G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Public Relations Review
Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century:
Structure, means and message
Greg Simons a,b,c,∗
a
b
c
Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden
CRISMART, Swedish National Defence College, Sweden
Department of Communication Sciences, Turiba University, Riga, Latvia
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 30 October 2013
Received in revised form
28 December 2013
Accepted 10 March 2014
Keywords:
Russia
Soft power
Public diplomacy
Russian foreign policy
Ideology versus pragmatism
Relationship building
a b s t r a c t
Many studies have focussed upon Western countries, such as the United States and members of the European Union, and how they engage with foreign publics. There is also an
increasing amount of attention being paid to non-Western countries. The debate on soft
power, for instance, shows that the concept is perceived and applied in a manner that differs from Nye’s vision. This present article seeks to examine and analyse how and why the
Russian state engages foreign publics with different communicational means and methods. Relations and approaches are much more pragmatic in the current situation, ideology
seems to have been discarded. The current foreign policy concept gives context to positioning Russia, which not only gives Russia a certain role, but one that is set in relation
to other international actors. Although, not all countries are treated the same, a different
approach based upon a different set of assumptions produces a different understanding as to
what programmes and means are needed. This produces a difference in approach between
Western countries and those countries on the territory of the Former Soviet Union.
© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Public Diplomacy is a well-used term and a practice widely employed by different governments around the world. It is
an art that has been in existence for a long time and was refined during the Cold War. Today it is still widely practiced and is
undergoing continuous development and refinement. Many high hopes and expectations are associated with the use of this
form of communication. Many studies have focused on Western countries, and particularly the United States (Lord, 2006;
Seib, 2009a, 2012; Zaharna, 2009). More attention is starting to be paid to other countries, including Russia (Tsygankov,
2006; Simons, 2011).
This article is concerning Russia, why and how the country organises and practices its Public Diplomacy (PD) efforts in
the 21st century. Russia is a well-known country, with a high profile and a poor image. This situation inhibits a number
of different state directed ambitions, including hampering the ability to develop its desired great power status and role. A
number of stereotypes and associations make this reputation sticky, which affects its credibility as a messenger adversely
(Simons, 2011; Osipova, 2012). The question that this present paper seeks to address is what is Russia’s message to the
world, and how is this delivered?
∗ Correspondence to: UCRS, Box 514, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. Tel.: +46 702759940.
E-mail addresses: greg.simons@ucrs.uu.se, gregmons@yahoo.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
0363-8111/© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
2
The first task is to define the term Public Diplomacy, what kinds of activities are associated with it and why governments
are attracted to it. Soft power as a concept shall be briefly introduced as defined by the inventor of the term Joseph Nye.
Then the concept, and how it is interpreted in Russia. These two sections form the theoretical and conceptual basis for the
paper.
The more pragmatic and operational aspects of PD in Russia are then subjected to examination. A first step in this regard
is defining and exploring what Russia what to say to the world. What are the values involved? Is the basis ideologically
driven or through more pragmatic and concrete national interests? A number of institutions associated with engaging in
PD, and their approach to communication form the focus of the next and final section of the paper.
2. Public diplomacy
There is a need to utilise a means of projecting a country’s attractiveness internationally. Public diplomacy is something
that has been in existence for a long time in practice (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, p. 287), but is still very much in vogue. The
term, at times, is used inter-changeably or confused with propaganda or nation branding, which tends to add confusion as
to its purpose (L’Etang, 2009, p. 608; Lord, 2006, p. 27; Melissen, 2005, pp. 16–21; Snow & Taylor, 2009, p. ix; Szondi, 2008).
It is a term that is often uttered, but what does it mean and entail? One possible explanation for its purpose is given below.
“Public diplomacy [. . .] deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.
It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments
of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the
reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as
diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012,
p. 287).”
As the above quotation notes, the type of communication largely involves a government and a foreign public audience.
This quotation helps in explaining what public diplomacy is, and why governments engage in public diplomacy. The above
mentioned quote dovetails with the hierarchy of impacts that public diplomacy can potentially achieve – increasing peoples’
familiarity with one’s country, increasing peoples’ appreciation of one’s country, getting people engaged with one’s country
and influencing people (Leonard, Stead, & Smewing, 2002, pp. 9–10). L’Etang says that this can involve offering a nation’s
cultural capital to target countries in order to generate goodwill with younger generations (2011: p. 241). Others, such as
Seib, note that “public diplomacy is a process, but it cannot be separated from policy” (2012: p. 122). This has implications
for the underlying reasons for engaging in PD, other than the superficial aspect of making a country more ‘likeable’. Common
objectives for PD include: increasing awareness, managing reputations, changing legislation or altering attitudes (Coombs
& Holladay, 2010, p. 299).
The issue of what different aspects constitute PD programmes need to be illuminated. There are five elements of public
diplomacy, which are identified by Nicholas Cull: Listening: collecting the opinions and data from the target audience
through listening, rather than speaking to them; Advocacy: an active function where the messenger attempts to promote a
certain idea or policy that benefits them; Cultural diplomacy: making known and promoting a country’s cultural resources
and accomplishments. In effect, an exporting of culture; Exchange diplomacy: to send abroad and to receive people for a
period of study and/or acculturation, thereby exporting ideas and ways of doing things; International broadcasting (news):
an attempt to manage the international environment through mass media assets, in order to engage the foreign publics
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012, pp. 287–88).
Public diplomacy is not only a matter of trying to ‘sell’ an idea or policy to foreign audiences, it is also an exercise in
reputation management. Therefore, the task of public diplomacy emphasizes mass media reputation management in order
to increase the effect of the message. The focus has been on how media cover a country (Coombs & Holladay, 2010, p. 300).
This task is made easier when a foreign government possesses its own media assets, which reduces the likelihood of the
message being ‘distorted’ when it passes through a media outlet.
PD is becoming a much more interactive form of communication in a changing international environment (Seib, 2009a;
Snow & Taylor, 2009). As a result of this transformation PD is moving away from a focus on the mass communicated
form to a more networked variant (Zaharna, 2007). As a tool of international relations, public diplomacy continues to
develop in order to meet new needs and challenges in a rapidly changing global environment. Nancy Snow distinguishes
between what she terms as being Traditional Public Diplomacy and New Public Diplomacy. The listed features of Traditional
Public Diplomacy include: Government to Publics (G2P); official in nature; “necessary evil” as technology and new media
democratised international relations; linked to foreign policy/national security outcomes; one-way informational and twoway asymmetric (unequal partners in communication); give us your best and brightest future players; passive public role;
and crisis driven and reactive (Snow, 2010, p. 89).
The New Public Diplomacy formula has a number of significant changes over the old non-interactive and reactive model. Its
features include: Public to Publics communication (P2P); unofficial actors present (NGOs, practitioners and private citizens);
“everyone’s doing it”; active and participatory public; dialogue and exchange oriented, two-way symmetric; generally more
reference to behavioural change; based upon relationship, systems and network theories (Melissen, 2005, pp. 11–16; Snow,
2010, pp. 91–92). The political and information environment in the new model is much more dynamic, and involves a greater
range of actors. Developments in information technology and politics has not only enabled, but pushed these changes as
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
3
the information and political environment has evolved. This enables foreign governments to engage foreign audiences with
political marketing within their public diplomacy programmes.
There is a belief in some circles though, public diplomacy is much more than various informational strategies and programmes that are aimed at influencing publics. One such publicly expressed opinion was by US diplomat, Peter van Buren,
during an interview with the Huffington Post. When asked how he would define public diplomacy, he answered “any communications strategy, from advertising to propaganda to social media to whatever you call it, plays second to reality – actions
really do speak louder than words.”1 PD programmes should not be a stand-alone enterprise or to try to ‘sell’ poor policy, it
should ideally be linked to a viable policy in order to enhance it (Seib, 2009b). Therefore there is a necessity for actions to
match the messaging, if there is to be any credibility and influence value in the PD efforts undertaken.
Some clarification is needed of the conceptual and intangible elements, which should be built in to the programme. In
October 2011, a meeting was held at Wilton Park in the United Kingdom on the issue of soft-power, bringing together a
diverse group of people. There was a wide variety of opinion on what mattered most in better positioning one’s country
image in terms of tactics and strategy. Two broad groups appeared, one advocating a slick and professional campaign, and
the other relying on a naturally charismatic performance. The ways that governments communicate to various audiences
are becoming much more complex, and tends to include an ever wider variety of tools.2
The example of Norway was given at the Wilton Park conference, where the expressed values were backed by concrete
deeds in order to consolidate Norway’s international brand. The power of the brand is found in the concept that Norway
is a ‘force for good.’ This is strengthened by the positive personal values associated with its citizens as being rooted in
egalitarianism, non-aggression and communitarianism. A Norwegian participant claimed that credibility is rooted in one’s
actions as well as one’s word, and there is a need to be consistent and realistic about the projected character and image.
Public Diplomacy is Government to Publics communication and not government to government. This provides the means
for a foreign government to directly influence a foreign public, without the constraints of traditional diplomacy (Yli-Kaitala,
2014). It is a foreign public and not a foreign government that is the intended direct object of influence for public diplomacy
to be effective there needs to be sufficient physical and psychological means to convey the desired image for the effect that
is desired. In a physical sense this means the tangible assets that are required to send messages, TV, radio, newspapers,
the internet, etc. With regard to psychological means, it is those intangible assets that are required in order for a message to be successful (considering the senders agenda in this instance). Intangible assets include aspects like reputation,
trustworthiness, brand and message recognition/acceptance.
3. Concept of soft power in Russia
The nature of power is also in the process of changing. According to Nye, power is capable of two things. An ability to get
the desired outcomes, and to influence the behaviour of others in order to achieve the desired outcomes (2004, pp. 1–2).
There are two alternative ways of wielding power – through fear and coercion or through attraction and co-opting. One
needs to bear in mind that “power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists.” If objectives seem to
be legitimate and just, others may willingly assist without the use of coercion or inducements (Nye, 2004, p. 2). In order to
proceed, there needs to be an understanding of power.
Power’s definition is related to vested interests and values. Some argue that it is related to the ability to make or resist
change (Nye, 2011, p. 5). A dictionary definition states that power is “the capacity to do things and in social situations to
affect others to get the outcomes we want” (Nye, 2011, p. 6). Nye contends that power is a two-way relationship, which
is defined by who is involved in the power relationship (scope of power) and what topics are involved (domain of power)
(2011: pp. 6–7). In the context of this paper, power and influence are to be viewed as being related and interchangeable.
Hard power’s basis is found in military and economic weight. This is in contrast to soft power that “rests on the ability
to shape the preferences of others” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Soft power is about establishing the preferences, normally associated
with intangible assets – attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies seen as being legitimate
or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead (Nye, 2004, p. 6).
In terms of a country, soft power can be found in its culture, its political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004, p. 11). In a
2013 article to Foreign Policy, Nye criticised both Russia and China for failing to understand the nature and practice of soft
power. His main contention is that it cannot be generated solely by the state, but is a product of a flourishing private sector
and civil society in a free society. Soft power is absent in non-free societies.3
There has been a great deal of discussion in Russia concerning soft power and public diplomacy, how these concepts
currently relate and how to develop the potential further. One of the debates has been to look at the United States and see if
there is anything that can be learned and applied for Russia. This not only includes the theoretical and conceptual levels, but
1
Brown, J. (2012, April 24). U.S. Diplomat Peter Van Buren speaks about American public diplomacy. The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
john-brown/peter-van-buren-interview b 1449165.html Accessed 25.04.12.
2
Adnan, I. (2011, October 20). Who’s got the x-factor on the global stage?. The Huffington Post (UK), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/indra-adnan/whosgot-the-xfactor-on-t b 1021466.html Accessed 07.11.11.
3
Nye, J. (2013, April 29). What Russia and China don’t get about soft power. Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what china
and russia don t get about soft power Accessed 03.10.13.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
4
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
the creation of institutions as well (such as the idea to create a Russian equivalent of the US Information Agency).4 There are
others that advocate that Russia should develop its own soft power concept (application techniques, development strategies,
priorities and objectives).5 Both of these sides see an urgent need to develop a viable soft power concept, otherwise Russia’s
international position and potential will be eroded. Konstantin Kosachev, who served as the Chairman of the State Duma
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and then was appointed as head of the agency Rossotrudnichestvo (function to be explained
later) gave his opinion on the function to be served by soft power. “Soft power opportunities best meet Russian foreign
policy tasks at present. These tasks stem from the needs of domestic development [. . .]. They are [. . .] means to modernise
the country.”6 Reasons for developing soft power seem to be out of instrumentalist and pragmatic considerations, rather
than being ideologically based.
A seeming consensus does exist on the need for Russia to engage in soft power, through effective global communications.
This includes communicating what is termed as ‘objective information’ about Russia. The perceived reward is that Russia
shall be more successful in attaining its stated foreign policy objectives and to protect Russian interests, however, the first
step being to possess a resource of soft power.7 Within the territory of the CIS a mixture of security, economic and cultural
issues are used (attempted at least) as a means of soft power capital for Russia (Tsygankov, 2006).
Additionally, Russia’s quest for soft power in the area of the Former Soviet Union has met with a number of setbacks. The
supposed basis for Russia is based on the assumption that there is a ‘natural’ attraction of weak powers to the strong on a
voluntary basis. Yet, the current directions of, among others, Ukraine and Georgia are both towards a Western vector. An
article that appeared in Nezavisimaya Gazeta outlined possible reasons for this situation of disconnect.
“In formulating certain goals and ambitious tasks which affect to some degree or other the interests of adjacent or
even other countries, Moscow seems to be overlooking the processes taking place in national societies. While it may
be forming excellent relations with the ruling elites, it is ignoring the moods of the population.”8
The criticism mentioned above implies problems with how Russia tries to project and accumulate its soft power capital.
An article that appeared in the newspaper Kommersant in June 2013 detailed moves to try and streamline international
attempts at soft power accumulation through the use of international development assistance. In 2012 the Ministry of
Finance allocated some US$500 million on international development assistance programmes. The general idea was to
direct this assistance in a more ‘meaningful’ way, by getting something back in return. Rather than sending assistance to
African countries without attribution where there is no recognition or reward (in form of ‘likeability’), these funds would
be overtly directed to countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States and there would be recognition that it came
from Russia.9 This move shows a very pragmatic approach, which calculates the best avenue to potentially gain soft power
and to prioritise the region.
In July 2012, President Putin defined soft power as being “all about promoting one’s interests and policies through
persuasion and creating a positive perception of one’s country, based not just on its material achievements but also its
spiritual and intellectual heritage.”10 This is in-line with an earlier observation made by Georgy Filimonov from People’s
Friendship University (Moscow). He made strong connections between the accumulation of soft power and an effective and
a functional system of public diplomacy.
“I believe it is quite legitimate to treat the concept of public diplomacy as a system of strategic views aimed at forming
a positive image of a country abroad through the implementation of multi-level information and advocacy policy. The
main directions of this policy are foreign cultural policy, cultural diplomacy, information and ideological promotion,
educational exchange programmes, the involvement of a wide range of non-governmental organisations and other
civic institutions, the corporate sector . . . etc. Moreover, in contrast to traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy is
addressed directly to the public. Therein lies its strength and effectiveness.”11
4
Koshkin, P. (2013, April 3). Soft power: What can Russia learn from the US experience?. Russia Beyond the Headlines, http://rbth.ru/blogs/
2013/04/03/soft power what can russia learn from the us experience 24621.html Accessed 08.04.13.
5
Zlobin, N. (2013, 31 May). ‘Soft power’: Russian priority in new world order. Russia Beyond the Headlines. In Johnson’s Russia List, 2013-#99, 31 May
2013.
6
Shakirov, O. (2013, February 14). Russian soft power under construction. e-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/14/russian-soft-powerunder-construction/ Accessed 12.06.13.
7
(1) Пчeльhиков, Л. (2012, November 1). Роccии hyжhɑ “мягкɑя cилɑ”, Роccийcкɑя гɑзetɑ, http://www.rg.ru/2012/11/01/sila-site.html
Accessed 05.06.13.
(2) МИД: Иcпользовɑhиe “мягкой cилы” cпоcобctвyet рeɑлизɑции иhteрecов РФ, Роccийcкɑя гɑзetɑ (2012, October 31).
http://www.rg.ru/2012/10/31/gatilov-anons.html Accessed 05.06.13.
8
Reality of soft power; without support in national societies, Russia’s desires for geopolitical dominance are doomed, Editorial, Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(2013, February 25). Johnson’s Russia List 2013-#40, 27 February 2013.
9
Chernenko, E. (2013, June 5). Means of “Soft Power” Supply. Kommersant, 95(5126), http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2204815 Accessed 05.06.13.
10
Putin, V. (2012, 9 July). Speech at a meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organisations,
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4145 Accessed 17.07.13.
11
Filimonov, G. (2010, December 25). Russia’s soft power potential. Russia in Global Affairs, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Soft-PowerPotential-15086 Accessed 12.06.13.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
5
Efforts to develop Russia’s public diplomacy and ability to accumulate soft power potential, as described above, rely on
the use of mass communication with foreign audiences in order to explain official policy. This comes against a backdrop
where Russia considers itself at a disadvantage on the international stage owing to a poor image and reputation that has
been the result of ‘lack of understanding’ and ‘bad’ (non-objective) information in the global information space. There have
been an increasing number of institutions created, which communicate and form relationships with an increasing number
of people in foreign publics. Yet, the image of Russia has not improved. This has led to some stating that Russia is losing
its soft power quest. An underlying reason given, is that this does not concern Russia’s cultural or intellectual heritage and
reputation, but more precisely a lack of popularity in its pursued policies.12
There has been some criticism of the priorities and means for gaining soft power. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor in Chief of the
journal Russia in Global Affairs, notes that Russia’s understanding differs “radically” from the Western view. He characterises
Russian soft power as being “too soft.” There are three identified goals in the foreign policy area – the first is “to promote
Russian culture, the Russian language and the Russian education system as attractive and competitive.” The second goal is
“to counter foreign media’s negative depiction of the country’s policies and the Russian way of life.” Thirdly, is to “create a
group of Russia’s friends around the world.” Lukyanov characterises this situation as attempting to revive reasonably effective
Soviet-era practices. However, the Soviet Union as a generous patron to those countries that aligned with it, and the current
Russia that places profit first, is incompatible.13 There is certainly disconnect between the ideologically driven soft power
of the Soviet Union, and the more pragmatic approach of contemporary Russia. The question being, are those messages and
values from the 20th Century still attractive in the 21st Century?
4. Russia’s message to the world
Russia has attempted to balance the political character of its state and society with its history, which has resulted in a
debate on its identity and foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation differs greatly from
any of its predecessors in terms of its political system, state borders and geopolitical surroundings in its immediate neighbourhood. In June 2000, President Putin approved the Russian Foreign Policy Concept. A significant point of this document
was that no matter how deep the internal changes a country makes, its foreign policy never starts from a clean slate. It
is influenced and bears a measure of continuity based upon the geopolitics, history and culture of the country concerned
(Ivanov, 2001, p. 7). To some extent, at least, a country can be trapped by their past.
According to Ivanov (2001, p. 8), the above mentioned debate reached the conclusion that Russia’s foreign policy should
be based upon the drivers of national interests and not by political ideology. He concluded that “Russian diplomacy has
always succeeded when guided by realistic, pragmatic considerations and failed when dominated by imperial ideology and
messianic ambitions.” This seems to signal a departure from the Soviet past, where ideology played the central role, which
was (according to this quote) replaced by more realistic and pragmatic approaches. In March 2013, Russia’s Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov wrote in an article that “the main task of the international activity of Russia is to create favourable external
conditions for the rise of its economy, its transfer to innovative rails, increasing living standards of people.”14 This links the
activities of Russia’s foreign policy with the realisation of domestic policy, which includes tangible pragmatic goals.
The latest foreign policy concept replaces the earlier version from 2008. On 7 May 2012, a presidential decree was issued
that set out the terms and conditions for the new foreign policy concept. In mid-February 2013, President Putin unveiled
the new concept to members of the Security Council at a meeting hosted in the Kremlin. During his address to members of
the Security Council, Putin remarked that:
“Russia will continue to pursue an active and constructive line in international affairs. Its weight and influence in the
world will increase. [. . .] The basic principles of Russian foreign policy remain the same. [. . .] That means, above all,
openness, predictability, pragmatism, and the pursuit of national interests without any confrontations in accordance
with the role of the United Nations and the rule of international law. [. . .] The concept focuses on modern foreign
policy tools, including economic diplomacy, elements of so-called soft power, and careful integration into the global
informational space.”15
There are a number of points that emerge from Putin’s address, the desire for Russia to be more active on the world
stage, to be more engaged in the global information space, the active pursuit and accumulation of soft power, to peacefully
pursue Russia’s national interests within the existing international institutional and legal framework. He emphasizes that
this needs to be done in a transparent and predictable manner. This seems to be an attempt to align Russia’s foreign policy
to an apparent narrative that emphasizes the country as a constructive force for good in international affairs.
12
Dolinskiy, A. (2013, February 5). Why Russia is losing its soft power quest. Russia Beyond the Headlines, http://rbth.ru/opinion/2013/02/05/
why russia is losing in its soft power quest 22521.html Accessed 08.04.13.
13
Lukyanov, F. (2013, February 1). Why Russia’s soft power is too soft. Global Affairs, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Why-Russias-Soft-Power-Is-TooSoft-15845 Accessed 19.09.13.
14
Lavrov, S. (2013, March). Russia’s foreign policy philosophy. International Affairs. Johnson’s Russia List 2013-#61, 3 April 2013.
15
Makarychev, M., & Latukhina, K. (2013, February 25). Russia updates its foreign policy concept: Russia will focus its global efforts on economic diplomacy
and soft power. Rossiskaya Gazeta/Russia Beyond the Headlines. Johnson’s Russia List, 2013-#38, 25 February 2013.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
6
The 2013 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (here after “the Concept”) states the priorities, goals and
objectives. This new concept was precipitated by changing events and dynamics in the international arena.16 After listing
what are seen as various actual and emerging global problems, the document then sets out to describe Russia’s priorities
and role in addressing those problems. The highlighted problems are illustrated under various rubrics – Emergence of a
New World Order, Rule of Law in International Relations, Strengthening International Security, International Cooperation
in the Sphere of Economy and Environment, International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights and Information
Support for Foreign Policy Activities. In point 103 of the Concept, there is even mention of the possibility of public–private
partnership in helping to realise the stated goals and objectives. If these goals and objectives in the Concept are to be realised,
then Russia requires a good reputation and brand in order to be credible and effective. This is likely to be a long-term project
given the current state of perception and the international image of Russia.
There have been a number of different on-going discussions on what Russia can offer the world and in identifying problems with the way in which foreign communications are handled. Igor Jurgens (Chairman of the Institute of Contemporary
Development) had his ideas published in the Moscow-based newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta. In his opinion had two centuries
of soft power potential that served as a significant attraction. The first aspect is Russia “as a patron of the Slavs, Orthodox, as
conductor of European civilisation in the vast expanses of Eurasia, as a unique multi-ethnic alliance of nations.” The second
consideration was during the years of Communism, where Russia offered an ideological alternative to the Western world
(appealing to leftists and national liberation movements).17 These images and values were and are very much how Russia
sees her place in the world, which is based upon cultural and historical accounts. Currently, Russia seems to be in the process
of developing an alternative model of the conduct of international relations to what is seen as a Western (US) dominated
sphere, albeit without the lens of an international political ideology (from the Cold War era).
In terms of Russia’s ability to conduct itself (effectively, in terms of achieving goals and objectives) on the international
stage requires engaging in offering competitive attractive ideas to the world. Jurgens sees that global leadership requires “a
moral authority, the appeal of success stories of the country as a whole or its separate national and transnational projects.”
And that this leadership is not derived from the potential of military power that is possessed by a country.18 The initial
obstacle to achieving this success is to formulate national values and ideals that are credible and can be communicated.
According to Jurgens, Russia has not yet been able to formulate its value idea at this stage. One of the suggested values is to
re-formulate a historical idea, which was Russia acting as a shield between the Mongols and Europe. In the contemporary
context to reshape this value to Russia acting as a cultural and transport bridge between East and West.
5. Institutional setting and means of communication for Russian public diplomacy
Public diplomacy is one of the hot topics of debate in Russian circles. A number of articles in Russian language have been
appearing on the issue of soft power and public diplomacy. In December 2012 the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy met
and discussed the issue of shaping Russia’s image. They identified four components to choose from that were at their disposal
to influence that image – ideas, images, money and weapons. Conclusions that were reached included: the changes in image
were not going to happen automatically; purposeful and focussed work was required; and that creativity is an essential
element in the process. The way forward, in order to improve the image, was seen through the ability of combining the best
of Russian history and culture. Konstantin Kosachev, the head of Russotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation Agency)19 stated
the primary dilemma from the Russian point of view, “the real Russia is better than its image.” Then the article concluded
with the caveat,20 “but it is important that we are not the only ones who understand this.” The following institutions are a
selection of the various institutions and means with which Russia currently engages in PD.
Russotrudnichestvo was created by presidential decree (Medvedev) in 2008.21 It is intended to serve as a coordinating
centre for different forms of Russian foreign humanitarian activity, which includes the support of Russian compatriots living
abroad, “preserving Russian cultural heritage, promoting the Russian culture and language and educational and scientific
cooperation.”22 This has been regarded by some as a means to try and preserve Russian influence in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).23 The website of the agency (http://rs.gov.ru/) pays a lot of attention to issues and
16
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Unofficial Translation, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (official site), (2013,
18),
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp 4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument
February
Accessed 20.08.13.
17
Юргehc, И. (2011, September 16). Жectкий вызов “мягкой cилы” (Tough Call “Soft Power”), “Роccийcкɑя гɑзetɑ”(Rossiskaya Gazeta)
– Фeдeрɑльhый выпycк (Federal Edition) №5583 (207), http://www.rg.ru/2011/09/16/yurgens.html Accessed 07.11.11.
18
Ibid.
19
Full name is the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Residing Abroad, and International Humanitarian
Cooperation. The Russian understanding of Humanitarian Cooperation is much broader than the Western understanding, including issues and aspects such
as education and culture.
20
Shestakov, Y. (2012, December 4). Russia chooses force. Rossiskaya Gazeta. Johnson’s Russia List 2012-#215, 6 December 2012.
21
Russia Investing in Soft Power, UPI (2013, July 25), http://www.upi.com/Top News/Special/2013/07/25/Russia-investing-in-soft-power/UPI57361374760438/ Accessed 01.08.13.
22
Shakirov, O. (2013, February 14). Russian soft power under construction. e-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/14/russian-soft-powerunder-construction/ Accessed 12.06.13.
23
The Kremlin Reinforces Russia’s Soft Power in the CIS, Centre for Eastern Studies (2008, September 17), http://archive.is/TAw5 Accessed 08.04.13.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
7
activities in the CIS, but also gives information on its presence and activities around other parts of the world (with some
small ‘blind spots’ in Greenland and Oceania).
“Today Rossotrudnichestvo is represented in 77 countries, 59 Russian centres of science and culture, and eight subsidiaries (four of which are in India) and 18 representatives of federal authority in the diplomatic missions of the
Russian Federation. Rossotrudnichestvo geographically covers the territory of the United States of America to Japan
and from Finland to Argentina.”24
This seems to represent an attempt at creating an overarching agency that coordinates the PD activities around the globe,
which Igor Panarin stated that there was a need for. Other coordinating and facilitating bodies have also been created, such
as the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) (http://russiancouncil.ru/en/), which began operations in 2011. It states
that it “serves as a link between the state, expert community, business and civil society in an effort to find foreign policy
solutions.”25 These different organisations that are designed to coordinate and interact with events, organisations and people
hint at a relational approach to PD. That is to develop a relationship through joint engagement and production, it is not the
end result that is of greatest importance, but the process.
The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation (http://gorchakovfund.ru/), which has information on its website
in Russian only, sets out its mission and purpose. It provides “an integrated support for domestic civil society institutions.
Together we can achieve the synergy, actively working on a common goal: the creation of the world public the correct
presentation of Russia and our national cultural values.”26 It appears as though the primary role for this organisation is
to perform an organising and coordinating body for other NGOs working in the sphere of international relations. There are
currently some 5000 officially registered NGOs involved in foreign policy, of which 859 possess an international status.27 Part
of the given mission statement includes “[. . .] the Foundation’s mission is to promote the development of public diplomacy,
as well as to facilitate the creation of a favourable for Russia, social, political and business environment abroad.”28 The
two above mentioned organisations are intended to create an interactive dialogue with different foreign target groups,
and to form a relationship with them in order to be able to influence opinions and perceptions concerning Russia. This
suggests that New Public Diplomacy is becoming the preferred method, which is facilitated with the relationship marketing
approach.
The Gorchakov Foundation does run a number of special programmes, such as the Baltic Dialogue (for Russian speaking
youth from the Baltic States) and the Caucasus Dialogue. With regard to the later programme, the Caucasus Dialogue, it focuses
upon the subject of historical accounts of the 19th Century Caucasian War (especially pertaining to the plight of the Circassian
ethnic group). This is intended to act as informational support for the successful hosting of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi
in 2014.29 This is a very narrow purpose, but an important one as the hosting of these games can potentially accumulate soft
power for the Russian Federation. Both organisations (RIAC and the Gorchakov Foundation) are located within the structure
of the Foreign Ministry, and the Russian International Affairs Council is also associated with the Ministry of Education. The
funding of these organisations comes from the state budget.30
The September 2000 Doctrine of Information Security paved the way for the development of international broadcasting
and media outlets, which were intended to stem the flow of negative and ‘non-objective’ information about Russia in the
global information space.31 These assets perform the broader function of news management through creating and disseminating news from the Russian government’s point of view. There are various mass media assets that use a communicational
approach to PD, which is a one to many model of communication that was the hallmark of the Cold War era. A very brief
selection of media outlets shall be given below to illustrate this category of communication.
The creation of the English language (and later Arabic and Spanish) Russia Today (http://rt.com/, has been rebranded as
RT) was intended to fill one of the gaps identified in the Doctrine of Information Security, the state’s capability to directly
broadcast to an international audience. RT also has a presence on social media – Twitter, Facebook and You Tube. The TV
channel was launched in 2005, and now boasts having coverage on some five continents and over 100 countries. Their
promotion/differentiation is the ability to “show you how any story can be another story altogether.” On their website is
24
About Rossotrudnichestvo, http://rs.gov.ru/node/28132 Accessed 03.10.13.
Shakirov, O. (2013, February 14). Russian soft power under construction. e-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/14/russian-soft-powerunder-construction/ Accessed 12.06.13.
25
26
Oбрɑщehиe Иcполhиteльhого дирeкtорɑ фоhдɑ (Message from the Executive Director of the Foundation), O Фоhдe (About the Foundation), Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation, http://gorchakovfund.ru/about/ Accessed 26.01.13.
27
Shakirov, O. (2013, February 14). Russian soft power under construction. e-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/14/russian-soft-powerunder-construction/ Accessed 12.06.13.
28
Миcccия И Зɑдɑчи (Mission and Objectives), Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation, http://gorchakovfund.ru/about/mission/ Accessed
26.01.13.
29
Lavrov, S. (2013, March 4). Speech to representatives of Russian NGOs interacting with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on international topics. Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp 4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/480a438af0b73ddb44257b26003ee019!OpenDocument
Accessed 12.06.13.
30
Russia builds up its public diplomacy structures, Centre for Eastern Studies (2010, February 10), http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/
2010-02-10/russia-builds-its-public-diplomacy-structures Accessed 26.01.13.
31
To view the wording of the doctrine see Rossiskaya Gazeta (in Russian) – http://www.rg.ru/OFICIAL/DOC/MIN AND VEDOM/MIM BEZOP/DOCTR.SHTM.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
8
the claim to have a potential audience of about 200 million paying viewers among pay-tv subscribers.32 The format of the
programming appearing on RT is tailored for an international (Western) audience.
A recent example of the offering of alternative views and news is the talk show on RT called The World Tomorrow. The host
of the show is Wikileaks founder, Julian Assange. During the first show, he interviewed Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah
via computer video link.33 Figures for the potential viewership are impressive, with a very large pool of a global audience to
influence. The sense of familiarity of format is intended to be the means of getting the message received with less resistance.
This is tempered by an express suspicion that RT is a propaganda tool under the control of the Russian state.
Der Spiegel paid attention to RT in August 2013 in the wake of veteran US broadcaster Larry King beginning to work there
during the summer. Benjamin Bidder characterised the station as being an anti-CNN creation of Vladimir Putin for Western
audiences. “With its recipe of smart propaganda, sex appeal and unlimited cash, it is outperforming its peers worldwide.”
The article goes on: “Russia Today sees itself as a champion of a global audience critical of the West. But it is also meant to
amplify the self-doubts of Europeans and Americans who have been forced by recent events to wonder if their own countries
– like Russia and China – are corrupt and in the grip of a pervasive intelligence apparatus.34 Better analogues for RT would
be such outlets as BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle and Euronews. All of them are seeking to message and influence global
publics in a crowded marketplace of such assets.
RIA Novosti (http://en.rian.ru/) a government owned news agency operates in some 45 countries in some 14 different
languages.35 It positions itself as an objective source of information, “the main criteria of RIA Novosti’s information services
were the combination of promptness, objectiveness, authenticity and its own opinion regardless of the political situation.”36
This media outlet delivers its news product in a format that is more easily recognised by foreign audiences, and does allow for
some commentary on the news items that are posted on its website. By using the medium of the internet, RIA Novosti is able to
send out uniform messages to a large potential audience. The radio station Voice of Russia’s (VOR) (http://voiceofrussia.com/)
predecessor (Radio Moscow) began broadcasting in 1922. Radio Moscow was renamed in 1991, following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The radio station broadcasts to 160 countries around the world in 38 different languages. VOR claims to
have some 109 million listeners in those 160 countries. In terms of mission statement, VOR states that it is to “acquaint the
international community with the life of Russia, its point of view on events in the world, and to enhance the positive image
of Russia in the world, effective dialogue with compatriots abroad to promote the popularisation of Russian culture and the
Russian language.”37 Both of these media outlets have a virtual (internet and social media) as well as a physical presence.
A third approach to PD is to create and use a network. It allows for building relationships and for individual interaction.
What is being referred to as digital diplomacy (the term innovative diplomacy is used by the Foreign Ministry), involves the
use of information and communication technologies to influence public opinion. Currently the Russian Foreign Ministry has
some 70 official accounts on Twitter. Brian Fung, editor of The Atlantic, stated that “digital diplomacy is good for at least two
not widely publicised purposes: gathering intelligence from open sources and influencing public opinion in foreign countries
to set the scene for future diplomatic clashes.”38
Not all aspects of innovative diplomacy are even Russian entities or organisations, such as the US-based
lobby firm Ketchum, which opened a new website that is promoted on their Twitter site called thinkRussia
(http://www.thinkrussia.com/). In addition to being linked to Twitter, the site is also linked to Facebook. This new platform appears to be a replacement for the Modern Russia Twitter account. Material on the site is divided into five different
categories – Global Outlook, Business and Economy, Policy Initiatives, Life and Arts, and Multimedia. Under the rubric About
Us, the website describes their aims.
“thinkRUSSIA is an online platform that offers news and shares perspectives on Russia, from global and domestic
policy matters to the country’s quality of life and economic and social modernization. Like its predecessor, ModernRussia.com, thinkRUSSIA provides a space to identify opportunities and challenges, and focus on the plans and
steps underway to address them. thinkRUSSIA encourages visitors to participate in our online forum and contribute
insightful commentary and analysis.”39
The wording of the aims suggests the Public Diplomacy link to policy implications, especially with regard to the modernisation narrative. Additionally there are hints that the site intends to create value adding relationships with the viewers
along the lines suggested by the relational perspective. The final sentence of the quote mentions the ambition to get viewers
actively involved and engaged in the process.
32
Russia Today (2011, February 11). Corporate profile – RT about. Retrieved from http://rt.com/about/corporate-profile/.
Blade (2012, April 17). Assange Interviews Hezbollah Chief in TV Debut, France 24, http://www.france24.com/en/20120417-assange-interviews-hezbollahchief-tv-debut Accessed 19.04.12.
34
Bidder, B. (2013, August 13). Russia today: Putin’s weapon in the war of images, Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/putin-fightswar-of-images-and-propaganda-with-russia-today-channel-a-916162.html Accessed 04.10.13.
35
A Brief History of RIA Novosti, RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/docs/about/novosti.html Accessed 11.02.11.
36
A Brief History of RIA Novosti, RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/docs/about/novosti.html Accessed 04.10.13.
37
For more information see the VOR’s website (in Russian) – http://rus.ruvr.ru/about/.
38
Chernenko, E. (2013, March 14). Digital diplomacy: Threat or opportunity?. Kommersant, in Russia Beyond the Headlines,
http://rbth.co.uk/international/2013/03/14/digital diplomacy threat or opportunity 23865.html Accessed 08.04.13.
39
About Us. thinkRussia, http://www.thinkrussia.com/about Accessed 08.09.13.
33
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
9
State/owned companies and the Russian government have been hiring foreign PR companies in order to target specific
audiences. One of those audiences is the business community, which is being targeted with the message that Russia is a
safe and profitable country to invest. An additional message is the “reliable energy supplier” message, which intersects
with the business community.40 The nature and means of Ketchum’s message seems to imply that the business community is the intended target audience. Target audiences are segmented based upon the subject discussed and the nature of
communication means.
RIA Novosti opened a new page on the social media site Facebook, called The RealRussia (https://www.facebook.com/
TheRealRussia). This page is in the process of being developed at the present time, and there seems to be more material on
the way. According to the statistics on this page there are some 8525 people ‘like’ the page and a further 6685 are talking
about it (as of 22 October 2011). The figure had risen to 29,850 ‘Likes’ and 2673 ‘Talking About’ it by 8 September 2013. This
page carries a variety of different subjects ranging from culture and education to science and sport, and some other subjects
such as politics.
Even the Russian Foreign Ministry possesses an official account on Facebook (http://facebook.com/MIDRussia). The page
has some 11,203 likes (as of 4 October 2013). However, material that appears on this page is almost exclusively in Russian
language. Although, the Foreign Ministry published a report on its website stating that “topical information about Russian
foreign policy, archive materials about the history of the Russian diplomatic service, helpful information for countrymen
and Russians staying abroad will be posted there. We can expect that the page will become a popular ground for interactive
communication.”41 Therefore, the primary audience appears to be those with Russian language skills. Non-Russian speakers
do use the site, there was one note of protest (in English) written by a visitor concerning the arrest of the Greenpeace Artic
30 protestors.
There are a number of current challenges facing Russian PD and consequently attempts to project a more positive image
of Russia abroad. For instance, there are various issues surrounding Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics (namely freedom of journalism and homosexuals), the international fall-out from the Pussy Riot and Mikhail Khodorkovsky trials, the arrest of the
Greenpeace Artic 30. These particular issues tend to reinforce the negative stereotypes. However, they are to some lesser
extent, offset by the recent amnesties offered by Putin (to Khodorkovsky and Pussy Riot), plus the eventual dropping of
charges in the Artic 30 case, as well as allowing Snowden to take refuge in Russia. He is a divisive character insofar as people
are split whether he is a hero or a traitor. The case of Snowden is interesting as it seems to confirm the positioning of Russia
as a counter to the West. Likewise the interesting case of the French actor Gerard Depardieu moving to Russia and taking up
citizenship in a symbolic move and spat with the French authorities.
All of these assets and communication strategies produce results that are hard to observe and measure. Russia still has
a number of image problems, which it is currently working on trying to resolve in rehabilitating its old and unwanted
stereotypes and prejudices. The quest for being liked is proving to be difficult in spite of a lot of time, money and effort being
spent on various programmes. There is seemingly little payback for this effort so far. Although, the so-called Russia proposal
on securing and destroying Syrian chemical weapons in order to avert another war in the Middle East has resonated well
with many publics that have become tired of being bogged down in a seemingly endless series of wars since 2001. This
led to a UPI article with the title Commentary: Russia back as geopolitical force. The same article declared Russia “won a
round in Syria at the expense of Obama’s national and global prestige.”42 In this particular event, Russia projected itself as a
peacemaker and the US was communicating itself as being a warmonger. The state of international relations and the climate
of public opinion (war weary) played in Russia’s favour on this occasion, not owing to well-constructed and executed PD
programmes, but catering to strong public opinion.
6. Conclusion
A two part question was posed in the introduction of this paper, what is Russia’s message to the world and how is this
delivered? Russia is attempting to project itself as an attractive country in the world and to utilise its soft power potential.
There are different means of going about achieving this, for instance in the CIS the expectation of attracting the weaker
countries to orbit around a strong Russia. In other parts of the world this mounts to projecting elements of soft power –
such as sport, culture, education and so forth. Soft power is seen as the mechanism with which it can achieve policy goals –
domestic as well as foreign. Political and academic discussions have leaned towards steering away from an ideological basis
to one that is determined/guided by pragmatic considerations and national interests.
The 2013 Concept outlines the way in which Russia should react to changes occurring in the international relations
environment, seen through meeting the challenges of a series of enumerated threats. Russia seeks to project itself as a positive
force in international relations, and that it can contribute constructively to processes and events. This has been demonstrated
recently, with the Russia proposal on Syrian chemical weapons, which defused what seemed to be an inevitable war. Russia
40
Kupchinsky, R. (2009, August 3). Russia’s hired lobbies in the west. The Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?tx ttnews[tt news=35351].
41
Russian Foreign Ministry Opens Facebook Account, Interfax (2013, February 21). Johnson’s Russia List 2013-#37, 22 February 2013.
42
De Borchgrave, A. (2013, September 13). Commentary: Russia Back as a Geopolitical Force, UPI, http://www.upi.com/Top News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/
2013/09/13/Commentary-Russia-back-as-geopolitical-force/UPI-24761379073711/ Accessed 16.09.13.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002
G Model
PUBREL-1276; No. of Pages 10
10
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Simons / Public Relations Review xxx (2014) xxx–xxx
earned some measured praise for this feat. This demonstrates that when government policy coincides with strongly held
public opinion that the chances of success are higher. Although this is a foreign policy outcome, there is some bearing upon
PD and soft power. As words (read messages – PD) and deeds (foreign policy application) need to be in alignment. If this
positive consistency is maintained there may be some pay off in terms of accumulating soft power in the future. Having said
this, now Russia needs to prove that this is not a one off, but a new trend in the face of suspicious to hostile foreign media.
This ultimately links to whether Russia wants and prioritises to be ‘liked’ or whether it would be ‘missed’ if it Russia was no
longer around.
To turn to the second part of the question, about how Russia’s message to the world about itself was delivered, there are
several observable approaches to communicating within the framework of PD. The institutions and means of PD represent
the different types of approach to messaging foreign publics – communicational, network and relational. The communicational
approach relies on International Broadcasting assets to use the outdated method of passive one-way mass communication.
Given the vast array of competing assets from other countries this is unlikely to prove to be very effective as the target
audience can choose what and when they want to view/listen, and in fact if they want to. Relational approaches are gaining
momentum, where the target audience is actively engaged in a joint value process. The use of NGOs and agencies (such
as Rossotrudnichestvo) seek to build a relationship with their target publics through cultural and educational exchanges or
humanitarian assistance. The network approach utilises modern information communication technologies and web-based
social networks to reach out to and engage foreign publics. Much greater use is being made of on-line communication means,
which includes both top-down (for instance Medvedev and Twitter) as well as news media (RIA Novosti), NGOs (RIAC) and
foreign/domestic commercial organisations (Ketchum/Gazprom).
The communicational approach has been in existence for some time, seeing its Hay Day during the Cold War. It is diminished in its effectiveness, yet it is unlikely to completely disappear from the PD scene. Relational and network approaches to
PD seem to be gaining much more traction and popularity. Their proactive and interactive properties make them potentially
more effective in influencing target publics.
References
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2010). PR strategy and application: Managing influence. Singapore: Wiley-Blackwell.
Ivanov, I. (2001). The new Russian identity: Innovation and continuity in Russian foreign policy. The Washington Quarterly, 24(3), 5–13.
Jowett, G. S., & O’Donnell, V. (2012). Propaganda and persuasion (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Leonard, M., Stead, C., & Smewing, C. (2002). Public diplomacy. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
L’Etang, J. (2009). Public relations and diplomacy in a globalised world: An issue of public communication. American Behavioural Scientist, 53(4), 607–626.
L’Etang, J. (2011). Public relations: Concepts, practice and critique. London: Sage Publishing.
Lord, C. (2006). Losing hearts and minds? Public diplomacy and strategic influence in the age of terror. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2005). The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York: Public Affairs.
Nye, J. S. (2011). The future of power. New York: Public Affairs.
Osipova, Y. (2012). Selective processing: A strategic challenge for public diplomacy an alternative approach to Russian public diplomacy in the
United States. Journal of Communication, Culture and Technology, XII(II). Spring, Retrieved from http://gnovisjournal.org/2012/04/26/selectiveprocessing-a-strategic-challenge-for-public-diplomacy-an-alternative-approach-to-russian-public-diplomacy-in-the-united-states/
Seib, P. (Ed.). (2009). Towards a new public diplomacy: Re-directing U.S. foreign policy. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Seib, P. (2009, September). Connecting public diplomacy and policy. Perspectives, 1(5). Retrieved from http://www.layalina.tv/index.php/
vol-i-issue-5-september-2009-connecting-public-diplomacy-and-policy
Seib, P. (2012). Real-time diplomacy: Politics and power in the social media era. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Simons, G. (2011). Attempting to rebrand the branded: Russia’s international image in the 21st century. Russian Journal of Communication, 4(3/4), 322–350.
Summer/Fall.
Snow, N. (2010). Public diplomacy: New dimensions and implications. In T. L. McPhail (Ed.), Global communication: Theories, stakeholders and trends (3rd
ed., pp. 84–102). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Snow, N., & Taylor, P. M. (Eds.). (2009). Routledge handbook of public diplomacy. New York: Routledge.
Szondi, G. (2008). Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and differences. Discussion papers in diplomacy. Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael. Retrieved from http://ts.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20081022 pap in dip nation branding.pdf
Tsygankov, A. (2006, November). If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin’s foreign policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 58(7), 1079–1099.
Yli-Kaitala, K. (2014). Revolution 2.0 in Egypt: Pushing for Change, Foreign Influences on a Popular Revolt. Special Issue: Political Marketing and Propaganda:
Uses, Abuses and Misuses, Journal of Political Marketing, 13(1–2), 127–151.
Zaharna, R. S. (2007). The soft power differential: Network communication and mass communication in public diplomacy. Hague Journal of Public Diplomacy,
2, 213–228.
Zaharna, R. S. (2009). Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy After 9/11. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Please cite this article in press as: Simons, G. Russian public diplomacy in the 21st century: Structure, means and message.
Public Relations Review (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.03.002