Management Audit of the County of Santa Clara
Sheriff’s Custody Operations
Prepared for the Board of Supervisors of the
County of Santa Clara
February 22, 2021
Prepared by the
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
County Administration Building, East Wing, 10th Floor
70 West Hedding Street
San Jose, CA 95110
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Table of Contents
This document is linked. Click on a section to view.
Executive Summary
1
Introduction
7
Topics Requiring Additional Review I - Contraband
17
Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
21
Topics Requiring Additional Review III - Tasers
27
Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
31
Topics Requiring Additional Review V - Out of Cell Time
39
Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
43
Section 2: Inmate Grievances
55
Section 3: Surveillance Technology
63
Section 4: Staffing
73
Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs 91
Section 6: Classification and Housing
101
Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
109
Section 8: Custody Health
119
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
133
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
143
Attachments A-H
157
Attachment A: Department Responses
159
Attachment B: Inmate Survey
175
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
181
Attachment D: Cost Accounting Methodology
191
Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
193
Attachment F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
203
Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies 207Attachment H: MOU with the Santa Clara Valley
229
Health and Hospital System
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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County of Santa Clara
Board of Supervisors
County Government Center, East Wing
70 West Hedding Street
San Jose, California 95110-1770
(408) 829-3344 TDD 993-8272
Contract Auditor: Harvey M. Rose Associates, LLC
E-mail: cheryl.solov@bos.sccgov.org
February 22, 2021
Supervisor Otto Lee, Chair
Supervisor Cindy Chavez, Vice Chair
Board of Supervisors’ Finance and Government Operations Committee
70 West Hedding Street
San Jose, CA 95110
Dear Supervisors Lee and Chavez:
We have completed the Management Audit of the County of Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody Operations.
This audit was added to the Management Audit Division’s work plan by the Board of Supervisors of
the County of Santa Clara, pursuant to the Board’s power of inquiry specified in Article III, Section
302(c) of the Santa Clara County Charter. This audit was conducted in conformity with generally
accepted government auditing standards as set forth in the 2011 revision of the “Yellow Book” of
the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The purpose of this audit was to examine the operations,
management practices and finances of the Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody Operations Bureau to identify
opportunities to increase the Bureau’s efficiency, effectiveness and economy.
The fieldwork, writing, and internal review of this audit occurred in late 2017 and early 2018. However,
the subject matter of this audit implicated a number of legal matters that required evaluation, including,
at the time, the two pending class action settlement negotiations, the latter of which were ultimately
finalized and implemented by way of two consent decrees managed by the federal courts. We cannot
verify if all information in the audit is current due to the amount of time that has passed since the audit
occurred. Further, due to the consent decrees, the County and Board of Supervisors may not have the
legal authorization to implement all our recommendations, as some may now require approval by Class
Counsel and or review by federal courts. As such, we recommend that the Board of Supervisors forward
all recommendations it votes to implement to County Counsel for review. County Counsel will determine
if the recommendation requires the approval of Class Counsel or federal court or not and respond to the
Board of Supervisors with an update.
We appreciate the assistance of the Sheriff's Office and Custody Health Services.
Respectfully submitted,
Cheryl Solov
Management Audit Manager
CC:
Supervisor Mike Wasserman
Supervisor Susan Ellenberg
Supervisor S. Joseph Simitian
Jeffery V. Smith, County Executive
James R. Williams, County Counsel
Project Staff:
Julian Metcalf
Gabe Cabrera
Alice Hur
Anna Chenakina
Executive Summary
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
Finding 1: Using Administrative Leave
In multiple instances, the Custody Bureau allowed employees who were accused
of beating inmates to continue with their regular duties for weeks or months
without placing them on paid leave. Contributing factors to the under-utilization
of Administrative Leave are that the Custody Bureau lacks a policy governing the
circumstances that would trigger leave placement, and the one-sentence policy for
the Department of Correction specifically allows paid leave to be delayed until after
a formal investigation is complete. Failure to rapidly place staff accused of beating
inmates on paid leave pending investigation increases the risk to inmates.
With assistance from the Employee Services Agency and County Counsel, the Custody
Bureau should prepare and implement a policy governing the circumstances under
which paid administrative leave shall occur, and, critically, the timing of such leave.
Employees who face serious accusations of use of excessive force should be placed
on paid leave as soon as possible, with the investigation of any employee on such
leave prioritized by Internal Affairs to minimize operational disruption.
Finding 2: Inmate Grievances
The Custody Bureau created a Grievance Unit in response to recommendations from
the Blue Ribbon Commission. Our analysis of the grievance system found that
high volumes of grievances (48.3 percent) are closed so quickly that we question
whether a true resolution to the grievance could have been achieved. The staffing
structure of the Grievance Unit lends itself to potential conflicts of interest, as well as
administrative inefficiencies. Supervisors collect, enter, and review complaints that
could possibly involve their direct reports, threatening the objectivity of the grievance
process. Further, at the time of our audit fieldwork, the manager of the Grievance
Unit was as also serving in a capacity as President of the County’s Correctional Peace
Officers’ Association union, meaning the individual was also tasked with
representing officers who have been accused of wrongdoing. These factors combined
reduce the appearance of a transparent and effective grievance process, and the
potential conflicts of interest risk the Grievance Unit’s objectivity.
The Custody Bureau should restructure the Grievance Unit such that the civilian
Senior Management Analyst acts as the Unit’s manager, and the Bureau should also
submit a request to the Board of Supervisors for an additional Custody Support
Assistant to collect grievances. During the response and review stage, grievances
concerning badged personnel should be routed to supervisory staff not directly
in charge of the staff in question. Lastly, the Custody Bureau should integrate an
external review component into its grievance system to ensure that inmate needs
are being met overall. The Office of Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring, the
new jail oversight function, should review and analyze the Custody Bureau’s bi-annual
grievance summary reports and copies of grievances from the evaluated periods to
assess the efficacy of the grievance process and examine the most prevalent issues in
the correctional facilities.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Executive Summary
Finding 3: Surveillance Technology
During calendar years 2017 and 2018, the Custody Bureau implemented two major
surveillance technologies within County correctional facilities: facility surveillance
cameras and body worn cameras (BWC). In the Surveillance Use Policy for facility
cameras, there were no guidelines around when device audio should switched off
by Custody Bureau staff for legal or privacy purposes. Further, within the BWC
Surveillance Use Policy, specific processes to ensure accountability are poorly defined;
footage viewing requirements are not consistent with the Custody Bureau’s Use
of Force Policy; and there are no guidelines that dictate where the cameras must
be uniformly worn. These gaps in the Surveillance Use Policies increase the risk of
abuse or misuse of these technologies. Without guiding standards, audio may be
inappropriately switched off; BWC audits might not be thorough enough to identify
key issues; staff could view their BWC footage before writing their initial use-of-force
reports, which risks them writing the report to how the video will be perceived; and
BWCs could be placed on the body such that the resulting footage is not sufficient for
use as evidence.
The Bureau should revise its Surveillance Use Policies to address the risk areas
defined above, and the Board of Supervisors should adopt these revised policies. In
addition the Bureau should adopt training and monitoring procedures that support
the revisions.
Finding 4: Staffing
The Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody Bureau has neither a formal process to identify
staffing needs nor written documents that demonstrate annual staffing requests are
consistent with facility demands and legal requirements. Despite a chronic shortage
of correctional deputies, the Sheriff’s Office elects to use these staff to perform
tasks that other California Counties carry out with either civilian positions or “sworn”
personnel who are not deputies. Operating with excessive vacancies and insufficient
supervisorial staff, using the limited number of deputies to carry out tasks that do not
require deputy skills, and mandating overtime to backfill the vacant positions all have
negative outcomes. These result in conditions such as bare minimum staffing and
limited resources available to various support programs. These conditions then
increase risks to safety and security of staff, inmates and the public.
To improve this, the Custody Bureau should plan, assess, and regularly report on
staffing based on industry standards and implement criteria to evaluate when a post
should be filled with civilian staff or badge staff. Facility supervisors should submit
staffing requests consistent with facility needs regardless of department-wide or
countywide budget constraints and apply a relief factor, based historical trends
and analysis, to posts that require continuous coverage. To alleviate the chronic
shortage of deputies, the Custody Bureau should hire 95 non-sworn Custody Support
Assistants (CSAs) to occupy certain posts and re-assign the existing 85 deputies
to fill vacant positions. The addition of 95 new CSAs would increase the Bureau’s
salaries and benefits costs by an estimated $10.0 million per year. Reassignment of
deputies currently occupying posts that would be filled by CSAs is estimated to reduce
overtime costs by approximately $9.8 million and result in an estimated net General
Fund cost of $232,785 annually.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Executive Summary
Finding 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody
Costs
In response to the transfer of many low-level offenders from prisons to jails under
the Public Safety Realignment Act (2011), the Santa Clara County Office of the
Sheriff created the Custody Alternative Supervision Program (CASP) in March 2012.
CASP consists of two phases: 1) the in-custody phase, and 2) the out-of-custody
phase. During the in-custody phase, inmates participate in programs and are case
managed by Rehabilitation Officers (ROs). Research shows that many alternatives to
incarceration are cost-effective and do not lead to worse outcomes in terms of crime
and recidivism. The recidivism rate for those who completed CASP was 7.0 percent
lower than those who served their sentence in jail, according to the Office of Reentry
Services. An expanded CASP has the potential to lower custody costs as the program
reduces recidivism and the inmate population to the point that entire housing units
can be closed and associated staffing reductions can occur.
We recommend that the Custody Bureau expand the out-of-custody phase of CASP to
serve an additional 219 Realignment inmates in the jails. We recommend that it hire
15.0 additional full-time positions for these additional inmates. We estimate that after
accounting for personnel costs, the County would incur costs of approximately $3.8
million to $5.3 million per year by expanding CASP.
Finding 6: Classification and Housing
Inmate classification is a system that assigns inmates to housing units and programs
based on objective criteria. The Sheriff Office’s Custody Bureau’s new, automated
classification tool – implemented at the end of 2016 and throughout 2017 –
miscalculates inmates’ custody scores due to an error in the sign (plus/minus) of
numbers used in several of these calculations. Further, the tool’s alerts for upcoming
reassessments do not automatically generate for Minimum and Medium security
male inmates who were initially booked under the old classification system. In its
performance management of the classification process, the Custody Bureau does
not have written guidelines or a centralized recordkeeping system for its reported
classification audits. Lastly, the Management Audit Division was unable to verify
that the Custody Bureau has implemented components such as discretionary
overrides and face-to-face inmate interviews in a manner intended by the experts
who developed the new classification system. Failure to classify inmates accurately
according to the new, expert-vetted system may result in improper inmate housing
assignments. Improper housing assignments may, in turn, increase the risk of
violence among inmates who could be inadvertently housed together due to
classification errors.
The Custody Bureau should confer with its information technology specialists to
fix the calculation issues in the classification tool and bring the subgroup of lower
security male inmates into the system. The Custody Bureau should also develop
procedures for conducting and documenting the results of Classification Unit audits.
Lastly, the Custody Bureau should bring in the experts who helped design the new
classification system to assess the Classification Unit’s use of discretionary overrides
and face-to-face inmate interviews.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Executive Summary
Finding 7: LGBTQI Policy
In January of 2018, the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau finalized a policy and
corresponding training pertaining to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and
intersex (LGBTQI) inmates. Neither the final LGBTQI policy nor the corresponding
training were reviewed and approved by the County Executive’s Office of LGBTQI
Affairs. Thus, while the policy may address existing legal requirements, it is unclear
whether the policy comprehensively responds to the needs of LGBTQI inmates on
a practical level, as determined by subject matter experts. For instance, the policy
conspicuously lacks any discussion of LGBTQI medical and mental health treatment.
Additionally, the Custody Bureau does not track the size of the LGBTQI population,
or any other summary statistics around this group, and only uses its interview data
for individual advocacy rather than strategic planning. Neglecting to define standards
within the new policy, such as medical treatment for LGBTQI inmates, can result in
inappropriate inmate treatment. The lack of tracking of the overall LGBTQI inmate
population, and thus no opportunity by the Custody Bureau to use data to better
understand and accommodate this population. Finally, there is no regular audit of
these efforts, which prevents the Custody Bureau from correcting inaccuracies in its
LGBTQI inmate designations.
The Custody Bureau should reevaluate its LGBTQI policy with the Office of LGBTQI
Affairs and apply for technical assistance from the National Institute of Correction
(NIC, which has published a guide on LGBTQI policy development. The Classification
Unit should forward all identified LGBTQI inmates to OSIU, and OSIU should then
interview and extend its outreach to all LGBTQI inmates. OSIU should also produce
quarterly summary reports on LGBTQI inmates from both these interviews and CJIC
data that track the size of this population and identify trends that will inform future
planning. Finally, Custody Bureau’s Operational Standards and Inspection Unit should
create a schedule for its annual population audits, and expand these audits to the
broader LGBTQI population.
Finding 8: Custody Health
In addition to providing for public safety and jail security, the Sheriff’s Custody Bureau
is responsible for the humane treatment, feeding, and provision of health care
consistent with State regulations to inmates in the County’s correctional facilities. A
now defunct agreement between the Sheriff’s Office and the Custody Health Service
Department of the Health and Hospital System (Custody Health) required Custody
Health to administer medical, mental health and dental programs with appropriate
levels of staff to ensure effective and safe delivery of services. The agreement was
last updated in 2005 and its provisions are no longer monitored or enforced. This
limits the Custody Bureau’s ability to ensure the adequacy, timeliness, and cost
effectiveness of inmate health care. The lack of Custody Bureau oversight of Custody
Health increases the risk that medical care may be insufficient or poorly delivered.
We recommend development and implementation of a new agreement that includes
specific, measurable indices of quality and cost of Custody Health services. On an
ongoing basis, Custody Health should report and trend these indices to the Custody
Bureau, including comparisons where feasible with peer counties. Custody Health
staffing levels should be periodically examined by the Custody Bureau to ensure
adequacy and efficiency.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Executive Summary
Finding 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sets minimum standards for local
detention facilities, including a mandate for jail administrators to provide “individual
and/or family social service programs for inmates” (Section 1070). The Santa Clara
Sheriff’s Custody Bureau adheres to this mandate by offering 20 in-custody programs.
Research, including the County’s own 2012 recidivism study, indicates that individuals
who participate in the programs are less likely to recidivate after they return to the
community compared to similar individuals who do not participate. Some programs
were more effective at reducing recidivism than others. A few programs had no or
little effect on recidivism. Over the past five years, only about 20 percent of all
inmates (both male and female) have participated in the programs. The County is
missing the opportunity to further reduce recidivism and its associated custody costs,
and to make the community a safer place to live and work. The low participation rate
is primarily due to the fact that programs are offered in certain housing units (e.g., 5C,
7B, etc.) and participation is capped by each unit’s capacity. Housing unit assignments
are based on the inmates’ custody classification (i.e., minimum to maximum security
level), and not on an assessment of their individual programming needs.
The Custody Bureau should seek to ensure more inmates receive more programming.
We estimate that after accounting for increased programming costs, program
expansion would yield net cost-savings of approximately $3.4 million per year,
primarily in avoided re-incarceration costs.
Finding 10: Restrictive Housing
Restrictive housing is the broad practice of removing an inmate from the general
population and limiting their daily out-of-cell activity. There is a marked difference
in the extent of restrictive housing reported by inmates and the statements of
Custody Bureau staff. Inmates have repeatedly alleged use of “solitary confinement,”
a restrictive housing term typically associated with extreme isolation and loss of
privileges. While the Custody Bureau has denied that such a practice exists within the
County Jail, the Custody Bureau’s Disciplinary Housing process does not always follow
its own internal guidelines; infractions for similar incidents are not applied uniformly;
and the Bureau’s summary infraction logs contain inaccuracies. The lack of adherence
to internal Disciplinary Housing guidelines means that some inmates may arbitrarily
receive differential treatment. In addition, the Custody Bureau cannot confirm
whether reviews for this population are occurring on schedule due to the lack of
tracking.
The Custody Bureau should require all Sergeants and Hearing Officers involved
in the Disciplinary Housing process be re-trained in Custody Bureau policies and
collectively determine a uniform set of infractions to be applied to commonlyoccurring incidents. The Custody Bureau should keep copies of inmate Administrative
Hearing notifications in its classification files and develop a separate tracking system
for all inmates in Administrative Segregation. Quarterly summary statistics from this
tracking system should be provided to the Board of Supervisors. Finally, guidelines
around restrictive housing should be revised so that they are internally consistent,
and all inmates and staff should be trained on these revised guidelines.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Introduction
This Management Audit of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Custody Operations was
added to the Management Audit Division’s Fiscal Year 2017-18 work plan by the Board
of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara, pursuant to the Board’s power of inquiry
specified in Article III, Section 302(c) of the Santa Clara County Charter. The Board
added this audit after considering the annual County-wide audit risk assessment
conducted by the Management Audit Division in accordance with Board policy.
PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of the audit was to examine the operations, management practices and
finances of the Sheriff’s Custody Operations, and to identify opportunities to increase
the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of that administration.
The primary objectives of the audit were to answer the following questions:
•
Are the policies and practices, and number, level and type of staff in each
of the County’s custody facilities adequate to ensure compliance with laws,
regulations and other requirements?
•
To what extent do County practices, policies and procedures relative to
custody operations – including oversight – increase or decrease risks to County
staff/contractors, County inmates, and the public?
•
Are there opportunities to increase the safety, economy, efficiency, or
effectiveness of operations?
AUDIT METHODOLOGY
Interviews
We interviewed key management personnel. These included the Sheriff,
Undersheriff/Chief of Corrections, the Assistant Sheriff responsible for
management of custody facilities, the Captains assigned to command of
the jails, inmate programs and strategic planning, Lieutenants assigned to
watch commands and administrative support functions, and the Director of
Administrative Services for the Sheriff’s Office.
We interviewed line-level Correctional Deputies, as well as various
administrative staff.
We interviewed inmates of various security levels, housing locations and
genders.
We also interviewed various stakeholders from within the County. These
included the Director of Custody Health Services, the Psychiatry Department
Chair, the Medical Director of Behavioral Health, staff from the Jail Observer
Program, the Director of the Office of Women’s Policy, the Office of Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) Affairs, and the Director of the
Re-Entry Resource Center.
We toured the Main Jail and Elmwood Complex, including restricted areas such
as the infirmary and behavioral health units.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Introduction
We conducted observations of the intake booking area.
We also viewed video clips of assaults within the facilities, at the request of
Custody staff.
We conducted an assessment of risk and modified our task plan to reflect our
stronger understanding of operations and began fieldwork. This included several
visits to the jail facilities to conduct a survey offered to every inmate present at that
time. We also surveyed the management of other jurisdictions regarding their
custodial practices. We conducted analysis of digital and paper records, and
conducted additional interviews with Custody Bureau staff, interviews with outside
departments, interviews with peer jurisdictions and sought clarification on legal
questions.
COMPLIANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED GOVERNMENT AUDITING
STANDARDS
This management audit was conducted under the requirements of the Board of
Supervisors Policy Number 3.35 as amended on September 5, 2017 That policy states
that management audits are to be conducted under generally accepted government
auditing standards (GAGAS issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. We
conducted this performance audit in accordance with GAGAS as set forth in the 2011
revision of the “Yellow Book” of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, except as
described below. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Prior to commencement of the audit, a group of staff assigned to the audit attended a
multi-day training in Los Angeles regarding auditing of local jails.
In accordance with auditing standards, we performed the following procedures:
Entrance Conference - An entrance conference was held with the Undersheriff, who
at the time served as the Chief of Correction, and other staff, including the Sheriff’s
Director of Administration, to introduce the audit team, describe the audit program
and scope of review, and to respond to questions. A letter of introduction from the
Board, the audit work plan and a request for background information were also
provided at the entrance conference. Subsequently, a letter was furnished to all
Bureau staff by the Sheriff to make them aware of the audit, and to advise them of
how to reach the auditors if they wished to provide input.
Pre-Audit Survey - Audit staff reviewed documentation and other materials to obtain
an overall understanding of the Bureau’s operations, and to isolate audit areas that
warranted more detailed assessments.
Risk Assessment – The audit team met to evaluate the various risks identified during
our pre-audit survey. This assessment guided our revision of the task plan, and
development of fieldwork activities to ensure that risks were adequately tested,
documented and addressed.
Field Work - Field work activities were conducted after completion of the pre-audit
survey, and included: (a survey offered to every inmate present, (b a survey offered
to 68 peer jurisdictions, (c) analysis of digital and paper records, (d) additional
interviews with Custody Bureau staff, (e interviews with outside departments,
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Introduction
(f) interviews with peer jurisdictions, (g) operational observations, and (h) sought
clarification of legal questions, including regarding legal restrictions on access to
records and facilities.
Draft Report – On May 14, 2018, a confidential draft report was provided to the
Sheriff’s Office to describe the audit progress, and to share our preliminary findings
and conclusions. Although no recommendations are directed to Custody Health, a
portion of the report related to that separate department were furnished to Custody
Health, which was asked to comment.
Exit Conferences – We held an exit conference with Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau
management on May 15, 2018. During the exit conference, the Sheriff’s Office
requested additional time beyond the standard two weeks to review the accuracy of
the information in the audit report.
Final Report – Despite multiple requests from the audit team, the Sheriff’s Office
provided no feedback regarding the audit report for over a year. On September 11,
2019 the Sheriff’s Office emailed feedback they noted as a “Formal Response.” After
a review of their feedback and additional input from County Counsel, we revised the
report and incorporated feedback from all parties. A revised draft was prepared and
issued to the Sheriff’s Office on January 14, 2021 The Sheriff’s Office and Custody
Health Services furnished written responses, which are attached to this final
report.
Portions of the report were redacted from the main public report due to confidential
information related to operational security of the jail. These confidential portions
were issued separately to the Office of County Counsel on December 17, 2020.
The Office of County Counsel will issue the confidential portion to the Board of
Supervisors in closed session.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Introduction
BACKGROUND
The Custody Bureau operates three correctional facilities, Main Jail, the Elmwood
Men’s Correctional Complex, and the Elmwood Women’s Correctional Complex. The
average daily population declined in 2017, in part due to new measures to reduce
low-risk inmates and prior statewide legislative changes. In December 2017, the
inmate population was at a five-year low of an average of 3,142 per day throughout
the month. See Figure i.1 below.
Figure i.1: Average Daily Population is Declining
Presented as Monthly Averages
4,190
4,000
3,759
3,677
3,500
Average Daily Population
3,724
3,671
3,662
3,501
3,499
3,591
3,575
3,142
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
#
Combined Average Population
Average Female Population
Min & Max of Combined Population
of Each Year
Average Male Population
2017
.
.
.
.
2016
.
.
.
.
2015
.
.
.
.
2014
.
.
.
.
2013
.
.
.
.
2012
.
.
.
.
1,000
Source: Management Audit Division’s analysis of Custody Bureau’s daily population statistics
The majority of inmates, 71.9% throughout 2017, are unsentenced, meaning they are
awaiting arrangement, awaiting trial, currently attending trial, or awaiting sentencing.
Of these unsentenced inmates, a small portion, 97 as of May 4, 2018, had been held
for three or more years.
The three facilities are geographically and functionally unique. The Main Jail is located
next the County Government Center in San Jose and serves as the booking facility,
and houses high-risk inmates including security levels “three and four,” inmates with
greater behavioral care needs and some inmates under protective custody. The
facility has two buildings, Main Jail North and South. The North building was built in
the 1980’s and houses the majority of inmates and operations. The South building
was built in 1956 and at the time of our audit housed some inmates on the second
floor. It’s third floor was closed to inmate housing in August 2017. The third floor
had been previously used for high-security inmates and various disciplinary housing
practices.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Introduction
The Men’s and Women’s Elmwood Correctional Complexes are located in Milpitas
on a shared 71-acre parcel. The Men’s Complex houses the minimum-security camp
and several buildings for “level-two” and protected custody inmates. The Women’s
Complex houses all female inmates after they are booked at the Main Jail for all
security levels and behavioral dispositions. See Figure i.2 below for the population
distribution among these facilities.
Figure i.2: Where Are Inmates Housed?
Population on the afternoon of January 3, 2018
Elmwood - Men's:
Elmwood - Women's:
Main Jail - Intake/Booking:
Main Jail - North:
Main Jail - South:
2,101
348
8
656
76
106
89
86
74
66
64
64
55
52
52
63
101
58
56
63
92
50
62
47
50
92
43
32
59
91
58
50
42
48
32
27
32
15
32
51
68
59
65
42
58
53
55
24
16
21
65
45
47
39
40
44
38
36
14
44
36
20
Source: Analysis of de-identified inmate location records provided by the Public Safety and Justice Emergency
Management Executive Leadership Committee (formerly CJIC). Numbers in the boxes reflect the number of
inmates in a housing unit.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Introduction
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Prior to 1988, the Office of the Sheriff supervised jail facilities in the County. This is
how most counties in California manage their jail operations. In June 1988, County
voters amended the County Charter1 to move supervision and responsibility of
the County jails to the Board of Supervisors (BOS). The amendment created the
Department of Correction (DOC) and appointed a Chief Officer (known as the
Chief of Correction) to operate the County jails and report directly to the BOS. The
amendment was intended as a cost-saving measure that used lower-paid custodial
officers instead of sworn law enforcement officers to staff the jails.2
In 2010, effectively, all adult custody operations were moved back to supervision
by the Sheriff Office. The change was made to eliminate duplicative functions and
reduce costs on the heels of the national financial crisis. Under this “single-reporting
model,” which the BOS adopted when it approved the FY 2010-11 budget, the Chief of
Corrections operates the jail in “conjunction and cooperation” with the Sheriff’s Office,
and authority over personnel functions is divided between the DOC and the Sheriff’s
Office. See Figure i.3 on page 13 for a visual summary, and Attachment F for a
summary and legal timeline.
1
2
By voter approval, Section 509 was added to the County Charter in June 1988.
Because the Chief of Correction cannot confer peace officer status or firearm-bearing authority on
Department of Correction employees, it contracted with the Sheriff’s Office to meet its limited peace
officer staffing needs through a Memorandum of Understanding. See County of Santa Clara v. Deputy
Sheriffs’ Assn. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 873.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Introduction
Figure i.3: Who Has Historically Managed the Jails?
A more detailed timeline is set forth in Appendix F.
Before 1987
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
The Sheriff’s Office
Department of Correction overseen by the
Board of Supervisors
The Department of Probation managed the
Department of Correction and both were
overseen by the Board of Supervisors
The Department of Correction overseen by
the Board of Supervisors with contracted
Peace Officer staff from the Sheriff’s Office
Board of Supervisors conveyed
responsibility of most jail functions to the
Sheriff’s Office except some support
functions are still managed by the
Department of Correction.
Current ordinance extended to July 1, 2021
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of legal history
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Introduction
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
Authority and responsibility for jail operations and personnel is shared between the
Department of Corrections and the Sheriff’s Office.
Within the Department of Correction, the Chief of Correction appoints employees
in specified non-badge operational positions in the following units: food services,
administrative booking, inmate laundry and warehouse. Employees in these units
report directly to the Chief of Correction. The Chief is technically “appointed” by the
Board of Supervisors to the position on an interim basis. However, at the time of our
audit, the Chief was actually the Undersheriff, who did not report to the Board, but
reported to the Sheriff.
Within the Sheriff’s jurisdiction of the jail, the Undersheriff appoints and
oversees employees in all badge positions, and some non-badged staff in various
administrative units.3 In addition to other custodial duties, badge staff under the
Sheriff are responsible for inmate classification.
Custody Health Services, a department of Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital
System, provides medical and mental health services to inmates pursuant to a
memorandum of understanding with the Department of Correction. Similar support
services are also provided by central service departments that provide support
functions affecting jail operations. A high-level organizational chart depicting the
current structure is shown in Figure i.4 on page 15.
The Custody Bureau had a total of 1206.54 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff budgeted
in fiscal year 2017-18. Out of this total, 867 FTE are badged staff/peace officers, and
339.5 FTE are civilian staff. Most of the budgeted staff, 705.5 FTE, are located at the
Main Jail and administrative buildings, however some of them perform support
functions that serve both facilities. The Elmwood Complex, including the laundry,
warehouse, food service and the men’s and women’s correction facilities, has 501 FTE
assigned to it.
3
4
In addition to appointing badged staff within the jails, the Sheriff also appoints the following nonbadge administrative positions including those assigned to the following units: fiscal, information
technology, professional standards, personnel training, detention services administration, Public
Service Program/Weekend Work Program, detention screening and programs, analytical support,
clerical support, and all others not assigned to the units specifically reporting to the Chief of
Correction, including telephone services for inmates.
As of July 17, 2017.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Introduction
Figure i.4: Reporting Structure for Employees/Departments Supporting Operation of
the Jails at the time of the audit
Board of
Supervisors
Undersheriff
Main Jail
Elmwood
Support Services
Chief of
Correction
Inmate Laundry
Food Services
County
Executive
M.O.U.
Custody Health
Services
Employee
Services Agency
Warehouse
Information
Services
Department
Administrative
Administrative
Booking
Facilities and
Fleet
ControllerTreasurer
Jail Reforms
County Counsel
Central Services Departments
Sheriff
Source: Simplified organizational structure created by Management Audit Division based on assessment of
County Charter and Sheriff’s Office Organizational Charts
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review I - Contraband
REDUCING CONTRABAND IN THE COUNTY JAIL
The Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau defines contraband as “Any item possessed by
inmates or found within the facility that is illegal by law or prohibited by those legally
charged with the administration and operation of the facility or program.” Contraband
includes everything from extra food and clothing to cell phones, drugs, and weapons.
The Management Audit Division reviewed a contraband log for Elmwood (the County’s
Minimum and Medium-security correctional facility), which tracked contraband
discovered during staff searches from calendar year 2015 to calendar year 2017.
Among the most commonly occurring types of contraband recorded were weapons,
drugs and drug paraphernalia, unauthorized communication known as “kites,” tattoo
devices, and Pruno—inmate-created wine.5 In terms of volume, total occurrences
of contraband found during staff searches decreased from 2015 to 2017, although
several high-profile incidents of dangerous contraband occurred during 2017. In July
of 2017, four inmates overdosed on a substance suspected to be fentanyl.6 Three
months later, an inmate smuggled a gun hidden within a body cavity into a County
correctional facility.7
The Custody Bureau has numerous internal policies for controlling contraband.
Custody Bureau staff may compel inmates to go through metal detectors, pat-downs,
cell searches, and strip searches. Further, outside visitors are searched prior to their
visits, and the Custody Bureau has restrictions on the types of mail inmates are
allowed to receive.
Despite these measures, it is difficult to control all instances of contraband. For
instance, makeshift weapons can be created out of approved items from inmate
commissary—the contraband log listed sharpened toothbrushes and altered combs
and pencils. Another area of particular vulnerability is contraband hidden within
body cavities. While body cavity searches are occasionally permitted, they must be
performed by medically trained personnel under the authority of a search warrant
and the approval of a Watch Commander. Due to these stringent requirements, body
cavity searches are rare, and contraband hidden in body cavities cannot be detected
through the other types of authorized security searches. Other techniques, such
as the use of “dry cells”, where inmate’s fecal waste is monitored for several days,
are similarly rare. Dry cells require specialized facilities and higher levels of staff to
monitor each inmate, making them unfeasible for all but the highest risk inmates.
To this end, the Custody Bureau is in the process of procuring eight body scanners,
which can detect contraband through non-invasive means. The National Institute
of Justice has found success with similar scanning technologies. For instance, in
a pilot program at Graterford, a maximum-security facility outside Philadelphia,
imaging systems were used to scan visitors. These systems decreased the presence
of contraband by detecting prohibited items and potentially deterring individuals
5
6
7
The recorded contraband may understate the full scope of contraband within the jails, as staff and
management report that almost every search results in low-level contraband that goes unrecorded
such as extra food and clothing.
Kaplan, Tracey. (2017, Jul. 20). Santa Clara County: fentanyl suspected in inmate overdoses. Bay Area
News Group.
Kaplan, Tracey. (2017, Oct. 30). Santa Clara County jail inmate smuggles gun in body cavity, spurring
calls for body scanner. Bay Area News Group.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review I - Contraband
who knew about the scanners from smuggling.8 While the Graterford scanners were
akin to the scanning technology found at airports, the Custody Bureau’s planned
scanners will be able to additionally detect items in body cavities, bypassing the strict
requirements for body cavity searches.
As of September of 2018, the Custody Bureau was still in the requirements drafting
and procurement phase of this project and had not yet finalized a surveillance use
policy for the body scanner technology. The Management Audit Division suggests the
Bureau include the following considerations within its proposed use policy concerning
the scanners:
1. Guidelines around who may view body scanner images, whether the staff
reviewing images shall be the same gender as the individual being scanned,
and what training must be attained prior to operating the body scanner device.
2. Guidelines for who is allowed to be body scanned and when, and logistics
around accompanying inmates to the scanners. These guidelines should
include exceptions for pregnant women, and any other persons legally
precluded from undergoing body scanning procedures. Protocols for property
scans should be included as well.
3. Guidelines for conducting pat downs in conjunction with body scans.
One of the respondents to the Management Audit Division’s peer survey
recommended a pat down prior to the scan, as well as having inmates hold
their shoes to locate contraband in shoes and socks.
4. In addition to inmates, the Custody Bureau should also consider requiring
scanning all staff and visitors, who have contact with inmates and may be
additional sources of contraband. For instance, in Dane County, Wisconsin,
a Sheriff’s Deputy was sentenced to 90 days in jail for delivering contraband
such as a radio, batteries, and chewing tobacco to individuals housed at Dane
County Jail.9 In a separate case, a Sheriff’s Deputy in Colorado was accused of
planning to smuggle chewing tobacco and marijuana edibles into the Boulder
County Jail.10 Further, in 2014, California’s Department of Corrections reported
that 546 visitors had been arrested for smuggling drugs and cell phones into
state prisons.11 Custodial staff in various other state and local jurisdictions
have occasionally even helped inmates escape by providing them with
contraband. For example, in 2015, a civilian worker in a New York state prison
provided two inmates with hacksaws, which they used to escape.12 While
we know of no incidents of custody staff or visitors providing contraband to
inmates in Santa Clara County, it remains that there are control weaknesses
that can be reduced.
8
Bulman, Philip. (2009). Using Technology to Make Prisons and Jails Safer. National Institute of Justice
Journal No. 262.
9 Aadland, Chris. (2017, Sep. 1). Former Dane County Sheriff’s deputy gets 90 days jail for sneaking
contraband to inmates. Wisconsin State Journal. Retrieved from http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/
local/courts/former-dane-county-sheriff-s-deputy-gets-days-jail-for/article_1e7ec636-b10b-5618aba1-26254a29e5af.html.
10 Byars, Mitchell. (2017, Mar. 6). Fired Boulder sheriff’s deputy sentenced to probation in jail
contraband case. The Denver Post. Retrieved from https://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/06/
boulder-sheriffs-deputy-sentenced-jail-contraband-case/.
11 Mason, Melanie. (2014, Sep. 24). State prisons to conduct stricter searches of visitors, staff. Los
Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-prisons-20140925story.html.
12 Morgenstein, Mark. (2015, Sep. 28). Joyce Mitchell, who aided prison break, going to prison herself.
CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/us/ny-prison-break/index.html.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review I - Contraband
5. The steps that should occur in the event of a positive contraband finding
through a body scan, including how these positive scans are logged and
tracked.
6. Protocols for how to address inmates who are combative or otherwise refuse
to cooperate in the scanning process.
7. Safety and operating parameters, including radiation limits.
Two of the jurisdictions from the Management Audit Division’s peer survey cited
equipment breakage and malfunctions as a challenge of the scanners, and one of
these jurisdictions strongly recommended purchasing a service agreement with
the vendor for repairs. The Custody Bureau should consider including this service
agreement as part of its body scanner contract. Another jurisdiction mentioned
that their scanner model had difficulty detecting small bundles of drugs, and the
Department should ensure that the produced images from its chosen scanner model
are able to detect this type of contraband.
A final area of consideration is preventing contraband being smuggled through
drones. Given the drone sightings over the Elmwood facility in November of 2017,
the Custody Bureau should continue to examine new technologies for preventing this
mechanism of bringing contraband into the correctional facilities.13
13 Cestone, Vince. (2017, Nov. 6). VIDEO: Drones possibly used to smuggle drugs into Elmwood
Correctional Facility in Milpitas. Kron4.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
Classification Changes Have Not Affected High-Security Inmates
In December of 2016, the Custody Bureau began piloting a new classification tool
for housing inmates. This tool was based on National Institute of Corrections (NIC)
standards and emphasized in-custody behavior in determining inmate housing
assessments. The Custody Bureau piloted this tool with female inmates beginning in
December of 2016, and rolled out the system to male inmates in March of 2017. In the
first stage of implementation, the Custody Bureau applied the new initial assessment
tool for each population, and then introduced a 60-day reassessment tool for each
group. This reassessment tool applied the new classification methodology to all
inmates booked prior to the rollout of the new system, see Figure II.1 below for the
full schedule.
Figure II.1: Schedule of New Classification System Implementation
Population
Female Inmates
Booked into
Custody
60-Day
Reassessment
Tool for Female
Inmates
Male Inmates
Booked into
Custody
60-Day
Reassessment
Tool for Male
Inmates
Rollout Date
12/12/2016
2/13/2017
3/09/2017
5/08/2017
Source: Custody Bureau
In August of 2017, the Custody Bureau presented an update of its new Classification
system to the Board of Supervisors. The report largely praised the new tool. In
contrast, the audit team heard concerns from numerous badged staff that frequent
down-classing of high-risk inmates under the modified system had resulted in
increased violence within the facilities. Many staff reported concerns for their
personal safety while working within the jail. To test these claims, the Management
Audit Division reviewed both the statistics outlined in the Custody Bureau’s
classification update, as well as quarterly summary reports from its correctional
facilities. Based on these two data sources, we could not conclusively verify the
Custody Bureau staff’s claims around excessive down-classing of high-risk inmates
and higher frequencies of assaults.
Changes in Inmate-on-Inmate and Inmate-on-Staff Assaults do not Coincide with
Changes in the Classification System
Custody Bureau staff also reported that the new classification system had resulted
in more inmate assaults due to the mixing of high-risk and low-risk inmates in open
housing arrangements. The Management Audit Division reviewed the Custody
Bureau’s classification update, which contained aggregate annual inmate-on-inmate
and inmate-on-staff assault data for the County Jail from 2014 to 2017. The update
showed that the prevalence of both types of assaults was highest in 2016, with
rates that were nearly double those recorded in 2015. However, this spike does not
cleanly align with the introduction of the new classification system, which was not
implemented—and only for incoming women—until December of 2016.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
The majority of changes in the classification tool occurred during 2017, and both
inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults decreased from 2016 to 2017. While
this may not be a complete picture due to the 2017 data not containing a full year’s
worth of information at the time of the update, the information that was gathered up
until August of 2017 does not support staff reports of increased assaults correlated
with the introduction of the new classification system.
In addition, the Management Audit Division reviewed the Custody Bureau’s quarterly
facility reports, which contained inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assault
statistics. As with the classification update, these more detailed reports did not
definitively show increases in assault rates. Inmate-on-inmate assaults for female
inmates has been on an upward trajectory since 2015. While the peak of these
assaults occurred during the first quarter of 2017, which aligns with implementation
of the initial tool in December of 2016 and the reassessment tool in February of
2017, inmate-on-inmate assaults dropped below pre-implementation levels during
the second quarter of 2017. Meanwhile, rates of inmate-on-staff assaults remained
relatively consistent across the implementation timeframe (see Figure II.2 below for
inmate assault trends in the women’s housing units).
Figure II.2: Violent Incidents Involving Female Inmates
Don’t Align with Implementation of New System
Initial Tool
(Dec. 2016)
Reassessemnt Tool
(Feb. 2017)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
2015
Inmate v. Inmate rate (out of 100)
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
2016
2017
Inmate v. Staff rate (out of 100)
Source: Custody Bureau Quarterly Facility Reports
Quarterly data on assaults within the men’s housing units were similarly inconclusive.
At Main Jail and the men’s side at Elmwood, inmate-on-inmate assault rates were
highest during the first quarter of 2017, but then dropped during the next quarter,
which is when the reassessment tool was introduced for men. Like the rates for the
women’s facilities, inmate-on-staff assault rates for males largely did not fluctuate
(see Figure II.3 on page 23 for inmate assault trends in the men’s housing units).
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
Figure II.3: Violent Incidents Involving Male Inmates Appear Unaffected So Far
Reassessemnt Tool
(May. 2017)
Initial Tool
(Mar. 2017)
4
3
2
1
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
2015
2016
Inmate v. Inmate rate (out of 100)
Inmate v. Staff rate (out of 100)
Q2
2017
Source: Custody Bureau Quarterly Facility Reports
These results do not necessarily indicate that inmate assaults have not been
exacerbated by the new classification system. For instance, while inmate assault
levels may not have changed much overall across the implementation period, assault
rates in lower security housing units could have increased disproportionately.
However, because the Management Audit Division was only able to view aggregate
data, we could not evaluate more location-specific patterns. Finally, given the recent
implementation of the new system, not enough time may have passed to accurately
assess its long-term impacts on staff and inmate safety. The Management Audit
Division suggests that the Custody Bureau gather more granular, housing unit-level
assault data in order to more accurately assess any changes in safety of staff or
inmates.
Marginal Changes in Proportion of Maximum and High-Medium Security Level
Inmates following New Tool Suggest “High-Risk” Inmates are not being Excessively
Down-classed
There is a perception among some staff that a large volume of what they consider
“high-risk” inmates were down-classed and moved to lower security areas within
the jail. The term “high-risk” could mean many things such as the seriousness of the
inmate’s charge, management challenges, and escape potential. The most objective
measures available to the audit team for “high-risk” were those inmates classified as
levels three and four, or High-Medium and Maximum-security levels. By this metric,
there is insufficient evidence to support staff claims around excessive down-classing
of high-risk inmates.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
The classification update, presented to the Board of Supervisors in August of 2017,
provided first-of-the-month counts for all inmates at each security level, at threemonth intervals, from May of 2016 to August of 2017. In these snapshots, the most
significant changes occurred in percentages of the population housed in Minimum
and Medium security, see Figure II.4 below.
Figure II.4: Largest Apparent Change Was Medium to Minimum Security Level
Female Population
Security Level
Total % Difference from
May 2016 to Aug 2017
Minimum
25.0
Medium
-21.7
High Med
-2.5
Maximum
-0.7
Male Population
Security Level
Total % Difference from
May 2016 to Aug 2017
Minimum
15.7
Medium
-10.4
High Med
-3.4
Maximum
-1.7
Source: Management Audit Division Analysis of August 2017 Custody Bureau Classification Update to the Board
of Supervisors
Medium/Minimum Security Population Changes for Female Inmates
For women, the largest difference was between November of 2016 and February of
2017, in which the proportion of individuals in Medium security dropped from 39.4
percent to 30.5. At the same time, the proportion of individuals in Minimum security
rose from 32.4 percent to 42.3. These shifts coincided with the introduction of the
initial assessment tool for female inmates. However, there was also a significant
decline in the proportion of Medium security inmates between May of 2016 and
August of 2016, several months before the introduction of the new classification
system.
Medium/Minimum Security Population Changes for Male Inmates
For men, the most significant change occurred between February of 2017 and May of
2017, which coincides with the introduction of the initial classification assessment tool
to male inmates booked into custody. Within this period, the proportion of inmates
in Medium security dropped from 50.6 percent to 42.7 percent, and the proportion
of inmates in Minimum security rose from 20.5 percent to 30.8 percent. This was
presumably the movement of approximately 275 inmates from level-two housing to
the minimum camp due to reclassification.14
14 Between February and May 2017, the male population of medium-security inmates declined by 275,
and the minimum-security increased by 299. Some portion of this is likely due to reclassification, and
another portion due to regular fluctuations in jail populations, which declined overall in 2017.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review II - Downclassing of High-Risk Inmates
Only Small Shifts within “High-Risk” Security Levels for both Genders
Despite these notable shifts in Medium and Minimum-security inmates for both men
and women, there were comparatively marginal changes in the proportion of HighMedium and Maximum-security inmates. For men, the differences in High-Medium
and Maximum security during the time periods corresponding with the initial and
reclassification tool implementations did not exceed 1.7 percentage points from
period to period. For women, the differences did not exceed 1.9 percentage points.
The Custody Bureau, in its classification update, acknowledges this fact and states
that the somewhat static High-Medium and Maximum populations may be due to
the general seriousness of charges for inmates at this security level. Further, these
populations also include individuals who have been temporarily housed at this
security level for involvement in a serious violent incident while in custody.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review III - Tasers
Board Considerations if “Tasers” are to be Authorized in the County Jail
At a budget meeting during May of 2017, the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau
requested that the Board of Supervisors approve a $45,000 pilot program for
research and testing around Tasers™ (“Taser”) within the County correctional facilities.
The Board responded to the Bureau’s request by stating that they would set aside
these funds, but that the purchase of Tasers for the pilot would be dependent on the
Sheriff’s Office authoring a satisfactory Use Policy around these devices, which would
apply to both the Custody and Enforcement Bureaus. As of May of 2018, the Sheriff’s
Office had not completed any preliminary drafts of its Taser Use Policy. The Custody
Bureau reported that it had begun creating a scoping document for the proposed
pilot program, but when the Management Audit Division requested this document,
the Custody Bureau did not provide it.
The request for Tasers within the County Jail has sparked some community backlash.
In August of 2017, demonstrators, which included representatives from the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Coalition for Justice
and Accountability, stood outside Main Jail in order to protest these devices. At this
demonstration, participants read a letter authored by one of Michael Tyree’s sisters
stating, “… I believe too much opportunity for the misuse of these Tasers exists.”15
The risks of Taser use have also been highlighted by news and research organizations.
In December of 2017, Reuters reported that, of 104 documented prisoner fatalities
involving Tasers (almost all of which had occurred since 2000), the device was
listed as a cause or contributing factor of death in roughly 20 percent of these
cases.16 The Reuters study argues that Tasers have less of a use behind bars than
in Enforcement settings, given that inmates are typically confined, restrained, and
unarmed. Department of Justice consultant Steve Martin is quoted as stating, “Of all
the hundreds and hundreds of Taser incidents I’ve reviewed over the years in jails
and prisons … I can count on one hand when it was used properly.” Senior staff at
the American Civil Liberties Union also pointed to the particular risks of distributing
Tasers in high-turnover facilities such as jails, which take in comparatively unstable
individuals who may have substance use or mental health issues.17
15 Kaplan, Tracey. (2017, Aug. 24). Should jail guards be equipped with Tasers? The Mercury News.
Retrieved from https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/24/should-jail-guards-in-san-jose-bearmed-with-tasers-protesters-say-no/.
16 Eisler, Peter et al. (2017, Dec. 17). Inmate deaths reveal “torturous” use of Tasers. Reuters. Retrieved
from https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-taser-jails/.
17 Eisler, Peter et al. (2017, Dec. 17). Inmate deaths reveal “torturous” use of Tasers.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
In addition to the potential for abuse and misuse of these devices, a study conducted
within the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) raises concerns
that Tasers will be readily used in lieu of other, potentially less dangerous devices
such as oleoresin capsicum spray (pepper spray).18 For the study, researchers
randomly assigned Tasers to an experimental group of 32 LVMPD staff during fieldtraining scenarios, while a second control group of 32 individuals did not receive
these devices. The results suggested that officers in the experimental group may
have chosen to use the Taser as an alternative to pepper spray in one of the three
scenarios. While the field-training scenarios were for enforcement officers and
cannot be readily generalized to a correctional setting, this study at least points to the
possibility of Tasers—along with their heightened risks—gaining traction over other
force options such as pepper spray among Custody Bureau staff.
Finally, Tasers carry not just physical risk, but also legal risk. Litigation is filed and
payouts are won at higher rates for Taser use within correctional facilities than in
enforcement settings. The Reuters study found that 68 percent of its 104 identified
Taser-involved fatalities had resulted in a wrongful death lawsuit, and that payouts
were won by Plaintiffs in 93 percent of those cases. In a prominent example, San
Bernardino County paid a $2.8 million settlement to inmates who alleged that
Tasers were regularly used for torture within the facility. These liabilities exist within
a context of already intense scrutiny over the County Jail and demonstrated public
opposition to Tasers within the County.
Nevertheless, the Custody Bureau showed us several video clips of inmate
altercations, and in these instances, other force options such as pepper spray were
largely ineffectual. In such extenuating circumstances, a more extreme force option
such as a Taser may have been useful. Additionally, a quasi-experimental evaluation
by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in 2009 found that Tasers were
associated with improved safety outcomes such as reduced officer and suspect
injuries, although this study was not conducted with a specific focus on correctional
settings.19
Further, while Tasers are not used within the federal prison system, and only carried by
special units and certain supervisors in the California prison system, they are prevalent
in County jails.20 The common use of Tasers in local correctional facilities was reflected
in the Management Audit Division’s peer survey. In our results, the majority of 28
respondents had deployed Tasers within their correctional facilities to either line staff
or special units such as Transportation and Correctional Emergency Response Teams
(CERT), or had the devices stored within locked compartments on-site. This shows that
having Tasers within jails is at least a common practice within neighboring jurisdictions.
See Appendix B, Peer Survey Results, for additional details.
A notable exception is New York City, which manages an average daily population of
8,705 as of January 2018. New York only has Tasers deployed for emergency teams.
Miami-Dade, which has an average daily population of 7,050, also does not use these
devices. Both of these jail facilities are among the top ten largest in the U.S.21
18 Sousa, William et al. (2010). The impact of TASERs on police use-of-force decisions: Findings from a
randomized field-training experiment. J Exp Criminol 6:35-55.
19 Taylor, Bruce. (2009). Comparing safety outcomes in police use-of-force cases for law enforcement
agencies that have deployed Conducted Energy Devices and a matched comparison group that have
not: A quasi-experimental evaluation. Police Executive Research Forum.
20 Eisler, Peter et al. (2017, Dec. 17). Inmate deaths reveal “torturous” use of Tasers.
21 Misachi, John. (2017, Sep. 28). The Largest Jails In The United States. World Atlas. Retrieved from
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largest-jails-in-the-united-states.html.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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If the Board of Supervisors considers approval of Tasers for their potential benefits
and to align with the practices of other jurisdictions, the Management Audit Division
suggests the Board mitigate safety and legal risks by requiring the following:
1. A pilot study scoping document that contains the following components:
a. Which staff will be responsible for receiving, researching/testing, and
storing the 40 requested Tasers.
b. Whether the Tasers will be actually deployed within the County Jail, and to
which housing units.
c. The duration of the pilot program.
d. A description of the research and testing exercises to be applied to the
Tasers.
e. A list of metrics for evaluating the pilot, as well as a minimum measure
of “success” to justify purchasing additional Tasers beyond the pilot.
Upon completion of the pilot, a report containing these metrics should be
submitted to the Board of Supervisors.
2. A Taser Use Policy that designates the device as a “less lethal weapon”
capable of causing serious bodily injury rather than a “nonlethal
weapon.”22 In drafting this Use Policy, the Custody Bureau should make
the following considerations:
a. How the Taser Use Policy will interact or integrate with the existing Use
of Force Policy. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), in a 2011
publication called, “Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines,” suggests
that Tasers should be considered part of an agency’s overall use of force
policy.23
b. Whether the devices will only be given to special units such as CERT to be
used in emergency cases (rather than all line staff).
c. How to prevent Custody Bureau staff from using Tasers excessively, or
from using the device as a ready alternative to other, less risky options
such as pepper spray. For instance, one of the Management Audit
Division’s surveyed jurisdictions stated that any use of a Taser within their
jail automatically results in an Internal Affairs investigation, regardless
of the incident’s outcome. PERF’s publication also discussed how several
departments require officers to carry Tasers on their “weak” side.
d. Where the Tasers may be used, and in what mode. Axon (formerly TASER
International) issued a statement in 2009 that chest shots should be
avoided whenever possible.24 In addition, the Reuters study advises on the
dangers of the device’s “drive-stun mode,” which is typically used to gain
compliance through the administration of pain.
22 Police Executive Research Forum. (2011). Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines.
23 Police Executive Research Forum. (2011). Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines.
24 TASER International, Inc. (2009). Training Bulletin 15.0 Medical Research Update and Revised
Warnings.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
e. Use on high-risk populations such as pregnant women, the elderly, and
individuals with mental and physical disabilities, as well as protocols for
use on restrained individuals.
f.
Maximum usage cycles within a certain timeframe, and the duration of
each cycle (PERF suggests no more than three, five-second cycles).
g. Training requirements.
h. Periodic public reporting on Taser use and outcomes.
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
In 2015, the Custody Bureau faced a wave of scrutiny after three of its Correctional
Deputies were arrested for the fatal beating of mentally ill inmate Michael Tyree.
To address concerns around inmate treatment and operations within the County
Jail, the Board of Supervisors promptly established a Blue Ribbon Commission to
identify potential reforms. One of the primary topics of public interest was reforms
surrounding the Custody Bureau’s use of force. Two years later, in 2017, the three
Deputies involved in the Tyree incident were convicted, and an additional excessive
force lawsuit around the death of Walter Roches (another inmate with a mental illness
who died in custody) was filed during October of the same year.25
The Blue Ribbon Commission initiative resulted in a list of 629 jail reform
recommendations that were grouped into 80 summarized recommendations
within 13 broad categories, which included “Use of Force.”26 In accordance with
these recommendations, the Custody Bureau released a new use of force policy in
August of 2017, which was created with input from Don Specter from the Prison Law
Office—a nonprofit public interest law firm that has sued the County over conditions
in the jail. Further, in spring of 2016, the Custody Bureau adopted an electronic
tracking system, called BlueTeam, to capture and track critical incidents, including use
of force.
Data Limitations
To assess use of force incidents and corresponding reporting and investigative
mechanisms within the Custody Bureau, the Management Audit Division requested
aggregate use of force data from Fiscal Years 2016, 2017, and half of Fiscal Year 2018.
Requested data-points included the 1) time, date, and location of each incident; 2) the
number of Correctional Officers, inmates, and witnesses involved; 3) each and every
type of force that was used, and by how many Correctional Officers; 4) demographic
information for all involved parties; 5) the cause of each incident; and 6) investigative
processes following each incident. The Management Audit Division also requested
a random sample of use of force “packages” containing employee incident reports,
supervisors’ review documents, and media such as photographs and video footage.
Lastly, we asked the Custody Bureau for the number of use of force incidents by
Correctional Officer, along with each individual’s shift and facility assignments, and
training hours received.
25 Small, Julie. (26 Oct., 2017). Lawsuit Alleges Inmate Died from Neglect, Excessive Force at Santa Clara
County Jail. KQED News. Retrieved from https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/10/26/lawsuit-allegesinmate-died-from-neglect-excessive-force-at-santa-clara-county-jail/.
26 County of Santa Clara Jail Reforms. (8 Jan. 2019). Summarized Recommendations by Categories.
Retrieved from https://www.sccgov.org/sites/jr/summarized-recommendations/Pages/home.aspx.
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
Review of these types of materials during use of force audits is not uncommon. For
instance, the Los Angeles Sheriff Department’s Audit and Accountability Bureau
examined use of force packages for multiple correctional use of force audits issued
in 2016.27 In Multnomah County, Oregon, the Sheriff’s Office’s auditor had access to
aggregate use of force data, which included demographic information, as well as use
of force incidents by employee.28
The requested information is material that the Custody Bureau largely already has in
its possession. A BlueTeam training video provided by the Custody Bureau revealed
that the Bureau tracks—at minimum—time and location information for incidents,
involved parties, the types of force used, and the cause of each incident, as well as
the number of use of force incidents for each Correctional Officer. The packages are
required materials for use of force reviews, so the Custody Bureau has these items in
their possession as well.
The Custody Bureau did not give the Management Audit Division access to any of the
aforementioned records. In lieu of the requested information, the Custody Bureau
provided a small subset of use of force incidents from its Internal Affairs system,
IAPro. This data only covered “Level 3” use of force incidents that have undergone an
Internal Affairs investigation—a total of 64 incidents over a period of three calendar
years.29 Further, the dataset only contained a general overview of the use of force
cases, and did not reveal anything about the nature and precipitating cause of the
incidents, demographic information, time and location of the events, or the specific
types of force used.
From this dataset, the Custody Bureau also withheld an unknown number of use of
force incidents out of the estimated 1,900 records of backlogged critical incidents
held in their BlueTeam system at the time of our fieldwork.30 The records are a mix
of Custody and Enforcement Bureau incidents. The exact proportion is unknown to
us, but is recorded in the BlueTeam system. This backlog, along with other BlueTeam
tracking issues, are discussed in detail in the Management Audit Division’s audit of
the Sheriff Office’s Enforcement Bureau31, issued September 20, 2019. Following
the release of the audit, the Sheriff’s Office reported that technical modifications
to the BlueTeam system have effectively eliminated the backlog. At this time, the
Management Audit Division is awaiting a possible hearing where evidence related to
the changes to the system will be presented by the Sheriff’s Office.
While the Custody Bureau did not provide the requested aggregate use of force data
and only furnished us with a small subset of summary Internal Affairs investigation
records, the Bureau offered the Management Audit Division the opportunity to review
redacted investigation packets from Internal Affairs. These packets are authored
by Internal Affairs investigators and review evidence including, but not limited to,
27 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Audit and Accountability Bureau. (2016). Use of Force Audit
– Inmates with Mental Health Issues Twin Towers Correctional Facility; Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department Audit and Accountability Bureau. (2016). Use of Force Audit – North County Correctional
Facility; Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Audit and Accountability Bureau. (2016). Use of
Force Audit – Inmates with Mental Health Issues Inmate Reception Center.
28 Marshman, Shea and Amanda Lamb. (2015). Corrections Use of Force Audit. Multnomah County
Sheriff’s Office.
29 A level 3 use of force must involve, at minimum, the use of pain compliance techniques or higher. The
dataset covered calendar years 2015 – 2017.
30 In addition to use of force, BlueTeam contains other critical incidents from the Enforcement and
Custody Bureaus including vehicle pursuits, the muting of a body worn camera, cell extractions, etc.
31 Management Audit Division, “Management Audit of the Office of the Sheriff’s Operations (Excluding
Adult Custody Operations)”, September 20, 2019
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
information contained in a typical use of force package. However, upon reviewing
one of these investigation packets, we discovered that these packets do not include
the original documents and media materials from the use of force packages. Given
this lack of source material, and the amount of time it would have taken to redact
the investigation packets, the Management Audit Division opted not to review these
documents.
In the absence of appropriate data, the Management Audit Division was unable to
assess the following:
1. The volume of use of force incidents, and the percentage of overall arrests/
bookings that include a use of force
2. The percentage of use of force incidents that resulted in either an
administrative Internal Affairs or criminal investigation
3. Statistics around the types of force used (e.g., pepper spray, control holds, etc.)
4. Trends in the number of use of force incidents by time, shift, and location
5. Disproportionate use of force along demographic characteristics such as race
6. Use of force by employee, and any trends around their shifts or training hours
7. Medical treatment as a result of use of force incidents
8. Adherence to reporting and review policies (timeliness, complete
documentation, etc.)
9. Cases of seemingly excessive force
Internal Affairs Investigation Outcomes
The limited materials we did receive showed 64 use of force incidents taking place
between January of 2015 and October of 2017. Within these incidents, there were
81 use of force allegations (some incidents being associated with more than one
allegation) involving 87 deputies and 1 Emergency Response Team.32 Internal Affairs
learned of these incidents primarily through citizen complaints, which comprised
75 percent of the received cases. The remainder of incidents were associated with
administrative investigations, and there was also a single inmate inquiry.
Generally, as of December of 2017, when we received the data, the majority of use
of force allegations were unfounded, not sustained, or the officers involved were
exonerated or otherwise deemed not to warrant action. Of the 81 allegations, only
7 (8.6 percent) were sustained. See Figure IV.1 on page 34 for full breakdown
of Internal Affairs outcomes. In total, the 64 incidents resulted in four employee
terminations, with three of these terminations coinciding with five of the seven
sustained use of force allegations.
For the other two sustained use of force allegations, the involved employees were
terminated in separate cases, despite a “sustained” finding from Internal Affairs.
This may have occurred due to concurrent criminal investigations that resulted in
convictions. Internal Affairs is responsible for administrative investigations, only, and
Internal Affairs may have allowed their own investigations around these cases to time
out in light of outcomes from criminal investigations.
32 7 incidents also listed “Unknown Deputies” under “Involved Officers”.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
Figure IV.1: Internal Affairs Outcomes for Level 3 Use of Force Cases
Finding
Number
Percentage
Unfounded, not sustained,
exonerated, or no finding
52
64.20%
Sustained
7
8.60%
Pending
22
27.20%
81
100%
Total
Source: Internal Affairs summaries of use of force incidents
Inmate Survey Data
The Management Audit Division included a question regarding use of force in its
inmate survey. Of the 689 respondents to the use of force question, 68.7 percent
stated that they had seen force used against an inmate, as shown in Figure IV.2 below.
Inmates were also asked to mark every type of force they had observed within the
County Jail.33 From the responses, it appears as though pepper spray is the most
commonly used type of force, although the distribution among the force categories
was relatively even.
Figure IV.2: Excerpt from Management Audit Division’s Inmate Survey
13.
Have you ever seen force used against an inmate?
Yes
473
No
216
13a.
Types of force observed:
Chokeholds
238
Pepper Spray
356
Punching and/or kicking
251
Tackles
308
Other: ________________
155
Source: Management Audit Division survey of inmates. Survey methodology and details are available in
Attachment A.
Similar to the Internal Affairs investigation data, it is difficult to make assessments
around use of force from this inmate-reported information alone. While inmate
observations suggest that force may be quite prevalent within the County Jail,
this alone doesn’t automatically indicate a use of force problem. Force may serve
legitimate correctional ends.
33 These are not formal use of force categories employed by the Custody Bureau. Rather, we used
categories that would likely be recognizable to inmates, as terms such as “control holds” may not be
decipherable to respondents.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
However, some of the written inmate comments under the “Other” category
suggested violations of use of force policy. For instance, multiple inmates volunteered
that they had observed the following:
10. Inmates being punched and kicked while handcuffed or restrained
11. Cases of “chicken winging” (when a Deputy holds an inmate’s arms behind
their back and forcefully raises up their arms towards the shoulders)
12. Flashlights being used to strike inmates in the head and ribs
Although multiple accounts don’t necessarily verify that these incidents occurred, the
fact that multiple individuals volunteered these severe allegations speaks to the need
for transparency in use of force incidents. Further, in light of these responses, it is
critical for inmates to have an easily-accessible channel for contacting Internal Affairs
and the new oversight entity about these cases.
New Use of Force Policy and Training
The new use of force policy was finalized in August of 2017 and is publicly available in
the Jail Reforms section of the Sheriff’s Office website. This policy uniformly applies to
all sworn Custody Bureau staff, and a presentation from the 2017 use of force training
states that this policy applies to Custody Bureau contractors and volunteers as well.
There are no facility-level differences in the policy, and all sworn staff from all facilities
and Academy recruits receive the exact same training.
Overall, the new use of force policy is clear in its definitions and reporting guidelines.
The new policy explicitly defines physical force and mandates reporting on all uses
of physical force except for three specific exceptions around unresisting, inactively
resisting, or initially resisting but subsequently compliant inmates. Unlike the old
policy, the new policy prohibits involved Correctional Officers from collaborating
with one another when writing their reports. Also, within the new policy is a list of
authorized force options and guidelines, an appendix of all acceptable instruments
of force, and prohibited use of force techniques. Force situations are categorized
broadly as “Planned” or “Reactive” force, with the former being accompanied by a list
of additional guidelines. Further, the new policy discusses considerations for using
force with seriously mentally ill inmates.
Following the finalization of the new use of force policy, the Custody Bureau
administered a 10-hour training session to all sworn staff on this policy, and the
Bureau reported to the Board of Supervisors that all training had been completed by
December of 2017. The Management Audit Division attended one of these training
sessions in December of 2017. This training was interactive and covered the primary
differences between the old and new use of force policies. Attendees were given a
written pre-assessment covering both policy questions and hypothetical scenarios.
After attendees had completed this pre-assessment, the trainers reviewed every
answer and addressed confusion around incorrect responses. Although the majority
of the training was PowerPoint-based, there were also small group discussions on
particularly difficult use of force situations, as well as group-based reviews of incident
reports for a simulated use of force incident.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
While the training was largely interactive and seemed to address staff misperceptions
about the new use of force policy, the Management Audit Division identified potential
areas of improvement. For example, the packet of simulated incident reports was
intentionally incomplete and inconsistent, and the individual reports were unideal for
the purpose of attendees identifying gaps and weaknesses within these documents.
Although critiquing this packet appeared to be helpful for the attendees, it may also
be beneficial for employees to view exemplary use of force incident reports in order
to have a clear model for their own writing.
Further, there generally seemed to be a knowledge gap among attendees on specific
de-escalation techniques. Attendees could largely identify when a situation called
for de-escalation, but had more difficulty articulating which de-escalation skills they
would actually use during an imagined scenario. The trainers even discussed how
sometimes Deputies will conflate a verbal command with de-escalation, although the
two are categorically distinct.
The Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) 2015 report “Re-Engineering Training
on Police Use of Force” shows a breakdown of new recruit training, and the heavy
emphasis placed on use of force techniques versus de-escalation. Of the major
training topics, the median hours for firearms, defensive tactics, and use of force
scenario-based training were 58, 49, and 24, respectively. In comparison, crisis
intervention and de-escalation trainings received around 8 hours each.34 Similar
trends held true for in-service training: firearms and defensive tactics comprised 18
percent and 13 percent of all training time, respectively. Meanwhile, de-escalation and
communication skills were each 5 percent of training hours, and crisis intervention
comprised 9 percent.
The Custody Bureau reported that its Academy recruits receive 16 hours of deescalation training with an additional 4 hours of simulator practice. They also undergo
56 hours of crisis intervention training and 12 hours of interpersonal communication.
If these reported hours are accurate, the Custody Bureau has more hours of deescalation-related training for Academy recruits than the median figures from the
280 agencies that responded to PERF’s training survey. Then, instead of providing
more training hours around de-escalation, it may be useful for the Custody Bureau
to integrate more specific de-escalation techniques into its use of force policy course.
For instance, the trainers could discuss what the Deputies should actually say and do
to exercise de-escalation techniques when responding to specific scenarios.
Based on the Management Audit Division’s observations, the new policy and training
are comprehensive. However, because of the information limitations described in the
first section, we could not evaluate to what extent Bureau staff are complying with the
new policy.
34 Police Executive Research Forum. (2015). Re-Engineering Training On Police Use of Force.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
Early Intervention System for Repeated Use of Force Incidents
The BlueTeam use of force tracking system feeds into IAPro, which generates early
intervention alerts if a staff member has been involved in a large volume of incidents
within a certain time period. See Figure IV.3 below for an example of such an alert for
vehicle pursuit incidents within the Sheriff’s Office Enforcement Bureau.
Figure IV.3: Screenshot of Early Intervention Alert
Source: Internal Affairs
In theory, this system could be used to alert supervisors when their Deputies have
exceeded a certain threshold of use of force incidents. However, despite our requests,
the Custody Bureau would not provide us the threshold numbers for use of force
incidents for Custody Staff. We were simply informed that there is some variance in
these numbers depending on the shift and facility location, but were not provided any
indication of the magnitude of these thresholds.
Further, because this early warning system pulls from all BlueTeam incidents,
including the 1,900 backlogged ones that had yet to be reviewed by Internal Affairs
at the time of our fieldwork, the early warning system was at least partially fed by
data that hadn’t been vetted. If the problem hasn’t been fix sufficiently the data used
in the early warning system may contain inaccuracies. Thus, if the quality of the data
in the system remains potentially inaccurate, then the value of the use of force early
warning system in such a state of operations is questionable. Similar to the other
issues related to BlueTeam tracking and Internal Affairs incident reviews, this early
warning system is discussed in greater depth in the Management Audit Division’s
Enforcement Bureau audit.
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Topics Requiring Additional Review IV - Use of Force
Conclusions
Use of force, due to its high levels of risk and impacts on inmate and staff safety, is
an area that requires robust oversight. A large part of this oversight entails making
detailed records available to reviewers in order for them to assess critical questions
such as the volume of use of force incidents, which types of force are most commonly
used, and adherence to internal policy. Due to data restrictions, the Management
Audit Division was unable to evaluate the vast majority of risk areas pertaining to
use of force. This concern of records access will continue to be an issue with future
oversight efforts, and the Board of Supervisors should have these concerns in mind
with any planned attempts to further evaluate use of force within the Custody Bureau.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review V - Out of Cell Time
Although we did not find evidence to suggest lack of compliance with the law, the
Custody Bureau as of May 2018 had no reliable means of documenting that inmates
receive the legally mandated amount of exercise time.
In response to lawsuits and inmate allegations regarding limited out-of-cell time35,
the Custody Bureau began recording some inmates’ time in and out of their cells in
2017. The issue of confinement somewhat overlaps with restrictive housing practices,
which are discussed in detail later in this report. However, the overall amount of time
that general population inmates are allowed out of their cells is a distinct risk area.
State law requires a minimum of “three hours of exercise distributed over a period
of seven days.”36 This equates to an average of less than 26 minutes per day. While
this pertains to exercise, this is the legal minimum of out-of-cell time that the Custody
Bureau must provide, whether or not the inmates use the time for exercise.
Research shows that isolation of inmates is harmful to their mental health, cognitive
function, behavior, recidivism rates, and risk of self-harm and suicide. The National
Institute of Justice, the Department of Justice’s research arm, generally agrees with
these research conclusions but suggests more research is needed to assess the
magnitude of the impacts.37
The Custody Bureau had 1,311 inmates in closed-cell housing units as of January 3,
2018.38 A closed-cell housing unit is comprised of single or double-occupancy locked
cells, that surround an open space used for classes or personal time when the cells
are open. We don’t know what percentage of inmates who are fully isolated or share
a closed cell. This is because the Custody Bureau does not track or record inmate
locations at the specific cell level, only the overall housing unit.
The Management Audit Division surveyed inmates in December 2018 and received
responses from 731 inmates. Appendix A – Inmate Survey, provides additional details
and methodology. Of the responses, 354 were from inmates in housing units with
closed cells. Of those in closed-cell housing units, 161 (45.5 percent) responded
that they typically have zero to two hours per day of out-cell-time. Only 15 percent
indicated 0-1 hour on a typical day, which suggests that the vast majority of inmates
report being out of their cells far more than the legal minimum. Responses to this
question are shown in Figure V.1 on page 40.
35 This out-of-cell time is often called “program time” among inmates and Custody Bureau staff.
36 Section 6030, California Penal Code. Title 15, § 1065 Exercise and Recreation.
37 Kapoor, R. & Trestman, R. (2016). Mental Health Effects of Restrictive Housing. NCJ 250321. In
Restrictive Housing in the U.S.: Issues, Challenges, and Future Directions. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
38 Management Audit Division analysis of inmate records provided by the Santa Clara Public Safety,
Justice & Emergency Management Division (PSJEM) on January 3, 2018.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Topics Requiring Additional Review V - Out of Cell Time
Figure V.1: Excerpt from the Management Audit Division’s Inmate Survey
5. (closed cell only) On a normal day, how many hours per day do you spend out of
your cell?
0-1 hours
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
3-4 hours
5 or more hours
57
104
91
36
66
Responses received from open dormitories were excluded from these totals.
Source: Management Audit Division Survey of Inmates39
The extent of out-of-cell time is unclear and poorly documented by the Custody
Bureau. The audit team found the records to contain errors, duplicate names, and
implausible time entries, as shown in the Figure V.2 on page 41. The frequency
of these errors when reviewing the records suggested that the data overall was not
useful as a tool for determining the extent to which inmates are out of their cells.
39 See Attachment A: Inmate Survey for additional details and survey methodology
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Topics Requiring Additional Review V - Out of Cell Time
Figure V.2: Examples of Record Errors
Duplicate and overlapping entries. In this example, the same inmate was listed twice on
the same day. It did not appear to be a mistyped date since seemingly normal entries
were listed on the day before and after.
Inmate
Name
Unit
Type of Time
Time out of cell
Time back in
cell
Total Hours
Example
Inmate 1
4C2
Unstructured
Program
13:04
8/30/2017
16:18
8/30/2017
3.2333
Example
Inmate 1
4C2
Unstructured
Program
8:40
8/30/2017
18:00
8/30/2017
9.3333
Hour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Same Inmate
Same Inmate
Implausible times entered. In this example, a single entry is made for an inmate, but the
record suggests they were free to roam around the housing unit and recreation yard
until 1:45 am for a total of 13.5 hours, which is not plausible.
Inmate
Name
Unit
Type of Time
Time out of cell
Time back in
cell
Total Hours
Example
Inmate 2
4C1
Unstructured
Program– yard
time
12:03
8/26/2017
1:33
8/27/2017
13.5
August 26, 2017
Hour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
August 27, 2017
Hour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of Custody Bureau records
These contradictory and erroneous records undermine the Custody Bureau’s ability to
demonstrate compliance with the law, which could affect the ability of the County to
defend itself from lawsuits. In addition, the data that this system should provide is not
available to inform the Custody Bureau management, the Board, the public, or others
who may seek to understand processes that affect inmate outcomes.
During our tours, interviews and time surveying inmates, often inmates would ask
Custody Bureau staff if they “would be allowed to program today” meaning have outof-cell time. In contrast, we often observed inmates out of their cells with access to
the yard, telephones and other amenities.
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Topics Requiring Additional Review V - Out of Cell Time
Tracking System
As of January 2018, the Custody Bureau reports that it has implemented a new outof-cell time tracking system called I-Tracking for all housing units. However, as of May
2018, we have not seen the new system. Nor has the Custody Bureau provided the
Management Audit Division with these more recent records or any procedures that
staff are required to follow when using the new system.
This new system, if coupled with regular reviews, and performance requirements for
staff to maintain accurate records should be sufficient to measure if out of cell time
meets legal minimums. However, manual entry is time-consuming and burdensome.
Long-term, the Custody Bureau is implementing a new computer system, the Jail
Management System (JMS), by 2020. Once this is in place, the Custody Bureau reports
that they will pursue additional functionality such as radio frequency identification
(RFID) bracelets that the inmates will wear. These bracelets would more accurately
track their location, including out-of-cell time, and relieve the staff of burdensome
data entry. At this time, there is no specific plan, budget or anticipated completion
date for the bracelets.
The Custody Bureau should update the Finance and Government Oversight
Committee on the implementation of the I-Tracking system and provide assurances
that its data is accurate.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Background
At the time of fieldwork for this audit, State law prohibited the Sheriff Office’s
Custody Bureau from disclosing information regarding the handling of complaints
or disciplinary action against employees who are peace officers. Therefore, we used
public information, Internal Affairs investigations lists and County payroll records
to gain insight into the Bureau’s timelines and processes for handling allegations of
misconduct.
Problems and Adverse Effects
In multiple instances, management allowed employees who were accused of beating
inmates to continue with their regular duties for weeks or months without placing
them on paid leave. One reason for this is that the Bureau lacks a policy governing the
circumstances that would trigger leave placement, and the one-sentence policy for
the Department of Correction specifically allows paid leave to be delayed until after a
formal investigation is complete. Internal Affairs records furnished to us indicate that
another reason for continuing to deploy personnel accused of abuse in at least one
instance was an apparent failure to investigate the matter at all.
Failure to rapidly place staff accused of beating inmates on paid leave pending
investigation increases the risk to inmates. Following a 2015 incident of alleged abuse
of an inmate, an accused deputy was not placed on paid leave pending investigation
and continued to work regular shifts. Internal Affairs records show no investigation
opened into an incident occurring on or about the date of the alleged beating. Weeks
later, the accused deputy and two other deputies beat a different inmate to death. In
another instance in July 2015, deputies were accused of beating a shackled inmate.
They were not placed on leave, despite later being arrested on criminal charges
stemming from that incident. In between the incident and their arrests, they were
alleged to have beaten a different inmate according to complaint records. In a third
instance, two officers whose alleged abuse of an inmate was severe enough to result
in termination of their employment continued to work in their regular duties for ten
months after the incident occurred.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
With assistance from the Employee Services Agency and County Counsel, the Custody
Bureau should prepare and implement a policy governing the circumstances under
which paid administrative leave shall occur, and, critically, the timing of such leave.
Employees who face serious accusations of use of excessive force should be placed
on paid leave as soon as possible, with the investigation of any employee on such
leave prioritized by Internal Affairs to minimize operational disruption.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
FINDING
When it comes to records related to the hiring, management, investigation and
discipline of peace officers, many states restrict what is available to the public. At
the time of fieldwork, California was one of the most restrictive states in America
concerning these records. As such, there were strong restrictions on the Custody
Bureau’s ability to release information about its officers or its disciplinary processes.
These restrictions applied even to the elected Board of Supervisors, which is
responsible for appropriating funds for the operation and associated costs of law
enforcement functions, including Custody Bureau operations. At the time of our
fieldwork, Penal Code Sections 832.7 and 832.8 generally prohibited disclosure of
records related to allegations of misconduct. Senate Bill 1421 of 2017-2018 revised
these sections. The new law, effective January 1, 2019, provides for significantly
greater transparency in the case of allegations relating to “serious police misconduct”
or discharge of a firearm.
Given the lack of transparency as a result of the State’s previous protections for peace
officers, we developed an alternate methodology to serve as a proxy for evidence of
the Bureau’s handling of allegations of inmate abuse.
Methodology
Given the legal restrictions at the time of fieldwork on the Custody Bureau provision
of the information we would have required to conduct a comprehensive assessment
of internal procedures related to the Bureau’s handling of serious allegations of
misconduct, we turned instead to the limited information available.
Specifically, we compared the following three sources of information:
•
•
•
Public lawsuits in which there were allegations of misconduct against named
Custody Officers related to specific events that were identified by date;
A listing of investigations provided by the Sheriff’s Office Internal Affairs unit
that included the date of occurrence of use of force incidents that the unit
investigated; and,
County payroll data, including pay type by date, for the personnel named in
the suits.
By comparing information across these three sources, we pieced together the
timeline of the investigations into two incidents in which there were allegations that
Correctional Deputies used excessive force or were otherwise unprofessional.
We acknowledge that the information available regarding these incidents is
incomplete and that the handling of these incidents may differ in some way from how
other incidents are handled by the Custody Bureau. However, these instances are
documented and are the only information available to the Board of Supervisors that
speaks to how the Bureau handles personnel alleged to have used excessive force
against an inmate. Given the life-and-death nature of outcomes stemming from these
matters, we concluded that the insight from these available materials outweighed the
risks posed by their lack of comprehensiveness.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Internal Affairs Investigations Completed
The chart below shows the outcomes of 131 investigations that were shown as
resolved at the time the information was furnished to us by the Sheriff’s Office in
January 2018, and the “pending” status of 60 additional complaints. This provides an
overview of the nature of the information regarding Internal Affairs investigations.
The Sheriff’s Office refused to discuss the data that they furnished. We know that
it contains errors, as some cases are listed as having completed investigations
prior to receipt of the complaints. We attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a better
understanding of the data and its limitations from May 15, 2018 until February, 2019.
Given the presence of obvious errors, and the Sheriff’s Office refusal to verify the
accuracy of its own records, we recommend that the reader evaluate this information
in that context.
Figure 1.1: Custody Internal Affairs Cases (2015 to 2017)
All Custody Cases Furnished by the Sheriff’s Office
Outcome by Type of Investigation
Status
Percent
Sustained
37
44%
Pending
21
25%
Not Sustained
8
10%
No Finding
8
10%
Unfounded
5
6%
Exonerated
3
4%
Criminal Tolling
2
2%
Administrative Investigation
84
100%
Unfounded
44
41%
Pending
39
36%
Exonerated
11
10%
Not Sustained
5
5%
Sustained
4
4%
Criminal Tolling
2
2%
No Finding
1
1%
No Status Listed
1
1%
107
100%
56%
191
100%
100%
Citizen Complaint
Grand Total
Share of Cases
44%
Note: If there are multiple outcomes in a given investigation, if one outcome is a sustained allegation, the
outcome appears here as sustained.
Management Audit Division analysis and interpretation of data furnished by the Sheriff’s Office. The Sheriff’s
Office refused to verify or refute the accuracy of this information from May 15, 2018 through February
2019. This chart pertains only to Internal Affairs investigations related to Custody.
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
The majority of cases brought by the Sheriff’s Administration were sustained,
according to the data, while the majority of cases brought by citizens were not.40 Of
the four brought by citizens that were sustained, in three of the four, only allegations
of insubordination were sustained. Allegations of use of excessive force were not
sustained, according to the data.
Investigative Time
Of the 191 Custody cases that the Sheriff’s Office furnished data for, 76 of them
had no completion date listed. Four others had an erroneous date. Removing these
80 cases yielded 111 for which a plausible period of time could be calculated from
receipt of complaint to completion of the investigation. For this 111, the average
length of time from complaint receipt to completion of the investigation was 234 days,
or more than 33 weeks, based on the dates furnished by the Sheriff’s Office. This may
or may not be representative of Custody investigations overall, and should not be
considered reflective of investigation timelines pertaining to the Sheriff’s Enforcement
Bureau.
Three specific examples are described below.
Situation #1
In a lawsuit filed in early 2016, a former inmate alleged that multiple officers beat him
in an assault that left him with visible injuries, including a black eye. According to the
suit, the beating occurred during the overnight shift spanning July 9 to July 10, 2015.
The inmate alleged that he filed a complaint with the Sergeant on duty “two days
later” while the evidence of injuries were still visible. We assume this means he filed
the complaint with the Sergeant on or about July 12, 2015. In the lawsuit, the inmate
alleged that the beating involved four Correctional Officers.
In the listing of use of force incidents in the Custody Bureau investigated by Internal
Affairs as furnished to us, there are six investigations of use of force incidents listed
as having occurred in July 2015.
However, there is no use of force incident listed as having occurred on July 9 or 10.
The listing includes an investigation of an incident that occurred on July 12, 2015,
but that complaint involved a single officer, according to the records the Sheriff’s
Office furnished. A different investigation of an incident involving four officers shows
an incident date of July 1, 2015. That complaint was received by Internal Affairs
in February 2016, according to the Sheriff’s Office records. It is possible that an
investigation of the allegations in the lawsuit took place, at least beginning in February
2016, but that the Internal Affairs records reflect a different date of occurrence than
reported in the lawsuit. Even if the investigation of the incident did occur, it took
seven months for Internal Affairs to receive the complaint, and none of the officers
were placed on leave as a result of that investigation.
40 Administrative cases – 84-21=63. 37 sustained/63 = 59%. Citizen complaints – 107-39=68. 4
sustained/68 = 6%.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
The Internal Affairs listing furnished to us therefore indicates that if an investigation
of the alleged incident occurred at all, it commenced many months after the alleged
incident and well after the lawsuit alleges the inmate reported abuse to Custody
staff. The Sheriff’s Office refused to discuss this incident or its investigation or any of
the investigation data the office furnished to us. The Sheriff’s Office was given nine
months to review this conclusion and dispute or explain it, if warranted. The Sheriff’s
Office raised no concerns about this conclusion.
The lawsuit was filed in early 2016, making the allegations public. Even if the
allegations had not been transmitted to Internal Affairs before that point, the lawsuit
itself should have prompted Internal Affairs to open an investigation in 2016. The
Custody Bureau should ensure that Internal Affairs receives all lawsuits involving
Custody and Department of Corrections personnel, and should have a policy
requiring investigations of alleged assaults or other serious accusations that are made
in such suits as a matter of course. Failure to open investigations into allegations of
serious misconduct increases the risk that personnel who have exhibited dangerous
behavior to inmates will continue to engage in misconduct. Over the course of its
nine-month review of this recommendation, the Sheriff’s Office raised no concerns
about it whatsoever.
No Administrative Leave for Involved Officers
The lawsuit alleges that the incident involved personnel we will refer to as
Correctional Deputies A, B, C, and D. Officer A’s timekeeping records indicate that he
was not placed on paid administrative leave following the inmate’s alleged reporting
to the Sergeant of the beating on about July 12. Officer A’s pay records reflect that he
continued to work night shifts and was not placed on leave.
The Custody Bureau did not then and through the period of our fieldwork have a
policy regarding the types of circumstances that warrant removal from duty pending
investigation. In the Employee Discipline policy of the Department of Correction, it
states: “Administrative leave may be imposed pending completion of a Formal
Investigation into employee misconduct, or after the investigation is complete.” This
one-sentence statement is the only policy furnished to us related in any way to use of
paid leave pending investigation. This policy was applicable to the previous jail guards
when the jail was managed by a Department of Correction (DOC) Chief appointed by
the Board of Supervisors. Whether this policy is considered applicable to the Sheriff’s
Custody Bureau, which has since taken over management of the jail except for certain
administrative functions, from the DOC, is unknown.
We recommend that the Custody Bureau work with Internal Affairs, County Counsel,
the Employee Services Agency and affected labor unions to develop and implement a
policy that would ensure that officers accused of offenses that could result in either
criminal charges or termination, such as assault of inmates, are immediately placed
on paid leave or assigned to duties that do not involve inmate contact, pending
investigation.
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Had such a policy been in place and enforced at the time that the inmate alleged
to a sergeant that Officer A beat him, it is a statistical likelihood, as detailed below,
that the officer would have been on leave with pay by August 26, 2015—so long as
Internal Affairs received the allegations in a timely fashion. Instead, Officer A was on
duty on August 26, and, along with two other officers, he beat a different inmate to
death. After the murder, he was placed on administrative leave with pay. The murder
occurred about 47 days after the former inmate’s lawsuit alleges that the inmate
filed a complaint of abuse by Officer A to a sergeant. Therefore, we calculated the
likelihood that the complaint would be referred and investigated within 47 days.
Figure 1.2: Correctional Officer A’s Timeline
Alleged Beating of Inmate 1
Alleged Beating of Inmate 1
Reported
Murder of Inmate 2
July 9th or 10th, 2015
July 11th or 12th, 2015
August 26, 2015
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of Custody Bureau records
Based on the 135 cases with a plausible date of incident and a referral date,41 70
percent were referred to Internal Affairs within four weeks of the date of incident.
Had the alleged beating of the inmate been referred for investigation within four
weeks, and had the Sheriff’s Office placed Officer A on leave at that time, Officer A
almost certainly would have been on paid leave on August 26, 2015.
This assertion is based on the average length of time that Internal Affairs
investigations take. On January 24, 2018, we received a listing from the Custody
Bureau for Internal Affairs investigations related to Custody that occurred from 2015
through 2017. This list included 191 investigations. Of these, only 21 (11 percent) were
completed within 47 days. Of the 111 records that included the date the complaint
was received and the date the complaint investigation was completed, the average
length of these investigations was 234 calendar days.
41 Some dates were in error – for example, complaints were listed as received before the listed date of
the incident.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Figure 1.3 below shows the timeline between incident dates and the date Internal
Affairs received the complaint for 191 instances furnished to us.
Figure 1.3: Incident Date Compared to Date Complaint Received
(2015 to 2017 - 191 Complaints)
Month+
Unknown:
51%
53
Count of Complaints
One Month: 49%
41
28
25
15
15
11
3
Same Day Day After Remainder Week Two Weeks
Three or
of Week
Four
One
More than Incorrect
Date
Four
Weeks
Date of
Incident
Missing
Days Between Incident and When Received
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of Custody Bureau records
Statistically speaking, the odds are that the complaint against Officer A would have
been received by Internal Affairs in time to begin an investigation that would have
continued well past the date of Officer A’s murder of an inmate. We do not know if
Internal Affairs received information about the beating alleged in the former inmate’s
lawsuit prior to the murder.
Officers B, C, and D
Officer D was never placed on leave. It is unclear if the allegations against him were
ever investigated, although it is possible that the aforementioned investigation of
four correctional officers that began in February 2016 could have stemmed from the
incident alleged to have occurred on or about July 10, 2015.
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Officers B and C were not placed on leave timely, as described below.
Situation #2
Another lawsuit filed in January 2016 alleged that an inmate was severely beaten by
multiple Correctional Officers around July 23-24, 2015. Two of these officers were
Officers B and C, the same officers described in Situation #1, who were alleged in a
different lawsuit to have beaten a different inmate about two weeks earlier. These two
officers were not placed on leave until February 2016, seven months after the second
beating of an inmate was allegedly reported to a jail sergeant, and more than a month
after a lawsuit alleging misconduct was filed. The lawsuit alone should have triggered
a prompt placement of the Officers on paid leave pending investigation. Although
unclear, the allegation may have been investigated prior to the lawsuit having been
filed. A complaint regarding a use of force incident dated July 24, 2015 involving two
Correctional Deputies was listed as received by Internal Affairs in September 2015.
We do not know if this was the same incident. The Sheriff’s Office refused to discuss
with us the data that it furnished. The data furnished by the Sheriff’s Office did not
list an outcome or an end date to that investigation as of January 2018. Regardless of
whether Internal Affairs investigated either or both of these allegations, both officers
were accused of having beaten inmates in separate incidents in July, but were not
placed on administrative leave until February the following year. This is true even
though a lawsuit regarding one of the alleged beatings was filed in January.
Situation #3
According to a lawsuit brought against the County by two additional Custody Bureau
officers, whom we refer to as Officers E and F, another inmate-involved incident
occurred in the Main Jail on August 9, 2015. A list provided by Internal Affairs showed
an investigation was opened into an incident that occurred on that date. According to
the lawsuit, which accused the County of wrongful termination and discrimination, a
set of allegations against Officers E and F included abuse of an inmate. The listing
shows that allegations against two officers regarding an incident on that date were
sustained by Internal Affairs. According to the Internal Affairs list, the complaint of the
August 9, 2015 incident was received by Internal Affairs the same day.
We do not know the names of the officers in the Internal Affairs list. However,
because the allegations involved two deputies, in an incident that occurred on August
9, 2015, and the allegations were sustained, we believe it is highly likely that the
Internal Affairs investigation was of the incident that resulted in the terminations
described in the lawsuit. We cannot know for sure because the Sheriff’s Office refused
to discuss this information with us.
Payroll records show that Officer E was placed on leave pending investigation during
the two-week earnings period that began June 20, 2016, ten months after the August
2015 incident. County payroll records show that Officer F was also placed on leave
pending investigation during the same earnings period.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
Regardless of whether the officers engaged in inappropriate conduct or were
wrongfully terminated, given the nature of the abuse allegations, ten months is an
excessive period of time to have officers engaged in regular duties while the Sheriff’s
Office assesses allegations of abuse that, if sustained, are sufficient to warrant
termination. If employees are facing allegations that if sustained would warrant
termination, for the safety of inmates, we recommend that affected personnel be
placed on paid leave or reassigned to duties that do not require inmate contact, while
an investigation takes place.
Other Observations Pertaining to Investigations: Poor Record-Keeping
As shown previously in Figure 1.3 on page 49, the Internal Affairs unit also has
errors within its summary records of investigations. For example, several dates in
their investigation log indicate completion dates prior to the complaint having been
received. In other cases, the date of the incident under investigation is missing. This
is true even for investigations identified as having been completed. Presumably, an
investigation into an incident cannot be closed without determining an approximate
date of its occurrence.
Internal Affairs should ensure that its attention to detail in record-keeping is reflective
of the weight of its charge and the potential for such records to become evidence in
lawsuits or criminal trials.
Internal Affairs should ensure that its attention to detail in record-keeping is reflective
of the weight of its charge and the potential for such records to become evidence in
lawsuits or criminal trials.
CONCLUSION
Although more than 4 years have passed since the beating death of an inmate in
August 2015 by a group of officers, one of whom allegedly beat a different inmate in
the weeks prior to the murder, the Custody Bureau at the time of our fieldwork
had not adopted any type of policy governing placement of officers on leave or
alternate assignment while excessive force allegations are investigated. There is no
requirement to place officers accused of serious offenses on leave at all, much less to
place them on leave as soon as serious allegations are brought to the attention of
Custody Bureau sergeants, legal representatives, or the County’s medical personnel
who treat the injuries of inmates beaten by staff.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Board of Supervisors should:
1.1
Require that the Custody Bureau work with Internal Affairs, County
Counsel, the Employee Services Agency and affected labor unions to
develop and implement a policy that would ensure that officers accused
of serious offenses, such as assault of inmates, are immediately placed
on paid leave or assigned to duties that do not involve inmate contact,
pending investigation. Such assignment should be triggered when
allegations are brought to the attention of custody, legal or medical
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
personnel. (Priority 1)
1.2
Require that the Custody Bureau develop and implement a policy to
ensure that Internal Affairs receives all lawsuits involving Custody Bureau
and Department of Corrections personnel and should require Internal
Affairs to automatically open an investigation into alleged assaults or
other serious allegations that are made in such suits. (Priority 1)
1.3
Require that Internal Affairs prioritize investigations in which an employee
is on paid leave or alternate duty to minimize operational disruption and
the expense of placing employees on leave. (Priority 1)
1.4
Require that Internal Affairs ensure that its attention to detail in recordkeeping is reflective of the weight of its charge and the potential for such
records to become evidence in lawsuits or criminal trials. (Priority 2)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Based on the most recent three years of data furnished by Internal Affairs, we expect
the implementation of Recommendation 1.1 would result in administrative leave or
alternate duty placement for an estimated 19 staff in an average month with nearly
all of the affected personnel returning to regular duty following the investigation.
This estimate is based on data provided by the Sheriff’s Office showing 87 individuals
investigated for use of force incidents in the 32-month period of data furnished to us
(from March 2015 through November 2017). This amounts to about 2.7 per month
on average, or a little more than 32 per year. The average length of an internal affairs
investigation (not just use of force investigations) is estimated to be 7.7 months based
on this same data. Assuming 2.7 new use of force investigations begin each month,
and last on average 7.7 months, this equates to an estimated 19 to 21 officers who
would be on leave or alternate duty in any given month.
There are monetary and operational costs associated with placing approximately 30
additional employees on leave or alternate duty each year. Monetary costs include
the cost of “backfilling” an absent employee’s work time with either a new employee
or overtime work by existing employees. We estimate the annual cost to backfill
employees on leave due to use of force investigations is between $3.5 and $3.8
million per year.
Non-monetary costs include additional strain on an already-understaffed
organization, such as the effect of additional overtime work on remaining staff and
the potential for important posts to be left vacant by the sudden departure of staff.
Other non-monetary costs include the potential for stigma experienced by officers
accused of wrongdoing, whether they engaged in inappropriate conduct or not.
Benefits of implementation of a formal paid-leave-pending-investigation program
would be both monetary and operational. By removing officers who are accused of
abusive behavior from inmate contact, the County would not incur the cost of liability
for any subsequent inappropriate acts by those officers. For the subset of accused
officers whose behavior, in fact, is inappropriate, there may be morale improvements
or improvements in the behavior of remaining staff from removing these “bad apples”
from the workforce as soon as possible. In addition, staff who are accused of abusive
behavior likely experience heightened stress, particularly if by continuing to work
in their regular duties they must interact with the same inmates who have made
accusations against them. By providing them with alternative work arrangements or
paid leave, there may be operational or morale improvements.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 1: Using Administrative Leave
The most important potential benefit from implementing Recommendation 1.1 is
reduction in the risk that inmates will be abused or killed while in County custody due
to staff misconduct.
Implementation of Recommendation 1.2 would ensure that Internal Affairs is
aware of allegations of misconduct and opens investigations into those allegations.
It is unclear how many more investigations could be opened as a result of this
requirement and whether this would necessitate additional investigative staff.
Implementation of Recommendation 1.3 would potentially reduce the amount of time
that employees are on leave and thus the strain on remaining personnel. Employees
whose alleged behavior is of a less serious nature, such as allegations of rudeness to
a supervisor, would presumably see their investigations take longer. Implementation
of Recommendation 1.4 would improve Internal Affairs record-keeping, which could
be helpful when the County is sued for employee misconduct or employees are
charged with crimes.
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Section 2: Inmate Grievances
Section 2: Inmate Grievances
Background
The inmate grievance process seeks to provide a means of addressing inmate
concerns in a timely, fair, and effective fashion. During the latter half of 2016,
the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau created a Grievance Unit in response to
recommendations from the Blue Ribbon Commission. The grievance process begins
with Shift Sergeants collecting and inputting paper grievance forms from inmates
into an electronic system. The Grievance Unit then verifies these grievance reports,
forwards them to relevant parties for resolution, and checks that responses are
appropriate. Between June and September of 2017, 3,878 inmate grievances were
submitted.
Problems and Adverse Effects
While grievance reports are generally responded to in a timely fashion, over half of
respondents to the grievance question on our inmate survey reported dissatisfaction
with the process. Respondents’ written comments included statements that their
grievances are not adequately addressed; that Sergeants disregard grievances
pertaining to Deputies; and that staff retaliate against those submitting grievances.
Further, high volumes of grievances (48.3 percent) are closed so quickly that we
question whether a true resolution to the grievance could have been achieved.
Finally, the staffing structure of the Grievance Unit lends itself to potential conflicts
of interest, as well as administrative inefficiencies. Supervisors collect, enter, and
review complaints that could possibly involve their direct reports, threatening the
objectivity of the grievance process. In addition, the Grievance Unit’s manager has
two competing responsibilities. First, the manager is tasked with ensuring that
grievances against officers are adequately investigated and addressed. However,
in this employee’s capacity as President of the County’s Correctional Peace Officers’
Association union, they are also tasked with representing officers who have been
accused of wrongdoing.
These problems reduce the appearance of a transparent and effective grievance
process. If inmates feel that the grievance process is not effective or reliable, they may
turn to alternatives such as litigation, hunger strikes, or other methods that might
not be in the best interests of inmates or custody personnel in order to vocalize their
concerns. Furthermore, if the Custody Bureau is inadequately addressing grievances
in any manner, this failure to respond may impact the physical and emotional wellbeing of inmates and incur litigation costs—particularly for medical or mental health
grievances.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Custody Bureau should restructure the Grievance Unit such that the civilian
Senior Management Analyst acts as the Unit’s manager, and the Bureau should also
submit a request to the Board of Supervisors for an additional Custody Support
Assistant to collect grievances. Further, during the response and review stage,
grievances concerning badged personnel should be routed to supervisory staff not
directly in charge of the staff in question. Lastly, the Custody Bureau should integrate
an external review component into its grievance system to ensure that inmate needs
are being met overall. The Office of Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring, the
new jail oversight function, should review and analyze the Custody Bureau’s bi-annual
grievance summary reports and copies of grievances from the evaluated periods to
assess the efficacy of the grievance process and examine the most prevalent issues in
the correctional facilities.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 2: Inmate Grievances
BACKGROUND
Inmates may raise custody-related issues and concerns to Custody Bureau staff by
filling out an inmate grievance form.42 During the latter half of 2016, the Custody
Bureau created a new Grievance Unit as a mechanism for reviewing and resolving
these grievances per recommendations from the Blue Ribbon Commission. The Unit
was fully staffed by March of 2017. The Unit contained a Management Analyst and
a Senior Management Analyst, both supervised by a Custody Bureau Lieutenant. A
Bureau-wide policy around the inmate grievance process was also finalized in the
same month.
The Grievance Unit is responsible for monitoring the inmate grievance process
by 1) facilitating the timely collection of grievances; 2) forwarding grievances to
the appropriate business unit for response; 3) reviewing responses to verify their
appropriateness; and 4) tracking the entire process to ensure that grievances are
addressed in a timely fashion (within 30 days). Under the new grievance system,
inmates can appeal any grievance response, and the Grievance Unit monitors these
appeals as well.
While grievance monitoring and review are conducted by civilian analysts within
the Grievance Unit, grievance collection and electronic data entry are performed by
Shift Sergeants throughout the jails. Shift Sergeants must collect and enter these
grievances in between all other custody-related responsibilities.
The Department provided a summary report from their grievance tracking system
capturing all inmate grievances submitted from June of 2017 to September of 2017.
During this period, 3,878 grievances were submitted across all correctional facilities,
as well as from other locations such as the Court and out of custody programs. The
most frequently occurring categories of grievances were as follows in Figure 2.1
below.43
Figure 2.1: Most Frequently Occurring Categories of Grievances
June of 2017 to September of 2017
Ranking
Category
Number of
Grievances
Percentage of
Total
1
Medical Services
618
15.9%
2
Out of Cell Activity
433
11.2%
3
Staff Conduct & Behavior
403
10.4%
4
Classification
263
6.8%
5
Environmental Conditions
231
6.0%
6
All other categories
including positive comments
and requests
1,930
49.8%
TOTAL
3,878
42 Forms and submission boxes are located within each dormitory and barracks throughout the jails.
43 Inmate requests and positive comments were also among the most frequently occurring categories,
but these items are categorically distinct from grievances, despite being captured in the online
tracking system.
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Section 2: Inmate Grievances
According to a bi-annual grievance and appeal report submitted by the Custody
Bureau in April of 2018, these areas persisted as the top five most prevalent grievance
categories through December of 2017. However, the second bi-annual report on this
topic, covering grievances collected from January through June of 2018, demonstrated
some shifts. In this second report, “Medical Services” was still the most cited category
of grievances, but “Staff Conduct & Behavior” replaced “Out of Cell Activity” (which fell
to fifth place) as the second largest grievance category. Meanwhile, “Classification”
rose to third place, and “Commissary” took fourth, with “Environmental Conditions”
being pushed out of the top five most prevalent grievance areas.
In addition to its bi-annual reports, the Custody Bureau maintains a running grievance
dashboard on the Jail Reforms website, which includes monthly grievance data and
historical comparisons. As of September 2018, the Custody Bureau had published
monthly dashboards for June and July of 2018.
The Grievance Unit Addresses the Majority of Grievances in a Timely Fashion
From the summary report data provided in November of 2017, the Management
Audit Division randomly selected 253 closed grievances in order to assess response
times.44 Of 253 samples, 2 contained no submission date, leaving 251 samples
available for analysis. Based on the sample, the average response time for all
grievances over the period of June of 2017 to September of 2017 was 8.4 days, with a
margin of error of +5 percent.45
In total, 235 of 251 grievances, or 93.6 percent, were resolved in a timely fashion
(defined by the Grievance Unit as taking fewer than 30 days for resolution).
Meanwhile, 16 grievances, or 6.3 percent, took longer than 30 days to resolve. The
majority of untimely grievances were located at Elmwood, and there did not appear
to be any sort of trend in the categories of grievances that were untimely. These
grievances covered everything from more serious allegations concerning officer
conduct to requests for toilet paper and facility work orders.
The Custody Bureau also sent grievances that were still open at the time of the
sample request. Many of these grievances, which had been open for a period longer
than 30 days, concerned staff conduct. These grievances did not reach a timely
resolution due to ongoing investigations by other entities such as the Internal Affairs
Unit and Jail Crimes.
The percentage of timely responses in the closed sample closely mirrored the
response times in the summary report provided by the Bureau, which showed that
96 percent of all closed grievances were resolved in a timely fashion. Both the sample
and the summary report indicate that response times are not a key issue in the
grievance system, and that the Grievance Unit issues prompt responses to inmate
grievances.
44 This sample size was selected from all grievances with a “closed” status that occurred within the
correctional facilities. Grievances occurring outside the County Jail were excluded from the sample
size calculation. The samples were pulled by the Custody Bureau from ACeS, their electronic
grievance system.
45 At a confidence level of 90 percent.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 2: Inmate Grievances
Inmates are Largely Dissatisfied with the Grievance System
Despite relatively quick turnaround times for inmate grievances, a significant
proportion of inmates appear discontent with the grievance process. In the
Management Audit Division’s inmate survey, 55.7 percent of respondents who
completed the question on grievances reported dissatisfaction or extreme
dissatisfaction.
While the survey was closed-choice in nature, multiple inmates left additional
comments pertaining to the grievance process. Among several general comments
calling the grievance process a “joke” or “sham,” one comment stated that the
grievance system is designed to twist complaints into ones more favorable to the
jail. Another alleged that floor staff and Sergeants are non-responsive to grievances.
Then, while the grievance summary reports and samples pulled from the Bureau’s
electronic grievance tracking system indicate that grievances are typically answered
in a timely fashion, inmates are continuously dissatisfied with the quality of the
responses they receive.
One aspect of these perceptions around unsatisfactory response quality might be the
high volume of grievances that are immediately marked as resolved by Shift Sergeants
who collect and respond to them. If the Grievance Unit agrees with a Shift Sergeant’s
initial response, it closes out the grievance in its review and verification stage without
forwarding the grievance to additional staff or business units. Of the 3,878 grievances
that were received from June to September of 2017, 1,873 grievances (48.3 percent)
were closed during this review and verification stage.
It is possible that several inmate requests and positive comments were included
in this subset of 1,873 grievances, as the summary report did not break down the
categories of grievances that were resolved at each stage of the grievance process.
However, even if every single request and positive comment from this time period
helped comprise the set of grievances with an immediate resolution, these two
categories only account for 682 inmate submissions over the evaluated time period.
If all inmate requests and positive comments are excluded from the 1,873 grievances
that were immediately resolved and closed, that still leaves a minimum of 1,191
grievances (30.7 percent) from other grievance categories that were never forwarded
to other Custody Bureau staff or business units. And while an immediate closure
alone doesn’t prove that the Custody Bureau is inadequately addressing inmate
issues (for instance, inmates may erroneously submit complaints that are not
custody-related), it is questionable whether true resolutions can actually be reached
for such a large percentage of grievances in such a short time span.
The general dissatisfaction of inmates with the grievance process, in conjunction with
the large proportion of grievances resolved immediately after submission, speak to
the need for a more extensive analysis of inmate grievances. This analysis should
include criteria in addition to turnaround times, and include a qualitative review
of Grievance Unit responses. The Grievance Unit is already tasked with creating
summary reports and conducting internal audits. However, an internal review may
result in Unit staff evaluating grievance responses that they approved themselves,
potentially diminishing the objective nature of the audit.
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Section 2: Inmate Grievances
Meanwhile, a bi-annual review from an external party, such as the new Office of
Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring, would add an additional layer of
oversight to the grievance process. The Office of Correction and Law Enforcement
Monitoring should receive the Custody Bureau’s bi-annual grievance and appeal
reports and electronic copies of grievances from the reporting periods. After
analyzing these items, the Office should make its own assessments of the grievance
process and how effectively key inmate issues are being addressed through the
Grievance Unit. These assessments should be presented to the Board of Supervisors
on a bi-annual basis.
There is an Inherent Conflict of Interest in Badged Supervisory Staff Collecting
and Resolving Grievances Concerning Correctional Officers
Shift Sergeants are responsible for collecting and inputting inmate grievances into
ACeS, the electronic grievance tracking system. While the subsequent steps in the
grievance process are performed by civilian staff within the Grievance Unit, this initial
grievance collection by badged staff lends itself to inherent conflicts of interest. As an
example, Shift Sergeants might collect grievances concerning their direct reports or
even themselves, and preemptively mark the grievance as resolved before thoroughly
investigating the matter.
Additional conflicts of interest lie not just with the collection and entry of grievances,
but also with the resolution process for grievances involving Correctional Deputies.
Typically, supervisors review these grievances, and multiple inmates reported on the
survey that Sergeants tend to “side with” the Deputies; justify their behavior; and
not take complaints against Correctional Deputies seriously. While the Management
Audit Division was unable to verify these claims on a general level, several grievance
responses in our sample were—at the very least—phrased in a manner that aligns
with the aforementioned concerns.
For instance, a Sergeant responded to a grievance pertaining to staff conduct with,
“[This] Deputy conducts himself in a professional manner at all times.” In another
response to a Deputy-related grievance, a Custody Bureau staff member wrote the
following:
[This] Deputy is a Jail Training Officer and valued member of this
agency. Deputy [...] denies acting unprofessional and/or “spewing
insults” at inmates during medical emergencies. Medical emergencies,
just like any critical incident, can be stressful for all those involved.
Please don’t misconstrue Deputy[’s] actions. All staff are expected to
conduct themselves professionally, as does [this] Deputy.
Although these responses may be valid, they are worded in a way that seems to
favor the Deputies, and do not offer much remedy or resolution for the inmate who
submitted the grievance.
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Section 2: Inmate Grievances
Additionally, within the survey, several inmates reported retaliation for grievance
submission, including loss of out-of-cell time.46 Whether these allegations are founded
or not, this risk could be reduced if supervisors were not responsible for collecting,
entering, and responding to grievances. This is especially true in light of weak controls
around staff abuse of the grievance process. The language around accountability
within the Department’s grievance policy is vague, only stating that abuses “may be
cause for disciplinary action.” (emphasis added)
Ultimately, the structure of the Grievance Unit is such that badged supervisors collect,
enter, and respond to grievances that may involve their direct reports. Further,
the head of the Grievance Unit is also the President of the Santa Clara County
Correctional Peace Officers Association (CPOA), a peace officer union.47 While none
of these aspects suggest that abuse of the system will automatically occur, conflict of
interest risks are inherent in the configuration of the grievance process. This structure
gives inmates a reason to believe that the grievance process is not legitimate, even if
the process is actually functioning as well as it would under an alternate system.
Finally, as a matter of practicality, having Shift Sergeants collect and input grievances
yields administrative inefficiencies. These supervisors have a number of other
responsibilities, and their divided attention may cause entry errors. For instance, a
Sergeant might be called to address an emergency and forget to finish aspects of a
grievance he or she had started entering. In the event of these errors, the Custody
Bureau reported that the Grievance Unit’s civilian analysts must go back to the
Sergeant who inputted the data to fix grievance details, reducing efficiency.
In order to remedy the inherent conflicts of interest in having Sergeants collect
and enter grievances that could involve their direct reports or themselves, as
well as reduce the administrative burdens and inefficiencies that follow from this
practice, the Grievance Unit should task a civilian to perform these collection and
entry functions instead. To this end, the Grievance Unit reported that it has already
submitted a request to Sheriff’s Office Administration for a Custody Support Assistant
(CSA) to collect and enter grievances. Yet, despite the Management Audit Division’s
multiple requests—beginning in November 2017—for a copy and status update of
this staffing request, the Department’s Administration never offered a response.
We recommend the Sheriff’s Office prioritize this request and submit a budget
modification request for this CSA position to the Board of Supervisors as soon as
possible.
To further mitigate potential conflicts of interest, we also recommend that, following
electronic entry of grievances concerning badged staff, the Grievance Unit should
not forward these grievances to the named staff’s direct supervisors, but rather to
someone higher up on the chain of command. For instance, if the grievance concerns
a Deputy, the grievance should be forwarded to a Lieutenant, who is one step
removed in the reporting chain. Similarly, a grievance concerning a Sergeant would
be forwarded to a Captain instead of the supervising Lieutenant. This arrangement
would reduce the risk that the reviewer has personal ties to the named individual,
which may impact the outcome of the grievance.
46 Out of cell time is commonly called “program time” by inmates and staff. This term includes
everything from time to shower, make phone calls or attended classes.
47 Kaplan, Tracey. (12 May, 2016). Santa Clara County’s jail guards elect first woman as union president.
Mercury News. Retrieved from http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/05/12/santa-clara-countys-jailguards-elect-first-woman-as-union-president/.
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Lastly, in light of Custody Bureau postings for two Management Analyst positions
to staff the Grievance Unit, we recommend that the current Senior Management
Analyst manage the Unit, and supervise all current and new Management Analysts.
This would eliminate the need for a Lieutenant who is the President of a peace
officer union to serve as the final arbiter on all grievance responses, which lends
itself—again—to potential conflict of interest issues and appearances of bias,
even if the entire system is operating as fairly as possible. As the new lead, the
Senior Management Analyst would still report to the Custody Bureau Captain, but
we advise that any reports, analyses, or new information generated by the Unit
also be forwarded to the new oversight function, the Office of Correction and Law
Enforcement Monitoring.
CONCLUSION
Since March of 2017, the Custody Bureau has maintained a formalized system
of addressing inmate grievances with the creation of its Grievance Unit and the
finalization of a grievance process policy. Thus far, according to the data contained
within its electronic ACeS system, the Grievance Unit has been responding to the vast
majority of grievances in a timely manner. However, according to inmate feedback,
over half of inmates still feel as though their concerns are being inadequately
addressed, despite the timeliness of the responses.
Further, the structure of the grievance process lends itself to inherent conflicts
of interest when it comes to grievances that concern Correctional Officers. These
conflicts of interest are exacerbated by the fact that few controls exist for preventing
abuses in the Custody Bureau’s grievance process policy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
2.1
Restructure the Grievance Unit such that the current Senior Management
Analyst acts as head of the Unit. The Senior Management Analyst should
receive additional training on law enforcement, legal issues, and data
confidentiality rules to facilitate their transition into this supervisory role.
In their new capacity, they would continue to report to the Correctional
Captain, but also dually send any issues and analyses to the new oversight
function, the Office of Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring.
(Priority 1)
2.2
Create a budget modification request for a new Custody Support Assistant
to collect and enter grievances and present it to the Board of Supervisors
for approval. (Priority 1)
2.3
Revise the grievance process policy such that supervisors may not review
and respond to grievances concerning their direct reports or themselves.
(Priority 1)
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Section 2: Inmate Grievances
2.4
Develop and implement a bi-annual external review component to the
grievance process with the new oversight function, the Office of Correction
and Law Enforcement Monitoring, and the Board of Supervisors. A digital
copy of all grievances and responses should be provided to all parties
each period. (Priority 1)
The Office of Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring should:
2.5
Receive and review the Custody Bureau’s bi-annual grievance and appeal
reports, and receive digital copies of corresponding grievances and
responses from the evaluation periods in these reports. The Office should
then investigate these responses, as well as the grievance categories that
appeared in the highest frequency over the bi-annual period, to determine
whether the Grievance Unit is effectively addressing inmate concerns.
The results of this review should be reported to the Board of Supervisors.
(Priority 1)
The Board of Supervisors should:
2.6
Receive and hear the Office of Correction and Law Enforcement
Monitoring’s bi-annual review and investigative outcomes. (Priority 1)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 are feasible within the County’s existing budget
allocations. Recommendation 2.2 will require a budget modification of $104,056.90
for the Custody Support Assistant position.
Recommendation 2.5 may require additional programming and time, but not
additional staffing. Recommendations 2.6 won’t require additional future funding
beyond what would be expected of the forthcoming Office of Correction and Law
Enforcement Monitoring, which should integrate grievance monitoring into their
review processes.
These recommendations will reduce the conflicts of interest that exist within the
grievance process, increase inmate trust in the system, and potentially improve the
most frequently grieved issues within the County Jail.
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
Section 3: Surveillance Technology
Background
During calendar years 2017 and 2018, the Custody Bureau implemented two major
surveillance technologies within County correctional facilities: facility surveillance
cameras and body worn cameras (BWC). The Facilities and Fleet Department (FAF)
installed 1,393 surveillance cameras in the correctional facilities from April of 2017 to
April of 2018. And as of August of 2018, 762 Deputies and Sergeants had been trained
and outfitted with a BWC. These two surveillance technologies are governed by the
Custody Bureau’s Surveillance Use Policies and County Ordinance.
Problems and Adverse Effects
In the Surveillance Use Policy for facility cameras, there are no guidelines around
when device audio should switched off by Custody Bureau staff for legal or privacy
purposes. Further, within the BWC Surveillance Use Policy, specific processes to
ensure accountability are poorly defined; footage viewing requirements are not
consistent with the Custody Bureau’s Use of Force Policy; and there are no guidelines
that dictate where the cameras must be uniformly worn. In the training program for
in-service staff there are no exercises for staff to build muscle memory and reactive
capabilities to activate their devices in the field. The Custody Bureau also lacks
procedures to identify staff who repeatedly fail to activate their BWCs appropriately.
Gaps in the Surveillance Use Policies increase the risk of abuse or misuse of these
technologies. Without guiding standards, audio may be inappropriately switched off;
BWC audits might not be thorough enough to identify key issues; staff could view
their BWC footage before writing their initial use-of-force reports; and BWCs could
be placed on the body such that the resulting footage is not sufficient for use as
evidence. Further, the BWC classroom training alone does not adequately prepare
staff for use of this technology in real-world settings, which may result in staff failing
to activate their cameras while on duty. The lack of an early intervention system
also means that the Custody Bureau cannot correct the practices of individuals who
routinely struggle with activating their BWCs.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Bureau should revise its Surveillance Use Policies to address the risk areas
defined above, and the Board of Supervisors should adopt these revised policies. In
addition, BWC activation should be an explicit component of the Bureau’s simulationbased training modules, and these exercises should take priority in the upcoming
training schedule. Until this training, supervisors should give daily reminders to their
reports to activate their BWCs and conduct preliminary footage reviews to ensure that
there are no misunderstandings surrounding the policy or technology. The Custody
Bureau, for the sake of performance management and transparency, should also
develop early intervention systems to identify staff who are not activating their BWCs
appropriately.
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
FINDING
During calendar years 2017 and 2018, the Custody Bureau implemented two
major surveillance technologies: facility surveillance cameras and body worn
cameras (BWCs). Under the direction of the Custody Bureau, the Facilities and Fleet
Department (FAF) initiated a capital project to install 1,393 surveillance cameras
across the County’s correctional facilities. Construction began in April of 2017, and
the Board of Supervisors accepted the project as complete in June of 2018. These
devices are meant to identify and prevent threats and escapes, gather evidence for
prosecution of crimes committed in the facilities, monitor blind spots, and resolve
complaints, among other uses.
Further, in January of 2017, the Board approved an agreement to acquire 1,200
BWCs for the Sheriff’s Office. After approval of the initial contract, the Sheriff’s
Office purchased additional cameras for Academy training, February 2018 Academy
graduates, and in-service staff who had not been assigned a BWC due to fluctuations
in staffing levels. During May of 2018, an Amendment to the original BWC vendor
agreement was approved to accommodate 340 additional cameras. As of August
of 2018, the Sheriff’s Office had 1,374 BWCs in its inventory, 762 of which had
been allocated to sworn Custody Bureau Correctional Deputies and Sergeants.48
The primary purpose of these BWCs is to document Deputy contacts and critical
incidents. The Custody Bureau may use BWC footage for criminal and administrative
investigations, in report writing, and for Deputy evaluation and training.
The Custody Bureau’s chosen BWC model has a 142-degree field of view lens, up to
70 hours of record time, and more than 12 hours of battery life. The device, once
it is turned on, is continuously in buffering mode. If a user hits the camera’s record
button, the device will capture up to 30 seconds of buffered footage (without audio)
prior to the moment at which the record button was activated. Then, even if a user is
unable to hit the record button as soon as an incident begins, the BWC footage will
still show video up to 30 seconds prior, which may provide valuable context in an
investigation.
These two projects are large overhauls within a department that did not previously
have extensive surveillance technology. In 2016, as a stopgap measure, the Custody
Bureau installed approximately 300 cameras at Main Jail North. However, these
cameras, purchased at a total of $20,000, did not have audio, and could only store
video for five to seven days.49 At Elmwood, prior to 2017, cameras were only installed
inside the women’s housing units. The Custody Bureau had no BWCs prior to the 2017
implementation. In comparison, the new facility surveillance cameras and BWCs offer
the potential for much greater oversight.
48 August 14, 2018 Quarterly Report on Information Technology Related to Jail Reforms.
49 Handa, Roberts. (2016, Jul. 11). Nearly 300 Cameras Installed at Santa Clara County Jails Helps Solve 3
Recent Cases. NBC Bay Area.
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
Under FAF and the Custody Bureau’s plans, audio-equipped surveillance cameras
were installed at Main Jail North and Elmwood inside areas such as housing units,
outdoor recreational spaces, and in inmate movement locations such as hallways and
common areas. As such, the new surveillance cameras offer coverage of most areas
relevant to inmate activities, with some exceptions.50 The Custody Bureau plans to
outfit all sworn staff, including Academy recruits, with a BWC.
Existing Surveillance Policies Exhibit Risk Areas
Per the County’s Surveillance Technology and Community Safety Ordinance, the
Custody Bureau has Surveillance Use Policies for both its facility cameras and BWCs.
However, both Use Policies exhibit gaps that open up the risk of abuse or misuse
of these technologies. For instance, while the surveillance cameras come equipped
with audio, the Use Policy does not describe under what circumstances this function
should be muted. The Custody Bureau’s 2018 Annual Surveillance Report on its
facility cameras discusses that concerns were brought forth by the Office of the
Public Defender and the Health and Hospital System Management Team surrounding
inmate confidentiality during interviews and mental health treatment sessions.
Consequently, cameras were removed from interview rooms, and device audio was
muted in certain areas such as nurse work stations and medical clinical areas.
However, the Use Policy does not specify criteria for when audio may or may not be
shut off, despite legitimate legal or privacy concerns that would lend themselves to
muting these surveillance devices. As a result, there is ambiguity around when it is
appropriate to deactivate the audio function. Without this guidance spelled out in a
written policy, it is possible that facility cameras will not be muted when they should
be in order to protect the confidentiality of inmates. On the other end, inappropriate
or unnecessary deactivation of audio might diminish the usefulness of camera
footage in internal or external investigations. Clarifying criteria around usage of this
audio function in the Use Policy would reduce the likelihood of both scenarios.
50 These exceptions are not delineated in our audit for security purposes. Decisions around camera
placement were made on both operational and legal bases (e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act
standards) by the Department and construction contractor.
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Additionally, the Management Audit Division compared the BWC Use Policy against
two sets of best practice guides: 1) the “BWC Scorecard” created by the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights and Upturn51 and 2) the BWC policy
recommendations matrix authored by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
and the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services.52;53 While
the Custody Bureau’s BWC Use Policy adheres to the majority of best practices
advanced by these advocacy organizations and law enforcement professionals, the
Policy does not align in the following key areas:
1. The Policy does not prohibit officer pre-report viewing and is internally
inconsistent with the Custody Bureau’s Use of Force policy and Use of Force
training guidelines.
The topic of pre-report viewing was one of the few areas in which the advocacy
organizations and PERF had opposing views. On one hand, the BWC Scorecard stated
that allowing officers to review footage prior to writing a report may diminish the
evidentiary value of reports by prompting officers to conform the report to what
the video shows, rather than what they personally observed. On the other hand,
PERF stated that allowing an officer to review their footage before writing a report
would help the officer remember an incident more clearly, and yield more accurate
documentation.
However, the Custody Bureau has already adopted a stance under its Use of Force
Policy that its staff may not review BWC footage for any use of force incident until
after they have written a preliminary report. Then, for the sake of internal consistency,
the Custody Bureau should align the viewing provisions in its BWC Use Policy with
those described in its Use of Force Policy. The BWC Use Policy, contrary to the Use of
Force Policy, states that Correctional Officers have a right to review BWC footage prior
to writing their reports unless the incident is an “Officer-Involved Incident” or a case
involving a serious bodily injury.54 This provision covers far fewer incidents than those
in the Custody Bureau’s Use of Force Policy.
51 The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights is a coalition of 200 national organizations
that aims to promote and protect civil rights of all persons in the United States. Upturn is a DC-based
nonprofit that produces research on how technology can inform social justice and public policy.
These two organizations jointly developed the BWC Scorecard based on civil rights principles cosigned by 32 different civil rights and advocacy groups.
52 The Leadership Conference and Upturn. (2017, Nov.). Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard.
Retrieved from https://www.bwcscorecard.org/.
53 Miller, Lindsay, Jessica Toliver, and Police Executive Research Forum. (2017). Implementing
a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned. Washington, DC:
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Retrieved from https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/
dispatch/10-2014/body_worn_camera_program.asp,
54 The Santa Clara County Police Officer’s Association defines “Officer-Involved Incident” as an incident
in which a peace officer is directly involved in 1) any discharge of a firearm by an Officer which
proximately causes the death of, or injury to another; 2) an intentional use of any other deadly or
dangerous weapon by an Officer which proximately causes the death of, or injury likely to produce
death to another; 3) an intentional act on the part of an Officer which proximately causes the
death of, or injury likely to produce death to another; 4) any death of a person while in custody, or
under Officer control. Santa Clara County Police Chiefs’ Association. (2016) Officer-Involved Incident
Guidelines. Retrieved from https://www.sjpd.org/BOI/Homicide/images/Officer-Involved_Incident_
Guidelines.pdf.
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Because the BWC Use Policy is written in permissive language, and is thus overruled
by the requirements in the compulsory Use of Force policy, the two policies are legally
consistent. However, this legal consistency has not eliminated practical confusion
among Custody Bureau staff. For example, the Custody Bureau reported that, in its
initial round of BWC trainings, trainers had informed attendees that they had the right
to review BWC footage prior to writing reports in use of force cases that did not fall
under the categories of “Officer-Involved Incident” or a case involving serious bodily
injury. Trainers later had to correct this assumption of pre-report viewing during
the use of force training. Revising the BWC Use Policy viewing requirements to be
consistent with those contained in the Use of Force Policy would mitigate the risk of
future training discrepancies and staff confusion around these devices.
2. The Policy does not specify a location on the body in which the cameras should
be worn.
PERF recommended that BWC policies should specify where body-worn cameras
should be mounted and worn. The Policy does not specify this location, stating
instead that staff should “Wear the recorder in a conspicuous manner.” The Custody
Bureau reported that they conducted a 12-week field test, during which they could
not decide on a single “best location” for wearing the cameras, despite determining
that center of the chest provides the most ideal field of view. When asked why the
Custody Bureau did not simply adopt a center-of-chest location for its BWCs, the
Bureau reported that staff with pacemakers cannot wear the mounting magnet within
a certain range of their assistive devices. In addition, detectives and other special
operatives cannot ideally perform their functions with center-mounted cameras.
However, in the Management Audit Division’s peer survey, five of the six jurisdictions
with BWCs specified that these devices must be worn on either the belt or chest. In
the absence of an assigned mounting location for their BWCs, Custody Bureau staff
might diminish the evidentiary value of their BWC footage by wearing their devices
in an area with a poor field of view. The Bureau should decide on a single mounting
location for general staff, and define a list of exceptions for this requirement to
accommodate individuals with assistive devices and on specialized teams.
3. The Policy tasks supervisors with periodically auditing BWC footage instead of
the Custody Bureau’s Internal Audit Unit, and does not offer guidelines around
the size, scope, and tracking of these audits.
PERF recommended that a department’s Internal Audit Unit, rather than the officer’s
direct chain of command, should conduct random reviews of BWC footage to monitor
compliance and assess officer performance. PERF’s discussions with police officials
revealed that having direct supervisors review BWC footage could undermine the
trust between an officer and their supervisor and having the Internal Audit Unit
conduct these audits instead would help bypass this issue.55
In contrast, the Custody Bureau’s Use Policy tasks supervisors, and not the Internal
Audit Unit, with conducting periodic audits at a minimum of once per month. The Use
Policy does not dictate the size of the random sample to be audited, specific datapoints to review, or how these audits should be recorded and tracked. The Custody
Bureau reported that it does not have formal guidelines or supervisor trainings
around these audits outside the Use Policy. Without these guidelines, the scope,
55 Miller, Lindsay, Jessica Toliver, and Police Executive Research Forum. (2017). Page 25.
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
frequency, and consequent effectiveness of BWC audits are undetermined. More
robust standards for these audits and their tracking should be outlined in the Use
Policy, and the Custody Bureau should also consider having its Internal Audit Unit
conduct these reviews in lieu of supervisors.
4. The Policy does not require Custody Bureau staff to note the existence of BWC
recordings in official incident reports.
PERF recommended that, in order to make investigators, prosecutors, oversight
boards, and courts aware of the existence of BWC footage, officers should note
whether there is BWC footage associated with the incidents described in their reports.
The Custody Bureau does not explicitly state this in its Use Policy, although the Policy
does require staff to explain incomplete or nonexistent footage in their reports.56
Adding requirements for Custody Bureau staff to denote which incidents have
supporting BWC footage may help expedite future investigations.
In order to preserve the quality and integrity of its evidence and ensure proper
usage of its new surveillance technology, the Bureau should revise its Surveillance
Use Policies to address the aforementioned concerns. For a full comparison of the
Custody Bureau’s BWC Use Policy against the aforementioned best practice guides,
see Appendix D: Detailed Analysis of Body -Worn Cameras.
Custody Bureau Staff have not Received Simulation-Based Training for BWCs
The Management Audit Division attended a BWC training for in-service staff held in
November of 2017. The training was thorough in its technical components. Attendees
at the training were instructed on how to activate and charge the cameras, upload
footage, tag key points in the footage, and access data. Training Deputies also
discussed the evidence management system’s audit trail for the BWCs, which tracks
every time the footage is accessed, viewed, and edited.
During the policy portion of the BWC training, Training Deputies comprehensively
reviewed the most salient aspects of the BWC Use Policy. Covered topics included
when to turn the camera on and off, how to handle footage, and various appropriate
and inappropriate uses of BWC files. One area of improvement would be to distribute
the Use Policy at the beginning of the course, so that attendees could have a paper
copy in hand to reference during the training. In addition, the instruction around
the Use Policy was largely lecture-based, without many small group exercises
and discussions. Incorporating more interactive components into the Use Policy
instruction, particularly around gray areas such as when to turn on the cameras,
consent, and privacy laws, might improve understanding and reduce the risk of BWC
misuse and litigation.
The largest training gap, however, was the lack of scenario-based exercises simulating
situations in which Custody Bureau staff would activate their BWCs on the job. During
the BWC training course, attendees only turned on their devices and activated the
recording feature while sitting at their computer stations. This lack of situational
training was not a shortcoming of the BWC training course itself, but more so due
56 PERF also recommended that officers should tag and categorize BWC footage at the time of download.
The Department’s Use Policy does permit Deputies to add metadata such as the category of contact to
their footage, but does not require them to do so. Given the logistical and time challenges of categorizing
every piece of recorded footage, the Management Audit Division believes that the Department’s existing
provision around metadata is reasonable.
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to the curriculum and training schedule under the Custody Bureau. The Bureau
issues policy trainings separately from its Force Options, Defensive Tactics, and other
simulator trainings. While this setup might be necessary due to time, scheduling, and
space constraints, this structure makes it difficult for staff to immediately apply policy
guidelines to realistic scenarios.
The ultimate consequence of this training gap is that Custody Bureau staff are issued
BWCs without having developed the habit of using these devices in accordance with
the Use Policy, and without adequate training to make the use of this technology
second nature. The Custody Bureau reported that there have been incidents where
its staff did not activate the record feature in a timely fashion or forgot to switch
on the cameras at all. While this might be expected as part of a learning curve
associated with new technology, these issues may have been at least reduced by staff
undergoing more scenario-based exercises.
To at least develop these skills in the future, the Management Audit Division
recommends that the Custody Bureau explicitly incorporate BWC procedures into its
field training courses such as Force Options and Defensive Tactics. Given the limited
nature of the initial BWC training, supervisors should also issue daily reminders
to their reports to activate their BWCs until all sworn staff have undergone these
simulation trainings and conduct preliminary reviews of footage for individuals who
have recently been issued BWCs.
BWC Performance Management
The Custody Bureau does not have an early intervention system in place to identify
and provide further training to staff who routinely struggle with activating their
BWCs in accordance with the Use Policy. While the Custody Bureau stated that
supervisors are able to use the mandated audits for this function, randomly selected
BWC samples would not necessarily reveal trends in the behavior of individuals.
Developing this system would reduce the risk that these identified staff members will
fail to activate their BWCs in the event of a critical incident.
CONCLUSION
The Custody Bureau’s addition of facility cameras and BWCs marks a significant
improvement in oversight mechanisms within the County’s correctional facilities.
However, device shortages, risk areas in these technologies’ Use Policies, and gaps in
scenario-based BWC trainings may diminish the impact of these devices and open the
Custody Bureau to potential litigation. While it is unrealistic for the Custody Bureau
to completely restructure and integrate the BWC policy and simulator trainings, the
Bureau should orient its existing trainings towards supporting staff as they physically
adapt to this new technology. Finally, for the sake of performance management and
transparency, the Custody Bureau should develop systems for tracking BWC usage
and intervening with staff members who repeatedly struggle with activating their
BWCs.
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
3.1 Revise its Use Policy for facility cameras to include specific guidelines on
when audio may be switched off for these devices for legal or privacy
purposes. (Priority 1)
3.2
Revise its Use Policy for BWCs in the following capacities. (Priority 1)
a. Adjust the footage viewing provisions for Custody staff so that they
match the requirements in the Custody Bureau’s Use of Force Policy.
b. For the purposes of consistency in evidence-gathering, specify a
location on the body in which BWCs must be worn, citing exceptions
for individuals with health conditions and in special units.
c. Task the Internal Audit Unit with conducting periodic audits of BWC
footage instead of direct supervisors. Define the size of the sample
to be drawn and test criteria, as well how the audits will be recorded
and tracked.
d. Require Correctional Deputies to record on their reports whether
there is BWC footage available of an incident.
3.3
Integrate BWC activation as an explicit learning objective in its upcoming
Force Options, Defensive Tactics, and other simulation trainings for inservice staff, and immediately into the curriculum for Academy recruits.
(Priority 1)
3.4
Develop an early intervention system, monitored by supervisors,
to identify BWC users who repeatedly fail to use the technology in
accordance with the Use Policy. During their incident reviews, supervisors
should record each time a Deputy’s BWC footage did not comply with the
Use Policy and review the frequency of these occurrences for their direct
reports every month. (Priority 1)
3.5
Have supervisors issue daily reminders to their reports to activate their
BWCs until all Correctional Deputies have undergone simulation trainings.
(Priority 2)
3.6
Have supervisors conduct preliminary reviews of footage and usage
patterns within the first four weeks after BWC training for both in-service
staff and Academy recruits to ensure that there are no misunderstandings
surrounding the policy or technology. (Priority 2)
3.7
Add additional interactive exercises to the Use Policy portion of the BWC
training. (Priority 2)
The Board of Supervisors should:
3.8 Adopt revised Surveillance Use Policies for the Custody Bureau’s facility
cameras and BWCs such that the revised Use Policies contain provisions
around audio; align with best practices; and are internally consistent with
other Custody Bureau policies. (Priority 1)
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 3: Surveillance Technology
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendations 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.8 are feasible within the County’s existing
budget allocations. Implementation of Recommendations 3.3, 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7 may
require additional programming, but not enough to warrant additional staffing.
The BWC data management system comes with built-in reporting features that can
facilitate data tracking and analysis for 3.4 and 3.6. Administrators can create reports
such as user summaries, video summaries that track usage metrics such as number
of hours uploaded, and the number of videos in each category.
These recommendations will ensure that the new surveillance technologies
implemented by the Custody Bureau are utilized to their maximum capacity and
potential as evidence gathering, investigative, and oversight devices.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 4: Staffing
Section 4: Staffing
Background
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sets minimum standards for adult
correctional facilities, but it does not specify the level or classification of staff
necessary to operate a jail safely and efficiently. Prior studies have cited understaffing
as a critical concern with the County’s correctional facilities. The Santa Clara Sheriff’s
Office added new positions in the Custody Bureau to address the deficiency, but
vacancies and increased workload have effectively eliminated gains.
Problems and Adverse Effects
The Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody Bureau has neither a formal process to identify
staffing needs nor written documents that demonstrate annual staffing requests are
consistent with facility demands and legal requirements. During fiscal year (FY) 201617, both the Main Jail and Elmwood Complex were operating with an average of 46
fewer officers than authorized and with 85 percent of their authorized security posts
filled. Over the most recent five-year period, the average staffing level for the jails was
612 officers, approximately five employees less than the minimum level identified by
correctional consultants in 2009. Despite a chronic shortage of correctional deputies,
the Sheriff’s Office elects to use these staff to perform tasks that other California
Counties carry out with either civilian positions or “sworn” personnel who are not
deputies. At least 85 positions carry out tasks currently assigned to deputies that do
not require the special training of a deputy.
Operating with excessive vacancies and insufficient supervisorial staff, using the
limited number of deputies to carry out tasks that do not require deputy skills, and
mandating overtime to backfill the vacant positions, has at least three negative
outcomes. First, facility supervisors add employees by using overtime, often
mandatory, to provide a bare staffing minimum. This is borne out by a 125 percent
increase in overtime costs in just five years. Second, activities, programs and services
are suspended or reduced due to understaffing. This may affect the Bureau’s ability to
consistently meet out-of-cell time required by State regulations. Third, failure to staff
key posts results in higher safety and security risks to staff, inmates, and the public.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Custody Bureau should plan, assess, and regularly report on staffing based on
industry standards and implement criteria to evaluate when a post should be filled
with civilian staff or badge staff. Facility supervisors should submit staffing requests
consistent with facility needs regardless of department-wide or countywide budget
constraints and apply a relief factor, based on actual leave experience, to posts
that require continuous coverage. To alleviate the chronic shortage of deputies, the
Custody Bureau should hire 95 non-sworn Custody Support Assistants (CSAs) to
occupy certain posts and re-assign the existing 85 deputies to fill vacant positions. The
addition of 95 new CSAs would increase the Bureau’s salaries and benefits costs by an
estimated $10.0 million per year. Reassignment of deputies currently occupying posts
that would be filled by CSAs is estimated to reduce overtime costs by approximately
$9.8 million and result in an estimated net General Fund cost of $232,785 annually.
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Section 4: Staffing
FINDING
The Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody Bureau operates two adult correctional facilities,
and provides re-entry, electronic monitoring, and other programs to offenders. The
Main Jail houses medium security, medium high security, and high security inmates.
All inmates are booked and classified at the Main Jail and most of the seriously ill
inmates are housed at this facility. The Elmwood Complex houses medium and
minimum-security males and all security levels of females.
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations and industry standards address the
adequacy of staffing and require a staffing plan but do not establish formal criteria
regarding the actual number of staff members necessary to operate a detention
facility. The Sheriff is responsible for assigning sufficient staff to ensure the safe and
secure operation of the County jails and seeking necessary resources from the Board
of Supervisors to fund 24-hour staffing, seven days per week.
As of December 2019, the Sheriff’s Office is awaiting the completion of a staffing
study being conducted by an outside vendor. The results of the study may
offer new information on specific staffing levels that are needed. However, our
recommendation to use civilian positions, such as Custody Support Assistants, to
fill assignments that do not require a sworn officers as a practice would hold true
regardless of specific levels of staff recommended by the study.
Data Limitations
The audit team attempted to review the Custody Bureau’s staffing plan for the two
facilities to determine if the Bureau included the appropriate number of correctional
deputy positions in the FY 2017-18 budget to meet minimum staffing requirements
in the jails. However, due to limited data provided by the Sheriff’s Office, auditors
could not ascertain whether the Custody Bureau’s current posts represent a critical
complement (minimum number of officer posts that must be filled on each shift)
or an optimal staffing level with flexibility to absorb non-post activities such as jail
reform initiatives. Considering these limitations, our final audit objectives focused
on evaluating the accuracy and reliability of the Custody Bureau’s relief factor
assumptions, overtime utilization, and mix of sworn/civilian personnel in the context
of current operational demands established by management.
Notwithstanding the limitations of our review, the Management Audit Division
notes that staffing shortfalls and reliance on overtime to maintain minimum staffing
levels in the County’s correctional facilities have been documented since at least
2009. A facility and operational needs assessment by MGT of America Inc., and
JFA identified staffing deficiencies as a substantial concern in need of immediate
attention. The report stated that the Department’s established relief factors do not
provide adequate relief staff coverage and that “policymakers should be aware of
the current custody staffing shortfalls in the DOC [Department of Correction]
because of the increased level of operational risk this creates.”57
57 MGT of America, and JFA. (August 2009). County of Santa Clara, Department of Correction Needs
Assessment/Facilities Study, pg. 225.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 4: Staffing
A review of actual staffing levels at Main Jail and Elmwood over the most recent fiveyear period reveals a dearth of operational gains. From FY 2012-13 to FY 2016-17,
the average officer58 staffing level at Main Jail and Elmwood was approximately 704
authorized positions, of which 612 were filled. As shown in Figure 4.1 below, while
the number of authorized positions has increased over time, actual filled positions
reflect a net decrease compared to the critical level documented in MGT’s 2009
report.59 Thereafter, two other publicly available assessments commissioned by the
Board of Supervisors in 2012 and 2014 showed that staffing deficiencies that existed
in 2009 remained unaddressed.60 Despite a positive trend reported in recent vacancy
reports61, staffing levels have not kept pace with operational demands.
Figure 4.1: Filled Staffing Levels Have Changed Little Over Time
Authorized
Filled
Staffing Rate
Average
FY 2012-13 to FY 2016-17
704
612
86.9%
MGT Report CY 2009
675
617
91.4%
29
(5)
(4.5%)
Difference
Source: Management Audit Division.
Note: Represents officer positions at Main Jail and Elmwood only.
Current Staffing Levels
The Management Audit Division identified three factors that hurt staffing levels. First,
the Custody Bureau conducts limited planning and analysis to assess staffing needs
using industry standards and practices. This results in operational inefficiencies and
budgetary inconsistencies. Second, the Custody Bureau has consistently relied on
inaccurate absence and vacancy rate assumptions in its annual staffing requests. As
a result, budgeted and approved positions appear to underestimate the personnel
resources needed to meet minimum staffing without drawing on staff overtime.
Third, badged peace officers cover post assignments that that do not require officer
training or experience and could be filled with less costly and more accessible civilian
positions. Fixing these problems could yield efficiencies without compromising
operational effectiveness and “free-up” sworn personnel to perform more
appropriate functions within the jails.
58 The term “officer” refers to Sheriff’s Correctional Sergeant and Sheriff’s Correctional Deputy.
59 Position detail data sourced from Human Resources Payroll System (PeopleSoft) furnished by Santa
Clara. County’s Employee Services Agency. See MGT report pg. 223 for comparative values.
60 See Kitchell. (January 2012). Needs Assessment Report, Santa Clara County Jail System; MGT of
America, Inc. (December 2014). Department of Correction Needs Assessment/Facilities Study.
61 Staffing as of February 26, 2018 was 702 officers.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 4: Staffing
The Sheriff’s Custody Bureau consists of five divisions: Main Jail, Elmwood Complex,
Administration, Jail Reforms, and Support Services. Each division is led by a Captain
who reports to the Assistant Sheriff of Custody Operations and up to the Sheriff
through the Undersheriff.62 The Custody Bureau has 1,148.5 authorized positions
in the FY 2017-18 adopted budget. This includes 825 sworn and 323.5 civilian staff
across multiple service areas.63 Correctional Deputies and their first-line supervisors,
Correctional Sergeants, account for 804 or 97.5 percent of the total sworn positions
and the majority work in the jail facilities. Figure 4.2 below summarizes their assigned
service area.
Figure 4.2: Sheriff’s Custody Bureau FY 2017-18 Position Allocation by Service Area
Service Area
Sergeant
Deputy
Total
% of Total
Main Jail
17
362
379
47.1%
Elmwood
18
326
344
42.8%
Classification
4
23
27
3.4%
Programs
2
12
14
1.7%
Multi-Support Unit
1
10
11
1.4%
Op. Standards
1
5
6
0.8%
ADA Compliance Unit
1
3
4
0.5%
Custody Alternatives
0
4
4
0.5%
Jail Transition Team
1
2
3
0.4%
Operations
0
3
3
0.4%
Internal Affairs
3
0
3
0.4%
Sustainability
0
2
2
0.3%
Industries
0
2
2
0.3%
Training
0
1
1
0.1%
Inmate Screening
1
0
1
0.1%
49
755
804
100%
Grand Total
Source: Sheriff’s Office Custody Operations Bureau, Staffing Report dated July 17, 2017.
Note: This total is less than 825 as it does not include captains or other senior personnel.
As illustrated above, nearly 90 percent of the Bureau’s authorized deputy and
sergeant position codes are in the Main Jail and Elmwood Complex. These institutions
operate around the clock and require uninterrupted staffing. The Custody Bureau
relies heavily on overtime to maintain required staffing levels within the facilities.
Per the Department’s Staffing Policy 1.25, the required staffing level is the level of
staffing required to provide mandated services while preserving a safe and secure
62 At the time of our audit the Undersheriff also served as the Chief of Correction.
63 Sworn total includes one unfunded Chief of Correction position. An additional 42 sworn employees
from the Sheriff’s enforcement budget are assigned to the custody department to assist with inmate
transport. These positions are not included in the 825. Cadets are considered “non-badge” security
positions and are included in the civilian total.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 4: Staffing
environment.64 The Bureau estimates that it takes approximately 4.65 full-time
equivalent (FTE) staff to fill one 24-hour post assignment. Overtime is used to backfill
vacant positions, holidays, and cover shift relief, including vacation, sick leave,
training, and other leaves. Each “fixed” post requires constant staffing and backfill
when an employee is out on any type of leave, training, or a position is vacant.
No Coverage Plan or Analysis since 2009
The way the Custody Bureau identifies security needs and deploys staff to meet
these needs is crucial to the effective operations of the County jail system. However,
the Custody Bureau has not established a process to define and document these
needs. Custody Bureau Policy No. 1.25 mandates a “written Staffing Plan…that will
adequately meet the safety, security, service, program and legal requirements/
as set forth in the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, §1027” and charges
Division Commanders to “annually review the staffing, facility space and equipment
requirements within their facility or area of responsibility and recommend any
needed changes in the written Staffing Plan.” Review and update of the staffing
plan by the jail administrator is supposed to occur annually per the policy and, once
appropriate supervisory approvals are in place, serve as the written justification for
the number of coded staff positions submitted to the County Board of Supervisors.
Policy 1.25 has not been reviewed since June of 2008 and the most recent “staffing
plan” and post audit we found was from MGT’s 2009 Needs Assessment, which
was the year prior to the 2010 shift of jail administration from the Department of
Correction to the Sheriff’s Office.65
The Department’s response to our request for a staffing plan was two documents: a
summary of authorized permanent positions with a column for desired badge/civilian
staff and an excel spreadsheet with a listing of posts at each facility (“post charts”)
dated July 17, 2017. The key components of the Custody Bureau’s staffing process,
as it exists on paper, are the “post charts” and the application of the “relief” or “post”
factor. A post chart reflects where security staff are needed – a post. The relief factor
is a mathematical factor for determining how many full-time equivalent employees
(FTEs) are needed to staff the post for 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, or any part
thereof. Thus, theoretically one could multiply the number of posts times the relief
factors and know how many security staff are needed to operate a given facility.
The staffing information provided by the Department did not include documentation
for the relief factor calculation nor did it indicate whether a post is always required
to be filled (mandatory) or can occasionally remain vacant. Audit staff found that
post charts for Main Jail and Elmwood Complex do not accurately reflect staffing
patterns. Posts and positions listed in the “staffing plan” are all the assignments in the
facilities. However, actual operation has shown that some posts may not need to be
staffed (e.g. rover posts or Main Jail South). Other posts, while intended to be staffed
at a certain level, have been staffed at something less than what was intended or is
required to provide staffing for assignments that are more critical elsewhere in the
facility. Command staff at both facilities confirmed that variation from the staffing
plan (as reflected in the post charts) is the norm rather than the exception due to
the dynamic nature of jail operations. Facility managers informally prioritize post
64 The Professional Compliance and Audit Unit, the unit responsible for managing and maintaining
the Department’s policy manual, conducting internal inspections and audits related to custody
operations, and participating and responding to external inspections and audits by other
governmental agencies was eliminated in 2010.
65 Prepared by MGT of America, 2009.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 4: Staffing
closures consistent with operational needs; however, such actions are not adequately
documented for review on the daily rosters. Since in practice staff are allocated in
a manner that is not consistent with the “post charts,” this indicates that the listed
positions are not consistent with “fixed post” requirements. Therefore, we lacked the
ability to determine the true minimum staffing levels required to properly operate
each facility 24/7.
Since the Bureau does not formally document distinctions between types of posts,
many posts appear on daily rosters as vacant (without an employee name next to the
identified assignment) but which have actually been closed. Other posts may appear
on the daily rosters as vacant but are actually filled. The lack of post classifications
and the number of filled and unfilled posts make it more difficult for supervisory
personnel to determine which posts to fill and which posts to close when insufficient
staff is present. For example, a supervisor may decide to close a housing unit or
floor officer post due to insufficient staffing. The decision to close a post assignment
may result in inmates not being provided access to mandatory services, reduced
programming and out-of-cell time, inefficient staff schedules, security concerns, and
excessive overtime expenditures.
A degree of flexibility should be available to the facility supervisors, however
administrative oversight is necessary to ensure specific post assignments are filled.
The Custody Bureau should develop guidelines for determining which security posts
are essential to facility security and prepare post listings that specify: 1) the number of
posts to be filled; 2) when the posts are to be filled; 3) coverage schedule; 4) whether
the posts require relief personnel during employee absences; and, 5) the most upto-date relief factor. We recommend that the Custody Bureau conduct a complete
staffing analysis as recommended by National Institute of Correction to ensure the
appropriate mix and number of staff are assigned to custody positions. In addition,
the Bureau should establish a policy on critical work force requirements, below
which staffing levels may not fall. The policy should specify what duties and posts
are critical to maintaining security during an emergency, and for which overtime
may be paid if necessary to fill these posts. It may turn out that not every position
or post of every shift is critical enough to warrant overtime, but this decision should
be set by policy, not left to discretion. Thus, the Bureau should annually report to
the Board of Supervisors on its staffing plan and analysis including staffing levels,
post assignments, relief factor assumptions, overtime expenditures, vacancies by
rank and assignment, the number of personnel on loan or modified assignment/
duty, and projected short-term and long-term vacancies; include a plan for filling
these vacancies while meeting minimum staffing requirements. This report should be
agendized for Board of Supervisors review no later than April of each year, in advance
of the release of the County Recommended Budget.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 4: Staffing
Staffing Levels and Overtime
Over the last five fiscal years, spending for security personnel who directly supervise
inmates has increased by $33.6 million or 27.6 percent, from $121.7 million in FY
2012-13 to $155.3 million in FY 2016-17 after adjusting for inflation. The Custody
Bureau’s authorized staffing levels increased by 63 FTEs or nine percent over this
period, from 741 to 804 officers.66 Ostensibly, the additional positions should have
reduced the need for overtime work or at least mitigated the growth of overtime
hours. Instead, overtime expenditures increased by $14.8 million or 124.9 percent,
from $11.9 million in FY 2012-13 to $26.7 million in FY 2016-17 as summarized in
Figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4.3: Personnel Expenditures in County’s Correctional Facilities
FY
2012-13
FY
2013-14
FY
2014-15
FY
2015-16
FY
2016-17
$ Δ from
2012-13
% Δ from
2012-13
Salaries
$56.3
$58.9
$65.9
$65.6
$67.6
$11.4
20.2%
Benefits
51.3
44.4
47.9
53.3
57.9
6.6
12.8%
Overtime
11.9
16.2
15.7
19.7
26.7
14.8
124.9%
Other
2.3
2.4
2.9
3.0
3.1
0.8
36.1%
$121.7
$121.9
$132.4
$141.5
$155.3
$33.6
27.6%
($ millions)
Total
Compensation†
†Total may not add due to rounding.
Source: Auditor analysis of SAP Financial System data.
Most of this increase was due to additional recorded overtime hours, rather than an
increase in the cost of each hour. For example, over this five-year period, Sheriff’s
Correctional Deputy pay increased from $56.3 million to $67.6 million, or 20.2 percent
in real dollars, far less than the 124.9 percent increase in overtime expenditures.
Custody Bureau overtime expense growth amounted to 44 percent of the total
increase in personnel costs over the period.
Timekeeping records from the County’s PeopleSoft Payroll Software System
(PeopleSoft) indicate that sergeants and deputies worked 358,69167 paid overtime
hours in addition to their regularly scheduled hours in FY 2016-17, as illustrated in
Figure 4.4 on page 80.68 On a productive hours basis, 69 this was equivalent to an
additional 204 deputies and 14 sergeants (a detailed analysis of staff availability and
its impact on staffing requirements is addressed later in this report).
66 The 804 includes only those employees in the classification of Sheriff’s Correctional Deputy (job
code T84/U84) and Sheriff’s Correctional Sergeant (job code T74/U57). The focus of this section was
on custody line staff and first-line supervisors. These positions represent Correctional Deputy and
Correctional Sergeant classifications in Budget Unit 235, Sherriff’s Office-Department of Correction
contract. It does not include badge or civilian staff funded from Budget Unit 240, Department of
Correction, or staff assigned to Transportation from Budget Unit 230, Sheriff’s Department.
67 Includes all cost centers in Budget Unit 235 filtered by earn codes 300, 301, and 405.
68 Analysis based on data for pay periods ending 7/3/2016 to 6/18/2017.
69 Based on FY 2016-17 net annual productive hours of 1,592 for sergeants and 1,662 for deputies.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 4: Staffing
Figure 4.4: Fiscal Year 2016-17 Custody Overtime Hours by Division
Sergeant
Deputy
Grand
Total
Main Jail
9,142
159,861
169,003
Elmwood Men’s Facility
8,811
150,222
159,033
DOC Classification
1,137
11,605
12,742
Inmate Programs
826
6,736
7,562
Multi-Service Deputy Unit
132
4,549
4,681
Custodial Alternative Sup
0
1,311
1,311
Op. Standards & Inspection Unit
18
1,146
1,164
Sustainability - SDC
0
908
908
110
587
697
Operations
0
483
483
Correctional Industries
0
196
196
DOC Training Division
0
119
119
Jail Transition Team
623
0
623
Internal Affairs
117
0
117
Inmate Screening Unit
55
0
55
20,969
337,722
358,691
Department Description
ADA Compliance Unit
Grand Total
Source: PeopleSoft data.
This level of overtime to fill basic operational posts can indicate an imbalance
between staff available for assignment and operational post requirements, a
conscious policy decision to rely on overtime in the belief that it is more efficient
than hiring additional staff, inefficient scheduling/balancing of staff resources, or an
inadequate relief pool. Standardized data on the utilization of overtime by post, shift,
and cause is not available. The limited information on overtime available entailed a
significant effort on the part of Custody Bureau administrative staff to generate and
on the part of audit staff to manually code and reconcile.
The Custody Bureau should develop standardized reporting elements to identify
– whether compensated by payment or by leave time – overtime worked to meet
minimum staffing requirements and overtime worked to cover intermittent activities
or unforeseen emergencies. Administration can then consider whether a staffing
request based upon overtime worked to ensure coverage of essential security duties
is justified.
Fixed Posts Are Planned with Wrong Relief Factor
In examining potential causes for overtime, the audit team calculated the total
number of deputy and sergeant work hours required given the current complement
of established posts and compared this with total funded staff positions supported
in the Custody Bureau’s FY 2017-18 budget. Our analysis of current Custody Bureau
operations documented the annual number of hours required for each 24-hour post
assignment that appears to be relieved based on the posts and positions identified in
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 4: Staffing
the Custody Bureau’s “post charts” for Main Jail and Elmwood. The Custody Bureau
applies a relief factor of 4.65 to posts requiring 24-hour coverage when determining
the actual number of full-time equivalent (FTE) positions to request in the budget.
Command staff could not provide auditors documentation or underlying data for
the post charts used in developing budget requests for positions but recognized that
variables such as the relief factor had not been updated in many years, potentially in
more than a decade.
Since the established relief factor used by the department appears to be over 10
years old and not documented, we attempted to calculate a post factor for deputies
and sergeants. Using FY 2016-17 payroll data, we were able to make considerable
progress toward conducting a Net Annual Work Hours (NAWH) staffing analysis
using the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) methodology outlined in the Staffing
Analysis Workbook for Jails. Based on data reviewed, we developed new relief factors
for sergeants and deputies as shown in Figure 4.5 below.
Figure 4.5: Fiscal Year 2016-17 Net Annual Work Hours (NAWH) Calculation
Main Jail and Elmwood Complex
Categories
Deputy
Sergeant (1)
Weighted Average
2,086
2,086
2,086
Total Off-Post Hours/Employee
424
494
428
Net Annual Work Hours (NAWH)
1,662
1,592
1,658
5.27
5.50
5.28
Total Hours Contracted per Employee/Year
Relief Factor
(1) Current 24/7 first line supervisor (sergeant) posts are not relieved. In practice, using NAWH calculations for
fiscal year 2016-17, would require 5.5 full-time equivalent (FTE) sergeants to fill. Applying a proper relief
factor to sergeant posts provides another cadre of security personnel to respond immediately to incidents
and to supervise line staff.
Because we could not obtain complete and reliable data, we could not arrive at
a definitive number of staff needed for each distinct job classification. However,
assuming the 24-hour posts identified in the post charts are relieved, appropriate and
staffed as intended, our analysis shows the Custody Bureau’s calculation understates
the number of staff needed to meet established post requirements. The Bureauundercounted its need for officers by 84 positions because it used incorrect absence
rates. Specifically, the Bureau projected a need for 634 line-staff, including relief staff.
We estimate that if the Bureau had used the correct absence rates, it would have
projected a need for 718 line-staff or 84 more. Figure 4.6 on page 82 compares the
Custody Bureau’s projected staffing needs for FY 2017-18 to our estimate of actual
officer staffing needs for posts requiring continuous 24-hour coverage.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 4: Staffing
Figure 4.6: Comparison of Custody Bureau’s Projected Staffing Needs for 2017-18 to
the Auditor’s Estimate of Actual Staffing Needs for Deputies and Sergeants Assigned to
24-Hour Posts
Rank
Sergeant
Custody Bureau
Projected Staffing
Needs (2)
Auditor Estimate
of Custody Bureau
Staffing Needs (2)
Difference
24
33
9
610
685
75
634
718
84
(1)
Deputy
Total
Source: Auditor analysis of Custody Bureau Data
(1) Auditor’s adjustment of Custody Bureau’s FY 2017-18 staffing proposal for positions assigned to 24-hour,
7-day posts at Main Jail and Elmwood. Includes six sergeant posts that are not relieved based on current
practices.
(2) Does not include officers assigned to non-24-hour posts. Positions including those sergeants and deputies
on 5/8 or 4/10 schedules are 35 and 688, respectively.
It is important to note that the higher relief factor does not necessarily equate to a
need to increase the number of staff for two reasons: 1) the Custody Bureau’s method
of determining correctional deputy staff need using post charts does not always
match the department’s actual staffing patterns for those posts; and 2) the audit
team could not determine whether the level requested is the minimum necessary to
house inmates in a secure fashion. To develop definitive conclusions on appropriate
staffing levels, additional documentation and cooperation from the Sheriff’s Office
would be required. Prior to making any future staffing decisions, the Sheriff’s Office
should document current deployment to gain a better understanding of operational
requirements.
Vacancy Rate Consistently High
The Custody Bureau does not account for vacancies in its staffing requests. Between
FY 2012-13 and FY 2016-17 the Custody Bureau operated, on average, with 96
employees less than what was in the authorized budget due to vacancies.
Historically, the vacancy rate of the Custody Bureau has averaged 13.1 percent. Fiscal
Year 2017-18 began in a similar fashion with 103 vacant officer positions or 12.0
percent. However, as of February 26, 2018, the number of vacant positions decreased
to 67. This improvement is attributable to an increase in the number of newly hired
cadets graduating from academies and the department’s commitment to improve
and expand recruitment practices. Figure 4.7 on page 83 shows the number of
recruits in each cadet class since the Department restarted its Academy following a
2011 hiring freeze.
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Section 4: Staffing
Figure 4.7: Number of Cadet Recruits by Academy
Number of
Academies
2
Cadets Started
59
Cadets
Graduated
49
% Graduated
83%
2013-14
2
88
73
83%
2014-15
3
156
89
57%
2015-16
3
142
86
61%
2016-17
3
103
86
83%
2017-18*
2
129
118
91%
15
677
501
Average: 76%
Fiscal Year
2012-13
Totals
*Does not include Academy Class 16 that began on March 13, 2018 with 22 recruits and was in progress during
the preparation of this report.
Source: Custody Bureau Personnel and Training Division.
A relatively high average-historic vacancy rate of 12.6 percent may help explain
the perception of staffing shortages. Even now, as the most recent recruits have
graduated from the academy, they are still training in their posts. Figure 4.8 below
provides a historical context of authorized badge staffing levels and average vacancy
rates in the Custody Bureau from FY 2012-13 to FY 2016-17.
Figure 4.8: Authorized and Vacant Badge Positions†
Five - Year Average for all Divisions
FY
2012-13
FY
2013-14
FY
2014-15
FY
2015-16
FY
2016-17
5-Year
Avg.
As of
Feb. 2018
Authorized
741
741
752
784
804
765
804
Vacant
118
95
59
109
99
96
67
15.9%
12.8%
7.8%
13.9%
12.3%
12.6%
8.3%
(1)
% Vacancy Rate
† Represents modified budget figures.
(1) Includes sergeant and deputy classification codes. Deputies accounted for 93.8 or 98% of the 96 average
annual vacancies.
Source: Santa Clara County Final Adopted Budgets and Budget Unit 235 Vacancy Reports.
Vacant deputy positions in Main Jail and Elmwood have the greatest impact on
operations. As discussed earlier in the report, the number of officers available for
deployment has not kept pace with the increased demands of managing a more
challenging inmate population. Despite increased funding for new positions and cadet
academies, the net change in available employees has been marginal.
This gap requires remedial action from management to improve recruitment and
retention. The progress on maintaining a low vacancy rate made to date should be
sustained in preparation for future staff turnover and reduce the Custody Bureau’s
reliance on mandatory overtime.
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Section 4: Staffing
More Retirements are Expected
As demonstrated in Figure 4.9 below, about 33.4 percent of the workforce will be
eligible for retirement in the next five years, and about 48.1 percent will be eligible in
10 years.
Figure 4.9: Custody Bureau Retirement Eligibility
Eligibility for Retirement (1)
Percentage
As of 7/1/2017
17.0%
5 Years (7/1/2022)
33.4%
10 Years (7/1/2027)
48.1%
Source: Auditor summary of PeopleSoft data as of July 1, 2017.
(1) Classifications include Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, and Correctional Deputies in Budget Units 235 and
240.
Steps the Custody Bureau has taken to improve recruitment include running
continuous Custody Academies and developing a stand-alone Training and
Compliance unit separate from the Personnel Unit. In addition, the Sheriff’s Office
has also taken proactive steps to streamline the long application process by hiring an
in-house polygrapher and increasing capacity for contracted polygraphist services to
continue to expedite the background check process. The Personnel Unit attended 20
recruitment events from August to December 2017 and has been working to identify
community events that provide an opportunity for the Sheriff’s Office deputies
to promote the department and educate potential applicants on the hiring and
background process.70
Future Staffing Considerations
To address current and future vacancies, the Custody Bureau should use civilians in
positions that do not require the expertise of sworn deputies and redeploy sworn
staff to more appropriate security assignments in the jails. As the appointing authority
for all badge and non-badge staff working in the jails, the Sheriff has broad discretion
in determining the optimal staffing mix that strikes a balance between and among
specific sworn and civilian personnel classifications. There are certain positions, by
law, the Sheriff must staff with sworn officers; however, there are other positions
throughout the Custody Bureau in which judgement can be applied in deciding
whether to use sworn officers or civilians.
70 Sheriff’s Office Quarterly Report relating to the Academy, Recruitment, and Staffing Levels from
August through December of 2017. Received by the Public Safety and Justice Committee (PSJC) on
February 21, 2018. Accessed: http://sccgov.iqm2.com/Citizens/Detail_LegiFile.aspx?ID=89653.
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Section 4: Staffing
Our review of staffing levels and workload responsibilities at Main Jail and Elmwood
found that there are opportunities for the Custody Bureau to achieve efficiencies
without compromising operational effectiveness by converting certain Deputy
positions in “control room” posts at Main Jail and Elmwood to civilian status. To
determine what criteria to use in deciding if a position qualifies as one a civilian could
perform, we adapted a methodology based on a series of sequential questions drawn
from civilianization studies performed by police departments and law enforcement
agencies across the country.71
For the positions we reviewed, we asked:
1. Does the position require law enforcement duties (i.e., powers of arrests, use
of force, statutory requirements, carrying a firearm)?
2. Does the position require the skills, training, and experience of a sworn deputy
to fulfill the job duties?
3. Can a trained civilian fulfill the requirements of the position?
The Management Audit Division considered a position suitable for conversion if the
answer to the first two questions was “no” and the answer to the last question was
“yes.”72
To reduce the burden of mandatory overtime and the shortage of Correctional
Deputies, the Bureau should adopt a policy requiring use of civilian job classifications
for assignments relating to administrative, support, and other functions where
badged staff is not required. We recommend that the Bureau work with the Employee
Services Agency to conduct a comprehensive review of civilian classifications for
positions identified as candidates for civilianization to ensure an appropriate
matching of skills and qualifications. A deliverable from this effort should be a plan for
recruiting, hiring, and training civilian staff pursuant to the job duties they would be
performing.
For those uniformed positions that we determined could be “civilianized,” we
reviewed the County’s job specifications to determine comparable civilian job codes.
Based on our review of the Custody Bureau’s permanent authorized positions as of
July 17, 2017, we determined that approximately 18 out of the 13073 fixed posts in the
Main Jail and Elmwood could be filled by civilians.
71 Adapted from prior civilianization studies in Vancouver, Kansas City, New York City, Los Angeles, and
San Jose.
72 Curt Taylor Griffiths, “Civilianization in the Vancouver Police Department,” March 13, 2006, Appendix
Q – Interview Record Summary, accessed February 2, 2018, http://vancouver.ca/police/assets/pdf/
studies/vpd-studycivilianization.pdf.
73 Consists of nine 24-hour control room posts at Main Jail and nine 24-hour control room posts at
Elmwood based on post listings provided by the Custody Bureau.
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Section 4: Staffing
This change would create three benefits: 1) More efficient use of dollars expended
on staffing costs, 2) the ability to re-allocate scarce deputy resources, which would
eliminate chronically vacant positions, and 3) reduce the need for mandatory
overtime. The primary reasons for recommending this change are operational – that
is, to enhance the number of available deputies for duties that only deputies can carry
out, thereby reducing the burden of mandatory overtime and employee fatigue. As
noted previously, overtime requirements have increased significantly over the last
five years. Numerous studies have found that excessive overtime takes a toll on the
mental and physical health of employees. Improving the well-being of staff who work
a minimum of 12 hours per day in a stressful and dangerous environment could
reduce the County’s liability by enabling these employees to be less mentally and
physically fatigued.
According to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), research shows that fatigued police
officers:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Use more sick leave.
Practice inappropriate uses of force more frequently.
Become involved in more vehicle accidents.
Experience more accidental injuries.
Have more difficulty dealing with community members and other law
enforcement agencies.
Have a higher likelihood of dying in the line of duty.
The NIJ has compared fatigued officers to drunk officers, saying that high levels of
fatigue are equivalent to alcohol intoxication. Although this research was conducted
on police officers, we believe these findings are applicable to the County’s correctional
deputies.
We carefully reviewed the written position procedures and compared them to
the written job specifications for both Correctional Deputies and Custody Support
Assistants. Control room duties include, among others, maintaining the post log book,
the security of the sally-port and module doors, and control of the post keys and
radio. These functions are critical to facility operations but do not involve any contact
with inmates nor require the specific skills of trained, uniformed officers. Therefore,
the Management Audit Division recommends converting all 42 control room
positions at Main Jail and all 43 control room positions at Elmwood to civilian status.
It’s important to note that we are not proposing to eliminate any existing deputy
positions. Rather, instead of hiring additional deputies to fill existing or new vacancies,
the Custody Bureau could hire CSAs to fill control room functions currently performed
by deputies and redeploy those employees to tasks that require their specific training
and skills.
To illustrate the impact of civilianization, we performed a high-level cost/benefit
analysis of using custody support assistants (CSAs) in 18 “control room” posts that call
for 24-hour continuous coverage on each 12-hour shift.74 Deputies incurred 337,722
of the 358,691 overtime hours reported in FY 2016-17 at an average hourly overtime
rate of $69. Time entry reports from PeopleSoft show that over 70 percent of those
hours were attributable to backfilling vacant, authorized post assignments at Main Jail
and Elmwood. Assuming future years will generate similar levels of overtime absent
74 Nine control room posts in Main Jail and nine control room posts in Elmwood assuming current relief
factor established by the Bureau (18*4.65=85). Round up for relief.
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Section 4: Staffing
any action, we estimate one re-deployed deputy currently assigned to a Main Jail or
Elmwood “control room” post can work the equivalent of 1,66275 straight time hours
a regular hourly pay rate, thereby reducing future overtime costs by $114,678. The
goal of this recommendation is to be proactive in taking steps to identify appropriate
responses to staff shortages and match operations with resources.
Figure 4.10 below summarizes the recommendation to add new civilian positions in
Main Jail and Elmwood, thus freeing up deputies to fill existing, chronically vacant
positions.
Figure 4.10: Projected Net Annual Impact of Civilianizing Control Room Posts
Additional
Civilians
Sworn FTERedeployed
OT Hours
Reduction
Additional
Civilian
Personnel
Costs
Control Room Posts
– Main Jail
47
42
69,804
$4,937,679
($4,816,476)
$121,203
Control Room Posts
– Elmwood
48
43
71,466
$5,042,736
($4,931,154)
$111,582
95
85
141,270
$9,980,415
($9,747,630)
$232,785
Civilianize
Totals
OT Cost
Reduction
Net
Impact
Source: Management Audit Division
The above projections are based on the premise that the full net available work hours
(NAWH) from reassigned sworn deputies will be used to fill staffing voids caused
by vacancies and planned/unplanned absences at the regular hourly rate of pay
previously filled by deputies working at the overtime rate. Civilianizing the 18 fixed
control room posts would require:
1. Hiring a total of 95 Custody Support Assistants to fill control room functions
currently performed by deputies.
2. Re-deploying the deputies, estimated to be 85 positions, previously performing
these duties to staff vacant posts at a regular hourly rate of pay in lieu of
paying overtime.
75 Net annual work hours for deputies (NAWH) are calculated in Figure 4.5 on page 81.
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Section 4: Staffing
It is important to note that there are two components of “savings” attributable to 1)
the conversion from Sheriff’s Correctional Deputies to Custody Support Assistants;
and 2) the projected reduction of overtime. The Management Audit Division is not
proposing to eliminate any existing deputy positions. The audit identifies specific
sworn positions that could be filled by civilian CSAs with funds previously used to
finance overtime. Impacted sworn positions would be used to reduce overtime
within the Custody Bureau. Therefore, the addition of 95 new CSAs would increase
the Department’s regular salaries and benefits costs by an estimated $10.0 million
per year. However, effectively adding 85 deputies would result in reduction of use
of overtime. We estimate the overtime reduction would amount to $9.8 million per
year.76
The addition of 95 new CSAs would increase the Bureau’s regular salaries and
benefits costs by an estimated $10.0 per year. However, adding 95 CSAs would
effectively generate a pool of relief deputies that can be used to support 24-hour post
assignments throughout the facilities at a regular hourly rate in lieu of paid overtime.
The estimated impact of one reassigned deputy is $114,678 in reduced overtime
costs. Assuming 85 deputies are available for reassignment, the conversion could
reduce overtime expenses by $9.8 million. The net cost to the general fund would be
$232,785 per year. It is possible that the change could result in a net savings, if due to
the end of chronic vacancies, there is a decrease in leave time, such as sick leave, as a
result of less stress and fatigue.
In sum, the estimated increased expense for new CSA positions would be about $10.0
million per year, minus the estimated reduction in overtime costs of $9.8 million per
year, resulting in an estimated net increase in annual General Fund cost of $232,785
per year. Assuming the Bureau continued to aggressively recruit personnel and hold
multiple academies per year, this change would substantially reduce the chronic
vacancies that have plagued the Bureau for years. We note that historically, CSA
positions have been easier to fill than deputy positions.
CONCLUSION
For the Department to efficiently accomplish its mission it must have sufficient staff
to provide a safe environment and protect the public, facility staff, and inmates.
The Department has increasing demands and expectations on its performance and
outcomes. This will likely require some level of additional staff, but the Department
should first establish the foundation of regular staffing analysis, over-time controls
and continued efforts to decrease vacancies. Without these efforts, a lower level of
staff could compromise goals, erode safety and security, add unnecessary stress to
staff thorough excessive overtime, and expose the County to greater liability and
litigation.
76 The reason 95 CSAs are needed versus the 85 deputies currently assigned is because the Custody
Bureau’s relief factor does not accurately reflect absences and relief requirements of deputies in
those positions. We did not calculate net productive hours for Custody Support Assistants but rather
assumed that the productivity level of the two job classifications would yield the same net annual
work hours of 1,662.
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Section 4: Staffing
Although we identified several potential adverse consequences that result from
the current level of staffing, we cannot determine whether increasing staff beyond
the presently authorized levels is necessary to allow the Department to achieve its
mission and goals. It is possible that having all the authorized positions filled may
adequately address the current security needs of the department. Ultimately, an
annual staffing plan is critical to identify staffing requirements which will ultimately
lead to whether a position surplus or deficit exists.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Board of Supervisors should:
4.1 To improve efficiency, increase the availability of Deputies and reduce
overtime use, approve the addition of 95 Custody Support Assistants
at Main Jail and Elmwood, with the direction that as the positions are
hired, they are assigned to control room posts and Correctional Deputies
currently assigned to control room posts are reassigned to the A, B, C, or D
teams within the jails. (Priority 1)
4.2
To reduce the burden of mandatory overtime and the shortage of
Correctional Deputies, adopt a policy requiring the Sheriff’s Office to
use civilian job classifications for assignments relating to administrative,
support, and other functions where badged staff is not required.
(Priority 1)
4.3
To ensure sufficient resources are available in the budget, require all
requests for new posts or additional staff to be supported with written
justification of the need, specifying the criteria used to justify the
need. Such documentation should include, but not be limited to, post
assignment requirements, position classifications needed to fill each post,
and staffing patterns based on the number of net annual post hours
established for each primary position classification (relief factor).
(Priority 2)
The Sheriff’s Office should:
4.4 Develop guidelines for determining which security posts are essential
to facility security. The guidelines should specify what duties and posts
are required to maintaining security during an emergency and for which
overtime may be paid if necessary to fill these posts. (Priority 1)
4.5
Update the relief factor to accurately determine the number of
correctional staff needed to provide post coverage identified in
recommendation 1.5. (Priority 2)
4.6
Conduct a complete staffing analysis as recommended by National
Institute of Correction to ensure the appropriate mix and number of staff
are assigned to custody positions. (Priority 1)
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
4.7
Report to the Board of Supervisors updated staffing information no later than April of each year
including staffing levels, post assignments, relief factor assumptions, overtime expenditures,
vacancies by rank and assignment, the number of personnel on loan or modified assignment/
duty, and projected short-term and long-term vacancies; include a plan for filling these
vacancies while meeting minimum staffing requirements. This report should be agendized for
Board of Supervisors review in advance of the release of the County Recommended Budget.
(Priority 2)
4.8
Work with the Employee Services Agency to conduct a comprehensive review of civilian
classifications for positions identified as candidates for civilianization to ensure an appropriate
matching of skills and qualifications. Develop a plan for recruiting, hiring, and training civilian
staff pursuant to the job duties they would be performing. (Priority 2)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendations 4.1 - 4.2 combined would cost an additional $232,785 per year. These two
recommendations act together and will ultimately improve the safety, security and reduce the heightened
risk of financial liability to the County.
Recommendations 4.3 will enable the Custody Bureau to define its staffing needs and allow the Board to
evaluate the reasonableness of staffing requests in a consistent fashion.
Recommendations 4.4 - 4.5 are feasible with current resources. Accurate relief factors can be calculated
for any position classification using actual leave data tracked by administrative staff at each facility or by
fiscal services and applied.
Recommendation 4.6 is currently in the process of being implemented by the Custody Bureau and has no
budgetary implication.
Recommendations 4.7 - 4.8 could be implemented without additional resources.
Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Background
In response to the transfer of many low-level offenders from prisons to jails under
the Public Safety Realignment Act (2011), the Santa Clara County Office of the
Sheriff created the Custody Alternative Supervision Program (CASP) in March 2012.
CASP consists of two phases: 1) the in-custody phase, and 2) the out-of-custody
phase. During the in-custody phase, inmates participate in programs and are case
managed by Rehabilitation Officers (ROs) while in custody. Upon release, participants
are supervised by Sheriff staff and case managed by ROs in the community. All
participants must live in verified, clean and sober homes, with family or in transitional
housing. An average of 140 inmates per year participate in the program.
Problem and Adverse Effect
Research shows that many alternatives to incarceration are cost-effective and do
not lead to worse outcomes in terms of crime and recidivism. The recidivism rate
for those who completed CASP was 7.0 percent lower than those who served their
sentence in jail, according to the Office of Reentry Services. The cost to incarcerate an
inmate in jail is $88,000 per year. This includes “fixed” costs such as administration
and utilities and “variable” costs such as food and laundry services. The variable cost
per inmate alone is $3,245 per year, which we compared to the cost of supervising a
CASP participant in the community ($15,500 per year). Despite its higher per-inmate
cost, an expanded CASP has the potential to lower custody costs as the program
reduces recidivism and the inmate population to the point that entire housing units
can be closed and associated staffing reductions can occur.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
We recommend that the Custody Bureau expand the out-of-custody phase of CASP to
serve an additional 219 Realignment inmates in the jails. We recommend that it hire
15.0 additional full-time positions for these additional inmates. We estimate that after
accounting for personnel costs, the County would incur costs of approximately $3.8
million to $5.3 million per year by expanding CASP. Eventually some or all of these
additional costs would be offset by savings as the Custody Bureau closes portions of
its jail operations as a result of the reduced need to incarcerate people.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
FINDING
Enacted on October 1, 2011, the Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) transfers
the management of many low-level offenders from the state to the county level.
Thus, specified offenders overseen by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation are “realigned” to local agencies. The Realignment population consists
of two major subpopulations:
1170(h) offenders: Defendants newly convicted of non-serious, non-violent, and nonsexual offenses (or “N3” offenses, for short) now serve their sentence locally in jail.
The courts have at least three sentencing options for this population:
A “straight sentence”: Full sentence in county jail (can be served in alternative custody
programs);
A “split sentence”: Combination of a term in county jail and mandatory supervision,
which together cannot exceed the total term chosen by the sentencing judge.
County probation, which can include up to one year maximum in county jail. That is,
a defendant who violates the terms and conditions of probation could be given a full
term of imprisonment or a split sentence.
Post-release community supervision: Inmates in state prison whose current
commitment offense is a N3 offense are released to county probation, not state
parole.
Custodial Alternative Supervision Program
In response to the transfer of many low-level offenders from prisons to jails under
the Realignment Act, the Santa Clara County Office of the Sheriff created the Custody
Alternative Supervision Program (CASP) in March 2012. The purpose of CASP is
to provide intensive supervision of sentenced offenders who are participating in
community based programs in lieu of being physically incarcerated in jail. The
program is a collaboration of the Sheriff’s Inmate Programs and the Custody
Alternative Supervision Unit (CASU).
The program consists of two phases: 1) the in-custody phase, and 2) the out-ofcustody phase.
During the in-custody phase, inmates participate in in-custody educational and
vocational programs and are case managed by Rehabilitation Officers (ROs). When
appropriate, ROs refer participants to the out-of-custody phase of the program
with individualized transition plans. Based on needs, participants are assigned to
outpatient or residential treatment programs, educational or vocational programs,
and work release or school release programs.
During the out-of-custody phase, program participants are supervised by CASU
deputies in the community where they live and continue to be case managed by ROs.
Participants must abide by the terms and conditions of their transition plan. If they
fail to comply with their plan, they are subject to graduated sanctions, which range
from administrative sanctions (behavior contracts, warnings, etc.) to new charges and
a return to being physically incarcerated in jail.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
The number of staff currently assigned to CASU includes two Sheriff Deputies, two
Correctional Deputies, and one Sheriff Sergeant, for a total of five staff. This team can
supervise up to 75 participants, which equates to about 19 participants per deputy at
any given time.
CASP Participants
Although it was created for Realignment inmates, CASP is also offered to nonRealignment inmates, provided that they are assessed carefully and deemed suitable
to participate. CASP therefore includes a combination of Realignment and nonRealignment inmates. The Custody Bureau does not track the source of inmates in
CASP, however.
Figure 5.1 below is a comparison of annual CASP and Realignment inmates in the jails
since 2011. It shows that three to five times more Realignment inmates per year were
physically incarcerated in jail than enrolled in CASP. However, this comparison should
only be used to obtain a general indication of program usage because, as mentioned
above, CASP includes a combination of Realignment and non-Realignment inmates.
Figure 5.1: Most Realignment Inmates Were Not Enrolled in CASP
Source: County of Santa Clara Office of Reentry Service & the Custody Alternative Supervision Unit.
Notes:
The Realignment population includes both 1170(h) straight and split sentenced offenders.
CASP Participant Outcomes
Custody Bureau data shows that as of June 28, 2017, there had been 839 CASP
participants total, of which 62 were active participants and the remaining 777 were
previous participants. Also as of June 28, 2017, 547 of the 777 previous participants
(70 percent) had successfully completed their sentence in the community, as shown in
Figure 5.2 on page 94. Another 23 previous participants (three percent) successfully
completed their sentence after they were returned to jail but given a second or
third chance to participate in CASP. These individuals are categorized as “Return
Completions”.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Figure 5.2: CASP Participant Outcomes
Outcome
Mar 2012-Jun 2017
%
Successful Completion
547
70%
Return Completion
23
3%
Program Failure
77
10%
Drug/Alcohol Test Failure
59
8%
New Law Violation - Felony
26
3%
Absconded
16
2%
New Law Violation – Misd.
12
2%
Other
6
1%
Technical - Other
6
1%
Non-Reporting
5
1%
777
100%
Total
Source: Custody Bureau CASP program data
Recidivism Rate Comparison
In its August 2017 report to the Board assessing the first five years of Realignment,
the County of Santa Clara Office of Reentry Services found that the recidivism rate
for those who successfully completed CASP prior to September 2016 and had at least
one year to reoffend (357 individuals) was 7.0 percent lower than the Realignment
population as a whole (see Figure 5.3 on page 95).
This, in addition to the program’s client-focused services, led the Office of Reentry
Services to conclude that CASP is “a viable alternative to traditional custody” and “if
participants are chosen carefully and provided structure, supervised community living
is not only an appropriate alternative to incarceration, it is preferable.” In addition
to preferring CASP over traditional incarceration for selected offenders, the Office
of Reentry Services concluded that expanding CASP would allow for more savings to
the County (presumably in avoided jail costs), and improved opportunities for CASP
participants to reconnect with their families as they complete their sentence in the
community.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Figure 5.3: Recidivism Rate Comparison
Source: County of Santa Clara Office of Reentry Services.
CASP Cost-Effectiveness
The research literature on alternatives to incarceration generally agrees that
in addition to not leading to worse outcomes in terms of crime and recidivism,
alternative custody programs like CASP are cost-effective. We estimated that the
Custody Bureau’s average-per-inmate cost is about $88,000 per year. This includes
most Office of the Sheriff costs, and all Department of Correction and Custody Heath
costs, and is affected by a variety of factors, of which the size of the inmate population
is the biggest cost driver.
As discussed later, multiplying the average-per-inmate cost by a reduction in the
inmate population overestimates jail cost savings because the average cost includes
“fixed” costs for administration, utilities and facilities that do not change when the
inmate population declines. Savings should instead be made using “marginal” costs,
which consist of: 1) “variable” costs, such as food and laundry that are directly linked
to the number of inmates; and 2) “step-fixed” costs such as personnel costs, that
change when the inmate population declines to the point that entire housing units
can be closed and associated staffing reductions can occur.
We estimate that the Sheriff’s average-per-CASP participant cost is about $15,500 per
year.
CASP has other costs which are borne by other County departments, however. For
instance, the Behavioral Health Services Department (BHSD) has contracts with
three community-based organizations (Community Solutions, Heaven’s Gate Inc. and
Rainbow Recovery Foundation) for transitional housing units, which are utilized by
CASP and other clients. The cost to provide an individual with transitional housing is,
on average, $6,841 per year.
We note that BHSD receives grant funds, and is otherwise fully reimbursed by the
State of California under the Mental Health Services Act (MHSA) for transitional
housing. Aside from paying contract costs upfront that are eventually reimbursed, the
County’s General Fund does not bear any permanent costs for transitional housing to
CASP participants.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Most Inmates Have Never Heard of CASP
Based on our survey of 731 inmates, see Appendix A for more details, most inmates
reported being unaware of CASP, as revealed by their answers to the following two
multiple-choice survey questions in Figure 5.4 below.
Figure 5.4: Excerpt from Management Audit Inmate Survey
11. Are you currently in the first phase of the Custody Alternative Supervision Program (CASP).
Yes
No
63
591
11a. If no, please tell us why not?
Not interested
No space available
Not eligible
Not screened
I've never heard of this before
Other: ________________
25
7
53
27
327
28
Source: Management Audit Division. See Appendix A – Inmate Survey for methodology and additional details
Obstacles to CASP Expansion
The Custody Bureau advised us that the single greatest obstacle to expansion of
CASP is the limited number of transitional housing units for inmates who would
otherwise have no place to live. As previously mentioned, Behavioral Health, not
the Custody Bureau, contracts for transitional housing units, which are utilized by
CASP participants and other clients. Currently, Behavioral Health’s three transitional
housing providers serve a combined 86 clients per year, although it is unclear how
many are CASP participants versus other clients. Irrespective of how many are CASP
participants, the Custody Bureau’s ability to expand the program is dependent on
both the capacity and willingness of current (and potentially new) transitional housing
providers to serve additional CASP participants.
Calculation of Additional Expenses and Potential Costs Savings as a Result of
CASP Expansion
Custody Bureau records show that as of June 28, 2017, there were 3,521 inmates
total in the County’s jails. Of these, 219 were 1170(h) Realignment inmates, and 3,302
were other types of inmates, for a ratio between the two types of inmates of about
16:1. In other words, there were 16 non-Realignment inmates for every Realignment
inmate in the jails. However, as mentioned earlier, the Custody Bureau does not
track the source of inmates for CASP. Therefore, we could not apply the 16:1 ratio
to the jails’ Realignment and non-Realignment populations to estimate how many
additional inmates from each population would be deemed suitable for CASP. For this
analysis, we instead assumed that all 219 Realignment inmates, but none of the 3,302
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non-Realignment inmates, would be deemed suitable. However, it is far more likely
that a combination of Realignment and non-Realignment inmates would be deemed
suitable. Given our assumption, nevertheless, we estimated additional program costs
of $2,819,642 per year, based on current law enforcement and rehabilitation staff-toparticipant ratios, as shown in Figure 5.5 below.
Figure 5.5: Annual Expenses Required to Expand CASP
Additional FTE Required
Total Cost
Sergeant
1
$234,573
Deputy Sheriff
3
609,857
Correctional Deputy
3
539,831
Rehabilitation Officer
8
1,435,382
15
$2,819,642
Position Type
Total Additional Expenses
Source: Management Audit Division
As previously mentioned, the cost of expanding CASP would apply not only to
the Custody Bureau, but also to the Behavioral Health Services Department. We
estimated that providing transitional housing to 219 additional inmates (or 160
inmates after adjusting for the current program failure rate of 27 percent) would cost
Behavioral Health an additional $1,094,560 per year, based on its current per client
cost of $6,841 per year. However, as mentioned earlier, some or all of these costs may
be reimburse-able from the State MHSA.
We estimated the Custody Bureau would incur net variable costs $1.9 million per year
by expanding CASP to include the above-noted 160 inmates, as shown in Figure 5.6
below.
Figure 5.6: Annual Variable Costs Due to Expansion of CASP
Per
Participant
No. of New
Participants
Total
Proposed additional CASP
Cost
$15,500
Current Variable Jail Cost
-$3,245
-$519,269
$12,255
$1,960,731
Net Costs
160
$2,480,000
Source: Management Audit Division.
We also estimated that the Custody Bureau would realize jail cost savings of $985,000
per year due to the fact that individuals who complete their sentence in CASP are
less likely than other Realignment inmates to recidivate and return to jail. The cost
assumes an annual rate based on a year of custody, as shown in Figure 5.7 on page
98.
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Section 5: Rehabilitate More Offenders in the Community to Lower Custody Costs
Figure 5.7: Annual Cost Savings Due to Lower Recidivism of CASP
No. of New
Participants
Current 1170(h) inmates not in CASP
Proposed enrollment in CASP
Recidivism
Rate After
One Year
No. of
Recidivists
50%
80
43%
-69
7%
11
160
Net Savings
Jail Costs
Per Year
$88,000
Total Annual
Cost
$7,040,000
-6,054,400
$985,600
Source: Management Audit Division.
Annual variable costs together less custody costs associated with lower recidivism
among CASP completions total $975,131 per year. From the Sheriff’s perspective,
after accounting for additional staffing expenses of $2,819,642 per year, the Custody
Bureau would incur total costs of $3,794,774 per year. At the same time, however,
Behavioral Health would have additional expenses of $1,094,560 per year, which may
be offset with additional grant funds and State MHSA reimbursements. Because the
County’s allotment of grant funds or State MHSA reimbursements varies each year,
we cannot predict how much Behavioral Health will have available for transitional
housing next year or any year thereafter. If it does not receive any additional monies,
total costs to the County would be increased by $1,094,560 per year.
CONCLUSION
Despite the facts that the CASP program has a high rate of participant completion, is
cost-effective, and leads to better outcomes than traditional incarceration in terms of
crime recidivism, the Custody Bureau has underutilized CASP for the group of inmates
it was designed to serve.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Office of the Sheriff should:
5.1 Expand the out-of-custody phase of its Custody Alternative Supervision
Program to serve 219 additional Realignment inmates in the jails.
(Priority 1)
5.2
Hire 1.0 FTE Sheriff Sergeant, 3.0 FTE Sheriff Deputies, 3.0 FTE Correctional
Deputies, and 8.0 FTE Rehabilitation Officers to supervise and case
manage the 219 additional Realignment inmates in the community.
(Priority 1)
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SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
By implementing Recommendations 5.1 and 5.2, we estimate that the County would
incur costs of $3,794,774 to $5,292,888 per year, depending on whether the State
reimburses the Behavioral Health Services Department for the additional transitional
housing expenses. These costs may be partially or fully offset if the Custody Bureau
closed a portion of its jail operations as a result of the reduced need to incarcerate.
We estimate that it would take about four years for enough additional inmates to go
through CASP and not recidivate and thereby allow the Office of the Sheriff to close
a typical 42-inmate housing unit in the Main Jail, based on the above-noted 11 fewer
CASP recidivists per year.
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Section 6: Classification and Housing
Section 6: Classification and Housing
Background
Inmate classification is a system that assigns inmates to housing units and programs
based on objective criteria. The Classification Unit aims to place inmates in the least
restrictive environment possible, while still maintaining the safety and security of
all individuals who live and work within the County Jail. Initial housing decisions are
based on a risk assessment interview during the booking process, and a classification
file is created for each inmate. This file is reviewed every 60 days for potential housing
reassessments, calculated from the inmate’s booking date.
Problems and Adverse Effects
The Sheriff Office’s Custody Bureau’s new, automated classification tool –
implemented at the end of 2016 and throughout 2017 – miscalculates inmates’
custody scores due to an error in the sign (plus/minus) of numbers used in several
of these calculations. Further, the tool’s alerts for upcoming reassessments do not
automatically generate for Minimum and Medium security male inmates who were
initially booked under the old classification system. In its performance management
of the classification process, the Custody Bureau does not have written guidelines
or a centralized recordkeeping system for its reported classification audits. Lastly,
the Management Audit Division was unable to verify that the Custody Bureau has
implemented components such as discretionary overrides and face-to-face inmate
interviews in a manner intended by the experts who developed the new classification
system.
Failure to classify inmates accurately according to the new, expert-vetted system
may result in improper inmate housing assignments. Improper housing assignments
may, in turn, increase the risk of violence among inmates who could be inadvertently
housed together due to classification errors. Further, classification errors may unduly
deny inmates of privileges they would have received otherwise. For instance, the
“sign” error results in the accidental addition of two “points” on a scale in which
inmates who score 10 or higher are classified as “maximum security.” Maximum
security inmates receive differential programming opportunities as compared to
minimum and medium security inmates. Therefore, classification errors may deprive
otherwise eligible inmates of opportunities for programs that may aid in their
treatment and rehabilitation.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Custody Bureau should confer with its information technology specialists to
fix the calculation issues in the classification tool and bring the subgroup of lower
security male inmates into the system. The Custody Bureau should also develop
procedures for conducting and documenting the results of Classification Unit audits.
Lastly, the Custody Bureau should bring in the experts who helped design the new
classification system to assess the Classification Unit’s use of discretionary overrides
and face-to-face inmate interviews.
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FINDING
The inmate classification system assigns inmates to housing units and activities based
on objective behavior and demographic criteria. Goals of inmate classification include
placing inmates in the least restrictive housing environment possible while also 1)
optimizing the control and management of inmates; 2) reducing the potential for
inmate victimization; and 3) preventing staff and inmate assaults. Therefore, a welldesigned and effective classification system is fundamental to the security and safety
of inmates and staff. In addition, because treatment programs are only offered in
certain housing units, which, in turn, are assigned based on an inmate’s classification
score, an inmate’s day-to-day experience and subsequent potential for recidivism are
directly affected by the setup of classification processes and systems.
Classification decisions are made by the Classification Unit, which conducts a risk
assessment and creates a classification file for each inmate during the booking
process, as shown in Figure 6.1 below for the Classification Unit’s organization chart.
Figure 6.1: Classification Unit Organization Chart
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Classification is an ongoing process, and inmates are continuously reassessed
to determine changes in security levels and housing assignments. During these
reassessments, the Classification Unit, per Custody Bureau policy, must move inmates
to less restrictive housing units as frequently as possible.77
At the end of calendar year 2016 and during the first half of 2017, the Custody
Bureau implemented a new risk assessment system called the Austin Tool as part
of the Sheriff’s Jail Reform Plan issued in March of 2016 (see Figure 6.2 below for
the full timeline). This tool was created in partnership with a justice and corrections
research organization called the JFA Institute, which partners with federal, state,
and local government agencies to evaluate current criminal justice practices and
implement effective policies and programs.78 The purpose of the new Austin tool was
to implement the following National Institute of Corrections (NIC) standards regarding
classification:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The use of objective, numerically-scored criteria
The use of face-to-face interviews
An initial and reclassification process
The application of over-rides
According to the JFA Institute’s report issued in August of 2016, the previous
classification tool contained several non-numeric, subjective criteria; lacked a set
of formal over-rides; and had no formal re-classification process. Under the new
system, inmates are scored according to an initial numeric risk assessment tool, and
a reassessment is completed every 60 days from the inmate’s original booking date to
determine potential re-housings.
Figure 6.2: Implementation of New Classification Tool79
Population
Rollout Date
Female Inmates
Booked into
Custody
60-Day
Reassessment
Tool for Female
Inmates
Male Inmates
Booked into
Custody
60-Day
Reassessment
Tool for Male
Inmates
12/12/2016
2/13/2017
3/09/2017
5/08/2017
Source: Custody Bureau
The Austin Tool’s Automated Features have Limitations that may Result in
Inappropriately Classified Inmates and Late Reassessments
Both the initial and reassessment classification tools under the Austin system
are on an electronic platform that auto-calculates an inmate’s custody score and
corresponding security level based on certain criteria selected by the Classification
Officer. For every initial assessment and reassessment, the Classification Officer prints
out the tool’s cover sheet, which summarizes the inmate’s custody score and security
level, and places this cover sheet in the inmate’s physical classification file.
77 The Classification Unit refers to this process as a “down-class.”
78 JFA Institute. (2006). Services. Retrieved from http://www.jfa-associates.com/.
79 Further discussion regarding the timeline and implementation process of the classification system
can be found in the introductory Classification Changes section.
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The Management Audit Division reviewed a sample of four of these classification
files, which the Custody Bureau reported was chosen through random selection.80 In
three of the four samples, the files contained Austin Tool cover sheets with incorrectly
calculated custody scores. Primarily, this was a recurring issue with the reassessment
tool, which lists criteria related to in-custody behavior in addition to risk factors
outlined in the initial assessment. The electronic reassessment tool repeatedly
added +1 to the overall custody score (higher custody scores corresponding to
higher security levels) for an in-custody behavior category that was supposed to be
associated with a -1. This net difference of +2 is significant on a scale in which any
score of 10 or more is associated with a Maximum-security level.
If Classification Officers used these scores to heavily inform their classification
decisions, it is possible that this recurring miscalculation might have erroneously
placed inmates into higher security levels than intended under the new classification
system. Such an error undermines one of the core reasons for converting to the
new system, which was to introduce objective, numerically scored criteria into the
classification process.
Further, while the electronic platform automatically schedules 60-day reassessments
for inmates booked into custody under the new Austin Tool, it does not do so for a
proportion of individuals who were classified under the old system. Names of inmates
requiring a 60-day reassessment are generated by security level on the electronic
platform. Classification Officers check this platform daily, and reassess the inmates
whose names appear in the system. However, the names of 1,528 pre-Austin male
inmates who are currently designated as either Minimum or Medium security are
not generated in either this platform or the legacy electronic system, making it
impossible to determine, from any electronic system, when these inmates require a
reassessment.81
To schedule reassessments for this population, Classification Officers at Elmwood
manually review the booking dates all males housed at this facility, and identify
individuals who were booked prior to March of 2017 (when the initial tool was
introduced to male inmates). They then pull the physical classification files for these
inmates to check when their file was last reviewed, and schedule a reassessment
accordingly. In addition to the inefficiencies posed by this manual process, the
possibility of human error increases the risk that inmates may not receive their
scheduled review on time. If a Classification Officer overlooks a pre-Austin Medium or
Minimum-security inmate and thus fails to retrieve that inmate’s last reassessment,
the Classification Officer will be unable appropriately schedule the individual’s next
review.
80 The External Oversight finding contains a detailed discussion of the limitations of the records that the
Custody Bureau was able or willing to provide. In this case, the Custody Bureau was restricted from
revealing inmate’s names and identifiers, and offered the Management Audit Division the opportunity
to review four records selected by the Custody Bureau. The Custody Bureau reported concerns
regarding how the audit team would interpret the information and the time burden of redacting
inmate information if it were to provide more records. Despite these limitations, several problems
were observed in the limited number of records provided to the audit team and these problems were
confirmed by Custody Bureau staff.
81 Figure of 1,528 is as of January 3, 2018, from Management Audit Division analysis of de-identified
inmate records provided by the Justice & Emergency Management committee (PSJEM).
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Section 6: Classification and Housing
The Custody Bureau Lacks Guidelines and Documentation Around its Reported
Classification Audits
To facilitate the goals of inmate classification, the Classification Unit reported that
it conducts periodic audits to ensure that 1) inmates have received their 60-day
review on schedule; 2) that inmates are down-classed to the least restrictive housing
unit possible during reassessments; and 3) that inmates have received information
around all available programs. In addition, the Custody Bureau stated in its August
2017 classification update to the Board of Supervisors that the Classification Unit will
review 20 percent of all assessments every six months to evaluate appropriate scoring
of assessments and reassessments. The Lieutenant and Captain will then examine the
results of these reviews.
However, it is unclear whether there are any standards or documentation around
these performance review processes, as the Custody Bureau was unable to provide
the Management Audit Division with any records or written guidelines for these
audits. Consequently, we were unable to assess the validity, scope, or even existence
of either the periodic audits or more comprehensive six-month reviews. This apparent
lack of guidelines and reporting around classification audits is problematic from
both an inmate welfare and agency risk management perspective. Several written
responses from the Management Audit Division’s inmate survey reported that
classification reassessments are not always completed on a timely schedule, and that
housing decisions focus primarily on charges rather than behavior—priorities that
are inconsistent with the structure of the new Austin Tool.82 Having audits with clearly
defined parameters and documentation would help ensure that inmates are being
assessed and reassessed in a timely and appropriate fashion, and also provide a
counterpoint to allegations of inappropriate classification practices.
The Custody Bureau’s Implementation of Discretionary Overrides and Face-toFace Interviews May Not Align With the Goals of the New Classification System
In August of 2016, the JFA Institute highlighted discretionary overrides as an area for
re-evaluation with the new tool.83 Generally, “overrides” are specific factors that alter
an inmate’s security level from the security level assigned by the numeric custody
score. Mandatory overrides typically correspond to straightforward objective criteria
such as charges, whereas discretionary overrides are more judgmental and on a caseby-case basis.
The report found that the two most frequent categories of discretionary overrides
into higher security levels were “known management problem” and “gang member.”
Yet, a significant number of these cases were not accompanied by any documentation
of poor in-custody behavior. For ten of the individuals assessed as a “known
management problem,” there were no disciplinary infractions on file. Further, for
the “gang member” override, only one of twenty inmates with this designation had
received either a formal Disciplinary Report or had infractions listed in informal
Custody Input Reports. One year later, in the Custody Bureau’s classification update
to the Board of Supervisors, “known management problem” was again the most
prevalent category of discretionary override under the new classification system.
82 See Appendix A: Inmate Survey for additional details on the survey methodology and results.
83 Austin, James and Robin Allen. (2016). Santa Clara County Office of the Sheriff Custody Bureau Jail
Classification System Evaluation. The JFA Institute.
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While the JFA institute characterizes overrides as an essential part of jail classification,
excessive overrides defeat the purpose of adopting a new classification tool
that emphasizes numeric custody scores and objective criteria. Because “known
management problem” is such a vague and subjective category, this discretionary
override is subject to potential abuse against certain inmates who may be unpopular
with Custody staff. To mitigate this, as suggested in the JFA Institute’s report, there
“must be some evidences that such inmates pose a threat to other inmates and
staff.” Unfortunately, the random sample provided by the Custody Bureau did not
have instances of behavior-based overrides. All overrides in the four classification
files dealt with either charges or severe mental health concerns. Consequently, the
Management Audit Division was unable to assess whether cases of discretionary
overrides—particularly the “known management category”—were supported by
documentation.
In addition, the initial August 2016 report stressed the importance of face-to-face
interviews with inmates during the classification reassessment process. While the
Management Audit Division was unable to observe a live reassessment interview,
Custody Bureau staff reported that the Classification Unit typically goes through the
following process during reassessments: 1) the Classification Officer completes the
automated reassessment tool and decides on any housing changes; and 2) discusses
the results of this reassessment and housing changes with the inmate. From this
depiction of the reassessment process, it appears as though face-to-face interviews
are not conducted as a part of the inmate’s reassessment—rather, they are primarily
used to inform the inmate of the reassessment’s outcome after the fact. It is unclear
whether this manner of face-to-face interview fulfills the objectives of the new
classification system.
CONCLUSION
The new classification system was designed to implement NIC standards and
render the classification process more efficient by way of an automated platform.
However, issues with the system’s technology impair the ability of the Classification
Unit to appropriately classify inmates and conduct timely reassessments of lower
security populations. Further, the lack of guidelines and documentation around
classification audits makes it impossible to measure performance and usage of the
new classification tool in any systematic way. Lastly, it is ambiguous whether the
new system has been implemented with fidelity regarding discretionary overrides
and face-to-face interviews. Thus, while field experts approved the design of the new
system, it remains unclear whether the objectives of this system are being adequately
met, given the implementation challenges and lack of audit records.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
6.1 Work with the Custody Bureau’s Information Technology specialists within
the Bureau to fix and troubleshoot the custody scoring malfunctions on
the electronic platform. (Priority 1)
6.2
Work with the Custody Bureau’s Information Technology specialists to
either migrate lower security, pre-Austin Tool inmates to the electronic
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Section 6: Classification and Housing
platform for reassessment scheduling, or create an alternative mechanism
for generating automated reassessment alerts for these inmates.
(Priority 1)
6.3
Have its Classification Unit develop written guidelines for classification
audits, and create a formal tracking system for these audits. (Priority 1)
6.4
Have the JFA Institute classification experts conduct observations of
both inmate classification files and reassessment interviews to evaluate
whether overrides and interviews have been applied according to NIC best
practices. (Priority 1)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendations 6.1 through 6.3 are feasible within the County’s existing budget
allocations and staff resources. Recommendation 6.4 will require an additional $7,000
for an estimated 40 hours billed by the classification experts.84
These recommendations will allow the Custody Bureau to maximize the intended
impacts of the new classification system.
84 This estimate is based on the existing contract with the JFA Institute. The contract sets an hourly rate
of $175/hr.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
Background
In January of 2018, the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau finalized a policy and
corresponding training pertaining to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer,
and intersex (LGBTQI) inmates. The Custody Bureau’s Operational Standards and
Inspection Unit (OSIU) also has an LGBTQI Officer who addresses departmental
LGBTQI-related questions and acts as an advocate for LGBTQI inmates. Every week,
the Classification Unit reports any newly identified transgender inmates, but not
any other LGBTQI inmates, to OSIU, and OSIU conducts an interview with each of
these inmates to discuss their in-custody experience and needs. In June of 2017,
OSIU completed an audit to verify the size of the transgender inmate population and
inform priorities.
Problems and Adverse Effects
Neither the final LGBTQI policy nor the corresponding training were reviewed
and approved by the County Executive’s Office of LGBTQI Affairs. Thus, while the
policy may address existing legal requirements, it is unclear whether the policy
comprehensively responds to the needs of LGBTQI inmates on a practical level, as
determined by subject matter experts. For instance, the policy conspicuously lacks
any discussion of LGBTQI medical and mental health treatment. Additionally, the
Custody Bureau does not track the size of the LGBTQI population, or any other
summary statistics around this group, and only uses its interview data for individual
advocacy rather than strategic planning. OSIU also focuses its resources primarily
on transgender inmates, and its outreach and advocacy for the general LGBTQI
population is comparatively limited. Lastly, OSIU’s inmate audits do not occur on a
regular, recurring schedule.
Neglecting to define standards within the new policy such as medical treatment
for LGBTQI inmates can result in inappropriate inmate treatment and litigation.
For instance, in the 2018 case of Hicklin v. Precynthe, the Missouri Department of
Corrections and its contracted healthcare provider were ordered to provide Plaintiff
“medically necessary” treatment for her gender dysphoria. While several areas of
inmate treatment may be executed by other entities such as Custody Health, it is
ultimately the Custody Bureau’s responsibility to coordinate with these entities to
ensure the safe and humane treatment of inmates. Further, because OSIU’s efforts
center largely on transgender inmates, inmates who are part of the broader LGBTQI
population may under-utilize the unit as a resource for information and advocacy.
There is no tracking of the overall LGBTQI inmate population, and thus no opportunity
by the Custody Bureau to use data to better understand and accommodate this
population. Finally, the lack of regular audits prevents the Custody Bureau from
correcting inaccuracies in its LGBTQI inmate designations.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Custody Bureau should reevaluate its LGBTQI policy with the Office of LGBTQI
Affairs and apply for technical assistance from the National Institute of Corrections
(NIC), which has published a guide on LGBTQI policy development. The Classification
Unit should forward all identified LGBTQI inmates to OSIU, and OSIU should then
interview and extend its outreach to all LGBTQI inmates. OSIU should also produce
quarterly summary reports on LGBTQI inmates from both these interviews and CJIC
data that track the size of this population and identify trends that will inform future
planning. Finally, OSIU should create a schedule for its annual population audits, and
expand these audits to the broader LGBTQI population.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
FINDING
The Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau aims to supervise individuals in a safe and secure
environment, while also providing for their humane care, custody, and control.
Inmates are evaluated on a case-by-case basis in order to be housed in the least
restrictive setting possible, with maximum opportunities to participate in programs
that reduce criminal behaviors and facilitate reintegration into society. These
provisions extend to all inmates, including individuals who identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI).
During the intake and booking process, the Classification Unit asks each inmate a
series of questions in order to assess whether the inmate identifies as LGBTQI, and
enters this information into both its classification tool and a field in the Criminal
Justice Information Control System (CJIC). An inmate’s LGBTQI identity may then be
one of the considerations used to determine housing assignments. However, despite
LGBTQI designations being entered into CJIC, this information is not tracked as part of
a larger dataset.
Generally, the housing and treatment of LGBTQI inmates comes with a set of
unique challenges that involve balancing inmate safety with other legal standards
surrounding conditions of confinement. On the one hand, the Custody Bureau, in
its obligation to provide a safe, secure, and humane environment, must address the
vulnerability of this population to victimization. The results of the 2011-2012 National
Inmate Survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that, nationally,
inmates who identified as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or other were sexually victimized
at higher rates.85 Within a jail setting, 8.5 percent of this population reported
victimization by another inmate, and 4.3 percent reported victimization by jail staff
(compared to the 1.2 percent and 1.7 percent reported by heterosexual inmates).
These higher rates held true for demographic subgroups separated by variables such
as sex, race, age, and education.
At the same time, decisions to protect inmates must be weighed against these
individuals’ constitutional rights and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). For
instance, Custody staff may choose to place LGBTQI inmates in isolated housing
units for safety and security reasons. However, PREA standards dictate that,“Inmates
at high risk for sexual victimization shall not be placed in involuntary segregated
housing unless an assessment of all available alternatives has been made, and
a determination has been made that there are no available alternative means
of separation from likely abusers.”86 Additionally, while certain forms of gender
expression might add to an inmate’s risk of victimization, previous case law indicates
that denying individuals with gender dysphoria the ability to present themselves in a
manner consistent with their gender identity is a potential 8th Amendment violation.87
The housing and treatment of LGBTQI inmates thus requires navigating a complex
legal matrix in the course of providing a safe and secure environment for these
individuals. Promoting the welfare of this population and minimizing litigation risks
requires a set of policies, protocols, and practices that have been created with the
unique needs of LGBTQI inmates in mind.
85 Beck, Allen et al. (2013). Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-2012.
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved from https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf.
86 §115.43 (a). 2012. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/115.43.
87 National Institute of Corrections. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Offenders.
Retrieved from https://nicic.gov/lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-and-intersex-offenders.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
In Isolation, the New LGBTQI Policy Does Not Cover Major Areas in LGBTQI
Standards Advanced by the National Institute of Corrections
In January of 2018, the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau finalized a policy pertaining
to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) inmates. Prior to
this policy, the Custody Bureau had no standardized or written policies around the
treatment and classification of this inmate population. The new policy contains the
following sections:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Staff responsibilities
Identification guidelines
Searches of transgender or intersex inmates
Housing and programming assignments for transgender or intersex inmates
Services for LGBTQI inmates
Toiletry items and clothing
Policy revision
In addition, the policy includes three appendices: a) a list of definitions pertaining
to various LGBTQI designations and terms; b) a copy of the Custody Bureau’s Strip
Search Authorization Form; and c) a copy of the Custody Bureau’s Statement of
Preference Form, which inmates use to define their preferred pronoun and gender
preferences for housing and searches (a full version of the new policy can be found in
Appendix F).
The policy addresses federal and state legal standards, such as PREA, in its rules
around searches, housing, and services. However, even though the policy speaks
to legal requirements around LGBTQI inmate treatment, the broad language in the
policy makes it difficult to assess whether Custody Bureau staff could effectively use
this policy as a guide address the needs of LGBTQI inmates on a practical level. For
instance, the “Services for LGBTQI inmates” section contains only two parameters:
A. Transgender and intersex inmates shall be given the opportunity to shower
separately from other inmates.
B. LGBTQI inmates shall not be denied access to programs or services based
solely on their LGBTQI status.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
The policy does not discuss how LGBTQI status does affect program or service access,
if at all, or whether any programs or services exist specifically for LGBTQI inmates.
Further, the policy does not cover key areas regarding LGBTQI inmate welfare. The
National Institute of Corrections (NIC), an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice,
published its second edition of the Policy Review and Development Guide for Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Persons in Custodial Settings in 2014. Within
this guidebook, NIC advised the following areas be addressed in developing policies
for LGBTQI inmates in custodial settings, based on legal standards and precedents:
1. Nondiscrimination
2. Intake screening
3. Risk assessment, classification, and housing
4. Program participation
5. Respectful communication with LGBTI population
6. Medical care
7. Mental health care
8. Privacy and safety
9. Transportation
10. Inmate orientation
11. Staff training
12. Volunteer and contractor training.88
The Custody Bureau’s LGBTQI policy, when reviewed against the categories advanced
by NIC, does not reference medical or mental health care, privacy requirements,
transportation, inmate orientation, or training. Particularly concerning is the absence
of medical or mental health guidelines, given the number of lawsuits filed over the
last decade relating to LGBTQI medical treatment in custody. NIC’s informational page
on LGBTQI inmates lists at least seven court cases on in-custody hormone therapy,
transgender health care, and gender reassignment surgery.89 These legal risks could
be better mitigated by a robust LGBTQI policy that more specifically addresses NICdefined topics pertaining to LGBTQI inmate treatment.
As a point of comparison, multiple NIC topic areas missing from the Custody Bureau’s
policy are covered in the LGBTQI policies of other agencies such as the Harris
County Sheriff’s Office in Texas and the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation
Department in Florida (full policy contained in Appendix F). To note, these policies are
not necessarily exemplars, and cannot be mapped directly onto the Custody Bureau’s
policy due to potential differences in local and state legal requirements. Further, the
Custody Bureau’s policy may have aspects, such as the use of preferred pronouns for
inmates, which are more progressive than those contained in the policies of other
jurisdictions. However, we reference these policies merely to illustrate that other
jurisdictions have, in their own LGBTQI policies, entire sections dedicated to issues
such as LGBTQI transportation, staff training, and health care—all of which are absent
from the Custody Bureau’s policy.
88 National Institute of Corrections. (2014). Policy Review and Development Guide – Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Persons in Custodial Settings, pp. 27-28.
89 National Institute of Corrections. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Offenders.
Retrieved from https://nicic.gov/lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-and-intersex-offenders.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
There are several potential explanations for why the Custody Bureau’s policy has
gaps in critical areas of LGBTQI treatment. The first is that the policy is meant to serve
primarily as a supplement to existing Custody Bureau policies such as those covering
PREA, classification, and others. However, if this is the case, the Custody Bureau
should—as it does with several of its other policies—provide a list of references to
these policies within the LGBTQI policy, and describe which topics these policies
cover. This would clarify which aspects of LGBTQI inmate treatment are governed by
existing guidelines, and which are subject to requirements in the new LGBTQI policy.
Further, this enumerated list would allow the Custody Bureau to better weigh the
entirety of its policies concerning LGBTQI inmates against the best practices published
by NIC.
A second explanation is that portions of the policy areas discussed in NIC’s guide are
executed by entities outside of the Custody Bureau. For instance, Custody Health is
the party responsible for actually administering medical and mental health treatment
to LGBTQI inmates. As such, it is possible that the Custody Bureau defers to Custody
Health to define its own criteria for LGBTQI inmate medical and mental health care.
Nevertheless, under Title 15, it is still the Custody Bureau’s legal responsibility to
coordinate with Custody Health to ensure inmates are administered appropriate
treatment.90 Then, the Custody Bureau should consider adding some sort of medical
and mental health care oversight provision to its LGBTQI policy.
Adding to these concerns surrounding policy deficiencies is the fact that the Office
of LGBTQI Affairs did not review the final version of the Custody Bureau’s LGBTQI
policy, or its corresponding training. The Bureau should re-evaluate its LGBTQI policy
with the County Office of LGBTQI Affairs, paying particular attention to the topics
covered in the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) guidelines. The policy should be
revised and finalized with the approval of the Office of LGBTQI Affairs, with technical
assistance from NIC as identified in Recommendation 1.5, and assistance from County
Counsel.
Further, it may be necessary for the Custody Bureau to add a more specific future
review and revision timeline to its LGBTQI policy, given the rapidly changing landscape
of LGBTQI issues in correctional settings. In its current form, the policy states, “All
Sheriff’s Office policies will be periodically reviewed by the Operational Standards and
Inspections Unit (OSIU).” However, considering that several other Custody Bureau
policies have not been updated in over ten years, it may be worth more explicitly
outlining the timeframes for this review.
Lastly, the new LGBTQI policy states that inmates may make changes to their
Statement of Preference Form at any time. All inmates should be reminded of this
right during their 60-day classification interviews, per NIC’s recommendation on
periodically updating inmate information regarding their sexual information and
gender identity. This is especially important for inmates who were booked into
custody prior to the finalization of this form and the LGBTQI policy.
90 15 C.C.R. §1200 Responsibility for Health Care Services.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
The Custody Bureau Has No Tracking System for the Broad LGBTQI Population
and Conducts Little Analysis of Overarching LGBTQI Inmate Trends and Needs
While the Custody Bureau retains inmate LGBTQI identity information in CJIC, the
Bureau does not track the total number of LGBTQI inmates in custody, nor does it
review summary statistics around other metrics such as housing locations or access
to programs for LGBTQI inmates. The Classification Unit reported that, while they
input an inmate’s LGBTQI identity into their information systems during the initial
classification process, their Unit is unable to access or pull reports from CJIC to track
this data. Meanwhile, OSIU reported that they only receive notice of newly identified
transgender inmates from the Classification Unit, and not information about the
broader LGBTQI population. Consequently, the Custody Bureau was unable to answer
the Management Audit Division’s inquiries on the number of LGBTQI inmates in
custody, or what proportion of the overall inmate population this group comprises.
Further, the Custody Bureau does not use the information it gathers from OSIU’s
advocacy and outreach efforts for any broader strategic planning or needs
assessments. In doing so, the Bureau is perhaps missing an opportunity to engage
in more targeted efforts to effectively accommodate LGBTQI inmates. For instance,
if the LGBTQI Officer repeatedly hears the same concerns during their interviews
with transgender inmates, this might call for an overarching policy change within the
Custody Bureau or a review of housing practices, based on CJIC data.
Because OSIU does not have the ability to extract CJIC data itself, the Bureau should
ensure that OSIU receives twice-weekly CJIC reports with high-level summary statistics
on all LGBTQI inmates. In addition, the Bureau should submit monthly requests to
the Public Safety, Justice & Emergency Management (PSJEM) Executive Leadership
Committee for detailed data on LGBTQI inmates broken down by Person File Number
(PFN). Using these CJIC datasets and information from its one-on-one interviews,
OSIU should produce quarterly reports on 1) the size of this population; 2) trends in
housing locations, program access, and incidents for these inmates; and 3) recurring
issues from interviews with the LGBTQI Officer.
The Custody Bureau Focuses Its Outreach Efforts Narrowly on Transgender
Inmates
The Classification Unit asks all incoming inmates questions about sexual orientation
and gender identity during the initial interview process. However, the majority of the
Custody Bureau’s resources are directed towards transgender inmates.
The Classification Unit reported that it only sends names of newly identified
transgender inmates to OSIU, and the Management Audit Division confirmed this
when reviewing OSIU’s redacted emails. Further, OSIU’s LGBTQI Officer only holds
interviews regarding the booking process, medical care, and other needs with these
identified transgender inmates. Then, while all LGBTQI inmates are designated as
such in CJIC, it is primarily transgender inmates who receive services from OSIU.
The Custody Bureau reported that this prioritization of transgender inmates stems
from the familiarity the Bureau has with lesbian, gay, and bisexual inmates, and its
relative lack of experience with transgender inmates. While this may be the case, it
is also possible that inmates within the broader LGBTQI population still have unique
needs that are not being addressed because of the Custody Bureau’s limited outreach
efforts. The Bureau should ensure that OSIU expands its interviews and advocacy
efforts to all LGBTQI-identifying inmates.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
The Custody Bureau Does Not Have a Set Schedule for LGBTQI Audits
The Custody Bureau reported that its 2017 LGBTQI audit was the first of its kind,
and there is no set schedule for these audits. However, the results of the last
audit showed that there were eight additional transgender individuals who had
not been previously identified by the Classification Unit, which had only reported
three transgender inmates to OSIU. OSIU’s discovery of more than twice as
many transgender inmates as those initially identified by the Classification Unit
demonstrates the need for periodic review of the County Jail’s LGBTQI population to
correct inaccuracies. Further, like OSIU’s outreach efforts, the audit focused primarily
on transgender inmates. The Bureau should ensure that OSIU creates a schedule for
annual audits, and extend these audits to the broader LGBTQI population.
Negative Effects of Current Practices
Under current practices, at least 72 percent of transgender inmates were overlooked
in the classification process, which resulted in a failure to directly address their
unique needs at least until they were subsequently identified. As LGBTQI inmates are
far more likely to be victimized during their incarceration than non-LGBTQI inmates,
failure to identify and address the greater security needs of this population exposes
inmates, staff and the County to unnecessary risk.
OSIU reported that, after its audit of the transgender inmate population, the LGBTQI
Officer met with Classification Unit staff to discuss the discrepancies between
identified transgender inmates prior to and after the audit. The LGBTQI Officer
recommended further training around LGBTQI terminology, rapport development
and questioning strategies, and additional transgender issues. OSIU reported that,
thus far, they have provided two hours of this training to Classification Unit staff. The
Custody Bureau should continue to ensure that the results of audits are discussed
with the Classification Unit to potentially adjust the intake/classification processes
to better identify members of the population. After each audit, OSIU and the
Classification Unit should analyze whether these adjustments have resulted in more
accurate identification of LGBTQI inmates.
In addition, we recommend that the Custody Bureau apply for technical assistance
from NIC regarding its policy and practices pertaining to LGBTQI inmates. To apply,
the Division need only send a letter to the Jails Division of NIC outlining the need for
assistance.91 The Custody Bureau should align its operations with respect to LGBTQI
inmates with these established best practices in order to improve its identification of
and management of LGBTQI inmates, and potentially reduce future litigation.
91 National Institute of Corrections. I’m Looking for Technical Assistance for My Agency. Retrieved from
https://nicic.gov/im-looking-technical-assistance-my-agency.
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
CONCLUSION
Creating a safe, secure environment for LGBTQI inmates is a challenging task
that involves navigating a large number of legal guidelines. When it comes to this
population of inmates, the Custody Bureau’s official LGBTQI policy was not reviewed
by the County’s Office of LGBTQI Affairs, and has significant gaps when compared
to NIC checklists and the policies of peer organizations. While OSIU provides some
support and advocacy for LGBTQI inmates, transgender inmates take priority, and
the remaining LGBTQI population does not receive the same degree of services. The
Custody Bureau also does not use its existing data and tracking systems for strategic
planning, and has no formal audit schedule in place.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
7.1 Review the LGBTQI policy with the County Office of LGBTQI Affairs. The
policy should be revised and finalized with the approval of the Office
of LGBTQI Affairs, with technical assistance from NIC as identified in
Recommendation 1.5 and assistance from County Counsel. In revising this
policy, the Custody Bureau should consider the following:
a. Comparing the major policy sections against the topics and
checklists covered in the National Institute of Corrections (NIC)
guidelines
b. Adding a section that lists and describes references to other
departmental policies that discuss LGBTQI inmate treatment
c. Including a provision that staff remind all inmates during 60-day
classification interviews that inmates may make changes to their
Statement of Preference Form at any time
d. Specifying the policy review timeline, given the rapidly changing
nature of LGBTQI issues and legal landscape in correctional
facilities. (Priority 1)
7.2
Have OSIU expand its interviews and advocacy efforts to all LGBTQIidentifying inmates. (Priority 1)
7.3
Have OSIU receive twice-weekly, high-level CJIC reports on all LGBTQI
inmates and submit additional monthly requests to the PSJEM Executive
Leadership Committee for more detailed data on this population, broken
down by PFN. Using this CJIC data and information from its interviews,
OSIU should produce quarterly reports on 1) the size of the LGBTQI
population; 2) trends in housing locations, program access, and incidents
for these inmates; and 3) recurring issues from interviews with the LGBTQI
Officer, and present these reports to the Board of Supervisors. (Priority 1)
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Section 7: LGBTQI Policy
7.4
Have OSIU create a schedule for annual population audits, expand the
scope of these audits from transgender inmates to the broader LGBTQI
population, and ensure that the results of audits are used to inform
the intake/classification processes to better identify members of the
population. (Priority 1)
7.5
Apply for and accept technical assistance from the National Institute of
Corrections, which can assist with implementation of effective practices
and policies related to meeting the needs of LGBTQI inmates. (Priority 1)
The County Office of LGBTQI Affairs should:
7.6 Review the Custody Bureau’s LGBTQI policy and corresponding trainings
and offer any recommendations for improvements. (Priority 1)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendation 7.1 is feasible within the County’s existing budget allocations.
Implementation of Recommendations 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.6 may require additional
programming, but not enough to warrant additional staff. Implementation of
Recommendation 7.5 would enable the Department to obtain federal assistance in
implementing best practices.
Adopting these measures will help the Custody Bureau apply consistent treatment
and housing methodologies to LGBTQI inmates, address critical safety and security
concerns, and reduce litigation risks.
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Section 8: Custody Health
Section 8: Custody Health
Background
In addition to providing for public safety and jail security, the Sheriff’s Custody Bureau
is responsible for the human treatment, feeding, well-being and providing health
care consistent with State regulations to approximately 3,400 inmates in the County’s
correctional facilities (jails) each day, at a cost of $86.3 million per year. In 2017, more
than 42,000 individuals received a health screening in the County’s Main Jail.
A now defunct agreement between the Department of Correction and the Custody
Health Service Department of the Health and Hospital System (Custody Health)
required Custody Health to administer medical, mental health and dental programs
with appropriate levels of staff to ensure effective and safe delivery of services.
Problem and Adverse Effect
Of 28 California County custody facilities surveyed for this audit, 72 percent reported
that they had mechanisms in place to ensure that their inmate healthcare provider
was in compliance with basic standards of care. Although the Custody Bureau
has an agreement for provision of inmate healthcare with Custody Health, it was
last updated in 2005 and its provisions are no longer monitored or enforced. This
limits the Custody Bureau’s ability to ensure the adequacy, timeliness, and costeffectiveness of inmate health care.
The lack of Custody Bureau oversight of Custody Health increases the risk that
medical care may be insufficient or poorly delivered. Several indicators suggest that
greater oversight is warranted: our analysis shows that medical staffing is not always
aligned with peak demand, and a majority of inmates surveyed for the audit reported
waiting longer than ten days to receive medical care. On average, someone files a
claim against the County related to inmate medical care about every seven weeks.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
We recommend development and implementation of a new agreement that includes
specific, measurable indices of quality and cost of Custody Health services. On an
ongoing basis, Custody Health should report and trend these indices to the Custody
Bureau, including comparisons where feasible with peer counties. Custody Health
staffing levels should be periodically examined by the Custody Bureau to ensure
adequacy and efficiency.
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Section 8: Custody Health
FINDING
The County operates two custodial facilities – the Main Jail and the Elmwood
Correctional Facility. The majority of inmates in these facilities have not been
convicted of crimes; they are being held awaiting trial. Combining both facilities, the
number of inmates, on average per day, is about 3,000. The Main Jail serves multiple
purposes, including being the central processing center for all bookings, holding
higher security inmates, providing a lock-down mental health facility, serving as the
main infirmary for more serious inmate care, and housing inmates with mobility
problems. Each of these subpopulations has a different headcount and requires
varying levels of medical care throughout the day and night. In 2017, 42,484 inmates
were booked in the Main Jail.
The mechanisms of inmate care vary across California counties. We surveyed 28
counties and found that care was usually provided by Sheriff’s Office staff, County
health or hospital staff, or by a vendor contracted by the Sheriff’s Office as shown in
Figure 8.1 below.
Figure 8.1: Who Provides Your Jail’s Medical Services as the Official Health Authority?
Staff hired and managed by the Sheriff’s Office
3
County health or County hospital staff
8
Private vendor contracted by the Sheriff’s
Office
15
Other
Did Not Respond
2
0
Source: Management Audit Survey of 28 California County Jail Administrators
Regardless of the vehicle by which care is administered, 72 percent of survey
respondents reported that they had mechanisms in place to ensure that medical care
in their facilities meets basic standards. In the County of Santa Clara, inmate medical
care is provided by the Custody Health Department, which is under the County’s
health and hospital system. In contrast to most survey respondents, Santa Clara
County custody administrators do not independently enforce adherence to medical
standards.
Inmate Healthcare Rights and Standards
Title 15 State Regulations for Correctional Healthcare
The Custody Bureau is responsible for the provision of adequate healthcare to
inmates. Because inmates have no ability to seek care on their own, some level
of healthcare is mandated under California Penal Code Section 6030, California
Code of Regulations, Title 15, and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.92
92 Estelle v. Gamble.
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Section 8: Custody Health
Requirements for the provision of medical care are specified in Article 8, Sections
3350 through 3359 of the California Code of Regulations. In essence, “the department
shall only provide medical services for inmates, which are based on medical necessity and
supported by outcome data as effective medical care.” The regulations go on to define
“medically necessary” as “healthcare services that are determined by the attending
physician to be reasonable and necessary to protect life, prevent significant illness or
disability or alleviate severe pain, and are supported by health outcome data as being
effective medical care” and those terms are further defined. In addition, there are
industry organizations, such as the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare,
which promulgate standards for administration of healthcare to local jail inmates.
Custody Health Service hires the Institute of Medical Quality (IMQ) to review its
compliance with Tittle 15 every two years. Custody Health provides the final report
to the Custody Bureau and the Health and Hospital Committee each year. As of the
most recent report from October 2017, Custody Health Service maintained IMQ
accreditation for the prior 20 years.
Delivery of Inmate Healthcare Services in Santa Clara County
Since 2010, the Sheriff’s Custody Bureau assumed operational responsibilities
for the jail, which include the provision of medical care. Effective January 6, 2005,
the Department of Correction entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital System (SCVHHS) to deliver
inmate healthcare services in County jails to meet Title 15 State regulations. The
agreement requires SCVHHS to administer medical, mental health and dental
programs and to provide appropriate levels of staff to ensure their safe and effective
delivery. The Custody Health Department of SCVHHS assesses inmate mental health,
treats mental health crises, administers medications, and delivers therapy. A copy
of the MOU between the Department of Correction and Custody Health is provided
in Appendix G. Although the agreement remains in effect, the administrators of the
Custody Bureau of the Sheriff’s Office weren’t aware of the agreement or enforcing its
provisions at the commencement of this audit. Custody Health Services noted they
were aware of it.
In FY 2017-18, Custody Health’s modified budget (gross) for County jails was
approximately $87.3 million and actual expenditures totaled approximately $86.493
million. Expenditures on medical services accounted for $69.1 million or 80.0 percent
of this total, with the remaining $17.3 million, or 20.0 percent, funding mental health
services. Salaries and benefits are the primary cost driver, accounting for 60.1 percent
of total expenditures. To put these figures into context, the County’s correctional
healthcare costs have increased $39.3 million or 83.6 percent in constant-value (June
2018) dollars since FY 2012-13. This represents an average annual increase of 16.7
percent from FY 2012-13 to FY 2017-18. Figure 8.2 on page 122 summarizes this
information.
93 Approximately $5.2 million is reimbursed by the State through AB 109 funds.
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Section 8: Custody Health
Figure 8.2: Growth of Actual Expenditures for Inmate Healthcare
Fiscal
Year
Total
Expenditures
$ Δ from
FY 201213
% Δ from
FY 201213
Medical
Mental
Health
2012-13
$33.8
$13.2
$47.0
----
----
2013-14
$36.9
$12.9
$49.9
$2.8
6.0%
2014-15
$37.4
$15.5
$52.9
$5.8
12.4%
2015-16
$45.1
$20.6
$65.7
$18.7
39.7%
2016-17
$58.3
$23.3
$81.6
$34.5
73.4%
2017-18
$69.1
$17.3
$86.4
$39.3
83.6%
Source: SAP Budget vs Actual by Budget Unit Report, Budget Unit 414.
Note: Adult inmate healthcare costs presented above are in constant-value June 2018 dollars (the inflation
adjustment uses unadjusted historical federal Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for San
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA).
Despite the increase in medical spending, anecdotal evidence and inmate survey
results suggest that several service gaps exist.
Limited Enforcement
No Records of Inmate Healthcare Quality and Cost Controls
Although representatives of the two agencies meet regularly and review patient
volume, the Custody Bureau exercises no formal, documented enforcement of
healthcare regulations in the custody facilities it manages.94 The only documented
measure of quality and compliance that does occur is the biennial IMQ report that
Custody Health provides to the Custody Bureau. Custody Bureau management stated
that “it was always assumed Custody Health would provide the appropriate level
of professional care.” Although Custody Health provides the services, the Sheriff’s
Custody Bureau is responsible for ensuring that healthcare regulations are met.
We found no evidence that it enforces these regulations with regular performance
requirements.
94 The data on patient volume does include some high-level categorization of the number of inmates
treated for series mental illness and communicable diseases. However, these data have no measures
of the quality, timeliness, cost, or other pertinent factors related to their treatment, or the Custody
Bureau’s management of their health service provider. Custody Health reported that its HealthLink
system, which tracks and reports patient and medical information, has shown improvement in wait
times and this is reported to the Sheriff’s Office. However, Custody Health was unable to provide any
supporting documentation to this and notes that the data and reporting in HealthLink is still being
validated.
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Section 8: Custody Health
For example, there are no minimum performance requirements that Custody Health
is formally held accountable to, no regular reports of performance metrics provide
to or requested by the Custody Bureau administrators, and no documentation of any
active management by the Custody Bureau of its health service provider. Measures
of quality in this regard would include indices such as timely access to care, time to
first clinician appointment, and identification/treatment of communicable diseases
and mental illness. The only documented exception is the IMQ report which assures
compliance with state regulations. (Note: auditors did not receive nor review the
contents of the IMQ report).
No Standard Contract Terms and Conditions
Contract administration best practices recommend that a contract administrator
implement a contract monitoring plan that addresses key contract requirements
prioritized by risk, establishes performance measures, and assesses the extent to which
the contractor achieves these. The Custody Bureau has no such plan for administering
the jail healthcare contract despite the additional risk this creates for the Bureau,
Custody Health, and the County. Of particular concern are allegations in lawsuits filed
against the County regarding the adequacy and sufficiency of medical staff, especially
in the booking/intake area at the Main Jail.
Approximately 40 percent of all lawsuits and complaints filed against the County over
the last five years were related to healthcare in the County’s jails.95 Of the $8.8 million
the County spent on litigation involving the Sheriff’s Custody Bureau, the Management
Audit Division estimates that approximately $1.2 or 13.7 percent involved Custody
Health according to data provided by County Counsel and the County Executive’s Risk
Management Office. A categorical breakdown of all lawsuits involving the Custody
Bureau is summarized in Figure 8.3 on page 124.96
95 Auditor analysis of complaint and settlement data involving the Sheriff’s Office Custody Bureau from
July 1, 2012 to October 30, 2017. Documents provided by County Counsel.
96 Includes the following criteria: general liability and medical malpractice liability; payments from both
self-insurance and commercial insurance; payments on lawsuits and claims, both open and closed;
and payments for both indemnity and expense. Totals relating to specific case categories were
provided by County Counsel. “All Other” total for Adult Custody Health and Sheriff’s Office Custody
Bureau provided by the County Executive’s Risk Management Office.
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Section 8: Custody Health
Figure 8.3: Custody Bureau Litigation, Settlements, and Claims
July 1, 2012 – October 30, 2017
Total Cases
Filed
Cases
Settled
Medical
25
2
Booking Area (Medical)
2
1
All Other Medical Claims
n/a
n/a
Subtotal - Medical
27
3
Booking Area (Use of Force)
6
3
Staff
21
6
Conditions of Confinement
2
0
Personnel Practices
4
1
Other
9
1
All Other Non-Medical
Claims
n/a
n/a
Subtotal - Non-Medical
42
11
69
14
Category of Allegation
Total
Total
Payments
Medical as
a % of Total
Payments
$ 1,200,544
13.7%
$ 7,575,207
86.3%
$ 8,775,751
100.0%
Source: Auditor analysis of data provided by County Counsel.
Note: cases involving more than one category were grouped according to primary allegation. Medical includes
all health-related claims, including mental health.
Significant deficiencies in management data about inmate healthcare practices
and operations impede collection and careful tracking of quantitative measures of
utilization, adherence to standards of care, outcomes, etc. for cost management and
medical controls, and the County’s ability to defend itself in the event of litigation.
Inmates Report Long Waits for Medical Appointments
The audit team surveyed 731 inmates in Main Jail and Elmwood and found that
inmates report overall dissatisfaction and long wait times for medical treatment.
Some inmates wrote comments reporting that their waits were at times as over a
month or more. See Figure 8.4 on page 125. A majority of inmates reported 10+ day
waits for medical appointments. See Appendix A for additional survey details and
methodology.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-124-
Section 8: Custody Health
Figure 8.4: Inmate Survey Results Regarding Medical Care
8. How do you feel about the medical care within the jail?
Very satisfied
45
Satisfied
72
Neutral
147
Dissatisfied
165
Very dissatisfied
244
I have never needed medical care
30
Source:
survey
of inmates
– see
A forappointment
additional information
and
On average,Audit
howDivision
long do
you have
to wait
forAppendix
a medical
when you
are in need of
9. Management
methodology.
medical care?
Lesscontrasts
than a day with our survey findings is that Custody Health noted
23 that
One area that
1-2
days
60
inmates receive their medications within 13 hours after booking and that overall wait
days
times have 3-5
improved
based in preliminary results it has measured. Custody65
Health
6-10
was not able
todays
provide any records or reports supporting this statement at94
this time.
Custody Health
anticipates that such measures will eventually be reportable
10+ days
415from its
HealthLink Isystem
when
itsmedical
reports
have never
needed
careare fully verified.
38
High Rates of Inmate Mortality from Suicide
The risk of inmate death is high within the jails when compared to some state and
national indicators, but on-par with the other California County jails. See Figure 8.5
below and Figure 8.6 on page 126. Custody Health noted that the figures reported
in the first half of 2017 for suicide attempts may be higher than previous years due to
increased awareness and new reporting methods.
Figure 8.5: Inmate Mortality Due to Suicide Is High
Comparison per 100,000 inmates
Suicide
Deaths
Average Daily
Population of
Jails
Santa
Clara
County
All CA
County Jails
Exc. SCC
CA State
Prisons
US
Local
Jails
2012
2
3,658
55
34
20
40
2013
0
4,006
0
56
20
46
2014
1
4,123
24
49
16
50
2015
2
3,637
55
59
16
No data
2016
1
3,593
28
34
21
No data
First Half 2017
0
3,540
0
No data
No data
No data
Year
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of records from the Office of the Medical Examiner-Coroner and
the Sheriff’s Office.
-125-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 8: Custody Health
Figure 8.6: Inmate Suicide Attempted Are Higher Than Average in Santa Clara County
Comparison per 100,000 Inmates
Suicide
Attempts
Average Daily Population
of Jails
Santa Clara
County
CA State
Prisons
2012
No data
3,658
No data
279
2013
No data
4,006
No data
303
2014
No data
4,123
No data
298
2015
21
3,637
577
343
2016
60
3,593
1,670
350
First Half 2017
48
3,540
1,560
No data
Year
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of records from the Sheriff’s Office.
Without greater access to the jail’s and Custody Health Service’s records, it’s difficult to
conclude what factors may cause these higher levels of suicide deaths and attempts.
The Sheriff’s Office reports putting in place many new measures to prevent suicides,
including the physical modification to facilities and additional screening for behavioral
health needs, including risk of suicide. These efforts may or may not reduce the rate
of suicide and the associated risks.
Overall, Santa Clara County’s inmate mortality rate is better than that of the California
State Prison system, often below or at times in-line with all other California County
jails, but well above the national average for local jails. However, the national and
state comparisons have not been updated since 2014 and trends may have shifted.
See Figure 8.7 below.
Figure 8.7: Inmate Mortality Due to All Causes of Death
Comparison per 100,000 Inmates
Deaths
Average Daily
Population of
Jails
Santa
Clara
County
All CA
County Jails
Exc. SCC
CA State
Prisons
US Local
Jails
2012
4
3,658
109
148
134
40
2013
4
4,006
100
163
212
46
2014
8
4,123
194
193
214
50
2015
8
3,637
220
196
No data
No data
2016
4
3,593
111
174
No data
No data
First Half 2017
5
3,540
144
No data
No data
No data
Year
Source: Management Audit Division analysis of records from the Office of the Medical Examiner-Coroner, the
Sheriff’s Office, and the US Department of Justice.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-126-
Section 8: Custody Health
Medical Staffing
Medical Staffing Does Not Match Inmate Intake Times
Based on the lawsuits filed against the County, the intake booking area appears to
be a particular risk area with high legal cost. At intake, every inmate undergoes an
initial screening by a Registered Nurse (RN). The screening includes taking a set of vital
sings, asking dental, medical and mental health questions related to acute, chronic
and infectious diseases and suicide risks, and observing the inmate for any acute
conditions and injuries.
Because people may be arrested at any time of the day or night and brought to the
jail, and because State regulations (Title 15) require all defendants to be medically
screened at the time of intake, the booking area must be staffed at all times with
the right people. Given several complaints and lawsuits around inadequate medical
staffing, particularly at intake, the audit team reviewed Custody Health’s staffing plans
and actual deployment schedules to identify gaps in coverage.97
Booking volumes vary throughout the day. For the two and half year period of July 1,
2015 to December 31, 2017, the hourly volume varied between 5.1 to 41.4 arrestees
arriving, as shown in Figure 8.8 on page 128. Despite this variability, the booking
area is scheduled to always have five RNs always on staff throughout a 24 hour per
day.98 This flat scheduling plan may not be appropriate given the variability of volume.
However, the volume alone does not indicate the relative time-intensity that a given
arrestee may require. For example, someone arrested and brought to the jail midday on a Wednesday, the highest-volume period, could in actuality have an easy
temperament or disposition. In contrast, someone arriving at 3 a.m. on a weekend, a
lower-volume period, may be intoxicated, which could slow the nurses’ assessment
or they may have greater medical needs. In the absence of any formal performance
management by the Custody Bureau on their health service provider’s staffing and
performance, it’s difficult to know if this staffing level matches the intake booking
area’s needs.
97 In “Jails: Inadvertent Health Care Providers,” Pew and Vera’s report finds that “conducting a medical
and mental health screening at intake is a crucial step to ensuring the safety of both the person being
booked and jail personnel, and to promoting public health.” pp. 18.
98 Based on shifts, this would require ten staff people to cover a 24-hour period. Shift times are
staggered, with staff starting at 7 a.m., 3 p.m., and 11 p.m. All staff are scheduled to work eight-hour
shifts and to cover each other for 15-minute breaks and a 30-minute lunch.
-127-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 8: Custody Health
Figure 8.8: Average Intake Booking Volume
Hour of Booking
Time
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
F riday
S aturday
S unday
12 AM
8.3
15.7
16.6
19.9
18.0
17.5
12.1
1 AM
10.3
13.3
13.9
14.5
16.0
14.0
11.2
2 AM
15.7
13.5
13.5
14.9
15.6
17.2
13.5
3 AM
13.0
12.0
14.1
13.1
15.7
15.0
14.9
4 AM
10.0
10.5
11.6
13.6
13.0
16.0
12.1
5 AM
5.1
6.1
7.1
7.3
8.3
10.0
6.8
6 AM
8.3
7.7
6.8
8.2
8.5
12.4
9.8
7 AM
14.3
13.0
12.7
11.1
11.0
14.6
14.1
8 AM
11.7
11.2
10.9
9.5
12.0
14.5
12.3
9 AM
11.6
11.0
11.0
10.2
10.3
15.2
11.6
10 AM
11.9
11.2
10.8
11.6
12.5
13.4
10.8
11 AM
12.3
13.0
13.5
13.8
13.6
10.2
10.3
12 PM
11.7
14.1
14.8
13.5
14.4
8.7
8.4
1 PM
17.1
26.5
26.6
23.3
22.9
13.3
11.6
2 PM
20.9
41.4
40.6
34.5
36.1
13.0
11.4
3 PM
18.4
32.6
28.0
26.3
31.2
11.8
12.3
4 PM
17.0
21.6
22.5
22.8
19.7
10.2
9.9
5 PM
17.1
20.6
19.4
20.3
18.3
6.6
7.1
6 PM
16.9
21.8
19.4
19.8
15.7
9.1
10.9
7 PM
30.5
40.9
38.5
38.3
32.8
20.3
18.9
8 PM
23.5
26.6
28.6
29.4
27.6
14.0
15.3
9 PM
21.8
25.2
28.9
27.3
25.5
15.2
16.4
10 PM
21.0
27.0
29.5
29.7
24.9
19.7
18.0
11 PM
15.0
14.7
19.7
19.4
16.9
14.2
13.7
Average count of inmates processed at intake/booking area during hour period.
5.1
41.4
Source: County’s Criminal Justice Information Control (CJIC) data for July 1, 2015 to December 31,
2017 provided by Public Safety and Justice Committee.
These records may not reflect the actual time that arrestees arrive. These records
likely skew toward the time that the booking was entered into the system, rather than
the time that an arrestee came to the Jail, but it is the only data available. The Custody
Bureau does not track booking data beyond that which is recorded in the Criminal
Justice Information and Control Center (CJIC).
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-128-
Section 8: Custody Health
Based on a sample of staffing records, Custody Health’s staffing levels are typically
below the scheduled five RNs for the intake booking area. From September 25, 2017
to October 15, 2017, they averaged 4.2 RNs present throughout any given hour.
For this period, the records show that during the low-volume hours the staffing
levels fell accordingly. However, during peak times such as weekday afternoons,
the actual staffing level did not increase to support the increased volume, nor did it
meet the planned staffing level of five RNs. See Figure 8.9 below. Overall, this results
in an arrestee-to-RN ratio that ranges from roughly 2:1 to 4:1 throughout the day.
The Custody Bureau should assess these patterns regularly with Custody Health to
determine the appropriate staffing levels.
Figure 8.9: Bookings vs. Percent of Actual Staff Hours During Sample Period
6.0
25
18
18 18
16
15
15
14
14
3.0
16
16
12
11 11
2.0
13 13
14
13
14
14
11 11
10
10
9
8
Number of Arestees Booked
4.0
20
21
5
1.0
Average Booking Volume
11:00 PM
10:00 PM
9:00 PM
8:00 PM
7:00 PM
6:00 PM
5:00 PM
4:00 PM
3:00 PM
2:00 PM
1:00 PM
12:00 PM
11:00 AM
10:00 AM
9:00 AM
8:00 AM
7:00 AM
6:00 AM
5:00 AM
4:00 AM
3:00 AM
2:00 AM
1:00 AM
12:00 AM
Average RN Staff Present
5.0
Average Number of Actual RN Staff Present
Source: CJIC records for from September 25, 2017 to October 15, 2017 and Custody Health timesheets.
Custody Health maintains its staffing records in hand-written logs that are difficult
to transcribe and assess, as shown in Figure 8.10 on page 130. The Management
Audit Division transcribed these staffing records for the sample period but could
not feasibly assess staffing patterns across a longer period. As such, this analysis is
thought to be illustrative of regular staffing patterns but could vary outside of the
period we assessed.
-129-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 8: Custody Health
The timesheet records used by Custody Health are not conducive to regular review
and assessment. For the purposes of ensuring staffing is correctly scheduled and
reporting performance metrics to the Custody Bureau, Custody Health should record
staff time using a digital system. This can include an excel or spreadsheet version of
the paper timesheets they currently use. All nursing stations within the booking intake
area have computer terminals where RNs could enter time digitally into a simple
spread-sheet based system. Later efforts could include the use of Krono’s time clocks
as used by the Custody Bureau or other enterprise-level time keeping solutions.
Custody Heath noted that they regularly request additional staff. However, without
clearer records of current staffing schedules it would difficult to determine the exact
staffing requirements needed for the Intake/Booking Area.
Figure 8.10: Custody Health’s Handwritten Staffing Records Are Difficult to Decipher
Source: Custody Health
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-130-
Section 8: Custody Health
CONCLUSION
The Custody Bureau of the Sheriff’s Office is responsible for monitoring inmate
healthcare providers to ensure that services are delivered in accordance with the
related contract(s) and follow minimum State requirements. Specific responsibilities
include determining whether Custody Health, the department currently providing
these services in the jails, meets requirements to provide sufficient qualified staffing
and timely treatment services. Our assessment indicates that the Custody Bureau
is not sufficiently managing its health service provider, and not monitoring the
service delivery requirements outlined in the 2005 MOU (the only written agreement
outlining inmate healthcare procedures).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
8.1 Work with Custody Health and County Counsel to update the
Memorandum of Understanding to include (1) minimum performance
standards; (2) quarterly reporting requirements; and (3) a provision to
annually review, update and re-certify the agreement to ensure it remains
actively managed. The update should comport to any legal agreements
that may be applicable. (Priority 1)
8.2
Implement a simple spreadsheet-based timesheet to replace the paperbased timesheet to assist with regular performance reporting to the
Custody Bureau. (Priority 1)
The Board of Supervisors should:
8.3 Require the Custody Bureau to provide annual reports to the Board on its
management of its health service provider for the jails. (Priority 2)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Performance management of the jail’s service provider would enable better
healthcare decision-making, planning and resource allocation. Further, the County has
already expended a significant amount settling lawsuits related to inmate healthcare.
Any improvements to the Custody Bureau’s management and support of these
services will help reduce risk and future costs. The cost of quarterly reporting should
be minimal, as Custody Health has already integrated with the County-wide health
information system, but it is currently evaluating the accuracy of its information
process.
-131-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Background
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sets minimum standards for local
detention facilities, including a mandate for jail administrators to provide “individual
and/or family social service programs for inmates” (Section 1070). The Santa Clara
Sheriff’s Custody Bureau adheres to this mandate by offering 20 in-custody programs.
Generally accepted research including the County’s own 2012 recidivism study
indicates that individuals who participate in the programs are less likely to recidivate
after they return to the community compared to similar individuals who do not
participate. Some programs were more effective at reducing recidivism than others. A
few programs had no or little effect on recidivism.
Problems and Adverse Effects
Over the past five years, only about 20 percent of all inmates (both male and female)
have participated in the programs. Low levels of program participation mean the
County is missing the opportunity to further reduce recidivism and its associated
custody costs, and to make the community a safer place to live and work. The low
participation rate is primarily due to the fact that programs are offered in housing
units (e.g., 5C, 7B, etc.) and participation is capped by each unit’s capacity. Housing
unit assignments are based on the inmates’ custody classification (i.e., minimum to
maximum security level), and not on an assessment of their individual programming
needs.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
The Custody Bureau should seek to ensure more inmates receive more programming.
We estimate that after accounting for increased programming costs, program
expansion would yield net cost-savings of approximately $3.4 million per year,
primarily in avoided re-incarceration costs.
-133-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
FINDING
Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations sets minimum standards for local
detention facilities, including a mandate for jail administrators to provide “individual
and/or family social service programs for inmates” (Section 1070). The Santa Clara
Sheriff’s Custody Bureau adheres to this mandate by offering inmates the following
20 in-custody programs:
1. AWAKE (Awesome Women Acquiring Knowledge and Empowerment)
2. Breaking Barriers
3. Bridge
4. COPE (Create an Optimistic and Purposeful Environment)
5. Empower
6. Get Right
7. HEROES (Honorable Men Engaged in Recovery to Overcome Everyday Stresses)
8. IMPACT
9. Lifeline
10. New Directions
11. New Horizons
12. PACE (Program about Change and Experience)
13. PACT (Parents and Children Together)
14. Pride
15. RCP-1 (Reentry Correction Program – Phase 1)
16. REAL (Rehabilitating Each Addict’s Life)
17. Roadmap to Recovery
18. Second Chance
19. Un Dia A La Vez
20. WINGS (Women Investigating New Gates to Sobriety)
All programs are coordinated by the Custody Bureau’s Inmate Programs Unit, and
delivered by community-based organizations under contract with the County. The
programs are commonly referred to as “comprehensive programs” because they
consist of a variety of classes developed for specific inmate populations and their
needs.99 Many programs have a core curriculum. Thirteen of the 20 programs
introduce inmates to the 3Rs of correctional counseling (Recovery, Rehabilitation,
and Reentry). Seven programs include academic preparation for the High School
Equivalency Test. Six programs include a trauma recovery component. Each program
is eight to ten weeks long. We estimate that when all classes within individual
programs are combined, participating inmates each receive 165 to 247 hours of
programming during an 8-10 week cycle, depending on the size of each program’s
curriculum. We noted that all programs are offered equally to un-sentenced and
sentenced participating inmates.
99 The Programs Unit’s mission is to “enhance the successful reintegration of the program participants
into the community by providing them counseling, course study, personal skill training and after
custody care components in a structured environment.”
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-134-
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
What Works, and What Doesn’t Work
It is widely accepted among correctional researchers that individuals who participate
in effective treatment are less likely to recidivate after they return to the community
as compared to similar individuals who do not participate. In 2012, a study of
the County’s own inmate programs and their effect on recidivism indicated that
individuals who participated in programs were significantly less likely to be rearrested
or reconvicted at 6, 12, and 24 months compared to similar individuals who did not
participate in programs.100 This study also indicated, however, that some programs
were more effective at reducing recidivism than others, and that a few programs had
no to little effect on recidivism. One of those programs considered ineffective, the
Get Right program continues to be offered today. Get Right provides substance abuse
education to men with a substance abuse history. According to the study’s authors,
Get Right had several deficiencies, including the fact that “it is not a treatment
program but an education program which research has shown is not sufficient to
lead to long-lasting behavior change.”101 Unless the Programs Unit has addressed this
and other deficiencies, we recommend for the Custody Bureau to discontinue the Get
Right program, and replace it with an evidence-based approach to treating substance
abuse. Spending County funds on programs that are ineffective is wasteful.
Program Participation
Comprehensive programs are offered in different areas of the jails and are offered
to inmates of different security levels. Five of the 20 programs (Breaking Barriers,
Get Right, HEROES, REACH, and Roadmap to Recovery) are offered to high-medium
security inmates at Main Jail North. The remainder of the programs (and Roadmap
to Recovery) are offered to inmates of all security levels at the Elmwood Correctional
Facility, albeit most inmates at Elmwood are low and medium security. No
programming is offered at Main Jail South.
Historical Program Participation
As illustrated in Figure 9.1 on page 136, over the past five years, from Calendar Years
2013 to 2017, only 20.2 percent of all inmates (both male and female) participated
in any comprehensive program. These low levels of program participation mean the
County of Santa Clara is not taking the full opportunity to further reduce recidivism
and its associated criminal justice costs, and to make the community a safer place to
live and work.
100
Huskey, Bobbie, et al. Recidivism Study of the Santa Clara County Department of Correction’s
Inmate Programs Final Report. Huskey & Associates in association with U of Cincinnati Center for
Criminal Justice Research, January 31, 2012, pp. 8-14.
101
Ibid, p. 139.
-135-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Figure 9.1: Few Inmates Are in Comprehensive Programs
4,500
Average Number of Inmates
4,000
3,500
840
763
3,000
681
796
747
2,956
2,796
2,785
2015
2016
2017
2,500
2,000
1,500
3,243
3,283
2013
2014
1,000
500
0
Not In Comprehensive Programs
In Comprehensive Programs
Source: Custody Bureau.
Inmate Interest in Comprehensive Programs
Based on our survey of 731 inmates (see Appendix A for methodology and results)
few inmate reports being “not interested” in participating in programs, as revealed
by their answers to the two multiple-choice survey questions depicted in Figure 9.2
below. Many other inmates reported never hearing of program or class opportunities,
and others believe they were not eligible or were not screened for them.
Figure 9.2: Excerpt from Inmate Survey
10. Are you currently in any programs or classes (REAL, New Life, etc.)?
Yes
305
No
386
10a. If no, please tell us why not?
Not interested
No space available
Not eligible
Not screened
I've never heard of this before
Other: ________________
47
23
48
22
101
51
Source: Management Audit Division. See Appendix A – Inmate Survey for methodology and additional details.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-136-
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Current Program Participation
As of January 3, 2018, there were 3,189 inmates in the County’s jails, of which 893
were participating in comprehensive programs. This equates to 28.0 percent of all
inmates, which is 7.8 percent higher than the five-year historical average percentage.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of inmates (2,296) were not participating in programs
as of January 3, 2018.
How to Increase Program Participation
We found that the number of inmates participating in programs is primarily affected
by the fact that programs are offered only in housing units. There are no separate
facilities or rooms for programs. Program participation is therefore capped by each
unit’s capacity. In addition, we found that programs are not offered in the majority
of housing units. This coincides with the 28.0 percent of all inmates who were
participating in programs as of January 3, 2018.
It is our recommendation for the Custody Bureau to expand its use of comprehensive
programs, as shown in Figure 9.3 on page 138. In most instances, we recommend
keeping at least one dorm per floor or building as a non-programming location. This
can accommodate the portion of inmates who choose not to participate.
Of the 16 active housing units in Main Jail-North & South, only four (25.0 percent)
offered programs. None of the inmates classified as highest-security (“Level 4”) in the
Main Jail were offered any programming. Of the 613 inmates who were in custody
at the Main Jail-North as of January 3, 2018, only 219 (35.7 percent) were physically
housed in units that offered any type of programming.
None of the 76 inmates in the four housing units in Main Jail-South are offered
programming.
Of the 25 active housing units for men at the Elmwood Correctional Facility, only nine
(38.5 percent) offer programming. Unit E in Building M8-West is not active but set up
to offer programming. Half of the 12 active housing units in the Elmwood Women’s
Facility offered programming. Unit A in the Building W4 is not active but set up to
offer programming.
-137-
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Figure 9.3: Program Participation and Audit Recommendations
Main Jail North:
Security
Level
Program
Inmates in
Programs
4A
4B
4C
3
4
4
Vacant
None offered
None offered
0
46
42
0
0
0
Add
5A
5B
5C
3PC
3PC
3PC
Vacant
None offered
Breaking Barriers
0
55
65
0
0
65
Add
6A
6B
6C
3PC
3PC
3PC
None offered
None offered
HEROES
65
58
42
0
0
42
7A
7B
7C
2
2
2
None offered
Get Right
REACH
68
59
53
0
59
53
8A
8B
8C
4
3&4
2
None offered
None offered
Vacant
21
39
0
0
0
0
Security
Level
Program
Inmates in
Custody
Inmates in
Programs
4
None offered
2
0
2
2&3
None offered
None offered
36
37
0
0
2
None offered
1
0
Housing Unit
4th Floor
5th Floor
6th Floor
7th Floor
8th Floor
Audit
Recommends
Adding Programs
Inmates in
Custody
Add
Add
Main Jail South:
Housing Unit
2nd Floor - East
E Dorm
2nd Floor - West
A Dorm
various
2nd Floor - Max Unit
F Dorm
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
-138-
Audit
Recommends
Adding Programs
Add
Add
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Elmwood Men’s Facility:
Housing Unit
Min. Security Camp
Barracks 1-5
Barracks 6-7
Barracks 8-12
Building M2
Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Building M3
Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Building M4
Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Building M5
Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Building M8 - East
Unit A
Unit B
Unit C
Unit D
Building M8 - West
Unit E
Unit F
Unit G
Unit H
Security
Level
Program
Inmates in
Programs
0
94
0
1
1
1
None offered
301
94
281
2
2
2
2
None offered
None offered
None offered
None offered
63
58
59
55
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
None offered
None offered
None offered
None offered
45
48
47
32
0
0
0
0
2
2
2
2
Empower (GED)
PACE
None offered
43
56
74
92
43
56
74
0
2
2
2
2
None offered
None offered
None offered
New Directions
86
91
89
64
0
0
0
64
2
2
2
2
None offered
Pride
58
50
32
47
0
50
32
47
0
50
0
63
0
50
0
0
2
2
2
2
None offered
Inmates in
Custody
RCP-1 & PACT
REAL
Un Dia A La Vez
New Horizons
Bridge
Lifeline
Vacant
None offered
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Audit
Recommends
Adding Programs
Add
Add
Add
Add
Add
Add
Add
Add
Add
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Elmwood Women’s Facility:
Security
Level
Program
Inmates in
Custody
Inmates in
Programs
Dorm 1
2
AWAKE
16
16
Dorm 2
2
None offered
4
0
Special Use South
4
None offered
3
0
Special Use Felony West
4
AWAKE
6
6
Unit A
1
None offered
40
0
Unit B
1
None offered
36
0
Unit C
1
None offered
38
0
Unit D
2
44
44
14
14
Housing Unit
Audit
Recommends
Adding Programs
W1 Building
W2 Building
RCP-1 & PACT
WINGS & PACT
Unit E
2
Unit F
2
None offered
51
0
Unit A
3
COPE
0
0
Unit B
3
Second Chance
44
44
Unit C1-C3
4
IMPACT
40
40
Add
Add
W4 Building
Source: Custody Bureau and Management Audit Division recommendations
Notes: All inmate counts as of January 3, 2018. Excludes inmates who are not permanently housed, such as
intake/book or infirmary. Facilities that have been permanently closed such as the third floor of Main Jail
South are excluded from the above tables,
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
Other Issues to Consider
Housing assignments are based primarily on inmates’ custody classification (i.e.,
minimum (Level 1) to maximum (Level 4) security level). After inmates have been
admitted to a housing unit, the Rehabilitation Officers (ROs) of the Inmate Programs
Unit will complete an in-depth assessment of inmates to determine their specific
needs for programs. If inmates are deemed suitable for programs, ROs submit
requests to classification staff to transfer inmates to a housing unit with a program,
or for a change to their custody classification to transfer the inmate to a unit with a
program. By offering more programs in more areas of the jails, it is likely that more
inmates of different security levels will be able to participate in programs.
CONCLUSION
Although inmates who participate in comprehensive programs are less likely to
recidivate compared to similar inmates who do not participate, few inmates are
offered programming. Of those programs offered, one program in particular should
be replaced by a more effective program. We project that increased participation in
effective programming would reduce recidivism and its associated costs, and make
the community safer.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
9.1 Offer comprehensive programs to the inmates of the following housing
units of the County’s jails (Priority 1):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
9.2
Units 4B, 5B, 6A, and 8B, Main Jail North;
Dorm A and the various small units in the West Wing, 2nd Floor, Main Jail
South;
Barracks 1 to 5, 8 to 12, Elmwood Men’s Facility;
Units A, B, and C Building M2, Elmwood Men’s Facility;
Units A, B, and C Building M3, Elmwood Men’s Facility;
Units B and C Building M5, Elmwood Men’s Facility;
Units A and C Building W2, Elmwood Women’s Facility.
Discontinue the “Get Right” program, and replace it with an evidencebased approach to treating substance abuse treatment. (Priority 1)
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 9: Expanding Inmate Programs
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Implementation of Recommendation 9.1 would increase the County’s General Fund
costs by an estimated $2,819,609 per year for increased programming to be delivered
by County contractors. This is based on a recent study by the Legislative Analyst’s
Office which found that in California prisons, rehabilitation programs cost $2,437 per
inmate per year.102 ; 103 After accounting for these estimated increased programming
costs, the County would realize net cost-savings of $3,428,391 per year, primarily in
reduced recidivism and avoided incarceration costs to the County.
As of January 3, 2018, there were 1,157 inmates in housing units to which we
recommend adding programs. Using data from the County’s 2012 recidivism
study, we calculated that after one year the re-incarceration rate for inmates who
participated in programs was on average 6.1 percent lower than the matched
comparison group that did not participate in programs. If these 1,157 inmates
were offered programs, it is likely that 71 would not recidivate and be returned to
custody after one year, and the County would avoid paying $6,248,000 per year to
re-incarcerate them, based on the per inmate cost of $88,000 per year. The County
would only realize actual savings if the Custody Bureau closed a housing unit as a
result of fewer inmates due to lower recidivism.
Implementation of Recommendation 9.2 may increase or decrease the County’s
General Fund costs by an unknown amount depending on whether the “Get Right”
program is replaced with a more or less costly alternative.
102
California Legislative Analyst’s Office, “How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate?”
2016/2017. We used the total rehabilitation program costs which include academic education,
cognitive behavioral therapy, and vocational training combined to account for the varied inmate
program offerings within the County.
103
As of the writing of this report, we had obtained only two of the seven contracts that together
form the basis of the Custody Bureau’s programming curriculum (the Milpitas Adult Education and
PACT contracts). To calculate more precise estimates of increased programming costs and savings, we
need copies of the remaining contracts.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Background
Restrictive housing is the broad practice of removing an inmate from the general
population and limiting their daily out-of-cell activity. This type of housing can
serve a number of purposes, from discipline to securing inmates who are a threat
to themselves and others. Under these definitions, the Sheriff’s Office Custody
Bureau employs at least two types of restrictive housing: Disciplinary Housing and
Administrative Segregation. Other inmate designations such as Protective Custody,
Maximum-security, and Special Management may result in conditions of confinement
that mimic aspects of restrictive housing, but not as consistently or to the same
degree as the Custody Bureau’s Disciplinary Housing and Administrative Segregation
practices.
Problems and Adverse Effects
There is a marked difference in the extent of restrictive housing reported by inmates
and the statements of Custody Bureau staff. Inmates have repeatedly alleged
use of “solitary confinement,” a restrictive housing term typically associated with
extreme isolation and loss of privileges. While the Custody Bureau has denied
that such a practice exists within the County Jail, the Custody Bureau’s Disciplinary
Housing process does not always follow its own internal guidelines; infractions for
similar incidents are not applied uniformly; and the Bureau’s summary infraction
logs contain inaccuracies. For Administrative Segregation, the inmate notification
process is inadequately documented, and there is no separate tracking system for
administratively segregated inmates who must—per Custody Bureau policy—have
their classification reviewed more frequently than other inmates. There is also a lack
of consistency in how the two types of restrictive housing are referenced between the
Custody Bureau’s written policies and materials given to inmates prior to July of 2018.
The lack of adherence to internal Disciplinary Housing guidelines means that some
inmates may arbitrarily receive differential treatment. Further, the inaccuracies within
the infraction logs defeat the entire purpose of tracking this information. Inadequate
documentation surrounding inmate notification of Administrative Segregation
suggests that, in the event of litigation, the Custody Bureau cannot prove it provided
written notice of housing changes to these inmates. In the absence of a tracking
system around administratively segregated inmates, the Custody Bureau cannot
confirm whether reviews for this population are occurring on schedule. Lastly, the
Custody Bureau’s inconsistencies in its restrictive housing policies and practices may
cause inmates to perceive their housing arrangements as solitary confinement and
take legal action.
Recommendations, Savings, and Benefits
All Sergeants and Hearing Officers involved in the Disciplinary Housing process should
be re-trained in Custody Bureau policies and collectively determine a uniform set
of infractions to be applied to commonly-occurring incidents. The Custody Bureau
should keep copies of inmate Administrative Hearing notifications in its classification
files and develop a separate tracking system for all inmates in Administrative
Segregation. Quarterly summary statistics from this tracking system should be
provided to the Board of Supervisors. Finally, guidelines around restrictive housing
should be revised so that they are internally consistent, and all inmates and staff
should be trained on these revised guidelines.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
FINDING
Many correctional systems rely on some manner of physically separating and
restricting out-of-cell time for certain individuals or classes of inmates. However,
the terminology around this practice varies widely: “administrative segregation,”
“enhanced supervision,” and “secure housing” are just a handful of the terms used
to describe comparable mechanisms of isolating inmates.104 The U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) and its research agency, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), uses
the phrase “restrictive housing” to generally refer to conditions of confinement that
involve removing inmates from the general population and having these individuals
remain in their cells for 22 or more hours a day.105
Restrictive housing practices have undergone heavy scrutiny due to their health
implications. Anecdotal accounts have discussed inmate isolation leading to severe
psychological and emotional effects such as anxiety, rage, and reduced impulse
control. In order to provide a more rigorous analysis of restrictive housing’s
psychological impact on inmates, the NIJ conducted an extensive literature review
of mental health studies associated with this practice. While the NIJ could not
derive conclusions around the majority of restrictive housing-related mental health
concerns, two findings were corroborated by multiple papers. First, mental illness
is more prevalent among individuals in restrictive housing, and second, inmates in
restrictive housing have a higher probability of committing suicide.106
As such, several mental health organizations such as the American Psychiatric
Association have recommended that agencies create restrictive housing policies and
guidelines with mental health concerns in mind. More generally, the DOJ takes the
position that restrictive housing should be administered cautiously, infrequently, and
under reasonable constraints due to its unconventional conditions of confinement
and accompanying risks. While the agency recognizes the need for restrictive
housing in some instances to promote safety and security, the DOJ states that “It
is the responsibility of all governments to ensure that this practice is used only as
necessary—and never as a default solution.”107
Inmate Allegations Surrounding the Custody Bureau’s Use of Restrictive Housing
Restrictive housing has been the subject of litigation against the County. One lawsuit
reported that the Custody Bureau isolates “hundreds of men and women in tiny, filthy
concrete jail cells” for “months or even years at a time, and that inmates are held in
solitary confinement in specified locations such as Maximum-security and psychiatric
housing units.”108
104
Kapoor, Reena and Robert Trestman. (2016). Chapter 6 – Mental Health Effects of Restrictive
Housing. In Restrictive Housing in the U.S.: Issues, Challenges, and Future Directions. Washington,
DC.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
105
U.S. Department of Justice. (2016). Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of
Restrictive Housing.
106
Kapoor, Reena and Robert Trestman. (2016). Chapter 6 – Mental Health Effects of Restrictive
Housing.
107
U.S. Department of Justice. (2016). Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of
Restrictive Housing. p. 2.
108
Chavez v. County of Santa Clara, 1:15-cv-05277. Docket 1, Class Action Complaint for Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief, p. 1.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
These allegations of prolonged periods of restrictive housing are consistent with
responses to the inmate survey we issued in December of 2018. Of the 696 inmates
who responded to the restrictive housing questions, 285, or 40.9 percent, of
respondents reported that they had been placed in disciplinary solitary confinement,
and 95, or 33 percent, of these 285 inmates claimed that their length of stay in
such housing was over three months, as shown in Figure 10.1 below.109 Further,
in a letter to the County Sheriff regarding an October 2017 hunger strike, inmates
demanded that the Custody Bureau “[p]rohibit the use of long-term/indefinite solitary
confinement” and “[p]rohibit the use of solitary confinement based solely on gang
allegations, affiliation, validation, etc.”110
Figure 10.1: Excerpt from the Management Audit Division’s Inmate Survey111
6.
Have you ever been placed in disciplinary solitary confinement?
Yes
285
No
411
6a. If yes, how long was your stay in solitary confinement?
Less than 1 week
43
1 – 3 months
41
1-2 Weeks
62
2-4 weeks
37
More than 3 months
95
Source: Management Audit Division
Multiple lawsuits also alleged violations of Title 15112 requirements around required
out-of-cell time for restrictively housed inmates. One Plaintiff claimed that they
were not let out of their cell to shower for nine days. In another class action lawsuit,
Plaintiffs suggested that they were not allowed outside for seven months, and instead
only had the option to spend their out-of-cell time in another windowless cell called
“The Box.” Plaintiffs also alleged unsanitary living conditions due to being denied
adequate supplies to clean their cells, as well as frequent strip searches—sometimes
held in the view of other people.113
In contrast, the Custody Bureau repeatedly denied that solitary confinement is
employed within the County Jail, and reported that they had no knowledge of “The
Box.” Further, the Custody Bureau denied the existence of dedicated housing units
for restrictive housing. However, the latter claim is rendered questionable by a
legal document filed jointly between both parties in one of the 2016 lawsuits, which
asserted that “there are more than 150 prisoners in the restrictive housing units in the
109
We used the term “disciplinary solitary confinement” since we observed that most inmates refer
to any type punitive restrictive housing as solitary confinement and may not be familiar with the
technical terminology used by the Custody Bureau’s administration.
110
SV De-Bug. (2016). Letter from County Jail inmates to Sheriff Laurie Smith. Retrieved from
https://issuu.com/svdebug/docs/endsolitaryconfinementinhumanetreat.
111
See Appendix A: Inmate Survey for additional details and survey methodology.
112
California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Crime Prevention and Corrections.
113
Chavez v. County of Santa Clara, 1:15-cv-05277 (Filed 1/20/2016); Vasquez-Bernabe v. County of
Santa Clara, 5:16-cv-03218 (Filed 6/10/2016).
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
County’s jails.”114 The phrase “restrictive housing units” suggests dedicated units for
restrictive housing purposes. To reconcile these conflicting statements, it is possible
that there were once restrictive housing units located in the Maximum-security wings
of Main Jail South before the majority of this facility closed down throughout 2017.
To the extent that the Management Audit Division reviewed these inmate allegations,
we assessed the types of restrictive housing employed by the Custody Bureau,
the process of placing inmates into restrictive housing, and the length of stay in
these settings. We did not, however, examine whether these restrictive housing
practices constitute “solitary confinement,” as the lawsuits did not clearly define the
parameters of solitary confinement. There is also little formal consensus among law
enforcement and government agencies as to the definition of this term. Insofar as
“solitary confinement” is sometimes associated with additional isolation and losses
of privileges (e.g., reduced lighting, restrictions on programs, and limited visitation
rights115) beyond physical separation and minimal out-of-cell time116, we reviewed—to
the extent possible—conditions of confinement for restrictively housed inmates.
The Management Audit Division did not find any evidence that supported the more
severe allegations of Title 15 violations. In the handful of lock-down logs we were able
to review as part of inmates’ Disciplinary Housing packets, inmates were afforded at
least one hour every other day, in accordance with state requirements.117 However,
our paper sample was quite small, and the electronic out-of-cell logs we received
for the housing units were unreliable, as described in the Out-Of-Cell section of
the introduction of the report. Consequently, we cannot definitively state that all
that inmates in Disciplinary Housing and Administrative Segregation are uniformly
receiving appropriate out-of-cell time. Further, we can only speak to the issues of
unsanitary restrictive housing units and open-view strip searches insofar as the
Management Audit Division did not observe such phenomena during our facility
tours.
Types of Restrictive Housing Within the Custody Bureau
The Custody Bureau employs at least two forms of restrictive housing: Disciplinary
Housing and Administrative Segregation. See summary of terms in Figure 10.2
on page 147. These two types of restrictive housing are not uncommon. In the
Management Audit Division’s peer survey, all 25 jurisdictions responded “Yes” to the
question, “Does your department utilize either Disciplinary Housing or Administrative
Segregation?” See Appendix B: Peer Survey for additional details.
114
Chavez v. County of Santa Clara, 1:15-cv-05277. Docket 29, Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2.
115
Frost, Natasha and Carlos Monteiro. (2016). Chapter 1 – Administrative Segregation in U.S.
Prisons. In Restrictive Housing in the U.S.: Issues, Challenges, and Future Directions. Washington, DC.:
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
116
The Custody Bureau refers to this out-of-cell time as “program time,” which includes both
structured classes and programs and unstructured out-of-cell activities such as watching television
and making phone calls.
117
Title 15 of State law requires a minimum of “three hours of exercise distributed over a period
of seven days.” This equates to an average of less than 26 minutes per day. While this pertains to
exercise, this is the legal minimum of out-of-cell time that the Custody Bureau must provide, whether
or not the inmates use the time for exercise. Section 6030, California Penal Code. Title 15, § 1065
Exercise and Recreation.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Figure 10.2: Summary of Restrictive Housing Terms
Figure 10.3: Summary of Restrictive Housing Terms
Common Restrictive Housing Terminology:
Restrictive Housing: A general term that refers to conditions of confinement that involve
removing inmates from the general population and having these individuals remain in their cells
for 22 or more hours a day.
Solitary Confinement: A controversial term with little consensus or formal definition. This term is
sometimes associated with additional isolation and losses of privileges beyond physical
separation and minimal out-of-cell time.
Specific Terminology in Santa Clara County:
Disciplinary Housing: A disciplinary sanction administered in direct response to inmate rule
violations called infractions.
Administrative Segregation: A state of “separate and secure” housing for inmates who are
deemed a threat to other inmates and/or staff, prone to escape, or in need of protection from
other inmates. Inmates may also be administratively segregated if they are involved in an
ongoing investigation or inquiry. This housing in non-punitive in nature and is not assigned as a
result of specific inmate actions.
Protective Custody: Inmates who are housed and program separately from general population
inmates for their own safety. While this form of separation may come with some restrictions in
practice, Protective Custody is not automatically accompanied by single-occupancy housing or
reduced out-of-cell time or privileges.
Special Management: A portion of inmates with mental/behavioral health needs are housed in
Special Management units. They might program alone due to difficulties these individuals have
with programming with others. Like those in Protective Custody, these inmates, in practice, may
have more restrictions than general population inmates. However, there are no uniform
restrictions on out-of-cell time or privileges for this population.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, and Custody Bureau’s written policies
In addition to Disciplinary Housing and Administrative Segregation, the Custody
Bureau uses other designations that reflect some aspects of restrictive housing. For
instance, general Protective Custody inmates may be housed with one another and
program separately from other inmates for their own safety. Additionally, several
Special Management dorms may have inmates program separately due to difficulties
these individuals have with programming with others. However, because the two
primary conditions of restrictive housing—separation and drastically reduced
out-of-cell time—are not applied uniformly across these populations, we focus
on Disciplinary Housing and Administrative Segregation as the two main types of
restrictive housing used by the Custody Bureau.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Disciplinary Housing
Within the Custody Bureau, Disciplinary Housing is a disciplinary sanction
administered in direct response to inmate rule violations called infractions. According
to an Infraction Summary log provided by the Custody Bureau, Disciplinary Housing
was used as a form of disciplinary sanction in 762 of 1,399 inmate discipline cases
(54 percent) reviewed during calendar years 2015 – 2017.118 This type of restrictive
housing is characterized by the following:
1. Single-occupancy housing
2. One hour of out-of-cell time every other day (per Title 15 requirements)
3. Loss of personal property with the exception of clothing, bedding, hygiene
supplies, and other essentials
4. Restricted phone calls and visits, with the exception of legal counsel
5. Loss of commissary
6. No television
7. Restrictions on correspondence being kept in the cell
Because the nature of Disciplinary Housing is punitive, inmates who are subject to
this form of discipline are afforded due process. Sergeants and Lieutenants assigned
as “Hearing Officers” conduct interviews and disciplinary hearings and determine
appropriate sanctions if the rule violations are sustained. Any accompanying housing
changes (e.g., from a double cell to a single cell) are determined by the Classification
Unit.
When the sanction is as severe as Disciplinary Housing, which entails bare minimum
amounts of out-of-cell time and the loss of multiple privileges, it is essential
that internal policies and procedures are strictly followed. However, when the
Management Audit Division reviewed a judgmental sample of Disciplinary Housing
packets for ten inmates we had identified from the 2015 - 2017 Infraction Summary
log, we found several cases in which the infraction process and administered
discipline did not follow the Custody Bureau’s own policies.
Single Infraction Punished for Longer Than 10 Days
Because Disciplinary Housing is a punitive form of restrictive housing, it is
accompanied by due process guidelines and infraction-based time limits, as defined
by the Custody Bureau:
1. Inmates will not be given more than 10 consecutive days for a single infraction.
2. An inmate will not be confined for more than 30 consecutive days without the
Division Commander’s approval and consultation with medical staff.
3. The maximum days for all violations arising out of one incident (which may be
associated with multiple infractions) shall not exceed 60 days.
Based on the Custody Bureau’s infraction summary log, the overwhelming majority of
Disciplinary Housing assignments were 10 days or less (see Figure 10.4 on page 149
for a full distribution of assigned Disciplinary Housing days).
118
This figure excludes cases in which Disciplinary Housing was recommended, but then dropped
due to charges that were dismissed, or cases in which inmates did not receive this sanction due to no
longer being in custody.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Figure 10.4: Consecutive Days of Disciplinary Housing Assigned in 762 Discipline
Cases119 from 2015 to 2017
Count from Infraction Log
250
225
192
200
150
132
100
57
49
50
9
9
less 1
than
1 day
2
7
22
16
2
0
3
4
5
6
7
5
4
8
9
24
1
10
12
14
15
20
6
2
21
30
Days
Source: Custody Bureau’s Infraction Summary logs, calendar years 2015 to 2017
As shown in Figure 10.4 above, when discipline is meted out in the form of housing
conditions, the single most common length of punishment is ten consecutive days,
according to records furnished by the Bureau. Although, inmates are held for more
than ten days in 13.6 percent of cases when this punishment is used, per the Bureau’s
records, none are held for more than 30 consecutive days.
However, within our sample of Disciplinary Housing packets for ten inmates, the
Management Audit Division identified at least two cases in which inmates had
received 14 days of Disciplinary Housing for a single listed infraction. As described
earlier, Custody Bureau policy states that inmates are not to receive more than 10
consecutive days of Disciplinary Housing for any single infraction. In one of these
cases, the inmate had initially been charged with two rule violations, but one of
these violations was subsequently dismissed. When we asked the Custody Bureau
about these two cases, the Custody Bureau responded that an inmate might be
given additional days if the inmate has committed the infraction multiple times or
was the perpetrator of a particularly violent offense. However, the Custody Bureau
reported that there are no written guidelines around these discretionary extensions
of Disciplinary Housing time.
The fact that we were able to identify two cases of this internal policy violation in our
very limited sample of Disciplinary Housing records for ten inmates has troubling
implications for how frequently these violations—which should not be occurring at
all—are happening across all discipline cases.
119
“Case” refers to a discrete incident for disciplinary review. A single case may consist of multiple
infractions, and an inmate may have multiple pending cases against them.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Delayed Infraction Hearing
Further, within the sampled files, there was one instance in which the Custody Bureau
did not follow its own disciplinary hearing process timeline. According to internal
policy, when an inmate has been charged with an infraction, the inmate must first
receive a copy of this infraction to view their charges. They are then entitled to an
infraction hearing within 10 days of when the infraction was first written up. However,
the Management Audit Division identified a case in 2015 where an inmate received a
copy of their infraction on May 23, but did not have their infraction hearing until June
8. Despite the lack of adherence to disciplinary hearing timelines, this inmate was still
administered discipline.
Further, Section 1081 of Title 15 states, “[a] charge(s) shall be acted on no later
than 72 hours after an inmate has been informed of the charge(s) in writing.” In
the aforementioned instance, the hearing occurred more than two weeks after the
inmate was informed of their charge in writing. While the Management Audit Division
cannot ascertain what “acted on” entails within the Title 15 requirement, the two week
window between the infraction notice and hearing at least appears inconsistent with
inmate discipline requirements in Title 15.
Along the same lines, one of the sample Disciplinary Housing packets revealed that an
inmate had received their infraction hearing in March of 2016, but did not begin their
period of Disciplinary Housing until May of 2016. While the Custody Bureau’s internal
policy does not dictate that sanctions must be administered immediately after the
hearing, it is questionable whether the involved inmate still remembered which rule
violations had resulted in their placement into Disciplinary Housing two months after
the fact. If the purpose of Disciplinary Housing is not just to punish, but also to deter
the individual from committing the same rule violation, then administering a sanction
long after an infraction prevents the individual from making a connection between
their actions and the disciplinary outcome.
Infractions Applied Inconsistently
Finally, we observed different infractions written up for similar incidents. For instance,
manufacturing unauthorized beverages, including an inmate wine called Pruno, has
its own rule violation code. Additionally, there are also codes for removing food or
property from the dining area, not consuming all meals within 30 minutes of when
the meal was served, and inmates being responsible for the contents of their cells. In
the Disciplinary Housing packets that involved an inmate manufacturing Pruno, the
code for manufacturing unauthorized beverages was consistently cited. However,
several Disciplinary Housing packets also contained one or more of the other
aforementioned rule violation codes, lengthening the time of Disciplinary Housing
depending on the number of citations. The implication is that different inmates may
have received substantially different sanctions for similar incidents, depending on
how many infractions were cited and sustained.
These inconsistencies and failures to follow a series of set processes are troubling
in that they demonstrate differential treatment without a solid basis for these
differences. There is an equity concern in that an inmate’s administered discipline
may be heavily dependent on the particular Hearing Officer conducting the discipline
review, and how the inmate is perceived by Custody Bureau staff.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Discipline Incident Tracking is Inconsistent
The Custody Bureau’s discrepancies in its disciplinary process also extend to its
tracking of infractions. Upon reviewing the sample of Disciplinary Housing packets,
it was evident that several incidents had not been included in the tracking log. While
some of these incidents had been dismissed, other dismissed cases were included
in the log, demonstrating a lack of uniformity in how discipline cases are recorded.
Further, there were at least two incidents in which the tracking log had only listed one
rule infraction for a disciplined inmate, but the Disciplinary Housing packets showed
additional violations. If this tracking log is kept for the purpose of informing future
discipline proceedings or classification decisions, the inaccuracies within the log
reduce the utility of documenting these incidents in the first place.
Administrative Segregation
The second type of restrictive housing, Administrative Segregation, is non-punitive
in nature and is not assigned as a result of specific inmate actions. Rather,
Administrative Segregation is a provision in State law that requires - “separate and
secure” housing for inmates under certain circumstances.120 These circumstances
include 1) physical separation of inmates awaiting trial, convicted inmates and
inmates sentenced on civil grounds, such as contempt of court as required by
Section 4001 of the Penal Code; 2) physical separation of male and female inmates
as required by Section 4002 of the Penal Code; and 3) physical separation of inmates
who are deemed a threat to other inmates and/or staff, prone to escape, or in need
of protection from other inmates, pursuant to Section 1053 of Title 15 Regulations.
Use of administrative segregation for this third purpose requires policies and
procedures for its implementation under Title 15 Regulations. Inmates may also be
administratively segregated if they are involved in an ongoing investigation or inquiry.
Further, Title 15 Regulations expressly state that Administrative Segregation “shall not
involve any other deprivation of privileges than is necessary to obtain the objective
of protecting the inmates and staff.” According to the Custody Bureau, those in
Administrative Segregation retain telephone and visitation opportunities, commissary,
programs, and correspondence privileges insofar as affording these privileges does
not threaten the safety and security of inmates and staff. Further, unlike Disciplinary
Housing, there are no time limits associated with Administrative Segregation,
although inmates’ Administrative Segregation status must be reviewed at least once
every 30 days per Bureau policy. Lastly, because Administrative Housing is not the
result of specific infractions, the Classification Unit is responsible for Administrative
Housing decisions rather than Hearing Officers.
While Disciplinary Housing serves the straightforward purpose of inmate discipline
and has a standard set of processes and guidelines (even if, as described in the
preceding section, these standards are not always followed), the boundaries
for Administrative Segregation are less clearly defined. An inmate may be
administratively segregated for a number of reasons, and there are no defined time
limits for how long an inmate may stay in Administrative Segregation, either within
state code or Custody Bureau internal policy. Consequently, this form of restrictive
housing arguably poses even more risks than Disciplinary Housing and should be
accompanied by abundant documentation and tracking. However, the Custody
Bureau does not sufficiently have these controls in place.
120
15 CCR § 1053
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Lack of Documentation Around Informing Inmates of Administrative Segregation
Per Custody Bureau policy, an inmate must be informed of their Administrative
Segregation status within 48 hours of placement. The Custody Bureau allowed the
Management Audit Division to view the classification files of three inmates who had
been administratively segregated during their stay in custody. Within these files,
barring write-ups of inmate interviews, there was no evidence of inmates’ initial
notification of their placement into Administrative Segregation. The Custody Bureau
reported that a copy of the notification paperwork is only given to the inmate, and not
retained by the Classification Unit. Reasons for placement are administered verbally
and are not recorded on any specific form.
This lack of documentation is highly problematic from a litigation standpoint. If
an inmate claims they were never notified of being placed into Administrative
Segregation and informed of the reasons why, the Custody Bureau does not have
any hard evidence in its classification files to refute these allegations. In comparison,
the Disciplinary Housing packets contain a copy of the initial infraction given to the
inmate, as well as the outcome of the disciplinary hearing.
No Tracking System or Documentation of Additional Reviews
Further, the Custody Bureau does not have a centralized tracking system for
administratively segregated inmates. Unlike the reviews of general population
inmates, which are conducted every 60 days, administratively segregated inmates
must be reviewed every 30 days per the Custody Bureau’s Administrative Segregation
policy. Additionally, the policy states that a designated Classification Committee shall
meet every 30 days to review the status of all administratively segregated inmates. It
is questionable how either type of review may occur when the Custody Bureau has
no overarching mechanism for keeping track of which inmates have been placed into
Administrative Segregation.
In response, the Custody Bureau stated that all administratively segregated inmates
are automatically reviewed more frequently than every 30 days, by the function of
being part of either the Maximum-security or out-alone populations. The Jail Intel
Unit reportedly reviews these categories of inmates daily, of which administratively
segregated inmates are a subset. Additionally, the Custody Bureau claimed that
inmates are rarely held in Administrative Segregation for prolonged periods due
to the shortage of Maximum-security beds. However, the Custody Bureau did not
provide documented proof of these Jail Intel Unit reviews. Further, a jointly-filed
legal document in the case of Chavez v. County of Santa Clara stated, “Prisoners may
remain in restrictive housing unit cells for months or years at a time,” weakening the
claim that Administrative Segregation is rarely assigned for over 30 days.121
Additional Considerations
Apart from the aforementioned issues, there may exist additional concerns pertaining
to documentation around administratively segregated inmates. According to the
Custody Bureau policy, decisions around Administrative Segregation must be based
on documentation demonstrating that the inmate is a threat to the safety and
security of the facility, others, or themselves. While this documentation was provided
in the sample classification files, the Custody Bureau only provided files of inmates
121
Chavez v. County of Santa Clara, 1:15-cv-05277. Docket 29, Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶4.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
who had been placed into Administrative Segregation for their own protection, due
to either their charges or suspected danger from fellow gang members. According
to the Custody Bureau, there are no inmates in custody as of February of 2018 who
have been administratively segregated for other reasons such as being a threat to
other inmates/staff. Thus, while the sample files showed sufficient documentation
undergirding placement into Administrative Segregation, it is unclear whether this
documentation exists for all categories of Administrative Segregation.
Further, when an inmate is administratively segregated, they are entitled to an appeal
hearing with a member of the Classification Unit, so long as they submit an Inmate
Appeal of Administrative Segregation Housing form within seven days of being
notified of this status. However, none of the inmates in the provided sample had
requested a formal appeal, so it was impossible for the Management Audit Division to
assess this process or identify trends in appeal outcomes.
Restrictive Housing References in Inmate Materials Published Before July of
2018 Were Inconsistent with Custody Bureau Internal Policy
In addition to the Custody Bureau’s internal policy violations and tracking and
documentation issues around restrictive housing, there are clear inconsistencies
between the Custody Bureau’s restrictive housing policies and the materials created
for inmates. For example, prior to July of 2018, the Inmate Handbook, a set of
guidelines distributed to all inmates, depicted Administrative Segregation in a manner
that did not align with the true purpose of Administrative Segregation. Under the
sections “Criminal Offense Sanctions” and “Major Offense Sanctions,” the Handbook
enumerated different forms of discipline for rule violations and stated, “[T]he
Hearing Officer may impose any combination of the following penalties.” In this list,
“Rehousing to another unit with Classification’s approval (Administrative Segregation)”
was one of the listed penalties. See Figure 10.5 on page 154 for a summary of the
various discrepancies.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
Figure 10.5: Variation Between Custody Bureau Policy and Previous Version of Inmate
Rulebook
Topic
Custody Bureau Policy
“Administrative Segregation is not a
punitive system.”
Administrative
Segregation
Policy 13.03 Administrative Segregation
Previous Version of Inmate Rulebook
Lists “Rehousing to another unit with
Classification’s approval (Administrative
Segregation)” as a penalty for various rule
violations.
Criminal Offense Sanctions and Major
Offense Sanctions section of Rulebook
Disciplinary
Housing
“Housing, where an inmate is confined as
a penalty for violating facility rules after
having received a hearing and found guilty.
Disciplinary Housing may be in the same
housing unit or separate from the general
population.”
Policy 13.15 Disciplinary Housing
The term is used throughout. However,
the terms Disciplinary Segregation and
Disciplinary Isolation appear to replace it
sporadically.
Criminal Offense Sanctions and Major
Offense Sanctions sections of Rulebook
“When approved by the Division
Disciplinary
Isolation
Commander, Disciplinary Housing may
include a disciplinary isolation diet in
accordance with Title 15 and Department.”
The term is used throughout in a
manner that seems interchangeable with
Disciplinary Housing.
Policy 15.01, Inmate Rules and Discipline
Criminal Offense Sanctions and Major
Offense Sanctions sections of Rulebook
Policy 8.07 Inmate Meals. Otherwise, not
described in Custody Bureau’s Policies.
Disciplinary
Lockdown
“A punishment status assigned an inmate
who has violated facility rules.”
Policy 13.15 Disciplinary Housing
Disciplinary
Segregation
Not described in Custody Bureau’s Policies.
Not mentioned in Rulebook, although
the Rulebook references “Housing Unit
Lockdown,” which is used in a manner that
seems interchangeable with Disciplinary
Housing.
The term is used throughout in a
manner that seems interchangeable with
Disciplinary Housing.
Criminal Offense Sanctions and Major
Offense Sanctions sections of Rulebook
Source: Custody Bureau
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Section 10: Restrictive Housing
This version of the Handbook likely exacerbated inmate confusion around restrictive
housing practices because Administrative Segregation is not a “sanction” or “penalty.”
Placing Administrative Segregation under this category erroneously suggests that
this condition is the outcome of an infraction process, when, in reality, Administrative
Segregation determinations are a function of the Classification Unit. By the wording
of these sections, it would have been easy for an inmate to conflate Administrative
Segregation and Disciplinary Housing, and for administratively segregated inmates
to perceive that they had been placed in indefinite Disciplinary Housing without due
process and without having committed any rule violations. Further, the specific terms
“disciplinary segregation” and “disciplinary isolation” in the Handbook may have
only fueled inmates’ belief that the Custody Bureau uses solitary confinement for
disciplinary purposes.
In July of 2018, the Custody Bureau updated its Inmate Handbook, and removed all
instances of the terms “administrative segregation” and “disciplinary segregation”
from this revised version (although “disciplinary isolation” is still mentioned in the
new Handbook). This change will likely cause fewer inmates to conflate Disciplinary
Housing and Administrative Segregation, and make an incorrect assumption
that Administrative Segregation is a punitive measure in response to disciplinary
infractions. However, it is unclear whether inmates booked before July of 2018
have been trained on the changes in this version of the Inmate Handbook. Without
appropriate training, it is unlikely that inmates booked prior to July of 2018 will alter
their perceptions surrounding Disciplinary Housing, Administrative Segregation, and
solitary confinement.
CONCLUSION
Restrictive housing is a controversial practice that is primarily characterized by two
conditions: separation from the general inmate population and minimal out-of-cell
time. Because of its unique conditions of confinement, restrictive housing—while
sometimes necessary—should be utilized minimally and conscientiously, according
to a set of consistent standards. The Custody Bureau’s application of Disciplinary
Housing and Administrative Segregation does not adhere to these requirements.
The Bureau’s defined process for Disciplinary Housing is not consistently followed,
and the Custody Bureau does not retain records around inmate notification of
placement into Administrative Segregation. Insufficient tracking exists around both
types of restrictive housing. Further, up until July of 2018, the Custody Bureau’s
internal materials did not align in their references to the two types of restrictive
housing. In order to ensure and provide evidence that inmates who have been
assigned to restrictive housing have been placed in a fair and deliberate manner, the
Custody Bureau must strengthen its processes, documentation, and tracking around
Disciplinary Housing and Administrative Segregation.
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Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
Section 10: Restrictive Housing
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to recent legal settlements and resulting consent decrees, parts or all of these
recommendations may be subject to approval by Class Counsel and or federal courts
before they can be legally implemented.
The Custody Bureau should:
10.1 Administer training on the disciplinary hearing process to all involved
staff members. This training should include deciding on a uniform set of
infractions for common rule violations so that there is consistency in the
administration of Disciplinary Housing for similar offenses. (Priority 1)
10.2 Retain a written carbon copy of the inmate’s notification of Administrative
Segregation (both the generic form and the reasons behind this status
change) in inmate classification files. (Priority 1)
10.3 Develop a tracking system for administratively segregated inmates and
provide quarterly reports to the Board of Supervisors on 1) the number
of inmates that were administratively segregated during the given period;
2) the average length of stay in administrative segregation; 3) statistics on
where these inmates were housed; and 4) the number and outcome of
appeals. (Priority 1)
10.4 Revise all inmate and staff materials referencing restrictive housing so
that they are internally consistent. All staff and existing/incoming inmates
should be trained on these revised materials, including the new Inmate
Rulebook Handbook that was updated in July of 2018. (Priority 1)
10.5 Create written guidelines for tracking disciplinary incidents and infractions.
(Priority 2)
SAVINGS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS
Recommendations 10.1 through 10.5 are feasible within the Custody Bureau’s
existing budget allocations and staff resources. These recommendations will allow the
Custody Bureau to provide a safe and secure environment for all inmates and staff
through restrictive housing practices that are fair, uniform, and grounded in evidence.
Implementing these measures will also better protect the Custody Bureau against
litigation threats surrounding restrictive housing.
Board of Supervisors Management Audit Division
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Attachments A-H
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Attachment A: Department Response
County of Santa Clara
Attachment A: Department Response
Office of the Sheriff
55 West Younger Avenue
San Jose, California 95110-1721
(408) 808-4610
Laurie Smith
Sheriff
TO:
Cheryl Solov, Board of Supervisors Management Audit Manager
FROM:
Sheriff Laurie Smith
DATE:
February 12, 2021
SUBJECT:
Management Audit of the Sheriff’s Custody Operations dated January 14, 2021
I am in receipt of the Management Audit of the County of Santa Clara Sheriff’s Custody
Operations dated January 14, 2021 and I have reviewed the findings. Attached is a spreadsheet
which details each recommendation, whether agree or disagree with the recommendation, and
my rationale. Please accept it as my response to the audit.
-159-
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2.2
2.1
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
Audit #
Create a budget modification request for a new Custody Support
Assistant to collect and enter grievances and present it to the
Board of Supervisors for approval.
Require the Custody Bureau develop and implement a policy to
ensure that Internal Affairs receives all lawsuits involving
Custody Bureau and Department of Corrections personnel and
should require Internal Affairs to automatically open an
investigation into alleged assaults or other serious allegations
that are made in such suits.
Require that Internal Affairs prioritize investigations in which an
employee is on paid leave or alternate duty to minimize
operations disruption and the expense of placing employees on
leave.
Require that Internal Affairs ensure that its attention to detail in
record-keeping is reflective of the weight of its charge and the
potential for such records to become evidence in lawsuits or
criminal trials.
Restructure the Grievance Unit such that the current Senior
Management Analyst acts as the head of the Unit. The Senior
Management Analyst should receive additional training on law
enforcement, legal issues, and data confidentiality rules to
facilitate their transition into this supervisory role. In their new
capacity, they would continue to report to the Correctional
Captain, but, also, dually send any issues and analyses to the
new oversight function, the Office of Correction and Law
Enforcement Monitoring.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 2
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Agree
Disagree
Partially Agree
Partially Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Sheriff's Office Response to Audit Findings
SO Response
Priority
The Custody Bureau should work with Internal Affairs, County
Counsel, the Employee Services Agency and affected labor
unions to develop and implement a policy that would ensure
that officers accused of series offenses be immediately placed on
paid leave or assigned to duties that do not involve inmate
contact, pending investigation. Such assignment should be
triggered when allegations are brought to the attention of
custody, legal or medical personnel.
Audit Finding
Strongly agree, however CSA were cut by the county in the
budget cuts. The Staffing Study should address this issue.
Request 6 CSA per facility (for a total of 12) for 24/7 coverage
since grievances are collected on all shifts.
Job Specification for Senior Management Analyst (B1N) is not
generally supervisory. Specification does state, "...may provide
direct supervision over assigned professional, technical, and
office support staff." This classification of employee cannot
supervise entire unit consisting of some badge staff, including a
manager.
It is optimal that these be prioritzed, as is our standard practice.
However, there are circumstance such as a corresponding
criminal investigation where the 1-year completion statute is
tolled.
Agree that there should be "attention to detail" in serious
incidents, but disagree because "attention to detail" should, and
is, the requirement for all investigations.
The Sheriff's Office receives copies of all lawsuits and interfaces
with and is advised by County Counsel for the best course of
action.
Response Statement
All internal investigations are judged on a case-by-case basis, in
conjunction with County Counsel. Factors that are considered
include the nature of the allegation, the involved employee's
prior conduct, the potential validity of the complaint. A cursory
review is often conducted. As an example, if the circumstances
or incident are preserved on video, that would be reviewed.
Attachment A: Department Response
-161-
3.1
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3
The Board of Supervisors should receive and hear the Office of
Law Enforcement Monitoring's bi-annual review and
investigative outcomes.
The Bureau should revise its Use Policy for facility cameras to
include specific guidelines on when audio may be switched off
for these devices for legal or privacy purposes.
Receive and review the Custody Bureau's bi-annual grievance
and appeal reports, and receive digital copies of corresponding
grievances and responses from the evaluation periods in these
reports. The Office should then investigate these responses as
well as the grievance categories that appeared in the highest
frequency over the bi-annual period, to determine whether the
Grievance Unit is effectively addressing inmate concerns. The
results of this review should be reported to the Board of
Supervisors.
Develop and implement a bi-annual external review component
to the grievance process with the new oversight function, the
Office of Correction and Law Enforcement Monitoring, and the
Board of Supervisors. A digital copy of all grievances and
responses should be provided to all parties each period.
Revise the grievance process policy such that supervisors may
not review and respond to grievances concerning their direct
reports or themselves.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Disagree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Facility Cameras are automatically set to record 24/7 and it
would not be practical or fesaible to try to have staff monitor
all 1,422 cameras in real time in order to cut the volume in
specific situations. Also, the purpose of the footage is to
provide evidence in criminal, administrative, and civil
investigations and for litigation. Redactions can be made to
video (including audio) if protected information is captured.
Also, cameras are not set up in areas where privacy is expected
such as restrooms, lactation rooms, etc.
The contract with OIR Group specifies reporting time frames.
OCLEM was formed and OIR Group was selected as vendor for
this function.
OCLEM was formed and OIR Group was selected as vendor for
this function.
The Job Specification for Correctional Sergeant states, "...under
direction, to supervise correction and support personnel." The
implication is that a sergeant would show favortism to those he
supervises, but it is the express duty of a sergeant to supervise
subordinates and take corrective action.
Attachment A: Department Response
3.3
3.2
Integrate BWC activation as an explicit learning objective in its
upcoming Force Options, Defensive Tactics, and other simulation
trainings for in-service staff and immediately into the curriculum
for Academy recruits.
Revise its use policy for BWC's in the following capacities. (a)
Adjust the footage viewing provisions for Custody staff so that
they match the requirements in the Custody Bureau's Use of
Force Policy. (b) For the purposes of consistency in evidencegathering, specify a location on the body in which BWCs must be
worn, citing exceptions for individuals with health conditions and
in special units. (c) Task the Internal Audit Unit with conducting
periodic audits of BWC footage instead of direct supervisors.
Define the size of the sample to be drawn and test criteria, as
well as how the audits will be recorded and tracked. (d) Require
Correctional Deputies to record on their reports whether there is
BWC footage available on the incident.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Agree
Disagree
-162-
Initial training did indeed focus on the policy and technical
aspects of the BWC; however, BWC activation and usage has
since been incorporated into ongoing perishable skills training.
Dummy BWC's are also available at the Academy and utilized by
recruits during scenarios and other academy training situations
to simulate activation and appropriate usage.
(a)The BWC policy and Custody Use of Force policy are two
distinct policies and each delineates its own distinctive
mandates clearly for deputies to understand. Deputies are
trained to each policy and there is no confusion regarding
requirements. (b) The BWC policy requires deputies to position
the BWC properly in order to record events, and to wear the
recorder in a conspicuous manner. SInce the policy approval in
January of 2017, there have not been any issues regarding
deputies not wearing the BWC in a proper manner and this
recommendation appears to be a solution in search of a
problem that doesn't exist. (c) The BWC policy was derived from
discussions with lawyers and the affected unions with the
purpose of ensuring proper usage and conduct. The policy
requires that supervisors, AT MINIMUM, review random
footage on a monthly basis to ensure the BWC's are being used
in accordance with policy and to identify additional areas where
training or guidance is required. Violations observed result in
corrective action or discipline of the employee. (D) Deputies
are already required to have thier BWC's on for all
circumstnaces that could result in a report. Per current Sheriff's
Office BWC policy, they are required to document in their repor
if their BWC is not on during an incident and the reason it
wasn't on.
Attachment A: Department Response
-163-
3.7
3.6
3.5
3.4
Add additional interactive exercises to the Use policy portion of
the BWC training.
Have supervisors conduct preliminary reviews of footage and
usage patterns within the first four weeks after BWC training for
both in-service staff and Academy recruits to ensure that there
are no misunderstandings surrounding the policy or technology.
Have supervisors issue daily reminders to their reports to
activate their BWCs until all Correctional Deputies have
undergone simulation trainings.
Develop an early intervention system, monitored by supervisors
to identify BWC users who repeatedly fail to use the technology
in accordance with the Use Policy. During their incident reviews,
supervisors should record each time a Deputy's BWC footage did
not comply with the Use Policy and review the frequency of
these occurances for their direct reports every month.
Priority 2
Priority 2
Priority 2
Priority 1
Disagree
Initial BWC training focused on the technical aspects of the BWC
and the policy. Formal BWC training has evolved along with the
program and is now part of the Academy, in-service training,
and perishable skills training. This recommendation is no longer
applicable.
Per BWC policy, supervisors will randomly review BWC
recordings to ensure that the equipment is operating
properly and that deputies are using the devices
Partially Agree
appropriately and in accordance with policy and to identify
any areas in which additional training or guidance is
required.
Disagree
We have many policies and procedures that staff are required
to follow. Daily reminders are not feasible for all policies
even for those that are high risk subjects. Roll-call training and
reminders from supervisors were frequent early in the BWC
program. Usage of the BWC is now well-ingrained in the
deputy's daily routine and muscle memory. BWC usage is part of
the Academy and Jail Training Program, and the
recommendation is no longer applicable.
Supervisors who identify staff not using BWC's in accordance
with policy begin the progressive discipline process with that
employee in order to bring the conduct into allignement with
the expectations of the Sheriff's Office and BWC policy. Creating
a seperate early intervention system isn't necessary since
Partially Disagree
Supervisors are addressing incidents of violation when they see
them. If employees continue to violate the policy, then the
progressive discipline gets more severe until the conduct is
corrected.
Attachment A: Department Response
-164-
6.1
5.2
5.1
4.6
4.5
4.4
3.8
Expand the out-of-custody phase of its Custody Alternative
Supervision Program to serve 219 additional Realignment
inmates in the jails.
Hire 1.0 FTE Sheriff Sergeant, 3.0 FTE Sheriff Deputies, 3.0 FTE
Correctional Deputies, and 8.0 FTE Rehabilitation Officers to
supervise and case manage the 219 additional Realignment
inmates in the community.
Work with the Custody Bureau's Information Technology
specialists within the Bureau to fix and troubleshoot the custody
scoring malfunctions on the electronic platform.
Conduct a complete staffing analysis as recommended by
National Institute of Correction to ensure the appropriate mix
and number of staff are assigned to custody positions.
Update the relief factor to accurately determine the number of
correctional staff needed to provide post coverage identified in
recommendation 1.5.
Develop guidelines for determining which security posts are
essential to facility security. The guidelines should specify what
duties and posts are required to maintaining security during an
emergency and for which overtime may be paid if necessary to
fill these posts
Adopt revised Surveillance Use Policies for the Custody Bureau's
facility cameras and BWCs such that the revised Use Policies
contain provisions around audio; align with best practices; and
are internally consistent with other Custody Bureau policies.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 2
Priority 1
Priority 1
Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Partially Agree
Partially Agree
Disagree
Completed. The new Classification tool was fully implemented in
early 2017. Since then, any issues with the Classification scoring
tool have been completed.
Additional staffing needed. Should be addressed in Staffing
Study. We strongly agree with recommendation which could
serve to decrease the jail population.
Additional staffing needed. Should be addressed in Staffing
Study.
Agree with the concept. The County contracted with CGL to
provide a comprehensive Staffing Study. This is the work that
should be relied on instead of the Custody Bureau providing the
assessment. It is believed that a portion of their study will
address the relief factor.
This is one of the reasons that the Staffing Study was
recommended. The entire staffing study should be completed
soon, per the County Executive's Office.
Agree with the concept. The County contracted with CGL to
provide a comprehensive Staffing Study. This is the work that
should be relied on instead of the Custody Bureau providing the
assessment. Overtime is required if sufficient staff is not
available to fill mandated post positions.
The BWC policy already provides provisions concerning audio,
and deputies are required to list in the report if an audio
recording is stopped for a reason other than the approved
reasons listed within the BWC policy itself. Facility Cameras are
automatically set to record 24/7 and it would not be practical or
fesaible to try to have staff monitor all 1,422 cameras in real
time in order to cut the volume in specific situations. Finally,
deputies are trained on custody policies so that there is proper
understanding and ability to carry out the mandates of each
policy.
Attachment A: Department Response
7.1
6.4
6.3
6.2
Review the LGBTQI policy with the County Office of LGBTQI
Affairs. The policy should be revised and finalized with the
approval of the Office of LGBTQI Affairs with technical assistance
from the National Institute of Correction as identified in
Recommendation 1.5 and assistance from County Counsel. In
revising this policy, the Custody Bureau should consider the
following: (a) Comparing the major policy sections against the
topics and checkslists covered in the National Institute of
Corrections guidelines; (b) Adding a section that lists and
describes references to other departmental policies that discuss
LGBTQI inmate treatment; (c) Including a provision that staff
remind all inmates during 60-day classification inteviews that
inmates may make changes to their Statement of Preference
Form at any time; (d) Specifying the policy review timeline, given
the rapidly changing nature of the LGBTQI issues and legal
landscape in correctional facilities.
Have the JFA Institute classification experts conduct observations
of both inmate classification files and reassessment interviews to
evaluate whether overrides and interviews have been applied
according to NIC best practices.
Have its Classification Unit develop written guidelines for
classification audits and create a formal tracking system for
these audits.
Work with the Custody Bureau's Information Technology
specialists to either migrate lower security, pre-Austin Tool
inmates to the electronic platform for reassessment scheduling
or create an alternative mechanism for generating automated
reassessment alerts for these inmates.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Completed - Policy 14.17 (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Questioning/Queer and Intersex inmates) was created in June
2018 with references to the American Correctional Association,
Department of Justice, California Goverment codes, US
Department of Health and Services and the assistance of County
Counsel. The following policies are also refrenced in Policy
14.17: Policy 14.15 (Prison Rape Elimination Act) and Policy
9.05 (Strip Search). The policies are reviewed periodically
within the Sheriff's Office's Operational Standards and
Inspection Unit. The Classification Unit conducts a 30 and 60
day PREA review of all inmates that are identified as LGBTQI
during their incarceration. The LGBTQI Deputy also conducts
interviews with the inmates that have identified as LGBTQI
during the first 30 days of their incarceration and periodically
after that. The inmates are informed that they can choose to
identify at any time during their incarceration at which time a
new statement of preference form will be filled out to update
the inmates gender identity and the appropriate stakeholders
will also be advised (Medical, Classification and administration)
so that they can update their records.
Recommend that the County contract with JFA to conduct an
audit.
Recommend that the subject matter expert and the author of
the validated classification system, Jim Austin, be contracted
with to audit the application of the classification system.
Done. in 2017, all pre- Austin tool inmates of all security levels
were manually inputted into the Classification reassessment
tool. This created an alert every 60 days that a 60 day
reassessment was due.
Attachment A: Department Response
-165-
7.2
Have OSIU expand its interviews to all LGBTQI identifying
inmates.
Priority 1
Partially Agree
The LGBTQI unit consists of only (1) deputy who oversees the
entire Main Jail, Elmwood and CCW facilities. The LGBTQI
deputy conducts periodic interviews of all documented inmates
who identify as Transgender while in custody. However,
inmates are not forced to identify if they choose not to but can
still request interviews at anytime by reaching out to their dorm
deputy, using a request form or by using the grievance system.
at any time during the interview process if an inmate discloses
that they want to change their gender idenity they are provided
with a new Statement of preference form that can be filled out
during the interview. The new statement of preference form
will then by shared with other stakeholders so that they can
update the inmates gender identity in Medical, Classification
and Administration. Without a true Jail Management System in
place, we currently do not have the ability to track all of the
required information regarding members of the LGBTQI
community in any other way than to track the information by
hand. Recommend additional staffing.
Attachment A: Department Response
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7.4
7.3
Have OSIU create a schedule for annual population audits,
expand the scope of these audits from transgender inmate to
the broader LGBTQI population and ensure that the results of
audits are used to inform the intake/classification processes to
better identify members of the population.
Have OSIU receive twice weekly, high-level CJIC reports on all
LGBTQI inmates and submit additional monthly requests on the
PSJEM Executive Leadership Committee for more detailed data
on this population, broken down by PFN. Using this CJIC data and
information from its interviews, OSIU should produce quarterly
reports on 1) the size of the LGBTQI population; 2) trends in
housing locations; 3) recurring issues from interviews with the
LGBTQI Officer, and present these reports to the Board of
Supervisors
Priority 1
Priority 1
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We do not currently have a Jail Management System that can
assist in gathering or collecting the requested data nor can we
currently expand to a broader population without a JMS. We
currently have to collect all data manually. The Classification
Unit sends a bi-weekly population statistic for the Main Jail,
Elmwood and CCW facilities at the beginning and end of each
week. The LGBTQI deputy gathers the data sent from
Partially Disagree
classification and reviews it and compares it to previous months
and previous quarters. All collected data is put into a quarterly
audit and reviewed with the PREA Manager as well as the
Support Services Captain. All information is also shared with
medical, Classification and facility administration.
Currently we do not have a Jail Management System to gather
the necessary information requested. At this time we utilize
CJIC to track certain categories however CJIC does not have the
capabilities to send or track detailed information on the LGBTQI
inmates in custody. At this time the LGBTQI deputy does work
with the classification unit to generate manual statistics of all
documented Transgender inmates in custody. The statistics
include: Rolling counts of in-custody and out of custody
documented Transgender inmates, names, PFN's, Booking
numbers, Preferred name/Pronouns, Facility, housing unit, date
of arrest and the 30 day PREA review deadline. The
Classification Unit also notifies the LGBTQI deputy of all newly
Partially Disagree
booked inmates who identified as Transgender during either the
Booking process or during the Classification interview. The
LGBTQI deputy will then initiate an in-person interview. The
LGBTQI deputy will then begin keeping a statistic of pending
housing locations. All in person interviews conducted by the
LGBTQI deputy are documented. All issues and concerns are
documented and disclosed to the unit supervisor for corrective
action. All follow up and any responses or corrective action is
also documented.
Attachment A: Department Response
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10.1
9.2
9.1
8.2
8.1
Administer training on the disciplinary hearing process to all
involved staff members. This training should include deciding on
a uniform set of infractions for common rule violations so that
there is consistency in the administration of Disciplinary Housing
for similar offenses.
Offer comprehensive programs to the inmates of the following
housing units of the County's jails: - Units 4B, 5B, 6A, and 8B,
Mail Jail North; - Dorm A and the various small units in the West
Wing, 2nd Floor, Mail Jail South; - Barracks 1 to 5, 8 to 12,
Elmwood Men's Facility; - Units A, B, and C Building M2,
Elmwood Men's Facility; - Units A, B, and C Building M3,
Elmwood Men's Facility; - Units B and C Building M5, Elmwood
Men's Facility; - Units A and C Building W2, Elmwood Women's
Facility.
Discontinue the "Get Right" program and replace it with an
evidence-based approach to treating substance abuse
treatment.
Implement a simple spreadsheed-based timesheet to replace the
paper-based timesheet to assist with regular performance
reporting to the Custody Bureau.
Work with Custody Health and County Counsel to update the
Memorandum of Understanding to include (1) minimum
performance standards; (2) quarterly reporting requirements;
and (3) a provision to annually review, update, and re-certify the
agreement to ensure it remains actively managed. The update
should comport to any legal agreements that may be applicable.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Because each sustained allegation has different fact patterns,
this is not practical. Instead, we utilize a comparative discussion
and evaluation into past disciplinary action decisions. The
effectiveness of our current system is reenforced by arbitrator's
decisions.
"Get Right" was just the name of the dorm where a program
was provided and not the name of a program. The inmates
named the program dorm the "Get Right" program. Programs
provided are evidence based in the areas of Trauma Informed,
Substance Abuse, Life Skills, Education and Recreational.
With the exception of the Main Jail South housing units listed,
which has been demolished, comprehensive programming
exists for all inmates incarcerated at both the Main Jail and
Elmwood facilities regardless of the housing unit.
The Sheriff's Office neither oversees nor has the expertise to
conduct performance reporting of Custody Health. However,
the lack of any JMS hinders all "paper" record keeping.
Sheriff's Office staff does not provide the supervisory fuction of
Custody Health. Furthermore, the Sheriff's Office does not have
the expertise to determine the "..quality and cost of Custody
Health Services."
Attachment A: Department Response
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10.5
10.4
10.3
10.2
Create written guidelines for tracking disciplinary incidents and
infractions.
Revise all inmate and staff materials referencing restrictive
housing so that they are internally consistent. All staff and
existing/incoming inmates should be trained on the revised
materials, including the new Inmate Rulebook Handbook that
was updated as of July of 2018.
Develop a tracking system for administratively segregated
inmates and provide quarterly reports to the Board of
Supervisors on 1) the number of inmates that were
administratively segregated during the given period; 2) the
average length of stay in administrative segregation; 3) statistics
on where these inmates were housed; and 4) the number and
outcome of appeals.
Retain a written carbon copy of the inmate's infraction
notification of Administrative Segregation (both the generic form
and the reasons behind this status change) in inmate's
classification files.
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Priority 1
Partially agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Without a Jail Management system it would be extremely
difficult to track disciplinary records since all files are paper at
this time. This can and will be accomplised once we have a JMS
system in place.
Done. When the consent decree was finalized, all materials
referring to restrictive management housing (Restrictive
housing) were updated in the classification unit.
Unfortunately, the jails do not have access to a jail management
system. All tracking is done by hand and recorded onto/into an
inmate classification file, which is a paper file. To manually track
the information requested without a JMS system would require
more staffing for the classification unit with the primary
responsibility of only tracking inmates placed into
administrative management since administrative management
is not a specific location and is more of a housing status.
Administrative management is when an inmate receives less
than the allocated out of cell time outlined in the county's
consent decree, which means inmates out of cell time at both
facilities and all housing units must also be tracked.
Infractions are a process utilized by the facility when inmates
violate a rule listed in the rule book. Infractions have nothing to
do with an inmate being housed in Administative Management
housing. The reasons for an inmate being placed in
administrative management are outlined in the county's federal
consent decree. When an inmate is placed in administrative
management housing the documented reasons are placed into
the inmates classification file.
Attachment A: Department Response
DocuSign Envelope ID: B6CD3344-13B1-46ED-A77A-7A93CA8AFB9B
Attachment A: Department Response
Custody Health Services
Administration
150 W. Hedding Street
San Jose, CA 95110
Tel (408) 808-3648
Fax (408) 808-3633
TO:
Management Audit Report Division
FROM:
Eureka C. Daye, PhD., MPH, MA, LPC. LMFT, CCHP, Director of Custody Health and
Behavioral Health Services
RE:
ACHS Response to Redacted Draft Management Audit Report of County of Santa Clara
Sheriff’s Custody Operations
DATE:
February 16, 2021
Adult Custody Health Services (ACHS) was provided with a redacted draft Management Audit Report
of Sheriff’s Office Custody Operations for fiscal year 2017-2018, which includes a portion on ACHS
services with a request for response.
As you may know, I am new to the position of Director of ACHS. I have 10 years’ experience working
in correctional healthcare and a combined 35 of experience between acute healthcare, behavioral
healthcare, academia, and correctional healthcare leadership. After reviewing the Management Audit
Report, I certainly would have liked the opportunity to research in more detail some of the issues
raised. And I would have welcomed the opportunity to share all the important work currently being
done by the ACHS team, although I recognize you may not have had the opportunity to evaluate these
accomplishments: The Gilead FOCUS Program: To Increase HIV, HCV, HBV syphilis, chlamydia,
and gonorrhea screening in The County Jails; Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) for Substance
Use Disorders in incarcerated patients. The MAT Program utilizes oral long-acting injectable
naltrexone and acamprosate to treat alcohol-use disorder (AUD), and oral and long-acting injectable
naltrexone for OUD, PACE Program for Chronic Pain Patients; White Card IPAD Patient Request for
Services; Trauma Informed High Needs Women’s Project to name a few.
Unfortunately, since almost four years has passed since the audit, it has been challenging for ACHS
staff to respond to the audit findings. Nevertheless, ACHS provides the following response.
A. Custody Bureau Oversight of ACHS and Contract Performance Measures
The stated purpose of the audit was to examine the operations, management practices and finances of
the Sheriff’s Custody Operations and identify opportunities to increase efficiency. (Management Audit
Report p. 7.) The Management Audit Report finds that a best practice recommends that Custody
Bureau should have contract measures in place for ACHS performance. (Management Audit Report pp.
122-123.) And further concludes that the lack of Custody Bureau oversight of ACHS increases the risk
that medical care may be insufficient or poorly delivered. (Management Audit Report pp. 119, 122123). As a solution, the Management Audit Report recommends that the Custody Bureau should be
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responsible for ensuring the “adequacy, timeliness, and cost effectiveness” of inmate healthcare.
Custody Bureau and ACHS enjoy a good working relationship, meet regularly, and share information
but ACHS disagrees with this recommendation. The Custody Bureau is required by law to designate,
in writing, the “health authority” in the jail.1 The Custody Bureau and ACHS 2005 memorandum of
understanding cited in the Management Audit Report memorializes this relationship and complies with
Title 15.
In addition to this agreement, the Management Audit Report recommends that Custody Bureau and
ACHS enter a contract with specific performance measures. (Management Audit Report p. 123.) This
recommendation appears to be based on the survey of 28 California counties of which 20 responded
that they had mechanisms in place to ensure their inmate healthcare providers followed basic standards
of care. (Management Audit Report pg. 119.) In our experience, many county jails outsource their
healthcare services and contract with private healthcare entities and, thus, it may be a “best practice”
for their contract to have healthcare deliverables since this is the only mechanism to measure
performance.2 In our County, ACHS is directly responsible to the Board of Supervisors without a need
for an outsourced contract. Our County is fortunate to have its inmate healthcare directly responsible to
healthcare leaders in the County. It is generally accepted that the use of private medical contractors is
inferior to publicly provided healthcare in a custodial setting.3 It would make sense that counties that
hire private contractors would have performance standards in their contracts.
The Management Audit Report also mentions litigation costs as being indicative of a deficiency in
management data as a reason for contract performance terms. (Management Audit Report p. 124.)
Based on the information in Figure 8.3, the County settled 3 out of 25 cases related to jail healthcare in
a period of five years. Given that these cases were settled, it appears that the County denied liability
for the allegations and, in this writer’s experiences, litigation often resolves for reasons other than
actual evidence of negligent care. Three healthcare litigation events in five years are not an appropriate
measure healthcare performance. Nevertheless, ACHS works closely with the Custody Bureau and
County Counsel on risk management strategies. Given that ACHS is imbedded in the health system,
ACHS disagrees with the need for performance metrics accountable with the Custody Bureau and
recommends the continued practice of ACHS’s accountability to the health system for ACHS
healthcare metrics.
B. Responsibility for Quality Assurance
Title 15, section 1200 requires the Custody Bureau to “ensure the provision of emergency and basic
Title 15, §1006 provides that “the “health authority” means that individual or agency that is designated with
responsibility for health care policy pursuant to a written agreement, contract or job description. The health authority may
be a physician, an individual or a health agency. In those instances where medical and mental health services are provided
by separate entities, decisions regarding mental health services shall be made in cooperation with the mental health
director. When this authority is other than a physician, final clinical decisions rest with a single designated responsible
physician.”
2
The Management Audit indicates that 72 percent (e.g., 20 of the 28) counties responded that they have performance
measure for their healthcare provider. Only 8 of the entities that responded use county employees for their healthcare.
The Management Audit indicates that some of these counties have clear contractual deliverables, but the Management
Audit does not indicate if this is true for the very few counties that responded to the survey that, like our County, that
utilize county employees to provide healthcare.
1
3
Special Management Audit: U.S. jails are outsourcing medical care — and the death toll is rising (msn.com)
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health care services to all patients,” of which “matters involving clinical judgments” are the “sole
province” the responsible healthcare provider. ACHS disagrees with the finding that the lack of
Custody Bureau oversight of ACHS increases the risk that medical care maybe insufficient or poorly
delivered. (Management Audit Report p. 119)
Based on the content of the Management Audit Report, it appears to be focused on medical care (e.g.,
medical appointment wait-times, intake screenings, etc.) and not mental health care. However, only the
mental health leadership for the Management Audit Report was reviewed. Dr. Alex Chyorny is the
Medical Director of ACHS, and he was not interviewed. (Management Audit Report pg. 7.) Consistent
with Title 15, Dr. Chyorny has been the appointed medical heath authority and had held that position
for 17 years. With respect to medical care in the jails, the quality, timeliness, and staffing levels are
determined by ACHS healthcare leadership as they have the expertise and knowledge to make these
determinations. ACHS is works closely with the health system to model – where possible –
community standards for care, treatment, and quality.
For instance, our jail’s board-certified medical providers are all privileged and credentialed through the
Santa Clara County Valley Medical System Hospital Medical Staff Office. ACHS has a division
dedicated to Quality Improvement and Quality Assurance that oversees Department-wide performance
management activities, across programs and disciplines, and provides oversight to critical functions
within the performance management system, including communicating performance improvement
principles; evaluating CHS processes, policies, procedures, practices, training programs, and
communications against those principles; and the implementation of initiatives and improvement
projects.
ACHS values its close working partnership with the Custody Bureau to ensure the wellbeing of
incarcerated patients and regularly meets, collaborates, and shares information with Custody Bureau.
The Custody Bureau has never indicated a desire to oversee the quality of care provided to patients, nor
does ACHS believe that would be appropriate as Custody Bureau lacks the expertise and it would be an
inferior model to the current one.
C. Healthcare Performance
As a basis for concluding that ACHS requires greater oversight by the Custody Bureau, the
Management Audit Report finds that: (a) inmate survey Management Audit Reported wait time of
greater than 10 days and dissatisfaction with the medical care in the jail (Management Audit Report pp.
124-125); (b) the jails suicide mortality rate (Management Audit Report pp. 125-126); and (c) medical
staffing does not match inmate intake times. (Management Audit Report pp. 127.)
1. Patient Wait Times
According to the Management Audit Report, the inmate survey asked individuals, on average, how
long patients wait for a medical appointment. The Management Audit Report concludes that because
most patients waited 10+ days for an appointment, greater accountability was needed. On the issue of
tracking appointment times during the audit period, ACHS did not have a reliable mechanism to gauge
wait times, which were measured sporadically. 2017 was also the time that the Electronic Health
Record System (EHRS) HealthLink was launched and the audit took place shortly thereafter. Any new
launch of an EHRS is considered disruptive technology and takes practice time and time in general to
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Attachment A: Department Response
replace paper records with complex electronic systems. Since that time, the HealthLink informatics
team has built and continues to build management reports which allow healthcare leadership to monitor
many performance indicators, including patient wait times by acuity and other relevant factors. These
reports can now be run electronically and in real-time.
Additionally, ACHS currently evaluates wait times as a metric for access to care and, as HealthLink
management reports continue to be built, we look at that information in a more granular way.
Importantly, however, ACHS monitors patient appointment wait times based on acuity of need.
Patients with urgent medical issues should be seen sooner than 10 days. It is consistent with
community standards for a patient to wait 10 days or more for routine care, follow up care, or specialty
care appointments.
Accordingly, the survey results from the Management Audit Report did not account for the patient’s
acuity; if the medical appointment was for routine or chronic care follow up; or the type of provider,
including whether the appointment was with a specialist.
2. Suicide Mortality Rate and Suicide Attempts
Comparing three years of data, the Management Audit Report concludes that the suicide mortality rate
for our County is lower than most other California county jails and the California state prison but finds
that it is higher than other “US Local Jails.” (Management Audit Report p. 125.) According to Figure
8.5, the County had a lower suicide mortality rate than other US Local Jails in 2013 and 2014 but had a
slightly higher rate in 2012 than the national average. (Management Audit Report p. 125.)
ACHS does not believe that a single year of higher rate of suicide than the national average balanced
against years of lower average nationally and statewide points to a systemically higher rate of suicide
as suggested by the Management Audit Report. The Management Audit Report also compares the
County’s number of suicide attempts to data reported by California state prisons to conclude that the
County has a higher rate of suicide attempts, and thus a problem with preventing suicide attempts.
However, the definition of what constitutes a suicide attempt is not uniform among different reporting
entities, which can skew the data, particularly when comparing state prison’s suicide rates to county
jails. Jails have always had a higher suicide rate than prisons, which researchers attribute to first-time
“shock of confinement.”4
Regardless of ACHS disagreement about the relevance of comparative suicide data, suicide prevention
is a critical focus of ACHS work. To maintain low suicide mortality rates, ACHS has a suicide
prevention plan that is a constant source of focus and includes:
 ACHS reserves every third Thursday of each month for the Multi-disciplinary RCA review of
serious self-harm, suicide attempts, and completed suicides. These meetings are held only if a
qualifying incident occurred within the previous 30-day period.
4
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/why-jails-have-more-suicides-thanprisons#:~:text=One%20reason%20why%20jails%20have%20a%20higher%20suicide,suicide%20before%20they%20have%20been%2
0convicted%20at%20all.
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 ACHS implemented a 2-hour training to all mental health staff on suicide prevention. For
completion rate for 2020 was 92% overall for all County employed staff. For contracted
employees, the completion was 48% overall.
 Michael Mann Stock, ACHS psychiatric social worker, provides suicide prevention training for
Custody Bureau staff.
 ACHS has recently adopted the nationwide validated Columbia Suicide Severity Rating Scale
(C-SSRS) to take the place other currently use Suicide Risk Evaluation (SRE) tool with a target
Go-Live date of April 2021.
 ACHS has developed and continues to develop informatics metrics to monitor patients at risk of
suicide.
 Facilities and Fleet recently completed construction of some of the planned suicide prevention
cells, which are being utilized.
And at present, we are updating our suicide prevention policy to incorporate updates to our suicide
prevention plan.
3. Nurse Staffing Levels at Intake
The Management Audit Report indicates the number of nursing staff assigned to intake is flat and does
not fluctuate to match peak intake times. (Management Audit Report p. 127.)
ACHS recognizes that the unpredictability of individuals entering through Booking 24/7 present
challenges with respect to the volume variability of medical and mental health screenings that need to
be completed. While the Management Audit Report suggests that a flat staffing model is not desirable,
it should be noted that nursing staff do complete medication ordering, reconciliation, documentation,
etc. during slower non-peak periods. In addition, ACHS will be adding additional Medical Unit Clerks
to the Intake Booking area.
D. Conclusion
ACHS disagrees with the audit recommendation that the Custody Bureau should be responsible for
ensuring the “adequacy, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness” of inmate healthcare. ACHS believes that
the Custody Bureau should be responsible for the safety and security of the patients, and that ACHS
should be responsible for those healthcare metrics better measured by the health system’s oversight
structure and of the care provided by ACHS physicians, psychiatrists, nurses, dentists, psychologists,
and clinicians.
ACHS policy on health authority expressly states that ACHS Director, Behavioral Health Director and
Medical Directors have the authority and responsibility for Quality Improvement metrics. ACHS is
first part of the Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital Systems, and we work in partnership with
Custody Bureau colleagues.
I look forward to working with the Management Audit Report Division in the future.
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
ATTACHMENT B: Inmate Survey
Attachment B: Inmate Survey
The audit team conducted a survey of inmates during three days in early December
2017. The Sheriff’s Office provided the audit team with full access to all facilities. A
Correctional Deputy escorted the audit team throughout the facility. At no time did
the audit team observe any attempt to obstruct or influence the survey results. The
audit team was granted access to each dormitory. Each inmate present was offered
an opportunity to complete a survey in English, Spanish or Vietnamese. Inmates were
given approximately 15 to 30 minutes to complete the survey. Surveys were often
collected directly from the inmates by the audit team, but in some cases the Deputies
on duty pre-emptively collected them. There were no signs on tampering of the surveys
collected by the Deputies, however in one instance an inmate insisted on handing their
completed survey directly to the audit team.
We collected 737 surveys, however we excluded six from analysis because they
exhibited characteristics of duplicates, meaning that both of following conditions were
true: (1) the same answers and matching handwriting were observed, and (2) they
were collect sequentially. The remaining 731 unique results are summarized below and
included in the audit where relevant. Some results below may not sum to 731 as some
questions were left blank by respondents.
The 731 unique results represent 23.0 percent of the jails’ average daily population of
3,184 averaged for the three days when the survey was conducted.
Dates and Location of Survey
Date of survey
Locations
Total Average Daily
Population for Date
of Survey
Monday December 5, 2017
Elmwood Men’s M2, M3, M4, M5 and all of
the Women’s Facility
3,197
Wednesday December 7,
2017
Main Jail North and South
3,175
Thursday December 8, 2017
Elmwood M8 and Minimum Camp
3,179
A detailed list of dormitory locations is included on the final page of Attachment A.
Languages of Survey Responses:
English
Spanish
Vietnamese
687
43
1
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
1.
What do you consider your ethnic background? (check all that apply):
White
Hispanic or Latino
Black or African American
Asian or Pacific Islander
Native American or American Indian
Other: _____________
133
333
63
47
17
105
The ethnic backgrounds were selected for comparability with those used in the Sheriff’s Office
daily jail population statistics (White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, North American Indian, and
Other). For the survey we added some additional modifiers to offer a wider variety of more
familiar terminology, such as adding Latino, to the Hispanic option. The “Other” category is
displayed here combined with responses where multiple options were selected.
2.
What gender do you identify as?
Male
Female
Prefer to self-describe: _________________________
555
163
8
Four of the “Prefer to self-describe” responses appear to be joke response such as “feline”
or “extraterrestrial”, three where checked but the written portion was left blank, and one
response was “transgender.”
3.
How old are you?
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55+
4.
146
251
176
86
53
How long have you been in jail?
Less than a week
1 week – less than a month
1 – 3 months
4 - 6 months
7 – 9 months
10 – 12 months
1- 3 years
3 or more years
13
55
239
139
45
46
107
64
5.
(closed cell only) On a normal day, how many hours per day do you spend
out of your cell?
0-1 hours
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
3-4 hours
5 or more hours
57
104
91
36
66
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
6.
Have you ever been placed in disciplinary solitary confinement?
Yes
No
285
411
6a. If yes, how long was your stay in solitary confinement?
Less than 1 week
1 – 3 months
1-2 Weeks
2-4 weeks
More than 3 months
43
41
62
37
95
We used the term “disciplinary solitary confinement” since we observed that
most inmates refer to any type punitive restrictive housing as solitary confinement
and they may not be familiar with the technical terminology used by the Custody
Bureau’s administration. In practice, there is a wide variety of terminology to define
various housing conditions and punishments within he jails. The Restrictive Housing
finding within the report addresses the widespread confusion and inconsistent use of
these terms among staff and inmates. Given that, these results should be considered
through the lens of widespread confusion of these terms, where each person’s
definition of disciplinary solitary confinement likely varies.
7.
If you have submitted a grievance form, were you satisfied with how it was
addressed?
Very satisfied
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
I have never submitted a grievance
8.
22
25
95
120
266
165
How do you feel about the medical care within the jail?
Very satisfied
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
I have never needed medical care
45
72
147
165
244
30
9.
On average, how long do you have to wait for a medical appointment when
you are in need of medical care?
Less than a day
1-2 days
3-5 days
6-10 days
10+ days
I have never needed medical care
23
60
65
94
415
38
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
10.
Are you currently in any programs or classes (REAL, New Life, etc.)?
Yes
No
305
386
10a. If no, please tell us why not?
Not interested
No space available
Not eligible
Not screened
I've never heard of this before
Other: ________________
47
23
48
22
101
51
11.
Are you currently in the first phase of the Custody Alternative Supervision
Program (CASP).
Yes
No
63
591
11a. If no, please tell us why not?
Not interested
No space available
Not eligible
Not screened
I've never heard of this before
Other: ________________
12.
25
7
53
27
327
28
On a normal day, do you feel safe within the jail?
Yes
No
13.
473
205
Have you ever seen force used against an inmate?
Yes
No
473
216
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
13a. Types of force observed:
Chokeholds
Pepper Spray
Punching and/or kicking
Tackles
Other: ________________
238
356
251
308
155
14.
How often do you observe physical fights between inmates and
correctional staff?
More than once a day
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Never
Other: ______________________
15.
10
17
52
168
311
112
How often do you observe physical fights between inmates?
More than once a day
Daily
Weekly
Monthly
Never
Other: ______________________
8
19
90
214
238
106
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Attachment B: Inmate Survey
Main Jail
South
Main Jail North
Elmwood Men's Facility
Elmwood Women's Facility
Detailed Locations of Survey Responses:
W4 - C dorm
W4 - B dorm
W4 - A dorm
W2 - F dorm
W2 - E dorm
W2 - D dorm
W2 - A, B, & C dorms
W1 - Special Housing Unit & Obs cells
W1 - BB
W1 - BA
Minimum camp
M8 - H dorm
M8 - G dorm
M8 - F dorm
M8 - C dorm
M8 - B dorm
M8 - A dorm
M5 - D dorm
M5 - C dorm
M4 - D dorm
M4 - B dorm
M3 - C dorm
M3 - B dorm
M2 - C dorm
M2 - A dorm
8B & 8C - Special management units, step down
8A - Special management unit
7B
7A
6C
6B
6A
5C
4C - Maximum security
4B - Maximum security
2C - Infirmary
2B - Special Management Unit
2 West F dorm
2 West A dorm
2 West 5, 6, 7, & 17
2 West 2-4
-180-
11
17
24
19
11
31
25
11
6
8
126
11
7
9
16
13
9
21
18
29
8
12
15
9
26
18
2
30
35
20
15
15
31
22
10
3
7
1
3
3
24
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
ATTACHMENT C: Peer Survey Results
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
Background and Methodology
The audit team sent a survey of 15 questions, through email, in December 2017 to
all 55 California counties that operate a jail, and six counties and two cities outside of
California, that operate jails with inmate populations similar to or larger than that of the
County of Santa Clara.
Respondents were Jail Commanders, Correctional Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains,
Deputy Chiefs, and a Sheriff. In total, 27 counties and New York City responded
to the survey. Twenty-five out of the 27 counties are in California and range in
total populations from just above 10,000 to about three million. The Average Daily
Populations of each responding jail, as of March 2017122, were as small as 32 to as large
as 6,053. For comparison, the County of Santa Clara’s Jails Average Daily Population at
that same point in time was 3,583. Staffing in the responding jail facilities ranged from
about 15 to about 1,500.
The audit team chose to solicit survey responses from a diverse range of jail institutions
throughout California. While not every jail is comparable one-to-one, they face similar
types of challenges, resource constraints and may offer insights from their diverse
institutions. In some cases, respondents provided through email or phone specific
insights and lessons they have learned from various policies, practices and technology
implementations. The body of the audit report contains references to any shared
feedback on various topics. One respondent requested that we anonymize their
responses to ensure they could speak candidly.
Survey Respondents
Jurisdiction
Anonymous
Average
Daily
Population
Average
Daily
Population
Date of
ADP
Santa Cruz
386
Mar-17
Date of
ADP
Jurisdiction
200-500
Butte
586
Mar-17
Shasta
337
Mar-17
Colusa
80
Mar-17
Siskiyou
99
Mar-17
Fresno
2,744
Mar-17
Solano
1,034
Mar-17
465
Mar-17
Sonoma
1,045
Mar-17
Kern
2,176
Mar-17
Stanislaus
1,234
Mar-17
Lake
293
Mar-17
Tehama
191
Mar-17
Marin
323
Mar-17
Tuolumne
145
Mar-17
Merced
663
Mar-17
Yolo
405
Mar-17
Mono
32
Mar-17
Yuba
339
Mar-17
6,053
Mar-17
Imperial
Orange
Riverside
3,774
Mar-17
King County, WA
2,184
2017
San Bernardino
5,506
Mar-17
Miami-Dade County, FL
4,129
Feb-18
San Diego
5,626
Mar-17
New York City
8,705
Jan-18
San Joaquin
1,323
Mar-17
Santa Clara
Survey Questions and Results
1. Jurisdiction:
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3,583
Mar-17
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
2. Name of survey respondent:
3. Title or role of survey respondent:
4. Does your in-service training program for correctional staff include
simulations, practice exercises and/or drills?
Yes
25
No
Did Not Respond
2
1
5. Who provides your jail’s medical services as the official health authority?
Staff hired and managed by the Sheriff’s…
3
County health or County hospital staff
8
Private vendor contracted by the…
15
Other
Did Not Respond
2
0
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Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
6. How are classes and rehabilitation programs offered to inmates?
Program-specific housing units or
dormitories
17
Central classrooms, inmates are moved
during day to attend classes
23
Other
Did Not Respond
6
0
Some respondents use both types of facilities for programs.
7. How many staff (FTE) with direct inmate contact, excluding medical staff, do
you have budgeted for the following types of posts?
Butte
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
Classification
Booking
Support posts
with direct inmate
contact
Other:
Colusa
Imperial
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
48-total
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
17
0
3
0
0
0
1
39
0
4
5
0
1
0
20
0
11
1
1
11
0
Officers FTE
0
0
included
above
10
1 MRT
Classroom
Supervision
Other:
Fresno
0
529 Total
0
FSO
6 Kitchen
0
- Civilian
Personnel
-183-
0
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
Kern
Post
Badged
Staff
King County, WA
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Lake
Marin
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
0
0
0
6
0
0
2
0
2
0
16 Direct
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
285
64
Classification
20
0
Booking
16
0
12
0
0
0
3
1
Support posts
with direct
inmate contact
33
2
5
0
6 Officers
1 Sergeant
0
3
0
0
0
0
2 Lobby
Supervision
/ 27 Linear
Indirect
Total Badged
37 Officers
staff:
(We have a
517
Other:
Two
0
facilities linear
total of 45
budgeted CO
and Direct
positions that
Supervision
work all units)
2 Central
Dispatch
62 posts
(M-F, 8-5)
Other:
0
(Court Detail /
5 Sergeants
1 Lobby
Transportation
Merced
Miami-Dade
Mono
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
20
2
1711
364
Classification
4
0
229
Booking
0
11
61
Post
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
Civilian
Staff
Orange
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
16
508
254
79
included
80
3
4
included
80
12
46
2
County workers
Support posts with
direct inmate contact
5
1
included
with behavioral
health by
contract
-184-
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
Riverside
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Diego
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
144
0
455
62
1222
0
1222
0
Classification
48
0
24
0
30
0
30
0
Booking
68
0
5
17
0
263
0
263
Support posts with
direct inmate contact
143
43
27
25
60
0
60
0
Santa Cruz
San Joaquin
Shasta
Siskiyou
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
0
0
28
0
4
0
28
0
Classification
4
0
8
0
4
0
0
0
Booking
3
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
Support posts with
direct inmate contact
0
0
14
0
8
0
2
0
4 Honor Farm
Gate Security,
Other:
Central
0
Control, Ad/
0
4/2
Kitchen / IT
Seg Control
Tower
3
Other:
Administration
-185-
0
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Tehama
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
223
0
180
(custody) 5
(Admin)
76
(Support)
202
0
N/A
0
Classification
10
0
10
1
13
1
3
0
Booking
24
0
see fixed
post #’s
see fixed
post #’s
20
18
N/A
0
Support posts with
direct inmate contact
41
15
see fixed
post #’s
see fixed
post #’s
13
0
0
0
11 Jail
5 Jail
Alternatives
Alternatives
0
5 Kitchen
6 Programs
0
Post
Other:
Other:
Tuolumne
Yolo
Yuba
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Badged
Staff
Civilian
Staff
Fixed inmate
supervision posts
26
0
24
0
All
0
Classification
1
0
5
0
5 to 6
0
Booking
0
6
20
0
All
0
Support posts with
direct inmate contact
6
2
0
0
3
0
6 Sergeants
0
Post
Other:
1 Jail
Other:
0
Commander
10
Supervisors
15 Special
Services and
0
0
Rovers
8. Does your Department utilize body scanners?
Yes
7
No
21
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Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
9. If your Department uses body worn cameras within a correctional setting, does
your staff wear these devices in a standard mandatory location (e.g., chest, belt,
etc.)?
Yes
No
7
1
The Department Does Not Use Body
Worn Cameras
20
Note: One county responded with a “No”, but answered question #10 with “The Department
Does Not Use Body Work Cameras”. Based on the answer to #10 for that county, their
answer for #9 was implied to be with “The Department Does Not Use Body Work Cameras”,
too.
10. If your Department uses body worn cameras within a correctional setting,
does your training on these devices include a simulation-based component?
Yes
0
No
Did Not Respond
8
0
Note: Only included counties that answered “Yes” or “No” to question #9.
11. Does your Department have a formal structure in place for addressing inmate
grievances?
Yes
No
28
0
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Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
12. Have you implemented any policies or new technology to prevent contraband
delivered by drones?
Yes
2
No
26
13. Which of the following devices are deployed to correctional staff within the
jail?
Counties: Anonymous (X), Butte (B), Colusa (Co), Fresno (F), Imperial (I), Kern (K), King County
WA (Ki), Lake (L), Marin (M), Merced (Me), Miami-Dade (MD), Mono (Mo), New York City (NY),
Orange (O), Riverside (R), San Bernardino (SBe), San Diego (SD), San Joaquin (SJ), Santa
Cruz (SC), Shasta (Sh), Siskiyou (Si), Solano (So), Sonoma (Son), Stanislaus (St), Tehama (T),
Tuolumne (Tu), Yolo (Yo), Yuba (Yu)
Carried by
correctional
staff within
jail
Stored in
locked
compartments
throughout
jail
23
Pepper Spray
(Oleoresin Capsicum
Spray) –personal/
small-size
Pepper Spray
(Oleoresin Capsicum
Spray) – large-size/
riot
Pepper Ball Pistol
Conducted Energy
Devices: Stun Gun or
baton
Riot team or
ERT
12
6
(B, Co, F, I, K, Ki,
MD, NY, O, R,
(F, K, Mo, NY, O,
(K, M, SJ, SC, Sh,
SBe, SD, SJ, SC,
SBe, SD, SJ, SC,
Yo)
Sh, Si, Son St, T,
Sh, St, Yo)
Tu, X Yu, Yo)
2
(Sh, NY)
1
(F)
6
(B, K, Sh, Si, St,
T)
Jail perimeter
(external and
tower)
6
Inmate
Transportation
16
(F, K, O, SBe,
SD, Sh)
(F, K, L, M, NY, O,
SBe, SD, SJ, SC,
Sh, So, St, T, Tu,
Yu)
0
0
0
0
1
5
(SD)
(K, Mo, SD, Sh, T)
15
14
(B, F, I, K, Ki, M,
MD, O, SBe, SJ,
SC, Sh, St, Yu)
(F, K, Ki, NY, O,
R, SBe, SJ, SC,
Sh, Si, Son, St,
Yu, Yo)
10
6
(B, F, Mo, O, R,
SBe)
(Co, F, Ki, I, Mo,
O, SBe, Sh, So,
Tu)
7
4
(K, Ki, M, SD)
-188-
(K, Mo, SBe, SD,
Sh, St, Yo)
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
20
Conducted Energy
Devices: launched
projectile probes
(Taser)
Blunt force rounds in
rifles or launcher
Bean bags rounds in
rifles or launcher
Bright light/highlumen devices
(B, Co, I, K, Ki,
Mo, O, R, SBe,
SD, SC, Sh, Si,
So, Son, St, T,
Tu, X, Yo)
16
7
(F, K, M, O, SD,
Yu, Yo)
12
1
4
(T)
(B, O, SD, St)
5
(Mo, SD, Si, Tu,
X)
(I, K, Ki, Mo, O,
R, SJ, SC, Sh, Si,
Son, St)
4
(K, O, SBe, SD)
(Co, F, I, K, M,
Mo, O, SBe, SD,
SJ, SC, Sh, So,
Son, St, T, Tu)
1
1
(SD)
(St)
0
0
16
6
0
(Co, F, I, K, Mo,
NY, O, SBe, SD,
SJ, SC, Sh, Si,
Son, St, Yo)
17
(F, M, O, SBe,
SD, St)
(Co, F, I, K, Ki, L,
Mo, O, R, SBe,
SD, SJ, Sh, Si,
St, X)
1
4
1
3
(I)
(K, Mo, Si, Son)
(SD)
(Mo, SD, Tu)
0
0
0
0
15
Noise Flash
Diversionary Devices
(NFDD)
0
Active Denial System
0
5
(B, Ki, Mo, SJ, St)
(Co, F, I, K, Ki,
L, Mo, SJ, SC,
Sh, Si, So, Son,
St, X)
1
0
(L)
-189-
Attachment C: Peer Survey Results
Other: ASP
1
(Tu)
Other: Long Handle
Baton
0
Other: Sting Ball
Grenade
0
Other: Orcutt Police
Nunchaku
1
(Si)
Other: Pepper Ball
Launcher
0
Other: Shield
0
Other: 40 mm
Launcher
0
Other: 40 cal
handgun
0
0
0
1
0
(X)
1
2
(SBe)
(SBe, Sh)
0
0
2
1
(T, K)
(K, X)
2
1
(B, Co)
(Co)
1
(T)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(K)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14. Does your Department utilize either disciplinary housing or administrative
segregation?
15. Are there any differences in the housing and treatment of sentenced and
unsentenced inmates in your facility?
-190-
1
1
(Mo)
Attachment D: Cost Accounting Methodology
ATTACHMENT D: Cost Accounting Methodology
Attachment D: Cost Accounting Methodology
The Department’s Fiscal Division provided the Management Audit Division a
spreadsheet containing an estimate of jail costs for FY 2016-17. Based on an average
daily population (ADP) of 3,578, the per-inmate cost within the County’s correctional
facilities for Fiscal Year 2016-2017 was approximately $241.12 per day, or $88,008.80 a
year.
The total operational costs of $314,860,576 include 1) direct costs in the form of actual
expenses for salaries and benefits and services and supplies on a facility operations
level; 2) expenses for inmate medical and mental health care; and 3) indirect allocated
costs. These indirect costs are allocated—based on actual personnel salary and benefits
expenses and ADP—from Administrative Support, Jail Support, and Jail Programs cost
centers within the Sheriff’s Office and Department of Corrections. The indirect costs
in the provided spreadsheet further included overhead costs allocated through the
Countywide Cost Allocation Plan.
The Management Audit Division believes that this $88,008.80 annual cost per inmate is
a conservative estimate of the total overall costs of running the correctional facilities,
and that these costs will only continue to rise in coming years. These cost calculations
did not include depreciated or amortized costs for capital projects and information
management systems, which have undergone sizable developments over the past two
fiscal years. If these costs, which are associated with the operation of the County Jail,
were factored into the per-inmate calculation, these capital projects and information
systems would drive the $88,008.80 figure upwards.
For example, in February of 2017, the Board of Supervisors approved the transfer of
$9.2 million into a Facilities and Fleet (FAF) capital project for surveillance cameras
at Main Jail North and Elmwood. Further, a jail reform cost estimate report issued
in September of 2017 projected $81 - $98 million in construction costs related to
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) remodeling and compliance at the County
correctional facilities. These capital costs are separate from the slated construction of
a new jail facility, which has estimated costs of over $281 million per a February 2016
estimate. In September of 2017, the Department also procured a new Jail Management
System at contract value of $5 million.
Further contributing to rising per-inmate costs is the potential for reduction in ADP
levels per policy changes such as statewide bail reform. While this may marginally
reduce variable costs, fixed costs of over $303 million would remain, and the ADP
divisor for total costs would become smaller, thus raising the average cost per inmate.
One item that would skew the annual per-inmate cost downwards is excluding the
costs of inmate programs for individuals not housed in custody, including the Custodial
Alternative Supervision and Public Service programs. If one wanted to determine
the true annual costs of housing an inmate, a portion of these program costs would
not be included, as participants in these programs are not housed within the County
correctional facilities. However, the total costs for these programs are $501,881 and
$7.7 million respectively, which are marginal in comparison to the aforementioned
costs that would drive the $88,008.80 estimate upwards.
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
ATTACHMENT E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
The Management Audit Division chose two sets of criteria to assess the County’s
body worn camera (BWC) policy and training: the BWC scorecard developed by The
Leadership Conference and Upturn, and the Implementing a Body-Worn Camera
Program manual developed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
These criteria were selected for the number of organizations that supported these
standards, the methodology used to create them, and their clearly delineated
recommendations. The Management Audit Division included criteria from both
advocacy and law enforcement perspectives in order to provide a more balanced
analysis of the Department’s BWC policy.
The Leadership Conference and Upturn developed the BWC scorecard based on shared
Civil Rights Principles on Body Worn Cameras.123 These Principles were co-signed by 32
different civil rights and advocacy groups including the American Civil Liberties Union,
Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the NAACP, and National Council of La Raza. The
authors of this scorecard have applied this scorecard to 75 different BWC-implementing
police agencies across the country.124
PERF is an independent research organization of both scholars and police officials.125
COPS is a U.S. Department of Justice office that was established in 1994 to advance
community policing practices through providing training, technical assistance, and grant
resources to law enforcement agencies, community members, and local government
leaders.126 PERF, in partnership with COPS, developed its Implementing a Body-Worn
Camera manual after hosting a conference with more than 200 attendees comprised of
law enforcement officials, academics, and representatives from federal agencies. This
conference, along with 40 interviews with police executives and reviews of existing BWC
policies, served as a basis for the PERF and COPS publication.
BWC Scorecard
BWC Scorecard Standard
Meets Criteria
Explanation
Makes the department policy
publicly and readily available
Yes
The Policy is clearly located in the “Body
Worn Camera” section in the “About Us”
tab of the Department’s website.
Limits officer discretion on when
to record
Yes
The Policy’s “Custody Bureau” section gives
an enumerated list of when Correctional
Deputies should activate their BWCs.
Yes
The Policy explicitly states that
Deputies should not record inmates
while conducting a strip search, during
classification and medical interviews,
during the provision of medical care,
and while inmates are using the toilet or
shower.
Yes
The Policy requires the deletion of
footage unassociated with a criminal or
administrative investigation, civil litigation,
or other administrative matters after one
year.
Addresses personal privacy
concerns
Limits retention of footage
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Protects footage against
tampering and misuse
Makes footage available to
individuals filing complaints
Prohibits officer pre-report
viewing
Limits the use of biometric
technologies
Yes
The Policy expressly prohibits the deletion
or alteration of footage without supervisor
approval, as well as removing, dismantling,
or tampering with any hardware and/or
software component of the BWC system.
The Policy also lists a set of prohibited uses
of BWC footage.
Yes, under certain
conditions
The Policy states individuals filing an
officer-misconduct complaint against
Department personnel may view
applicable BWC footage if this viewing is
not prohibited by County Counsel; if it is
not part of a criminal investigation, civil
lawsuit, or government tort claim process;
if the footage requestor is the subject or
recipient of the alleged officer misconduct;
when reviewing the footage will not hinder
subsequent investigative processes; and
when privacy protections are utilized to
protect the privacy of other individuals
captured in the footage.
No
According to the Policy, Correctional
Deputies are allowed to review BWC
footage before writing their reports
unless in the event of an “Officer-Involved
Incident” or an incident involving serious
bodily injury.
Not applicable
The Policy states that the technology does
not possess biometric capabilities, and
any future use of biometric technologies
should be brought to the Board.
-194-
Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Chart 2: PERF and COPS Manual (Custody-Related Policy Provisions Only)
PERF Standard
Meets Criteria
Explanation
Not applicable
All Correctional Deputies, including
Academy recruits, will be issued and
required to wear a BWC during the
performance of their official duties.
Deputies will check their equipment at the
beginning of each shift to determine if their
device is operational in accordance with
the BWC manufacturer’s specifications.
Not applicable
All Correctional Deputies, including
Academy recruits, will be issued and
required to wear a BWC during the
performance of their official duties.
Deputies will check their equipment at the
beginning of each shift to determine if their
device is operational in accordance with
the BWC manufacturer’s specifications.
Agencies should not permit
personnel to use privatelyowned BWCs while on duty
Yes
The Policy prohibits the wearing of any
personal video recorder to fulfill the
purposes of a BWC. The wearing of any
other personal video recorder for the same
purpose is prohibited without permission
from the Division Commander.
Polices should specify the
location on the body on which
cameras should be worn.
No
The Policy only states that the recorder
should be worn in a “conspicuous” manner
Officers who activate the
BWC while on duty should be
required to note the existence
of the recording in the official
incident report.
No
The Policy does not have a provision
stating this.
Yes
The Policy states that if a deputy fails to
activate the BWC, fails to record the entire
contact, or interrupts the recording, the
deputy shall document why a recording
was not made, was interrupted, or was
terminated.
Policies should clearly state
which personnel are assigned
or permitted to wear bodyworn cameras and under which
circumstances.
If an agency assigns cameras
to officers on a voluntary basis,
policies should stipulate any
specific conditions under which
an officer might be required to
wear one.
Officers who wear BWCs should
be required to articulate on
camera or in writing their
reasoning if they fail to record
an activity that is required
by department policy to be
recorded.
General recording policy:
Officers should be required
to activate their body-worn
cameras when responding to
all calls for service and during
all law enforcement-related
encounters and activities that
occur while the officer is on
duty.
Not applicable
-195-
Applicable to Enforcement only. The
Policy offers a separate enumerated list
of situations in which Custody personnel
should activate their BWCs.
Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Policies and training materials
should clearly define what is
included in the description “law
enforcement-related encounters
and activities that occur while
the officer is on duty.”
Not applicable
Applicable to Enforcement only. The
Policy offers a separate enumerated list
of situations in which Custody personnel
should activate their BWCs.
Yes
In addition to the enumerated list of
situations in which Custody personnel
should activate their BWCs, the Policy
also has a general provision stating that
Deputies should make a reasonable
effort to record any contact that
becomes confrontational, assaultive, or
enforcement-oriented, as well as any other
contact that turns adversarial. This general
provision may be relevant for Custody
personnel’s interactions with the public
during visitations, inmate transportation,
and alternative housing visits.
Yes, under certain
conditions
The Policy states that, whenever possible,
deputies should inform individuals that
they are being recorded. However, the
Policy also states that deputies are not
required to advise or obtain consent
from a private person at any jail of the jail
facilities.
Yes
The Policy states, that, once activated,
the recording should not be intentionally
terminated until the deputy’s direct
participation in the incident is complete; or
the situation no longer fits the criteria for
activation.
Regardless of the general
recording policy, officers should
be required to obtain consent
prior to recording interviews
with crime victims.
Not applicable
Applicable to Enforcement only. The Policy
states that deputies are not required to
advise or obtain consent from a private
person at any jail of the jail facilities.
Regardless of the general
recording policy, officers
should have the discretion to
keep their cameras turned off
during conversations with crime
witnesses and members of the
community who wish to report
or discuss criminal activity in
their neighborhood.
Not applicable
Applicable to Enforcement only.
Officers should also be required
to activate the camera during
any encounter with the public
that becomes adversarial after
initial contact.
Officers should be required to
inform subjects when they are
being recorded unless doing so
would be unsafe, impractical, or
impossible.
Once activated, the bodyworn camera should remain
in recording mode until the
conclusion of an incident/
encounter, the officer has left
the scene, or a supervisor has
authorized (on camera) that a
recording may cease.
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
When determining whether to
record interviews with witnesses
and members of the community
who wish to share information,
officers should always consider
both the evidentiary value of
recording and the subject’s
comfort with speaking on
camera. To better capture
evidence, PERF recommends
that officers record statements
made by witnesses and people
sharing information. However,
if a person will not talk unless
the camera is turned off, officers
made decide that obtaining
the information is more
important than recording. PERF
recommends allowing officers
that discretion.
Policies should provide clear
guidance regarding the
circumstances under which
officers will be allowed to
exercise discretion to record,
the factors that officers should
consider when deciding whether
to record, and process for
documenting whether to record.
Agencies should prohibit
recording other agency
personnel during routine, nonenforcement-related activities
unless recording is required by
a court order or is authorized
as part of an administrative or
criminal investigation.
Not applicable
Applicable to Enforcement only.
Yes
The Policy states that it does not intend to
describe every possible circumstance for
when to record. It dictates that Deputies,
in addition to the required conditions of
operation, should activate the system any
time they feel its use would be appropriate
and/or valuable to document an incident.
If circumstances prevent the Deputy
from recording such a contact, this must
be noted, along with an explanation, in
any subsequent report. The Policy also
recommends that Deputies record any
interview, pedestrian or inmate contacts,
and other events.
Yes
The Policy states that Deputies shall not
use the BWC to record any conversations
of or between another department
member or employee without the
member’s/employee’s knowledge or
consent.
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Policies should clearly state any
other types of recordings that
are prohibited by the agency.
Prohibited recordings should
include the following:
Yes
The Policy states that, within the Custody
division, Deputies shall not record
inmates during a strip search, conducting
a classification or medical interview,
during administration of medical care or
treatment, or during an inmate’s use of a
toilet or shower.
Yes
The Policy states that all files for each
BWC deployed on a shift shall be securely
uploaded by the individual deputy to
whom the BWC was issued periodically
and no later than the end of each shift.
However, in the event of a use of force
incident, the appropriate supervisor shall
take charge of all BWCs from involved
Deputies, and be responsible for uploading
the BWC files.
Policies should include specific
measures to prevent data
tampering, deleting, and
copying.
Yes
The Policy expressly prohibits removing,
dismantling, or tampering with any
hardware or software component of the
system; deleting any footage without
supervisor approval; and unauthorized
uses of footage. The Policy also describes
an audit log that is maintained of all access
to video footage.
Data should be downloaded
from the BWC by the end of
each shift in which the camera
was used.
Yes
The Policy states that uploading should
occur during the Deputy’s regularly
scheduled shift.
Permits, but does not
require
The Policy states that the system
automatically stamps the video with the
current date/time and the camera user’s
identity. The user has the option to add
metadata manually such as the category
of contact, disposition of contact, and
associated case number.
Conversations with confidential
informants and undercover
officers to protect confidentiality
and officer safety
Places where a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists
Strip searches
Conversations with other agency
personnel that involve case
tactics or strategy
Policies should designate the
officer as the person responsible
for downloading recorded data
from his or her body-worn
camera. However, in certain
clearly identified circumstances,
the officer’s supervisor should
immediately take physical
custody of the camera and
should be responsible for
downloading the data.
Officers should properly
categorize and tag body-worn
camera videos at the time
they are downloaded. Videos
should be classified according
to the type of event or incident
captured in the footage.
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Policies should specifically state
the length of time that recorded
data must be retained. For
example, many agencies provide
60-day or 90-day retention times
for non-evidentiary data.
Policies should clearly state
where BWC videos are to be
stored.
Officers should be permitted
to review video footage of an
incident in which they were
involved, prior to making a
statement about the incident.
Written policies should clearly
describe the circumstances
in which supervisors will be
authorized to review an officer’s
body-worn camera footage
An agency’s internal audit unit,
rather than the officer’s direct
chain of command, should
periodically conduct a random
review of body-worn camera
footage to monitor compliance
with the program and assess
overall officer performance.
Policies should explicitly
forbid agency personnel
from accessing recorded data
for personal use and from
uploading recorded data
onto public and social media
websites.
Yes
The Policy states that all BWC recordings/
files in the Sheriff’s Office’s possession
of routine events that are not associated
with either a criminal or administrative
investigation or a civil litigation or
administrative matter shall be retained for
no longer than one year.
Yes
The Policy states that BWC data will be
uploaded to a Criminal Justice Information
System (CJIS) compliant off-site Evidence
Management System (EMS) managed by
the BWC vendor.
Yes, under most
conditions
The Policy states that, except in the in the
event of an “Officer-Involved Incident” or
a case involving a serious bodily injury,
Sheriff’s personnel may review their BWC
files before making a statement about the
incident.
The Policy states that supervisors can
review BWC footage for specific complaints
or incidents, and may also retrieve the
BWC from the involved personnel at the
scene. Following a time sensitive critical
incident, a video may only be viewed by
the on scene supervisor prior to being
uploaded to the storage server.
Yes
Additionally, Field Training Officers may
review BWC recordings to evaluate the
performance of Deputies in the field
training program, and Jail Training Officers
may review BWC recordings to evaluate the
performance of deputies assigned to them
in the jail training program. Supervisors
may also randomly audit BWC recordings.
No
The Policy states that supervisors, not the
agency’s internal audit unit, will randomly
review BWC recordings to ensure that
the equipment is operating properly
and that deputies are using the devices
appropriately and in accordance with
policy.
Yes
The Policy states that personnel may
not use the BWC system for personal
purposes, or make copies to upload onto
public or social media internet sites. The
Policy also prohibits users from using a
secondary recording device to record BWC
files.
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Yes
The Policy states that the server shall only
be accessed from Department authorized
computers. Copies of BWC footage shall
only be released to authorized personnel
following a formal request to Sheriff’s
Office upper management. The Policy also
describes an audit log in within the BWC’s
Evidence Management System.
Yes
The Policy states that media inquiries
and/or requests shall be received and
processed in accordance with General
Order 24.00.
Body-worn camera training
should be required for all
agency personnel who may use
or otherwise be involved with
body-worn cameras.
Yes
The Policy states that Deputies should
not use BWCs until they have successfully
completed the training, and that a written
record of the training will be completed by
the trainer and maintained in the Deputy’s
training file.
Before agency personnel are
equipped with body-worn
cameras, they must receive all
mandated training.
Yes
The Policy states that Deputies should
not use BWCs until they have successfully
completed the training.
Policies should include specific
measures for preventing
unauthorized access or release
of recorded data.
Agencies should have clear
and consistent protocols
for releasing recorded data
externally to the public
and the news media (a.k.a
Public Disclosure Policies).
Each agency’s policy must
be in compliance with the
state’s public disclosure laws
(often known as Freedom of
Information Acts).
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Body-worn camera training
should include the following:
All practices and protocols
covered by the agency’s bodyworn camera policy (which
should be distributed to all
personnel during training)
An overview of relevant state
laws governing consent,
evidence, privacy, and public
disclosure
Procedures for operating the
equipment safely and effectively
Scenario-based exercises that
replicate situations that officers
might encounter in the field
Yes, partially
Procedures for downloading
and tagging recorded data
The BWC training the Management Audit
Division attended included many of these
listed requirements. However, the BWC
policy was not distributed at the beginning
of the training; the training did not include
scenario-based exercises or how to
prepare digital evidence for court; and the
relevant state laws were briefly touched
upon, but not discussed in detail.
Procedures for accessing and
reviewing recorded data (only
for personnel authorized to
access the data)
Procedures for preparing and
presenting digital evidence for
court
Procedures for documenting
and reporting any
malfunctioning device or
supporting system
A body-worn camera training
manual should be created in
both digital and hard-copy form
and should be readily available
at all times to agency personnel.
Agencies should require
refresher courses on body-worn
camera usage and protocols at
least once per year.
No
The Department does not have a BWC
training manual.
Yes
According to an interview with BWC
training officers, BWCs will be integrated
into rotating simulator trainings such as
Defensive Tactics, Firearms, and Force
Options. In addition, there will be new
trainings every time the BWC technology is
updated (interviewees projected every two
years).
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Attachment E: Detailed Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Policies
Agencies should collect
statistical data concerning bodyworn camera usage, including
when video footage is used
in criminal prosecutions and
internal affairs matters.
Agencies should conduct
evaluations to analyze the
financial impact of implementing
a body-worn camera program.
Agencies should conduct
periodic reviews of their bodyworn camera policies and
protocols.
Yes, partially
The Policy does not have a provision
concerning statistical data collection and
analysis, although the County Ordinance
requires an annual surveillance report for
this technology that contains several of
PERF’s data-points.
Yes
The Department included projected fiscal
costs for BWC implementation in its
Anticipated Surveillance Impact Report
submitted to the Board of Supervisors on
January 10, 2017.
Unclear
-202-
The Department reports that it periodically
reviews its internal policies, so it is possible
that the BWC policies and protocols will be
reviewed as well.
Attachment F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
ATTACHMENT F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
Attachment F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
The following is a detailed timeline of the legal changes and events that have frequently
changed the management and oversight of the jails from1987 to the present. Prior
to 1987 the County jails were managed by the Sheriff similar to most other California
counties. Since then, each decade has seen multiple changes, legal challenges and new
approaches to management and responsibility of the County jails.
Year
Provision
Description
Detail
State law that delegates Sheriff
keeper of county jails.
Per Penal Code, sheriffs keep
county jails.
Govt. Code § 23013
Resolution creating Department
of Corrections (DOC).
County of Santa Clara passes
resolution to establish
Department of Corrections
(DOC) to be overseen by a Chief
of Correction appointed by the
Board.
Beck v. County of Santa Clara
Lawsuit by Sheriff regarding
establishment of DOC and
transfer of powers.
Beck argued that transfer
of powers from elected to
appointed official violated state
constitution.
Measure A, Charter § 509
Adopted by electorate; Court of
Appeal upholds establishment
of DOC and transfer of jail
operations from Sheriff to DOC.
BOS shall 1) establish DOC
to operate county jails and
appoint Chief Officer 2) ensure
adequate staffing of trained
law enforcement personnel
authorized to use firearms 3)
DOC and Chief Officer to report
to BOS.
Amendment to Ordinance Code
§ A20-3
Provided for the transfer of
deputy sheriffs from Sheriff’s
office and providing them with
dual status as both deputy
sheriffs and DOC correctional
officers but subjecting them
to the authority of the Chief of
Corrections.
1992
County of Santa Clara v. Deputy
Sheriffs’ Assn.
A lawsuit was filed resulting
in a California Supreme Court
holding that the Chief of
Correction did not have the
authority to grant limited peace
officer status to correctional
officers.
To address the issue of limited
peace officer status, the
County placed DOC under the
jurisdiction of the Probation
Department.
1996
Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County
of Santa Clara
Court of Appeal rejected the
action that put DOC under the
jurisdiction of the Probation
Department.
Court held that the Chief of
Correction and Chief Probation
Officer are incompatible offices
that cannot be consolidated.
< 1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
Penal Code § 4000
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Attachment F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
Year
Description
Detail
The County and the Sheriff’s
Office entered an MOU to
resolve the issue of peace officer
status.
Inmate transportation and
perimeter security functions
were transferred to the Sheriff
s Office, and the Sheriff agreed
to appoint correctional officers
to perform those functions
under the Sheriff s direction. The
Sheriff also agreed to staff 15
peace officer deputies at DOC.
Penal Code § 83 I.5
Legislature amended the Penal
Code to settle the issue of peace
officer status for correctional
officers. It confirmed that County
correctional officers are not
peace officers, but were granted
the power to perform some
peace officer functions, and
granted limited authority to carry
firearms under the direction of
the Sheriff.
Penal Code § 831.5(d) provides
that there “must be at least one
peace officer, as described in §
830.1, on duty” whenever 20 or
more correctional officers are on
duty. Language suggest that DOC
could satisfy the peace officer
requirement by contracting with
another agency that employs
Section 830.1 peace officers (i.e.
District Attorney) but not clear
whether these employees would
have peace officer status. Even
if they did, their presence and
supervision would not enable
correctional officers to carry
firearms under Section 831.5(b).
2010
Memo from Jeff Smith (County
Exec) to the Public Safety &
Justice Committee
As part of the 2011 budget,
the Board approved a singlereporting model that divided jail
functions between the Sheriff
and DOC to reduce operating
costs. The jail would continue
to be operated by a Chief of
Correction, but in conjunction
and cooperation with the
Sheriff’s Office.
Transferred authority over
all badge positions (including
deputies and correctional
officers) and many non-badge
administrative staff to the
Sheriff. DOC retained authority
over non-badge staff in, and
operations of, the Food Services,
Administrative Booking, Inmate
Laundry, and Warehouse units of
the jail.
2010
Liddle v. Board of Supervisors of
the County of Santa Clara
Lawsuit alleging that the
reorganization violated the
County Charter.
Santa Clara County Super. Ct.
No. 1-10-CV- 179642.
Adopted by electorate; Amended
the County Charter in response
to settlement with Liddle.
Allowed the board to “by
ordinance supported by a
4/5ths vote of the Board, convey
jurisdiction over any or all jail
operations to the Sheriff, to the
Department of Correction, to
any other department or agency
that may lawfully exercise such
jurisdiction, or to any of these
entities jointly as the Board may
determine.”
1997
1999
2012
Provision
Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU)
Measure A, amending Charter §
509
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Attachment F: Timeline on Creation of the Department of Correction
Year
2012
2016
Provision
Description
Detail
Penal Code § 830.1(c)
Granted peace officer status
to deputy sheriffs of certain
counties who performed
exclusively custodial assignments
in county jails.
This enabled the Sheriff to
employ deputies with peace
officer status, known in
the County as “correctional
deputies,” to perform exclusively
custodial duties in the jails.
Following this amendment, the
Sheriff conferred peace officer
status on most correctional
officers, who then became
correctional deputies with the
authority to carry firearms in the
performance of their duties.
County Ordinance Code Division
A20
Codified the “current” structure
of County jail operations
adopted by the Board as part of
the FY 2010-11 Budget process
and ratified by voters in 2012
through Charter Amendment
to Section 509 of Santa Clara
County Code.
Ordinance Code was not
amended to conform to the
changes adopted by the Board in
FY 2010-11 Budget and approved
by voters in 2012. Set to expire
on July 1, 2021, with the intent
that Board will adopt more
permanent provisions governing
the operation of County jails.
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
DSOP NO. 18-017
SUBJECT: TRANSGENDER INMATES
EFFECTIVE DATE: December 28, 2009
SUPERSEDES: None
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
POLICY
II. DEFINITIONS
III. TRANSGENDER COMMITTEE
IV. TRAINING
V. PROCEDURES
A. Communication
B. Intake
C. Classification and Housing Assignment
D. Personal Clothing and Hygiene
E. Programs and Services
VI. FRISK AND STRIP SEARCHES
VII. TRANSPORTATION
VIII. HEALTH CARE
A. Access to Health Services
B. Hormone Treatment and Surgical Reassignment Surgery
IX. CROSS REFERENCES
X. RELATED REFERENCES
XI. ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
XII. REVOCATIONS
XIII. AMENDMENTS
I.
POLICY
It is the policy of Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (MDCR) to
establish procedures for the intake, housing and medical treatment of transgender
inmates. MDCR does not discriminate on the basis of sex, sexual orientation or gender
identity expression. For the purpose of this policy, the term transgender shall be inclusive
of inmates identified as androgynous, cross-dresser, gender variant, intersex,
transgender and transsexual.
In accordance with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and Department Standard
Operating Procedure (DSOP) 15-008 “Inmate Sexual Assault/Battery Prevention,” MDCR
Page 1 of 14
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
DSOP NO. 18-017
has a zero tolerance for incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual assault/battery and staff
sexual misconduct/harassment towards inmates. Staff shall ensure that a transgender
inmate classification and housing assignment provides a safe, humane and secure
environment, free from the threat of sexual assault/battery and staff sexual
misconduct/harassment.
II.
DEFINITIONS
Androgynous
Being male and female; hermaphrodite, having both masculine and feminine
characteristics.
Biological Sex or Sex
Genetic/biological/hormonal/physical characteristics (including genitalia), which are used
to classify an individual as female, male or inter-sex.
Bisexuality
An individual is attracted to members of either sex.
Cross-dresser
A person who, on occasion, wears clothing considered typical for another gender, but
who does not necessarily desire to change his/her gender.
Gender
A social construct based on a group of emotional and psychological characteristics that
classify an individual as feminine, masculine, androgynous or other. Gender can be
understood to have several components, including gender identity, gender expression
and gender role.
Gender Identity Expression
An individual’s sense of his/her own gender, as communicated to others through
expression, appearance, identity or behavior, regardless of the person’s sex at birth.
Gender Variant
A person who has chosen not to conform to the societal gender norms associated with
his/her external genitalia.
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
DSOP NO. 18-017
Heterosexuality
An individual is attracted to individuals of the opposite sex.
Homosexuality
An individual is attracted to individuals of one’s own sex.
Intersex
A person who is born with genitalia and/or secondary sex characteristics determined as
neither exclusively male, female, or combined male and female features. A person with
an intersex condition is born with sex chromosomes, external genitalia, or an internal
reproductive system that is not considered ‘standard’ for either male or female.
Hermaphrodite
A plant or animal that has both male and female reproductive organs.
Sexual Orientation
Male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality or bisexuality, by preference or practice.
Transgender
A person whose identity or behavior differs from traditional gender expression. An
umbrella term describing individuals whose appearance or characteristics are perceived
to be gender atypical.
Transsexual
A person who establishes a permanent identity with the opposite gender of his/her
assigned sex. A transsexual may undergo medical treatment(s) to change his/her
external genitalia so that it is in accord with his/her gender expression.
Transvestite
A term for a cross-dresser that is considered derogatory.
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
III.
DSOP NO. 18-017
TRANSGENDER COMMITTEE
The Transgender Committee (TC) is responsible for determining a permanent housing
assignment for each transgender inmate through a review of the respective classification,
medical and mental health records. In addition, prior to permanent housing, the TC shall
meet with each inmate to determine his/her vulnerability within the general jail population
and length of time living within a community as the acquired gender. The TC shall be
comprised of medical and mental health personnel from Corrections Health Services
(CHS), and an Intake and Release Bureau (IRB) Supervisor or designee, who shall serve
as Chairperson. A written decision by the TC shall be maintained in the inmate’s
confinement and medical records.
IV.
TRAINING
MDCR staff shall be provided information on transgender awareness through classroom
training or an educational workbook. Training shall also be provided to volunteer and
contractual staff through an educational workbook. It shall be the responsibility of the
respective Facility Supervisor/Bureau Commander to designate MDCR supervisors to
provide the workbook and obtain sign-off sheet(s) indicating that volunteer and
contractual staff have completed the training. Copies of the sign-off sheet(s) shall be
forwarded to the Training Bureau. In addition, MDCR sworn personnel shall complete
transgender awareness refresher training every 4 years as a requirement for Mandatory
In-Service Training (MIST). The training shall include but is not limited to the following:
V.
1.
Cultural awareness;
2.
Employee ethics;
3.
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA);
4.
Procedures for reporting inmates identified as transgender;
5.
Signs and symptoms of gender identity disorder.
PROCEDURES
All staff shall adhere to established guidelines to provide for the appropriate treatment,
safety and security needs of transgender inmates.
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Attachment G: LGBTQI Policies
MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
A.
DSOP NO. 18-017
COMMUNICATION
Staff shall adhere to the following protocol when communicating with a transgender
inmate:
B.
1.
Address the transgender inmate by last name or use the gender specific
identifier appropriate to the inmate’s gender identity expression such as Mr.,
Mrs., Miss, Ma’am, Sir, he, she, etc.;
2.
Avoid using language that a reasonable person would consider demeaning,
specifically, language aimed at a person’s actual or perceived gender identity
expression and/or sexual orientation;
3.
Questions relating to an inmate’s gender identity or gender expression shall
only be asked when necessary for ensuring proper classification, housing,
and medical treatment;
4.
Questions relating to an inmate’s gender identity or gender expression shall
only be asked to protect the inmate’s confidentiality and human dignity, and
avoid subjecting the inmate to abuse, humiliation, ridicule or assaults.
INTAKE
Identify and document any information or circumstance that may indicate an inmate
is transgender, male, female or intersex, as follows:
1.
Review arrest affidavit for gender assignment and any notification that
identifies the inmate as transgender;
2.
Ask the Arresting/Transporting Officer the sex of the inmate;
3.
Ask the inmate, if he/she is transgender, his/her sex and/or gender identity
expression;
4.
Complete a MDCR Incident Report;
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VOLUME NO. 18
5.
Document a transgender inmate’s birth and/or legal name, gender identity
expression, and biological sex on the respective inmate’s Jail Booking
Record, classification/rolodex cards, medical records, property room records,
etc.
6.
Upon the determination that an inmate is transgender or intersex:
7.
C.
DSOP NO. 18-017
a.
Temporarily place the transgender inmate in a single cell;
b.
Conduct and document visual checks on the 15/30-Minute
Confinement Physical Sight Checks at intervals not to exceed 30
minutes.
If for any reason a determination cannot be rendered regarding whether the
inmate is transgender, staff shall adhere to the following protocol:
a.
Notify the IRB Supervisor immediately;
b.
A male and female officer shall escort the inmate to the clinic for a
physical examination by CHS medical staff;
c.
If the inmate refuses a physical examination, the IRB Supervisor shall
ensure that a MDCR Incident Report is completed;
d.
The inmate shall be placed in administrative confinement pending an
administrative review by the Facility Supervisor or designee. The
administrative review shall be completed within 72 hours to determine
if continuation of such confinement is warranted.
CLASSIFICATION AND HOUSING ASSIGNMENT
The IRB staff shall ensure that each transgender inmate is classified and housed in
accordance with DSOP 19-005 “Objective Jail Classification.” A transgender
inmate shall be classified and housed based on housing availability, safety/security
needs, his/her gender identity and genitalia. Inmates with male genitals shall be
assigned to male housing. Inmates with female genitals shall be assigned to
female housing. A transgender inmate may be housed in general population or
administrative confinement.
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MIAMI-DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT
VOLUME NO. 18
DSOP NO. 18-017
During the classification interview process, IRB staff shall conduct an assessment
to determine if a transgender inmate has a history of sexual assault and/or being
sexually victimized. The findings shall be a factor in assignment of housing for a
transgender inmate.
1.
General Population Housing
A transgender inmate assigned to the Training and Treatment Center (TTC)
shall be assigned to a direct supervision housing unit. The transgender
inmate may be housed at the following detention facilities in general
population, unless such classification results in disruptive behavior or
presents safety concerns:
2.
a.
Women’s Detention Center (WDC);
b.
Turner Guildford Knight Correctional Center (TGKCC);
c.
Metro West Detention Center (MWDC).
Transgender Juvenile
Transgender juvenile inmates shall be kept separate from adult inmates and
afforded the same privileges as other juvenile inmates consistent with their
classification. A transgender juvenile inmate shall be assigned housing in
accordance to the provisions outlined in DSOP 12-001 “Juvenile Intake,
Classification, Housing and Programs.” Transgender juvenile inmates shall be
housed at the following detention facilities:
3.
a.
TGKCC - Male Juveniles
b.
WDC - Female Juveniles
Administrative Confinement
A transgender inmate shall be placed in administrative confinement in
accordance with DSOP 12-002 “Inmate Administrative and Disciplinary
Confinement.” A transgender inmate may be housed in administrative
confinement, when his/her presence in general population poses a threat to
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self, staff, other inmates, is vulnerable to victimization or the orderly operation
of the detention facility. Each transgender inmate housed in administrative
confinement shall have access to activities, programs and services consistent
with his/her classification status. A transgender inmate shall be housed in
administrative confinement based upon any of the following:
a.
A review and determination by the TC;
b.
A determination by CHS medical staff that the inmate has an intersex
condition;
c.
A history of increased risk or vulnerability;
d.
A history of vulnerability to victimization
assault/battery and/or sexual harassment;
e.
A history of sexual battery/assault behavior consistent with the
potential of being a sexual perpetrator;
f.
The inmate expresses or implies safety concerns;
g.
Pending permanent housing assignment.
including
sexual
Note: A transgender inmate may only be housed in administrative
confinement at the Pre-Trial Detention Center on a temporary basis.
In accordance with DSOP 19-005 “Objective Jail Classification,” a transgender
inmate has the right to request a review and appeal his/her classification.
Additionally, a transgender inmate may submit or file a complaint/grievance
regarding his/her classification in accordance with DSOP 15-001 “Inmate
Complaint/Grievance Process.”
D.
PERSONAL CLOTHING AND HYGIENE
In accordance with provisions outlined in DSOP 13-002 “Inmate Hygiene,” DSOP
13-004 “Inmate Clothing, Bedding and Linen Supplies” and DSOP 18-014 “Inmate
Uniforms and Personal Clothing,” a transgender inmate shall be authorized to
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maintain possession of personal clothing and hygiene items consistent with his/her
classification.
In addition, the aforementioned DSOP shall be adhered to for the issuance and
exchange of clothing, linen, bedding, etc. for transgender inmates. MDCR staff
assigned to housing areas shall ensure that each transgender inmate is provided
the opportunity to shave, shower and participate in hair care services.
A transgender inmate shall be provided gender appropriate clothing based upon a
medical determination by CHS medical staff and/or the inmate’s anatomy e.g.
brassieres for inmates with breast development/augmentation.
E.
PROGRAMS AND SERVICES
MDCR shall provide each transgender inmate the opportunity for nondiscriminatory participation in the below listed programs and services. An inmate’s
participation in programs and services shall be consistent with his/her classification
and shall not conflict with safe, secure and orderly operation of a detention facility.
The MDCR Inmate Handbook contains information and procedures for accessing
programs and services available to inmates in MDCR custody. The IRB staff shall
ensure each transgender is provided a copy of the MDCR Inmate Handbook during
the inmate orientation process.
1.
Commissary;
2.
Counseling;
3.
Mail;
4.
Telephone;
5.
Television;
6.
Visitation;
7.
Exercise/recreation;
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8.
Library services;
9.
Educational services;
10.
Medical services;
11.
Pretrial services;
DSOP NO. 18-017
12. Religious services/observances;
13. Grievance procedures;
14. Social services;
15. Inmate worker assignments.
VI.
FRISK AND STRIP SEARCHES
A transgender inmate shall not be strip searched randomly or as a form of harassment.
All frisk and strip searches shall be conducted in accordance with DSOP 11-022 “Frisk
and Strip Search Procedures.” At no time will a sworn officer frisk or strip search an
inmate to determine the inmate’s sex.
Additionally, if a sworn officer conducting a frisk or strip search discovers that an inmate
is a transgender with the opposite external genitalia, he/she shall immediately stop
performing the search and notify his/her respective supervisor. The respective supervisor
shall ensure that the search is completed by an officer of the same external genitalia as
the transgender inmate. Additionally, the respective supervisor shall ensure the incident is
documented on a MDCR Incident Report and that the inmate is placed in administrative
confinement pending administrative review by the Facility Supervisor or designee.
VII.
TRANSPORTATION
Transgender inmates shall be transported in accordance with provisions outlined in
DSOP 11-027 “Vehicle Transportation of Inmates.” Additionally, transporting officers shall
record the starting and ending mileage, the location from which they are leaving and the
destination for all transports involving transgender inmates. If possible, transgender
inmates shall be transported in a vehicle equipped with a separate compartment (splitPage 10 of 14
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cage) that prohibits physical contact with other inmates. Transgender juveniles shall be
transported in a separate compartment from adult inmates.
VIII.
HEALTH CARE
Health care assessments, evaluations, examinations, etc. shall be conducted in a private
setting.
A.
ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES
All personnel shall adhere to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) and applicable legal requirements in order to maintain the inmate’s
privacy. Each transgender inmate shall be afforded the opportunity to address
health care issues and receive treatment in accordance with DSOP 14-001 “Inmate
Injury/Illness - Inmate Request for Health Services,” DSOP 14-002 “Inmate Medical
Records,” DSOP 14-003 “Informed Consent for Medical Treatment,” DSOP 14-004
“Medical Services,” DSOP 14-005 “Dental Services” and DSOP 14-006 “Mental
Health Services.” A transgender inmate shall have access to the same necessary
medical, dental and mental health care services as other inmates. Each
transgender inmate booked into a detention facility shall receive an initial
medical/mental health screening by sworn personnel and subsequent
comprehensive medical/mental health screening by CHS staff in accordance with
DSOP 18-006 “Intake Procedures.”
B.
HORMONE TREATMENT AND SURGICAL REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
A transgender inmate may continue hormonal treatment and/or sex reassignment
surgery based upon an evaluation by CHS medical/mental health staff and in
accordance with the following factors:
1.
Prior to incarceration, the inmate was receiving hormonal medication as part
of an established sexual reassignment treatment regimen under the
supervision of a medical doctor;
2.
Prior surgical alteration of genitals and hormonal treatment;
3.
Prior to incarceration, sex reassignment surgery was scheduled (documented
by receipt of definitive medical records) and received hormonal treatment
(laboratory verification) under medical supervision;
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IX.
DSOP NO. 18-017
4.
Prior to incarceration, the inmate was receiving hormonal treatment as part of
a medically monitored program of gender transition;
5.
Prior to incarceration, surgical castration was performed (confirmed
anatomically, or in biological females by definitive medical records);
6.
Elects to receive hormone treatment and/or sex reassignment surgery, at
his/her own cost;
7.
Other circumstances as determined by CHS medical staff.
CROSS REFERENCES
DSOP 11-022 “Frisk and Strip Search Procedures”
DSOP 11-027 “Vehicle Transportation of Inmates”
DSOP 12-001 “Juvenile Intake, Classification, Housing and Programs”
DSOP 12-002 “Administrative/Disciplinary Confinement”
DSOP 12-004 “Movement and Transportation of Safety Cell Inmates by Classification”
DSOP 13-002 “Inmate Hygiene”
DSOP 13-004 “Inmate Clothing, Bedding, and Linen Supplies”
DSOP 14-001 “Inmate Injury/Illness – Inmate Request for Health Services”
DSOP 14-002 “Inmate Medical Records”
DSOP 14-003 “Informed Consent for Medical Treatment”
DSOP 14-004 “Medical Services”
DSOP 14-005 “Dental Services”
DSOP 14-006 “Mental Health Services”
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DSOP 15-008 “Inmate Sexual Assault/Battery Prevention”
DSOP 18-006 “Intake Procedures”
DSOP 18-014 “Inmate Uniforms and Personal Clothing”
DSOP 19-005 “Objective Jail Classification”
X.
RELATED REFERENCES
Farmer v. Brennan, Warden 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
Prison Rape Elimination Act
Sandin Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility v. Conner 515 U.S. 472 (1995)
XI.
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
American Correctional Association: 4-ALDF-2A-22, 4-ALDF-2A-30, 4-ALDF-2A-32, 4ALDF-2A-34, 4-ALDF-2A- 38, 4-ALDF-2A- 44, 4-ALDF-2A-45, 4-ALDF-2A-46, 4-ALDF2A-48, 4-ALDF-2A-49, 4-ALDF-2A-52, 4-ALDF-2A-55, 4-ALDF-2A-66
Florida Corrections Accreditation Commission: 9.02, 9.07, 9.15, 10.08, 12.21
National Commission on Correctional Health Care: J-A-01, J-A-08, J-B-04, J-D-02, J-E-12
XII.
REVOCATIONS
Any language in a DSOP, Procedural Directive, Standard Operating Procedure, Post
Order, and/or written correspondence that conflicts with this policy is hereby revoked.
XIII.
AMENDMENTS
None
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FORMS/SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
15/30-Minute Confinement Physical Sight Checks
MDCR Incident Report
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