Ancheta VS. Guersey Dalaygon GR. No. 139868 (June 8, 2006) Facts: American citizens, spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey, were residents in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979 leaving a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of her conjugal share in real estate in Forbes Park, a bank account, cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to Candelaria, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife’s estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland). Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy. Issue: 1) Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated 2) Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled. Ruling: 1) Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife’s properties may be found in the Philippines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator. 2) A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Aznar VS. Garcia GR. No. L-16749 (January 31, 1963) Facts: Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion. Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply. Held: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter. 1. 2. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California. The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.” Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides. Testate Estate of Bohanan 106 Phil 997 Facts: The testator was actually born in Nebraska, where at least he was a citizen of the state and also had properties in California. Notwithstanding, even though the decedent stayed long in the Philippines, his stay was merely temporary therefore continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6, 000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10, 000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000. It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211, 639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90, 819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6, 000 each, or a total of P12, 000. In the proceedings for the probate of the will, the children and the wife of the deceased Bohanan question the validity of the testamentary dispositions of the executor/testator C.O Bohanan’s last will and testament. Issue: Whether or not the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitimate given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. Held: Yes. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code now Article 16 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002. Doctrines: * I. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. II. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded. Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. Issue: whether or no Marriage is valid. Ratio: In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALO G.R. No. 221029 Apr 24, 2018 Doctrines: I. Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types: 1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. FACTS: Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese court. Manalo was allowed to testify. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court Order finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2) Affidavit of Publication; (3) Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; (4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese court; (5) Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo. The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country. On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former capacitating him to remarry. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter? Ratio: Yes. Article 26 of the Family Code which reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our court. The Court state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitation him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Also, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese Court. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. Wild Valley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 119602, 06 October 2000 Doctrines: I. The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we have found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the “main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries” were checked and found to be in good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel’s double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew. II. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje N 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river. o ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws. Ratio: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged. MOORE and SONS MERCANTILE CO v WAGNER 50 Phil 128 Doctrines: It having been proven by the evidence of record that the liabilities exceed the assets of the deceased husband's intestate estate and that his widow had not contributed any property to the marriage, she cannot be granted support, pending the liquidation of the intestate estate, because said support, having the character of an advance payment to be deducted from the respective share of each participant is without legal basis under article 1430 of the Civil Code when there is no property to be partitioned. FACTS: Widow of the deceased Samuel William Allen in the settlement proceedings petitioned the court to require the administrator of the estate to give her and her daughter Avelina Allen an allowance of P80. The special administrator appointed in the case objected to the allowance of the widow upon the ground that the estate is insolvent, in view of the claims presented and approved by the committee on appraisal and claims. Attorney P. J. Moore, in behalf of several creditors also entered his opposition to said order. Notwithstanding this insolvent condition of the estate, the lower court entered the order referred to of March 5, 1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the order granting the allowance to the widow and daughter valid? HELD: NO. Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance for their support out of the general estate, pending the liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or income. Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to the said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That the support does not encumber the property of the deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife can always be allowed support as part payment of the income of her property. In any case, the support is given prior to the termination of the liquidation of the partnership, and it does not seem logical to deny the same before knowing exactly the result of the liquidation, just because of the fear that the liabilities will exceed the estate, or on the ground of estimates more or less uncertain, and without any sufficient proof of its reality.In this case, it appears from the record that the liabilities exceed the assets of the estate of Samuel William Allen and that his widow, by her own admission, had not contributed any property to the marriage. Wherefore, it is unlawful, in the present case, to grant the support, having the character of an advance payment to be deducted from the respective share of each partner, when there is no property to be partitioned, lacks the legal basis provided by article 1430.