HAND OUT No. 1 - INTRODUCTION
Constitutional Law I - Atty. Renato Ma. S. Callanta, Jr.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Political Law defined
That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
government organs of the state and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants
of its territory.1
Macariola vs. Asuncion, AM No. 133-J, May 31, 1982 (114 SCRA 77)
HELD: Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its
territory.2
Scope of Political Law - The entire field of political law may be subdivided into (a) the
law of public administration, (b) constitutional law, (c) administrative law, and (d) the
law of public corporations.3
These four subdivisions may be briefly described for the time being, as follows: The first
deals with the organization and management of the different branches of the government;
the second, with the guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations
on governmental action; the third, with the exercise of executive power in the making of
rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights; and the last, with
governmental agencies for local government or for other special purposes. 4
LAW SUBJECTS COVERED UNDER THE BAR EXAM ON POLITICAL LAW:
1) Constitutional Law I – Structures & Power of the Government
2) Constitutional Law II – Bill of Rights & Citizenship
3) Administrative Law
4) Law on Public Officers
5) Law on Public Corporations
6) Election Law
7) Public International Law

1st exam to be taken in the Bar Exams
THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. DEFINITION
Constitution Defined:

According to Cooley: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the
powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.
Constitution of the Philippines; Defined:

According to Justice Malcolm: The written instrument enacted by direct action of
the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established,
limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.

A Constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
1
Sinco, Philippine Political Law 1, 11th ed., 1962
2
Citing the case of People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887 (1922)
3
Sinco, Philippine Political Law 1, 11th ed., 1962
4
Ibid
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Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and
duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. 5
B. PURPOSE AND NATURE
Purpose of the Constitution:

To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government, to assign to the several departments
their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain fixed principles on which government is
founded.

What is the Purpose/Nature of the Philippine Constitution?
1) As the supreme law of the land, it establishes the government and prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of that government so established;
2) Assigns the several departments of the government their respective powers and duties;
3) Establishes certain principles of which the government is to exercise its powers;
4) Balances the powers of government with the civil liberties of its citizens, and
5) Promotes the common good of the people.6
C. SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law of which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No acts shall be valid, however noble its
intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow
to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude.

Under the DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent
GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.7

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.8
Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003 – PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF A LAW
HELD: Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC,9 the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be
within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution
rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the
validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the
government itself.
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:
5
Manila Prince v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997 (267 SCRA 408)
Philippine Governance and Constitution (2002), Mauro R. Munoz and Delilah Gonzalez-Munoz
7
Manila Prince v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997 (267 SCRA 408)
8
Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003 citing the Manila Prince case
9
L-47771, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 55 citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 95 (1937)
6
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Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the
attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.10
D. CLASSIFICATION
I. Written vs. Unwritten
1. Written – one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of
documents.
2. Unwritten – consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single,
concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of
fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists,
customs and traditions, and certain common law principles.
II. Conventional vs. Cumulative
1. Conventional – an enacted constitution, formally “struck off” at a definite
time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a
constituent body or ruler.
2. Cumulative – result of political evolution, “not inaugurated at any specific
time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method.”
III. Rigid vs. Flexible
1. Rigid – one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult
process.
2. Flexible – one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and rigid
E. ESSENTIAL QUALITIES OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
1. Broad
 Not only because it provides for the organization of the entire government
and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State but more
so because it is supposed to embody the past, to reflect the present and to
anticipate the future. The constitution must be comprehensive enough to
provide for every contingency.
2. Brief
 It must be brief and confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with
legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend.
3. Definite
 Ambiguity in its provisions will result in confusion and divisiveness among the
people, and perhaps even physical conflict.
 Exception: Found only in those cases where the rules are deliberately worded
in a vague manner, like the due process clause, to make them more
10
Salas vs. Hon. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690 (1972) citing Morfe vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 31 January 1968, 22
SCRA 424.
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Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of new conditions and
circumstances.
F. ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION
1. Constitution of Liberty
 Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights
of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a
means of securing the enjoyment of these rights.
 ARTICLES II, III, IV, V, and, XII.
2. Constitution of Government
 Series of provisions outlining the organization of the government,
enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration and defining the electorate.
 ARTICLES VI to XI
3. Constitution of Sovereignty
 Consists of provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with
which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about.
 ARTICLES XVII
G. PERMANENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION
Permanence of the constitution:
 One advantage of the written, conventional and rigid constitution is its permanence,
or its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate
needs but only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of
the people with ideas or personalities.

Such a constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political
expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change.
Disadvantage:
 Where the written constitution is unable to adjust to the need for change justified
by new conditions and circumstances. The difficulty itself of the amending process
may be responsible for the delay in effecting the need and thus cause irreparable
injury to the public interest.
H. SELF EXECUTING AND NON-SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS
11

A constitutional provision is self-executing if it fixes the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed such that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. On the other
hand, if the provision needs a supplementary or enabling legislation, it is merely a declaration of policy
and principle which is not self-executing.11

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
Manila Prince v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997 (267 SCRA 408)
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 5 of 22
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.12

In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.13

Parenthetically, there have been several occasions in the past where Congress provided supplementary or
enabling legislation for constitutional provisions that are not self-executing. To name just some: the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,14 the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997,15 the Local
Government Code of 1991,16 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,17 the Speedy Trial Act of 1998,18
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, 19 the Party-List System Act, 20 the Paternity Leave Act of
1996,21 and the Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000. 22
I. INTERPRETATION
Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
HELD: It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In
Chiongbian vs. De Leon,23 the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest.24 The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers
through their debates in the constitutional convention.25
1. It should be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to the intent of the
framers.
 Intent is discoverable either in the document itself or through the use of
extrinsic aids, such as records of the constitutional convention.
Q: Whether the constitution should be interpreted in the light of conditions obtaining at the time of its
adoption or according to changes inevitably transpiring in the history of the nation?
A: The constitution must change with the changing times lest it impede the progress of the people with
antiquated rules grown ineffective in a modern age.
2. It should be interpreted as self-executing.
 Self-executing – no need to enact law in order for it to become operative.
EXAMPLE: Article III
12
Ibid
Id
14
Section 21, Article II
15
Section 22, Article II
16
Section 25, Article II
17
Section 25, Article II
18
Section 16, Article III
19
Section 2, Article V
20
Section 5, Article VI
21
Section 3, article XIII
22
Ibid
23
82 Phil. 771, 775 (1949).
24
Citing the Separate opinion of Vitug, J. in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra, p. 387, citing Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr.,
L-42428, 18 March 1983, 121 SCRA 51.
25
Citing Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51,
58-59.
13
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Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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
Non self executing – remains dormant unless it is activated by legislative
implementation.
Examples:
1. Article II, Section 4
2. Article IV, Section 3
3. It should be mandatory.
 Otherwise, the fundamental law would have no more force and prestige than
a set of directions which the government and the people would be free to
disregard.
4. It should be prospective in application
 Rights already acquired or vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn
even in the absence of an unmistakable intention to place them within the
scope of the constitution.
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be
proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2.
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right. (*remains to be a non-self executing provision)
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
SECTION 4.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under
Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission
on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
AMENDMENT - Isolated or Piecemeal change.

An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
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Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous.26
REVISION - Revamp or Rewriting of the entire instrument.

The guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how
and to what extent they should be altered.27
AMENDMENT vs. REVISION:
 The distinction between amendment and revision was noted in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, to wit:
The observation made in the famous or notorious Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision
rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between
“amendment” and revision” of an existing constitution: “Revision” may involve a rewriting of the
whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of
specific portions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered
obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of time.28
Lambino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006
HELD: Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change
alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.” The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes “change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances.”
J. Procedure
1. Proposal
Modes of Proposing Amendments or Revision
Proposal
26
Thru Congress
Thru Con. Con.
By a ¾ vote of All its
members
By a 2/3 vote of all
members of Congress
Thru People’s initiative
By petition of at least
12% of the total no. of
registered voters Which
at least 3% of Each
legislative district Must
be represented
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, page 1294
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, page 1294
28
As cited by Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, pp. 1294 – 1295
27
Ratification
By Majority of votes cast
in a Plebiscite.
The plebiscite shall be
held not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90
days after the approval of
such amendment /
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 8 of 22
Here it will not Act as a
legislative Body but as a
Constituent Body
By a majority vote of all
its members if calling is
submitted to the people
revision, or after the
certification by the
COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition
as the case may be.

The proposal is generally made either directly by the Congress or by a Constitutional Convention. 29

Methods in making proposal:
1. Direct Legislative Action

Where what is intended is a mere amendment or change of particular provisions only, the
proposal is better made by direct legislative action. In this case the vote of at least three-fourths
of all the members of the Congress shall be needed.

Q:
Must Congress assemble in joint session before it can propose amendment or call a
constitutional convention?
A: Since nothing is said about a joint session, it is submitted that each House may separately
formulate amendments by a vote of three-fourths of all its members, and then pass it in the
other house for a similar process. Disagreements can be settled through a conference
committee.
Alternatively, however, it is also submitted that Congress may decide to come together in joint
session and vote separately on proposed amendments and revisions. Since the Constitution is
silent about the method and since the amendatory process has been committed to Congress,
under the “political questions” doctrine Congress should be free to choose whichever method it
prefers.
It is also submitted, however, that what is essential, is that both House vote separately. This is
because the power to propose amendments is given not a unicameral body but a bicameral body.
The meaning of a constitutional command can also be drawn from the known governmental
structure set up by the Constitution.30
2. Constitutional Convention

This method is used if what is envisioned is the overhaul of the entire Constitution. It is
advisable to entrust the task to a Constitutional Convention because it will have more time,
opportunity and presumably also the needed expertise to discharge it.

The call for a constitutional convention may be made by a vote of two-thirds of all the members
of the Congress.
o If they cannot make up their mind, the question of whether or not to call the constitutional
convention shall be thrown by them to the people themselves, by at least a majority vote.
3. People’s Initiative
 Section 2, Article XVII.
* Applicable only for Amendments and not to Revision of the constitution
DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION

The entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Submission for
ratification of piecemeal amendments disallowed
Occena vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-56350, April 2, 1981 (104 SCRA 1)
Who determines what kind of method should be used in making a proposal to change the current constitution?
29
30
Article XVII, Sec. 1
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary, page 1298
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Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
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Doctrine: Whatever the nature of the change contemplated, the choice of the method of proposal is
discretionary upon the legislature.
Imbong vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-32432, September 11, 1970 (35 SCRA 28)
HELD: Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution (now Art. XVII),
has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a
three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.
The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of
the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of
delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention.
While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively
in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now
contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting
as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the
exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as long
as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the Constitution, they are valid.
Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details
after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as
amended by Res. No. 4.
The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument
against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly
and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-28196, November 9, 1967 (21 SCRA 774)
DOCTRINES:
(1) Proposal of amendments is not a political but a justiciable question subject to judicial review. This
doctrine is reaffirmed in Sanidad v. COMELEC.
(2) The choice as to whether to propose amendments or to call a constitutional convention for that
purpose or to do both was a question of wisdom and not of authority and hence was a political
question not subject to review by the courts.
2. Position of the Constitutional Convention
1. Theory of Conventional Sovereignty

Loomis vs. Jackson – Constitutional convention is supreme over the other departments of the
government because the powers it exercises are in the nature of sovereign powers.
2. Constitutional Convention is inferior to the other departments

Wood’s Appeal – constitutional convention inferior to the other departments of the government
since it is merely a creation of the legislature.
3. As long as it exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, the Constitutional Convention
must be considered independent of and co-equal with the other departments of the government.
(Frantz vs. Autry)
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 10 of 22
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-28196, November 9, 1967 (21 SCRA 774)
HELD: As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission, this Court — speaking through one of the leading members
of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel — declared
that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of power between the several departments and among the integral or
constitutional constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, this Court, characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, Avelino vs. Cuenco, Tañada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs.
Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second,
this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber,
purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth,
we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House
of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as nearly as may be possible
according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.
Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not
as members of Congress but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature
of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of the treatymaking power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-34150, October 16, 1971 (41 SCRA 702)
FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking
to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting
age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the
subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for
being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by
virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions
2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates
to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132.
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HELD: There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a
constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly
is at par with the former.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extraordinary powers generally beyond the
control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only
with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the
Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full
force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts, the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and
operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the
performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or
control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its
officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny
to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard
of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any
resolution providing for the taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting
of any tax, import or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or
between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less
exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be
assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution,
who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that
somehow somewhere the power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on
some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established by our
founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their
learning, experience and craftmanship in constitution-making.
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It
goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is
subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the
Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within
the power, as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which
petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE
Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997 (270 SCRA 106)
HELD: Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid…xxx
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article
IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
Doctrine: The Constitutional provision on people’s initiative is not self-executing and RA 6735 provided only for a
local initiative and not the national initiative required for proposing constitutional changes.
Lambino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006
FACTS: The Lambino group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).
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The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The COMELEC denied said petition invoking the ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC.
HELD: The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago vs. Comelec, as the present
petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,” thus:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready
to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO:
What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO:
No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
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The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If
so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of
the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must
sign on a petition containing such full text.
REVISION THRU INITIATIVE
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional
convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to “[A]ny amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
“[A]mendments to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant
to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report
No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of
the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should
not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO:
[I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
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MS. AQUINO:
In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO:
I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG:
Thank you.
(Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress
or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that a people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of
the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people
cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s
proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional
Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document
which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
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constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
3. Ratification (Art. XVII, sec. 4, 1987 Constitution)

The requirement for ratification thus involves the people themselves in the sovereign act of drafting or
altering the fundamental law. In the case of a mere statute, it suffices that it is enacted by their chosen
representatives pursuant to their mandate. But where it is the constitution that is being framed or
amended, it is imperative and proper that approval come directly from the people themselves.

Proposals to amend the Constitution must be ratified within a reasonable time after they are made
because they are intended to answer present needs or correct current problems.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-28196, November 9, 1967 (21 SCRA 774)
DOCTRINE: There is nothing to indicate that the election herein referred to is a special, not a general election.
The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Occena vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-56350, April 2, 1981 (95 SCRA 755)
HELD: The Supreme Court sustained the simultaneous holding in 1980 of the local elections and the plebiscite
on the proposal to restore the retirement age of judges to seventy years.
K. Judicial Review of Amendments

The questions of the validity of the adoption of amendments to the Constitution are regarded now as
subject to judicial review.
Tanada vs. Cuenco, GR No. L-10520, February 28, 1957 (100 Phil 1101)
DOCTRINE: The courts can inquire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for amendment has been
observed.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, GR No. L-44646, October 12, 1976 (73 SCRA 333)
HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly
during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru
Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of
the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in
the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
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PHILIPPINE - FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.

Under this principle, the Philippines is a democratic state that is, a government for, of, and by the people.
But it is not a pure democracy. Thus, while it is true that the people are the possessors of sovereign
power, it is equally the case that they cannot exercise the powers of government directly, but only
through the medium of their duly elected representatives.

The word “democratic” was added to “republican” in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution as a
“pardonable redundancy” to highlight the importance of the people’s role in government.— Of all the
organic laws of our country, the 1987 Constitution holds most sacrosanct the people’s role in governance.
As a first principle of government, the 1987 Constitution declares in Article II, Section 1, Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a democratic state. The
word “democratic” was added to “republican” as a “pardonable redundancy” to highlight the importance
of the people’s role in government, as evinced by the exchanges in the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 31

The Government of the Philippines, also known as the Philippine Government is the national
government of the unitary state of the Republic of the Philippines. It is a presidential, representative, and
democratic republic where the President of the Philippines is both the head of state and the head of
government within a pluriform multi-party system.32

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal
or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.33

The Philippines is a republic with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally divided
among its three branches: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments.

One basic corollary in a presidential system of government is the principle of separation of powers
wherein legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies
to the Judiciary.

The Legislative branch is authorized to make laws, alter, and repeal them through the power vested in
the Philippine Congress. This institution is divided into the Senate and the House of Representatives.

The Executive branch is composed of the President and the Vice President who are elected by direct
popular vote and serve a term of six years. The Constitution grants the President authority to appoint his
Cabinet. These departments form a large portion of the country’s bureaucracy.

The Judicial branch holds the power to settle controversies involving rights that are legally demandable
and enforceable. This branch determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part and instrumentality of the government. It is made
up of a Supreme Court and lower courts.

The Constitution expressly grants the Supreme Court the power of Judicial Review as the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or regulation unconstitutional.
SEPARATION OF POWERS

31
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers entails: first, the division of the powers of the government into
three, which are legislative, executive, and judicial; and second, the distribution of these powers to the
three major branches of the government, which are the Legislative Department, Executive Department,
and the Judicial Department. Basically, it means that the Legislative Department is generally limited to
AKBAYAN vs. Aquino, 558 SCRA 468, July 16, 2008
Wikepedia
33
Adinistrative Code of 1987, Sec. 2(1)
32
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the enactment of the law and not to implementation or interpretation of the same; the Executive
Department is generally limited to the implementation of the law and not to the enactment or
interpretation of the same; and the Judicial Department is generally limited to the interpretation and
application of laws in specific cases and not to the making or implementation of the same.

Purpose of the Doctrine - Prevention of Monopoly of Power. Separation of powers is said to be an
attribute of republicanism, in that, among other reasons, it seeks to prevent monopoly or concentration
of power to one person or group of persons, and thereby forestalls dictatorship or despotism. Sovereignty
resides in the people, and it should remain that way. Government officials, who are the representatives of
the people, must exercise the powers of their office in the interest of the public. While representational
exercise of power brings out the essence of republicanism, too much concentration of power rips it apart,
as was experienced some administrations.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case
HELD: The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 34 it means
that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,
belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the
power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this
respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere." Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law." The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation
of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the
other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function"; and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another." In other
words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague,35, the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of
budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the
"regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.
This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant
of all powers inherent in them. 36 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts
on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law - making role necessarily comes to an end and from
34
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).
273 Phil. 443 (1991).
36
Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 148.
35
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there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive."
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima 37 where
the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional." It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only
pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.
In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
X
x
x
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The ends of government are better achieved if the system of checks and balances will be observed.
Under the system of checks and balances, one department is given certain powers by which it may definitely
restrain the others from exceeding constitutional authority. It may object or resist any encroachment upon its
authority, or it may question, if necessary any act or acts which unlawfully interferes with its sphere of jurisdiction
and authority.38
The following are illustrations where there are checks and balances:
1. The lawmaking power of the Congress is checked by the President through its veto power, which in turn
maybe overturn by the legislature
2. the Congress may refuse to give its concurrence to an amnesty proclaimed by the President and the
Senate to a treaty he has concluded
3. the President may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the offender
4. the Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that of inferior courts and even abolish
the latter tribunals
5. the Judiciary in general has the power to declare invalid an act done by the Congress, the President and
his subordinates, or the Constitutional Commissions.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, GR No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
HELD: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
37
38
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
Suarez, 2005
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 19 of 22
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become
a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the
case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special
session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in
the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.
The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case
HELD: The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does
not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.39
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known
as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of
item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as
specified under the Constitution. 40 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication."
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case
39
40
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 20 of 22
HELD: As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the
people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial
practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority
to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren41 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the non delegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
Undue Delegation to the President of Legislative Power – MALAMPAYA FUNDS
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – PDAF Case
ISSUE: Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since
the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President " gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used." Respondents, on the other hand,
urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."
HELD: The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a
legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for
its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. 42 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness
test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 43
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy,
and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
41
169 Phil 437 (1977)
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251.
43
See Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Edition, pp.
686-687, citing Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, 576-577 (1965).
42
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 21 of 22
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be
confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under
the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by
three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government." Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed
the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should
nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used –
as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Delegation of Powers of the Supreme Court to Congress - Jurisdiction
Tua vs. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014.

Issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Court’s authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress
of wrongs for violations of such rights.
HELD: The provision in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of
legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the
issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for
violations of such rights.
Delegation to Specialized Administrative Agencies:
BOCEA vs. Teves, GR No. 181704, December 6, 2011
HELD: The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. 44
Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means “what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.”
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another.45 However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,46 one of
44
45
46
Citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936).
Citing the case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730, September
1, 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 115-116.
The recognized exceptions to this principle are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
Hand Out No. 1
Political Law 1 (Constitutional Law 1)
Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr.
Page 22 of 22
which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this
case.
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v.
Department of Energy,47 to wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the
volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday
life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to
execute laws in their specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test.
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, id. at 117; Santiago v. Comelec, 336 Phil.
848, 897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) and Isagani A. Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 87
(1996).
47
G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696.