination,theprosecutingofficers shallbepresumedtohaveregularlyperformedtheirofficialduties. It is up to the personwhoclaimstohavebeenthevictimofselective enforcement to prove that the same was madeforadiscriminatory purpose. Juridicalentitiescannotbeconsidereda"suspectclass." In this case, aside from her allegation that DPWH IV-A was among thosesingledoutbytheCOAconcerningthedisallowanceoftheCNA Incentive,Cuaresmafailedtopresentevenasingleevidencetoshow that the disallowance of the subject CNA Incentive was made pursuanttoadiscriminatorypurpose. The rational basis test may be applied to determine the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971,Section47.Therational basistestrequiresonlythat a) therebealegitimategovernmentinterestandthat b) there is a reasonable connection between itandthemeans employedtoachieveit. A longer period of redemption is given to natural persons whose mortgagedpropertiesaremoreoftenusedforresidentialpurposes.A shorter period of redemption is given to juridical persons whose propertiesaremoreoftenusedforcommercialpurposes. Goldenway Merchandising explains that the shorter period is aimedtoensure thesolvencyandliquidityofbanks. There is, thus, a legitimate government interestintheprotectionof BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 69of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver the banking industry and a legitimate government interest in the protection of foreclosed residential properties owned by natural persons. The shortened period of redemption for juridical entities may be considered tobethereasonablemeansfortheprotectionof boththeseinterests. Conceptofasearch 1. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. (a) Thepurposeofthesearchorseizure; D.RightAgainstUnreasonableSearchesand Seizures (b) Thepresenceorabsenceofprobablecause; (c) The manner in which the search and seizure was Sec2.Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizuresof whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissuee xcept (d) Theplaceorthingsearched;and (e) Thecharacterofthearticlesprocured. 1. uponprobablecause Requisitesofavalidwarrant 2. tobed eterminedpersonallybythejudge (1) ExistenceofProbableCause 3. after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainantandthewitnesseshemayproduce,and 4. 1. Probable cause has been defined as referring to “such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious manto relyonthemandactinpursuancethereof.” particularly describingtheplacetobesearchedandthe personsorthingstobeseized. Conceptofprivacy 1. made; 2. circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautiousmaninbelievingaccusedtobecommittingtheoffense ortobeguiltyoftheoffense.” The rights against unreasonable searches and seizuresandto the privacy of communication and correspondence are availabletoa llpersons. 2. Suchrightispersonalandmayonlybeinvokedbytheperson 3. The “right to be left alone” extends notonlytotheprivacyof one’s home but also to his office, including the papers and effectsthatmaybefoundthere. 4. The right applies as a distraint directed only against the governmentanditsagenciestaskedwiththeenforcementofthe law.Theprotectioncannotextendtoactscommittedbyprivate individuals so as to bring them within the ambit of alleged unlawfulintrusionbythegovernment. It is the knowledgeoffacts,actualorapparent,strongenough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for prosecuting defendant in the mannercomplained of, the concurrence of facts and circumstances reasonably warrantingthebelief. entitledtoit. 3. It “consists of areasonablegroundofsuspicionsupportedby 4. Peoplev.Ramon2019Resolution Thequantumofprooftoestablishprobablecauseandaprima faciecaseforpurposesofissuanceofanarrestwarrantandfor preliminaryinvestigationareoneandthesame. Iftheevidenceonrecorddoesnotclearlyestablishprobablecauseto form a well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements thereof being present, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, or, stated otherwise, it is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case against the accused, then the imperativeisforthe prosecutororthejudgetorelievetheaccusedfromthepainofgoing throughtrial.Conversely,ifthefindingbytheprosecutororthejudge is that the evidence onrecordsufficientlyestablishesaprimafacie case or probable cause against the accused, the accused should be indictedandheldfortrial. (2) PersonalDeterminationbytheJudge 1. Thewarrantmustrefertoonlyonespecificoffense,provided inSec3Rule126oftheRulesofCourt. Estradav.OfficeoftheOmbudsman2015EnBanc According to Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, this poweris deriveddirectlyfromtheself-executingprovisionsofSec2Art IIIofthe1987Constitution.Theword“judge”includesjudges ofalllevels. A finding of probable causeneednotbebasedonclearand convincingevidence,oronevidencebeyondreasonabledoubt. But,itmustbemorethanmeresuspicion. 5. The determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the hearsaystatementiscredible.Probablecausecanbeestablished withhearsayevidence,aslongasthereissubstantialbasisfor crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigationswillchangethequantumofevidencerequiredin determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probabilityofguilttosubstantialevidenceofguilt. 2. Astothequestionofwhoshoulddetermineprobablecause as a requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the CourtinPlacerv.Villanueva,ruledthatsuchissuanceisnota ministerialfunctionofthejudgewhohadtherighttodetermine forhimselftheexistenceofprobablecause.Heisnotboundby thefindingsoftheprosecutor. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 70of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 3. Thus,inSolivenv.Makasiar: 7. Followingestablisheddoctrine,thejudgeshall (1) Personallyevaluatethereportandthesupportingdocuments submitted by the fiscal regarding the existenceofprobable causeandonthebasisthereof,issueawarrantofarrest,or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probablecause,hemay disregardthefiscal’sreportandrequirethesubmissionof supportingaffidavitsofwitnessestoaidhiminarrivingat aconclusionastotheexistenceofprobablecause. 4. In other words, as was held in Enrile v. Salazar, the judge neednotpersonallydeterminetheexistenceofprobablecause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the reportandsupporting documentssubmittedbytheprosecutor. 5. InPeoplev.Desmond,MeTCorMTC,andMTCC judgesareno In Salazar v. Achacoso, Art38(c)oftheLaborCodewhich empowers the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative to cause the arrest anddetentionandorderthe search of the office and the seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements of any unlicensed recruiter for overseas employment, was declared unconstitutional. Peoplev.Gabiosa,Sr.2020Division In the case of Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, the Court explained that ultimately,thepurposeoftheproceedingisforthejudgetodetermine thatprobablecauseexists.Thus,thereisnoneedtoexamineboththe applicant and the witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establishprobablecause. The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although thereisnohard-and-fastrulegoverninghowajudgeshouldconduct hisexamination,itisaxiomaticthat longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations as perAMNo.05-8-26-SC,August30,2005. 1) the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma; 6. In Ho vPeople,theobjectivesoftheprosecutorandthejudge 2) the judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry ontheintentand justificationoftheapplication; indeterminingprobablecauseweredistinguished: Prosecutor Judge Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty and should be heldfortrial. If a warrant of arrest should be issued to place the accused in immediate custody so as not to frustratetheendsofjustice. Conductspreliminary investigationproper Conducts preliminary inquiry/ examination InPeoplevDesmond,determinationofprobablecausemayeither be: Executive: for the purpose of Judicial: to ascertain whether a filing a criminal information in warrant o f arrest should be court issued. 3) the questions should not merely be repetitious of t he averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicantandthewitnesses. If the judge fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses intheformofsearching questions beforeissuingasearchwarrant,graveabuseofdiscretion iscommitted. Here, Judge Balagot made sure that the witness had personal knowledge of the facts by asking specifics, and asked how he obtained knowledge ofthesameandhowhewassurethatthefacts continuetoexist.ThequestionspropoundedbyJudgeBalagot,taken and viewed as a whole, were therefore probing and not merely superficialandperfunctory. We upholdthepowerofjudgestodismissacriminalcasewhenthe evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable causeforthe issuanceofawarrantofarrest. When judges dismiss a case or require the prosecutor to present additionalevidence,theydosonotinderogationoftheprosecutor's authoritytodeterminetheexistenceofprobablecause. First, judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause. That falls under the office of the DOJSecretary. Second, once a complaint or an Information has been filed, the disposition of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,subjectonlytothequalificationthatitsactionmustnotimpair thesubstantialrightsoftheaccusedortherightofthePeopletodue processoflaw. Third, and most important, the judge's determination of probable causehasadifferentobjectivethanthatoftheprosecutor. Tobesure,inthedeterminationofprobablecausefortheissuanceof a warrant of arrest, the judge is not compelled to follow the prosecutor's certification of the existence of probable cause.Aswe stated in People v. Inting, "it is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification whicharematerial inassistingthejudgetomakehisdetermination." The panel's act of resolving the complaint against petitioners and Ong primarily on the basis of Doble's evidence, andinspiteofthe timely submission of the counter-affidavits, wasclearlycommitted withgraveabuseofdiscretion. We have stressed that the court's dismissal of a case for lack of probable cause for theissuanceofawarrantofarrestmustbedone whentheevidenceonrecordplainlyfailstoestablishprobablecause; that is, when the records readily show uncontroverted and, thus, established facts that unmistakably negate the existence of the elementsofthecrimecharged. (3) ExaminationofApplicant 1. Evidencemustbebasedonthepersonalknowledgeofthose who offered same and not on mere information or belief. Hearsayisnotallowed. Fenixv.CA2016 BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 71of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 2. suchamannerthattheaffiantcouldbechargedwithperjuryif theallegationscontainedthereinarefoundtobeuntrue. 3. In Alvarez v. CFI, a search warrant was annulled as it was issuedofanaffidavitbasedon“reliableinformation”only. 4. 6. 9. 3. Otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is 9. Testsforspecificity: b) When the description expresses aconclusionoffact — not oflaw—bywhichthewarrantofficermaybe guided; c) Whenthethingsdescribedarelimitedtothosewhich bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrantisbeingissued. 4. GR:Personsoughttobeseizedshouldbeidentifiedbyname.A John Doe warrant is generally illegal. However, a search warrantneednotidentifywithparticularitythepersonagainst whom it is directed; it suffices that the place to be searched andthethingstobeseizedaredescribed. 5. But while a John Doe warrant is generally held invalid, it is enough if thereissomedescriptiopersonaethatwillenable theofficertoidentifytheaccused. 6. InPLDTv.HPSSoftwareandCommunicationCorporation, the search warrants were not general warrants because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physicallyand theirrelationtotheoffensescharged. 7. bearadirectrelationtotheoffensecharged. 8. circumstanceswillordinarilyallow; A challenge against the participation of a private person in a search warrant proceeding was rejected in PLDT v. HPS Software and Communication Corporation, for as long as the private party is in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motiontoquashthesearchwarrantissuedbythecourt,or (c) When the things described are limited to those that persons or things to be seized be described with such particularity as to enable the person serving the warrant to identifythem. a) When the description therein is as specific as the However, mere innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentationofwitnesseswillnotcausethequashalofa searchwarrant. tobeseized; The Constitution requires that the placetobesearchedorthe proscribedbybothjurisprudenceandtheConstitution. A finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrantmaybequashedif: ★ The applicants and their witnesses committed a deliberatefalsehoodorrecklessdisregardforthetruth on matters that are essential or necessary to the showingofprobablecause. 8. 2. The cases of Mata v. Bayona and Tabujara v. People invalidated the search warrant and warrant of arrest, respectively, as they were based solely on the statement of witnesses whom the judge did not personally examine in writing and under oath; neither did he propound searching questions. 7. 1. Bycontrast,thesearchwarrantwassustainedinYeeSueKoyv. Almeda, where it was shown that the complainant and his witnesses,oftheirownpersonalknowledgeobtainedfromthe personal investigations conducted by them, both declared under oath that the petitioner was engaged in usurious activities. (b) Itleavesthemwithnodiscretionregardingthearticles (4) ParticularityofDescription IntheBurgoscase,theapplicationforsearchwarrantsfiledby twomilitaryofficersonthebasisof“theevidencegatheredand collectedbyourunit”wasr ejected. 5. amotionforreconsiderationofthecourtordergrantingsuch motiontoquash. To be considered sufficient, the affidavits must be drawn in Thus,awarrantwouldbevalid: (a) When itenablesthepoliceofficerstoreadilyidentify thepropertiestobeseized; Only the articles particularly described in the warrantcanbe seized,andnootherpropertycanbetakenthereunderunlessit isprohibitedbylaw. A search warrant is severable. Thus, in Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000, the SupremeCourtsaidthatthegeneraldescriptionofmostofthe documents in the warrant — if there are others particularly described—willnotinvalidatetheentirewarrant.Thoseitems which are not particularly described may simply be cut off withoutdestroyingthewholewarrant.Thisrulingisreiterated inMicrosoftCorporationv.Maxicorp,Inc. 10. The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describenotonlytheplacetobesearched,butalsothepersons tobesearched. 11. InPeoplev.TiuWonChua,G.R.No.149878,July1,2003,the validity of the searchwarrantwasuphelddespitethemistake in the name of the persons to be searched, because the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. Theyhadpersonalknowledgeoftheidentity of thepersonsandtheplacetobesearched,althoughtheydid notspecificallyknowthenamesoftheaccused. Dimalv.People2018 Adescriptionofaplacetobesearchedissufficientiftheofficerwith thewarrantcanascertainandidentifywithreasonableeffortthe place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community.Adesignationthatpointsouttheplacetobesearchedto theexclusionofallothers,andoninquiryunerringlyleadsthepeace officerstoit,satisfiestheconstitutionalrequirementofdefiniteness. To the Court's view, the search warrant sufficiently describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly to the place described. At any rate, petitioners BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 72of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 3) intelligentlygivenand accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who had specifically flagged him and his companions down. He was underthecoerciveforceofarmedlawenforcers.Hisconsent,ifatall, wasclearlyvitiated. cannot beheardtodecryirregularityintheconductofthesearchof thepremisesoftheFelixGumpalCompoundbecause,asaptlyruled by the RTC, a Certification of Orderly Search was issued by the barangay officials, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duty was not sufficiently contradicted by petitioners. 2) specific, 4) uncontaminatedbyanyduressorcoercion. 3. a) Therightexists; In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identityof the property tobesearchedforandseized,sothatthewarrantshall notbeamerer ovingcommission. UnderAmericanjurisprudence,anotherwiseoverbroadwarrantwill complywiththeparticularityrequirementwhentheaffidavitfiledin support of the warrant is physically attached to it, andthewarrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference. Conversely, a warrant which lacks any descriptionoftheitemstobeseizedisdefectiveandisnotcuredbya descriptioninthewarrantapplicationwhichisnotreferencedinthe warrantandnotprovidedtothesubjectofthesearch. Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidenceofsomeitems,the Court sustains the validity of the Search Warrant and the admissibility of theitemsseizedwhichwereparticularlydescribed in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under American jurisprudence: (1) that the seizure ofgoodsnotdescribedinthewarrantdoes notrenderthewholeseizureillegal,andtheseizureisillegal onlyastothosethingswhichwasunlawfultoseize;and (2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidatethefirstsearchandseizure. Warrantlesssearches (1) Consentedsearches 1. Itisnottobelightlyinferredandmustbeshownbyclearand convincingevidence. 2. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwiseillegal search;thatis,theconsentmustbe 1) unequivocal, Itmustbeshownthat b) Thatthepersoninvolvedhadknowledge.Eitheractual (2) Incidenttoalawfularrest 1. weapons thatmaybeusedagainstthearrestingofficerandall unlawful articlesfoundinhispersonorwithinhisimmediate controlmaybeseized. orconstructive,oftheexistenceofsuchright;and c) Thesaidpersonhadanactual intentiontorelinquish theright. 4. 2. Thefollowingcharacteristicsofpersongivingconsentandthe 3. 4. 5) Presenceofcoercivepoliceprocedures; 5. 9) Possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 6. Here, Sison, who was then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officerstoopenthepickup'shood.Hisbeguilingconformityiseasily Prior surveillance isnotnecessaryforaslongasthebuy-bust teamisaccompaniedtothetargetareabyt heinformant. 7. Warrantless arrests made on the basis alone of “tips” or “reliable information” is not sufficient. It is further required thattheaccusedperformedsomeovertactthatwouldindicate thathehascommitted,isactuallycommitting,orisattempting tocommitanoffense. ⭐Peoplev.Yanson2019LeonenDivision ItcannotbesaidthatSison,thedriver,consentedtothesearch made by the arresting officers. Jurisprudence has settled that mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. The validity of asupposedlyconsentedwarrantlesssearchiscontingent on the totality of the attendant circumstances. This may entail an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was ostensibly given,suchas"thepresenceofcoercivepoliceprocedures." Decoy solicitation or the act of soliciting drugs during a buy-bustoperationhasbeenruledasv alid. 7) Natureofpolicequestioning; 8) Environmentwherequestioningtookplace;and While buy-bust operations havebeenrecognizedasvalid,it mustbedistinguishedfrominstigation,whenapersonwhois otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime isenticedor luredortalkedintocommittingthecrime. 4) Educationandintelligence; 6) Beliefthatnoincriminatingevidencewillbefound; Thelawfularrestmustprecedethesearchofapersonandhis belongings. 2) Publicorsecludedplace; 3) Objectedorpassivelylookedon; The Supreme Court stressed in People v. Figueroa that evidence obtained during a warrantless search made before, andnotafter,a warrantlessarrestwouldbeinadmissible. environmentinwhichconsentisgivenmaybeofhelp: 1) Ageofdefendant; The individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed 8. Thewarrantlessarrestsoftheaccusedwhichwerebasedsolely ona“reportfromacivilianasset”ormere“information”were likewise invalidated in People v. Tudtud and People v. Nuevas. 9. Antiquerav.People,inacquittingtheaccuseddeclared,citing People v. Martinez, that a waiver of an illegal warrantless BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 73of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver arrestdoesnotcarrywithitawaiveroftheinadmissibilityof evidenceseizedduringtheillegalwarrantlessarrest. 10. Mayonlybemadewithinthepermissibleareaofsearch,orthe placewithintheimmediatecontrolofthepersonbeingarrested asperEspanov.CA. 11. It has later been ruled that a search substantially contemporaneouswithanarrestcanprecedethearrestifthe policehaveprobablecausetomakethearrestattheoutsetof thesearch. ⭐Manibogv.People2019LeonenDivision Fora"stopandfrisk"searchtobevalid,thetotalityofsuspicious circumstances,aspersonallyobservedbythearrestingofficer,must leadtoagenuinereasontosuspectthatapersoniscommittingan illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this constitutesaninfringementofaperson'sbasicrighttoprivacy. Two(2)oftheexceptionstoasearchwarrant—awarrantlesssearch incidentaltoalawfularrestand"stopandfrisk"—areoftenconfused witheachother.Malacatv.CAexplainedthatthey"differintermsof the requisitequantumofproofbeforetheymaybevalidlyeffected andintheirallowables cope." The lawful arrest generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous,withthesearch. In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest,stopandfrisksearchesareconductedtodetercrime. Foravalidstopandfrisksearch,thearrestingofficermusthavehad personal knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a suspiciouscircumstanceasbasisforthesearchisaninfringementof the"basicrighttosecurityofone'spersonandeffects." Malacatinstructedthatforastopandfrisksearchtobevalid,mere suspicion is not enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to warrantabeliefthattheperson searchedwascarryingaweapon. To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally observed two (2) or more suspiciouscircumstances,thetotalityofwhichwouldthencreatea reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officertoinvestigatefurther. Here, while the CA correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what transpiredwasastopandfrisksearch. The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led toareasonablesuspicionthathewascarryingagun duringanelectiongunban.However,areasonablesuspicionisnot synonymouswiththepersonalknowledgerequiredunderSection 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, the Courtof Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted onpetitionerfell undertheestablishedexceptionofawarrantlesssearchincidentalto alawfularrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of the warrantlesssearchonpetitioner. Customssearches,asexceptiontotherequirementofavalidsearch warrant,areallowedwhenpersonsexercisingpoliceauthorityunder the customs law effect search and seizure in the enforcement of customslaws. Hence,tobeavalidcustomssearch,therequirementsare: (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising policeauthorityundercustomslaw; (2) thesearchwasfortheenforcementofcustomslaw;and (3) theplacesearchedisnotadwellingplaceorhouse. Here,thefactsrevealthatthesearchwaspartofroutineportsecurity measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized undercustomslaw.Itwasalsonotmotivatedbytheprovisionsofthe Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws.Althoughcustoms searchesusuallyoccurwithinportsorterminals,itisimportantthat thesearchmustbefortheenforcementofcustomslaws. (3) Of vessels and aircraftforviolationofimmigration,customs, anddruglaws 1. or jurisdiction in which the searchmustbesoughtbeforethe warrantcouldbesecured. DelaCruzv.People2016LeonenDivision In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constituteawaiver,itmustfirstappearthat 2. In People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, where the accused was searched and arrested upon disembarkation from a passenger vessel, the Court held thattherewasnourgencyto effect a warrantless search, as it is clear that the Philippine Constabulary had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to searchandarresttheaccused.Yet, theydidnothing;noeffortwasmadetocomplywiththelaw. (1) therightexists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,oftheexistenceofsuchright;and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's findings show that petitioner presented his bag for scanning in thex-raymachine.Whenhisbagwentthroughthex-ray machineandthefirearmsweredetected,hevoluntarilysubmittedhis bagforinspectiontotheportauthorities. Theconsentedsearchconductedonpetitioner'sbagisdifferentfrom acustomssearch. Rationale:Thevesselcanbequicklymovedoutofthelocality 3. TheTanglibenrulingcannotapplybecausetheevidencedid not show that the accused was acting suspiciously when he disembarkedfromthevessel. 4. Search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure which is allowed under Sec 9 of RA 6235 was applied in People v. Johnson and People v. Canton, such that announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 74of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizuresdonotapplytoroutineairportprocedures. 5. The scope ofasearchpursuanttoairportsecurityprocedures is not confined only to search for weapons under the Terry searchdoctrine. (4) Ofmovingvehicles 1. In People v. Dequina, the SC considered dried marijuana leaves in traveling bags being carried or transported by the accused in a taxi cab as admissibleinevidenceagainstthem. Since a crime was actually then being committed by the accused, their warrantless arrest was legallyjustified,aswell astheensuingsearch. 2. 3. A warrantless search and seizure involvinganaccusedwhich (3) flashesalightthereinwithoutopeningthecar'sdoors; (4) wheretheoccupantsarenotsubjectedtoaphysicalor bodysearch; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visualsearchorvisualinspection;and (6) wheretheroutinecheckisconductedinafixedarea. searchwarrantwhenitcomestomovingvehiclesdoesnotgive the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. Probable cause must exist. anextensivesearch,itwouldbeconstitutionallypermissible onlyif ★ the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probablecausetobelieve,beforethesearch,thateither themotoristisalawoffenderor ★ they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertainingtoacrimeinthevehicletobesearched. Peoplev.Johnson (2) simplylooksintoavehicle; Persons maylosetheprotectionofthesearchandseizureclauseby exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a l ack ofsubjectiveexpectationofprivacy,which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimalintrusiveness,thegravityofthesafetyinterestsinvolved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated withairline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, andnoticesintheirairlineticketsthatthey are subject to search and, if anyprohibitedmaterialsorsubstances are found, such would be subject to seizure.Theseannouncements BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL "stop-and-search" for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusivetomotorists.R outineinspectionsm aybehad: (1) where the officer merely drawsasidethecurtainofa vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fairgrounds; (b) Inadvertentd iscovery; (c) Immediatelyapparenttotheofficerthattheitemhe observes may be evidence of a crime, contrabandor otherwisesubjecttoseizure; ★ limitedtoamerev isualsearch, ➔ Ontheotherhand,whenthevehicleisstoppedandsubjectedto ➔ One such form of search of moving vehicles is the fromwhichhecanviewaparticulararea; permissiblewhenitis: bodysearch. Thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur: (a) Priorjustificationforanintrusionorisinaposition ➔ For a mere routine inspection, the search is normally Ithasbeenclarifiedthoughthat theexceptionfromsecuringa the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided that such searches are made at borders or “constructive borders”, like checkpoints near the boundarylinesoftheState. 1. checkpointsearchmayeitherbeamereroutineinspection, oritmayinvolveane xtensivesearch. ★ wheretheoccupantsarenotsubjectedtoaphysicalor ➔ Searches without warrant of automobilesarealsoallowedfor (6) Wheretheprohibitedarticlesarein‘plainview’ ➔ In the cases of Caballes v. CA and People v. Libnao, a was caughtinflagrantedelictotransportingmarijuanausinga bicyclewasupheldinP eoplev.Penaflorida. (5) Ofautomobilesatbordersorconstructiveborders place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airportprocedures. (d) Justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 2. Objectisinplainviewwhenitisplainlyexposedtosight. 3. If the package proclaims its contents, whether by its (a) distinctive configuration, its (b) transparency, or its (c) contents are obvious to the observer, thenthecontentsarein plainview. 4. The element of inadvertence would not be present if the police officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accusedwiththesubjectitems. 5. The“immediatelyapparent”testdoesnotrequireanunduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requiresmerelythattheseizurebepresumptively reasonable assuming that thereisprobablecausetoassociate thepropertywithcriminalactivity;thatanexusexistsbetween theviewedobjectandcriminalactivity. 6. In People v. Bolasa, acting on an anonymous tip, the warrantlessarrestandsearchofthesuspectswereinvalidated as they were not caught inflagrantedelictoorasaresultofa hotpursuit,andtheobjectsseizedwerenotinplainviewasit was shown that the police officers had to peep to see them. 75of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Theyoughttohaveconductedpriorsurveillanceandobtaineda searchwarrant. 1. and would not require a search warrant. These are routine inspections which, however, must be conducted during reasonablehours. 7. In People v. Figueroa,248SCRA679,where,whileservinga warrantofarrest,policeofficerssearchedthehouseandfound a pistol, a magazine and seven rounds of ammunition, the seizure of the firearm and ammunition was held lawful, becausetheobjectsseizedwereinplainviewoftheofficerwho hadtherighttobeintheplacewherehewas. 8. InPeoplev.Salanguit,G.RNo.133254-55,April19,2001,the peace officers entered the dwelling armed with a search warrantfortheseizureofshabuanddrugparaphernalia.Inthe course ofthesearch,they(presumably)foundtheshabufirst, and then came upon an article wrapped in newspaper which turned out to be marijuana. On the issue of whether the marijuanamaybevalidlyseized,theSupremeCourtsaidonce the valid portion of thesearchwarranthasbeenexecuted,the “plain view” doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. (Note that the marijuana was wrapped in newspaper which was not transparent.) DominguezyArganav.People2019Division The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratorysearchmadesolelytofindevidenceofdefendant'sguilt. The"plainview"doctrineisusuallyappliedwhereapoliceofficeris not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertentlycomesacrossanincriminatingobject. Inthecaseathand,whileitcanbesaidthatthepresenceofthepolice officers was legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence ofacrime,a contraband,orotherwisesubjecttoseizure. (7) Of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and buildingregulations conducting a patrol on the strength of an information that a Muslim group would explode a grenade, saw petitioner and companions attempting to explode a grenade but who, upon seeing the policemen, desisted and ran away; then, two days later, police officerssawpetitioneratastreetcorner,accosted him when his companions ran away, then searched him and foundagrenade. This is basically an exercise of the police power oftheState, (8) Stopandfriskor“Terrysearches” In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447,October7, 1997,theSupremeCourtupheldthevalidityofthesearchasakinto “stop-and-frisk”which,inthelandmarkU.S.case,Terryv.Ohio,was definedasthevernaculardesignationoftherightofapoliceofficerto stopacitizenonthestreet,interrogatehimandpathimforweapons wheneverheobservesunusualconductwhichleadshimtoconclude that criminal activity may be afoot. In this case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs; thus, the search. 1. (a) The police officer should properly introduce himself and makeinitialinquiries,(b)approachandrestrainapersonwho manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check thelatter’souterclothingforpossiblyconcealedweapons.The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surroundingconditions,towarrantthebeliefthatthepersonto be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him. It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure shouldprecedethearrestfortheprincipletoapply. 2. InPeoplev.Solayao,262SCRA255,theSupremeCourtfound justifiablereasontoapplythe“stop-and-frisk”rule,becauseof thedrunkenactuationsoftheaccusedandhiscompanions,and becauseofthefactthathiscompanionsfledwhentheysawthe policemen, and finally, because the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armedpersonswereroamingthevicinity. 3. TherulewasnotappliedinMalacatv.CourtofAppeals,G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, where police officers, In this case, the Supreme Court said that there was no valid searchbecausetherewasnothinginthebehaviororconductof the petitioner which could have elicited even meresuspicion other than that his eyes were moving fast. There was no reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner was armed withadeadlyweapon. 4. Tobevalid,searchesmustproceedfromawarrantissuedbya judge. While there are exceptions to this rule, warrantless searches can only be carried out when founded on probable cause. There must be a confluence of several suspicious circumstances. A solitary tip hardly suffices as probable cause; items seized during warrantless searches based on solitarytipsareinadmissibleasevidence.(P eoplev.Yanson) Peoplev.Cristobal2019Division The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized itemswereconfiscatedfromCristobalashewasbeingissuedatraffic violationticket. The policeofficersinvolvedinthiscaseconductedanillegalsearch whentheyfriskedCristobalonthebasisoftheforegoingviolations. It wasnot,asitcouldnothavebeen,evenbelievingthestoryofthe policeofficers,asearchincidentaltoalawfularrestastherewasno, astherecouldnothavebeenany,lawfularresttospeakof. "Stopandfrisk"searchesshouldbeallowedonlyinthespecificand limitedinstancescontemplatedinT erry: (1) itshouldbeallowedonlyonthebasisofthepoliceofficer's reasonable suspicion, in light of hisorherexperience, thatcriminalactivitymaybeafootandthatthepersonswith whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 76of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver (2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outerclothing;and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. Applyingtheforegoinginthepresentcase,thepoliceofficers'actof proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite theirownadmission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalidandunconstitutionalsearch. (9) Underexigentandemergencycircumstances 1. In People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, the raid of, and the consequentseizureoffirearmsandammunitionin,theEurocar Sales Office was held valid, considering the exigent and emergency situation obtaining. The military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was being committed, and theyhadnoopportunitytoapplyforasearch warrant from the courtsbecausethelatterwereclosed.Under such urgency and exigency, a search warrantcouldbevalidly dispensedwith. (10) Atmilitarycheckpoints In People v. Malmstedt, a passenger bus was stopped at a military checkpoint for inspection. One of the soldiers noticed a bulge on the waist of the accused which turned out to be a pouch containinghashish.Furthersearchrevealedmorehashishconcealed inseveralteddybearshewascarryinginhisbag. 1. ValmontevDeVillaupheldtheestablishmentofcheckpoints securityprotocol.Inthisregard, 1. metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installedatbusterminals; 2. passengerscanalsobefrisked; 3. in lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required insteadtoopentheirbagsandluggagesforinspection,which inspectionmustbemadeinthepassenger'spresence; 4. shouldthepassengerobject,heorshecanvalidlyberefused entryintotheterminal. Whileintransit,abuscanstillbesearchedbygovernmentagentsor the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. 1. 2. 3. Intheconductofbussearches,theCourtlaysdownthefollowing guidelines. Prior to e ntry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked andhisorherbagor luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnelasthough thepersonboardedthebusattheterminal. Third, a bus canbeflaggeddownatdesignatedmilitaryor policecheckpointswhereStateagentscanboardthevehicle for a routineinspectionofthepassengersandtheirbagsor luggages. Inbothsituations,theinspectionofpassengersandtheireffectsprior toentryatthebusterminalandthesearchofthebuswhileintransit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonablesearch. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was plantedagainsttheaccused. Thesearchofpersonsinapublicplaceisvalidbecausethesafetyof othersmaybeputatrisk.Giventhepresentcircumstances,theCourt takes judicial notice thatpublictransportbusesandtheirtenninals, justlikepassengershipsandseaports,areinthatcategory. Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarlyacceptspassengersattheterminalandalongitsroute islikewisecoveredbytheseguidelines. Toemphasize,theguidelinesd onotapply a) toprivately-ownedcars;and b) to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use,asinthecaseoftaxis. ⭐Vaporosov.People2019Division Case law requires a strict application of this rule, that is, "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrestedtohisorherpersonatthetimeofandincidenttohisorher arrestandto'dangerousweaponsoranythingwhichmaybeusedas proof of the commission of theoffense.'Suchwarrantlesssearch obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest." TheCourtconcludesthatthefirstsearchmadeonpetitioners,i.e.,the cursory body search which, however, did not yield any drugs but only personal belongings of petitioners, may be considered as a searchincidentaltoalawfularrestasitwasdonecontemporaneous totheirarrestandattheplaceofapprehension.Ontheotherhand,the same cannot be said of the second searchwhichyieldedthedrugs subjectofthiscase,consideringthatasubstantialamountoftimehad alreadyelapsedfromthetimeofthearresttothetimeofthesecond search,nottomentionthefactthatthesecondsearchwasconducted atavenueotherthantheplaceofactualarrest,i.e.,thePanaboPolice Station. 1. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliationorridicule. 2. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotypingandothersimilarmotives. Warrantlessarrestsanddetention Third,astothepurposeofthesearch,itmustbecontinued toensurepublicsafety. Therearethree(3)instanceswhenwarrantlessarrestsmaybelawfully effected.Theseare: by the military where it could conduct searches and make arrestswithoutwarrant. Saludayv.People2018EnBanconBusSearchesandInspections First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contrabandorillegalarticles,thebuswherethepassengeris aboardcanbestoppedenroutetoallowforaninspectionof thepersonandhisorhereffects. 4. 3. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 77of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver (a) anarrestofasuspectinflagrantedelicto; (b) an arrest of asuspectwhere,basedonpersonalknowledgeof the arresting officer, there is probablecausethatsaidsuspect wastheperpetratorofacrimewhichhadjustbeencommitted; and (c) an arrestofaprisonerwhohasescapedfromcustodyserving finaljudgmentortemporarilyconfinedduringthependencyof his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinementtoanother. Peoplev.Olarte2019Division The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused withwarrantlessarrestsbasedonprobablecauseascontemplatedin the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule 113. In the latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable cause which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been committed."Here,theoffense had alreadybeenconsummatedbutnotinthepresenceofthepeace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person tobearrested had committed it. More importantly, there is durational immediacy between theoffensethathadjustbeencommittedand thepeaceofficerorprivateperson'sperceptionorobservationofthe accused'spresenceattheincidentorimmediatevicinity.Suchiswhy probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases wherethepeaceofficerorprivatepersondidnotcatchorwitnessthe accusedintheactofcommittinganoffense. The rule onlyrequiresthattheaccusedperformsomeovertactthat would indicate that he hascommitted,isactuallycommitting,oris attempting to commit an offense. Therefore, it does notmatterthat accused-appellant was previously identified only from a CCTV footage supposedly coveringhispreviouscriminalconductbecause hewasseenbyPO2IntudandPO2Monilarperforminganovertactof drawingagunashewasabouttoenterLBC. Peoplev.Gardon-Mentoy2019Division Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are limitedto thefollowingsituations: (a) wheretheofficermerelydrawsasidethecurtainofavacant vehicleparkedonthepublicfairgrounds; (b) simplylooksinsideavehicle; (c) flashesalightintothevehiclewithoutopeningitsdoors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physicalorbodysearch; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual searchorvisualinspection;and (f) wheretheroutinecheckisconductedinafixedarea. In short, inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is permissible only whentheofficerconductingthesearchhadprobablecausetobelieve priortothesearchthathewillfindinsidethevehicletobesearched the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime. UnderSection5(a),theofficerhimselfwitnessesthecommissionof thecrime;underSection5(b),theofficeractuallyknowsthatacrime hasjustbeencommitted. Thearrestoftheaccused-appellantdidnotjustifythesearchof thepersonalbelongingsbecausethearrestdidnotprecedethe search. Thearrestingofficersplainlyignoredtheconstitutionalandstatutory limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basisarrestedher.Ifthearrestdidnotprecedethesearch,wherewas theprobablecausethatjustifiedherwarrantlessarrest? The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantlessarrestofthe accused-appellantandthewarrantlesssearchofherpersonaleffects wereunreasonable. report,andthiseventuallyresultedinthearrestofMarvin.Itwasnot establishedthatMarvinhadafirearmvisiblytuckedinhiswaist,or that he behaved in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Clearly, the trialcourtand the CA grievously erred in agreeing with the prosecution. The prosecution established only a suspicion that a crime was committed—nothingmore—priortothearrestofMarvin. In the same manner, the present circumstances do not suffice to fulfilltherequirementsforahotpursuitarrest.Theprosecutiondid notallegeandprovethatSPO4Pequirasandthearrestingofficershad personal knowledge of facts that Marvin had just committed an offense. Neither does the anonymous reportofasuspiciousperson operate to vest personal knowledgeonthepoliceofficersaboutthe commissionofanoffense. There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on Marvin's body and belongings is likewise unjustified. The law requiresthatthereshouldbealawfularrestpriortothesearch.The processcannotbereversed. Exclusionaryrule 1. rule originally enunciated in Stonehill v. Diokno and later constitutionallyaffirmedinS ec3(2)ArtIII. 2. SPO4 Pequiras merely testified that after receiving the information regarding the presence of a suspicious person, they verified the Evidence illegally obtainedhowevermaynonethelessbeused inthejudicialoradministrativeactionthatmaybefiledagainst theofficerresponsibleforitsillegalseizure. 3. Where theaccuseddidnotraisetheissueoftheadmissibility ofevidenceagainsthimonthegroundthatithadbeenillegally seized, such omission constituted a waiver of the protection grantedbythissection,andtheillegallyseizedevidencecould thenbeadmittedagainsthim. 4. Such objection should be made before arraignment as per Porteriav.People2019Division Theprosecutionfailedtoestablishanyovertactwhichcouldleadto Marvin's inflagrantedelictoarrest.Therewasalsonoevidencethat the arresting officers, or SPO4 Pequiras in particular, knew of an offensethatwasjustcommittedandthatMarvinwastheperpetrator oftheoffense. “Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, non-exclusionary Peoplev.Zaspa. 5. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby as it is purely personalandcannotbeavailedofbythirdparties. 6. Theobjectionmustbeonconstitutionalgrounds. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 78of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 7. 8. 9. whoissuedthesearchwarrantorinthecourtwherethecaseis alreadyfiled. Theconstitutionalguarantyagainstunreasonablesearchesand seizure is applicable only against governmentauthoritiesand NOTtoprivateindividualssuchastheb arangaytanod. 2) OmnibusMotion In Del Castillo v. People, however, having been established 3) File a petitionforcertiorarionthegroundofgraveabuseof that the assistance of the barangaytanodsweresoughtbythe police authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Thus, the constitutional proscription applied to them. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the partofthejudgewhoissuedthesearchwarrant. 4) Interpose a timely objection when the prosecution is formally offered the evidence during the trial for the inadmissibility of the evidence. The failure to object to the illegality of thearrestdoesnotincludethewaivertoobjectto theinadmissibilityoftheobjectsconfiscated. The complaint for warrantless searches charges no criminal offense. The remedy is civil under Article 32, in relation to Article2219(6)and(10)oftheCivilCode. 5) File a criminal case for violation of domicile or illegal procurementofsearchwarrant. Polangcosv.People2019Division Polangcos' violations werepunishableonlybyacityordinancethat prescribesaspenaltycertainfines. In view of the foregoing, SPO2 Juntanilla thus conducted an illegal searchwhenhefriskedPolangcosfortheforegoingviolationswhich werepunishableonlybyfine.Hehadnoreasonto"arrest"Polangcos because the latter's violation did not entail a penalty of imprisonment. It was thus not, as it could not have been, asearch incidentaltoalawfularrestastherewasno,astherecouldnothave beenany,lawfularresttospeakof. Ultimately, Polangcosmustbeacquitted,asthecorpusdelictiofthe crime,i.e.theseizeddrug,isexcludedevidence,inadmissibleinany proceeding,includingthisone,againsthim. Anyevidenceseizedasaresultofsearchesandseizuresconductedin violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is inadmissible"foranypurposeinanyproceeding"inaccordancewith theexclusionaryrulei nSection3(2),ArticleIII. 6) Ask forthereturnoftheobjectsconfiscatedwhenthesameis not illegal. However, this can only be asked during the terminationofthecaseexceptwhentheobjectsconfiscatedare notincludedinthesearchwarrant. Effectsofillegaldetention 1. The conspicuous illegality of the arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the trial court, because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrestedsubmitstoarraignmentwithoutanyobjection. E.PrivacyofCommunicationsandCorrespondence Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shallbeinviolablee xcept Effectsofunreasonablesearchesandseizures a) uponlawfulorderofthecourt,or Remediesagainstunlawfulsearches b) when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribedbylaw. 1) File a motion to quash the search warrant and motion to suppress evidence illegally obtained ifasearchwarrantis Conceptofcommunications,correspondence issuedandthesameisinvalid.Thismotionisfiledinthecourt Gaananv.I AC Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devicesinSection1ofRA4200,suchthatitsusetooverhearaprivate conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communicationsbetweenthetwopartiesusingatelephoneline. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the samecategoryasa dictaphone, dictagraphortheotherdevicesenumeratedinSection1 ofRANo.4200astheusethereofcannotbeconsideredas"tapping" thewireorcableofatelephoneline. Thetelephoneextensioninthis casewasnotinstalledforthatpurpose. Itjusthappenedtobethere forordinaryofficeuse. IntheMatterofPetitionforIssuanceof WritofHabeasCorpusofCamiloSabio One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiryisthat "therightsofpersonsappearinginoraffectedbysuchinquiriesshall berespected."Firstisther ighttoprivacy. Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissibleunless excusedbylawandinaccordancewithcustomarylegalprocess.The meticulousregardweaccordtothesezonesarisesnotonlyfromour convictionthattherighttoprivacyisa"constitutionalright"and"the right mostvaluedbycivilizedmen,"butalsofromouradherenceto theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightswhichmandatesthat,"no oneshallbesubjectedtoarbitraryinterferencewithhisprivacy"and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interferenceorattacks." Inevaluatingaclaimforviolationoftherighttoprivacy,acourtmust determine 1. whether a person hasexhibitedareasonableexpectation ofprivacyand,ifso, 2. whetherthatexpectationhasbeenviolatedbyunreasonable governmentintrusion. Applying this determination to these cases, theimportantinquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporationexhibitareasonableexpectationofprivacy?;andsecond, didthegovernment violate such expectation? The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. The inquiry focused on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 79of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the governmenthasinterest. This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. InValmontev. Belmonte,theCourtremarkedthataspublicfigures,theMembersof the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and theiractionsare subjecttocloserscrutiny. Vivaresv.STC Whetherornottherewasindeedanactualorthreatenedviolationof the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involvedinthiscase. Indevelopingthewritofhabeasdata,theCourtaimedtoprotectan individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. Availment of thewritrequirestheexistenceofanexusbetweenthe right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or securityontheother. Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. Is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectationofprivacy;and second, that the expectation be one that society is preparedto recognizeasreasonable(o bjective). InMancusiv.DeFortewhichaddressedthereasonableexpectations of private employees in the workplace, theUSSupremeCourtheld that a union employeehadFourthAmendmentrightswithregardto an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials. That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987caseofO'Connorv.Ortega where a physician, Dr. MagnoOrtega,whowasemployedbyastate hospital, claimed a violation ofhisFourthAmendmentrightswhen hospitalofficialsinvestigatingchargessearchedhisofficeandseized personalitemsfromhisdeskandfilingcabinets. In O'Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which governmentinterestsareweighedagainsttheemployee'sreasonable expectationofprivacy. This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy intheworkplace.Theemployees' privacyinterestinanofficeistoalargeextentcircumscribedby TherighttoinformationalprivacyonFacebook 1) thecompany'sworkpolicies, Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity,itisfirstnecessarythatsaiduser,inthiscasethechildren of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materializeincyberspacethroughtheutilizationoftheOSN’sprivacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world,oftheuser’sinvocationofhisorher righttoinformationalprivacy. 2) the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered intoby managementandthebargainingunit,and 3) theinherentrightoftheemployertomaintaindisciplineand efficiencyintheworkplace. Theirprivacyexpectationinaregulatedofficeenvironmentis,infine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacyhasbeen upheld. Here,therelevantsurroundingcircumstancestoconsiderinclude Intrusion,whenandhowallowed 1) theemployee'srelationshiptotheitemseized; Pollov.David2011EnBanc 2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employeewhenitwasseized;and The existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-foldrequirement: 3) whether the employee tookactionstomaintainhisprivacy intheitem. Thus,wheretheemployeeusedapasswordonhiscomputer,didnot sharehisofficewithco-workersandkeptthesamelocked,hehada legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and itemslocatedthereinmustcomplywiththeFourthAmendment. Assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had atleasta subjectiveexpectationofprivacyinhiscomputerasheclaims,such is negated by the presence of policyregulatingtheuseofoffice computers,asinSimons. TheCSCinthiscasehadimplementedapolicythatputitsemployees on notice that they have no expectation ofprivacyinanythingthey create,store,sendorreceiveontheofficecomputers,andthattheCSC maymonitortheuseofthecomputerresourcesusingbothautomated or human means. This implies thaton-the-spotinspectionsmaybe donetoensurethatthecomputerresourceswereusedonlyforsuch legitimatebusinesspurposes. On the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner's computer, it was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaintaddressedtoChairpersonDavid. Exclusionaryrule Any evidence obtained in violation of this xxxx section shall be inadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding. F.FreedomofSpeechandExpression Sec 4. Nolawshallbepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeech,of expression, or of thepress,ortherightofthepeoplepeaceablyto assembleandpetitionthegovernmentforredressofgrievances. Sec 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his politicalbeliefsandaspirations.xxxx Sec 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbeabridged. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 80of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Concept ⭐TheDioceseofBacolodv.Comelec2015LeonenEnBanc Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.COMELECdoesnothavetheauthoritytoregulatethe enjoyment of the preferred right tofreedomofexpressionexercised byanon-candidateinthiscase. While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied ArticleIII,Section4oftheConstitutioneventogovernmentalacts. Continuumofthought,speech,expression,andspeechacts The right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances madetoconductenacted,and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner ofcommunication.In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communicationandavalidformofexpression: Freedomofspeechincludestherighttobesilent.Aptlyhas it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individualthelibertytoutterwhatisinhismindalsoguarantees tohimthelibertynottoutterwhatisnotinhismind.Thesalute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid formofexpression,itcannotbecompelledanymorethanitcan be prohibited inthefaceofvalidreligiousobjectionslikethose raisedinthispetition.Toimposeitonthepetitionersistodeny them the right nottospeakwhentheirreligionbidsthemtobe silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society. The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyedthatitformspartoftheexpression.Thepresentcaseisin point. Itiseasytodiscernwhysizematters. First,itenhancesefficiencyincommunication. Second,thesizeofthetarpaulinmayunderscoretheimportance ofthemessagetothereader. Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate. These points become more salientwhenitistheelectorate,notthe candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. They are fundamentallypartofexpressionprotectedunderArtIII,Section4. Purposesoffreespeechdoctrines Thereareseveraltheoriesandschoolsofthoughtthatstrengthenthe needtoprotectthebasicrighttofreedomofexpression. First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in publicaffairs,includingtherighttocriticizegovernmentactions. Proponents of the political theory on “deliberativedemocracy” submit that“substantial,open,andethicaldialogueisacritical, andindeeddefining,featureofagoodpolity.” Second,freespeechshouldbeencouragedundertheconceptofa marketplace of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that “the ultimate good desired is betterreachedby thefreetradeinideas.” Third,freespeechinvolvesself-expressionthatenhanceshuman dignity. This right is “a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment,”amongothers. Fourth,expressionisamarkerforgroupidentity. Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities againstmajoritarianabuses perpetratedthroughtheframeworkofdemocraticgovernance.” Lastly, Free speech must beprotectedunderthesafetyvalve theory. This provides that “nonviolent manifestations of dissentreducethelikelihoodofviolence.” This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as “highlyrankedinourschemeofconstitutionalvalues.”Theserights enjoyprecedenceandprimacy. Inthehierarchyofcivilliberties,therightsoffreeexpressionandof assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;and such priority“givestheselibertiesthesanctityandthesanctionnot permittingdubiousintrusions.” This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so “when what may be curtailed is thedisseminationofinformationtomake moremeaningfultheequallyvitalrightofsuffrage.” Balancebetweenunbridledexpressionandliberty Restrictions onspeechmayberesortedtobythestateforreasons of publicorder,nationalsecurity,andothersituationswhichimpel thegovernmenttorepressthefreedomofspeech. Typesofregulation Priorrestraintandsubsequentpunishment Tordesillasv.Puno2018 WON the Advisory issued by therespondentsisnotcontent-neutral and thus constitutes prior restraint, censorship, and are content-restrictive,whichresultedtoa"chillingeffect"inviolationof thefreedomofthepress. In as early as the 1935 Constitution, our jurisprudence has recognizedfouraspectsoffreedomofthepress,towit: (1) freedomfrompriorrestraint; (2) freedomfrompunishmentsubsequenttopublication; (3) freedomofaccesstoinformation;and (4) freedomofcirculation. Prior restraint referstoofficialgovernmentalrestrictionsonthe pressorotherformsofexpressioninadvanceofactualpublicationor dissemination.Freedomfrompriorrestraintislargelyfreedomfrom government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,andregardlessofwhetheritiswieldedbytheexecutive, legislativeorjudicialbranchofthegovernment. Thus,itprecludesg overnmentalactsthatrequired a) approvalofaproposaltopublish; b) licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish;and c) eveninjunctionsagainstpublication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 81of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver publication,aredeemedaspreviousrestraintorcensorship.Anylaw or official that requires some form of permission to be hadbefore publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutionalright,andremedycanbehadatthecourts. 1. In Chavez, the Court struck down the statements madeby thenDOJSecretaryGonzalesandtheNTCwarningthemedia onairingtheallegedwiretappedtelephoneconversationsof thenPresidentArroyo,asconstitutingunconstitutionalprior restraintontheexerciseoffreespeechandofthepress. 2. In Primicias, the City Mayor of Manila's refusal to issue permit for a publicassemblywasheldtohaveviolatedthe freedomofexpression. 3. In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, the Court held that the COMELECresolutiontotallyprohibiting the conduct of exit polls in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly, and credible elections wasannulledasthe same is an absolute infringement of the constitutionally­ guaranteedrightsofthemediaandtheelectorate. 4. 5. In Sanidad v. COMELEC, a provision in a COMELEC resolution prohibiting the media to allow the use of a column or radio or television time to campaign for or againsttheplebisciteissuesasregardstheratificationofthe act establishing the CAR, was declared null and void and unconstitutionalbytheCourtasthesamerestricts,without justifiable reason, the choice of forum where one may expresshisview,tantamounttoarestrictionofthefreedom ofexpression. In David, the Court declared as unconstitutional the warrantless search of theDailyTribuneoffices,theseizure of materials for publication therein, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, among others, pursuant to President Arroyo's PP No. 1017 and GO No. 5, as the said actsconstituteplaincensorship. Thereispriorrestraintwhenthegovernmenttotallyprohibitsand/or insomeway,restrictstheexpressionofone'svieworthemannerof expressingoneself.T hereisnoneinthiscase. No other interpretationcanbehadofrespondents'pronouncements except that for being a reminderofprevailingprovisionsofthelaw and jurisprudence, applicable to all and not only to media personalities, that resistance or disobedience to lawful orders of authorities may result to criminal, and even administrative, liabilities. Contentbasedandcontentneutral ⭐TheDioceseofBacolodv.Comelec2015LeonenEnBanc Therighttofreedomofexpressionisindeednotabsolute.Evensome forms of protectedspeecharestillsubjecttosomerestrictions.The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. Content-based regulations can eitherbebasedontheviewpointofthespeakerorthesubjectofthe expression. Content-based restraint or censorship referstorestrictions“based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidentsofthespeechsuchastime,place,ormannerofthespeech. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,andthiscourthasusedtheclearandpresentdanger rule as measure. Under this rule,“theevilconsequencessoughtto bepreventedmustbesubstantive,‘extremelyseriousandthedegree ofimminenceextremelyhigh.’” Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailmentoftherightoffreedomofexpression.Thereisnoreason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to postthetarpaulinintheirprivateproperty.Thesizeofthetarpaulin doesnotaffectanyoneelse’sconstitutionalrights. If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation,thequestioned actsofCOMELECwillnotpassthethreerequirementsforevaluating such restraints on freedom of speech. “When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmentalinterestisrequiredforitsvalidity,”anditissubject onlytotheintermediateapproach. This intermediate approach is based on the test that wehave prescribed in several cases. A content-neutral government regulationissufficientlyjustified: 1. ifitiswithintheconstitutionalpoweroftheGovernment; 2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3. if the governmentalinterestisunrelatedtothesuppression offreeexpression;and 4. if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech& expression]isnogreaterthanisessentialtothefurtherance ofthatinterest. Onthefirstrequisite,itisnotwithintheconstitutionalpowersofthe COMELECtoregulatethetarpaulin. Onthesecondrequirement,notonlymustthegovernmentalinterest be important orsubstantial,itmustalsobecompellingastojustify the restrictions made. Compelling governmental interest would includeconstitutionallydeclaredprinciples. The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent ormotiveinimposingtherestriction,butmoreso attheeffectsofsuchrestriction,ifimplemented.Therestrictionmust not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to makespeech. Inthiscase,thesizeregulationisnotunrelatedtothesuppressionof speech. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedomofexpression. Therestrictioninthepresentcasedoesnotpasseventhelowertest ofintermediatescrutinyforcontent-neutralregulations. Incitementandadvocacy There are two categories of speech, the latter of which is a more specific typeoftheformerwhichisdirectedtoproduceimminent lawlessactionandwhichislikelytoinciteorproducesuchaction. Specificityofregulationandoverbreadthdoctrine Under this doctrine, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and notbesusceptibletoapplicationtoprotectedexpression. SouthernHemisphereEngagementNetworkv.Anti-Terrorism Council2010EnBanconFacialChallenge A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 82of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. The doctrine of vaguenessandthedoctrineofoverbreadthdo NOToperateonthesameplane. Astatuteoractsuffersfromthedefectofvaguenesswhenitlacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarilyguessatitsmeaninganddifferastoitsapplication. Itis repugnanttotheConstitutionintworespects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conducttoavoid;and (2) it leaves law enforcersunbridleddiscretionincarryingout its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Governmentmuscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to stateregulationsmaynotbeachievedby means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the areaofprotectedfreedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even thoughsomeofitisprotected. A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge. Distinguished froman as-applied challengewhichconsidersonly extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examinationoftheentirelaw,pinpointingitsflawsanddefects,not onlyonthebasisofitsactualoperationtotheparties,butalsoonthe assumptionorpredictionthatitsveryexistencemaycauseothersnot beforethecourttorefrainfromconstitutionallyprotectedspeechor activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. The allowance of a facial challenge in freespeechcases isjustifiedbytheaimtoavert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which shouldnotatalltimesbeabridged.Thisrationaleisinapplicableto plain penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterringsociallyharmfulconduct. Byitsnature,theoverbreadthdoctrinehastonecessarilyapplya facialtypeofinvalidationinordertoplotareasofprotectedspeech, inevitably almost always under situationsnotbeforethecourt,that are impermissibly swept by the substantiallyoverbroadregulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as appliedtothelitigants. The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is thatit marks an exceptiontosomeoftheusualrulesofconstitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutionalasappliedtohimorher;ifthelitigantprevails,the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,challengerstoalawarenotpermittedtoraisetherightsof thirdpartiesandcanonlyasserttheirowninterests. Inoverbreadth analysis,thoserulesgiveway;challengesarepermittedtoraisethe rightsofthirdparties;andthecourtinvalidatestheentirestatute"on its face," not merely "as applied for"; so that the overbroad law becomesunenforceableuntilaproperlyauthorizedcourtconstruesit morenarrowly. Inthisjurisdiction,thevoid-for-vaguenessdoctrineassertedunder the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionalityofcriminalstatutes. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitionerscontendthattheelementof"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by thefree speechclause. Theargumentdoesnotpersuade. Whatthelawseekstopenalize isc onduct,notspeech. Speechregulationinrelationtoelection Adiongv.Comelec The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile"placeswhetherpublicorprivateexceptindesignatedareas providedforbytheCOMELECitselfisnullandvoidonconstitutional grounds. First—theprohibitionundulyinfringesonthecitizen'sfundamental rightoffreespeechenshrinedintheConstitution.Thereisnopublic interestsubstantialenoughtowarrantthekindofrestrictioninvolved inthiscase. AlloftheprotectionsexpressedintheBillofRightsareimportantbut wehaveaccordedtofreespeechthestatusofapreferredfreedom. Wehavealsoruledthatthepreferredfreedomofexpressioncallsall the more for the utmost respect when whatmaybecurtailedisthe dissemination of information to makemoremeaningfultheequally vitalrightofsuffrage. When facedwithborderlinesituationswherefreedomtospeakbya candidateorpartyandfreedomtoknowonthepartoftheelectorate are invoked against actions intended for maintainingcleanandfree elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate arenotantagonistic.There canbenofreeandhonestelectionsifintheeffortstomaintainthem, thefreedomtospeakandtherighttoknowareundulycurtailed. National Press Club v. Comelec ruled that regulation of election activityhasitslimits.Weexaminethelimitsofregulationandnotthe limits of free speech. Regulation of election campaignactivitymay notpassthetestofvalidity 1) if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scopeinitsapplication, 2) if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one'sopinionofhisorherqualifications, 3) ifitcutsofftheflowofmediareporting,and 4) if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexuswiththeconstitutionallysanctionedobjective. Here,thepostingofdecalsandstickersinmobileplaceslikecarsand othermovingvehiclesdoesnotendangeranysubstantialgovernment interest.Thereisnoclearpublicinterestthreatenedbysuchactivity soastojustifythecurtailmentofthecherishedcitizen'srightoffree speechandexpression. The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulationbutwhenthisrightisjoinedbya"liberty"interest, theburdenofjustificationonthepartoftheGovernmentmust be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 83of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver metinthiscase. Speechregulationinrelationtomedia Davidv.Arroyo Thebestgaugeofafreeanddemocraticsocietyrestsinthedegreeof freedomenjoyedbyitsmedia. Thesearchandseizureofmaterialsforpublication,thestationingof policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices,andthe arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive governmentwhotellsthecitizenthathemayspeakonlyifallowedto do so,andnomoreandnolessthanwhatheispermittedtosayon painofpunishmentshouldhebesorashastodisobey.Undoubtedly, The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions becauseofitsanti-governmentsentiments.ThisCourtcannottolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional rightevenifitinvolvesthe mostdefiantofourcitizens.Freedomtocommentonpublicaffairsis essentialtothevitalityofarepresentativedemocracy.Itisthedutyof the courts to be watchfulfortheconstitutionalrightsofthecitizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The mottoshould alwaysbeo bstaprincipiis. Judicialanalysis,presumptionsandlevelsandtypesof scrutiny Gonzalesv.Katigbak Thepowertoexercisepriorrestraintisnottobepresumed,rather thepresumptionisagainstitsvalidity. Nicolas-Lewisv.Comelec2019EnBanc AtissueareSection36.8ofR.A.9189,asamendedbyR.A.10590and Section 74(II)(8) of the COMELEC Resolution No. 10035, which prohibit the engagement of any person in partisan political activitiesabroadduringthe30-dayoverseasvotingperiod. Afacialreviewofalaworstatuteencroachinguponthefreedomof speechonthegroundofoverbreadthorvaguenessisacceptablein ourjurisdiction. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,constitutionallysubjecttostateregulation,maynotbe achievedbymeansthatunnecessarilysweepitssubjectbroadly, therebyinvadingtheareaofprotectedfreedoms. Ontheotherhand,alaworstatutesuffersfromvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guessatitsmeaninganddifferas toitsapplication. Theallowanceofareviewofalaworstatuteonitsfaceinfreespeech casesisjustifiedbytheaimtoavertthe"chillingeffect"onprotected speech,theexerciseofwhichshouldnotatalltimesbeabridged. Restraintsonfreedomofexpressionarealsoevaluatedbyeitherora combinationofthefollowingtheoreticaltests,towit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which were used in earlyPhilippinecaselaws; (b) the clear and present danger rule, which was generally adheredtoinmorerecentcases;and (c) thebalancingofintereststest,whichwasalsorecognized inourjurisprudence. When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of thistypearenotdesignedto suppressanyparticularmessage,theyarenotsubjecttothestrictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach — somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-basedrestrictions. AsexplainedinC havez, 1) a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear andpresentdangerrule, 2) while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediatescrutiny. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189,asamendedbyR.A.No.10590,isan impermissiblecontent-neutralregulationforbeingoverbroad, violating,thus,thefreespeechclauseunderSection4,ArticleIII. The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one'sexerciseof the right to campaign ordisseminatecampaign-relatedinformation. The restraint, however,partakesofacontent-neutralregulationasit merely involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression, specificallythetimeandplacetoexercisethesame. Theintermediateapproachhasbeenformulatedinthismanner— Agovernmentalregulationissufficientlyjustified 1) ifitiswithintheconstitutionalpoweroftheGovernment; 2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3) if the governmentalinterestisunrelatedtothesuppression offreeexpression;and 4) iftheincidentrestrictionisnogreaterthanisessentialtothe furtheranceofthatinterest. Our point of inquiry focuses on the fourth criterion in the said intermediate test, i.e., that the regulation should be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance ofthegovernmental interest. By banning partisan political activities orcampaigningevenduring thecampaignperiodwithinembassies,consulates,andotherforeign service establishments, regardless of whether it applies only to candidates or whether the prohibitionextendstoprivatepersons,it goes beyond the objective of maintaining order during the voting period and ensuringacredibleelection.Tobesure,therecanbeno legally acceptable justification, whether measured against the strictest scrutiny or the most lenient review, to absolutely or unqualifiedly disallow one to campaign within our jurisdiction duringthecampaignperiod. Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189 should be struck down for being overbroad as it does not provide for well-defined standards, resulting to the ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and expression, and ultimately, resulting to the unnecessary invasion of the area of protectedfreedoms. Specialtopicsinfreeexpressioncases Hatespeech Defined as speech intended to degrade, intimidate, or incite violenceorprejudicialactionagainstcertainsocialgroupings. Lawsagainsthatespeechcanbedividedinto 1) Thoseintendedtopreservepublicorder;and 2) Thoseintendedtoprotecthumandignity. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 84of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Defamationandlibel ⭐Belo-Henaresv.Guevarra2018 The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms,isnotabsolute.Whilethefreedomofexpressionandthe right of speech and of the press are among the most zealously protectedrightsintheConstitution,everypersonexercisingthem,as the Civil Code stresses, is obligedtoactwithjustice,giveeveryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. As such, the constitutionalrightoffreedomofexpressionmaynotbeavailedof to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their nameorreputationorbringthemintodisrepute. A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacksofbadfaithand reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant,aswellasBMGI. Seditionandspeechinrelationtorebellion When a fictitious suicide photo and letter were published in newspapersofgeneralcirculationexpressingdisappointmentinthe Roxasadministrationandinstructingafictitiouswifetoteachtheir children to burn photos of the President, theCourtheldthatsuch actconstitutesincitingtosedition. Such utterance suggests or incitesrebelliousconspiraciesorriots and tends toturnthepeopleagainsttheconstitutedauthorities,or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer, which is the sum and substance oftheoffense underconsideration.(E spuelasv.People) Obscenity/pornography Gonzalesv.Katigbak The test is whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of thematerialtakenasawholeappealstoprurientinterest. The Hicklintest,judgingobscenitybytheeffectofisolatedpassagesupon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequatetowithstandthechargeofconstitutionalinfirmity. It is theopinionofthisCourtthattoavoidanunconstitutionaltaint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections,determinewhatmotionpicturesareforgeneralpatronage andwhatmayrequireeitherparentalguidanceorbelimitedtoadults only. Thatistoabidebytheprinciplethatfreedomofexpressionis theruleandrestrictionstheexemption. Thetest,torepeat,todeterminewhetherfreedomofexpressionmay be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causalconnectionmustbeevident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its being well-nighinevitable. Thebasicpostulate,therefore,asnotedearlier, is that where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowableonlyundertheclearestproofofaclearandpresentdanger ofasubstantiveeviltopublicsafety,publicmorals,publichealthor anyotherlegitimatepublicinterest. Thelaw,however,frownsonobscenity.Intheapplicablelaw,EONo. 876, reference was made to respondent Board "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard," words whichcanbeconstruedinananalogousmanner. Moreover,asfaras thequestionofsexandobscenityareconcerned,itcannotbestressed stronglythattheartsandletters"shallbeunderthepatronageofthe State."Thatisaconstitutionalmandate. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a lessliberalapproachcallsfor observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons havetopaytheirway,televisionreacheseveryhomewhere thereisaset. Childrenthenwilllikelybeamongtheavidviewersof the programs therein shown. It is hardly theconcernofthelawto deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifestanattitudeofcaringforthewelfareoftheyoung. ⭐Pitav.CA In Peoplev.Kottinger,theCourtlaiddownthetest,indetermining theexistenceofobscenity,asfollows:"whetherthetendencyofthe matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose mindsareopentosuchimmoralinfluencesandintowhosehandsa publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Anothertest,"soKottingerfurtherdeclares,"isthatwhichshocksthe ordinaryandcommonsenseofmenasanindecency." Whendoesapublicationhaveacorruptingtendency,orwhencanit besaidtobeoffensivetohumansensibilities? It was People v. Padan y Alova that introduced to Philippine jurisprudence the "redeeming"element thatshouldaccompany thework,tosaveitfromavalidprosecution. Kalaw-Katigbak represented a markeddeparturefromKottingerin the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme"ofthework,ratherthanisolatedpassages,whichwerecentral to Kottinger. Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence,totemperthewidediscretionKottingerhadgivenunto lawenforcers. Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusetts, established"basicguidelines,"towit: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards'wouldfindthework,takenasawhole,appealsto theprurienti nterest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicablestatelaw;and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacksseriousliterary, artistic,political,orscientificvalue. TheCourtisnotconvincedthattheprivaterespondentshaveshown therequiredprooftojustifyabanandtowarrantconfiscationofthe literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 85of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver themtocarryoutasearchandseizure,bywayofasearchwarrant. InBurgosv.ChiefofStaff,AFP,wecountermandedtheordersofthe Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We ForumandMetropolitanMail,twoMetroManiladailies,byreasonof a defective warrant. We have greater reason here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, apoliticalcase,because,andas wehaveindicated,speechisspeech,whetherpoliticalor"obscene". Wemakethisresume. 1. 2. 3. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrantfromajudge,ifintheiropinion,anobscenityrapis inorder; The authorities must convince the court that thematerials sought to be seized are "obscene”, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant Stateinterferenceandaction; The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-casebasisandonHisHonor'ssounddiscretion. 4. If, intheopinionofthecourt,probablecauseexists,itmay issuethesearchwarrantprayedfor; 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201oftheRPC; 6. Anyconvictionissubjecttoappeal.Theappellatecourtmay assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene". ⭐Madrilejosv.Gatdula2019EnBanc SCdismissedthepetitiononthegroundthatOrdinanceNo.7780,an anti-obscenity law, cannot be facially attacked on the ground of overbreadthb ecauseobscenityisunprotectedspeech. Theoverbreadthandvaguenessdoctrineshavespecialapplication onlytofreespeechcases.Theyareinaptfortestingthevalidityof penal statutes. The doctrinesofstrictscrutiny,overbreadth,and vaguenessareanalyticaltoolsdevelopedfortesting"ontheirfaces" statutesinfreespeechcases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminalstatute.Withrespecttosuchstatute,theestablishedruleis that "one to whomapplicationofastatuteisconstitutionalwillnot be heard to attack the statute on thegroundthatimpliedlyitmight also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in whichitsapplicationmightbeunconstitutional. Ithasbeenestablishedinthisjurisdictionthatunprotectedspeech orlow-valueexpressionrefersto 1) libelousstatements, 2) obscenityorpornography, 3) falseormisleadingadvertisement, 4) insultingor"fightingwords,"i.e.,thosewhichbytheirvery utteranceinflictinjuryortendtoinciteanimmediatebreach ofpeaceand 5) expressionendangeringnationalsecurity. Alitigantwhostandschargedunderalawthatregulatesunprotected speech can still mount achallengethatastatuteisunconstitutional asitisappliedtohimorher.Insuchacase,courtsarelefttoexamine the provisions of the law allegedly violated in light of the conduct with which the litigant hasbeencharged.Ifthelitigantprevails,the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidatingitsimproperapplicationsonacasetocasebasis. Commercialspeech ⭐TheDioceseofBacolodv.Comelec2015LeonenEnBanc Not all speech is treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales,this court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to regulation: Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulationby the State under its pervasive police power, inorderthatitmay not be injurious to the equal rights of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected becausetherelevantinterestsofonetypeofspeech,e.g.,political speech,mayvaryfromthoseofanother,e.g.,obscenespeech. In theUnitedStates,falseordeceptivecommercialspeechis categorized as unprotected expression that may be subject to priorrestraint. We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercialspeechhasbeendefinedasspeechthatdoes“nomore thanproposeacommercialtransaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however,definitelypoliticalspeech. Nationalemergencies The government may impose certain restrictions to protect itself againstutterancesintendedtoweakenitspowerofselfdefense. Speechofpublicofficers Vasquezv.CA Even ifthedefamatorystatementisfalse,noliabilitycanattachifit relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whetheritwasfalseornot. ThisisthegistoftherulinginthelandmarkcaseofNewYorkTimes v.Sullivan,whichthisCourthascitedwithapprovalinseveralofits owndecisions.Thisisther uleof“actualmalice.” Inthiscase,theprosecutionfailedtoprovenotonlythatthecharges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them withknowledgeoftheirfalsityorwithrecklessdisregardofwhether theywerefalseornot. Cognaterights Freedomofassembly Jacintov.CA AlthoughtheConstitutionvestsinpublicschoolteacherstherightto organize,toassemblepeaceablyandtopetitionthegovernmentfora redress of grievances,thereisnolikeexpressprovisiongranting themtherighttostrike.Rather,theconstitutionalgrantoftheright tostrikeisrestrainedbytheprovisothatitsexerciseshallbedonein accordancewithlaw. There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assemblytopetitionthegovernmentforaredressofgrievances and,forthatmatter,toorganizeorformassociationsforpurposes BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 86of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section2(5)ofArticleIX,andSection3ofArticleXIII. As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso “in accordance with law.” This isaclear manifestationthatthestatemay,bylaw,regulatetheuseofthisright, or even deny certain sectors such right. EO 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which willresultintemporarystoppageordisruptionof public service,” by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governingconcertedactivitiesandstrikesinthegovernmentservice shallbeobserved. It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the publicsectordonotenjoytherighttostrike. nor oppressive—wouldsufficetovalidatealawwhichrestrictsor impairs propertyrights.Ontheotherhand,aconstitutionalorvalid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely the existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantiveevilw hichtheStatehastherighttoprevent. Thedemonstrationheldbypetitionerswaspurelyandcompletelyan exerciseoftheirfreedomofexpressioningeneralandoftheirrightof assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, againstthepoliceofficersofthemunicipalityofPasig. The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair laborpractice. Becausetherefusalonthepartoftherespondentfirmtopermitallits employees and workers to join the mass demonstration and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedomofassemblyandfreedomtopetitionforredress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice. The freedoms of expression and ofassemblyaswellastherightto petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition,arenotonlycivilrightsbutalsopoliticalrightsessentialto man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and completefulfillment. WhiletheBillofRightsalsoprotectspropertyrights,theprimacyof human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and propertyrightscanbelostthruprescription;buthumanrightsare imprescriptible. Inthehierarchyofcivilliberties,therightsoffreeexpressionandof assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions;and such priority"givestheselibertiesthesanctityandthesanctionnot permittingdubiousintrusions." The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relationbetweenthemeansemployedbythelawanditsobject or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrarynordiscriminatory TheCourtlikewiseconsidersthedispersalandarrestofthemembers of KMU et al. unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañ ang'sdirectivecancelingallpermits previously issued by local government units. Thisisarbitrary.The wholesalecancellationofallpermitstorallyisablatantdisregardof the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to belimited,much less denied, except on a showing of aclearandpresentdangerofa substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." Toleranceis theruleandlimitationistheexception. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies andralliesislodgedwiththeLGUs.Theyhavethepowertoissue permits and to revoke suchpermitsafterduenoticeandhearingon the determination of thepresenceofclearandpresentdanger.Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of theirpermits. Bayanv.ErmitaonthePublicAssemblyActorBP880 Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people tomeet Davidv.Arroyo BMEmployeesv.PBM bebrandedascriminalsonthatscore. "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression,thisrightisnottobelimited,muchlessdenied,excepton ashowingofaclearandpresentdangerofasubstantiveevilthat Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embracedinthefreedomofexpression,therighttoassembleisnot subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization fromthegovernmentauthoritiesexcept,ofcourse,iftheassemblyis intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place,andnotfortheassemblyitself,maybevalidlyrequired. The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clearandpresentdangerthatwarrantedthelimitationofthatright. Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be madeacrime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.Thosewhoassistintheconductofsuchmeetingscannot peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,sofundamentaltothemaintenanceofdemocraticinstitutions, isthedanger,ofacharacterbothgraveandimminent,ofaserious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimatepublicinterest. B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and mannerofthe assemblies. This was advertedtoinOsmeñav.Comelec,wherethe Court referred to it asa"c ontent-neutral"regulationofthetime, place,andmannerofholdingpublicassemblies. AfairandimpartialreadingofB.P.No.880thusreadilyshowsthatit referstoallkindsofpublicassembliesthatwouldusepublicplaces. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise theywouldnotbe"peaceable"andentitledtoprotection.Neitherare the words "opinion," "protesting"and"influencing"inthedefinition ofpublicassemblycontentbased,sincetheycanrefertoanysubject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 87of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressionsintherally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under theUDHRandthe ICCPR. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speechisnotrelevanttotheregulation. Finally, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where nopriorpermitis needed for peaceful assembly and petitionatanytime.Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essentialpartofthe law's system of regulation of the people's exercise of their rightto peacefullyassembleandpetition,theCourtisconstrainedtorulethat after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise ofsuchrightinanypublic parkorplazaofacityormunicipalityuntilthatcityormunicipality shallhavecompliedwithSection15ofthelaw.Forwithoutsuchan alternative forum, to denythepermitwouldineffectbetodenythe right.Advancenoticesshould,however,begiventotheauthoritiesto ensurepropercoordinationandorderlyproceedings. AsfortheCPR,theCourtrulesthatinviewofthemaximumtolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves novalidpurposeifitmeans the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means somethingelse.Accordingly,whatistobefollowedisandshouldbe that mandated by the law itself, namely, m aximum tolerance, whichspecificallymeansthehighestdegreeofrestraintthatthe military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. IBPv.Atienza2010 In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion whenhedidnotimmediatelyinformtheIBPwhoshould have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminentand grave danger of a substantive evil thatmaywarrantthechangingof the venue. The opportunitytobeheardprecedestheactionon the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorableactiononthepermit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger testwhich,itbearsrepeating,isanindispensablecondition tosuchmodification. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoidofdiscretionindeterminingwhetherornotapermitwouldbe granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires thattherebearealisticappraisalnotofwhatmaypossibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption - especially so where the assemblyisscheduledforaspecificpublicplace-isthatthepermit must be for the assemblybeingheldthere.Theexerciseofsucha right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea thatitmaybeexercisedinsomeotherplace." Freedomofassociation ArtIX-BSec2(5).Therighttoself-organizationshallnotbedenied togovernmentemployees. ArtXIIISec3par2.Itshallguaranteetherightsofallworkersto self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security oftenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participateinpolicyanddecision-makingprocessesaffectingtheir rightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. AngLadladLGBTPartyv.Comelec Under our system of laws, every grouphastherighttopromoteits agendaandattempttopersuadesocietyofthevalidityofitsposition through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled anddeliberatedupon. Freedomofexpressionconstitutesoneoftheessentialfoundations of a democratic society, and this freedomappliesnotonlytothose that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionatetothelegitimateaimpursued.Absentanycompelling stateinterest,itisnotfortheCOMELECorthisCourttoimposeits views on the populace. Otherwise stated,theCOMELECiscertainly notfreetointerferewithspeechfornobetterreasonthanpromoting anapprovedmessageordiscouragingadisfavoredone. Thispositiongainsevenmoreforceifoneconsidersthathomosexual conductisnotillegalinthiscountry.Itfollowsthatbothexpressions concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of forming a politicalassociationthatsupportsLGBTindividualsareprotectedas well. Withrespecttofreedomofassociationfortheadvancementofideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the EuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECHR)hasrepeatedlystatedthata political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peacefulmeansmustbeaffordedaproperopportunityofexpression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas mayseemshockingorunacceptabletotheauthoritiesorthemajority of the population. A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debatecontroversialpoliticalissuesin order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Onlyifapoliticalpartyincitesviolenceorputsforwardpoliciesthat are incompatible with democracydoesitfalloutsidetheprotection ofthefreedomofassociationguarantee. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, becauseofCOMELEC'saction,frompubliclyexpressingitsviewsas a political party and participating on an equalbasisinthepolitical process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamentalrights. InReMarcialEdillon TocompelalawyertobeamemberoftheIntegratedBarisnot violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of anygroupofwhichheisnot already a member.HebecameamemberoftheBarwhenhepassed theBarexaminations.Allthatintegrationactuallydoesistoprovide anofficialnationalorganizationforthewell-definedbutunorganized BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 88of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver andincohesivegroupofwhicheverylawyerisalreadyamember. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his IntegratedBarChapterorvoteorrefusetovoteinitselectionsashe chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. TheSupremeCourt,inordertofurtherthe State'slegitimateinterestinelevatingthequalityofprofessionallegal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatoryprogram—thelawyers. Freedomofinformation Sec 7. The rightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublic concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,transactions,or decisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdatausedasbasisfor policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject tosuch limitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Therighttoinformationissubjecttocertainrecognized restrictions: 1) Nationalsecuritymattersandintelligenceinformation; 2) Tradesecretsandbankingtransactions; 3) Criminalmatters;and 4) Otherconfidentialinformation. Adiongv.Comelec Wehavetoconsiderthefactthatinthepostingofdecalsandstickers on cars and othermovingvehicles,thecandidateneedstheconsent oftheownerofthevehicle.Insuchacase,theprohibitionwouldnot only deprive the owner who consents tosuchpostingofthedecals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprivethecitizenofhisrighttofreespeech andinformation: Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation ofafree societythat,puttingasidereasonablepoliceandhealthregulationsof time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangerofdistributioncansoeasilybecontrolledbytraditionallegal methodsleavingtoeachhouseholderthefullrighttodecidewhether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the constitution, thenaked restrictionofthedisseminationofideas. TheProvinceofNorthCotabatov.GRP The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973Constitutionandthe1987Constitution,hasbeenrecognizedas aself-executoryconstitutionalright. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,involvingasitdoesthesovereigntyandterritorialintegrity oftheState,whichdirectlyaffectsthelivesofthepublicatlarge. Mattersofpublicconcerncoveredbytherighttoinformationinclude stepsandnegotiationsleadingtotheconsummationofthecontract. The right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and ifoneisconsummated,it maybetoolateforthepublictoexposeitsdefects. Intendedasa"splendidsymmetry"totherighttoinformationunder theBillofRightsisthepolicyofpublicdisclosureunderSection28, ArticleIIoftheConstitution.Therighttoinformationguaranteesthe right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizesthedutyofofficialdomtogiveinformationevenifnobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provisiononpublicdisclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand,itisabsurdtosaythatthebroaderrighttoinformation on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. Infine,E.O.No.3establishespetitioners'righttobeconsultedonthe peaceagenda,asacorollarytotheconstitutionalrighttoinformation anddisclosure. Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative LegalServicesv.PSALM2012EnBanc Unlikethedisclosureofinformationwhichismandatoryunderthe Constitution,theotheraspectofthepeople’srighttoknowrequiresa demandorrequestforonetogainaccesstodocumentsandpaperof the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose coversonly transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow accesshasabroaderscopeofinformationwhichembracesnotonly transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency.Suchreliefmustbegrantedtothepartyrequestingaccessto official records, documents and papers relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are relevant to a government contract. Belgicav.ExecutiveSecretary2013EnBanc Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explainedinthe caseofLegaspiv.CivilServiceCommission: While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by thegovernmentagencyincustodythereof, thedutytodisclosetheinformationofpublicconcern,andtoafford access to public recordscannotbediscretionaryonthepartofsaid agencies.Certainly,itsperformancecannotbemadecontingentupon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamusinapropercase. PrivatizationandManagementOfficev.StrategicDevelopment 2013 The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the people and aids them in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and theireffectiveimplementation.Byitself,itdoesnotextendtocausing theawardofthesaleofgovernmentassetsinfailedpublicbiddings. Thus, assumingthatDong-AConsortiummayaccesstherecordsfor the purpose of validating the indicative price under the right to information, it does not follow that respondent is entitled to the award. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 89of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver This Court cannot condone the incongruous interpretation of the courts a quo that the public’s right to information merits both an explanationoftheindicativepriceandanautomaticawardofthebid toDong-AConsortium. Serenov.CommitteeonTradeandRelatedMattersofNEDA2016 The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door toanyandallinformation,butisratherconfinedtomattersof public concern. Itissubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovided by law. The State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactionsinvolvingpublicinterest,andistemperedbyreasonable conditionsprescribedbylaw. Tworequisitesmustconcurbeforetherighttoinformationmaybe compelledbywritofmandamus. Firstly,theinformationsoughtmustbeinrelationtomattersof publicconcernorpublicinterest. And,secondly,itmustnotbeexemptbylawfromtheoperation oftheconstitutionalguarantee. Astothefirstrequisite,thereisnorigidtestindeterminingwhether ornotaparticularinformationisofpublicconcernorpublicinterest. Bothtermscoverawide-rangeofissuesthatthepublicmaywantto befamiliarwitheitherbecausetheissueshaveadirecteffectonthem or because the issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."Assuch,whetherornottheinformationsoughtisofpublic interest or public concern is left totheproperdeterminationofthe courtsonacasetocasebasis. Here, the position of the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth of our country's economy easily makestheinformationsoughtamatterofpublicconcernorinterest. The second requisite isthattheinformationrequestedmustnotbe excludedbylawfromtheconstitutionalguarantee.Inthatregard,the Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberationsoftheSupremeCourt. In Chavez v.PublicEstatesAuthority,theCourthasruledthatthe right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings." Likewise exemptedfromtherighttoinformationare"informationonmilitary and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information oninvestigationsofcrimesbylawenforcement agenciesbeforetheprosecutionoftheaccused." Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionallygrantedtothepeople,isliberallyconstruedinfavor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by specifyingthegroundsfortheexemption.Incaseofdenialofaccess to the information, it is the government agency concerned thathas the burdenofshowingthattheinformationsoughttobeobtainedis notamatterofpublicconcern,orthatthesameisexemptedfromthe coverage oftheconstitutionalguarantee.Wereiterate,therefore,that theburdenhasbeenwelldischargedherein. DFAv.BCAInternational2016 The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. Theinformation,however,mustconstitutedefinitepropositions by the government and shouldnotcoverrecognizedexceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets andsimilarmattersaffectingnationalsecurityandpublicorder. Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within the exceptions of the constitutional righttoinformation.Theprivilegedcharacteroftheinformationdoes notendwhenanagencyhasadoptedadefinitepropositionorwhena contracthasbeenperfectedorconsummated;otherwise,thepurpose oftheprivilegewillbedefeated. U.S.courtshaveestablishedtwofundamentalrequirementsforthe deliberativeprocessprivilegetobeinvoked. 1. First, the communication must be predecisional, i.e., "antecedenttotheadoptionofanagencypolicy." 2. Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions onlegalorpolicy matters." It must reflect the "give-and-take of the consultativeprocess." This case is one of first impression involving the production of evidence in an arbitration case where the deliberative process privilegeisinvoked. Thedeliberativeprocessprivilegecanalsobeinvokedinarbitration proceedingsunderRA9285. Thus,DFAinsiststhatwedeterminewhethertheevidencesoughtto besubpoenaediscoveredbythedeliberativeprocessprivilege. first,theprivilegeprotectscandiddiscussionswithinanagency; WehaveheldinC havezv.PublicEstatesAuthoritythat: Information, however,onon-goingevaluationorreviewofbids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, thereareno"officialacts,transactions,ordecisions"onthebids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part ofthegovernment.Fromthismoment,thepublic'srightto information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. Deliberativeprocessprivilegecontainsthreepolicybases: second,itpreventspublicconfusionfromprematuredisclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and third,itprotectstheintegrityofanagency'sdecision;thepublic shouldnotjudgeofficialsbasedoninformationtheyconsidered priortoissuingtheirfinaldecisions. There is no express waiver of information forming part of DFA's predecisionaldeliberativeordecision-makingprocess.Section20.02 doesnotstatethatapartytothearbitrationiscompelledtodisclose tothetribunalprivilegedinformationinsuchparty'spossession. Rights cannot bewaivedifitiscontrarytolaw,publicorder,public policy,morals,orgoodcustoms,orprejudicialtoathirdpersonwith BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 90of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver arightrecognizedbylaw.Thereisapublicpolicyinvolvedinaclaim of deliberative process privilege — "the policy of open, frank discussionbetweensubordinateandchiefconcerningadministrative action." Thus, the deliberative process privilege cannot be waived. As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agencyassertingthedeliberativeprocessprivilegetoprovethatthe informationinquestionsatisfiesbothrequirements—predecisional anddeliberative. RecordsofPoliceDrugOperationsAlmorav.DelaRosa2018EnBanc The Court is mandated to protect and enforce thepeople'srightto information.Theundeniablefactthatthousandsofordinarycitizens have been killed, and continue to be killed, during police drug operationscertainlyisamatterofgravepublicconcern. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the requested informationanddocumentsdonotobviouslyinvolvestatesecrets affecting national security.Theinformationanddocumentsrelate to routinepoliceoperationsinvolvingviolationsoflawsagainstthe sale or use of illegal drugs. There is no showingthatthecountry's territorial integrity, national sovereignty, independence, or foreign relations willbecompromisedorprejudicedbythereleaseofthese informationanddocumentstothisCourtoreventothepublic.These information and documents do not involve rebellion, invasion, terrorism, espionage, infringement of our sovereignty or sovereign rights by foreign powers, oranymilitary,diplomaticorstatesecret involvingnationalsecurity.Itissimplyridiculoustoclaimthatthese information and documents on police operations against drug pushersandusersinvolvenationalsecuritymatterssosensitivethat even this Court cannot peruse these information and documentsin deciding constitutional issues affectingthefundamentalrighttolife andlibertyofthousandsofordinarycitizens. not be restricted. This Court recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. Accordingly,mattersofpublicinterestshouldnotbecensuredforthe sakeofanunreasonablystrictapplicationoftheconfidentialityrule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, this Court dismissed claims that the confidentiality rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer thereinrepresentedamatterofpublicinterest. Asageneralrule,disciplinaryproceedingsareconfidentialinnature until their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. However, in thiscase,thedisciplinaryproceedingagainstpetitioner becameamatterofpublicconcernconsideringthatitarosefromhis representation of his client on the issue ofvideovoyeurismonthe internet.Theinterestofthepublicisnotinhimselfbutprimarilyin hisinvolvementandparticipationascounselofHaliliinthescandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner relatedtohis supposedconductandstatementsmadebeforethemediainviolation of the CPR involving the controversy. Indeed, to keepcontroversial proceedings shrouded in secrecywouldpresentitsowndangers.In disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the demandsofthelegalprofession. The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to thepress.However,theruledoesnotextendsofar that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. Petitioner assailstwoactsasviolatingtheconfidentialityrule:first, respondents' supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case againsthim,andsecond,respondents'publicstatementthattheyhad filedadisbarmentcomplaint. RighttoInformationandConfidentialityofDisbarmentProceedingsin Roque,Jr.v.AFPChiefofStaff2017LeonenDivision Wherethereareyetnoproceedingsagainstalawyer,thereisnothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private. Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentialityrule.Theconfidentialityruleisintended,inpart,to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer'sreputationinthepublicsphere. RemedyforEnforcement:J.Leonen’sSeparateOpinioninVitangcolIII v.Comelec2016EnBanc As a general principle, speech on matters of public interestshould Petitioners seek to determine whether the data received by the Comelec duringthetransmissionofelectionresultsoriginatedfrom thedevicesrecognizedbytheComelec. When the subject of the petition for mandamusrelatestoapublic right such as the right toinformationonmattersofpublicconcern, andwhentheobjectofthepetitionistocompeltheperformanceofa public duty, the petitioner need not show that its interest on the resultisexclusive.Itmaybesharedbythepublicingeneral. For every person's fundamentalright,thereisacorrespondingduty onthepartofgovernmenttorecognizeandprotectit.InValmontev. Belmonte: The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honestyin thepublicservice.Itismeanttoenhancethewideningroleofthe citizenry in governmental decision-making as well inchecking abuse in government.The policy of full public disclosure is enshrinedinArticleII,Section28. Likeotherconstitutionalguarantees,therighttoinformationandthe policyoffullpublicdisclosurearenotabsolute.ThePeople'srightto information is limited by the nature and classification of the information sought. The information should involve "matters of public concern" and should not be excluded by law from the operation of the guarantee. In the same manner, the policy of full publicdisclosureislimitedtotransactionsinvolvingpublicinterest andissubjecttoreasonableconditionsprescribedbylaw. Withoutadoubt,informationontheconductofelectionsisamatter of public concern as it directly affects the lives of the People. The CommissiononElectionsmaybecompelled,throughmandamus,to make an inventory of and disclose the MAC and IP addresses and IMSI and IMEI numbers of all electronic devices used during elections to the public. Itismandatedtoenforceandadministerall lawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection. I-Popefrancisv.DBM2016 ItisnotdisputedthatPDAFdisbursementsandtherecipientsofthe sameconstituteamatterofpublicconcernorpublicinterest,which are not exemptfromtheoperationoftheconstitutionalguaranteeof therighttoinformation. Nevertheless, it is not proper to issue a writ of mandamus in the presentcase. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 91of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Here, petitioners fail to establishthatrespondentactuallyneglected or refused to provide the information they requested. While respondenthasthedutytogivethepublicaccesstotheinformation, ithasthediscretiontoascertainthebestwaytodisseminate,publish, orotherwisemakeavailablethesaidinformation. The information petitioners seek are already postedonitswebsite, except that petitioners are unsatisfied because the names of the recipients of the PDAF disbursements do not include their middle names, making it more difficult to determine familial relations for petitioners'purposes.Itbearstostressthatpetitionersarenotableto present any law that specifically prescribes the medium by which respondentshallmakesuchinformationavailabletothepublic(i.e., through its website) and the form or content of the same (i.e., to includemiddlenamesoftherecipients).Thereisalsonoclearlegal mandate for respondents to identify familialrelationsand/or determine nepotism or political dynasties among the recipients of the PDAF disbursements. Infact,asofyet,thereis evennolawthatparticularlydefinesandgovernspoliticaldynasty. G.FreedomofReligion Sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thefreeexercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discriminationorpreference,shallforeverbeallowed.Noreligious testshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights. Basicprinciples Purpose ⭐Estradav.Escritor By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of hercongregation,inassertingthatherconjugalarrangementdoesnot constitutedisgracefulandimmoralconductforwhichsheshouldbe heldadministrativelyliable,theCourthadtodeterminethecontours ofreligiousfreedomu nderArticleIII,Section5oftheConstitution. Inresolvingclaimsinvolvingreligiousfreedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation,whether mandatoryorpermissive,isthespirit,intentandframework underlyingthereligionclausesinourConstitution;and (2) indecidingrespondent'spleaofexemptionbasedontheFree Exercise Clause (from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state interesttest,thestrictesttest,whichmustbeapplied. The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored formofreligion, buttoallowindividualsandgroupstoexercisetheirreligionwithout hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. Thus, what is soughtunderthetheoryofaccommodationisnota declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effect,"whether bythelegislatureorthecourts. ThecasesofSherberta ndYoderl aidoutthefollowingdoctrines: (a) free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test if government substantiallyburdenedtheexerciseofreligion; (b) heightenedscrutinyorcompellinginteresttestgoverned cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religiontriggeredacriminalorcivilpenalty,aswellascases where the burden was indirect, i.e., theexerciseofreligion resultedintheforfeitureofagovernmentbenefit;and (c) the Court couldcarveoutaccommodationsorexemptions from a facially neutral law of general application, whether generalorcriminal. Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free e xercise jurisprudence which would impose a discipline to prevent manipulationinthebalancingofinterests. Afreeexerciseclaimcouldresulttothreekindsofa ccommodation: (a) thosewhicharefoundtobeconstitutionallycompelled,i.e., requiredbytheFreeExerciseClause; (b) thosewhicharediscretionaryorlegislative,i.e.,notrequired bytheFreeExerciseClausebutnonethelesspermittedbythe EstablishmentClause;and (c) thosewhichthereligionclausesprohibit. Mandatory accommodation results when the Court finds that accommodationisrequiredbytheFreeExerciseClause,i.e,whenthe Courtitselfcarvesoutanexemption. In permissive accommodation, the Court findsthattheStatemay, butisnotrequiredto,accommodatereligiousinterests. Finally, when the Court finds no basis for a mandatory accommodation,oritdeterminesthatthelegislativeaccommodation runs afouloftheestablishmentorthefreeexerciseclause,itresults to a prohibited accommodation. In this case,theCourtfindsthat establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests. Given that a freeexerciseclaimcouldleadtothreedifferentresults, the question now remains as to how the Court should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny- compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolentneutrality-accommodationapproach. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arisingfromreligiousbelief. The"compellingstateinterest"testis proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conducthasdifferenteffectsonthestate'sinterests:someeffectsmay beimmediateandshort-termwhileothersdelayedandfar-reaching. The compelling state interest testinvolvesathree-stepprocess.We explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which mustbeansweredineachstep,v iz: First, Has thestatuteorgovernmentactioncreatedaburdenon thefreeexerciseofreligion? Second,Isthereasufficientlycompellingstateinteresttojustify thisinfringementofreligiousliberty? Third,Hasthestateinachievingitslegitimatepurposesusedthe least intrusive means possiblesothatthefreeexerciseisnot infringedanymorethannecessarytoachievethelegitimategoal ofthestate? As mentioned, what remained to be resolved, upon which remand wasnecessary,pertainedtothefinaltaskofsubjectingthiscaseto thecarefulapplicationofthecompellingstateinteresttest,i.e., determining whether respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue whichisessentiallyfactualorevidentiaryinnature. Thefreeexerciseofreligionisspecificallyarticulatedasoneof thef undamentalrightsinourConstitution.Itisafundamental rightthatenjoysapreferredpositioninthehierarchyofrights—"the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 92of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver mostinalienableandsacredofhumanrights." Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state's interest is important,becauseourConstitutionitselfholdstherighttoreligious freedom sacred.TheStatemustarticulateinspecifictermsthestate interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling. Thus,itisnottheState'sbroadinterestin"protectingtheinstitutions of marriage andthefamily,"oreven"inthesoundadministrationof justice" that must be weighed against respondent's claim, but the State'snarrowinterestinrefusingtomakeanexceptionforthe cohabitation which respondent's faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; itmustpreciselyshowhowandtowhat extentthoseobjectiveswillbeunderminedifexemptionsaregranted. This,theSolicitorGeneralfailedtodo. Thepublicmoralityexpressedinthelawisnecessarilysecularfor in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does notoffendcompellingstateinterests.The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor's conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as shehasmadeoutacase forexemptionfromthelawbasedonherfundamentalrightto freedomofreligion. ConceptofReligion Austriav.NLRC The principle of separationofchurchandstatefindsnoapplication inthiscase. Thecaseatbardoesnotconcernanecclesiasticalorpurelyreligious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiasticalaffair is"onethatconcernsdoctrine,creed,orform or worship ofthechurch,ortheadoptionandenforcementwithina religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from suchassociationsthosedeemedunworthyofmembership.Basedon this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to mattersoffaith, religiousdoctrines,worshipandgovernanceofthecongregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to whichtheStatecannotmeddleareproceedingsforexcommunication, ordinationsofreligiousministers,administrationofsacramentsand otheractivitieswithwhichattachedreligioussignificance. Thecaseatbardoesnotevenremotelyconcernanyoftheabovecited examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simplystated,whatisinvolvedhereistherelationship of the churchasanemployerandtheministerasanemployee.Itis purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith,worshipordoctrinesofthechurch. Principleofseparationofchurchandstate Operationofsectarianschools TaxExemption ArtVISec28(3).Charitableinstitutions,churchesandpersonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,actually,directly,and exclusively used for religious, charitable,oreducationalpurposes shallbeexemptfromtaxation. PublicAidtoReligion Art VI Sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated,applied,paid,oremployed,directlyorindirectly,for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, exceptwhensuchpriest,preacher,minister,ordignitaryisassigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanageorleprosarium. Art XIV Sec 4(2). Educational institutions, other than those Non-establishmentclause established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be ⭐Peraltav.PhilippineP ostalCorp2018EnBanc owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or Peralta assailed the constitutionality of the printing, issuance and associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is distributionoftheINCcommemorativecentennialstamps,allegedly owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require paidforbyPhilPostusingp ublicfunds. increased Filipino equity participation in all educational Religious freedom as aconstitutionalmandateisnotinhibitionof institutions. The control and administration of educational profound reverence for religion and is notdenialofitsinfluencein institutionsshallbevestedincitizensofthePhilippines. human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power thatbindsandelevatesmantohisCreatorisrecognized. Religiousinstructionsinpublicschools ArtXIVSec3(3).Attheoptionexpressedinwritingbytheparents orguardians,religionshallbeallowedtobetaughttotheirchildren orwardsinpublicelementaryandhighschoolswithintheregular classhoursbyinstructorsdesignatedorapprovedbythereligious authorities of the religion to which the children or wardsbelong, withoutadditionalcosttotheGovernment. The right to religious profession and worship has a two­fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs.Thefirstisabsoluteaslongasthebeliefisconfinedwithin the realm of thought. The second issubjecttoregulationwherethe beliefistranslatedintoexternalactsthataffectthepublicwelfare. The"Lemontest"usesathree-prongedtesttoadjudgewhetherthe assailed governmental actviolatedthenon-establishmentclause,as follows: 1. Thestatutemusthaveas ecularlegislativepurpose; 2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 93of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver advancesnorinhibitsreligion;and, 3. The statute must NOT foster "an excessive government entanglementw ithreligion.” Itisplain,thatthecostsfortheprintingandissuanceoftheaforesaid stamps were all paid for by INC. Any perceived use ofgovernment property,machinesorotherwise,isdeminimisandcertainlydonot amounttoasponsorshipofaspecificreligion. First, there is no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor is there any lawpurportingtorequire anyonetoadopttheINC'steachings.Thecentennialcelebrationofthe IglesianiCristo,thougharguablyinvolvesareligiousinstitution,has asecularaspect. The printing of the INC commemorative stamp is nodifferent.Itis simplyanacknowledgmentofINC'sexistenceforahundredyears.It doesnotnecessarilyequatetotheStatesponsoringtheINC. Indeed, what is prohibited is the State using itsresourcestosolely benefitonereligion. CeldranyPamintuanv.People2018 The non-establishment clause is a reinforcement of the principleofseparationofchurchandstate.Itisnotequivalentto separationofreligionandstate.Itisnotindifferencenordenialofthe religiousnatureoftheFilipinosociety. In this case, petitioner himself admittedthatArticle133oftheRPC "protectsallreligion."Itdoesnotendorsenorgiveaidtoonereligion over the other. No excessive entanglement will result from the effectivity of Article 133 of the RPCasitdoesnotpunisheveryact which may be construedtoattackonereligion.Itonlycoversthose acts which are "notoriouslyoffensive"tothefeelingsofthefaithful. IndeterminingwhethertherewasexcessiveentanglementoftheState inchurchmatters,thefollowingfactorsareconsidered: 1) the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited; 2) thenatureoftheaidthattheStateprovides;and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the religiousauthority. Inthiscase,petitionerandtheOSGhavenotendeavoredtoestablish howtheStatecanbeundulyinvolvedwithchurchmatters. ⭐ReValenciano2017EnBanc Whatisprohibitedistheuseofpublicmoneyorpropertyforthesole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intendedforthefurtheranceofaparticularchurch. It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious processionevenasitisavailableforacivicparade,inthesameway thatapublicplazaisnotbarredtoareligiousrallyifitmayalsobe usedforapoliticalassemblage. In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the manner of appropriation of public money or property, not as to whetheraparticularactinvolvesadirectoramereincidentalbenefit toanychurch. The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation betweenChurchandState.Itsimplymeans 1) that the State cannot set up a Church;norpasslawswhich aid one religion,aidallreligion,orpreferonereligionover another norforcenorinfluenceapersontogotoorremain awayfromchurchagainsthiswillorforcehimtoprofessa beliefordisbeliefinanyreligion; 2) that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendanceornonattendance; 3) that no tax in any amount, large or small, canbeleviedto support any religious activity or institution whatever they maybecalledorwhateverformtheymayadoptorteachor practicereligion; 4) that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairsofanyreligiousorganizationorgroupandviceversa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an officialreligion. In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may besummarizedinfourgeneralpropositions: 1) Government must not prefer one religion over another or religionoverirreligion; 2) Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes; 3) Governmentactionmustnotaidreligion;and 4) Government action must not result in excessive entanglementwithreligion because these can violate voluntarism and breedinterfaith dissension. AngLadladLGBTPartyv.Comelec,supra. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmentalrelianceonreligiousjustificationisinconsistentwith this policy ofneutrality."Wethusfindthatitwasgraveviolationof the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible andtheKorantojustifytheexclusionofAngLadlad. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding bytheCOMELECthatthegroup's membershavecommittedorarecommittingimmoralacts." As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interesttojustifyexclusionofhomosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselvesasa class, not because of any particular morally reprehensibleact.Itis thisselectivetargetingthatimplicatesourequalprotectionclause. Freeexerciseclause ⭐Valmoresv.Achacoso2017 The Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury or whenpublicsafety, peace,comfort,orconveniencerequiresit.Thus,asfacultymembers BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 94of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver oftheMSU-CollegeofMedicine,respondentshereinwereduty-bound toprotectandpreservepetitionerValmores'religiousfreedom. While insomecasestheCourthassustainedgovernmentregulation of religious rights, the Court fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by the denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there anyshowingthat petitioner Valmores' absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum was issued to address such conflicts and prescribes theactiontobetakenbyHEIsshouldsuchcircumstancearise. Freedomtopropagatereligiousdoctrine AmericanBibleSocietyv.CityofManila The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can onlybejustifiedlikeotherrestraintsoffreedomofexpressiononthe groundsthatthereisaclearandpresentdangerofanysubstantive evilwhichtheStatehastherighttoprevent. ConcurringOpinionofJ.MendozainC entenov.Villalon-Pornillos Thesolicitationofdonationsfortherepairofachapelisnotcovered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributionsfor"charitableorpublicwelfarepurposes." First,solicitationofcontributionsfortheconstructionofachurchis not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" butfora religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitableorpublicwelfarepurpose. Second, the purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view oftheproliferationoffundcampaignsforcharityand othercivicprojects.Ontheotherhand,sincereligiousfunddrivesare usually conducted among those belonging to the samereligion,the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations doesnot existinasgreatadegreeasdoestheneedforprotectionwithrespect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation. Third, to require a government permit before solicitation for religiouspurposemaybeallowedistolayapriorrestraintonthe theconcernsofpublicandsecularmorality.Itcannotbejudged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognizedintherealmof publicpolicyexpressedintheConstitutionandthelaws.Atthesame time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to privacy, should be observedtotheextentthattheyprotectbehavior thatmaybefrowneduponbythemajority. freeexerciseofreligion.Suchrestraint,ifallowed,maywelljustify requiring a permit before a church can make Sundaycollectionsor enforcetithing. IglesianiCristov.CA We reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review bytherespondentBoard.ItspublicbroadcastonTV ofitsreligiousprogrambringsitoutofthebosomofinternalbelief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rulethatthee xerciseofreligious freedomcanberegulatedbytheStatewhenitwillbringaboutthe clear andpresentdangerofsomesubstantiveevilwhichtheStateis dutyboundtoprevent,i.e.,seriousdetrimenttothemoreoverriding interestofpublichealth,publicmorals,orpublicwelfare. Underthesetests,twothingsmaybeconcludedfromthefactthatan unmarriedwomangivesbirthoutofwedlock: (1) ifthefatherofthechildishimselfunmarried,thewomanis not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoralconduct. Thereisnolawwhichpenalizesanunmarriedmotherunder those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, adocumentthataccommodatesvariousbelief systemsirrespectiveofdogmaticorigins. Religiousbeliefandprivateemployment Victorianov.ElizaldeRopeWorkers’Union The constitutionalityofRepublicActNo.3350wasquestioned.The said R.A. exempt employees from the applicationandcoverageofa closed shop agreement-mandated in anotherlaw-basedonreligious objections. A unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, holding that "government isnotprecludedfrompursuingvalid objectivessecularincharactereveniftheincidentalresultwouldbe favorable to a religion or sect."Interestingly,thesecularpurposeof the challenged law which the Courtupheldwastheadvancementof "theconstitutionalrighttothefreeexerciseofreligion." (2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than the mother, thenthereisa causeforadministrativesanctionagainsteitherthefatheror themother. In such a case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vowoffidelity. Religiousbeliefandpublicemployment Anonymousv.Radam Thedistinctionbetweenpublicandsecularmoralityasexpressed— albeit not exclusively — in the law, on the one hand,andreligious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Courtextendsonlytopublicandsecularmorality.Thus,government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like adultery or concubinage, must have a secular purpose. For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behaviorundercivilservicelaws,itmustberegulatedonaccountof H.LibertyofAbodeandFreedomofMovement Scopeandlimitations Sec 6. The liberty ofabodeandofchangingthesamewithinthe limits prescribedbylawshallnotbeimpairedexceptuponlawful orderofthecourt. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 95of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Neithershalltherighttotravelbeimpairedexceptintheinterest of 1) nationalsecurity, 2) publicsafety,or 3) publichealth, asmaybeprovidedbylaw. Marcosv.Manglapus It must be emphasized that the individual right involved isnotthe right to travel from the Philippines toothercountriesorwithinthe Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially,therightinvolvedistherighttoreturntoone's country, a totallydistinctrightunderinternationallaw,independent from,althoughrelatedto,therighttotravel. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteedintheBillofRights,whichtreatsonlyof the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-consideredviewthattherighttoreturnmaybeconsidered,asa generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution,ispartofthelawoftheland.However,itisdistinctand separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., againstbeing"arbitrarilydeprived"thereof. Watch-listandholddepartureorders explicitlyprovidingfortherestrictioninalaw.Thisisindeferenceto the primacy of the righttotravel,beingaconstitutionally-protected rightandnotsimplyastatutoryright,thatitcanonlybecurtailedby alegislativeenactment. In Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services(OAS)- Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs.WilmaSalvacionP. Heusdens, the Court enumerated the statutes which specifically providefortheimpairmentoftherighttotravel,viz.: 1. The Human Security Act of 2010 or R.A. No. 9372. The lawrestrictstherighttotravelofanindividualchargedwith the crime of terrorism even though such person is out on bail. 2. The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law,theSecretaryofForeignAffairsorhis authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen. 3. 4. Genuinov.DeLima2018EnBanc Therighttotravelispartofthe"liberty"ofwhichacitizencannotbe deprived without due process of law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of movement that the Constitution affordsits citizens. It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute.Thereareconstitutional,statutoryandinherentlimitations regulatingtherighttotravel.Section6itselfprovidesthattherightto travel may be impaired only in the interest ofnationalsecurity, publicsafetyorpublichealth,asmaybeprovidedbylaw. Thelibertyofabodemayonlybeimpairedbyalawfulorderofthe courtand,ontheonehand,therighttotravelmayonlybeimpaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies oftimescallforalimitation on the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by The"Anti-TraffickinginPersonsActof2003"orR.A.No. 9208.Pursuanttotheprovisionsthereof,the[BI],inorderto manage migration and curb trafficking in persons, issued MO 2011-011, allowingitsTravelControlandEnforcement Unit to "offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victimsofhumantrafficking"fromourports. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No.8042,asamendedbyR.A.No.10022.In enforcement of said law, the POEA may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific country that effectively preventsourmigrantworkerstoentersuchcountry. 5. TheActonViolenceagainstWomenandChildrenorR.A. No. 9262. The law restricts movement of an individual againstwhomtheprotectionorderisintended. 6. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee's right to travel "to protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which isharmful,detrimental,orprejudicial tothechild." TheissuanceofDOJCircularNo.41hasnolegalbasis TheremustbeanenablinglawfromwhichDOJCircularNo.41must deriveitslife.Unfortunately,allofthesupposedstatutoryauthorities relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of the questionedcircular. TheexceptionstotherighttotravelareLIMITEDtothosestated inSection6,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution The power to issue HDO is inherent to the courts.Thecourtsmay issueaHDOagainstanaccusedinacriminalcasesothathemaybe dealt with in accordance with law. It does not require legislative conferment or constitutional recognition; it co-existswiththegrant ofjudicialpower. ThepointisthattheDOJmaynotjustifyitsimpositionofrestriction on the right to travel of the subjects of DOJ Circular No. 41 by resorting to an analogy. Contrary to its claim, it does not have inherentpowertoissueHDO,unlikethecourts,ortorestricttheright totravelinanyway. I.EminentDomain For an extensive discussion on the following topics, please refer to BasicConcepts>FundamentalPowers>EminentDomain. 1. Concept 2. Justcompensation 3. Abandonmentofintendeduseandrightofrepurchase 4. Expropriationbylocalgovernmentunits J.Non-impairmentofContracts Sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. PADPAOv.Comelec2017EnBanc The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitutionislimitedinapplicationtolawsthatderogatefromprior BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 96of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver acts or contracts byenlarging,abridgingorinanymannerchanging theintentionoftheparties.Thereisimpairmentifasubsequentlaw changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions,dispenseswiththoseagreeduponorwithdrawsremedies fortheenforcementoftherightsoftheparties. Sec 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reasonofpoverty. Peoplev.Rio Inthiscase,PSAs'contractswiththeirclientsarenotaffectedinany manner by the requirement of having to obtain from theCOMELEC written authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside of theirresidenceorplaceofworkandinpublicplaces,duringelection period.AllthatPSAsmustdoistosecuresuchauthority. WONamotiontowithdrawappealmaybedeniedforthesolereason ofinabilitytoretaintheservicesofcounsel. YES. The Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his SWSandPulseAsiav.Comelec2015LeonenEnBanc It is settled that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment is limitedbytheexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheState,intheinterest ofpublichealth,safety,moralsandgeneralwelfare.Itisabasicrule incontractsthatthelawisdeemedwrittenintothecontractbetween the parties. The incorporation of regulations into contracts is a postulateofthepolicepoweroftheState. The relation of the state's police power to the principle of non-impairment of contracts was thoroughly explained in Ortigas andCo.v.FeatiBank: While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed,theruleisnotabsolute,sinceithastobereconciled withthelegitimateexerciseofpolicepower. Wehavedemonstratedthatnotonlyanimportantorsubstantialstate interest, but even a compelling one anchors Resolution No. 9674's requirement of disclosing subscribers to election surveys. It effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunitiesforpublicserviceandisimpelledbytheimperativeof "fair"elections. AsavalidexerciseofCOMELEC'sregulatorypowers,ResolutionNo. 9674 is correctly deemed written into petitioners' existing contracts. K.AdequateLegalAssistanceandFreeAccessto Courts Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege, because it does not call upontheaccusedas awitness—itdoesnotcalluponthe defendant for histestimonial responsibility.Mr.Wigmore says thatevidence obtainedinthiswayfromtheaccused,isnottestimonybyhisbody buthisbodyitself. Villaflorv.Summers appeal pursuant to Section13ofRule122oftheRulesofCourtand theconstitutionalmandateprovidedinSection11ofArticleIIIofthe 1987Constitution. The court ordered Villaflor to submit to a pregnancy test. She refusedtoobeytheorderonthegroundthatsuchexaminationofher person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thisrighttoacounseldeoficiodoesnotceaseupontheconviction ofanaccusedbyatrialcourt.Itcontinues,evenduringappeal,such thatthedutyofthecourttoassignacounseldeoficiopersistswhere anaccusedinterposesanintenttoappeal.Eveninacase,suchasthe oneatbar,wheretheaccusedhadsignifiedhisintenttowithdrawhis appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Theconstitutionalguarantythatnopersonshallbecompelledinany criminal case to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. Thecorollarytothepropositionisthat,ona proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspectionofthebodyoftheaccusedispermissible. L.RightAgainstSelf-incrimination Sec 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Sec 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained in violationof thisorSection17hereofshallbeinadmissibleinevidenceagainst him. Scopeandcoverage USv.TanTeng Beltranv.Samson The constitutional inhibition against self-incrimination is directednotmerelytogivingoforaltestimony,butembracesas wellthefurnishingofevidencebyothermeansthanbywordof mouth,thedivulging,inshort,ofanyfactinwhichtheaccused hasarighttoholdsecret. Writingissomethingmorethanmovingthebody,orthehand,orthe fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requirestheapplicationofintelligenceandattention;andinthe case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a meanstodeterminewhetherornotheisthefalsifier. Theprohibition ofcompellingamaninacriminalcourttobea witnessagainsthimself,is aprohibitionof theuseofphysical or moral compulsion,toextort communicationsfromhim,not an exclusionofhisbodyasevidence,whenitmaybematerial. Forthepurposesoftheconstitutionalprivilege,thereisasimilarity betweenonewhoiscompelledtoproduceadocument,andonewho is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for inboth cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. Tan Teng was identified by Oliva as her rapist.Thepolicestripped him of clothing and swore that hisbodyboreeverysignofthefact thathewassufferingfromg onorrhea. Here the witness iscompelledtowriteandcreate,bymeansof the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which mayidentifyhimasthefalsifier. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 97of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver InthecaseofVillaflorv.Summers,itwassoughttoexhibitsomething alreadyinexistence,whileinthecaseatbar,thequestiondealswith somethingnotyetinexistence;inshort,tocreatethisevidencewhich mayseriouslyincriminatehim. Peoplev.Olvis The accused-appellants were deniedtheirrighttocounselnotonce, but twice. We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the threeaccusedweremadetoperformshortlyaftertheirapprehension. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessionscomewithinthebanagainstself-incrimination. Thisconstitutionalprivilegehasbeendefinedasaprotectionagainst testimonial compulsion, but this has since been extended to any evidence"communicativeinnature"acquiredundercircumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedureofcompellingaperson,inacriminaloranyothercase,to furnishthemissingevidencenecessaryforhisconviction." Thus, anact,whethertestimonialorpassive,thatwouldamountto disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibitionofthe Constitution. This should be distinguished,parenthetically,frommechanicalacts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. Thisincludes 1. requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus fromhisbody, 2. orcompellinghimtoexpectoratemorphinefromhismouth, 3. ormakinghersubmittoapregnancytest 4. orafootprintingtest, 5. or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. Ineachcase,theaccuseddoesnotspeakhisguilt. Butaforcedre-enactmentisquiteanotherthing. Here,theaccused is not merely required to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal responsibility against his will. Itisapoliceprocedurejustascondemnableasanuncounselled confession. Chavezv.CA Compulsion as it is understood here does notnecessarilyconnote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements.Pressurewhichoperatestooverbearhiswill,disablehim from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lipsofthe defendant." Petitioner,asaccused,occupiesadifferenttierofprotectionfroman ordinarywitness.Whereasanordinarywitnessmaybecompelledto take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shotathim,anaccusedmay altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answeranyandallquestions. Ifheshouldwishtotestifyonhisownbehalf,however,hemaydoso. This is his right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross-examinedasanyotherwitness." It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal actionbeaskedaquestionwhichmightincriminatehim,notforthe crimewithwhichheischarged,butforsomeothercrime,distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline toanswerthat specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination. In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the followingrightsinthematterofhistestifyingorproducingevidence, towit: 1) BEFORETHECASEISFILEDINCOURT,butafterhavingbeen taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: thecontinuingrighttoremainsilentandtocounsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violationoftheserightsrejected; And the guideintheinterpretationoftheconstitutionalpreceptthat the accused shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself"isnottheprobabilityoftheevidencebutitisthecapability ofabuse." Wehavenohesitancyinsayingthatpetitionerwasforcedtotestifyto incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remainsilent.Itcannotbesaidnowthathehaswaivedhisright.He didnotvolunteertotakethestandandinhisowndefense;hedidnot offerhimselfasawitness;onthecontrary,heclaimedtherightupon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questionsinspiteofhisfearofbeingaccusedofperjuryorbeingput under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelledsubmission. 2) AFTERTHECASEISFILEDINCOURT a) torefusetobeawitness; b) nottohaveanyprejudicewhatsoeverresulttohim bysuchrefusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examinationbytheprosecution; 3) WHILETESTIFYING,torefusetoansweraspecificquestion which tends to incriminate him for somecrimeotherthan thatforwhichheisthenprosecuted. Peoplev.Ayson The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automaticallyoperational. Itmustbeclaimed. Ifnotclaimedbyor in behalf of the witness, the protection doesnotcomeintoplay. It followsthattherightmaybewaived,expressly,orimpliedly,asbya failuretoclaimitattheappropriatetime. Therightofthedefendantinacriminalcase"tobeexemptfrombeing a witness against himself” signifies that hecannotbecompelledto testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in whichheisthe accused,oroneoftheaccused. Alihv.Castro As the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution,allthefire­armsandammunitiontakenfromtheraided compound are in­admissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruitsofthepoison­ous tree." The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 98of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. US, "The prohibition of compel­lingamaninacriminalcourttobeawitness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsiontoextortcommunicationsfromhim,notanexclu­sionof hisbodyasevidencewhenitmaybematerial." SJSv.DDBreMandatoryDrugTesting ThedrugtestprescribedunderSec.36(c),(d),and(f)ofRA9165for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution,asthosefoundpositiveforillegaldruguseasaresultof this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should theillegaldrug userconsenttoundergorehabilitation. WhatcanreasonablybededucedfromtheUScasesofVernoniaand BoardofEducationandappliedtothisjurisdictionare: (1) schoolsandtheiradministratorsstandinlocoparentiswith respecttotheirstudents; (2) minorstudentshavecontextuallyfewerrightsthananadult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,guardians,andschools; (3) schools,actinginlocoparentis,haveadutytosafeguardthe health andwell-beingoftheirstudentsandmayadoptsuch measuresasmayreasonablybenecessarytodischargesuch duty;and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants foradmissionthatarefair,just,andnon-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatorybutrandomdrugtestprescribedbySec.36ofRA9165for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeitnotexactlyforthesamereason. As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couchedandashasbeenheld,"reasonableness"isthetouchstone ofthevalidityofagovernmentsearchorintrusion. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness isthe nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing intrudes. In thiscase,theemployees'privacyinterestinanofficeis to a largeextentcircumscribedbythecompany'sworkpolicies,the collective bargaining agreement,ifany,enteredintobymanagement and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectationinaregulatedofficeenvironmentis,infine,reduced;and adegreeofimpingementuponsuchprivacyhasbeenupheld. Takingintoaccounttheforegoingfactors,i.e.,thereducedexpectation ofprivacyonthepartoftheemployees,thecompellingstateconcern likelytobemetbythesearch,andthewell-definedlimitssetforthin the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of therandom testing, we hold that the challenged drugtestrequirementis,under thelimitedcontextofthecase,reasonableand,ergo,constitutional. Unlike the situation coveredbySec.36(c)and(d)ofRA9165, theCourtfindsnovalidjustificationformandatorydrugtesting forpersonsaccusedofcrimes. Wefindthesituationentirelydifferentinthecaseofpersonscharged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses. The operativeconceptsinthemandatorydrugtestingare"randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime beforetheprosecutor'soffice,amandatorydrugtestingcanneverbe randomorsuspicionless. Toimposemandatorydrugtestingontheaccusedisablatantattempt toharnessamedicaltestasatoolforcriminalprosecution,contrary to thestatedobjectivesofRA9165. Drugtestinginthiscasewould violateapersons'righttoprivacy.Worsestill,theaccusedpersons areveritablyforcedtoincriminatethemselves. Application Peoplev.Yatar A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsioninvolved.UnderPeoplev.Gallarde,whereimmediately aftertheincident,thepoliceauthoritiestookpicturesoftheaccused withoutthepresenceofcounsel,weruledthattherewasnoviolation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvementinanoffenseofwhichheisaccused. Cabalv.Kapunan,Jr. Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemedcriminalor penal,and,hence,theexemptionofdefendantsincriminalcase from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicablethereto. Thus,inBoydv.US,itwasheldthattheinformation,inaproceeding todeclareaforfeitureofcertainpropertybecauseoftheevasionofa certain revenue law, "though technicallyacivilproceeding,isin substance and effect acriminalone",andthatsuitsforpenalties andforfeituresarewithinthereasonofcriminalproceedingsforthe purposes ofthatportionoftheFifthAmendmentoftheConstitution of the U.S. which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminalcasetobeawitnessagainsthimself. ⭐Calidav.TrillanesIV2019LeonenEnBanc Thepoweroflegislativeinquirymustbecarefullybalancedwiththe private rights of those affected. A person's right against self-incriminationandtodueprocesscannotbesweptasideinfavor ofthepurportedpublicneedofalegislativeinquiry. Itmustbestressedthatpersonsinvitedtoappearbeforealegislative inquiry do so as resourcepersonsandnotasaccusedinacriminal proceeding. Thus, they should be accorded respect and courtesy since they were under no compulsion to accept the invitation extendedbeforethem,yettheydidsoanyway. Immunitystatutes RA 1379, SEC. 8. Protection against self-incrimination.— Neithertherespondentnoranyotherpersonshallbeexcusedfrom attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda andotherrecordsonthegroundthat the testimony or evidence,documentaryorotherwise,requiredof himmaytendtoincriminatehimorsubjecthimtoprosecution;but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for oronaccountof anytransaction,matterorthingconcerningwhichheiscompelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 99of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver testifyorproduceevidence,documentaryorotherwise,exceptthat suchindividualsotestifyingshallnotbeexemptfromprosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifyingorfromadministrativeproceedings. Galmanv.Pamaran Immunity statutesmaybegenerallyclassifiedintotwo: one,which grants "use immunity"; and theother,whichgrantswhatisknown as"transactionalimmunity". The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony anditsfruitsinany manner in connection withthecriminalprosecutionofthewitness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to thewitnessfromprosecutionforanoffensetowhichhiscompelled testimonyrelates. personarrestedsubmitstoarraignmentwithoutobjection. There was no violation of appellant's right to counsel during custodial investigation. The records show that appellant was informedofhisconstitutionalrightswhenhewasarrested.Sincehe chose to remainsilent,hewasnotinterrogatedandnostatementor evidence was extracted from him; neither was any evidence presented in court that was supposedly obtained from him during custodialinvestigation. Peoplev.Mahinay It ishigh-timetoeducateourlaw-enforcementagencieswhoneglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and whichtheCourtmustupdatein thelightofnewlegaldevelopments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest andhemustbe shownthewarrantofarrest,ifany; 2. He must bewarnedthathehasarighttoremainsilentandthat anystatementhemakesmaybeusedasevidenceagainsthim; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to beassistedatall times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer,preferablyofhisownchoice; 4. Hemustbeinformedthatifhehasnolawyerorcannotaffordthe services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyermayalsobeengagedbyanypersoninhisbehalf,ormay beappointedbythecourtuponpetitionofthepersonarrestedor oneactinginhisbehalf; M.RightsofPersonsUnderCustodialInvestigation Sec 12. Any person underinvestigationforthecommissionofan offenseshallhavetherighttobeinformedofhisright a) toremainsilentand b) to have competent and independentcounselpreferablyof hisownchoice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be providedwithone. Notorture,force,violence,threat,intimidation,oranyothermeans whichvitiatethefreewillshallbeusedagainsthim.xxxx Availability 5. Thatwhetherornotthepersonarrestedhasalawyer,hemustbe informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presenceofhiscounselorafteravalid waiverhasbeenmade; 6. The person arrested must beinformedthat,atanytime,hehas therighttocommunicateorconferbythemostexpedientmeans with his lawyer, any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,priestorministerchosenbyhimorbyanyone from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/conferwithdulyaccreditednationalorinternationalNGO; "Custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liabilityofthe"inviting"officerforanyviolationoflaw. Peoplev.MorenoyTazon2020Division Even assuming that appellant's arrest was irregular, still,itisnota jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the 7. He must be informed that he hastherighttowaiveanyofsaid rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligentlyandensurethatheunderstoodthesame; 8. Inaddition,ifthepersonarrestedwaiveshisrighttoalawyer,he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. Thatthepersonarrestedmustbeinformedthathemayindicate in any manner at any time or stageoftheprocessthathedoes notwishtobequestionedwithwarningthatoncehemakessuch indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has alreadybegun; 10. The person arrested mustbeinformedthathisinitialwaiverof hisrighttoremainsilent,therighttocounseloranyofhisrights doesnotbarhimfrominvokingitatanytimeduringtheprocess, regardlessofwhetherhemayhaveansweredsomequestionsor volunteeredsomestatements; 11. Hemustalsobeinformedthatanystatementorevidence,asthe case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whetherinculpatoryorexculpatory,inwholeorinpart,shallbe inadmissibleinevidence. Peoplev.Turla The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the ReceiptforCustodyisinadmissibleinevidence,asitwassignedby the accused duringcustodialinvestigationwithouttheassistanceof counsel of his choiceandwithouthavingbeenfirstinformedofhis constitutional right to silence and to counsel. ThesaidReceiptisa declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged, since mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as extra-judicialconfessionsoutlawedbytheConstitution. Requisites Peoplev.FernandezyDelaVega2018Division It is settled that for an extrajudicial confession to beadmissiblein evidenceagainsttheaccused,thesamemustbe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 100of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, (c) express,and (d) inwriting. InPeoplev.Cachuela,theCourtheldthatacustodialinvestigation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a personistakenintocustodyorotherwisedeprivedofhisfreedomof action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exactingaconfessionfromthesuspectinconnectionwithanalleged offense. Here, Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at alltimesduring his custodial investigation. He was assistedbyAtty.Franciscoonly duringthetimeheexecutedhisextrajudicialconfession.However,no lawyer assisted him at the time he wasarrestedandbroughttothe policestationtoanswerquestionsabouttherobberywithhomicide. Moreover, Atty. Francisco was not an independent counsel. Atty. FranciscotestifiedthathewasalegalconsultantintheOfficeofthe MunicipalMayorofBinmaley.Assuch,hisdutywastoprovidelegal advice to the Mayor whose duty, in turn,istoexecutethelawsand ordinancesandmaintainpeaceandorderinthemunicipality.Toour mind, Atty. Francisco cannot be considered as an independent counsel since protecting the rights of Fernandez as a suspect is in direct conflict with his duty to the Municipal Mayor and the local governmentoftheMunicipality. Given these circumstances, Fernandez's extrajudicial confession is inadmissibleinevidence. Righttohaveindependentandcompetentcounsel, preferablyofownchoice Peoplev.Deniega The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutionalrightsoftheaccusedinthecaseatbenchfallshortof thestandardsdemandedbyourcaselawandtheConstitutionitself. Thelawyercalledtobepresentduringsuchinvestigationsshouldbe asfarasreasonablypossible,thechoiceoftheindividualundergoing questioning. Ifthelawyerwereonefurnishedintheaccused'sbehalf, itisimportantthatheshouldbecompetentandindependent,i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of theindividual'sconstitutionalrights. InPeoplevs.Basay,thisCourtstressedthatanaccused'srighttobe informedoftherighttoremainsilentandtocounsel"contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutionalprinciple." Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect,asinmanyareas,therelationshipbetweenlawyersandlaw enforcementauthoritiescanbesymbiotic. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice asopposedtoameaningfuladvocacy oftherightsofthepersonundergoingquestioning. Theinvestigationwasactuallyconductedintheabsenceofcounselin one place (the QC SID headquarters) and signed in the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office). These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendantswere obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandatedbythe1987Constitution. Peoplev.Culala During the custodial investigation, accused was assisted by Atty. CelsoE.Santamaria,MunicipalAttorneyofValenzuela,MetroManila. In People vs. Bandula, it was held that a Municipal Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. Peoplev.RodriguezandArtellero Rodriguezandappellantweredetainedforfourdays,butAtty.Laoof thePAOwascalledonlyonthefourthdayofdetentionwhenaccused wasabouttoputhisconfessioninwriting.Underthefactualmilieu, the moment accusedandappellantwerearrestedandbroughttothe policestation,theywerealreadyundercustodialinvestigation. InthecaseofPeoplev.Bolanos,weheldthatanaccusedwhoison board the police vehicle on the way tothepolicestationisalready under custodial investigation, and should thereforebeaccordedhis rights under the Constitution. In this case, the teaching of Bolanos clearlywentunheeded. Jurisprudence is clear thatanaccusedundercustodialinvestigation must c ontinuously have a counsel assisting him from the very startthereof.Inthiscase,Rodriguezandappellantwereinthehands ofthepoliceforaboutfourdayswithouttheassistanceofcounsel. Peoplev.Andan It cannot be successfullyclaimedthatappellant'sconfessionbefore the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervisionandcontrol"overthelocalpoliceandmay arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in responsetoanyinterrogationbythelatter.Infact,themayordidnot questionappellantatall.Nopoliceauthorityorderedappellantto talktothemayor.Itwasappellanthimselfwhospontaneously,freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a privatemeeting.Themayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. Whenappellanttalkedwiththemayorasaconfidantandnotasalaw enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Hence we hold that appellant's confessiontothemayorwascorrectlyadmittedbythetrialcourt. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or anyotherinvestigatingofficer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and areadmissibleinevidence. Righttobeinformed Peoplev.Canoy Itissettledthatone'srighttobeinformedoftherighttoremain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctoryrecitationo fanabstractconstitutionalprinciple. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 101of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver The foregoing constitutional rights of GREGORIO were violated in thesecases. TherecordsshowthatthedocumentofWaiversignedbyGREGORIO was prepared on7February1990butwassubscribedandswornto on19February1990beforeAsst.CityProsecutorJoseGarcia,Jr.Over the signature of Atty. Ridgeway Tanjili, the following words were typed:"Declarantassistedbycounsel." No meaningful information as to his rights under custodial interrogation was conveyed to GREGORIO. He was not asked if he wantedtoavailofhisrightsandwasnottoldthatifhehadnolawyer of his own choice he could avail of one to be appointed for him. Furthermore,thewaiverstatesthathedoesnotwanttheassistanceof counsel and it is not shown that he agreed to be assisted by Atty. Tanjili. Waiver Sec12(1).T heserightsc annotbewaivedexcept 1. inwritingand 2. inthepresenceofcounsel. Peoplev.Bacor All throughoutthecustodialinvestigation,Atty.MiriamAngotofthe PAOtookpainstoexplainmeaningfullytotheaccusedeachandevery queryposedbySPO3Ydulzura.Accusedthenstampedhisapprovalto the extrajudicial confession by affixing his signature on each and every page thereofinthepresenceofcounselAngot.Consequently, therewasaneffectivewaiveroftherighttoremainsilent. Accused-appellant,whenasked,saidhewantedtohavetheassistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot ofPAOwasappointedcounseldeofficioto assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her appointment as his counsel before giving his confession. As this Court has held, a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counselwithinthecontemplationoftheConstitutionconsideringthat he is not a special counsel,publicorprivateprosecutor,counselof the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused-appellant. Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies the constitutional requirementofacompetentandindependentcounselfortheaccused. Lumanogv.People,supra PoliceofficersclaimedthatuponarrestingJoel,theyinformedhimof his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he wouldgivecouldbeusedagainsthim,andthathehadtherighttoa competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counselhewillbeprovided withone. However,sincetheserightscanonlybewaivedinwriting andwiththeassistanceofcounsel,therecouldnothavebeensucha valid waiverbyJoel,who waspresentedtoAtty.SansanoattheIBP Office,QuezonCityHallonlythefollowingdayandstayedovernight atthepolicestationbeforehewasbroughttosaidcounsel. AsobservedinPeoplev.Bandula,theindependentcounselrequired by Art. III, §12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interestisadmittedlyadversetotheaccused. For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confessionisi nadmissibleinevidence. Effectofnon-compliance Sec 12(3). Any confession or admission obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence againsthim. PorteriayManebaliv.People2019supra Peoplev.Obrero Therearetwokindsofinvoluntaryorcoercedconfessionstreated inthisconstitutionalprovision: (1) thosewhicharetheproductofthirddegreemethodssuchas torture,force,violence,threat,intimidation,whicharedealt withinparagraph2of§12,and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subjectofparagraph1ofthesame §12. Whatrenderstheconfessionofaccused-appellantinadmissibleisthe fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement is presumedtobepsychologicallycoerced. TherewasthusonlyaperfunctoryreadingoftheMirandarights toaccused-appellantwithoutanyefforttofindoutfromhimwhether hewantedtohavecounseland,ifso,whetherhehadhisowncounsel orhewantedthepolicetoappointoneforhim.Thiskindofgivingof warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful informationtothesuspect. Moreover,Art.III,§12(1)requiresthatcounselassistingsuspectsin custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. WhenthepoliceofficersaskedMarvinregardingthediscoveryofthe motorcycle's registration documents in his possession, Marvin's right to counsel automatically attached. Furthermore, his answer constitutes an implied admission of guilt, which should havebeen done in writing, with the assistance of his counsel, orafteravalid waiveroftheserights. Without the assistance of a counsel, and in the absence of a valid waiverofthisright,Marvin's"voluntary"answertoP/Insp.Villamer isinadmissibleasevidenceofhisguilt. Another circumstantial evidenceconsideredbythetrialcourtisthe alleged confession of Marvin to Virgie, the mother of the complainant. Unlike Marvin's admission to P/Insp. Villamer, the confession to Virgie, a private party, is not within the scope ofthe constitutionalandstatutorylimitationsonextrajudicialconfessions. This notwithstanding, the Court should still inquire upon the voluntariness of the confession. The prosecution must establish that the accused spoke freely, without inducement ofanykind,and fully aware of the consequences of the confession. This may be inferred from the language of the confession, as when the accused provideddetailsknownonlytohimorher. OutofCourtIdentifications/PoliceLine-ups Peoplev.MorenoyTazón2 020supra A police line-up is not indispensable for the proper and fair identification of offenders. The important consideration is for the victim to positively declare that the persons charged were the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 102of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver malefactors. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups wherethesuspectaloneisbrought face to face with the witness for identification. It isdonethrumug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thrulineupswhereawitnessidentifiesthe suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x xx.In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz[.]: (1) thewitness'opportunitytoviewthecriminalatthetimeof thecrime; (2) thewitness'degreeofattentionatthattime; (3) theaccuracyofanypriordescriptiongivenbythewitness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length oftimebetweenthecrimeandtheidentification; and (6) thesuggestivenessoftheidentificationprocedure. Applying the totality of circumstances test, We find appellant's out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall,Adelrizaafterbeingawakenedwhenahardobjecthitherhead andaftersheswitchedonthelightsinsidetheroom,hadaclearand direct view of the attack on her husband and the perpetrator. Moreover, she described with certainty the assailant to the police cartographer barely hours from the time of the incident, which description matched the facial features of the appellant, whom she subsequentlyidentifiedastheassailant.Inotherwords,theinterval between the time she witnessed the crime andheridentificationof theappellant,wasmerelyamatterofhours,leavingnoroomforher recollectiontobetainted. Verily,itwasAdelriza'sowndescriptionthatledtotheapprehension oftheappellant.Therewasnoevidenceonrecordindicatinganyhint ofasuggestionfromthepoliceofficerwhopresentedtheappellantto Adelriza. Hence, the identification of the appellant as the culpritof thecrimestands. N.RightsoftheAccused Criminaldueprocess Bailisthesecuritygivenforthetemporaryreleaseofapersonwho Sec 14. No person shall be held to answerforacriminaloffense withoutdueprocessoflaw. Nunezv.Sandiganbayan What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson this Court succinctly identified it with "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense." In criminal proceedingsthen,dueprocessissatisfiediftheaccusedis"informed as to why he is proceeded against and whatchargehehastomeet, withhisconvictionbeingmadetorestonevidencethatisnottainted withfalsityafterfullopportunityforhimtorebutitandthesentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course,thatthecourtthatrenderedthedecisionisoneofcompetent jurisdiction." Thiscourthashadfrequentoccasiontoconsidertherequirementsof due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generallyspeaking,itmaybesaidthatifanaccused 1. hasbeenheardinacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,and 2. proceededagainstundertheorderlyprocessesoflaw,and 3. onlypunishedafterinquiryandinvestigation, 4. uponnoticetohim, 5. withanopportunitytobeheard,and 6. ajudgmentawardedwithintheauthorityofaconstitutional law, thenhehashaddueprocessoflaw. Bail Sec13.Allpersons,exceptthosechargedwithoffensespunishable byreclusionperpetuawhenevidenceofguiltisstrong,shall,before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizanceasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Therighttobailshallnot beimpairedevenwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusis suspended.Excessivebailshallnotberequired. Peoplev.Escobar2017LeonenDivision has been arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognatetothefundamentalr ighttobepresumedinnocent. Bailmaybeamatterofrightorjudicialdiscretion.Theaccusedhas the right to bailiftheoffensechargedis"notpunishablebydeath, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the RTC.However,iftheaccusedischargedwithanoffensethepenaltyof which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer forbailissubjecttothediscretionofthetrial court. In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar's bail is, thus, a matterofjudicialdiscretion,providedthattheevidenceofhisguilt isnotstrong. Escobar'sSecondBailPetitionisnotbarredbyresjudicataasthis doctrineisnotrecognizedincriminalproceedings. A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter—whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is notafinaljudgmentonaccused'sguiltorinnocence. Tev.Perez Respondent Judge clearly acted irregularly when he motu proprio fixedandgrantedbailandsubsequentlyreducedtheamountthereof, in both instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution. Irrespective of his opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a h earing be conducted before bail could be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified. Wereiteratethefollowingdutiesofjudgesincaseanapplicationfor bailisfiled: 1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bailorrequirehimtosubmithisrecommendation; 2. Wherebailisamatterofdiscretion,conductahearingofthe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 103of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to presentevidencetoshowthatthe guilt of the accusedisstrongforthepurposeofenablingthe courttoexerciseitssounddiscretion; withoutofferinganybailorwithoutanyprayerthathebereleasedon recognizance. Besides, the reasons relied upon insaidmotions-to allowAdamastoattendtheSangguniangBayansessions-hadalready beenrebukedbythisCourt. 3. Decidewhethertheguiltoftheaccusedisstrongbasedonthe summaryofevidenceoftheprosecution;and 4. Iftheguiltoftheaccusedisnotstrong,dischargetheaccused upontheapprovalofthebailbond.Otherwisethebailshould bedenied. In People v. Hon. Maceda reiterated in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel Sr., this Court held that "all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practicetheir profession nor engage inanybusinessoroccupationorholdoffice, electiveorappointive,whileindetention." Villanuevav.Buaya JudgeBuayagrantedtheex-partemotiontograntbailonthesameday that itwasfiledbytheaccused. Hedidthiswithouttherequired noticeandhearing.Hejustifiedhisactionontheex-partemotionby arguing that the offense charged against the accused wasabailable offense; a hearingwasnolongerrequiredsincebailwasamatterof right. UnderthepresentRulesofCourt,however,noticeandhearing arerequiredwhetherbailisamatterofrightordiscretion. In order for the judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must firstconductahearingtodeterminewhethertheevidenceofguiltis strong.Thisdiscretionliesnotinthedeterminationofwhetherornot ahearingshouldbeheld,butintheappreciationandevaluationofthe weightoftheprosecution'sevidenceofguiltagainsttheaccused. In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearingforapetitionforbailisrequiredinorderforthecourtto consider the guidelines setforthinSection9,Rule114infixingthe amountofbail. Balanayv.Adalim-White2016 Respondent admits allowing Adamas six consecutive furloughs to attendregularsessionsoftheSangguniangBayanoftheMunicipality of Oras, Eastern Samar based on very urgent motions that did not containnoticeofhearingandwerenotheardinopencourt. It is basic, however, that bail hearing is necessary even if t he prosecution does not interpose any objection or leaves the applicationforbailtothesounddiscretionofthecourt. If hearing is indispensableinmotionsforbail,moresointhiscase where the motions for the temporary liberty of Adamas were filed ⭐Peoplev.Sales2019Resolution In non-capital offenses where thetrialcourtimposesthepenaltyof imprisonment exceeding six years, the convictionoftheaccusedof thecrimechargeddoesnotipsofactonegatebailpendingappeal.The accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the followingorothersimilarcircumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committedthecrimeaggravatedbythe circumstanceofr eiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail withoutvalidjustification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole,orconditionalpardon; (d) Thatthecircumstancesofhiscaseindicatetheprobability offlightifreleasedonbail;or (e) Thatthereisundueriskthathemaycommitanothercrime duringthependencyoftheappeal. In Leviste v. CA, We explained that the foregoing provisions contemplatetwoscenarios. First, where none of the listed bail-negating circumstances is present, the Court may grant or deny bail based on its sound judicialdiscretion. Second, if a bail-negatingcircumstanceexists,theCourthasno otheroptionbuttodenyorcancelthebail. However,theenumerationinSection5isn otexclusive. TheSandiganbayanmisappliedLeviste.Whenthethirdparagraphof Section 5, Rule 114 speaks of "other similar circumstances" which wouldresultinthedenialorcancellationofbail,itreferstomatters extraneous or separatefromthefactofconviction.Itcannotinclude the conviction of the accused because the provision first and foremost presupposes that the accusedwasalreadyfoundguiltyby the court and was sentenced to suffer the penaltyofimprisonment exceeding six years. If the fact of conviction would be treated as a bail-negating circumstance, the rules on bail pending appealwould berenderednugatory. Weclarifythatconvictionoftheaccusedofthecrimechargedis irrelevant only in bail application pending appeal where the penaltyimposedisNOTreclusionperpetua,lifeimprisonment, or death. TheRevisedRulesisclearthatwhenapersonischarged withacapitaloffenseoranoffensepunishablebyreclusionperpetua ordeath,he/sheshallnotbeadmittedtobail,regardlessofthestage ofthecriminalprosecution,whenevidenceofhis/herguiltisstrong. Conviction of a capital offense imports that evidence against theaccusedisstrongsobailpendingappealisforeclosed. ⭐Reyesv.People2019LeonenDivision Here, theSandiganbayaninitiallygrantedpetitioner'sapplicationfor bailonAugust29,2017. The factual findings show the presence of two (2) circumstances statedinRule114,Section5: (1) petitioner had previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail withoutavalidjustification;and (2) heposesaflightriskifadmittedtobail. TheSandiganbayandidnotactarbitrarilyorcapriciously,butrather, arrived at its decision with due consideration of the arguments presentedbytheprosecution. There was thus no error in the Sandiganbayan's exercise of its discretiontocancelpetitioner'sbail. Standardsforfixingbail Paduav.People2019Division The existence of a high degree of probability that the accused will abscondconfersuponthecourtnogreaterdiscretionthantoincrease the bond tosuchanamountaswouldreasonablytendtoassurethe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 104of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject,ofcourse,totheconstitutionalprovisionthat"excessivebail shall not be required." The recourse of the judge is to fix a higher amountofbailandnottodenythefixingofbail. Righttobailandrighttotravel Manotoc,Jr.vCA Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally releasedonbailhaveanunrestrictedrighttotravel?NO. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the natureandfunctionofabailbond. Its object is torelievetheaccusedofimprisonmentandthestateof theburdenofkeepinghim,pendingthetrial,andatthesametime,to puttheaccusedasmuchunderthepowerofthecourtasifhewerein custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accusedsoastoanswerthecallofthecourtanddowhatthelawmay requireofhim.Theconditionimposeduponpetitionertomake himself available at all timeswheneverthecourtrequireshis presenceoperatesasavalidrestrictiononhisrighttotravel. Presumptionofinnocence ⭐DeGuzmanyAguilarv.People2019LeonenDivision Therequisitequantumofproofbeyondreasonabledoubtisborne bytheconstitutionalimperativeofdueprocess.Itisalsoinkeeping withthepresumptionofinnocenceofanaccuseduntilthecontrary isproved. Here,thetrialcourtgaveextraordinaryweighttothebareassertionof apoliceofficer,whowaspresentedastheonlywitnesstoanalleged crime that hehimselfclaimedtohavebeendiscoveredbecauseofa public disturbance. It trivialized the defense's version of events, despite being more logical. This, coupled with an assertion of the motivesoftheloneprosecutionwitness—extortionandgettingeven afterlosingabet—shouldhavebeenenoughtogivepauseespecially because of the fundamental guarantee for every accused to be presumedinnocent. DisputablePresumptionsin ⭐Fuertesv.SenateofthePhilippines 2020LeonenEnBanc This Court has upheld the constitutionality of disputable presumptionsincriminallaws.Theconstitutionalpresumptionof innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection betweenthefactprovedandtheultimatefactpresumed.When such primafacie evidenceisunexplainedornotcontradictedbythe accused, the conviction founded on such evidence will be valid. However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyondreasonabledoubt.Theexistenceofadisputablepresumption doesnotprecludethepresentationofcontraryevidence. Section 14, paragraph4oftheAnti-HazingLaw,whichprovidesthat anaccused'spresenceduringahazingis primafacie evidenceofhis orherparticipation,doesnotviolatetheconstitutionalpresumption of innocence. This disputable presumption is also not a bill of attainder. The study of human behavior has shown thatbeingsurroundedby people who approve or encourage one's conductimpairsotherwise independent judgment, be it in the form of peer pressure, herd mentality,orthebystandereffect. The term "groupthink" was coined by American psychologist Irving L. Janis todescribethephenomenonof"mentaldeterioration of mental efficiency,realitytesting,andmoraljudgmentthatresults fromgrouppressures."Inhazing,p resenceisparticipation. cfPresumptionofRegularityinthePerformanceofOfficial Functionsin⭐P eoplev.Ordiz2019Division The Court stresses that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumptionofinnocenceinfavoroftheaccused.Otherwise,the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be heldsubordinatetoamereruleofevidenceallocatingthe burdenofevidence. Moreover,theregularityoftheperformanceoftheirdutycouldnotbe properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity ofperformancebyapoliceofficer mustbeinferredonlyfromanestablishedbasicfact,notpluckedout fromthinair.Tosayitdifferently,itistheestablishedbasicfactthat triggersthepresumedfactofregularperformance.Wherethereisany hint of irregularitycommittedbythepoliceofficersinarrestingthe accusedandthereafter,severalofwhichwehaveearliernoted,there canbenopresumptionofregularityofperformanceintheirfavor. Righttobeheard Peoplev.Tulin Does it constitute a violation of Hiong's constitutional right to be informedofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusationagainsthimonthe groundthathewasconvictedasanaccompliceunderSection4ofPD 532eventhoughhewaschargedasaprincipalbydirectparticipation underSection2ofsaidlaw? TherulingofthetrialcourtisWithinwell-settlejurisprudencethatif thereislackofcompleteevidenceofconspiracy,theliabilityisthat of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino). Any doubt as to the participation of anindividualinthecommissionof thecrimeisalwaysresolvedinfavoroflesserresponsibility. Assistanceofcounsel This right is available not only during trial. Every person under custodyofthelawenjoystheright. Anypersonarrested,detainedorundercustodialinvestigationshall atalltimesbeassistedbycounsel.Includedinthisrightistheright tobeinformedofhisrighttocounsel. Peoplev.PepinoyRueras2016EnBanc The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to precludetheslightestcoercionthatwouldleadtheaccusedtoadmit something false. The right to counsel attaches uponthestartofthe investigation. Custodial investigation commences when a personis takenintocustodyandissingledoutasasuspectinthecommission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineupisnot part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteedbytheConstitutioncannotyetbeinvokedatthisstage. Ibañezv.People2016 Therighttobeassistedbycounselisanindispensablecomponentof dueprocessincriminalprosecution.Assuch,righttocounselisone ofthemostsacrosanctrightsavailabletotheaccused.Adeprivation BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 105of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resultinginthedenialofalevelplayingfield. Here, there was no denial of right tocounselasevincedbythefact that the petitioners were not only assisted by a counsel de oficio duringarraignmentandpre-trialbutmoreso,theircounseldeoficio actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court includingthedirectandcross-examinationofthewitnesses.Asaptly found bytheCA,thepetitionersweredulyrepresentedbyacounsel deoficioallthroughouttheproceedingse xceptforonehearing. TheCourtisnotpersuadedthattheabsenceofthecounseldeoficio in one of the hearings of this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel.Nordoessuchabsencewarrantthenullificationoftheentire trialcourtproceedingsandtheeventualinvalidationofitsruling. Righttobeinformedofthenatureandcauseofaccusation Enrilev.People2 015EnBanc Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and causeofthe accusationagainsthim. The objective is to describetheactwithsufficientcertaintytofully appraise the accused of the nature of thechargeagainsthimandto avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accusedwouldbeleftspeculatingonwhyhehasbeenchargedatall. An Information is an accusation inwritingchargingapersonwith an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right of the accused tobeinformedofthenatureand cause of the accusation against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused toproperlyprepareforhis defensesinceheispresumedtohavenoindependentknowledge ofthefactsconstitutingtheoffensecharged. AnInformationonlyneedstostatetheultimatefactsconstitutingthe offense;theevidentiaryandotherdetailscanbeprovidedduringthe trial. TheproceduraldueprocessmandateoftheConstitutionrequiresthat the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informedasto why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convictedonlyonshowingthathisguiltisshownbeyondreasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Duringarraignment,theaccusedisgrantedtheopportunitytofully knowtheprecisechargethatconfrontshimandmadefullyawareof possiblelossoffreedom,evenofhislife,dependingonthenatureof thecrimeimputedtohim. term to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evidentpremeditation;(4)cruelty— is present, must state theultimatefactsrelativeto such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be subjecttoamotiontoquashunderSection3(e)(i.e.,thatit doesnotconformsubstantiallytotheprescribedform),Rule 117, or a motion for a bill of particulars under the parameterssetbysaidRules. The Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enablehimtopleadjeopardyagainstalaterprosecution,andinform thecourtofthefactsallegedsothatitcandeterminethesufficiency ofthecharge.AnInformationmaybesufficienttowithstandamotion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses.Insuchinstances,theRulesofCourt allowtheaccusedtomoveforab illofparticulars toenablehim properlytopleadandtopreparefortrial. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may be appreciatedagainsthimifprovenduringtrial. Ingeneral,abillofparticularsisthefurtherspecificationofthe charges orclaimsinanaction,whichanaccusedmayavailofby motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and preparefortrial. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is notamotiontoquash,butamotionfora billofparticulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegationsinthecomplaintorinformationtoenabletheaccusedto properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information,onethatpresentsalltheelementsofthecrimecharged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particularsmaysupplyareonlyformalamendmentstothecomplaint orInformation. ⭐Peoplev.SolaryDumbrique2019EnBanc IntheassailedDecision,whiletheCAaffirmedtheRTC'sfindingthat RolandoindeedkilledJoseph,itdowngradedtheoffensefromMurder to Homicide for failure of the Information to sufficiently state the particular facts establishing the existence of the qualifying circumstanceoftreachery. In sum, theCourtherebylaysdownthefollowingguidelinesforthe guidanceoftheBenchandtheBar: 1. Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in whichthelawusesabroad Alternatively,prosecutorsmaysufficientlyavertheultimate factsrelativetoaqualifyingoraggravatingcircumstanceby referencing the pertinent portions of the resolutionfinding probablecauseagainsttheaccused,whichresolutionshould beattachedtotheInformationinaccordancewiththesecond guidelinebelow. 2. Prosecutors must ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that mandates the attachment to the Information the resolution finding probable cause against the accused. Trial courts must ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of this Decisionpriortothearraignment. 3. Caseswhichhaveattainedfinalitypriortothepromulgation of this Decisionwillremainfinalbyvirtueoftheprinciple ofconclusivenessofjudgment. 4. For cases which are stillpendingbeforethetrialcourt,the prosecution,whenstillable,mayfileamotiontoamendthe Information pursuant to the prevailing Rules in order to properly allege the aggravating or qualifying circumstance pursuanttothisDecision. 5. Forcasesinwhichajudgmentordecisionhasalreadybeen rendered by the trial court and is still pending appeal, the case shall be judged by the appellate court depending on whethertheaccusedhasalreadywaivedhisrighttoquestion the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstanceintheInformation,(i.e.,whetherhepreviously BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 106of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver filedeitheramotiontoquashunderSection3(e),Rule117, or a motion for a bill of particulars) pursuant to this Decision. Peoplev.CubayyUgsalan2019Division Here,appellantwaschargedwithforty-four(44)countsofrape. TheInformationsconspicuouslylackthesecondelementofrape,i.e. the accused employed force or intimidation, or thatthevictimwas deprived of reason, unconscious,undertwelve(12)yearsofage,or wasdemented. Thus,theInformationsdonotvalidlychargethecrimeofrapeorany offense at all. The same, for sure, cannot be the basis of a valid judgmentofconviction. We are not unmindful of the rule that by his plea, an accused is deemed to have waived all objectionstotheinformation.Thisrule, however,iscorrectonlyinsofarasformalobjectionstothepleadings are concerned. By express provision of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and by established jurisprudence,thevalidityofthe Information vis-a-vis the essential issue of whether or not it sufficiently charges an offense goes into the very foundation of jurisdiction, hence, may beraisedandaddressedatanystageofthe proceedings. Righttospeedy,impartial,andpublictrial MartinezIIIv.People2019Division Althoughdelayisnottobedeterminedsolelyfromthelengthoftime takenfortheconductofthepreliminaryinvestigation,alongdelayis inordinateunlesstheOfficeoftheOmbudsmansuitablyjustifiesit. The Constitution guaranteesunderSection16,ArticleIIItherightto the speedy disposition of cases. The Court has adopted the "balancingtest"basedonthelandmarkrulingoftheUnitedStates Supreme Court in Barkerv.Wingototheeffectthatindetermining the existence of inordinate delay the courts should consider the presenceofthefollowingfactors,namely; (4) theprejudicetothedefendantasaresultofthedelay. The consequences of delay do not only affect the accused. The prosecution of the case will also be made difficult the longer the periodoftimepasses.InCorpuzv.Sandiganbayan: Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burdenofprovingitscasebeyondreasonabledoubt.Thepassageof timemaymakeitdifficultorimpossibleforthegovernmenttocarry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals.AsheldinWilliamsv.UnitedStates,forthegovernment to sustain its right to try the accuseddespiteadelay,itmustshow twothings: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyondthat whichensuedfromtheordinaryandinevitabledelay;and (b) thattherewasnomoredelaythanisreasonablyattributable totheordinaryprocessesofjustice. Undertheforegoingpronouncement,thedelayincurredinconducting thepreliminaryinvestigationsurelyprejudicedthepetitioners.After submitting their counter-affidavits withthedocumentsprovingthat Sikap Yaman had been a qualified NGO and showing the express authority of petitioner Martinez III to enter into theMOA,theyhad reasonable basis to become comfortable and to honestly believe themselvesclearedoftheaccusationTheyhadnoinklingwhatsoever thattheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwasinthemeanwhileaddingtheir supposed failure tomonitortheuseofthefundsbySikapYamanas the recipient NGO in support of the accusation. The addition was withoutpriornoticetothem.Worse,thefailuretomonitortheuseof thefundsbySikapYamanhadnotbeensupposedlyrequiredofthem. At least, they were not aware of the requirement, if true. With the lapse of nearly five years from the submission of their counter affidavits, they were thus no longer in the position to adequately preparethemselvesfortheirdefenseshouldfurtherproceedingsand trial be held, including the gathering of evidence upon the new allegation that had meanwhile contributed another ground fortheir indictmentfortheviolationofSection3(e)ofR.A.No.3019. (1) thelengthofdelay; (2) thereasonfordelay; (3) thedefendant'sassertionornonassertionofhisorherright; and Imperial,etalv.Joson,etal2010 Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delaysentailedbythepostponementsoftheaforesaidhearingswere, toagreatextent,attributabletopetitionerFrancisco'sownpursuitof extraordinaryremediesagainsttheinterlocutoryordersissuedbythe Sariaya MTCandtheassignmentofatleastthreepublicprosecutors to thecase,namely,ProsecutorsRodolfoZabella,Jr.,FrancisSiaand JoelBaligod. Rightofconfrontation ⭐Peoplev.SergioandLacanilao2019Division Mayaprosecutionwitness,likeMaryJaneVeloso,whowasconvicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death by the Indonesian Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by way of deposition without violating the constitutionalrighttoconfrontationofawitnessbytheaccused? YES. The righttoconfrontation ispartofdueprocessnotonly in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as well asin proceedingsinadministrativetribunalswithquasi-judicialpowers.It hasatwo-foldpurpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimonyofthewitnessbycross-examination;and (2) secondarily,toallowthejudgetoobservethedeportmentof thewitness. True, Cristina and JuliushavenoopportunitytoconfrontMaryJane face to face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the termsandconditionslaiddownbythetrialcourtensurethattheyare given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written interrogatories so as not to defeat thefirstpurposeoftheir constitutional right. To recall, the trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on theobjections.Thereafter,onlythefinalquestionswouldbe askedbytheConsulofthePhilippinesinIndonesiaorhisdesignated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should the prosecution raiseanyobjectionthereto,the trialcourtjudgemustpromptlyruleonthesame,andthefinalcross interrogatory questionsforthedepositionofMaryJanewillthenbe BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 107of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewisebetakeninverbatimandatranscribedcopythereofshallbe giventotheprosecution. The second purposeoftheconstitutionalrighttoconfrontationhas likewisebeenupheld.Asaptlystatedinthetermsandconditionsfor the taking of deposition, thetrialcourtjudgewillbepresentduring the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanorof the witness closely. Although the deposition is in writing, the trial courtjudgecanstillcarefullyperceivethereactionanddeportmentof Mary Janeassheanswerseachquestionpropoundedtoherbothby theprosecutionandthedefense. Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equallysafeguarded.Theparameterslaiddownbythetrialcourtare sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will givehertestimony under oath to deterlyingbythethreatofperjurycharge.Sheisstill subjected to cross-examination so as to determine the presence of anyfalsehoodinhertestimony.Lastly,theguidelinesenablethetrial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her credibility. Peoplev.Matibag The trial court committed no error in lending credence to the testimonyofMrs.AmparoCarlos.Theallegedinconsistencyastothe distance of Mrs. Carlos to her husband when the latterwasshotis definitely inconsequential. Whether the distance was four (4), five (5) or seven (7) meters, the fact still remains that she was in the vicinityandpersonallywitnessedthecrimewhenitwascommitted. Likewise, the prosecution could not be faulted for not presentinga certainMrs.Mercado,thePresidentoftheHomeowner'sAssociation and neighbor of theCarloses,whomMrs.Carlosallegedlysawafter herhusbandwasshot.Thetestimonyofasinglewitness,iffoundto becredible,trustworthyandstraightforwardwouldsufficetoconvict theaccusedofthecrimeofwhichhewascharged.Thediscretionstill lieswiththeprosecutionastothenumberofwitnessesandwhomto presentonthewitnessstand.Forsure,theprosecutioncouldnotbe accused of suppressing vital evidence. The defense could have presentedMrs.Mercadoasanadversewitnessifitsodesired. Ontheotherhand,thisCourtagreeswithaccused-appellantsthatthe trial court shouldnothaveconsideredtheextrajudicialstatementof EdnaCrisologoJacobwhowasnotplacedonthewitnessstand,thus, depriving the defense of its right to cross-examination. The veracity of her statementnothavingbeenascertained,itshouldnot have been given any probative value at all. Be that as it may, her testimony is merely corroborative, and its exclusion willnotaffect thefindingofguiltofaccused-appellants. Inthecaseatbar,thetrialcourtcorrectlydeniedappellant'smotion fortheproductionoftherecordswhichwerethebasisinissuingthe POEACertificationdatedFebruary3,1994,asthesamewouldnotin any way alter the undisputed fact that appellant was not issued a licenseuntilthen. Trialsinabsentia Peoplev.Givera Whenpresenceofaccusedisaduty On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legaltakeninthefirstcase,involvingthethreeotheraccused forthedeathofthesamevictim,offeredinevidenceinthecaseatbar, this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As correctly contended by the defense, because they did not have the opportunitytocross-examineDr.Baltazar,histestimonycannotbe used in evidence against accused-appellant. Indeed, where the opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness, this Court in severalcasesheld: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete,thatis,ifthewitnesshasbeenwhollycross-examined bytheadversepartyortherighttocross-examineislostwholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examinationisnotandcannotbedoneorcompleteddueto causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompletedtestimonyistherebyrenderedincompetent. Compulsoryprocess Peoplev.Chua Chua claimed that she was denied her constitutional right to compulsoryprocess. The1973and1987Constitutionsexpandedtherighttocompulsory processwhichnowincludestherighttosecuretheproductionof evidence in one's behalf. By analogy, U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid downtherequisitesforcompellingtheattendanceofwitnesses,may beappliedtothisexpandedconcept.Thus,themovantmustshow: (a) thattheevidenceisreallym aterial; (b) thatheisnotguiltyofneglectinpreviouslyobtainingthe productionofsuchevidence; (c) thattheevidencewillbeavailableatthetimedesired;and (d) thatnosimilarevidencecouldbeobtained. 1. Arraignmentandplea; 2. Duringtrial,foridentification; 3. Promulgationofsentence,unlessforlightoffense. O.RighttotheSpeedyDispositionofCases Sec16.Allpersonsshallhavetherighttoaspeedydispositionof their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Olbesv.Buemio On his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitionerinterposedno objectiontothesettingofthepre-trialtoMay28,2003whichwas,as earlier stated, later declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date wasbeyondthe controlofthetrialcourt. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, the Court stressed that the exceptions consisting of the time exclusions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility.Suchrighttoaspeedy trialandaspeedydispositionofacaseisviolatedonlywhenthe proceedingisattendedbyvexatious,capriciousandoppressive delays. Abalancingtestofapplyingsocietalinterestsandtherightsofthe accusednecessarilycompelsthecourttoapproachspeedytrialcases onanadhocbasis. Indeterminingwhethertheaccusedhasbeendeprivedofhisrightto a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors mustbeconsidered: BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 108of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditionsshallbedealtwithbylaw. (a) lengthofdelay; (b) thereasonforthedelay; (c) thedefendant'sassertionofhisright;and Estipona,Jr.v.Lobrigo2017EnBancrePlea-bargaining (d) prejudicetothedefendant. Leonen,Jconcurring The prohibition found in Section 23 is unconstitutional not only because it contravenes the rule-making power of thisCourt,italso constitutes"cruel,degrading,andinhuman"punishmentforthe accused.Theaimistorehabilitate,notpunish,thosedrugoffenders. Lumanogv.People2010EnBanc Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and dependsuponthecircumstances. WhattheConstitution prohibits are u nreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays,whichrenderrightsnugatory. It must bestressedthatinthedeterminationofwhethertherightto speedydispositionofcaseshasbeenviolated,particularregardmust betakenofthefactsandcircumstancespeculiartoeachcase. Amere mathematicalreckoningofthetimeinvolvedwouldnotbesufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the caseremainedpendingwiththeCAandthisCourt wasnotunreasonable,arbitraryoroppressive. In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so-called "radical relief" to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however,appellantsarenotentitledto the same relief in theabsenceofclearandconvincingshowingthat the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary. Sec20.Nopersonshallbeimprisonedfordebtornon-paymentof apolltax. Lozanov.MartinezonBP22 Among the constitutional objections raised against BP22,themost serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contendedthatthestatuterunscountertotheinhibitionintheBillof Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-paymentofapolltax." Sec19.Excessivefinesshallnotbeimposed,norcruel,degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,unless,forcompellingreasonsinvolvingheinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposedshallbereducedtoreclusionperpetua. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment fordebt? Toanswerthequestion,itisnecessaryto P.RightAgainstExcessiveFinesandCruel, Degrading,andInhumanPunishments The enactment of BP22isadeclarationbythelegislaturethat,asa matterofpublicpolicy,themakingandissuanceofaworthlesscheck isdeemedapublicnuisancetobeabatedbytheimpositionofpenal sanctions. Q.Non-imprisonmentforDebts ClosertothecaseatbarisPeoplev.VeraReyes,whereinastatutory provision which made illegal and punishable the refusal of an employertopay,whenhecandoso,thesalariesofhisemployeesor laborers on the fifteenth or last day of everymonthoronSaturday every week, was challengedforbeingviolativeoftheconstitutional prohibition against imprisonmentfordebt. Theconstitutionalityof the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within the authority ofthelegislaturetoenactsuchalawintheexerciseofthe police power. It washeldthat"oneofthepurposesofthelawisto suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborersoremployeeswithoutpayingthemthesalariesagreedupon for their services, thus causing themfinancialdifficulties."Thelaw was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an obligation, althoughobviouslysuchcouldbeitseffect,buttobanishapractice consideredharmfultopublicwelfare. examinewhatthestatuteprohibitsandpunishesasanoffense. ThegravamenoftheoffensepunishedbyBP22istheactofmaking andissuingaworthlesscheckoracheckthatisdishonoreduponits presentationforpayment. Itisnotthenon-paymentofanobligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerceadebtortopayhisdebt. Thethrustofthelawistoprohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making ofworthlesschecksand puttingthemincirculation. Becauseofitsdeleteriouseffectsonthe public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense againstpublicorder. R.RightAgainstDoubleJeopardy Mallariv.People With the prior conviction by a final judgment of petitioner for the crime of estafa thru falsification of publicdocumentinCA-G.R.No. 20817-CR, there is no question that the first and second requisites aboveenumeratedarepresentinthecaseatbar.Isthecrimecharged in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR the same as in this case (CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR)? Weruleintheaffirmative. A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings of facts oftheappellatecourt tellsusthattheyrefertothesameseriesofacts.Theseseriesofacts amount to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuingoffense. Acontinuedcrimeisasinglecrimeconsistingofaseriesofactsbut allarisingfromonecriminalresolution.Itisacontinuous,unlawful actorseriesofactssetonfootbyasingleimpulseandoperatedby anunintermittentforce,howeverlongatimeitmayoccupy.Although there are series of acts, there is only one crimecommitted.Hence, onlyonepenaltyshallbeimposed. It has alsobeenruledthatwhentwoinformationsrefertothesame transaction, the second charge cannot prosper because the accused will thereby be placed injeopardyforthesecondtimeforthesame BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 109of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver offense. Petitioner, having already been convicted of the complex crime of estafathrufalsificationofpublicdocumentinCA-G.R.No.20817-CR, itstandstoreasonthatshecannolongerbeheldliableforthesame crimeinthiscase.Theruleagainstdoublejeopardyprotectsthe accusednotagainsttheperilofsecondpunishmentbutagainst being tried for the same offense.Nemobispuniturproeodem delicto.Nomanispunishedtwiceforthesamefaultoroffense. Peoplev.Sandiganbayan(SecondDivision)2019Division We adhere to thefinality-of-acquittaldoctrine,thatis,ajudgment ofacquittalisfinalandunappealable. In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. As succinctly observed in Green v.UnitedStatestheunderlyingideaisthattheStatewithall its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him embarrassment, expense and ordeal andcompelling himtoliveinacontinuingstateofanxietyandinsecurity,aswellas enhancingthepossibilitythateventhoughinnocent,hemaybefound guilty. Theelementsofdoublejeopardyare (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substancetosustainaconviction; (2) thecourthadjurisdiction; (3) theaccusedhadbeenarraignedandhadpleaded;and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissedwithouthisexpressconsent. Theonlyinstancewhentheaccusedcanbebarredfrominvokinghis rightagainstdoublejeopardyiswhenitcanbedemonstratedthatthe trialcourtactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackor excessofjurisdiction,suchaswheretheprosecutionwasnotallowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trialwassham. In this case,alltheelementsofdoublejeopardyarepresent:(1)the Informations for thirteen (13)countsofviolationofSection3(h)of R.A. No. 3019 were sufficient in form and substance tosustainthe conviction of the respondent; (2) the court a quo definitely had jurisdiction over the cases; (3) arraignment took place on July 13, 2006wheretherespondententeredanegativeplea;and(4)thecourt a quo, on motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent, acquittedthelatteroftheoffensecharged. In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than thatajudgmentof acquittal is immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceedsfromtheaccused'sconstitutionally-enshrinedrightagainst prosecutionifthesamewouldplacehimunderd oublejeopardy. For an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution's right to dueprocesswasviolatedorthatthetrialconductedwasasham.The burdenisonthepetitionertoclearlydemonstratethatthetrialcourt blatantlyabuseditsauthoritytoapointsograveastodepriveitofits verypowertodispensejustice. RemedyofStatefromJudgmentofAcquittal: Bowdenv.Bowden2019Division If the court finds the evidence insufficient to support a verdict of guilt,thecourtshallgrantthedemurrerandthecriminalcaseshall be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolutiononthemeritsand tantamounttoanacquittal.Anyfurtherprosecutionoftheaccused after an acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Accordingly, an order granting the demurrer to evidenceandacquittingtheaccusedonthegroundofinsufficiencyof evidencecannotbethesubjectofanappeal. Inthiscase,petitionerMandaganfaultstheCAingrantingthepetition for certiorari of respondent JMV Corporation and reversing her acquittal. While petitioner Mandagan agrees thattheruleondouble jeopardy is not without exceptions, sheneverthelessmaintainsthat nograveabuseofdiscretionwasattributabletotheRTCinrendering theDecision. Itbearsstressing,however,thattheCourtisnotatallprecludedfrom reviewing an order of denial if it is shown that grave abuse of discretionattendeditsissuance. The CA, in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari of respondent JMV Corporation, thus reasoned that such error of judgment on the part oftheRTC"unfolded"intooneofjurisdiction, allegedly due to a misappreciation of the evidence. This is an egregiouserror. The rulebarringanappealfromajudgmentofacquittalis,however, notabsolute.Thefollowingaretherecognizede xceptionst hereto: 1. 2. whentheprosecutionisdenieddueprocessoflaw;and when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessofjurisdictionindismissinga criminal case by granting the accused's demurrer to evidence. Judicial review in certiorari proceedings shall be confined to the question of whether the judgment for acquittal is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. The court will look into the decision's validity—ifitwasrenderedbyacourtwithoutjurisdictionorifthe court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessofjurisdiction—notonitslegalcorrectness. Peoplev.CTA2019Resolution Ajudgmentofacquittalcannotbeappealedasthiswouldviolatethe constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused against double jeopardyenshrinedintheConstitution.Anexception,however,exists if the judgment of acquittal was rendered with grave abuse of discretion.Insuchacase,thejudgmentofacquittalmaybeassailed viaapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65. In this case, however, the arguments raised by petitioner involve mistakes in the appreciation of thefactsandtheevidenceallegedly committed bytheCTASecondDivisionwhichdonotfallwithinthe ambitofRule65. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion is not reviewable via certiorariforbeingnothingmorethanerrorsofjudgment. Guided by the foregoing, the Court so finds that the CA committed reversibleerrorwhenitannulledtheRTCDecision. S.RightAgainstInvoluntaryServitude Sec18.xxxNoinvoluntaryservitudeinanyformshallexistexcept asapunishmentforacrimewhereofthepartyshallhavebeenduly convicted. Mandaganv.JoseM.ValeroCorp2019Division BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 110of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver T.ExpostfactolawsandBillsofAttainder individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.This lastelement,thetotallackofcourtinterventioninthefindingofguilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the mostessential.P.D.No.1866doesnotpossesstheelementsofabill ofattainder. ⭐Fuertesv.SenateofthePhilippines2020EnBanc Contrarytopetitioner'sassertion,theAnti-HazingLawisnotabillof attainder. In modern times, a bill of attainder is generally understood as a legislativeactwhichinflictspunishmentonindividualsormembers ofaparticulargroupwithoutajudicialtrial. a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, 2. theimpositionofapunishment,penalorotherwise,and 3. thelackofjudicialtrial. InmatesoftheNewBilibidPrisonv.DeLima2019EnBanc While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctionalsystem,itsprovisions have thepurposeandeffectofdiminishingthepunishmentattached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonmentis,intheultimateanalysis,beneficialtothedetention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article22oftheRPC. The prospective application of the beneficialprovisionsofR.A.No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease inthepenalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prisonstay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as apracticalmatterresultsinextendingtheirsentenceand increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandateofArticle22oftheRPC. Themostessentialoftheseelementsisthecompleteexclusionofthe courtsfromthedeterminationofguiltandimposablepenalty. Indeed,itisonlywhenastatuteapplieseithertonamedindividuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way asto inflict punishmentonthemwithoutajudicialtrialdoesitbecomea billofattainder. Here, the mere filing of an Information against petitioner and her fellow sorority members is not a finding oftheirguiltofthecrime charged.Contrarytoherclaim,petitionerisnotbeingchargedmerely because she is a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, but because she is allegedly a principal by direct participation in the hazingthatledtoAbracia'sdeath.Asstated,thesearemattersforthe trialcourttodecide.Theprosecutionmuststillprovetheseoffense, and the accused's participation in it, beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner,inturn,maypresentherdefensestotheallegations. Misolasv.Panga But even if a challenge on the ground that P.D. 1866 is a bill of attaindercouldbeappropriatelyconsidered,itwillstillbemetwith little success. TheCourt,inPeoplev.Ferrer,supra,definedabillof attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individualsormembersofaparticulargroupwithoutajudicialtrial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain G.Rightsofpublicofficers H.Liabilitiesofpublicofficers Preventivesuspensionandbacksalaries Illegaldismissal,reinstatement,andbacksalaries Foralawtobeconsideredabillofattainder,itmustbeshownto containallo fthefollowing: 1. F.Powersanddutiesofpublicofficers Thus,Section4,Rule1oftheImplementingRulesandRegulationsof RepublicActNo.10592isDECLAREDinvalidinsofarasitprovides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and specialtimeallowanceforloyalty. X.LAWONPUBLICOFFICERS A.Generalprinciples B.Modesofacquiringtitletopublicoffice C.Modesandkindsofappointment D.Eligibilityandqualificationrequirements I.Immunityofpublicofficers J.Distinguish:defactoanddejureofficers K.Terminationofofficialrelation L.Civilservice Scope Appointmentstothecivilservice Personnelactions M.Accountabilityofpublicofficers Typesofaccountability TheOmbudsmanandtheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor TheSandiganbayan N.Termlimits A.Generalprinciples Section 1.ArtXI.Publicofficeisapublictrust.Publicofficers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;actwithpatriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives. Sec 2(b) RA 3019. "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as definedintheprecedingsubparagraph. E.Disabilitiesandinhibitionsofpublicofficers BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 111of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Sec 3 (b) RA 6713. "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whetherinthecareerornon-careerservice,includingmilitaryand police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardlessofamount. SecofDOTCv.Mabalot Apublicofficemaybecreatedthroughanyofthefollowingmodes,to wit,either (1) bytheC onstitution, (2) byl aw,or (3) bya uthorityoflaw. In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode — by authority of law, which could be decreed for instance, throughan E.O.issuedbythePresidentoranorderofanadministrativeagency suchastheCSCpursuanttoSection17,BookVofE.O.292. The President, throughAdministrativeOrderNo.36,didnotmerely authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various departments and agencies of government to immediatelyundertake thecreationandestablishmentoftheirregionalofficesintheCAR.To us,AdministrativeOrderNo.36isaclearandunequivocaldirective andmandate—nolessthanfromtheChiefExecutive—orderingthe heads of government departments and bureaus to effect the establishmentoftheirrespectiveregionalofficesintheCAR. As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution,weholdthattheassailedOrdersoftheDOTCSecretary do not violate the aforementioned constitutional provisions considering that in the case ofMemorandumOrderNo.96-735,the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR were, in effect, merely designatedtoperformtheadditionaldutiesandfunctionsofan LTFRB Regional Office subject tothedirectsupervisionandcontrol of LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB RegionalOffice. To designateapublicofficertoanotherpositionmaymeantovest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or in some cases, a public officer may be designatedtoapositioninana ctingcapacity. NLTDRAv.CSC Thereisnosuchthingasavestedinterestoranestateinanoffice, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices whichprovideforspecialimmunityasregardssalaryandtenure,no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. Noneoftheexceptionstothisruleareobtaininginthiscase. Toreiterate,thepositionwhichprivaterespondentGarciawouldlike to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to EO No. 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re-employedinareorganizedoffice. Laurelv.Desierto The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include (1) thedelegationofsovereignfunctions, (2) itscreationbylawandnotbycontract, (3) anoath, (4) salary, (5) continuanceoftheposition, Unlessthepowersconferredareofthisnature,theindividualisnota publicofficer. Carandangv.Ombudsman2 011 A corporation is considered a GOCC only when the Government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least a majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Consequently, RPN was neither a GOCC becauseoftheGovernment'stotalshareinRPN'scapitalstockbeing only32.4%. Abejav.Tanada We find as erroneous the substitution of the deceased Rosauro Radovan's widow, Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground that private respondent had a counter-claim for damages. "Public office is personaltotheincumbentandisNOTapropertywhichpasses to his heirs" The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee's counterclaim for damages against theprotestantforthat was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contestedoffice. DelaVictoriav.Comelec Whether the heirs of the deceased protestee in an election protest may be considered as real party-in-interest even if the vice-mayor has been allowed to intervene and the protestant had waived his claimfordamagesandcostsintheproceedings. NO.ThelateGenovevaMesina'sclaimtothecontestedofficewasnot (6) scopeofduties,and (7) thedesignationofthepositionasanoffice. Themostimportantcharacteristicwhichdistinguishesanofficefrom an employment or contract isthatthecreationandconferringofan office involves a d elegation to the individual o f some of the sovereignfunctionsofgovernment,tobeexercisedbyhimfor the benefit of the public — that someportionofthesovereigntyof the country, either legislative, executiveorjudicial,attaches,forthe timebeing,tobeexercisedforthepublicbenefit. in any senseatransmissiblerightthatdevolveduponhersurviving spouseandherchildrenafterherdeath.Publicofficeispersonalto theincumbentandisnotapropertywhichpassestohisheirs. Private respondents’ only interest in the outcome of the case is limited to no more than their interest in defending her against the protestant's claim for damages and costs. They may no longer prosecute her owncounter-claimfordamagesagainsttheprotestant forthatwasextinguishedwhendeathterminatedherrighttooccupy thecontestedofficeofmayorofAlbuera,Leyte. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 112of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Libananv.Sandiganbayan Petitionercontendsthattheorderofsuspension,beingpredicatedon his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that heisthe duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The implementation of the suspension order, he further claims, would amounttoadeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw. InDelosov.Sandiganbayan,thisCourtrejectedasimilarargument advanced by Governor Deloso who, at the time of issuance of the suspension order, was alreadyoccupyingtheofficeofgovernorand not the position of municipal mayor that he held previously when chargedwithhavingviolatedtheAnti-GraftLaw. PriortoDeloso,inBayotv.Sandiganbayan,thesuspensionofthen Cavite mayor Bayot was also sustained even as hewaschargedfor actscommittedasagovernmentauditoroftheCommissiononAudit. Inbothinstances,thisCourtruledthattheterm"o ffice"usedinthe law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarilytheparticularofficeunder whichhewascharged. Obviously,thesuspensionordercannotamounttoadeprivation ofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Publicofficeis"apublic agency or trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutionalprovisionwhichpetitionerinvokes. TheGeneralManager,PPAv.Monserate Whetherornottherewasdueprocesswhenrespondentwasreplaced by petitioner Anino from her position as Manager II, Resource ManagementDivision,anddemotedasAdministrativeOfficer. NO. This Court cannot accord validity to the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board which “upholds the appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resource Management Division Manager.” The PPA Appeals Board could not uphold an appointmentwhichwasnotyetexisting. In Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, this Court emphasized that “once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right(tothe position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution,andcannotbetakenawayfromhimeitherbyrevocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previousnoticeandhearing.” To be sure, her position asManagerIIneverbecamevacantsince her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction,"anappointmenttoa non-vacantpositioninthecivilserviceisnullandvoida binitio.” While petitioner Anino’s appointment to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is nonetheless considered a de facto officerduringtheperiodofhisincumbency. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court allowed a de facto officer to receive emoluments for actual servicesrenderedb utonlywhenthereisnod ejureofficer. Infine,theruleisthatwherethereisadejureofficer,adefacto officer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled to the emolumentsattachedtotheoffice,evenifheoccupiedtheoffice ingoodfaith. Thisrule,however,cannotbeappliedsquarelyon thepresentcase. Monserate is entitled only to backpay differentials for the period startingfromherassumptionasAdministrativeOfficeruptothetime of her actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Suchbackpaydifferentialspertaintothedifferencebetween the salary rates for the positions of Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino corresponding fromthetimehewrongfullyassumedthecontestedpositionuptothe timeofhisretirement. Nazarenov.CityofDumaguete The general rule isthatappointmentsshalltakeeffectimmediately; and should the appointees already assume the duties of their positions, they shall be entitled to receive their salary at once. Thereisnoneedtowaitfortheapprovaloftheappointmentsbythe CSC. The appointments shall be effective until disapprovedby theCSC. Nevertheless, the aforementioned g eneral rules cannot be simply applied to the case at b ar given its peculiar circumstances. Section3,RuleVIoftheRevisedOmnibusRulesonAppointments and Other Personnel Actions only categoricallyrecognizestheright oftheappointeetopaymentofsalariesfromthegovernment,during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration or appeal of the disapprovalofhisappointment,iftheappointmentwasdisapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violationofcivilservice law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the Qualification Standards(QS)prescribedfortheposition. Section4,RuleVIthenappliesiftheappointmentwasdisapproved for violation of civil service law, wherein the appointing authorityshallbepersonallyliableforthesalaryoftheappointee. ThisisincompleteaccordwiththeSection65,Chapter10,BookV,of ExecutiveOrderNo.292. Petitioners' appointments were invalidated and revoked on the groundthatsaidappointmentsweremadebyformerMayorRemollo in violation of a CSCResolution,whichprohibitstheoutgoingchief executive from making mass appointments after elections. Upon disapproval of petitioners' appointments, for being in violation of civilservicelaw,petitionersmaynolongerclaimentitlementtothe paymentoftheirsalariesfromthegovernment. OnlyifthisCourtfinallyrulesthatpetitioners'appointmentsdidnot violateanycivilservicelaw,ispetitioners'righttopaymentoftheir salaries by the City Government of Dumaguete, during the given period,indisputablyestablished. B.Modesofacquiringtitletopublicoffice 1. Bye lection; 2. Bydirectprovisionoflaw; 3. Bya ppointment. C.Modesandkindsofappointment Theappointmenttoagovernmentposttobecompleteinvolvesseveral steps. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 113of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver First,comesthenominationbythePresident. Second, to make that nomination valid and permanent, the CommissiononAppointmentsoftheLegislaturehastoconfirm saidnomination. Thirdandlastistheacceptancethereofbytheappointeeby hisassumptionofoffice. Thereisnopowerinthiscountrywhichcancompelaman toacceptanoffice. PermanentvsTemporaryAppointments Appointmentinthecareerserviceshallbepermanentortemporary. 1. Permanentstatus.Apermanentappointmentshallbeissued toapersonwhomeetsalltherequirementsforthepositionto which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibilityprescribed,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsoflaw, rulesandstandardspromulgatedinpursuancethereof. Where a person holds his position at the pleasure of asuperioror subjecttosomesuperveningevent,hisseparationfromofficeisnot a removal. It is effected by the will of the superior or by the happeningofthecontingency,resultinginanotheranddifferentmode ofterminatingofficialrelationsknownase xpirationoftheterm. There are now only two kinds of appointment under the AdministrativeCodeof1987,p ermanentandtemporary. Strictly speaking, the petitioner's temporary appointment as ExecutiveDirectoroftheLTOshouldhaveendedtwelvemonthsafter he assumed office, or on July 16, 1988. From that date, his appointment had ceased to be valid evenifaqualifiedreplacement was not yet available and consequently had to be discontinued. Indeed, even on the assumption that his appointment couldbeand had been validly extended beyond the one-year limit,thatextended term was nevertheless validly terminated with the appointment of hisqualifiedreplacement. 2. Temporary appointment. In the absence of appropriate ProvofCamarinesSurv.CA eligiblesanditbecomesnecessaryinthepublicinteresttofill avacancy,atemporaryappointmentshallbeissuedtoaperson WON D ato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of whomeetsalltherequirementsforthepositiontowhichheis CamarinesSuratthetimehewassuspendedonMarch16,1976. beingappointedexcepttheappropriatecivilserviceeligibility: NO.Datodoesnotdisputethefactthatatthetimehewasappointed Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed Assistant Provincial Warden, he had not yet qualified in an twelve months, but theappointeemaybereplacedsoonerifa appropriate examinationfortheaforementionedposition. Suchlack qualifiedcivilserviceeligiblebecomesavailable. of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporaryand withoutafixedanddefinitetermandisdependententirelyuponthe Pangilinanv.Maglaya pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that Dato obtained civil serviceeligibilitylateronisofnomomentashishavingpassedthe Grayandtheothercasescitedbythepetitionerinvolvedpermanent supervisingsecurityguardexamination,didnotipsofactoconvert appointees who therefore had security of tenure. Pangilinan was histemporaryappointmentintoapermanentone.Incasessuch only an acting appointee because he did not have the requisite astheoneatbench,whatisrequiredisan ewappointmentsince qualifications;assuch,hecouldnotclaimsecurityoftenure.Thefact that Pangilinan was qualified forhisinitialappointmentasagentin a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other positions he temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the might later occupy in the civil service. The law doesnotprescribe appointingauthority. uniformqualificationsforallpublicpositionsregardlessofnatureor In Luego v.CivilServiceCommission,theCourtruledthatCSChas degree. thepowertoapproveordisapproveanappointmentsetbeforeit. It doesnothavethepower 1. tom aketheappointmentitselfor 2. to direct the appointing authority to change the employmentstatusofanemployee. The CSCcanonlyinquireintotheeligibilityofthepersonchosen tofillapositionandifitfindsthepersonqualifieditmustsoattest. If not,theappointmentmustbedisapproved.ThedutyoftheCSCis to a ttest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participationintheappointmentprocessceases. In the case at bench, CSC shouldhaveendeditsparticipationinthe appointmentofprivaterespondentwhenitconfirmedthetemporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issuedtheforegoingcommunication,itsteppedonthetoes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vestedsolelyuponthelatter. Dato,beingmerelyatemporaryemployee,isnotentitledtothe reliefheseeks,includinghisclaimforbackwagesfortheentire periodofhissuspension. Sevillav.Santos Mayanofficerwhowasappointedtoanofficeinan"acting"capacity, bringaquowarrantoactionagainstthepermanentappointeetothe position? NO.An"acting"appointmentismerelytemporary,onewhichisgood only until another appointment is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner'srighttoholdofficeas"ActingCityEngineerofCabanatuan City"wasmerelytemporary.ItlapsedupontheappointmentofNerito Santosasthepermanentcityengineer. In as much as the petitioner does not aver that he isentitledtothe office of City Engineer of Cabanatuan City and that Santosisamere usurper of said office, the CA committed no reversible error in dismissingpetitioner'sactionforquowarranto. D.Eligibilityandqualificationrequirements SocialJusticeSocietyv.PDEA BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 114of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senatorneedsonlytomeetthequalificationslaiddowninSec.3,Art. VIoftheConstitution,towit: (1) citizenship, ConstitutionalInhibitions 1. The President and VP shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.(Sec6ArtVII) 2. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistantsshallnot,unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,holdanyotheroffice oremploymentduringtheirtenure.Theyshallnot,duringsaid tenure,directlyorindirectly, (2) voterregistration, (3) literacy, (4) age,and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification torunforsenator andbevoteduponandelectedasmemberoftheSenate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, asitcannotdisregard,evade,orweakenthe forceofaconstitutionalmandate,oralterorenlargetheConstitution. 3. 4. practiceanyotherprofession, b. participateinanybusiness,or c. befinanciallyinterestedinanycontractwith,orinany franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any otherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment, duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghisseat.(Sec13ArtVI) He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be calledupontoactonaccountofhisoffice.(S ec14ArtVI) 5. No member of a Constitutional Commission, the Ombudsmanandhisdeputies,shall,duringhistenure,hold anyotherofficeoremployment. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directlyorindirectly,inanyelectioneeringorpartisanpolitical campaign.(Sec2[4]ArtIX-B) Partisan political activity means active support for or affiliationwiththecauseofapoliticalpartyorcandidate.This generally includes becoming actively identified with the successorfailureofanycandidateorcandidateforelectionto publicoffice. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position duringhistenure. Unless otherwise allowed bylaworbytheprimaryfunctions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other officeoremploymentintheGovernment.(S ec7ArtIX-B) 8. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives maypersonallyappearascounselbeforeanycourtofjusticeor before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrativebodies. Neithershallhe,directlyorindirectly,beinterestedfinancially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege grantedbytheGovernment,duringhistermofoffice. Frivaldov.Comelec Literally, such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence — should thusbe possessed when the"elective[orelected]official"beginstogovern, i.e.,atthetimeheisproclaimedandatthestartofhisterm. a. 6. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interestintheconductof theiroffice.(Sec13ArtVII) Maquerav.Borra Thatsaidpropertyqualificationsareinconsistentwiththenatureand essence of the Republican system ordained inourConstitutionand the principleofsocialjusticeunderlyingthesame,forsaidpolitical system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanatesfromthem,andthis, inturn,impliesnecessarilythattherighttovoteandtobevotedfor shallnotbedependentuponthewealthoftheindividualconcerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall,byreasonof poverty,bedeniedthechancetobeelectedtopublicoffice. Neither shall heengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorin theactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhich,inany way,maybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,norshallhe be financially interested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government.(S ec2ArtIX-A,Sec8ArtXI) E.Disabilitiesandinhibitionsofpublicofficers No elective or appointivepublicofficeroremployeeshall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorizedbylaw,noracceptwithouttheconsent oftheCongress,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofany kindfromanyforeigngovernment. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double,orindirectcompensation.(S ec8ArtIX-B) 9. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation foranybusinesspurposemaybegranted,directlyorindirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the MembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupremeCourt, and the ConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, duringtheirtenure.(Sec16ArtXI) BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 115of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver purchasebyanofficeroremployeeshallbevoid.(Sec36Book IEO292) Government, is understood to include any subdivision, agency, or instrumentalitythereof,includingGOCCsortheirsubsidiaries. ConstitutionalDisqualifications 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 2. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within thefourthcivildegreeofthePresidentshallnot,duringhis tenure,beappointedas a. MembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,or b. theOfficeoftheOmbudsman,or c. asSecretaries,Undersecretaries, d. chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCsandtheirsubsidiaries.(S ec13ArtVII) If a Secretary, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than whatisallowed,hemustrelinquishtheexcess positionsinfavorofasubordinateofficialwhoisnextinrank, but innocaseshallanyofficialholdmorethantwopositions otherthanhisprimaryposition.(Sec49BookIVEO292) 3. Appointees to the Constitutional Commissions mustnothave been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediatelyprecedingtheirappointment.(S ec1[1]ArtIX-B) TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallnotbequalifiedtorun for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessationfromoffice.(S ec11ArtXI) No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the GovernmentoranyGOCCsorinanyoftheirsubsidiaries.(Sec 6ArtIX-B) Inhibition Against Purchase of Property at Tax Sale. — No officer or employeeofthegovernmentshallpurchasedirectly or indirectly any property sold by the government for the non-payment of any tax, fee or other publiccharge.Anysuch Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shallsitinanycase a. in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interestedasheir,legatee,creditororotherwise,or b. in which he is related to either party within the sixthdegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity,or c. to counsel within the fourth degree, computed accordingtotherulesofthecivillaw,or d. inwhichhehasbeenexecutor,administrator,guardian, trusteeorcounsel,or e. in which he has been presided in any inferior court whenhisrulingordecisionisthesubjectofreview, withoutthewrittenconsentofallpartiesininterest,signedby themandenteredupontherecord.(S ec1R137) OtherInhibitions 1. Disqualifications. —xxxNochairmanorcommissionerofthe Comelecshallsitinanycaseinwhichhehasmanifestedbias or prejudice or antagonism against any party thereto and in connection therewith, or in any case in which he would be disqualifiedundertheRulesofCourt.(Sec6TitleI-CBookVEO 292) 6. Inhibitions Against Commissioners. — The Chairman and the Members of the CHR shall not, during their tenure, hold any otherofficeoremployment. Thislimitationshallnotapplytoadhocbodiesorcommittees, or to boards, councils orbodiesofwhichthePresidentisthe Chairman. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives maybeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedor theemolumentsthereofincreasedduringthetermforwhichhe waselected.(S ec13ArtVI) The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. (Sec 12 ArtVIII) Inhibitions AgainstHoldingMorethanTwoPositions.—Even ifallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary, assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Departmentmay,inadditiontohisprimaryposition,holdnot more than two positions in the government and GOCCs and receivethecorrespondingcompensationtherefor. 5. 4. Certainattorneysnottopractice.—Nojudgeorotherofficial oremployeeofthesuperiorcourtsoroftheOSG,shallengage inprivatepracticeasamemberofthebarorgiveprofessional advicetoclients.(S ec35R138) Neithershalltheyengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorin theactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinany way will be affected bythefunctionsoftheiroffice,norshall they be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the government.(S ec3TitleII-ABookVEO292) 7. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. — It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directlyorindirectly,to: a. Engage in any business transaction with the LGU in which he is anofficialoremployeeoroverwhichhe has the power of supervision, or with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, wherebymoneyistobepaid,orpropertyoranyother thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the LGU to such personorfirm; b. Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensedbyanLGU; c. Purchaseanyrealestateorotherpropertyforfeitedin favor of such LGU forunpaidtaxesorassessment,or byvirtueofalegalprocessattheinstanceofthesaid LGU; d. Be a surety for any person contracting or doing businesswiththeLGUforwhichasuretyisrequired; and BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 116of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver e. 8. PracticeofProfession.— a. b. c. All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaginginanyoccupationotherthantheexerciseof theirfunctionsaslocalchiefexecutives. Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schoolse xceptduringsessionhours. SanggunianmemberswhoarealsomembersoftheBar shallnot: i. d. Appear as counsel before any court in any civilcasewhereinalocalgovernmentunitor any office, agency, or instrumentality of the governmentistheadverseparty; 10. There are prohibited acts and transactions as well under Section7ofRANo6713. F.Powersanddutiesofpublicofficers SourceofPower Section 1. Art II. The Philippinesisademocraticandrepublican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authorityemanatesfromthem. Ministerial Function. A mechanical act that must be performed in any case, and if it is not, may be ordered performedbyacourtofjustice. G.Rightsofpublicofficers A. RighttoOffice.Iftheappointmentonlystatedthepositionand not a particular station, then the officer may validly be reassigned or transferred to any station without violating the righttosecurityoftenure. 1. Theexpressgrantofpowercarrieswithitthegrantofallother powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficientexerciseoftheexpresslygrantedpower. 2. Alter ego principle. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which recognizes the establishment of a C. Notes Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the nationalorlocalgovernmentisaccusedofan offensecommittedinrelationtohisoffice. iii. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;and iv. Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest ofthegovernment. 3. Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during officialhoursofworkonlyonoccasions ofemergency. 4. Civil servants shall not strike against the Government as a means of securing changes in the terms and conditions of 5. B. Preference in Promotion. We find no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the foregoing provision that personsnext-in-rankareentitledtopreferenceinappointment. Whatitdoesprovideisthattheywouldbeamongthefirsttobe considered for the va­cancy if qualified, and if the vacancy is notfilledbypromotion,thesameshallbefilledbytransferor othermodesofappointment. ii. Provided that the officials concerned do not derive monetarycompensationtherefrom.(S ec90LGC) 9. employment.(Sec4R3RRtoGoverntheExerciseoftheRight ofGovernmentEmployeestoSelf-Organization) Possess or use any public property of the LGU for privatepurposes.(S ec89LGC) LeaveofAbsence. 15daysVLofabsenceand15daysofSLfor each year of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundaysandholidays. singleexecutive,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the variousexecutivedepartmentsareassistantsandagentsofthe D. Retirement Pay. Retirement laws should be interpreted ChiefExecutive,and,exceptincaseswheretheChiefExecutive liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to is required by the Constitution or law to actinpersonorthe provide for hissustenance,andhopefullyevencomfort,when exigencies of the situation demand that he actpersonally,the henolongerhasthestaminatocontinueearninghislivelihood. multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive Santiagov.COA departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such Whether t he additional compensation of Santiago received in his departments,performedandpromulgatedintheregularcourse capacityasMIAAAGMredoundstothecomputationofhisretirement ofbusiness,are,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbytheChief pay. ExecutivepresumptivelytheactsoftheChiefExecutive. This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the YES.Anhonorariumisdefinedassomethinggivennotasamatterof President. Control is said tobetheveryheartofthepowerof obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no thepresidency. compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the Discretionary Function. Ordinarily, mandamus will not petitionerwasinthenatureofasalarybecauseitwasreceivedbyhim prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is as a matter of right in recompense for services rendered by himas "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable Acting Assistant GeneralManagerforFinanceandAdministration.In excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter as the whichpetitionerisentitled,andthereisnootherplain,speedy petitioner's"salarydifferential." andadequateremedy,thewritshallissue. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 117of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver We agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between thetwotermsinSection9ofExecutiveOrderNo.966.Wethinkthisto bethemorereasonableinterpretation,especiallyconsideringthatthe provision includes in the highest salary rate "compensation for substitutionaryservicesorinanactingcapacity." FortheadditionalservicesherenderedfortheMIAA,hewasentitled to additional compensation which, following the letter and spiritof Section9,shouldbeincludedinhishighestbasicsalaryrate. H.Liabilitiesofpublicofficers 5. customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors. service shall be removed or suspended exceptforcauseprovided bylaw." A public officer commitsanoffenseinrelationtohisofficeif heperpetratestheoffensewhileperforming,thoughinan improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot commit the offense without holding hispublic office. In such a case, there is an i ntimate connection betweentheoffenseandtheofficeoftheaccused. To deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment aftertheyhavebeenexoneratedfromthe chargethatledtotheirdismissalorsuspension. Preventivesuspensionandbacksalaries RighttoCompensation. GR: Nowork,nopay; EXC: heCourtcraftedtwoconditionsbeforeanemployeemay T beentitledtobacksalaries: Malfeasance Doingofanactwhichapublicofficershouldnot havedone. Misfeasance Improperdoingofanactwhichapersonmight lawfullydo. 1. the employee must be found innocent of the chargesa nd Nonfeasance Failureofanagenttoperformhisundertakingfor theprincipal. 2. hissuspensionmustbeunjustified 1. A public officer shall notbecivillyliableforactsdoneinthe performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showingofbadfaith,maliceorgrossnegligence. 2. Anypublicofficerwho,withoutjustcause,neglectstoperform a duty within a period fixed bylaworregulation,orwithina reasonable period if noneisfixed,shallbeliablefordamages to theprivatepartyconcernedwithoutprejudicetosuchother liabilityasmaybeprescribedbylaw. 3. Aheadofadepartmentorasuperiorofficershallnotbecivilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissionsofduty,negligence,or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complainedof. 4. No subordinate officer or employee shall be civillyliablefor actsdonebyhimingoodfaithintheperformanceofhisduties. However,heshallbeliableforwillfulornegligentactsdoneby himwhicharecontrarytolaw,morals,publicpolicyandgood MuniofJasaanv.Gentallan An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstatedisentitledtobackwagesandothermonetarybenefitsfrom thetimeofherillegaldismissaluptoherreinstatement. In the instantcase,wenotethatthereisnofindingthatmaliceor bad faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds to answer for her claimsresultingfromdismissal. LiabilityofSuperiorOfficersforActsofSubordinates strictobservanceofthesecondconditionforanaward Ariasv.Sandiganbayan A of back salaries becomes important only if the Wewouldbesettingabadprecedentifaheadofofficeplaguedbyall employeeisnottotallyinnocentofanyadministrative too common problems — dishonest or negligent subordinates, infraction. overwork,multipleassignmentsorpositions,orplainincompetence —issuddenlysweptintoaconspiracyconvictionsimplybecausehe There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace employees who are charged with offenses punishablebyremoval every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every orsuspension: person involved in a transactionbeforeaffixinghissignatureasthe (1) Preventivesuspensionp endinginvestigationand finalapprovingauthority. (2) preventivesuspensionpendingappeal; All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their compensation is due onlyfortheperiodofpreventivesuspension subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, pendingappealshouldtheemployeebeultimatelyexonerated.(CSC purchasesupplies,orenterintonegotiations. v.RichardCruz2011EnBanc) NB: Illegaldismissal,reinstatement,andbacksalaries The Court has excepted from the general principleofnowork,no payandawardedbacksalariesevenforunworkeddaystoillegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil Alfonsov.OfficeofthePresident2 007 Petitioner contends that the issuance of Rivera's titles merely involved the mechanical procedure of transferring the dates contained in the derivative titles which she, as head of office, had everyrighttorelyontheb onafidesofhersubordinates. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 118of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver However, petitioner's foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an irregularity constituted added reason for her to exerciseagreaterdegreeofcircumspectionbeforesigningand issuingthetitles. Exceptioni nC esav.Ombudsman2 008EnBanc A public official's foreknowledge of facts and circumstances that suggested an irregularity constitutes an added reason to exercise a greater degree of circumspection before signing and issuing public documents.ByfailingtopreventtheirregularitythatCesahadreason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify,Cesahad toleratedthesameandallowedittowreakhavoconthecoffersofthe city. Santillanov.People2010 ThedoctrineinAriasv.SandiganbayancouldnotbeusedbyEcleo, Jr.toescapeliability,asthedocumentshehadtoapprovewerenotso voluminoussoastoprecludehimfromstudyingeachonecarefully. Navarra's alibi was also not enough to acquit her. She was not precludedfromsigningthedocumentsrelatingtothesubjectprojects whileshewasonleave.Shealsodidnotestablishanyproofthather signatures were forged. Worse, both Ecleo, Jr. and Navarra were parties to an agreement that approved disbursement of funds for a bogus municipal guest house and they could not come up with a plausiblejustificationforsuchagaffe. Santillano,ontheotherhand,wasindisputablyonthereceivingend of the overpayments and even issued receipts for them. He was unable to justify the excessive payments by showing a written agreementwiththemunicipalitypursuanttotheImplementingRules andRegulationsofPD1594.Alltheseundeniablecircumstanceslead to the logical conclusion that allthreeaccusedactedinaconcerted effort to, as the Sandiganbayan putit,deprivethegovernmentofits much-neededfunds. Bacasmasv.Sandiganbayan2013 Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixedtheirsignaturesonthecashadvancevouchers. Yet,theystill chosetodisregardtherequirementslaiddownbylawandrulesand regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete informationtherein. Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan that heads of offices cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixedtheirsignaturestocertaindocuments. TheCourtexplainedin thatcasethatconspiracywasnotadequatelyproven,contrarytothe case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where there were noreasonsfortheheadsof offices to further examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein,byvirtueofthedutygiventothembylawaswellasby rules and regulations, had the responsibilitytoexamineeach voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approveanddisbursethecashadvance. Mirallesv.COA2017EnBanc The COA'srefusaltoapplytheAriasdoctrinewasarbitrarybecause therefusalstoodonhighlyspeculativegrounds. The COA's submission that the petitioner was negligent in discharging his duty as the final reviewer of the loan documents becausehedidnotnoticethedeficienciesandinconsistenciesnoted intheloanfoldersoftheborrowerswassimilarlyunwarranted.The supposeddeficienciesandinconsistenciesincludedhomeaddresses indicated by the borrowers, non-submission of ITRs by some borrowers, and the amounts of declared business capitalizations. However, the borrowers' ITRs and information on their "initial capitalization(s)"werenotrequiredundertheguidelinesoftheFARE program.Also,thediscrepancyinthedeclarationsofhomeaddresses by two borrowers did not denote the absence of viablebusinesses requiredundertheFAREProgram. We find that the petitioner should have instead been presumed to haveactedintheregularperformanceofhisofficialdutybecauseno evidence had been presented to show his having acted in badfaith and with gross negligence. We should remindtheCOAthatitcould not justly execute its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures unless it accurately but fairly identified the persons liableforthedisallowances.ThistheCOAcoulddoonlyifithadthe adequatefactualbasisforidentifyingthepersonsliable. In our view, the petitioner's invocation oftheAriasdoctrineinhis favorwasappropriate. FieldInvestigationOfficev.Piano2017 Arias finds no application in this case since respondent signed Resolution No. IAC-09-045 not as a head of the agency but as ChairmanoftheIACwhichhasthedutytoinspectdelivereditemsto be conformingtotheNAPOLCOMapprovedtechnicalspecifications, and rejects the same if it is shown otherwise. Moreover, even the application of Arias may be barred in certain cases in view of exceptional circumstances which should have prodded a person to exercise a higher degree of circumspection. We find such circumstancepresentinthiscase. The WTCD Report already showed that the LPOHs did not fully conform to the NAPOLCOMstandardspecifications,andrespondent andtheCommitteemembersneednotbeanexpertonhelicoptersto understand the information written in the Report. Yet, respondent stillissuedResolutionNo.IAC-09-045concealingthetruthbystating that the 2 LPOHs conformed to all the specifications and accepted them. Castillo-Cov.Sandiganbayan2018 When a local legislative board gives the local chief executive authority to perform a certain act or enter into a specific transaction, the latter ought to strictly abide by the express terms of such authority. Any deviation therefrom, to the detriment of thelocalgovernmentunit,constitutesanoffense BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 119of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver punishable under theAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesAct,for whichthechiefexecutivemustbeheldaccountable. subordinate must be public officers working for the same governmentofficeoragency. Under the Arias doctrine, all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonableextentontheirsubordinatesandonthegoodfaithofthose who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. However,inR iveravs.People,theCourtheld: In his cross-examination, Atty. Marcosadmittedthathewasmerely consultedbyGov.Coinhiscapacitya saprivatelawyer. Toclarify,theAriasdoctrineisnotanabsoluterule.Itisnotamagic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates andnecessarilyescape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them, as heads of offices, to exercise ahigherdegreeofcircumspectionand,necessarily,go beyondwhattheirsubordinateshadprepared. In this case, the Court finds that Resolution No. 120 should have prompted Gov. Co to be more circumspect in transacting with Nakajima Trading.Toreiterate,theresolutionclearlydirectedherto procure brand new heavy equipment. Notwithstanding the tenor of the resolution, however, she contracted with Nakajima Trading for reconditionedequipmentandeffectedtheconsequentexpenditureof public funds thereon. All this, to the prejudice of the Province of Quirino. Gov.Cocannotnowpleadherinnocencebysimplyshiftingtheblame to Engr. Ringor. Between the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, which authorized her to purchase brand new equipment,ononehandand the Office of the Provincial Engineer, which recommended reconditionedequipmentduetoinsufficiencyoffunds,ontheother, she owed obedience to the former, the same being the legislative branch of the local government unit of which she was the chief executive. The subordinates contemplated by the Arias doctrine are those public officersandemployeeswhoareactuallyunderthecontrol or supervision of the head of office concerned, or those who answer directly or indirectly to their superiors, who are in the employ of the same government agency.Inotherwords,forthe Arias doctrine to find application, both the superior and the LiabilityforActsCommittedOutsideofDuty Remolonav.CSC Whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the governmentserviceforanoffensewhichisnotwork-relatedorwhich isnotconnectedwiththeperformanceofhisofficialduty. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal forthefirstoffenseunderSection23,Rule XIVoftheRulesImplementingBookVofEONo.292. Andtherule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of dutybythepersoncharged. Therationalefortheruleisthatif a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppressionorgravemisconduct,evenifsaiddefectsofcharacterare not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, evenifheperformshisdutiescorrectlyandwell,becausebyreason ofhisgovernmentposition,heisgivenmoreandampleopportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against officesandentitiesofthegovernmentotherthantheofficewherehe is employed; and byreasonofhisoffice,heenjoysandpossessesa certain influence and power which renders thevictimsofhisgrave misconduct, oppression anddishonestylessdisposedandprepared toresistandtocounteracthisevilactsandactuations. Theprivate life of an employee cannot be segregated from his publiclife. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in officeandthedisciplineandmoraleofthe service. I.Immunityofpublicofficers Doctrine of Official Immunity. Mistakes concededly committed bypublicofficersarenotactionableabsentanyclearshowingthat they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to badfaith.Afterall,"evenunderthelawofpublicofficers,theactsof thepetitionersareprotectedbythepresumptionofgoodfaith.” As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive,isnotpersonallyliabletooneinjuredinconsequenceof an act performed within the scope ofhisofficialauthority,andin lineofhisofficialduty. Farolanv.SolmacMarketing Even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding thereleaseofthesubjectimportationbecauseindeedit was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damagetheymayhavecausedasaresultofsuchanerroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededlycommittedbypublicofficers arenotactionableabsentanyclearshowingthattheyweremotivated bymaliceorgrossnegligenceamountingtobadfaith.Afterall,"even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protectedbythepresumptionofgoodfaith.” Lansangv.CA The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies tocomplaints filedagainstpublicofficialsforactsdoneintheperformanceoftheir duties. The rule is thatthesuitmustberegardedasoneagainstthe state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concernedwillrequirethestateitselftoperformapositiveact,such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awardedtotheplaintiff. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 120of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver The rule does notapplywherethepublicofficialischargedinhis officialcapacityforactsthatareunlawfulandinjurioustotherights of others. Publicofficialsarenotexempt,intheirpersonalcapacity, fromliabilityarisingfromactscommittedinbadfaith. Neither does it applywherethepublicofficialisclearlybeingsued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity,although theactscomplainedofmayhavebeencommittedwhileheoccupied apublicposition. PetitionerisbeingsuednotinhiscapacityasNPDCchairmanbutin hispersonalcapacity.Thecomplaintmerelyidentifiedpetitioneras chairmanoftheNPDC,butdidnotcategoricallystatethatheisbeing sued in that capacity. Also,petitionerwassuedallegedlyforhaving personalmotivesinorderingtheejectmentofGABIfromRizalPark. The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI fromtheirofficeandkioskatRizalParkandthat hehadtheauthoritytoterminatetheagreementwithGABIandorder the organization’s ejectment. The question now is whether or not petitionerabusedhisauthorityinorderingtheejectmentofprivate respondents. We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authorityonrecord. DeLimav.Duterte2019ResolutionEnBanc Atthecoreofthecontroversyistheinquiryontheapplication, scope and extent of the principle of presidential immunity fromsuit. May the incumbent Chief Executive be haled to court even for the limitedpurposeundertheRulesontheWritofHabeasData? NO. The concept of presidential immunity underourgovernmental and constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. The lack of distinctions preventsusfrommakinganydistinctions.Weshouldstillbeguided byourprecedents. Accordingly, the concept is clear and allows no qualifications or restrictions that the President cannot be sued while holding suchoffice. Sen. De Lima maintains that presidential immunity does not lie because President Duterte's attacks against her are not part of his official duties and functions; that before presidential immunity applies, there must first be a balancing of interest; and that the balancing favors her because her right to be protected from harassment far outweighs the dangers of intrusion on the Officeof ChiefExecutive. Sen. De Lima wants us to apply principles established by the US Supreme Court in the celebratedcasesofNixonandClinton,supra. Suchdecisions,thoughpersuasive,arenotbindingascaselawforus. J.Distinguish:defactoanddejureofficers (1) De jure —Onewhohaslawfultitletotheofficebuthasnotbeen abletotakepossessionofitorhasbeenoustedtherefrom. (2) De facto — One who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority toappoint,iftheofficeisanappointiveoffice, andwhoseappointmentisvalidonitsface. Onewhoisinpossessionofanoffice,andisdischargingitsduties undercolorofauthority,bywhichismeantauthorityderivedfrom an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbentbenotamerevolunteer. One who is in possession of an office in the open exercise ofits functionsundercolorofanelectionoranappointment,eventhough suchelectionorappointmentmaybeirregular. Allofthefollowinge lementsmustconcur: a. theremustbeadejureoffice; b. theremustbecolorofrightorgeneralacquiescencebythe public;and c. there must be actual physical possession of the officein goodfaith. Distinctionbetweendejureanddefactoofficers Dejure Defacto Onewhohaslawfultitletothe officebuthasnotbeenableto takepossessionofitorhasbeen oustedtherefrom Onewhoactuallypossessesthe officealthoughhehasan imperfectoronlycolorabletitle thereto. Hastitle Onlyhascoloroftitle Adefactomaygrowintoade jure. Ausurpermaygrowintoade factoiftheassumptionis acquiescedin Validlyappointed Notvalidlyappointed EntitlementtosalaryinS ampayanv.Daza Asadefactopublicofficer,respondentcannotbemadetoreimburse fundsdisbursedduringhistermofofficebecausehisactsareasvalid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, heis entitledtoemolumentsforactualservicesrendered. K.Terminationofofficialrelation A. Endofterm.—Itistobeunderstoodofcoursethatofficials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so longasconfidenceinthemendures.The termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office—two different causes for the terminationofofficialrelationsrecognizedintheLawofPublic Officers. B. Retirement. The compulsory retirement of government officialsandemployeesupontheirreachingtheageof65years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiencyinthegovernmentserviceandatthesametimegive to the retiringpublicservantstheopportunitytoenjoyduring the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhapsfortheirlongserviceanddevotiontothegovernment, intheformofacomparativelyeasierlife,freedfromtherigors BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 121of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver C. of civil service discipline and the exacting demands that the natureoftheirworkandtheirrelationswiththeirsuperiorsas wellas thepublicwouldimposeuponthem. c. Abolition of Office. It is a well-known rulealsothatvalid d. Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agencyconcernedandthereclassified officesperformsubstantiallythesamefunctionasthe originaloffices; e. Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Cotiangco v. Prov of Biliran2011EnBanc) abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. And, of course, if the abolition is void, the in­cumbentisdeemednevertohaveceasedtoholdoffice. As well-settled as the rule that theabolitionofanofficedoes not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principlethat,inordertobevalid,theabolitionmustbemade in good faith. Where the abolition is made in bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenureofcivilserviceemployees,it isnullandvoid. E. Abandonment. When a judge of first instance, presiding To consider an office abolished there must have been an intention to do away with it wholly and permanently, as theword"abolish"denote. D. Reorganization. As a general rule, a reorganization is carriedoutin"goodfaith"ifitisforthepurposeofeconomy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. If the "abolition," which is nothingelsebutaseparationorremoval,isdonefor political reasons or purposely to defeat security oftenure,or otherwisenotingoodfaith,novalid"abolition"takesplaceand whatever "abolition" is done, is ab initio. There is aninvalid "abolition"aswherethereismerelyachangeofnomenclature of positions,orwhereclaimsofeconomyarebeliedbythe existenceofamplefunds. Section 2 of R.A. 6656citesinstancesthatmaybeconsidered as evidence of bad faith in the removal from office of a government officer or employee pursuant to a reorganization: a. b. Wherethereisasignificantincreaseinthenumberof positions in the new staffing pattern of the departmentoragencyconcerned; Where an office is abolished and other performing substantiallythesamefunctionsiscreated; Whereincumbentsarereplacedbythoselessqualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; F. H. Recall I. Prescription. InviewofthepolicyoftheStatecontainedin thelawfixingtheperiodofoneyearwithinwhichactionsfor quowarrantomaybeinstituted,anypersonclaimingrighttoa positioninthecivilserviceshouldalsoberequiredtofilehis petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his office. J. FailuretoAssumeOffice. Theofficeofanyofficialelected who fails or refuses to take his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant, unlesssaidfailureisforacauseorcausesbeyondhiscontrol. PunishableunderArt234oftheRPC. over abranchofaCFIofajudicialdistrictbyvirtueofalegal andvalidappointment,acceptsanotherappointmenttopreside over the same branch of the same CFI, inadditiontoanother L.CivilService court of the same category, both of which belong to a new judicialdistrictformedbytheadditionofanotherCourtofFirst Scope Instance to the old one, enters into the discharge of the Sec 2 Art IX-B. The civil service embraces all branches, functions of his new office and receives the corresponding subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, salary, he a bandons his old office and cannot claim to be includingGOCCsw ithoriginalcharters. entitledtorepossessit. Khanv.Ombudsman IncompatibleOffice. Existswherethereisaconflictinthe The Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public dutiesoftheoffices,sothattheperformanceofthedutiesofthe officials and employeesofGOCCswithoriginalcharters.Thisbeing one interferes with theperformanceofthedutiesoftheother, so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the or whenever one is subordinate to the other in some of its officialsandemployeesofgovernmentcorporations. important and principal duties, andsubjectinsomedegreeto its revisory power. One person cannot and should not hold Therefore,althoughthegovernmentlateronacquiredthecontrolling bothoffices,iftheyareincompatible,atthesametime. interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an G. Resignation,Removal.Removalorresignationfromoffice is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. (OP v. Cataquiz2011) Resignation does not preclude the finding of administrative liability if the case was filed prior toresignation.However,if theofficialhasresignedwithoutanadministrativecasehaving been filed,noadministrativecasemaybefiledthereafter.The only recourse is to filecivilorcriminalcases.(Ombudsmanv. Andutan,Jr2022) "original charter" and its officers and employees could not be investigatedorprosecutedbytheOmbudsman. Appointmentstothecivilservice Appointmentsinthecivilserviceshallbemadeonly a) accordingtomeritandfitnesstobedetermined,asfaras practicable,and b) by competitive examination,excepttopositionswhich are BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 122of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 1) policy-determining, 2) primarilyconfidential,or 3) highlytechnical. CareervsNon-careerService 1. Entranceinthecareerserviceisbasedonmeritandfitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination,orbasedonhighlytechnicalqualifications. 2. On the other hand, entrance in the non-career service is appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limitedtoapprovingorreviewingtheappointmentinthelightofthe requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal require­ments are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordancewiththeCivilServiceLaws. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is qualified for thepositionto whichhehasbeennamed. Appointmentisanessentiallydiscretionarypowerandmustbe performed by the officer in which it is vested accordingtohis best lights, the onlyconditionbeingthattheappointeeshould Positionsinthec areerservicearefurthergroupedintothree(3)levels. possessthequalificationsrequiredbylaw. Ifhedoes,thenthe appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are 1. The first level includes positionsrequiringlessthanfour(4) othersbetterqualifiedwhoshouldhavebeenpreferred. Thisis yearsofcollegiatestudies. a political question involving considerations of wisdom which 2. The second level includes positions with duties requiring at onlytheappointingauthoritycandecide. least four (4) years of college work up to the Division Chief level. Lopezv.CSC based on criteria other than the "usual tests of merit and fitness. 3. The third levelincludespositionsintheCareerExecutive Service. Luegov.CSC IstheCivilServiceCommissionauthorizedtodisapproveapermanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacementbythelatter? NO. The appointing authority indicated thatitwaspermanent,ashe had the right to doso,anditwasnotfortheCSCtoreversehimand callittemporary. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. And whatmadetheapprovaltemporarywasthe factthatitwasmadetodependontheconditionspecifiedthereinand on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employeesaccordingtomeritandfitness,itistheappointingpower, especiallywhereitisassistedbyascreeningcommitteecomposedof persons who are in the bestpositiontoscreenthequalificationsof the nominees, who should decideontheintegrity,performanceand capabilitiesofthefutureappointees. The Commission’s power does not extend to considerations other than those enumerated in the law such as the belief that there are othersmorequalified. ThelawlimitstheCommission’sauthority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothingelse. The power of appointment exercised after a judicious recommendation made by a Placement Committee of the agency concerned is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which itisvestedaccordingtohisbest lights,theonlyconditionbeingthattheappointeeshouldpossessthe qualification required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannotbefaultedonthegroundthatthereareothersbetterqualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authoritycandecide. The Court emphasizes that the Commission has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the Philippine Ports Authoritywhenitcomestoevaluatingtheperformance,personality, and accomplishments of candidates who all have the necessary eligibilityandlegalqualifications. Santiagov.CSC Whetherthenext-in-rankruleismandatory. NO.Thereis"nomandatorynorperemptoryrequirementinthe(Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. Whatitdoesprovideisthattheywouldbeamongthe firsttobeconsideredforthevacancy,ifqualified,andifthevacancyis not filled bypromotion,thesameshallbefilledbytransferorother modesofappointment." The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial dutyontheappointingauthoritytopromotesuchperson tothenexthigherposition. Thepowertoappointisamatterofdiscretion. Theappointingpower has a wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. Toapplythenext-in-rankruleperemptorilywouldimposea rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policyofthe law that amongthosequalifiedandeligible,theappointingauthority isgranteddiscretionandprerogativeofchoiceoftheonehedeemsfit forappointment. Abadv.DelaCruz2015Leonen,J Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentallyon the basis of merit. Both the Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are nextinranktoavacantpositionmaybegivensomepreference, BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 123of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver no one has a vested right to a governmentposition.Seniority andsalarygradesshouldbegiventheirdueweightbutshould nottrumpthepublicinterest. The appointing authority in LGUs is the local chief executive who must assess the merits of the Personnel Selection Board's recommendation. If heads of offices or departments in an LGU are appointed, majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned must concur in the appointment. Finally, the appointment must be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from the appointment'sissuancedate. ForLGUs,theappointmentofanassessorismandatory.CSC-NCR andCSCagreethatrespondentpossessestheminimumqualifications underthelawforthepositionofCityGovernmentDepartmentHead III. Moreover, the appointment of Dela Cruz was confirmed by the SangguniangPanlungsodngMuntinlupa. Petitionercontends,however,thatheisaqualifiednext-in-rankwho was bypassed for appointment to the position of City Government Department Head III. Thus, respondent's appointment is void notwithstandinghispossessionofthequalificationsfortheposition. qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-in-rank. He failed to prove that his position of Local AssessmentOperationsOfficerVhasbeenpreviouslydeterminedto benext-in-ranktothepositionofCityGovernmentDepartmentHead IIIintheOfficeoftheCityAssessor. Petitioner, therefore, has no right to protest the appointment of respondent. Petitioner further contends that respondent was appointed in violationofthet hree-salary-graderule foundinItem15ofCSC MC No. 3, Series of 2001. It states that an employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is notmorethan three (3) salary, pay orjobgradeshigherthantheemployee's presentposition. Any or all of the following would constituteameritoriouscase exemptedf romthe3-salarygradelimitationonpromotion: 1. In promotions, the appointing authority must automatically consider the employees next in rank as candidates for appointment.Employeesnextinrankarethosewhooccupythenext lower positions in the occupational group under which the vacant position is classified,andinotherfunctionallyrelatedoccupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civilserviceeligibility. 2. The position isalone,orentranceposition,asindicatedin theagency'sstaffingpattern; 3. Thepositionbelongstothedearthcategory,suchasMedical Officer/SpecialistpositionsandAttorneypositions; 4. The position is unique and/or highly specialized such as ActuarialpositionsandAirwaysCommunicator; 5. The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the candidates' superior qualificationsinregardto: The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to considerforpromotion.Theruledoesnotgiveemployeesnextin rankavestedrighttothepositionnexthighertotheirsshouldthat positionbecomevacant.Appointmentisadiscretionarypowerof the appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the qualificationsrequiredbylaw,theappointmentisvalid. To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove his or her status as a The position occupied bythepersonisnext-in-ranktothe vacant position, as identified in the Merit Promotion Plan andtheSystemofRankingPositions(SRP)oftheagency; a. Educationalachievements b. Highlyspecializedtrainings c. Relevantworkexperience d. Consistenthighperformancerating/ranking;and 6. Thevacantpositionbelongstotheclosedcareersystem. CSC found that respondent's appointment fell under the fifth exception. Contrary to petitioner's claim, the Personnel Selection Board conducted a deep selection process, ranking the candidatesforthepositionofCityGovernmentDepartmentHeadIII. Out of nine (9) candidates, respondent ranked first with agradeof 90.67outof100.Respondent'scase,therefore,isa"verymeritorious case." Estrelladov.David2016EnBanc The next-in-rank status of a government employee is not a guarantee to one's fitness to the position aspired for, and the applicant must go through the rigors of a screening and selection process as determined and conducted by a department or agency, subject only to thestandardsandguidelinessetbytheCivilService Commission (CSC). This is in keeping with the ideal of promoting through merit rather than entitlement, and thus ensuring that governmentserviceisrewardedwiththebestfit. DiscretionofAppointingAuthority Lapinidv.CSC Whether or not the CSC can override the permanent appointment madebythePPAonthegroundthatsomeoneelseisbetterqualified. NO. The Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its ownpersonnel. Neitherdoesithavetheauthorityto review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain iftheappointeepossessestherequiredqualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with theminimumstatutory qualificationsshouldbepreferredbelongstotheappointingauthority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointmentbecauseitbelievesanotherpersonisbetterqualifiedand muchlesscanitdirecttheappointmentofitsownchoice. Personnelactions 1. While an appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 124of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver functions of a givenoffice,designationmerelyconnotesan impositionofadditionalduties,usuallybylaw,uponaperson already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. 2. Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or additionaldutiesontheofficeroremployeetobeperformedby him in a special manner. It does not entail payment of additional benefitsorgrantuponthepersonsodesignatedthe righttoclaimthesalaryattachedtotheposition. 3. An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceableatpleasurebecauseofthenatureofhisoffice. 4. Ontheotherhand,areassignmentismerelyamovementof an employee from one organizational unit to another in the samedepartmentoragencywhichdoesnotinvolveareduction inrank,statusorsalaryanddoesnotrequiretheissuanceofan appointment. Inthesamevein,adesignationconnotesmerely theimpositionofadditionaldutiesonanincumbentofficial. 5. Thelegalconceptoftransferdiffersfromreassignment.Most notably, a transfer involves the issuance of another appointment,whileareassignmentdoesnot.Atransferisa movementfromonepositiontoanotherwhichisofequivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuanceofanappointment. 6. Promotion is the advancement of an employee from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilitiesasauthorizedbylaw,andusuallyaccompanied byanincreaseinsalary. Oseav.Malaya ThedesignationofrespondentasSchoolsDivisionSuperintendentof Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the natureofar eassignmentfromIrigaCity,where she previously exercised her functions asOfficer-in-Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the LGC of 1991ofpriorconsultation with the local school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointmentsmadebyDECS. Suchistheplainmeaningofthesaid law. Petitioner asserts a vested right to thepositionofSchoolsDivision Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not acted upon by the President. Yangsonv.DepEd2 019Leonen,J Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-specific may be reassignedtoanotherstationintheexigencyofpublicservice. An appointment is station-specific if the employee's appointment paperspecificallyindicatesonitsfacetheparticularofficeorstation the position is located. Moreover, the station should already be specified in the positiontitle,eveniftheplaceofassignmentisnot indicated on the face of the appointment. Here, respondent alleges that petitioner was appointed as "Principal III of the Division of SurigaodelNorte." Evidently,petitioner'sappointmentisnotsolelyforSurigaoNational or for any specific school. There is no particular office or station specifically indicated on the face ofherappointmentpaper.Neither doesherpositiontitlespecificallyindicateherstation. Moreover, Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does not apply here. It applies to transfers, not reassignments. Petitioner's movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial wasa reassignment,notatransfer. Petitioner's reassignment did not violate her right to security of tenure. While she is entitled to her right to security of tenure, she cannot assert her righttostayatSurigaoNational.Herappointment papers are not specific to the school, which means she may be assigned to any station as may be necessary for public exigency. Because she holds no vested right to remain as Principal III of SurigaoNational,hersecurityoftenurewasnotviolated. When an employee's appointment is station-specific, his or her reassignment may not exceed a maximum period of one (1) year. Thisisnotthecaseforappointmentsthatarenotstation-specific.In such instances, the reassignment may be indefinite andexceedone (1)year—asinpetitioner'scase. M.AccountabilityofPublicOfficers Typesofaccountability Three-FoldLiabilityRule SanLuisv.CA Itiswell-settledthatwhenapublicofficergoesbeyondthescopeof his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection onaccountofhisoffice,butisliableforhisactslikeany privateindividual. Domingov.Rayala Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongfulactsoromissionsofapublicofficer maygiverisetocivil,criminalandadministrativeliability.Anaction for each can proceed independently of theothers.Thisruleapplies withfullforcetosexualharassment. Ombudsmanv.Regalado2018Leonen,J Section 11(b) of RA No. 6713 explicitlystatesthatdismissalfrom the service may be warranted through an administrative proceeding, even if the erring officer is not subjected to criminal prosecution.Thisisinkeepingwiththethree(3)-foldliabilityrulein the law on public officers, "which states that the wrongful acts or BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 125of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrativeliability.Anactionforeachcanproceedindependently oftheothers." TheOmbudsmanandtheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor 1. ThepoweroftheOmbudsmantoinvestigateandprosecuteany illegalactoromissionofanypublicofficialisnotanexclusive authoritybutasharedorconcurrentauthorityinrespectofthe offensecharged. 2. Ithasthepowertoimposethepenaltyofremoval,suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrativedisciplinaryauthority. 3. 4. Power to Investigate Administrative Charges. Unlike the "classical Ombudsman model" whose function is merely to "receive and process the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel," the Philippine Ombudsman — as protector of the people, isarmedwiththe power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable himtoimplementhisownactions. ConcurrentwiththeOfficeofthePresident.Theauthorityto conductadministrativeinvestigationandtoimposepreventive suspensionoverelectiveprovincialorcityofficialswasatthat time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsmanupontheenactment ofR.A.No.6770. Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners asDeputyOmbudsmanandSpecialProsecutor,respectively. 5. ConcurrentwiththeDoJ.TheauthorityoftheOmbudsmanto investigate offenses involving public officers oremployeesis notexclusivebutisconcurrentwithothersimilarlyauthorized agencies of the government.However,theOmbudsman,inthe 6. exerciseofitsprimaryjurisdictionovercasescognizableby the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of suchcases. 10. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decisionshallbestrictlyenforcedandproperlyimplemented. Power to Investigate Cases of Ill-gotten Wealth After February 25, 1986. In accordance with sec. 1 of Executive OrderNo.14,datedMay7,1986,thePCGG,withtheassistance of the Solicitor General, is the agency of the government empowered to bring these proceedings for forfeiture of property allegedly acquired unlawfully before February 25, 1986, the date of the EDSA Revolution. The power to investigate cases of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth acquiredafterthatdateisnowvestedintheO mbudsman. 11. The remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases,when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is a Rule65Petition forCertiorariw iththeSupremeCourt,notwiththeCA. 7. Ombudsman for the Military. Has jurisdiction over cases involvingPoliceofficers. 8. Preventive Suspension. PreventivesuspensionunderSection 13,Rep.Act3019asamendedshallbelimitedtoamaximum periodofninety(90)days,fromissuancesthereof,andthis appliestoallpublicofficers,(asdefinedinSection2(b)ofRep. Act3019)whoarevalidlychargedundersaidAct. Preventivesuspensionpursuantto§24oftheOmbudsmanAct expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until thecaseisterminatedbytheOfficeofthe Ombudsman but not more than sixmonths,withoutpay." Theirpreventivesuspensionforsix(6)monthswithoutpayis thusaccordingtolaw. 9. Preventive suspensionismerelyapreventivemeasure,a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purposeofthesuspensionorderistopreventtheaccused from using his positionandthepowersandprerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper withrecordswhichmaybevitalintheprosecutionofthe case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established andthepersoninvestigatedisfoundguiltyofacts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removedordismissed.Thisisthepenalty. 12. Appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman should be filed with theCourtofAppealsviaa verifiedPetitionforReviewunderR ule43. Real-party-interestinAdministrativeAppeals Ombudsmanv.Gutierrez2017 The Court ratiocinated in Samaniego that aside from the Ombudsmanbeingthediscipliningauthoritywhosedecisionisbeing assailed, its mandate under the Constitution also bestows it wide disciplinary authority that includes prosecutorial powers.Hence,it has the legal interest to appeal a decision reversing its ruling, satisfyingboththerequirementsofD acoycoya ndMathay. Samaniego remainstobetheprevailingdoctrine.TheOmbudsman haslegalinterestinappealsfromitsrulingsinadministrativecases. Petitioner could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion beforetheappellatecourt Ombudsmanv.Bongais2018 TheCourtagreesthattheOmbudsmanhaslegalstandingtointervene onappealinadministrativecasesresolvedbyit.Inthe2008caseof Ombudsmanv.Samaniego,theCourtcategoricallyruledthat,even if not impleaded as a party in the proceedings, the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene and defenditsrulingin administrative cases before the CA, its interest proceeding, as itis, fromitsdutytoactasachampionofthepeopleandtopreservethe integrityofthepublicservice. In the face of the clarificationmadeinGutierrez,itshouldnowbe considered as settled doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 126of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases, provided, thattheOmbudsmanmovesforinterventionbefore renditionofjudgment,pursuanttoRule19oftheRulesCourt,lestits motionbedeniedastheCourtdidinS ison,Magno,andLiggayu. TheSandiganbayan The rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment, however,isnotinflexible.Asjurisprudencehasshown,interventions havebeenallowedevenbeyondtheperiodprescribedintheRule N.Termlimits a) whendemandedbythehigherinterestofjustice; b) to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded,therighttobeheard; c) toavoidgraveinjusticeandinjuryand d) tosettleonceandforallthesubstantiveissuesraisedbythe parties;or, e) becauseofthegravelegalissuesraised. Stated otherwise, the rule mayberelaxedandinterventionmay beallowedsubjecttothecourt'sdiscretionafterconsiderationof theappropriatecircumstances. ThestatusoftheOmbudsmanasapartyadverselyaffectedby–and therefore with thelegalstandingtoassail–theCADecisiondidnot automatically warrant thegrantofitsmotiontointervene.Sincethe Courtdoesnotfindanyoftheexceptingcircumstanceslaiddownin jurisprudence, including those laid down in Santos, Beltran, Macabulos, and Quimbo, obtaining in this case, the general rule provided under Section 2 of Rule 19, as reinforced in Gutierrez, squarely applies.Hence,whiletheOmbudsmanhadlegalinterestto interveneintheproceedinginCA-G.R.SPNo.139835,theperiodfor thefilingofitsmotiontointervenehadalreadylapsedasitwasfiled aftertheCAhadpromulgateditsDecision. All told, the CA did notcommitreversibleerrorwhenitdeniedthe Ombudsman'sOmnibusMotiontoIntervene.WhiletheOmbudsman hadlegalstandingtointerveneinBongais'spetitionforreviewbefore theCA,theperiodforthefilingofitsmotiontointervenehadalready lapsed as it was filed after the CA had promulgated its assailed Decision. costofaviolationofanexpressprovisionoftheConstitution. DoctrineofHoldoverCapacityinA basKidav.Senate2011EnBanc The above considerations leave only Congress' chosen interim measure — RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuanttoSections3,4and5ofthislaw—astheonlymeasurethat Congresscanmake. Thischoiceitself,however,shouldbeexamined foranyattendantconstitutionalinfirmity. Whetherornotthoseelectedforthe2008-2011cancontinuetoserve officeinaholdovercapacityuntiltherescheduled2013elections. Section 16 Art VII classifies into four groups the officers that the Presidentcanappoint.Theseare: Sec 4. Art XI. The present anti-graft court known as t he Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise i ts jurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw. 1. Section 8. Art X. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such officialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutiveterms. First, the heads of the executivedepartments;ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from therankofcolonelornaval captain;andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedin thePresidentinthisConstitution; 2. Second, all other officers of the government whose appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw; It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the termoftheincumbent beyondtheperiodaslimitedbytheConstitution. 3. Third, those whom the Presidentmaybeauthorizedby lawtoappoint;a nd 4. Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the CongressmaybylawvestinthePresidentalone NO.SinceelectiveARMMofficialsarelocalofficials,theyarecovered andboundbythethree-yeartermlimitprescribedbytheConstitution; theycannotextendtheirtermthroughaholdover. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there hadbeenstatutorybasisforit(namelySection7,ArticleVIIof RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdovercanonlyapplyasanavailableoptionwherenoexpress or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot applywheresuchcontraryintentisevident. Congress,inpassingRANo.10153,madeitexplicitlyclearthatithad theintentionofsuppressingtheholdoverrulethatprevailedunderRA No.9054bycompletelyremovingthisprovision. In the same way that the term of electiveARMMofficialscannotbe extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by puttinganexpirationdateearlierthanthethree(3)yearsthat theConstitutionitselfcommands. Thisiswhatwillhappen—a termoflessthantwoyears—ifacallforspecialelectionsshall prevail.Insum,whilesynchronizationisachieved,theresultisatthe XI.ADMINISTRATIVELAW A.Generalprinciples B.Administrativeagencies C.Powersofadministrativeagencies Rule-makingpower Adjudicatorypower Fact-finding,investigative,licensing,andrate-fixingpowers D.JudicialReview Doctrineofprimaryadministrationjurisdiction Doctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies Doctrineoffinalityofadministrativeaction BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 127of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver A.Generalprinciples 1. 2. Administrative Law is that branch of modern law under (1) bytheC onstitution, (2) byl aw,or (3) bya uthorityoflaw. which the executive department ofthegovernmentactingina quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes withthe EugeniovCSC conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the CESBwascreatedbyPDNo.1.Itcannotbedisputed,therefore,thatas well-being of the community, as underlawsregulatingpublic the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the corporations, business affected with public interest, legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the professions, trades and callings,ratesandprices,lawsforthe creation and a bolition of public offices is primarily a protectionofthepublichealthandsafetyandthepromotionof legislativefunction. thepublicconvenienceandadvantage. TheessentialautonomouscharacteroftheCESBisnotnegatedbyits A rule in administrativelawenunciatedinthecaseofSisonv. attachmenttorespondentCommission.Bysaidattachment,CESB Pangramuyenprovidesthatintheabsenceofpalpableerroror was not made to fallwithinthecontrolofrespondentCommission. grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to UndertheAdministrativeCodeof1987,thepurposeofattachingone substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative functionallyinter-relatedgovernmentagencytoanotheristoattain agency entrustedwiththeenforcementandimplementationof "policyandprogramcoordination." thelaw. This principle however is subject to limitations. Administrativedecisionsmaybereviewedbythecourtsupon ashowingthatthedecisionisvitiatedbyfraud,impositionor mistake. B.Administrativeagencies "Agency"includes a) any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges,andadjudicatecases; b) researchinstitutionswithrespecttolicensingfunctions; Bethatasitmay,iftheabolitionwhichisnothingelsebutaseparation orremoval,isdonefor 1. politicalreasonsor 2. purposelytodefeatsecurityoftenure,or 3. otherwisenotingoodfaith, novalidabolitiontakesplaceandwhateverabolitionisdoneisvoidab initio.Thereisaninvalidabolitionaswherethereismerelyachangeof nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are beliedby theexistenceofamplefunds. ⭐Larinv.ExecutiveSecretary DoesthePresidenthavethepowertoreorganizetheBIRortoissue thequestionedE.O.NO.132? YES.Thereshouldbealegalbasisandsuchshouldbeingoodfaith. ⭐DelaLlanav.Alba Theabolitionofanofficewithinthecompetenceofalegitimatebody ifdoneingoodfaithsuffersfromnoinfirmity.Itisawell-knownrule also thatvalidabolitionofofficesisneitherremovalnorseparation oftheincumbents.Iftheabolitionisvoid,theincumbentisdeemed never to have ceased toholdoffice.Thetestremainswhether theabolitionisingoodfaith.Asthatelementisconspicuously present in the enactment of BP 129, then the lack of merit of this petitionbecomesevenmoreapparent. Reorganization c) government corporations with respect to functions regulating Asageneralrule,areorganizationiscarriedoutin‘goodfaith’ifitis for privateright,privileges,occupationorbusiness;and d) officials in the exercise of disciplinary power asprovidedby law. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure wouldnotbeaChineseWall. 1. thepurposeofeconomyo r 2. tomakebureaucracymoree fficient. Section20,BookIIIofE.O.No.292ontheResidualPowersof the President is one such legal basis which speaks of such other powersvestedinthePresidentunderthelaw. Whatlawthenwhichgiveshimthepowertoreorganize?ItisPDNo. 1772whichamendedPDNo.1416.Thesedecreesexpresslygrantthe President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions,tocreateandclassifyfunctions,servicesandactivitiesand tostandardizesalariesandmaterials. Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 taintedwith badfaith? YES.AreadingofsomeoftheprovisionsofthequestionedE.O.No. 132 clearly leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidence of bad faith in the reorganizationoftheBIR. Apublicofficemaybecreatedthroughanyofthefollowingmodes,to wit,either BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 128of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver 1. Section 1.1.2 of said executive order abolishes an office while another one performing substantially the same functioniscreated. 2. ThecreationofservicesanddivisionsintheBIRresultedin asignificantincreaseinthenumberofpositionsinthesaid bureau. Bagaoisanv.NationalTobaccoAuthority It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and No. 36 have not abolished the National Tobacco Administration but merely mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or reduction of its personnel. Article VII, Section 17, of the Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out reorganizationmeasuresunderabroadauthorityoflaw. ThefirstsentenceofthelawisanexpressgranttothePresidentofa continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structureoftheOfficeofthePresident. Inthepresentinstance,involvingneitheranabolitionnortransferof offices,theassailedactionisamerereorganizationunderthegeneral provisionsofthelawconsistingmainlyofstreamliningtheNTAin the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President, motivated and carried out, accordingtothefindingsoftheappellatecourt,ingoodfaith,afactual assessmentthatthisCourtcouldonlybutaccept. ⭐KapisananNgMgaKawaniNgERBv.Barin Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is nooccupantinanabolishedoffice.Where thereisnooccupant,thereisnotenuretospeakof.Thus,impairment oftheconstitutionalguaranteeofsecurityoftenuredoesnotarisein theabolitionofanoffice.Ontheotherhand,removalimpliesthatthe office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merelyseparatedfromtheirpositions. After comparing the functions of the ERB andtheERC,wefindthat the ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. However, the overlapinthefunctionsoftheERBandoftheERCdoesnotmeanthat thereisnovalidabolitionoftheERB.TheERChasnewandexpanded functions which are intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulatedpowerindustry. which are not subject to the tests of ownership orcontroland economicviability.Section16,ArticleXIIshouldnotbeconstrued soastoprohibitCongressfromcreatingpubliccorporations. Because oftheexpansionoftheERC'sfunctionsandconcerns,there was a valid abolition of the ERB.Thus,thereisnomerittoKERB's allegationthatthereisanimpairmentofthesecurityoftenureofthe ERB'semployees. The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the BSP. Toreiterate,therelationshipofthe BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the DECS, is definedintheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987. TheBSPmeets the minimum statutory requirement of an attached governmentagencyastheDECSSecretarysitsattheBSPBoard exofficio,thusfacilitatingthepolicyandprogramcoordination betweentheBSPandtheDECS. Banda,et.al.v.Ermita2010EnBanc In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, the Court pointed out that ExecutiveOrderNo.292ortheAdministrativeCodeof1987givesthe President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functionsoftheOfficeofthePresident. ItisundisputedthattheNPO,asanagencythatispartoftheOfficeof thePressSecretary,ispartoftheOfficeofthePresident.Inthecaseat bar,therewasneitheranabolitionoftheNPOnoraremovalofanyof its functions to betransferredtoanotheragency.Undertheassailed Executive Order No.378,theNPOremainsthemainprintingarmof the government for all kindsofgovernmentformsandpublications butintheinterestofgreatereconomyandencouragingefficiencyand profitability,itmustnowcompetewiththeprivatesectorforcertain governmentprintingjobs.Atmost,therewasamerealterationofthe main function of the NPO by limitingtheexclusivityofitsprinting responsibilitytoelectionforms. BoyScoutsofthePhilippinesv.COA2011EnBanc Sec 20, Chapter 8, Title VI, Book IV of EO 292 classifiesBSPasan AttachedAgency. The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentalitywithjuridicalpersonality,whichdoesnotfallwithin the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstandingtheamendmentstoitscharter. Publiccorporations aretreatedbylawasagenciesorinstrumentalitiesofthegovernment Thetestofeconomicviabilitydoesnotapplytopubliccorporations dealing with governmental functions, to which category the BSP belongs. Beja,Sr.v.CA Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned inBookIV,Chapter7ofthe Administrative Code of 1987, theothertwobeingsupervisionand controlandadministrativesupervision. Attachment refers to the lateral relationship between the departmentoritsequivalentandtheattachedagencyorcorporation for purposes of policy andprogramcoordination.Thecoordination shallbeaccomplishedby a) havingthedepartmentrepresentedinthegoverningboardof theattachedagencyorcorporation,eitheraschairmanoras amember,withorwithoutvotingrights,ifthisispermitted bythecharter; b) having the attached corporation or agency comply with a systemofperiodicreportingwhichshallreflecttheprogress ofprogramsandprojects;and c) having the department or its equivalent provide general policiesthroughitsrepresentativeintheboard,whichshall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attachedcorporationoragency. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 129of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free fromDepartmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the AdministrativeCodeexplicitlyprovidesthatChapter8ofBookIVon supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attachedtoaDepartment. Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent,f reefromDepartmentalinterferenceandcontrol. Malagav.Penachos,Jr. Instrumentality refers to any agency of theNationalGovernment, notintegratedwithinthedepartmentframework,vestedwithspecial functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,usuallythroughacharter.Thistermincludes regulatoryagencies,charteredinstitutions,andgovernment-ownedor controlledcorporations. Chartered institution refers to any agency organized oroperating under aspecialcharter,andvestedbylawwithfunctionsrelatingto specificconstitutionalpoliciesorobjectives.Thistermincludesthe state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. LuzonDevelopmentBankv.AssociationofLuzonDev.Bank Employees The voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoysinlawthestatusofaquasi-judicialagencybutindependent of,andapartfrom,theNLRCsincehisdecisionsarenotappealableto thelatter. Thevoluntaryarbitratornolessperformsastatefunctionpursuantto a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefore in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplationoftheterm"i nstrumentality". IronandSteelAuthorityv.CA The ISA in fact appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the GRP. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalitiesoftheGovernmentoftheRepublicare cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities,sometimeswithandatothertimeswithoutcapital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct fromthepersonalityoftheRepublic. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate oftheRepublicofthePhilippines.TheRepublicitselfisa body corporate and juridical person vestedwiththefullpanoplyof powers and attributes whicharecompendiouslydescribedas"legal personality." When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as wellastheassetsandliabilitiesof that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic. Intheinstantcase,ISAinstitutedtheexpropriationproceedingsinits capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272. The present expropriationsuitwasbroughtonbehalfofandforthebenefitofthe Republic as the principal of ISA. The principal ortherealpartyin interest is thus theRepublicandnottheNationalSteelCorporation, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involvedshouldthecondemnationsuitbeeventuallysuccessful. From theforegoingpremises,itfollowsthattheRepublicisentitled to be substituted in the expropriationproceedingsasparty-plaintiff inlieuofISA,thestatutorytermofISAhavingexpired. Republicv.CA Petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic and that theOfficeofthe Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to representsaidpetitionerinthiscase. It is apparent that its charter does not grant the SRA the power to representtheRepublicinsuitsfiledbyoragainstthelatter. It isafundamentalrulethatanadministrativeagencyhasonlysuch powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarilyimpliedintheexercisethereof. ThepowertorepresenttheRepublicinanysuitfiledbyoragainstit having been withheld from SRA, it follows that the latter cannot institute the instant petition. This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sue and be sued. This power can be implied from its powers to enter, make and execute routinary contracts. The Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the OGCC can representneithertheSRAnortheRepublic. Wedonot,however, share the view that only the Office of the Solicitor General can representtheSRA. Under Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the AdministrativeCodeof1987theSolicitorGeneralisthelawyerofthe government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes anadversepositionagainstanothergovernmentagency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performinghisdutyasthelawyerofthegovernment. Itisincumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers shouldlegally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client's position. In such an instance the government office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General,ifitstillbelievesinthemeritofitscase,mayappearonits ownbehalfthroughitslegalpersonnelorrepresentative. Consequently, the SRA need not be represented by theOSG. Itmay appear on its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative. Since the SRA is neither a GOCC nor a subsidiary thereof,OGCCdoesnothavetheauthoritytorepresentit. Leysonv. Ombudsman BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 130of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver TobeconsideredaGOCC,three(3)requisitesmustconcur,namely, first,anyagencyorganizedasastockornon-stockcorporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmentalorproprietaryinnature;and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalitieseitherwholly,or,whereapplicableasinthecaseof stock corporations, to theextentofatleastfifty-one(51)percent ofitscapitalstock. CommunityRuralBankofGuimbav.Talavera Inadministrativelaw,supervisionmeansoverseeingorthepower or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform theirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,theformermay takesuchactionorstepasprescribedbylawtomakethemperform such duties. C ontrol, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify ornullifyorsetasidewhatasubordinate officerhaddoneintheperformanceofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethe judgmentoftheformerforthatofthelatter. Review asanactofsupervisionandcontrolbythejusticesecretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. In short, the secretary of justice,whohasthepowerofsupervision and control over prosecuting officers,istheultimateauthoritywho decideswhichoftheconflictingtheoriesofthecomplainantsandthe respondents should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal authority to review or overrulethedecisionofthesecretary. Inthepresentcase,theaccusedfiledtheirMotionforReinvestigation onNovember29,2000,aboutthreemonthsaftertheAugust15,2000 Resolution of the secretary denying with finality their Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of their Petition for Review. Clearly, therefore,itwasgrosslyerroneousforrespondentjudgetoorderthe reinvestigationofthecasebytheprosecutor.Thisactionenabledthe lattertoreprobateandreversethesecretary'sResolution.Ingranting the Motion for Reinvestigation, respondent effectively demolished theDOJ'spowerofcontrolandsupervisionoverprosecutors. ⭐Biraogov.ThePhilippineTruthCommissionR ePowerofControl, FaithfulExecutionClause,andPowertoInvestigate The creation of the PTC is not justifiedbythePresident'spowerof control.Controlisessentiallythepowertoalterormodifyornullify or setasidewhatasubordinateofficerhaddoneintheperformance ofhisdutiesandtosubstitutethejudgmentoftheformerwiththatof thelatter. Clearly,thepowerofcontrolisentirelydifferentfromthe power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latterfindsbasisfromeitheravaliddelegation fromCongress,orhisinherentdutytofaithfullyexecutethelaws. Indeed,theExecutiveisgivenmuchleewayinensuringthatourlaws are faithfully executed. As statedabove,thepowersofthePresident arenotlimitedtothosespecificpowersundertheConstitution.One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. On the charge that Executive Order No.1transgressesthepowerof Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly,thereisnousurpationonthepartoftheExecutiveofthe power of Congresstoappropriatefunds.Further,thereisnoneedto specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commissionbecause,inthewordsoftheSolicitorGeneral,"whatever funds the Congress hasprovidedfortheOfficeofthePresidentwill betheverysourceofthefundsforthecommission." Moreover,since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existingauditingrulesandregulations,thereisnoimproprietyinthe funding. The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section17thereof. C.Powersofadministrativeagencies Smartv.NTC Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powersandquasi-judicialoradministrativeadjudicatorypowers. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create newandadditionallegalprovisionsthathavetheeffectoflaw,should (a) bewithinthescopeofthestatutoryauthoritygrantedbythe legislaturetotheadministrativeagency. (b) be germane to the objects and purposes of the law,andbe notincontradictionto,butinconformitywith,thestandards prescribedbylaw (c) conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Inquestioningthevalidityorconstitutionalityofaruleorregulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need NOT exhaust administrative remedies before going tocourt.Thisprinciple applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,andnotwhentheassailedactpertainedtoitsrule-making orquasi-legislativepower. In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicialoradjudicatoryfunction. Rule-makingorQuasi-legislativepower is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 131of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. Kindsofadministrativerulesandregulations Legislative designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. Before it is adopted, there must be hearing, and mustbepublished. Interpretative designedtoprovideguidelinestothelawwhichtheadministrative agencyisinchargeofenforcing.ItneedNOTbepublished. Eslaov.COA Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law have theforceoflawandareentitledto greatrespect. CIRv.CA In Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc., v. DepartmentofFinanceSecretary, theCourtexpressed: a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designedtoimplementaprimarylegislationbyprovidingthedetails thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit ofpublic hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules aredesignedtoprovide guidelinestothelawwhichtheadministrativeagencyisinchargeof enforcing. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicabilityneedsnothingfurtherthanitsbareissuanceforitgives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.When,upontheotherhand,theadministrativerulegoes beyond merely providing for themeansthatcanfacilitateorrender least cumbersome theimplementationofthelawbutsubstantially addstoorincreasestheburdenofthosegoverned,itbehoovesthe agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance tobe heard,andthereaftertobedulyinformed,beforethatnewissuance isgiventheforceandeffectoflaw. RMC 37-93 cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure. The BIR did not simply interpret the law; it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance oftherequirements ofnotice,ofhearing,andofpublicationshouldnothavebeenthen ignored. TheCourtisconvincedthatthehastilypromulgatedRMC37-93has fallenshortofavalidandeffectiveadministrativeissuance. Peraltav.CSC When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, itmerelyinterpretsapre-existinglaw; and the administrative inter­pretation of the law isatbestadvisory, for itisthecourtsthatfinallydeterminewhatthelawmeans.Ithas also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published. Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon thecourts.Actionofanadminis­trativeagencymaybe disturbedorsetasidebythejudicialdepartmentifthereisanerrorof law, or, abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letterorthespiritofa legislativeenactment. Melendresv.Comelec A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essentialtodueprocess.Itisenoughthatthepartiesaregivenafair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversyandtopresentevidenceonwhichafairdecisioncanbe based. EasternTelecomv.InternationalCommunication In caseswherethedisputeconcernstheinterpretationbyanagency ofitsownrules,weshouldapplyonlythesestandards: 1. Whetherthedelegationofpowerwasvalid; 2. whethertheregulationwaswithinthatdelegation;andif so, 3. whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due processtest. Requisitesforvalidity 1. Completeness Test. it must set forth thereinthepolicytobe executed,carriedoutorimplementedbythedelegate. 2. Sufficient Standard Test. thelimitsofwhicharesufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conformintheperformanceofhisfunctions. Dagan,et.al.v.PhilippineRacingCommission Thevalidityofanadministrativeissuancehingesoncompliancewith thefollowingr equisites: 1. Itspromulgationmustbea uthorizedbythelegislature; 2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribedprocedure; 3. Itmustbewithinthescopeoftheauthoritygivenbythe legislature; 4. Itmustbereasonable. All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. Philracom's authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegationmadeinthepresidentialdecreeisvalid.Philracomdidnot exceeditsauthority.Andtheissuancesarefairandreasonable. PetitionersalsoquestionthesupposeddelegationbyPhilracomofits rule-makingpowerstoMJCIandPRCI. There is no delegation of power to speak ofbetweenPhilracom,as thedelegatorandMJCIandPRCIasdelegates.ThePhilracomdirective ismerelyi nstructivei ncharacter. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 132of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver As a rule,theissuanceofrulesandregulationsintheexerciseofan administrativeagencyofitsquasi-legislativepowerdoesnotrequire notice and hearing. In Abella, Jr.v.CivilServiceCommission,this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearingare NOT essential to the validity of rules or regulations issuedin the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be establishedorascertained. As for the third requisite, the assailed guidelines prescribe the procedureformonitoringanderadicatingEIA.Theseguidelinesarein accord with Philracom's mandate under the law to regulate the conductofhorseracinginthecountry. Anent the fourth requisite, theassailedguidelinesdonotappearto be unreasonable or discriminatory. In fact, allhorsesstabledatthe MJCIandPRCI'spremisesunderwentthesameprocedure. 1.AuthorizedbyCongress TayugRuralBankv.CentralBank NowhereinR.A.720istheMonetaryBoardauthorizedtometeouton ruralbanksanadditionalpenaltyrateontheirpastdueaccountswith Appellant. Ascorrectlystatedbythetrialcourt,whiletheMonetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactiveimpositionofadministrativepenaltiescannotbetakenas ameasuresupervisoryincharacter. Administrativerulesandregulationshavetheforceandeffectoflaw. There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. Aruleshapedoutbyjurisprudenceisthat when Congress authorizespromulgationofadministrativerulesand regulationstoimplementgivenlegislation,allthatisrequiredisthat the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Hence an administra­tive agency cannot impose a penalty notsoprovidedinthelawauthorizingthe promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is appliedretroactively. EO156satisfiedthefirstrequisiteofavalidadministrativeorder. It hasbothconstitutionalandstatutorybases. a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, beforetheissuanceisgiventheforceandeffectoflaw. Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of ArticleVIoftheConstitution.Therelevantstatutes toexecutethisprovisionare: Intheinstantcase,EO156isobviouslyalegislativeruleasitseeks to implement or executeprimarylegislativeenactmentsintendedto protectthedomesticindustrybyimposingabanontheimportation ofaspecifiedproductnotpreviouslysubjecttosuchprohibition. 1) TheTariffandCustomsCode; 2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Codeof thePhilippines; 3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise knownasthe“Safeguard MeasuresAct”(SMA). There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles andcommoditiesintothecountry. Anent thesecondrequisite,thatis,thattheordermustbeissuedor promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properlydetermined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances DOES NOT require previous notice and hearing, the only exception beingwherethe legislature itself requires it and mandates thattheregulationshall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation. This exception pertains totheissuanceoflegislative rulesasdistinguishedfrominterpretativeruleswhichgivenoreal consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; and are designed merely toprovideguidelinestothelawwhichthe administrative agency is inchargeofenforcing. Alegislativerule, ontheotherhand,isinthenatureofsubordinatelegislation,crafted toimplementaprimarylegislation. In CIR v. CA, and CIR v. MLhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., the Court enunciated the doctrine that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behoovestheagencytoaccordatleasttothosedirectlyaffected The importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an administrativeissuancemust not be ultra vires orbeyondthelimitsoftheauthorityconferred.It mustnotsupplantormodifytheConstitution,itsenablingstatuteand other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature whichtheotherbranchesofthegovernmentcannotusurp. ThesubjectmatterofthelawsauthorizingthePresidenttoregulateor forbidimportationofusedmotorvehicles,isthedomesticindustry. EO156,however,exceededthescopeofitsapplicationbyextending theprohibitionontheimportationofusedcarstotheFreeport,which RA7227,considerstosomeextent,aforeignterritory.Thedomestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the “customs territory.”Theproscriptionintheimportationofusedmotorvehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceedsthe intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable. Astothefourthrequisite,thereisnodoubtthattheissuanceofthe ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of policepower.Intheexerciseofdelegatedpolicepower,theexecutive canthereforevalidlyproscribetheimportationofthesevehicles.The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the importation ban to the Freeport. TheCourtfindsnologicintheall encompassing application of the assailed provision to theFreeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehiclesdonotenterthecustomsterritory,theinjuryorharmsought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The applicationof the law should be consistent with the purpose of and ExecutiveSecretaryv.SouthwingHeavyIndustries BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 133of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver reasonforthelaw. Rationecessatlex,etcessatlex. Whenthe reasonforthelawceases,thelawceases. Itisnottheletteralonebut thespiritofthelawalsothatgivesitlife. In sum, the Court findsthatArticle2,Section3.1ofEO156isvoid insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in formerSubicNavalBasearea.Hence,usedmotorvehiclesthatcome into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-informerSubic Naval Base area may be stored, used or tradedtherein,orexported out of the Philippine territory,buttheycannotbeimportedintothe Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic NavalBasearea. LandBankv.Dalauta2017EnBanc In Section 57 of R.A.No.6657,CongressexpresslygrantedtheRTC, actingasSAC,theoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverallpetitions for the determination ofjustcompensationtolandowners.Onlythe legislaturecanrecallthatpower.TheDARhasnoauthoritytoqualify orundothat. 2.W ithintheScopeofAuthority Boie-TakedaChemicalsv.DelaSerna Inincludingcommissionsinthecomputationofthe13thmonthpay, the second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of theRevisedGuidelineson theImplementationofthe13thMonthPayLawundulyexpandedthe conceptof"basicsalary"asdefinedinP.D.851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law itisdesignedtoimplement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority bya particulardepartmentmustbeinharmonywiththeprovisionsofthe law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope.AnadministrativeagencycannotamendanactofCongress. MinersAssociationofthePhilsv.Factoran,Jr. Considering t hat administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek to implement, it is obvious that the spring cannotrisehigherthanitssource. "agricultural activity." Theraisingoflivestock,swineandpoultryis different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,activity. HolySpiritHomeownersAssociationv.Defensor Peoplev.Maceren Theregulationpenalizingelectrofishingisnotstrictlyinaccordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, becausethelawitselfdoesnotexpresslypunishelectrofishing. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one whichfallswithinthescopeof the authority conferred upontheadminis­trativebody,andtheorder willbescrutinizedwithspecialcare. Romulo,Mabanta,Buenaventura,Sayoc&DeLosAngelesv.HDMF WhentheBoardofTrusteesoftheHDMFrequiredinSection1,Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the IRR of R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement a nd housing benefitsforallitsemployeesinordertoqualifyforexemptionfrom the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolishedthatexemptionthroughthe 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendmentandsubsequentrepealofSection19arebothinvalid,as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation notconsistentwiththelawitseekstoapply. DARv.Sutton In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribingamaximumretentionlimitfortheirownership.However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or Inquestioningthevalidityorconstitutionalityofaruleorregulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need NOT exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its QUASI-JUDICIAL function, and not when the assailed act pertainedtoitsrule-makingorquasi-legislativepower. TheassailedIRRwasissuedpursuanttothequasi-legislativepower of the Committee. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailedIRRissuedbytheCommitteeisinvalidonthegroundthatit is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionalityofaruleorregulationissuedbytheadministrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts havejurisdictiontopassuponthesame.Hence,the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchyofcourts. A petition forprohibitionisalsonottheproperremedytoassailan IRRissuedintheexerciseofaquasi-legislativefunction.Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an actionwhichproperlyfallsunderthe jurisdictionoftheRTC. Wherearuleorregulationhasaprovisionnotexpresslystated or containedinthestatutebeingimplemented,thatprovision doesnotnecessarilycontradictthestatute. Orceov.Comelec2010 The COMELEC's intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term "firearm" and their resultant coverage by the election gunbanisto BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 134of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidationorterrorduringtheelectionperiod. Contrary to petitioner's allegation,thereisaregulationthatgoverns the possession and carriage of airsoft rifles/pistols, namely, PNP CircularNo.11datedDecember4,2007. The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term "firearm" in ResolutionNo.8714forpurposesofthegunbanduringtheelection periodisareasonablerestriction,theobjectiveofwhichistoensure theholdingoffree,orderly,honest,peacefulandcredibleelections. However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft gunsandairgunsfromtheterm"firearm"underResolutionNo.8714, becausetheyarenotsubjecttoanyregulation,unlikeairsoftguns. Purisimav.PhilippineTobaccoInstitute2017 AreadingofSection11ofRR17-2012andAnnex"D-1"onCigarettes PackedbyMachineofRMC90-2012revealsthattheyarenotsimply regulationstoimplementRA10351.Theyareamendatoryprovisions whichrequirecigarettemanufacturerstobeliabletopayformoretax than the law allows. The BIR, in issuing these revenueregulations, createdanadditionaltaxliabilityforpackagingcombinationssmaller than20cigarettesticks.Insodoing,theBIRamendedthelaw,anact beyondthepoweroftheBIRtodo. Excise tax oncigarettespackedbymachineshallbeimposedonthe packaging combination of 20 cigarette sticks as awholeandnotto individualpackagingcombinationsorpouchesof5's,10's,etc. distinction; it speaks of rates proposed by public services; and whether initial or revised, these rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them. The Public Service Commissionpractice,moreover,istohearandapproverevisedrates withoutpublishednoticesorhearing.Thereasoniseasilydiscerned: The provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitiveratesapproved,andin thecaseatbar,thePublicServiceCommissionorderof20May1970 expresslysoprovided. Macedav.ERB WhatmustbestressedisthatwhileunderExecutiveOrderNo.172,a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering,exparte,aprovisionalincrease,asitdidhere,subjecttoits finaldispositionofwhetherornot: (1)tomakeitpermanent;(2)to reduceorincreaseitfurther;or(3)todenytheapplication. Section3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte,andwhicharesubjecttotheresolutionofthemaincase. Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other,or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resorttoonebutnottobothatthesametime. Section3(e)outlines thejurisdictionoftheBoardandthegroundsforwhichitmaydecree apriceadjustment,subjecttotherequirementsofnoticeandhearing. Pendingthat,however,itmayorder,underSection8,anauthorityto increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the finaloutcomeoftheproceeding. 3.ObservanceofPrescribedProcedure;NoticeandHearing; Publication Republicv.Medina If the Commission is empowered toapproveprovisionalrateseven without a hearing,afortioriitmayactonsuchratesuponasix-day noticetopersonsconcerned.Infact,whentheprovisionalrateswere approved on20May,thefull10daysnoticehadbeenpublished.To be sure petitioner Gonzalez argues that the proviso applies onlyto initial,notrevised,rates.ThePublicServiceAct,however,makesno PhilippineConsumersFoundationv.SecofDECS We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always include the power to increase" such fees.Intheabsenceofastatutestatingotherwise,thispowerincludes thepowertoprescribeschoolfees.Noothergovernmentagencyhas been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the powershouldbeconsideredlodgedwiththeDECSifitistoproperly andeffectivelydischargeitsfunctionsanddutiesunderthelaw. Thefunctionofprescribingratesbyanadministrativeagencymaybe eitheralegislativeoranadjudicativefunction.Ifitwerealegislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing totheaffected parties is NOT a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicialfunction,priornoticeandhearingareessentialto thevalidityofsuchrates. When the rules and/orrateslaiddownbyanadministrativeagency aremeanttoapplytoall enterprisesofagivenkindthroughoutthe country,theymaypartakeofal egislativec haracter. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particularparty,baseduponafindingoffact,thenitsfunction isquasi-judicialincharacter. Is DO No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed DO prescribesthemaximum schoolfeesthatmaybechargedbyallprivateschoolsinthecountry for school year 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearingarenotessentialtothevalidityofitsissuance. PhilippineCommunicationsSatellitev.Alcuaz The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremostisthefactthatsaidorderpertainsexclusivelytopetitioner and to no other. Thus, an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the publicconsideringthemaintenancerequirements,theprojectsitstill has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine theinspectorwhoissuedthereportonwhichrespondentNTCbased itsquestionedorder. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of theapplicationofpetitioner,suchrate-fixingorder, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirementofreasonableness. Assumingthatsuchpowerisvested inNTC,itmaynotexercisethesameinanarbitraryandconfiscatory BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 135of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver manner. Categorizingsuchanorderastemporaryinnaturedoesnot perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedurethanwouldotherwisebeappliedtoanyotherorderonthe samematterunlessotherwiseprovidedbytheapplicablelaw. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authoritytomakesuchorderwithoutfirstgivingpetitionerahearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent,anditisimmaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the presentcase. An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low,sincethe utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue duringtheperiodcoveredbytheorderisconcerned. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petitionthesubjectcircularremainedinlegallimbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañada vs. Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensedwith,forthereasonthatsuchomissionwouldoffenddue process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge ofthelaws thataresupposedtogovernit." GMAv.MTRCB The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines LawCenterthreecertifiedcopiesofeveryrule adoptedbyit.Administrativeissuanceswhicharenotpublishedor filedwiththeONARareineffectiveandmaynotbeenforced. GMAv.COMELEC2 014EnBanc Rubeneciav.CSC CSC Resolution No. 93-2387, quoted earlier, did not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative casespendingbeforetheMSPB. AssumingthatRubeneciahadnotin fact been sent anindividualnotice,thefactremainsthatResolution No.93­-2387waspublishedinanewspaperofgeneralcirculation;the Commission may accordingly be deemed to have complied substantially with the requirement of written notice in its own Resolution. PITCv.COAcitingTañadav.Tuvera DBM-CCCNo.10hasbeenre-issuedinitsentiretyandsubmittedfor publicationintheOfficialGazette.Wouldthesubsequentpublication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioneditemsweredisallowedinaudit? The answer is in the negative, precisely, for the reason that publicationisrequiredasaconditionprecedenttotheeffectivityofa law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulationsbeforetheirrightsandinterestsareaffectedbythesame. Thepetitionsquestiontheconstitutionalityofthelimitationsplaced on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties,as wellastherequirementsincidentthereto,suchastheneedtoreport thesame,andthesanctionsimposedforviolations. WhileitistruethattheCOMELECisanindependentofficeandnota mere administrative agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply tothelattermustalsobedeemedtosimilarlyapplyto the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience but as a dictateofdueprocess.Thus,whatevermighthavebeensaidinCIRv. CA should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comestopromulgatingrulesandregulationswhichadverselyaffect, orimposeaheavyandsubstantialburdenon,thecitizenry. ForfailingtoconductpriorhearingbeforecomingupwithResolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regardtothenewruleon aggregateairtimeisdeclaredd efectiveandineffectual. ResolutionNo.9615d oesnotimpose anunreasonableburdenonthe broadcastindustry It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relationtoits substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions,mustbereasonablyrelatedtothe purpose or objective of the governmentinamannerthatwouldnot workunnecessaryandunjustifiableburdensonthecitizenry. Contrarytopetitioners’contention,theReportingRequirementfor the Comelec’s monitoring is reasonable. It is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidatesare affordedequalopportunitiestopromotetheirrespectivecandidacies. Unlike the restrictiveaggregate-basedairtimelimits,thedirectiveto givepriornoticeisnotundulyburdensomeandunreasonable,much less could it be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restrictionondisseminationofinformationbeforebroadcast. InthesamewaythattheCourtfindsthe“priornotice”requirementas not constitutionally infirm,itsimilarlyconcludesthatthe“rightto reply”provisionisreasonableandconsistentwiththeconstitutional mandate. 4.FairandReasonable Lupangcov.CA Is the RTC of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrativeactsofthelatter? NO. What is clear from PD No. 223 creating the PRC is that it is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.Wellsettledinourjurisprudenceistheviewthateven actsoftheOfficeofthePresidentmaybereviewedbytheRTC. InordertoinvoketheexclusiveappellatejurisdictionoftheCA,there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings whereintheadministrativebodyinvolvedexerciseditsquasi-judicial functions. This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purelyadministrativepoliciesandfunctionslikeResolutionNo.105 whichwasadoptedbytherespondentPRCasameasuretopreserve theintegrityoflicensureexaminations. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 136of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver CanthisCommissionlawfullyprohibittheexamineesfromattending reviewclasses,receivinghandoutmaterials,tipsorthelikethree(3) daysbeforethedateofexamination? NO. Onitsface,itcanbereadilyseenthatitisunreasonableinthat an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,reviewmaterial,or any tip from anyschool,collegeoruniversity,oranyreviewcenter orthelikeoranyreviewer,lecturer,instructor,officialoremployeeof anyoftheaforementionedorsimilarinstitutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing theprohibitedactsevenwithoutanyillmotiveswillbe barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC. Furthermore,itisinconceivablehowtheCommissioncanmanageto haveawatchfuleyeoneachandeveryexamineeduringthethreedays beforetheexaminationperiod. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrativeauthorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance ofrules andregulations.Tobevalid,suchrulesandregulationsmustbe reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If showntobearnoreasonablerelationtothepurposesforwhich theyareauthorizedtobeissued,thentheymustbeheldtobe invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the revieweesastohowtheyshouldpreparethemselvesforthelicensure examinations. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that itviolates the academic freedom of theschoolsconcerned.RespondentPRC cannot interfere withtheconductofreviewthatreviewschoolsand centers believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standardsrequiredbeforebecomingafull-pledgedpublicaccountant. Unless the means or methods ofinstructionareclearlyfoundtobe inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools andcentersmaynotbestoppedfromhelpingouttheirstudents. Theexerciseofthepowertosuperviseandregulatelegaleducationis circumscribed by the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount tocontrolandthatitrespects the Constitutionally ­guaranteed institutional academic freedom and thecitizen'srighttoqualityandaccessibleeducation.Transgression of these limitations renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional. The law schools areleftwithabsolutelynodiscretiontochooseits studentsatthefirstinstanceandinaccordancewithitsownpolicies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicantswhofailedtoreachtheprescribedPhiLSATpassingscore or those with expiredPhiLSATeligibilitytransferscompletecontrol overadmissionpoliciesfromthelawschoolstotheLEB. The right of the institutions then are constricted only in providing "additional"admissionrequirements,admittingoftheinterpretation that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the State which is antithetical to the very principleofreasonablesupervisionandregulation. It issettledthatthePhiLSAT,whenadministeredasanaptitudetest, is reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improvingthequalityoflegaleducation.Thisaptitudetest,however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive,orqualifyingastoencroach uponinstitutionalacademicfreedom. AdjudicatoryorQuasi-judicialpower Thisisthepowertohearanddeterminequestionsoffacttowhich the legislative policy is toapplyandtodecideinaccordancewith the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administeringthesamelaw. Theadministrativebodyexercisesitsquasi-judicialpowerwhenit performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrativenature,wherethepowertoactinsuch manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performanceoftheexecutiveoradministrativedutyentrustedtoit. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies arerequiredtoinvestigatefactsorascertainthe existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusionsfromthemasbasisfortheirofficialactionandexercise ofdiscretioninajudicialnature. Meralcov.Atilano2012 Apreliminaryinvestigationisnotaquasi-judicialproceeding,andthe DOJisnotaquasi-judicialagencyexercisingaquasi-judicialfunction when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court. The public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conductofpreliminaryinvestigationtodeterminewhether,basedon theevidencepresentedtohim,heshouldtakefurtheractionbyfiling a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities of the parties beforehim. Sincethepowerexercisedbythepublicprosecutorinthisinstanceis merely investigative or inquisitorial, it is subject to a different standard in terms of stating the facts and the law in its determinations. This is also true in the case of the DOJ Secretary exercising her review powers over decisionsofpublicprosecutors. Thus, it is sufficient that in denying a petition for review of a resolution of a prosecutor, the DOJ resolution state the law upon whichitisbased. We rule, therefore, that the DOJ resolution satisfactorily complied with constitutional and legal requirements when it stated its legal basisfordenyingMERALCO’spetitionforreviewwhichisSection7 of Department Circular No. 70, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to dismiss a petition outright if he finds it to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when theissues raisedthereinaretooinsubstantialtorequireconsideration. Encinasv.Agustin,Jr.2 013EnBanc Pimentelv.LEB2019EnBancR eReasonablenessofPhiLSAT BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 137of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Inadministrativelaw,aq uasi-judicialproceedinginvolves (a) takingandevaluatingevidence; (b) determiningfactsbasedupontheevidencepresented;and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, withrespecttothematterincontroversy,ofwhatthelawis;whatthe legal rights and obligationsofthecontendingpartiesare;andbased thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rightsandobligationsoftheparties. The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body isexercisingjudicialormerelyinvestigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authoritytoadjudicateupontherightsandobligationsoftheparties. Hence,iftheonlypurposeofaninvestigationistoevaluatethe evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. Inthiscase,ananalysisoftheproceedingsbeforetheBFPyieldsthe conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constitutedafact-findinginvestigationforpurposesofdetermining whetheraformalchargeforanadministrativeoffenseshouldbefiled againstpetitioner. Administrativedueprocess 1.Jurisdiction GlobeWirelessv.PublicServiceCommission The Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and theirfranchises,equipmentandotherproperties. However,Section5 ofRANo.4630,thelegislativefranchiseunderwhichpetitionerwas operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioneronlytotheratewhichpetitionermaychargethepublic. Theactcomplainedofconsistedinpetitionerhavingallegedlyfailed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addresseeinMadrid,Spain. Obviously,suchimputednegligencehad nothingwhatsoevertodowiththesubjectmatteroftheverylimited jurisdictionoftheCommissionoverpetitioner. disclosedtheexistenceofthepetitionpendingbeforetheMed-Arbiter andevenattachedacopythereof. UnliketheNLRCwhichisexplicitlyvestedwiththejurisdictionover claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages,the BLR is not specifically empowered to adjudicate claims of such naturearisingfromintra-unionorinter-uniondisputes. DeSyquiav.BoardofPowerandWaterWorks Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizanceofandadjudicatingthecomplaints filedbyrespondentsagainstpetitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations withrespondents-complainantsashertenants, since petitioner is notengagedinapublicservicenorinthesaleof electricitywithoutpermitorfranchise. Mariño,Jr.v.Gamilla The propriety of padlocking the union’s office, the relief soughtby the petitioner in the civil case, is interwoven with the issue of legitimacyoftheassumptionofofficebytherespondentsinlightof theviolationoftheunion’sconstitutionandby-laws,whichwasthen pendingbeforetheMed-Arbiter. Necessarily,therefore,thetrialcourt hasnojurisdictionoverthecaseinsofarastheprayerfortheremoval ofthepadlocksandtheissuanceofaninjunctivewritisconcerned. Itisasettledrulethatjurisdiction,onceacquired,continuesuntilthe caseisfinallyterminated.ThepetitionwiththeMed-Arbiterwasfiled aheadofthecomplaintinthecivilcasebeforetheRTC.Assuch,when the petitioners filed their complaint a quo, jurisdiction over the injunction and restraining orderprayedforhadalreadybeenlodged withtheMed-Arbiter. Theremovalofpadlocksandtheaccesstothe office premises is necessarily included in petitioners’ prayer to enjoinrespondentsfromperformingactspertainingtounionofficers and on behalf of the union. In observance of the principle of adherence of jurisdiction, it is clear that the RTC should not have exercised jurisdiction over the provisional reliefs prayed for in the complaint. A review of the complaint shows that petitioners 2.DueProcess In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognizedtoincludethefollowing: (1) therighttoactualorconstructivenoticeoftheinstitutionof proceedingswhichmayaffectarespondent'slegalrights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one'sfavor,andtodefendone'srights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonableguaranteeofhonestyaswellasimpartiality;and (4) afindingbysaidtribunalwhichis submittedforconsideration during the hearing or supported by substantial evidence containedintherecordsormadeknowntothepartiesaffected Uttov.Comelec In administrative proceedings,theessenceofdueprocessissimply anopportunitytobeheard,oranopportunitytoexplainone’sside or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. At the hearing before the Comelec en banc of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner was given full opportunity to present his case. He did not present controverting evidencetojustifytheexclusionofthefive(5)electionreturns. Garciav.Pajaro The city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate officersoremployees.The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 138of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. The constitutional mandate is satisfied when a petitioner complaining about an action or a ruling is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration. AngTibayv.CIR There are cardinal primary rights which must berespectedevenin proceedingsofthischaracter: (1) Thefirstoftheserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own caseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof. (2) Not only must the party begivenanopportunitytopresenthis caseandtoadduceevidencetendingtoestablishtherightswhich heassertsbutthetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose theobligationto decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity,aplacewhendirectlyattached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a findingor conclusion), but the e vidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidenceasareasonablemindmight acceptasadequatetosupportaconclusion. (5) Thedecisionmustberenderedontheevidencepresentedatthe hearing, or at leastcontainedintherecordanddisclosedtothe partiesaffected. (6) Courts must actonitsorhisownindependentconsiderationof the law and facts of the controversy,andnotsimplyacceptthe viewsofasubordinateinarrivingatadecision. (7) Courtsshould,inallcontroversialquestions,renderitsdecision insuchamannerthatthepartiestotheproceedingcanknowthe various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Domingov.Rayala The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to tryhim,heappeared, personallyandwithcounsel,andparticipatedintheproceedings. Riverav.CSC Inorderthatthereviewofthedecisionofasubordinateofficermight notturnouttobeafarce,thereviewingofficermustperforcebeother than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no realreviewofthe case. Thedecisionofthereviewingofficerwouldbeabiasedview; inevitably, it would bethesameviewsincebeinghuman,hewould notadmitthathewasmistakeninhisfirstviewofthecase. Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behoovedCommissionerGamindetoinhibitherselftotallyfromany participationinresolvingRivera'sappealtoCSCifwearetogivefull meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB'sdecisionof29August1990isunacceptable. Coronav.CA Whilerulesofproceduredonotstrictlyapplytoadministrativecases aslongasdefendant'srighttodueprocessisnotviolated,itsliberal application in administrative cases does not allow admission of hearsay evidence, i.e. affidavits not identified by affiants, as this wouldviolatetheconstitutionalrightofpetitionertodueprocessand hissubstantiverightnottobeadjudgedguiltyonthebasisofhearsay evidence. Thefactthatnoformalhearingtookplaceisnotsufficientgroundto saythatdueprocesswasnotaffordedtoBungubung.Itiswell-settled that in administrative proceedings, including those before the Ombudsman, casesmaybesubmittedforresolutiononthebasisof affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due process that mustbe metinadministrativetribunalsallowsacertaindegreeoflatitudeas long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionableforbeingviolativeofdueprocessforanadministrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavitsordocumentaryevidencesubmittedbythepartiesas affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.Undoubtedly,dueprocessinadministrativeproceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, which requirementwasaffordedBungubung. Perezv.People WhatisprescribedbythelawandtheBejacaseisthatallcomplaints against a PPA official or employee below the rank of Assistant GeneralManagershallbefiledbeforethePPAGeneralManagerbythe proper officials, such as the PPA policeoranyaggrievedparty.The aggrieved party should not, however, be one and the same official upon whose lap the complaint he has filed may eventually fall on appeal.Nemopotestessesimulactorjudex.Nomancanbeatoncea litigant and judge. Unless, of course, in an exceptional case, such officialinhibitshimselforexpresseshiswillingnessattheoutsetto waivehisrighttoreviewthecaseonappeal. Marcelov.Bungubung Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean “a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.” Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after consideringallthepiecesofevidencepresentedbeforeit. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigationproceedingisentitledtoberepresentedbycounseland that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. BasedontheBooksofC ruz,B ernas,Largo,Gujilde,Sarmiento ByRGL 139of210 PoliticalandPublicInternationalLaw REVIEWER Forthe2020/21#BestBarEver Atienza,Jr.v.Comelec2010EnBanc Although political parties play an important roleinourdemocratic set-upasanintermediarybetweenthestateanditscitizens,itisstill a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of membersbyapoliticalpartydoesnotinvolvetherighttolife,liberty or propertywithinthemeaningofthedueprocessclause.Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recoursetocourtsoflawfortheenforcementofthoserights,butnot asadueprocessissueagainstthegovernmentoranyofitsagencies. Thesecircumstances,bythemselves,pointtotheprematurityofthe petition. Villa-Ignaciov.Gutierrez2017EnBanc Changing regulations in the middle of the proceedings without reason, after the violation has accrued, does not comply with fundamentalfairness,orinotherwords,dueprocessoflaw. Exceptionstorequirementsofnoticeandhearing 1) SummaryAbatementofNuisanceperse Catacutanv.People2 011 Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial,orincompetentevidence,ortestimonyofanincompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence which although
