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J. RIGHT TO PROPERTY
1987 CONSTI ART 3
Sec 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
UDHR
Art 17 (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
1. Cassanovas v. Hord
2. Agan, Jr. v. Piatco
3. Rutter v. Esteban
G.R. No. L-3708; May 18, 1953; 93 Phil. 68
Ponente: Bautista Angelo
Doctrine: Inherent powers of the State; Police Power; The national economy
FACTS:
In August 20, 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in Manila. Esteban paid 3/4ths of the
purchase price and they constituted a mortgage over one of the parcels to secure the payment of the
balance.
However, the war broke out and somehow, Esteban was not able to pay the balance of the purchase
price on the due date and so, on August 2, 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance with
the CFI.
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense, he claimed that his obligation was a
pre-war obligation covered by the moratorium embodied in R.A. No. 342.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that “all debts and other monetary obligations contracted
before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any subsequent aggreement
affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a period of
eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War
Damage Commission.”
The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the sole issue raised by petitioner on
appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on certain pre-war obligations, is
unconstitutional for violation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of
contracts.
HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.
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Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally constitutional
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are not new: “For some 1,400 years western civilization
has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as
moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the
medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power.”
Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial distress such as wars and disasters.
Similar laws were passed in some US states after the civil war and they have been declared
constitutional. Some laws however, were declared unconstitutional where the period of moratorium
prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable.
The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of contracts does not hold water. It is justified as
a valid exercise of the state of its police power.
In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it was held that:
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
xxx
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the
regulation of a business it is no objection that the performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by
the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .
. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable and appropriate to that end.
Thus the “true test” of constitutionality of a moratorium statute “lies in the determination of the period of a
suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it
would be violative of the constitution.”
R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonable
The moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of executive orders likewise declaring
moratoriums. With its 8 year moratorium period, it is clearly unreasonable for creditors who have to
“observe a vigil of 12 years” to collect on debts which have become demandable as early as 1941. And
the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the
operation of the relief.
The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that the Philippines is headed to better
times. Hence the Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and hence, null
and void and without effect.
Disposition:
Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of 7% per annum with 12% attorneys
fees.
4. IDG v. Spain
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5. Lucas v. SCCC
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fifth Amendment prohibits governmental taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. This prohibition applies to the states as well through the Fourteenth
Amendment. In order to not constitute a taking, the land use regulation must first substantially advance a
legitimate state interest, and second not deny the owner of all reasonably economically viable use of his
land.
Facts. Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots in Isle de Palms in Charleston, South Carolina. He
intended to build single-family homes on the property. The state passed the Beachfront Management Act,
which had the direct effect of making Lucas’ property valueless because he could not build on the
property. The State did not act until after the property had been zoned for individual lot development and
most other parcels had been improved. This put the whole burden of the regulation on the remaining lots.
Lucas sued claiming that his property had been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which
required just compensation. The trial court found that the property had been “taken” by operation of the
Act and that the South Carolina Coastal Commission was ordered to pay “just compensation” in the
amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court and found that,
because Petitioner did not challenge the facial validity of the Act as a rea
sonable use of the police power, no compensation could be owed. Petitioner Lucas petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for review.
Issue. Did the dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas’s lots amount to a taking of private
property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments requiring the payment of “just compensation”?
Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.
If the protection against physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the
government’s power to redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was
necessarily constrained by constitutional limits.
There are two categories of regulatory action, which the government must compensate without case
specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first is when the property
owner has to suffer a physical invasion of his property. The second is where the regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of the land without a legitimate state interest.
The government does not need to compensate when acting under the government’s police powers where
the government could reasonably conclude that the health, safety, morals or general welfare would be
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land. In the past the cases held that if the use
prohibited was “harmful or noxious” then such standard was the touchstone to distinguish regulatory
takings from regulatory deprivations.
However, the standard of “harmful and noxious”cannot be the basis of departing from the categorical rule
that total regulatory takings must be compensated. There are limits to the non-compensable exercise of
police power. The cases should be understood to mean that when a state uses their police power, then
the test of whether or not there has been a taking depends on if the restrictions were reasonably related
to the implementation of the policy expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all
similarly situated property. Other landowners, similarly situated, built single-family homes. Those
landowners were permitted to continue the use denied to Lucas.
Whether or not this is a harm-preventing legislation is not enough to justify the taking. Here the legitimate
state interest is to stop construction too close to the beach-dune area. The regulation may advance this
interest because construction had contributed to the erosion and destruction of this public resource.
The lower courts found that Lucas’s land lost all economic value as a result of the new law. This would be
a categorical formulation because here the law deprives the land of all economically beneficial use. There
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are problems with determining whether the land has decreased in value so much that there is no
economically feasible use.
First is there is more to property than just the development and economics. Even if those are deprived,
the landowner could still enjoy the land. However, the Court here does not ignore the possibility of noneconomic uses. The Court stated that if those non-economic uses were impaired, that possible taking
would invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings Clause as they did in Loretto. Therefore if there
are still non-economic uses that the owner would enjoy and would increase the value to him in a noninvestment or development way, the Court would closely scrutinize the legislation to determine whether
there was harm to the non-economic value of the land.
The second problem is that one does not know if the owner was deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the burdened portion of the tract or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole. Therefore the Court would advocate looking to see whether the owner’s
investment-backed expectations are harmed by the legislation.
The third problem is that in a categorical formulation where “deprivation of all economically beneficial use
is taken away, an owner whose land has diminished in value by 90% could not recover. However, the
owner might still recover because the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are keenly relevant to
the takings analysis generally. So, in cases where the land has only diminished in value, the test of
whether a taking has occurred is if the owner’s investment-backed expectations were diminished
substantially. Then the state must show that its actions are in furtherance of stopping a noxious harm
(traditional nuisance analysis- the taking of a nuisance does not require just compensation).
The State is attempting to justify their regulation because the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the
public interest or that they violate a common-law maxim. If the State wishes to restrain Lucas in a
common-law action for public nuisance, then they must identify background principles of nuisance and
property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found.
KELO vs. CITY OF LONDON
FACTS: After approving an integrated development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy,
respondent city, through its development agent, purchased most of the property earmarked for the project
from willing sellers, but initiated condemnation proceedings when petitioners, the owners of the rest of the
property, refused to sell. Petitioners brought this state-court action claiming, inter alia, that the taking of
their properties would violate the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The
trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of the some of the properties, but
denying relief as to others.
ISSUE: Whether the city’s proposed disposition of the property qualifies as a “public use” within the
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
HELD: Yes. The city’s proposed disposition of petitioners’ property qualifies as a “public use” within the
meaning of the Takings Clause. (a) Though the city could not take petitioners’ land simply to confer a
private benefit on a particular private party, the takings at issue here would be executed pursuant to a
carefully considered development plan, which was not adopted “to benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals,” ibid. Moreover, while the city is not planning to open the condemned land—at least not in its
entirety—to use by the general public, this “Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that
condemned property be put into use for the … public.” Rather, it has embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as “public purpose.” Without exception, the Court has defined that
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concept broadly, reflecting its longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments as to what public
needs justify the use of the takings power.
(b) The city’s determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of
economic rejuvenation is entitled to deference. The city has carefully formulated a development plan that
it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and
increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development, the city is trying to
coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational land uses, with the hope that they will
form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the city has invoked a state statute
that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development. Given the
plan’s comprehensive character, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited
scope of this Court’s review in such cases, it is appropriate here, as it was in Berman, to resolve the
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan.
Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the Fifth
Amendment.
(c) Petitioners’ proposal that the Court adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not
qualify as a public use is supported by neither precedent nor logic. Promoting economic development is a
traditional and long accepted governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it
from the other public purposes the Court has recognized. Also rejected is petitioners’ argument that for
takings of this kind the Court should require a “reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits will
actually accrue. Such a rule would represent an even greater departure from the Court’s precedent. The
disadvantages of a heightened form of review are especially pronounced in this type of case, where
orderly implementation of a comprehensive plan requires all interested parties’ legal rights to be
established before new construction can commence. The Court declines to second-guess the wisdom of
the means the city has selected to effectuate its plan
6. MGM Studios v. Grokster
K. RIGHT TO RECOGNITION AS A PERSON BEFORE THE LAW
UDHR Art 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
ICCPR Art 16 Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
7. Arias v. Colombia
L. EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ART 3
Sec 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Sec 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
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his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
UDHR
Art 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
against any incitement to such discrimination.
Art 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Art 11.(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor
shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was
committed.
ICCPR
Art 9, 14, 26
8. People v. Cayat
FACTS: In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any
other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with
an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be
imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the
said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less
capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The
SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish
them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites
to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then,
does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all
measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of
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their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers.
But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure
for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian
brothers on the basis of true equality.
9. PASEI v. Drilon
F: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
DO No. 1, Series of 1988, of the DOLE, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition for being violative of Section 3, of Article XIII, of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination
against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel.
H:The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
No undue discrimination between the sexes
It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that:
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
(1) the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions. The
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. On
the other hand, the same predicament cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is
no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an
Identical predicament.
(2) The classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. The objective of DO No. 1 is to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers". In the midst of the terrible
mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
(3) The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely
so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the
administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to
say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency,
the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability,
depending on the circumstances of each case.
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(4) The impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, that it does not
apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given
universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not
all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select
person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or
resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
No violation on Right to Travel
The right to travel is subject to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute.
No
violation
on
the
Constitutional
guaranty
of
worker
participation
"in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits"
The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of
regulation. The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution
more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough
that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of
the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite
ban on deployment.
10. Lacson v. Exec. Sec
11. ISA v. Quisumbing
Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to
that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
1. a.....What is one's domicile?
2. b.....Where is one's home economy?
3. c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
4. d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
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Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the
theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his home
country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the union’s mfr.
He said, “The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an
established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated
by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is
based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial
distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no
amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to
attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.”
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes, Petition granted
Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity…”
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter promises “Fair wages and
equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.”
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly,
the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in
order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term “equal pay for equal work”, pertaining to persons being paid with
equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here that foreignhires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[
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For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as
valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreignhires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by localhires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Obiter:
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not appear
that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were
always treated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local
hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group the power to exercise bargaining rights.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
12. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad
YU CONG ENG V. TRINIDAD
FACTS: On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of their
legitimate functions, inspected the books of account of the Chinese merchant Yo Cong Eng. Upon finding
that said books were not kept in accordance with their understanding of the provisions of Act No. 2972,
they took possession of the merchant's books and referred the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for
appropriate action. Said Act reads as follows:
“No. 2972. — AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS SHALL BE KEPT, AND
TO ESTABLISH PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled
and by the authority of the same:
"SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance
with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local
dialect.
"SEC. 2. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years or both.
"SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on November first, nineteen hundred and twenty-one.
"Approved, February 21, 1921."
The city fiscal, considering that Yu Cong Eng had committed a violation of the law, on March 7, 1923,
caused an information to be filed, subscribed, and sworn to before Judge of First Instance Concepcion,
thereby giving rise to criminal case No.25551 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. This information
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alleged in substance that the accused merchant had kept his books of account "only in Chinese, instead
of keeping or causing them to be kept in English, Spanish, or any local dialect, thus rendering it difficult
for the agents and authorized representatives of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the City
of Manila, to examine and inspect the aforementioned books of account, thereby preventing and
hindering the investigation and determination of all the amount that said accused was, is, or will be under
obligation to pay for licenses, permits, and taxes." A warrant of arrest was issued by the Judge of First
Instance before whom the information was filed, and in compliance therewith, the accused merchant, now
become the instant petitioner, was arrested.
ISSUE/S: WON Act No, 2972 (Chinese Bookkeeping Law) will cause hardship and is so oppressive on
one particular nationality? — NO
RULING: We construe Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation,
engaged in commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands,
shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books and other records and returns required for
taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action was begun,
in English, Spanish, or a local dialect. Agreeable to such construction, we hold Act No. 2972 valid and
constitutional.
Act No. 2972 admits of three constructions. The first construction a literal application of the law, and the
second construction permitting of the keeping of duplicate sets of account books by merchants, would
probably result in holding the law unconstitutional. But the third construction to the effect that the law only
intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental
inspection for taxation purposes, permits the courts to sustain the law. This is a practical judicial
construction of a law where the validity of this law is in issue, which gives to the law a meaning
accomplishing everything needed by the Government for taxation purposes, without being unduly
oppressive on the individual and which permits the courts to uphold the law.
Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the Government agents and to prevent
fraud in the return of the merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income tax. Conceded that
the Chinese handle sixty per cent of the aggregate business of the Philippines, approximate equality in
taxation demands that they pay something like the same proportion in taxes for the support of the State.
Act No. 2972 is construed as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its
account books consisting of sales books and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by
the regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action was begun, in English,
Spanish, or a local dialect.
The rights of Chinese aliens resident in the Philippines are not less than the rights of American and
Philippine citizens. Nor more.
A description of the language situation in the Philippines discloses some of the difficulties which have
beset the attempt to hasten the adoption of a common language in the Philippines. The Filipino people
have cheerfully imposed upon themselves the burden of acquiring one or more languages other than their
native language. The purpose of their elective representatives in approving Act-No. 2972 is to require
conformity with governmental policy by a large class of foreign residents, so as to permit of a closer
approximation to equality in taxation.
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13. Aniag v. Comelec
14. Galman v. SB
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank
into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours
that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only
days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him
down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that
"the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a
military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority
report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the
military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.
Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition
and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal
ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are
entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with
the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter,
same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
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(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of
due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer
around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the
Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the AquinoGalman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to
the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided
that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference
was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice
Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where
the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the
President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay,
mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the AquinoGalman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six
respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired
over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and
his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a
better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of
witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice
Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement
in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision:
That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In
rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and
partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was
totally ignored and disregarded.
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The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and
his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any
executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any
case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at
bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system
is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been
issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims
flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was
issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively
prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against
them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government,
is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no
majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of
office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
15. In Re: Request for Live TV of Trial of Joseph Estrada
16. Javier v. Comelec
17. Pinchuk v. Belarus
18. Omar Sharif Baban v. Australia
19. Lawrence v. Texas
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right, intimate sexual
relationships between consenting adults are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts. In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were dispatched to a private home in response to
a reported weapons disturbance. They entered (the right to enter does seem to have been questioned)
the home where John Geddes resided, and observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner,
engaging in a sex act. The men were arrested, held over night and charged with violating a Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
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Specifically the statute provided “A person commits and offense if he engaged in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex”� and goes on to define deviate sexual intercourse as
follows: “ any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object”. The two men
were then convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
Issue. The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held. Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults, is a liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Discussion. (Written by Justice Kennedy) The court does not focus on protecting sodomy specifically, but
rather, personal relationships. It explains that despite the fact that the statutes in questions purport to
only prohibit sex, “Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”
The court found it alarming that the statute in question sought to control a personal relationship, stating
that forming personal relationships is one of the liberties we have, and should be able to choose such
relationships without fear of being punished or classified as criminals.
The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not target relations between consenting adults in
private, as this is what liberty hinges on. The court states that adults are entitled to respect for their
private lives, and “Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government”. The court ultimately applies a rational basis
review, stating that the Texas statute in question furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify an
intrusion into a personal and private life of an individual.
This case overrules Bowers v Hardwick, which had held that there is no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy, or homosexual activities. Bowers was based on the fact that historically sodomy has been
outlawed, but this court finds that historically it was only outlawed to protect individuals from sexual
predators, and that rationale should not be used when consenting adults are involved, specifically stating
"The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."
M. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION
1987 Consti Art III Sec 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
UDHR Art 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised
in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
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Manila. During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very
minimal profit. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it
was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with
the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter
of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. Plaintiff now questions the imposition of
such fees appliying Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, provides that:
"(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights."
ISSUE: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
HELD: Yes. The ordinances are constitutional but are inapplicable to the petitioner. Article III, section 1,
clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious
profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201). It has reference to one's views of
his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and character,
and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p.
297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and
sale of bibles and other religious literature.
It is true the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual
cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of general merchandise, cannot be
applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand,
City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention of the Mayor's permit before any
person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, does not impose
any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
practices. Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as
Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
20. German v. Barangan
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21. Estrada v. Escritor
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.
22. Islamic Da'Wah Council of the Philippines v. Exec Sec
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization
that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, respondent
OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the
halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion
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RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic
concerns of the Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the
"free exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize
its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity.
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already provided for
in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products
released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory
bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the
perceived danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal
certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious approval
of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
23. Young-Kwan Kim v. Rep of Korea
F: The authors of the communication are 50 individuals, all nationals of the Republic of Korea and are
Jehovah’s Witnesses,. They claim to be victims of violations by the Republic of Korea of their rights under
articles 9 and 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as they have been sentenced
to 18 months imprisonment for refusing, on the basis of their religious belief, to be drafted for military
service.
One of them is Young-kwan Kim. On 21 May 2001, the he became a Jehovah’s Witness. He received an
enlistment notice from the Military Manpower Administration Office in spring 2006 and replied with a
written statement about his religious belief and refusal to take up arms on the basis of his conscience. On
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20 April 2007, the author was sentenced to 18 months in prison by the Trial Court of Gwangju because he
was a conscientious objector to military service. On 12 July 2007, his appeal to the Court of Appeal was
dismissed and his appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 11 October 2007. He was released on
parole on 30 September 2008.
The authors assert that the State party’s refusal to recognize their right to conscientious objection to
military service, under penalty of imprisonment, constitutes a violation of article 18, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant. The authors submit that the Committee has clearly found that conscientious objection to
military service is a protected right deriving from the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The
authors also emphasize that it is undisputed that each one of them is a conscientious objector to military
service, as they have each personally decided that serving in the army would be a serious breach of their
Bible-trained conscience as Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The authors also argue that their detention due to their conscientious objection constitutes a violation by
the State party of article 9 of the Covenant, which prohibits arbitrary detention and guarantees an
enforceable right to compensation. The authors submit that the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention
categorizes the deprivation of liberty resulting from the exercise of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by
the Covenant as a form of arbitrary detention, and that the European Court of Human Rights noted the
findings of the Working Group in a recent judgment. 3.3The authors request that their criminal records be
expunged and that the State party provide them with adequate compensation and take necessary
measures to avoid similar violations of the Covenant in the future.
H:although the Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right of conscientious objection, such a right derives
from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to be involved in the use of lethal force may seriously conflict
with the freedom of conscience. The right to conscientious objection to military service inheres in the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It entitles any individual to an exemption from
compulsory military service if such service cannot be reconciled with that individual’s religion or
beliefs. The right must not be impaired by coercion. A State may, if it wishes, compel the objector
to undertake a civilian alternative to military service, outside the military sphere and not under
military command. The alternative service must not be of a punitive nature. It must be a real
service to the community and compatible with respect for human rights. The Committee notes that
the State party disagrees with this position on the grounds that the claim of conscientious objection could
be extended in order to justify acts such as refusal to pay taxes or refusal of mandatory education.
However, the Committee considers that military service, unlike schooling and payment of taxes,
implicates individuals in a self-evident level of complicity with a risk of depriving others of life.
In the present cases, the Committee considers that the authors’ refusal to be drafted for compulsory
military service derives from their religious beliefs, which, it is uncontested, were genuinely held, and that
the authors’ subsequent convictions and sentences amounted to an infringement of their freedom of
conscience, in breach of article 18, paragraph 1 of the Covenant. Repression of the refusal to be drafted
for compulsory military service, exercised against persons whose conscience or religion prohibit the use
of arms, is incompatible with article 18, paragraph 1 of the Covenant.
24. Min-Kyu Jeong v. Rep of Korea
N. FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION
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25. Adiong v. Comelec
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with this prohibition.
Issue: Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition unconstitutional.
Held: The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred
freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called
balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other —
is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific
authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
When faced with borderline situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to
know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of
election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in
time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of
his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no
clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly
present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or
a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction
as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's
private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in
the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.
26. US v. Bustos
Facts:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against
Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him
guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice,
instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
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The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied
the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
Error in not acquitting defendants
Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of
the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation
in this case arose.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.
Ratio:
Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made
by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty
when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant source
of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right
to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the
law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize
a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the
basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into
and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
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for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of
this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is
the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a duty
in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the
individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will
amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a
libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the
removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which
not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of
first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
27. Reyes v. Bagatsing
REYES V. BAGATSING
Petitioner - Jose B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC)
FACTS: This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some aspects, is called upon to
delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceable
assembly, 1 against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing. Petitioner, retired
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to
hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
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Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there,
and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. 2 During the course of the oral
argument, 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution
adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the
Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States
Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference.
There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and
rally.”
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on
October 20, 1983 was due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action
taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983, the answer of
respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It
turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the
denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to "police intelligence reports
which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied
for." 6 To be more specific, reference was made to "persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people is expected to attend." 7 Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with
the recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at
the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the
general public may be ensured.”
ISSUE/S: WON there was a showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that could justify the denial of a permit? — NO
RULING: WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs. That there was no
showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of
a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of
rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery;
and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a
defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of
free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question still confronts
this Court. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. Not that it should
be overlooked. There was in this case, however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera,
Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, that the police force is in a position to
cope with such emergency should it arise. That is to comply with its duty to extend protection to the
participants of such peaceable assembly. Also from him came the commendable admission that there
were at least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview Hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the
United States Embassy where no untoward event occurred. It was made clear by petitioner, through
counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would take
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place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the necessary steps would be taken by it `to
ensure a peaceful march and rally.'"
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the
utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the
case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent.
In Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or coincidence that
the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights,
while not identical, are inseparable. In every case therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the
exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest (Cf. Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 US 147 (1939).
What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be
invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. Free Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the
other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights. The presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of
such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
28. Primicias v. Fugoso
29. Non v. Dames
30. Celdran v. People
31. Morse v. Frederick
32. Hudgens v. NLRB
33. Miller v. California
34. Brandenburg v. Ohio
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Speech can be prohibited if it is “directed at inciting or producing imminent
lawless action”� and it is likely to incite or produce such action.
Facts. The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act (the “Act”�) made it illegal to advocate “crime, sabotage,
violence or . . . terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”� It also prohibited
“assembling with any society, group, or assemblage or persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism. The Defendant, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech promoting the
taking of revenge against the government if it did not stop suppressing the white race and was therefore
convicted under the Act.
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Issue. Did the Statute, prohibiting public speech that advocated certain violent activities, violate the
Defendant’s right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes.
(Per Curiam) The Act properly made it illegal to advocate or teach doctrines of violence, but did not
address the issue of whether such advocacy or teaching would actually incite imminent lawlessness. The
mere abstract teaching of the need or propriety to resort to violence is not the same as preparing a group
for violent action. Because the statute failed to provide for the second part of the test it was overly broad
and thus in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Concurrence.
Justice Hugo (J. Black) I agree with Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) in his concurring opinion of this
case that the “clear and present danger”� doctrine should have no place in our interpretation of the First
Amendment of the Constitution.
J. Douglas argues that the how the “clear and present danger”� test has been applied in the past is
disconcerting. First, the threats to which it was applied were often loud but puny. Second, the test was so
perverted as to make trial of those teachers of Marxism all out political trials, which had the effect of
eroding substantial parts of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Discussion. In order for “incitement to violence”� speech to be constitutionally barred, Brandenburg sets
a new standard. The language must (1) expressly advocate violence; (2) advocate immediate violence
and (3) relate to violence likely to occur.
CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE
FACTS: Chaplinsky (defendant) was a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Chaplinsky was distributing
religious literature on a street corner. Several citizens complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that
Chaplinsky was denouncing all religions. Bowering responded that Chaplinsky was lawfully permitted to
voice his opinion, but nevertheless warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. After a
disturbance occurred later, Chaplinsky was escorted by a police officer to the police station. On the way,
Chaplinsky passed Bowering and called him a “racketeer” and a “fascist.” Chaplinsky admitted to uttering
the offensive language in question. Chaplinsky was convicted by the State of New Hampshire (plaintiff)
for violating a New Hampshire law prohibiting speech directed at a person on public streets that derides,
offends or annoys others. Chaplinsky’s conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court, and he
appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the New Hampshire law violated the
First Amendment.
ISSUE: Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments violate his free speech
rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?
HELD: No. Some forms of expression – among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey
ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection.
Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and worship, but only an
attack on the basis of free speech is warranted. The spoken, not the written, word is involved. And we
cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any sense of the term. But even
if the activities of the appellant which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character, and
therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity
from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute. We
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turn, therefore, to an examination of the statute itself. Allowing the broadest scope to the language and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words -- those which, by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
"The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks. . . The test is
what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight. . . . The English language has a number of words and expressions which, by general
consent, are 'fighting words' when said without a disarming smile. . . . [S]uch words, as ordinary men
know, are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying
words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they
have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . . The
statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach
of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker - including 'classical fighting words,' words in current use less 'classical' but equally likely to cause
violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats."
We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the
Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish
specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause
a breach of the peace.
35. Near v. Minnesota
36. Schenck v. US
O. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
1987 Consti Art III
Sec 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Sec 8 The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
37. Franz Wallmann v. Austria
38. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. Alabama
Alabama sought to prevent the NAACP from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit
court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's
membership lists. The Supreme Court ruled that Alabama's demand for the lists had violated the right of
due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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F:In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John Patterson, brought a suit to the State Circuit Court of
Montgomery, Alabama, challenging the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People(NAACP) for violation of a state statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify before doing
business in the state. The NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation based in New York, had not
complied with the statute, as it believed it was exempt. The state suit sought both to prevent the
Association from conducting further business within the state and, indeed, to remove it from the state.
Referring to the Association's involvement with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 and its role in
funding and providing legal assistance to black students' seeking admission to the state university, the
suit charged that the Association was ". . . causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the
residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law
afford no adequate relief . . . ." On the day this suit was filed, the circuit court agreed to issue an ex parte
order restraining the Association from conducting business in the state or taking steps to qualify it to do
so.
The Association, represented throughout by Robert L. Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
responded by moving to dissolve the order on the grounds that its activities within the state did not require
its qualification under the statute and that the state's suit was intended to violate its rights to freedom of
speech and of assembly as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Before a hearing date
was set, the state issued a subpoena for much of the Association's records, including bank statements
and leases, but most notably the names and addresses of the "agents" or "members" of the Association
in Alabama.
In its response to the lawsuit, the Association admitted that it was in breach of the statute and offered to
obtain qualification to continue business if that part of the ex parte order was lifted. Because the
Association did not comply with the order to produce its records, that motion was denied and the
Association was held in contempt and fined $10,000. The contempt order allowed for the reduction or
remission of the fine if the production order was complied with within five days, after which the fine would
be raised to $100,000.
Contending that the State could not constitutionally force disclosure of the records, the Association
moved to dismiss the contempt judgment once more. According to Alabama case law, however, a
petitioner could not seek a hearing or to dissolve an order until it purged itself of contempt.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the first contempt judgment. The Alabama Supreme Court
then claimed the U.S. Supreme Court had relied on a "mistaken premise" and reinstated the contempt
judgment, which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed again. The NAACP moved to try the case on the
merits; this motion was denied and again appealed up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the
case to Alabama, and ordered the Federal district court to try the case on the merits if the Alabama court
system continued to refuse to do so.
The Alabama state circuit court finally heard the case on the merits, and decided the NAACP had violated
Alabama law and ordered it to stop doing business in the state; the Alabama appeals courts upheld this
judgment, refusing to hear the NAACP's appeals on Constitutional grounds. Finally, the fourth time the
case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, it granted certiorari and decided the case, itself, on the
merits rather than remand the case to the balking Alabama court system, which had taken five years to
get this far.
H: The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of
petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful
private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment" and, further, that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the
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"advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The action of the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely
interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was
superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
39. NAACP v. Button
40. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
FACTS: The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James
Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights
activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New
Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct
was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior
Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was
not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale
as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law
applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with
various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his
homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did
not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion
would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court
concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.
ISSUE: Does the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?
HELD: The Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts
to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the
ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop
leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would,
at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
P. FREEDOM TO PETITION GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES
41. Meyer v. Grant
Meyer v. Grant is a key decision of the United States Supreme Court asserting the right of proponents of
ballot measures to pay circulators to collect signatures.
The Supreme Court decision in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988), invalidated a provision of a
Colorado statute that made it a felony to pay persons to circulate petitions calling for the inclusion of
initiatives on state ballots. In doing so, the Court upheld the holding of an en banc session of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which had overturned an earlier decision by a three-judge panel of the same
appeals court that had upheld the law.
FACTS:
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A Colorado statute allows a proposed state constitutional amendment to be placed on a general election
ballot if its proponents can obtain thesignatures of at least five percent of the total number of qualified
voters onan "initiative petition" within a 6-month period, but makes it a felony to pay petition circulators.
Concluding that they would need the assistance of paid personnel to obtain the required signatures
within the allotted time,appellee proponents of a constitutional amendment that would removemotor
carriers from the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against appellant stateofficials seeking a declaration that the statutory payment prohibitionviolated their
First Amendment rights.
The District Court upheld thestatute, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, holding that thestatute
violates the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States bythe Fourteenth Amendment.
Held:
The statutory prohibition against the use of paid circulators abridged appellees' right to engage in political
speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 420-428.(a) The statute is subject to
exacting scrutiny, since the circulation of an initiative petition seeking to deregulate the Colorado trucking
industry necessarily constitutes "core political speech," for which First Amendment protection is at its
zenith. The statute burdens such speech in two ways:First, it limits the number of voices that will convey
appellees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can
reach.
Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of necessary signatures, thus limiting
their ability to make thematter the focus of statewide discussion. The statute's burden on speech is not
relieved by the fact that other avenues of expression remain open to appellees, since the use of paid
circulators is the most effective,fundamental, and perhaps economical means of achieving direct, one-onone communication, and appellees' right to utilize that means is itself protected by the First Amendment.
Nor is the statutory burden rendered acceptable by the State's claimed authority to impose limitations on
the scope of the state-created right to legislate by initiative; the power to ban initiatives entirely does not
include the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 106 S.Ct. 2968,92 L.Ed.2d 266, distinguished. Pp. 420-425.
(b) The State has failed to sustain its burden of justifying the statutory prohibition.
The argument that justification is found in the State's interest in assuring that an initiative has sufficient
grass roots support to be placed on the ballot is not persuasive, since that interest is adequately
protected by the requirement that the specified number of signatures be obtained. Nor does the State's
claimed interest in protecting the integrity of the initiative process justify the prohibition, because the State
has failed to demonstrate the necessity of burdening appellees' ability to communicate in order to meet its
concerns. It cannot be assumed that a professional circulator—whose qualifications for similar future
assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity—is any more likely to accept
false signatures than a volunteer motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the
ballot. Moreover, other statutory provisions dealing expressly with the potential danger of false signatures
are adequate to minimize the risk of improper circulation conduct.
Q. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
42. Marcos v. Manglapus
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MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
FACTS: We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power
have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos,
the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos
loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with
mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987]
awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism
and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the
victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's
presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col.
Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores
of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser
significance, but the message they conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military
establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization
that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military
establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and
the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent
that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control
while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these
groups’ determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through resort to arms but also
through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the
country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the
nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic
recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating
the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained
elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
This for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE/S: WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines— YES
LAWS INVOLVED:
Bill of Rights
Section 1. Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
UDHR
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
ICCPR
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which
are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent
with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
RULING: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
It is is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.]
It is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being “arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject
to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
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not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or
the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers
in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual
bases for the President's decision. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the
return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
43. Manotoc v. CA
44. Silverio v. CA
45. Kent v. Dulles
Freedom of Movement
FACTS: Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing
him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director
told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed
Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of
counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more
asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the
Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he
satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and
appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari.
ISSUE: Could the Executive's Passport Department defer or refuse the issuance of passports to
individuals suspected of being Communists or of traveling abroad to further Communist causes
HELD: The Secretary of State did not have the authority to deny a passport in this case. Kent was not
offered the due process of the law when he was denied his passport. In the decision of Kent v. Dulles the
Supreme Court examined the three liberties expressed in the U.S. Constitution: life, liberty, and property.
The Justices determined that freedom of movement is included in this phrase and is one of the basic
rights of citizens. This right, which they termed “freedom to travel”, cannot be denied to someone without
due process of the law.
The right to travel is an inherent element of "liberty" that cannot be denied to American citizens. Although
the Executive may regulate the travel practices of citizens, by requiring them to obtain valid passports, it
may not condition the fulfillment of such requirements with the imposition of rules that abridge basic
constitutional notions of liberty, assembly, association, and personal autonomy.
46. Mansour Ahani v. Canada
R. FREEDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS
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S. FREEDOM TO INFORMATION
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