The Politics of Fear in Aeschylus' "Persians"
Author(s): Ippokratis Kantzios
Source: The Classical World, Vol. 98, No. 1 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 3-19
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the Classical Association of the Atlantic
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THE POLITICSOF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS'PERSIANS
I. Introduction
in the theater of Aeschylus, but nomotif
recurrent
a
Fear is
where is it more prominent than in the Persians: words denoting
Tap3os,Uo;, 40'00, Tp-I4O;,
concern,intimidation,terror,such as ?bpoVris,
with all their derivatives, appear at the unparalleled rate of 3.5 per
every 100 lines.' Here, in typical Aeschylean manner, fear is not
only a product of the inability of humans to decipher the intentions
of the divine will, but also the corollary of the ideological foundations and institutional structure of a society. The first type of fear,
existential in nature, is primarily manifested in the earlier part of
the play, where the chorus (Persian elders) and queen Atossa are
weighed down by uneasy presentiment at the threatening omens regarding the fate of the expedition against Greece.2 The general principles
of Aeschylus' treatment of this existential fear have been laid out
by Jacqueline de Romilly in an entire book, and there is no need
to revisit the subject.3 The other type of fear, however, with its strong
political overtones, although acknowledged,4 is, to the best of my
awareness, mentioned only in passing by previous authors. Yet the
Persians is a play deeply political: Xerxes may conform to Aristotle's
notion of a universal symbol of a man who falls from prosperity;'
I This is almost twice as high as the rate in the Suppliants, Agamemnon, and
Eumenides, and fifty percent higher than in Prometheus and the Choephori. The rate
closest to that in the Persians appears in the Seven against Thebes (3.1).
2 Fear expressions of this sort, up to the entrance of the Messenger (249): cho("my heart within, a prophet of doom,
rUs-KaeKO0faVTr5 a)'caV ooAoorenFTat/ Ouvso goweeyv
is greatly troubled," 10-11), Tpotov0TaI ("they [the parents and wives of the soldiers]
shudder," 64), Trarai iLou jkeAayXI-rwov/ 4pq' a4p60-0-rTai 4540 ("because of these, my
4povTis ("and
darksome heart is torn by fear," 115-116), Atossa KaP C KapaitV aV'e1
anxiety tears at me in my heart," 161), ou'3aapC5a4pavTru ovaca &iZae
aTo5 ("in no way
failing to prophesy fear," 162), gpittv' a`4pra-ro5("unutterable anxiety," 165), a,ui4 a'
0'40aAi&ki
$6$o5 ("but my fear is about the 'eye,'" 168), 46+w a' a"oy'o; Ir4Oahv
("and I stood speechless with fear," 206), TavT' 4&ol7e e'lLasr' O'Ti'eiV ("these things
are fearsome for me to behold," 210). The Messenger's news reveals the veracity of
these premonitions. The text used here is that of D. Page, Aeschyli Septem quae Supersunt
Tragoedias (Oxford 1972). All translations in this article are mine.
J. de Romilly, La crainte et l'angoisse dans le thedtre d'Eschyle (Paris 1971).
See also W. Thalmann, "Aeschylus' Physiology of the Emotions," AJP 107 (1986)
489-511; S. D. Sullivan, " 'Dark' Mind and Heart in Aeschylus," RBPh 75 (1997)
59-67, and Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology (Montreal 1997) 35, 62, 1067, 117-18, 133-35, 230. For fear as an expression of the tension between male and
female, see L. Byrne, "Fear in the Seven Against Thebes," in S. Deacy and K. F.
Pierce, eds., Rape in Antiquity: Sexual Violence in the Greek and Roman Worlds (London
1997) 143-62.
4 E.g., D. Rosenbloom, "Shouting 'Fire' in a Crowded Theater: Phrynichos' Capture
of Miletos and the Politics of Fear in Early Attic Tragedy," Philologus 137 (1993)
187; J. C. Hogan, A Commentary on the Complete Greek Tragedies: Aeschylus (Chicago 1984) 224; E. Hall, Aeschylus: Persians (Warminster 1996) 158; and D. J. Conacher,
Aeschylus: The Earlier Plays and Related Studies (Toronto 1996) 11.
I E.g., H. D. F. Kitto, Poiesis (Berkeley 1966) 74-115; R. P. Winnington-Ingram,
"Zeus in the Persae," JHS 93 (1973) 210-19; de Romilly, Eschyle, Les Perses (Paris
3
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4
KANTZIOS
IPPOKRATIS
but in the minds of Aeschylus' audience, he is also a specific historical figure, the Persian king who, just eight years before, had
destroyed their territory and forced them to abandon their city.6
The play, therefore, must have rekindled memories of the monumental events of the war and must have stirredemotions and thoughts
beyond those generated by a tragedy of pure Aristotelian symbols.
By depicting life in the despotic regime of the enemy, Aeschylus
attempts to identify some of the Persian empire's quintessential
elements and the way they define the functioning of the society;
and by doing so, he inevitably invites a comparison with the corresponding aspects of the Athenian system. Simon Goldhill7 is well
justified in his claim that the Persians is an examination of the
opposition between tyranny and democracy in the light of the civic
developments in the polis, and that, in the playwright's view, the
military triumph of Athens is a reflection of its superior ideology.
Edith Hall,8 too, notes that the opposite of Oriental despotism is
not a generic type of Greek state, but specifically the democratic
regimes. It is no accident that the Delian League, which was formed
to protect its members from Persian expansionism, was also a primary force in establishing democracies.
In the Persians, the contrast between despotism and democracy is concretized at many levels. Whether these concretizations
1974) 16; Thalmann, "Xerxes' Rags: Some Problems in Aeschylus' Persians," AJP
101 (1980) 260-82; and Conacher (above, n.4) 3-35.
6 In contrast to Kitto, Greek Tragedy (London 1950) 36, a simultaneous theological and political understanding of the play is not only possible, but even more
rewarding; see for instance, the comments of M. Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama (Berkeley 1976) 50-51, on the blending of the two perspectives in the creation of a more
compelling synthesis.
I See S. Goldhill, "Battle Narrative and Politics in Aeschylus' Persae," JHS 108
(1988) 189-93; and "Civic Ideology and the Problem of Difference: The Politics of
Aeschylean Tragedy," JHS 120 (2000) 34-56, on the Dionysia as an institution of
the democratic polis and on the plays' constant reflection of their genesis in a fifthcentury Athenian environment (35).
8 Hall, Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford 1989) 16-17. See also A. Momigliano,
"Persian Empire and Greek Freedom," in A. Ryan, ed., The Idea of Freedom (Oxford
1979) 139-51. One might, of course, counter that in the play there is no explicit
distinction between the Athenian democracy and other Greek forms of government,
that the fundamental opposition is not between autocracy and democracy but rather
between autocracy and the rule of law, a principle embraced by a much larger number of Greek states, not all of them democratic. But I believe one can go only so far
in this direction: it is true, for example, that the concept of accountability (see next
section) is not, strictly speaking, exclusively democratic (see Arist. Pol. 1322b, where
it is stated that financial auditing is a requirement of all acceptable governments, oligarchies included: ivaryKaFov 'r'pav aj1v eJae 'rv A ogivnv Ao'yaov Kai -rpooeu&ivoiavo).
It is also true that in Hdt. 7.104 Demaratus, explains to Xerxes that for the Greeks
the master is law, which they fear more than the Persians fear their despot (EWeTVrt
7roAA4
p E'Tt piUol '4jof o; Ei). But the Athey'tp o-4uaeaor7T% v6Oo5, TOv urroaEq&kaziyouai
nian Aeschylus' play is intended for an Athenian audience, to which these attributes
have a familiar democratic resonance, not a generic one applicable to all sorts of
political systems.
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
5
are historically accurate in their entirety9 is less important than
the fact that the Athenians here construct an image of their enemy from which they differentiate themselves. With this play, Aeschylus
presents his own answers to questions that must have been in the
minds of the Athenians from at least the time of Darius' expedition against Greece, questions that are closely connected with the
formation of their social and political self-awareness: How do the
Persian and Greek systems shape the dynamics of power within
their societies? What qualities are required of a person to participate in each of these systems? Which kind of behavioral patterns
work for despotism and which for democracy? And finally, why
did the Greeks win the war? Aeschylus indicates that different political systems do indeed produce different military and civic virtues
and that the victory of the Greeks must ultimately be attributed
to the superior nature of their system, which encourages them to
achieve their highest potential. The Persians is a commentary on
the limitations of despotism and, by the same token, on the possibilities of a well-governed democratic society, which, in lieu of
imposed mechanisms of control, has adopted self-motivation and
self-discipline. In this paper, I concentrate on the way Aeschylus
unpeels a new layer in the contrast between the despotic Orient
and democratic Greece by examining the nature and sources of
fear, its uses as a political instrument, and the value attached to
it in each society. In addition, I discuss the human response to
the ideology of fear and the way it shapes the relationship not
only between the ruler and the ruled, but also between mortals
and gods.
II. Fear (or Lack of It) as Modus Operandi
The Persian Model
The first intimation of suppression and coercion as intrinsic
characteristics of the Persian regime appears in Atossa's exchange
with the chorus, when she asks them about Athens (230-245). Her
questions are simplistic:10 in real life the queen must have understood at least this much about the enemy long before the end of
9 R. Lattimore ("Aeschylus on the Defeat of Xerxes," in Classical Studies in
Honor of William Abbot Oldfather [Urbana 1943] 84-87), for instance, thinks that
Herodotus is much more reliable than Aeschylus. On the creation of a model of opposition between Greek and the barbarians, see Hall (above, n.8) 76-100; and (above,
n.4) 5-7. See also F. I. Zeitlin, "'Playing the Other: Theater, Theatricality, and the
Feminine in Greek Drama," in J. J. Winkler and Zeitlin, eds., Nothing to Do with
Dionysos? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context (Princeton 1990) 63-96, for the cathartic function of depicting the Other.
'0 It has been suggested that taking into account the fact that women were secluded, it is rather natural for Atossa to ask these questions. But Herodotus tells us
that she did have political influence on Darius (3.133-134), and presumably Aeschylus
was no less informed than his contemporary; see J. D. Craig, "The Interpretation of
Aeschylus' Persae," CR 38 (1924) 99.
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6
KANTZIOS
IPPOKRATIS
the war, but it is its obvious artifice that gives away the deeper
purpose of the passage. It serves in the first place to point out
the contrast between the vast material resources of Persia and the
poverty of Greece," but still more does the passage emphasize the
nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and the
function of instruments of control within the two societies. One
of the questions that comes to Atossa's lips is, "Who is the rroipiavwp
of the army?" (241). Hoquaycop
and who the despot (Ka7r1aeo-1r4e)
(literally "shepherd") is the person in charge of a noikavoptov ("flock"),
in this play identified with the invading host (75); and the (Uri)acnr6'ru
cr0paTn is the commander of the army, who holds absolute authority.'2 Atossa, then, seems to be inquiring about the Greek counterpart
of the Persian military ruler. But by asserting that the Athenians
1
("subjects," 242), the elare no one's aoUAoi ("slaves") or VTrTKOOI
ders imply that they understand her question as referring to the
entire population, not just the army.'3 The temporary confusion between
the two interlocutors reveals their typical Oriental conceptualization
of the allocation of power'4 and springs from the ambiguity of the
terms used, since in Persia, the leader of the army is also the
monarch, who has the unlimited power to force his will on his
subjects (see aeo oO5vowiOv aaoiyKzat, "by the compulsion of the despot,"
587). lopa4vwp and aE0r06Tv, therefore, signify the absolute authority of the king and also his ability to enforce it through his
army: he both rules the army and rules through the army. This
authority is powerfully underlined in 81-83, where Xerxes is described as "casting from his eyes the dark glance of a killer snake"'
AeUeoawv / boviou Up7lka apOp,KOVTO5, 81-82), his
(KuCiVeoV a' oLp,,aoi
venomous effectiveness springing from the multitude of his armed
c
roAuvavTa, 83), which emanate an aura of inforces (7roAUZeXpKai
vincibility and dread (see also bo/3epoi`ikeiv '1, 3egwoi e 1a%7VI
r'
T pavaploi,
40; bo/3epaivo'{v npoo-gio-aia, 48; aeiwvac
27; aewoi7rA',OTr
i
v ro 7rorraci, 58). Images of control and force appear re/3OaTAsCW
peatedly throughout the play, and the yoke (vu os), a metaphor for
tyrannical exercise of power, becomes one of the most visible motifs.'5
I The theme of excessive wealth that generates hybris is one of the recurrent
ideas of the play; see the references to the wealth of Persia, 9, 45, 53, 80, 250.
12 Note the intensification of the status of supreme authority with the preposition Erri(Smyth 1689a: E'ri with the dative "gives clear and emphatic outlines of
the . . . action"; see also LSJ on eiri, G.4)
13 See, for instance, Pind. P. 2.87; Aesch. Eum. 569, 683; and Soph. El. 749,
where a-Tpazo' is used in the sense of "people."
'4 See the Orientalized Danaids' despotic expectations from the Argive king in
Suppliants:o6 -rotnA15, i a TO J1V- / 7TpCrTaLVIS'aKp1TOS WV / KpaTUl/eft OWJ.oh, e'O-Tia.
/ I4OYokoIolri VL-udaOGt oe9EV, / SOVOaK-rfrpoIO1 a' ELvBpo'vo1 xpe?o / 7r&a1E7FKpaivei;
XzOoV?,
("you indeed are the city, you are the people; being a lord subject to no judge,
you are the master of the altar, the hearth of the land, with your single-vote commands; and on a throne of sole sovereignty you determine every need," 370-375).
's See lines 50, 68-72, 191, 196, 594, 722, and 736. For the image of yoke,
see W. B. Stanford, Aeschylus in His Style (Dublin 1942) 96-97; and M. Anderson,
"The Imagery of the Persians," G&R 19 (1972) 166-74.
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
7
In a political milieu in which suppression and confinement are
the norm, their opposite, freedom, is perceived as a liability and
an outright danger. When news of the disastrous outcome of the
battle of Salamis reaches the Persian palace, the chorus fears that,
with the power of the empire broken, the tongue of the people
will not be held in restraint (' 4VXaKa$1) anymore for they will
be released (AXAu-Tal)to speak with freedom (CAev6epa aciv),
because they have been liberated from the yoke of oppression (eAV6
Cv)O'V aeXAKa5) (591-597); and that the nations will no longer accept
the Persian rule nor will they pay their tribute because they cannot be forced by aearooiovo-w aVaTKai, nor with their knees on
the ground will they be possessed by fear (E5 yayV 7rpo7r1VOVTf I
a?orVTai) (584-590). Here the chorus renders the fundamentals of
the Persian ideology in practical terms: imposition of taxation for
the treasury of the ruler, prohibition of free speech, and submission to and recognition of the absolute authority of the king. Later,
Darius' synoptic history of the Persian royal house (759-786) brings
to center stage another cardinal principle of the empire, expansionism, the effort always to bring new lands under the rule of
the king: Auvv ae XaoV Kai' (Dpwy6ovKTV5OYLTO / 'IwVta. TE ra-av
,q1acTev$# ("he [Cyrus] acquired the Lydian and Phrygian people
and subdued the entire Ionia by force," 770-771), Ka7reoTpaTefuTa
iroXAa oizv 7roAA4 o-rpaTcp ("and I [Darius] went to many campaigns
with much army," 780). When the elders exalt the successes of
Darius, they mention the Greek cities that have come under his
power (880-903), and allusions to conquests appear throughout:
7repo7r-roAXI . . . / ca&ao?eto;rpo-rao ("the royal army, destroyer of
cities," 65-66), 7roAE4Ou; 7rUpyotaiKToU; / ?agirEiv ("to pursue towerdestroying wars," 104-105), 7rAotrTovEKT'OXZWaviv acx' ("you acquired
wealth by your spear," 755), 0oaa 6' elke rroAe,s ("and how many
cities he captured,"865),
EKpa'TVE
<7r6Ae,s> ("he
became master of
cities," 900). It is in this context that we must see Xerxes' attempt to enslave Greece (vtyoiv a41gL4aAEiv aoi'Aaov 'EXAa'a, "to cast
the yoke of slavery on Greece," 50; ir&oaa
'zp 'y OIT' a&'EAa4 aao-ieAw5
"for
all
of
Greece
would
become
subject to the king,"
V7T'KOO;,
234), 16 which is objectionable to Darius and the elders only because Greece is not part of Asia.'7
It is only natural that the ultimate embodiment of authority of
this internally and externally aggressive system, the king, becomes
16 See also &AA"wv
ipao,oei;, 826. For the transgressive connotations of `pcos and
its association with kings and tyrants see Hall (above, n.4) 165. Also see the comments of S. Said, "Darius et Xerxes dans les Perses d'Eschyle," Ktema 6 (1981) 29-30,
on "l 'unite de l'imperialism de Darius a Xerxes"; C. Pelling, "Aeschylus' Persae and
History," in Pelling, ed., Greek Tragedy and the Historian (Oxford 1997) 14-19; and
Rosenbloom (above, n.4) 190.
17 This is suggested by the honor bestowed by Zeus upon the king to rule over
Asia alone (EV abvap'aeiraio- 'Aoi8o5 jmqAoTp64ou/ TuvyeiiV, 763-764). The yoking of the
Hellespont and crossing into Europe reflect precisely the greedy arrogance of Xerxes;
see Kitto (above, n.6) 38-41; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, Studies in Aeschylus (Cambridge 1983) 10-11; and Conacher (above, n.4) 24-25.
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8
KANTZIOS
IPPOKRATIS
the source of fear par excellence. Regardless of what other emotions he evokes, be it affection, respect, or admiration, the master's
relationship with his subjects is defined by the immense awe his
position generates. There is an eloquent manifestation of this reality during the appearance of Darius. While in their preliminary
invocations to the dead king, the elders entreat him to appear; as
soon as this happens, they are struck speechless, not terrorized simply
by the supernatural spectacle, but struck once more by the "old"
(or "former") terror (apxah(p Trap$ee, 696) that his presence as a
despot produces. H. D. Broadhead'8 takes this terror to be the result of the fact that a ghost stands among them, but such an
interpretation fails to account for the adjective apXaiq". If in fact
the elders had been struck dumb by the presence of the disembodied Darius, a more appropriate adjective would have been viw.
The inviting words of the dead king do not sooth their fear, and
twice they profess their state of mind by the use of the verb alogaut
("be afraid"; literally, "be put to flight") (700-701). At last, even
Darius himself realizes that the elders cannot overcome their old
fear (ago; 7raXaiov, 703) and turns for explanations to his wife who
stands by.
This Tras,p$oand ao; that the Persians feel toward their master
should not be qualified by the unimpressive reception that Xerxes
receives upon his entrance (907). There the news of the disaster
at Salamis transforms the encounter of the king with the elders
into an occasion of profound mourning and empathy, temporarily
suspending the rituals and rhetoric of subordination. Indeed there
are no indications of prostration or any of the phraseology of submission; but, on the other hand, there is none of the customary
royal magnificence either: Xerxes enters without fanfare or entourage, draped in rags.19 The figure that reflects the might of the
empire stands in front of his people humiliated and vulnerable,
the agents of his authority, the army, all but destroyed. There should
be no doubt, however, that the relationship between the king and
his subjects will remain the same as in the past: after the initial
awkwardness and shock, Xerxes regains total control of the situation, and from line 1038 on, every one of his lines (except the
last two) contains a command, which the chorus obeys immediately.20 The play ends with Xerxes heading toward his palace (1077),
a symbolic restitution of his absolute power; and the queen has
already reasserted that the defeat in Greece will have no effect on
18 H. D. Broadhead, The Persae of Aeschylus (Cambridge 1960) 176. Contrast
Hall (above, n.4) 158, who does recognize the significance of fear in the relationships between Darius and the Persian elders.
t 0. Taplin, The Stagecraft of Aeschylus (Oxford 1977) 121-27.
20 The dramatic change between the earlier and later part in the interaction of
the chorus with Xerxes was noticed by H. C. Avery, "Dramatic Devices in Aeschylus'
Persians," AJP 85 (1964) 182, who, however, attributes it to Xerxes' putting on new
and undamaged royal robes. The text provides no hints of change of attire.
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
9
her son's usual (i.e., unrestrained) authority over Persia (o-6e'; a'
0ohoir
xOovo6, 214).21 Xerxes and his people have
Tj-a3e foK0pavet
failed to learn the lesson of his defeat.
The acceptance by the people of such unlimited exercise of
power finds its ideological justification in the Persian notion that
absolute monarchy is sanctioned by Zeus and that the status of
the monarch himself is divine. From the beginning of the play,
the Persians equate their kings with gods: ia-6Oeo; 4JW (80), Oe6hV
io'ov . . . / .abo; (150-151),
6eoU . . . eLUvaTreIpa, . . . OEoQ
,VUT'vp ( o157), kraaouwiv agteC;
(634), louoa-ycv'?j; GOe (643), 6eios
avaKTWp
(651), 6OepIY50TWP (twice) (654-655), ch; 6Oeo(711), io-66eo5
(856). Deification may also be suggested in 152, when the chorus
pays obeisance to the queen (7rpoon7r1'VW)
and in 74-75, where the
invading army is called 7roalpavo'paoiGeiov, literally a "divine flock,"
but which, according to Walther Kranz,22 should be understood as
the flock of a king "who is a god." Aeschylus, then, presents the
Persians as believing in the divinity of their king. Whether in the
earlier part of the fifth century they actually did so or simply regarded him as godlike remains uncertain:23 A. T. Olmstead24 makes
a case for the former and suggests that line 157 (6,O ue'v euLvadTepaa
HEpOWv,
6EOL a
Kai t.T'TIO5tp U;, "you [Atossa] are bedfellow of
the god of the Persians and also the mother of a god") is strong
evidence for the divinity of the Persian kings. Andrew Sydenham
Farrar Gow25 takes a modified stand by suggesting that the kings
are considered gods, but only after the conclusion of a successful
life. Thus, the living Xerxes' status is still undetermined, depending on the successful conclusion of his career. Broadhead, on the
other hand, warns us not to take 6eoO (157) literally. In a similar
manner, Hall26suggests that the views of the Greeks about the Persians'
21 On the continuing supremacy of the king and the accommodating chorus, see
L. Belloni, Eschilo: I Persiani (Milan 1988) li-lx; A. F. Garvie, "Aeschylus' Simple
Plots," in R. D. Dawe, J. Diggle, P. E. Easterling, eds., Dionysiaca (Bristol 1978) 71;
and D. Schenker, "The Queen and the Chorus in Aeschylus' Persae," Phoenix 48 (1994)
292-93.
22 W. Kranz, Stasimon, Untersuchungen zu Form und Gehalt der griechischen
Tragodie (Berlin 1933) 87; also in Broadhead (above, n.18) 50. 'Io60Eo; is an epic
echo, but see also Conacher (above, n.4) 12, who suggests that expressions equating
mortals to gods are "innocent in epic but not in tragic imitation of epic." See also
,
Hall (above, n.4) 119, who points out that the expression 6Eii '1'0oo
k4os may refer to
the chorus' inability to look at the queen directly.
23 See H. H. Bacon, Barbarians in Greek Tragedy (New Haven 1961) 36.
24
A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (Chicago 1948) 270. For a
variation of this thesis, see L. R. Taylor, "The 'Proskynesis' and the Hellenistic Ruler
Cult," JHS 47 (1927) 53-62, who thinks that the 7rpoOK6VnO1I;is for the king's immortal double, his &aaigv.
25 A. S. F. Gow, "Notes on the Persae of Aeschylus," JHS 48 (1928) 134-36;
but in 71 1, the queen says that Darius was 5it OEo&,even when he was alive. For
hints that the dead king embodies the daemon of the house, see A. J. Podlecki, The
Persians by Aeschylus (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970) 15.
26 See her excellent discussion in Hall
(above, n.8) 90-93.
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KANTZIOS
IPPOKRATIS
10
perceptions of their king are probably incorrect due to their misunderstanding of the oversized royal figure in art as opposed to
those of his subjects, and to the practice of obeisance, which the
Greeks confused with their own religious genuflection. But regardless
of whether the Persians actually believed in the divinity of their
king or not, Aeschylus presents them as paying him divine honors, which the Greeks would have found both humiliating and
sacrilegious. In this sense, the deification of the Persian kings, whether
real or fictitious, provides for Aeschylus not only another important point of opposition between the barbarians and the Greeks,27
but also another explanation for the unbridgeable gap between royal
authority and its subjects.
In short, the pervasive presence of fear in the Persian society
stems from the latter's institutional structure, that is, from the assignment of unlimited power to a master, which blurs the line between
mortal and divine. Persian ideology is defined by aggressive imperialistic policies abroad and by the imposition of a strict authoritarian
rule over the people at home, both implemented by means of the
army.
The Greek Model
The first reference to Greece as a political concept appears in
242, where the chorus informs Atossa that the Greeks are neither
slaves (aoUAo:)nor subjects (Ulrr1'Koo1)to any master. Although no
definition of the opposite of aouAeiaand 7Tr'KOO'T1q is provided there,
elsewhere Aeschylus indicates that this opposite is none other than
political freedom, AAeu6epka. The important choral passage 584-594
presents a clear contrast between the Persian rule (associated with
subjugation, royal tribute, and divine honors paid to the king) and
the Greek rule (associated, as Hall28notes, with an important Athenian
triptych: taxation directed to the state's not king's-treasury, equality
of the citizens, and the privilege of rrpp'vjlea, the right to speak
one's mind without the fear of prosecution). When the chorus laments that the "nations" will no longer be under the Persian rule,
they refer (implicitly) to the Greek islands and the Greek cities
of Asia Minor, since they alone were liberated in the aftermath of
the failed expedition of Xerxes. In the minds of the chorus, therefore, the reinstatement of these territories into the Greek world
will lead to the destruction there of the Persian model and its replacement by an antithetical model that emphasizes the various aspects
of eAeuAepia. The same polarity between Persia and Greece can be
seen in their objectives during the great military confrontation: while
the purpose of the Persian expedition is the enslavement of the
27
This opposition is clear, for instance, in Xen. An. 3.2.13: papTUp'oIVX sAEuepia
ev atIs
'aA4 TOV5
VEEOOE8
Kai ETpoi4?qTE.
o6ala top ae&ipOWtoiV
aEO-riTIOV,
E;
OEo? irpOOrKLVEITE ("the proof is the freedom of the cities in which you were born and
nurtured; for you do obeisance to no human, but to the gods").
28 Hall (above, n.8) 98.
&oi'rAWv
TrOV
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
11
Greeks (50, 234), the latter are defending their concept of freedom, the condition of an existence which, in their view, is most
worth preserving, as indicated by their emphatic self-exhortations
fAev6epoQre . . . fAeU0Epo0Te . . . vvv i7rEp 7rav'rVv a'yTw (402-405).
and VrvoK0oT-5 are inextricably connected with a culture
If aouAEi'a
is associated with
of intimidation imposed by a master, eiAEuepka
a masterless and fearless society, one that has no other source of
authority beyond the will of its citizens, the demos. The authoritarian ruler of the Orient finds his (antithetical) Athenian counterpart
in the person of apXWjv v6r6Ewvo;, the official who is obliged to
act within the parameters of his office, as these have been specified by the laws of the city and ultimately by the citizens themselves.
This "pXwv,far from acting at whim, must always take his actions
in the light of his e6Uvivva,,the public accounting to be provided
the end of the term. It is
by him and every elected official-at
this accountability that shields the common citizens from the abuse
of the men in power and liberates them from the fear of being at
the mercy of a master with unrestrained authority, who is beyond
punishment.29 Although the Persians contains no direct reference
to this quintessential Athenian democratic practice, it does contain an oblique, yet unmistakable, one: in 211-214, the queen asserts
that even if Xerxes fares badly, his failure will have no consequences for his rule because he is not Ulreuvio; 7roXEiT(213); in
other words, he is not accountable to his subjects. No Athenian
spectator would have failed to grasp the allusion and recall to mind
the vast difference between this despotic perception of exercising
power and the principles of transparency and responsibility which
permeate the civic institutions of his own city.
Here it must be pointed out that references to the fearlessness of the Athenians should not be understood as the negation of
fear in toto, which leads to anarchy and lawlessness, but as a counterpoint to the servile fear of the subject toward the despot. Elsewhere
Aeschylus does acknowledge that certain kinds of ?so; and ,b0o5
are beneficial to society: "There is a place where fear is good
and must remain guardian of the thoughts" (W06'0'7roU T0 EVoW'ELu/
EVEWVKa0r.Oevov), the chorus says in
Kai' 4pEvcvfU7r)iFOKo7roV / aeI
Eumenides 517-519; and later Athena proclaims, "From these fearsome
faces (sc. Erinyes), I see great benefits for these citizens" (fsK 'r6i
qo$fep
V ThWVE
7rpoorcnrwV
/ ILe' TO7aae
Paos 6p6J
iroXTa;,s, 990-
991). In lines 994-995 of the same play, fear is associated with
justice (op6oa1Ka1ohV 994) and the prosperity of the city. Sophocles,
too, notes the indispensability of fear coupled with reverence in
the discipline and effectiveness of the army: ov'T' 'a& arTpaTro -Ie
29 But, as J. Lembke and C. J. Herington (Aeschylus: Persians [New York and
Oxford, 1981] 102-3) note, eventually even the despot must give an account to god,
who alone is described as euiiuyos (828). Generally on the accountability of the holders of public office in Athens, see M. Pierart, "Les ETOTNOI atheniens," AC 40 (1971)
526-73.
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12
IPPOKRATIS KANTZIOS
tW)pOVw5 a?pXOtT' ETt, / wq3Ev?
jb6goi 7rpo?$Av?Wa
1,0o' a;ioLk'ow v (Aj.
1075-1076). There is, however, a great difference between the fear
that prevails in the Orient and that which the Athenians experience, for the latter understand fear as an effective means for the
preservation and success of the society only if associated with ai'&c;
and the very similar aio-xU'vq,that is, respectfulness and shame.30
The concept of a&lR is extremely persistent in Greek thought and
appears already in the Iliad (15.561-564), although there it refers
primarily to military virtue. Later, with the development of the
polis, it is understood in stronger political terms: ai;&z is a kind
of fear that dissuades the citizens from actions that bring disgrace
and that encourages them to be obedient to the written and unwritten laws of the city.3" Respect and reverence for the gods is
one of its characteristics, and Aeschylus, by presenting the Persian army as not being "ashamed" (ov . . . / jaOUVT0O, 809-810) of
violating the temples of the Greek gods, makes a pointed contrast
between the healthy fear/reverence of the Greeks and the unreflecting
fearlessness of the Persians towards the gods. The aia6; which the
Persians feel toward their master (Tr?j E4qv [i.e., Darius'] aiaC, 699)
is not a sort of peer pressure, like that of the Athenians, but an
expression of their self-abasement and their consciousness of inferiority. Darius' words indicate that he understands his subjects' awe
toward him as equivalent to despotic fear (ago; ira,acou', 703).
To summarize up to this point: the play sets forth a strong
case for the oppositional natures of the Persian and Greek political models. The former is characterized by complete submission
to the master; the latter, by a culture of equality and participation
in the affairs of the city, which protects the citizens from the abuse
of authority. Fear of a distant, godlike master is replaced in a
democracy by a sense of a;c3s and self-motivated respect for the
laws of the city that spring from the will of the people they serve.
Thus fear and freedom form two opposite poles of the possible
means of political motivation.
III. The Human Response to the Ideology of Fear
The Persian Model
The ruler. The attribution of excessive, even divine, honors to
the king makes him irreverent, that is, fearless towards the gods.
As an individual, Xerxes is blamed as hubristic (808, 821) and as
a transgressor of the laws of the gods (6eo$Aac0otV0'e7pKKO47L
rpa.oei,
"violating the gods with his boastful audacity," 831); as such, he
30 For fear as an aspect of a&i&s,see Socrates: 'AAA' 'o'vaye
aia65, EY6a Kai Uos
elva# ("but where there is reverence, there is also fear," P1. Euthphr. 12B). For the
relationship between Nos. a#W; (aiuriv'vT),and ow$pooi6m,see W. B. Stanford, Sophocles:
Ajax (Bristol 1963) 195.
31 See the excellent discussion of E. S. Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on
Plot and Emotion (Princeton 1992) 189-225; also Stanford (above, n.30) 194-95.
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
13
W Vp6p,irwV
Tr
meets with a fitting punishment (Ze'r TOI iOAa TSr
I
rCer-T-(V, "'Zeus is indeed the punisher of exdyaV /bpoVIO'TOve
ceedingly arrogant thoughts," 827-828). Xerxes not only invades
Europe, assigned by the gods to a different rule (763-764), but
with unheard-of audacity (vecp6pai-e, 744) he puts shackles (Eezo-,u61aawv,
745) on the straits of Hellespont like those of a slave (aoixovW`;,
745) and thus arouses the wrath of Poseidon. Later (809-812) we
hear of the sacrileges he and his army commit against the Greek
places of worship.
But is the behavior of Xerxes typical of absolute monarchy
or simply a by-product of his own aberrant character? Arnaldo
Momigliano, for one, thinks that his pride is an individual characteristic, not an institutional one.32 Indeed it is a curious fact-and
one of the difficulties of the play-that Aeschylus presents Darius
in a light quite different from that of his son, that is, as a wise
leader, respectful of the gods, and aware of human limitations.33
Darius' function in this play is complicated, the complication stemming
in part from the contradiction between his words as an apparition
and his former deeds as a monarch. The Athenian audience of Aeschylus
knows well that father and son are very similar: Darius, too, attempted to bridge a body of water (the Thracian Bosphorus) while
campaigning against the Scythians (Hdt. 4.83), attacked mainland
Greece to punish Athens and Eretria for their support of the Ionian
revolt, and returned to Asia empty-handed after the decisive defeat at Marathon. That he himself was not present in the expedition
against Athens, which, like that of Xerxes, violated divinely assigned boundaries, is merely a technicality, not an issue of substance.34
In fact, Herodotus (7.1) informs us that Darius was eagerly planning another invasion but was prevented by his death.35 During the
necromancy, he conveniently omits actions of his that contradict
his own advice, while chastizing his son for his folly and exalting
his own wisdom. But the credibility of his words is undermined
by the audience's knowledge of him.36 By his own standards, when
Momigliano (above, n.8) 147.
See Said (above, n.16) 31-36.
34 Line 244 (Ao-re AcapdiounroAXTE Kal Ka(OV41/ipai
oTpaT6v) makes a direct
connection between Marathon and Darius.
35 Ironically, when Xerxes came to the throne, he was first unwilling to undertake the expedition (Hdt. 7.5).
36 Conacher (above, n.4) 4: "[T]he poet of contemporary history has also to
recognize a certain responsibility: he must present events in such a way that they are
acceptable to those familiar with the actual happenings." Otherwise, either the poet
or his characters lose credibility. Broadhead (above, n.18) xvii: Aeschylus has adhered broadly to the historical facts, but his idealized Darius is the mouthpiece of
the philosopher poet. So also Winnington-Ingram (above, n.5) 218. Darius' version
of the events, however, contradicts seriously that of the spectators: despite his claim
that he has never caused so much harm to the state (781), the Athenian audience
knows that the Persian army suffered massive losses at Marathon (see also the chorus' acknowledgment in 244). If indeed the famous story, mentioned in Hdt. 5.105
(Darius being reminded three times every day of his intended punishment of the Athenians,
32
33
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14
IPPOKRATIS
KANTZIOS
alive, Darius was not a model of virtue. Now he either has belatedly acquired the wisdom of a sage in the netherworld or is trying
to present himself in the most favorable light.37 Aeschylus treads
a fine line by exposing the credibility of his character to subversion by external factors: although the text itself does not attach
an inherent impiety to the Persian monarchy, the experience of
Aeschylus' spectators, many of whom fought against the armies of
both Xerxes and Darius, directs them toward a different understanding,
one that accepts the propensity of despotism toward U8pt; and irreverence.
The army. It is typical of authoritarian regimes to have the
very instruments of coercion themselves subjected to the same kind
of fear they generate. A glimpse into the iron discipline and the
atmosphere of intimidation within the ranks of the Persian army
is provided by the reference to Xerxes' authority as the commander
in line 58 (aeivale oaatAfws uro owraG), which, pace Sidgwick,
should be understood "under the dread command of the king."38
The naval battle of Salamis further illustrates this point: Xerxes,
having been misled by a false messenger, falls into the Greek trap
and orders his commanders to make sure that the Greeks will not
find any secret way of escape. The penalty for imperfect implementation of this order is the decapitation of "all" (nrEw-rorEpecr6ca
KpaTor, 371). It is not unusual for strict hierarchies like armies to
associate failure with penalties. The harshness of the consequences
in this case, however, and especially their universality, underline
the Persian conviction that accomplishments can be achieved only
through fear of punishment.39 The mechanisms of internal control
do prove effective, but only up to a point: immediately following
the threats of the king, the Persians act as a well-disciplined body,
following their instructions, OUK a'KOOLW; aAAa rreOa6pxW#6pevW
("not
in a disorderly manner but with disciplined mind," 374).40 But as
T'ra 'AOiwaizkv),was known to Aeschylus' audience, the irony of Darius'
vii'ryrO
'A9v,ov, 824) was not missed.
31 So Gagarin (above, n.6) 52, who thinks that it is difficult, if not impossible,
for the Athenian audience to accept Darius, "garbed in Persian splendor and hailed as
the king who conquered most of Athens' current allies," as the mouthpiece of the
poet.
38 Broadhead's (above, n.18) 48 taking it as "at the dread summons" of the king
is not much different in practical terms.
39 Here we might compare Hdt. 7.103, where Xerxes expresses the same idea:
oE1/voiar' avY3eq.aLivovTe TOUtOV Kai
tLbtv 'Y(p EVo5QPXo,hevol KaTG Tpo7rOy TOV ?'uITepOY
aO-T(II
Kai 101EP aV(alyfO4K,6EVOI
erVroJRI
iV alVOVOE,
??pa
i; 7 AEuva; 4A6aLoVE5
Tip
ioirs- aiveq.dvo N es nr EApov OVK av rofEoaevro(v oALTepa("for if they are commanded
by one person, according to our ways, they might become better than their nature
out of fear of him and compelled by the whip might go against more numerous men
although they are fewer; but having been left at freedom, they would do neither of
these things").
I With the majority of commentators I take it here that the subject is the Persians; see also G. Bakewell, "Persae 374-83: Persians, Greeks, and ireuO4pxc
4p peiv,"
CPh 93 (1998) 232-36. Contra Hall (above, n.4) 137, with reference to Craig (above,
n.I0).
AEnoTaL
v4o
words
4
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
15
soon as the battle begins, all good order is reversed. Aeschylus
repeatedly underlines the lack of K6T0OJ in the Persian camp (4u-n
Q.aKOO'JJoJ7reeLtavaus 9qp ETOTo, "and in a disorderly fashion every
ship was being rowed in flight," 422; vqo' aKo60LJk( iv 4uy-, "he
lets [them] go in disorderly flight," 470; KaT' OVpOV OVJK EUKOOjhOV
a4povTal $vymv,"and they take disorderly flight, with the wind blowing
from behind," 481), which is connected with their fear (40o3o ae
TraYiI3ap0a3po; 71aprpv, "fear fell on all barbarians," 391).
In this context, it seems that references to the bravery of the
Persian soldiers should be reevakiated, since there is no space for
true nobility when one acts under necessity or. compulsion.41 Expressions of the valor of the Persian warriors, like TAX,gwo(28),
Cer6A6o(31), a'KiKpeLv (92), eZ4uxia (326), ELiKAeW_ (328), present
the point of view of the chorus, who are prone to perceive things
through the lens of a fear culture; but the playwright has already
provided his audience with clues that undermine this judgment seriously. The Persian soldiers have no option but to fight for their
master; hence, in the eyes of the Greeks, even in victory their
courage is suspect.42
It is an irony that while the Persian army fears its master as
a god, at the same time it sheds its fear of real divinity, by which
we define reverence. The soldiers of Xerxes reach such a level of
godless audacity that they do not hesitate to destroy the Greek
temples, the sacred images, and the altars (ovi 6ecnV0p0rTn / aOOVTO
6' I'pLiua4a/
a' 'aTol oaIaiuo6WOV
aTLvAa
ou'
L7rpaval vew;. / f3WpLoi
art7
were
not
ashamed to
7rp6pptCa
4eav'rp
"They
ga'Apwv,
4,,pa"wv
plunder the images of the gods nor to burn the temples. The altars of the gods vanished and the statues were toppled from their
foundations in confusion," 809-812).43 It is not surprising, therefore, that the soldiers, like their leader, repeatedly appear as victims
of divine wrath: k 7r6avVTa
Hl6pOoai;7rrKaGKaoK/ <0eog> "6eaoav("since
the gods arranged all things disastrously for the Persians," 282283), aai,uiOVTiS KaTE'&EIpE o-TpaTO'r ("some god destroyed the army,"
345),1' KaK0q &aa4ov 7ro6ev("or an evil god from somewhere,"354),
(KaKaK) 'a IiIE,pOaal5 fVKaTEEOWKTJEV 0/60oq ("evils that a god launched
against the Persians," 514), o xp4w'&x'o ("woes sent from heaven,"
ae,
4' This element of compulsion, G')va'Knr (see 4E-iroai'VoIoIV AVC)YKMLI,587), appears
also in the words of the Persian nobleman, companion of Thersander at the banquet
in Thebes: TaUTar
ETr4eO0a a4vUa/YKCi7evea4e1kgou ("many
rIepoE'WV
-XVoI fTorI4pei'olI
of us Persians know these things well, but we follow, bound by necessity," Hdt. 9.16).
42 See Hdt. 7.223, where the historian tells us that at Thermopylae a special
unit with scourges in their hands was placed behind the attacking Persian soldiers to
assure their forward progress. Momigliano (above, n.8) 146 thinks that neither Aeschylus
nor Herodotus had a high opinion of the military attitudes of the Persians.
4 See Hdt. 8.109: O";Ta TE Iipa Kai T'r 'ala
Eu v O4oii
hrOliETO, 4mfTrp&; TE Kai
TriiV OeV
Ta- aiycAzaTa
("who treated both the temples and private propKaTaOa'AOjUv
erty in the same way, burning and casting down the images of the gods"). For the
burning of the temples and shrines of Attica, esp. the Acropolis, see Podlecki (above,
n.25) 95-96; and The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy (Ann Arbor 1966)
21-23.
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16
IPPOKRATISKANTZIOS
573), uOpew;a"rotVaKa4eLWv$povpILarTwv("reward for hubris and godless
thoughts," 808), Zes Tro(KOAGcTr' T'6Vtd7repKopArwv
ayav / 4povrjpaiTwv
("Zeus is indeed punisher of exceedingly arrogant thoughts," 827828), hii ik, aaituovcE/ (0e*T'' 'aA7rrov6KaKOV("the gods laid an unexpected
misfortune," 1005-1006). The lack of fear of the gods in the despot-who is himself perceived as a god-is replicated by his army,
which also commits LOpt;and sacrilege, and thus becomes a target
of divine retribution as well.
The people. While the king and his army represent the political aspect of the Persian society, the chorus and the queen express
its more universal human side through their concern for the men
away on expedition and their compassion for those at home. Reared
in an autocracy, naturally the chorus understands the world through
its tyrannical norms: they are submissive to the master, accept the
necessity of his absolute authority, regard freedom as a negative
value that disrupts the order and integrity of the empire. But they
still retain their sense of morality and their reverence for the gods.
The king and his army express the aggressive, masculine face of
Persia with its imperialism and the imposition of tyrannical rule;
but that segment of the society is currently absent, gone against
Greece. The country is empty of its flower (59, 252), and this
emptiness becomes a motif4 starting ominously from the first line.
What is left behind are the peripheral elements of the society, women
and elderly males,45 who, being outside of the immediate political
apparatus of the master, are able to retain their values more successfully, and who are depicted by Aeschylus with great sympathy,
as persons of dignity and uprightness. Had the playwright done
otherwise, he would have painted a whole nation as villains and
written a melodrama of good Greeks versus bad Persians. But on
at least one occasion, Aeschylus suggests that the Greeks and Persians, as peoples, are related: the two women in Atossa's prophetic
dream, representing Greece and Persia, are both faultless in beauty
and sisters of the same stock (Ka')eAE
T'
a4,u'tw,
Kai
Kao-I'YVqTa
yevou
44 See lines
1, 13, 18, 60, 65, 118, 129, 139, 252, 718, 730, 761, 1002, and
1003. See also Stanford (above, n.15) 36; Anderson (above, n.15) 169-70; and WinningtonIngram (above, n.1 7) 198-99.
45 Belloni (above, n.21) li-Iii overemphasizes the role of the elders as guardians
of the king's authority. Although they are (self-)introduced as being in a position of
trust and responsibility (irrnoa KaAeTTaei,"we are called the trusty ones," 2; Etpa'vsv
Eopev5ew,"to oversee the land," 7), their
46AaKE;,"guardians of the palace," 4; xwxpas
function in the play should be understood more widely, as representatives of all people
of Persia; see Gagarin (above, n.6) 43; Garvie (above, n.21) 68; J. R. Wilson, "Territoriality and Its Violation in the Persians of Aeschylus," in M. Cropp, E. Fantham,
and S. E. Scully, eds., Greek Tragedy and Its Legacy (Calgary 1986) 51-57; and Schenker
(above, n.21) 283-93. In fact, aspects of their behavior place them within the female
domain. It has been noticed that the lamentation of the Persians is unusual because
it is performed by males; see Hall (above, n.8) 83-84. On women's lamentations, see
M. Alexiou, The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition (Oxford 1974) 102-3; and G. HoIstWarhaft, Dangerous Voices. Women's Lament and Greek Literature (London 1992) 133.
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THE POLITICSOF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS'PERSIANS
17
/ 7av'TO, 185-186).46 The great difference between the two nations
is that the Persians live in a misguided political system, one which
employs all its energy in coercion and suppression and which overestimates the effectiveness of forced obedience.
The Greek Model
The ruler. In contrast to the Persian side, where lists of the
commanders appear three times (21-58, 302-330, 955-1001), no
Greek individual is ever mentioned. This is an expression of fifthcentury Athenian democratic ideology which expects the identity
of the individual to yield to the collectivity of the
city.47
In a
democracy, ideally there is no distinction between the ruler and
the ruled, since all authority springs from the people and the offices are not only of limited duration, but also accessible to every
citizen. The concept of a looming, all-powerful figure harboring
aspirations toward divine honors is simply incompatible with a democratic system of governance.48
The army. The sea-battle of Salamis reveals the virtues of the
Greek fighters. While after the initial stage the Persian ships are
presented in a state of disarray, the Greek fleet moves 6uTa'KT(O5
(399), KOO-.4Q) (400), and OVK a4qpaur,o6zw; (417), even under the severe pressure of the confrontation. This element of order, skill,
and discipline is further underlined by the mention of their synchronized movements (iuvet.qoA-, "with synchronized dipping [of
the oars]," 396; OoOg ae 7rvTre;, "swiftly all [Greeks]," 398; o TraS
o-roAo;, "the entire fleet," 400). There are no threats of decapitation or the dread orders of a master here, but simply the sound of
a trumpet that fires the entire army with courage and confidence
(394-395) as they rush against the enemy. Instead of inarticulate
46
There may be another reference to the common ancestry of the two nations,
if, on line 80, the expression is xpvooro6vou(instead of xpwoovoigou) yevce&,which alludes to the legend of the Persians' descent from Perseus, son of Danae and Zeus (in
the form of a golden shower).
47 Goldhill (above, n.7) 192, with references to N. Loraux and M. Pohlenz (n.31).
There may be some additional reasons, such as the emphasis on national pride or
simply dramatic considerations, i.e., the Greeks representing the anonymous divine
nemesis; see Conacher (above, n.4) 18, n.31. Another aspect of this democratic anonymity is the Athenian reluctance to laud extravagantly its leaders, lest they arrogate
too much personal power and become tyrants. A more topical aspect of such dogged
nonpartisanship is suggested by the fact that many of the Athenian leaders of the
war (or their children) were still politically active at the time of the performance and
to single any few out might have been divisive. My thanks to my anonymous CW
referee for this observation.
48 In the Agamemnon, Aeschylus gives the Greek response to the Oriental notion of the divine king: when Clytaemnestra urges her husband to walk on the red
carpet, Agamemnon expresses his objections, because such honors belong to the gods
alone (6eos Tro#T0oi4E rTitA4eiv Xpedw, 922) and humans cannot accept them without
fear (oueaaguii-'aiveu$01gou,924). For similarities between Xerxes' return and that of
Agamemnon, see Anderson (above, n.15) 174. Bacon (above, n.23) 40-41: Clytaemnestra's
words have a foreign flavor, which Agamemnon notices (Ag. 918-922).
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18
KANTZIOS
IPPOKRATIS
barbarian clamor (Hlepaiao- 7XAW.oo-'i
k66o;, 406), the Greeks encourage
each other to fight for what is of highest value to them, the preservation of their freedom. The order, synchronization, and self-motivated
discipline described here emphasize the unanimity of the polis and
its ability to defend itself. Indeed soon the enemy suffers carnage.49
The connection of the Greeks' courage with piety is indicated
by the fact that during their charge against the enemy, they sing
a sacred paean (7ratail' $6'.iUvouvoep.I'6v, 393), while their hearts
fill with daring confidence
(6pRItJeS
EZ4XqW
op4oei,
394). Their
exhortations also underline their deep religious devotion, since one
of their priorities is the protection of the seats of their ancestral
TE 7raTp4wv9a,
gods (OewJhv
404). In contrast to the Persian army,
Athens is depicted as being under divine protection (Oeoi 7rAwo
v r4uo-i
[IaAALao; Oei,;, 347).
The people. There are no references to the people as distinct
from the ruler and the army. This may be due to the fact that the
Persians encounter primarily the Greek fighters, and they can speak
only of them. More importantly, this lack of distinction underlines
a fundamental aspect of democracy, where, in contrast to the despotism of the Orient, the people both serve as rulers and defend
their homeland as an army.
IV. Conclusions
In the Persians, Aeschylus treats the uses of fear as a case
study to reveal yet more aspects of the superiority of democratic
Greece over autocratic Persia, a superiority vindicated by the military
victory of the Greeks.
First there is the contrast between the Persian and Greek models
in the use of fear as an implement of rule. In the former, ubiquity
of ago; and b6fo; stems from the assignment of absolute power to
a master, whose status blurs the line between mortal and divine,
and who, through his instruments of coercion, forces his subjects
to complete submission. In the Greek model, on the other hand,
servile fear is absent since the society is permeated by a spirit of
Aeu6epha and recognizes only one authority, its people. The fear
of a master is replaced by self-discipline and by the fear of disgrace in the eyes of fellow citizens.
The second polarity in the play appears in the human response
to each of these systems. Atossa's question about the ability of a
The same notion of self-motivated bravery appears repeatedly in the ultimate
Ike
verbalization of the Athenian democratic ideal, Pericles' Funeral Oration: Kal
TO ?rAoiov
Y64O.rJy
X)Tpei7roU avpei&5 iOiAoI&ev KVwaLfVE'EIV ("andwe want to take risks with
courage, not obliged by the laws but rather by our ways of life," 2.39.4), Kai Ev avrr
TO p'
ToO
1ro aoVvEO&al Kai IraTvOEW
pL&AOVTiV 4 evos X' TO eVa6VTE5aer4Eueoai,
a;4oxpo1v
Cg
A&rouibvrov .. .p KzLIa
A ov i TOV aou; 4wriAA4rr-eav("and in this,
5 Ni
having thought it better to defend themselves and suffer rather than to yield and be
saved, they escaped a shameful report . . . (and] they passed away at the peak of
("and having
glory rather than of fear," 2.42.4), TO a' UAE6OpovTO E`4IXoy KpivayTe;
judged courage to be freedom," 2.43.4).
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THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AESCHYLUS' PERSIANS
19
despotes-less democracy to defend itself is answered by a disquisition on the superiority of the conscious soldier over the faceless
slave who has been dragged into battle and who advances against
the enemy out of fear, generated by his awareness that retreat will
mean worse evils than those waiting for him in the front line.
While the Persians are present on the battlefield out of necessity,
the Greeks are there willingly, because higher issues are at stake
for the community as a whole and also for each citizen individually. Abjuring slavish fear of a human master, the Greeks display
proper fear of the gods, which safeguards them from hubris and
thus earns them the divine protection. While Xerxes' lack of divine reverence is coupled with his reign of fear on earth, the Athenians'
sense of aia6; and healthy fear of the gods are coupled with their
free and fearless spirit towards other men. It must be noted that
in this regard the Greek populace is not compared to the Persian
populace, but to the Persian ruler (just as it is compared to the
Persian army in the matter of fearless courage), an interesting gloss
on the idea of democracy. There occurs here an ironic inversion
in the depiction of the two camps: while in the earlier part of the
play, the terrifying qualities of the Persian army are emphasized
repeatedly (27, 40, 48, 58), by the time the Messenger announces
the disaster at Salamis, it is Greece and the Greek fighters that
become "dread" (&t,', 257; Umava'EAAMaa,271; a1g ael*9, 576).50
Aeschylus' Persians is not only a tribute to Athens' civic ideology, but also subtle advice to the Athenians that the most effective
way to preserve their city's strength-and freedom-is the protection of its democratic institutions; for all the superior qualities
that resulted in the victory of the Athenian army are concomitant
with these institutions. Such advice is offered at a time when another Persian invasion of Greece must have seemed like a real
possibility.5' With his play, then, Aeschylus is reassuring his fellow-citizens that as long as they remain god-fearing, self-motivated,
and freedom-loving they can look to the future of the city with
confidence. Likewise, preserving their system guarantees brave, selfmotivated citizen-soldiers. The fact that the Athenians awarded him
the first prize suggests that they were pleased with his advice.52
Universityof South Florida
Classical World98.1 (2004)
IPPOKRATISKANTZIOS
kantzios@cas.usf.edu
so This inversion is foreshadowed by Atossa's reaction to the mention of the
defeat at Marathon, .3eivi -roI AX'yeis. . . O,6povriooa (245).
sI See Avery (above, n.20) 183: "Themistocles was probably still in Athens. Xerxes
was still on the Persian throne. The Battle of Eurymedon was still some four or five
years in the future. The victories of 480 and 479 had been magnificent, but it had
taken the Persians ten years to return to Greece after Marathon. What guarantee was
there that the Persians would not come back again?" See also Pelling (above, n.16)
12.
52 Special thanks to Dr. Niki Holmes Kantzios for her critique and editorial assistance. Thanks also to my colleague Dr. John Noonan for his comments.
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