Crystal v. BPI (Solidary)
Facts:
 March 28, 1978 - Raymundo and Desamparados Crystal obtained a P300,000.00 loan in behalf of the Cebu
Contractors Consortium Co. (CCCC) from the Bank of the Philippine Islands-Butuan branch (BPI-Butuan).
 secured by a chattel mortgage on heavy equipment and machinery of CCCC
 executed in favor of BPI-Butuan a Continuing Suretyship
 29 March 1979, Crystal executed a promissory note6 for the amount of P300,000.00, favor of BPI-Butuan.
 August 1979, CCCC renewed a previous loan from BPI Cebu branch
 CCCC had no real property to offer as security for the loan so the spouses executed a real estate mortgage.
 CCCC failed to pay its loans to both BPI Butuan and Cebu branch when it’s due.
 BPI resorted to the foreclosure of chattel mortgage and the real estate mortgage
 BPI filed a complaint for sum of money against CCCC and the spouses
 Petitioners who are the heirs of the spouses argue that the failure of the spouses to pay the BPI Cebu was due to
it’s refusal to accept payment unless the loan from Butuan would also be paid. Also, the unjust refusal to accept
payment would also make the obligation extinguished.
Issue: Whether or not the obligation is extinguished
Holding: No, under article 1236, creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no
interest in the fulfillment of the obligation unless there is a stipulation. There’s no stipulation in the promissory note.
Thus, the spouses alone bear responsibility
Sunga-Chan vs. CA
Facts:
 Lamberto Chua (respondents) and Jacinto Sunga, husband of Cecilia Sunga (petitioner), formed a partnership to
engage in the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas in 1977, which was named Shellite that was registered as a
sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto
 Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Sunga continued the business when Jacinto died in 1989, without Chua’s consent.
 Chua repeatedly demanded for accounting but was ignored which prompted him to file a Complaint for Winding
Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal, and Recovery of Shares and Damages with a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.
 The accounting report came up with P8,733,644.75 as Chua’s claim
 Due to the petitioner’s failure to appear the hearings, they were deemed to have waived the right to object the
claim.
 Sheriff of Manila levied the property of Lilibeth Sunga-Chan which was auctioned to Lamberto Chua for P8
million. However, petitioner Sunga-Chan argues that such property forms part of a conjugal partnership
between his husband and cannot be held liable.
 the approved claim of respondent Chua is hereby corrected and adjusted to cover only the aggregate amount of
PhP 5,529,392.52;
 Subject to the payment by respondent Chua of PhP 2,470,607.48 to petitioner Sunga-Chan
 The property was auctioned for a price of P8 million by Chua but the claim of Chua only amounts to
P5,529,392.52 which means that Lamberto Chua owes Lilibeth Sunga-Chan the excess amount of P2,470,607.48.
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Republic Glass v. Qua
Solidary Obligation, Novation
Republic Glass, Gervel and Qua were shareholders of Ladtek
Ladtek obtained loans from Metrobank and Private Dev’t Corp of the Phils (PDCP)
They entered into agreement that in case of default in payment of Ladtek loans, the parties will reimburse each other the
proportionate shares of any sum that any might pay to creditors
Ladtek defaulted on its obligation to Metrobank and PDCP
Republic Glass Corp and Gervel Corp payed Metrobank 7M (not full payment of the amount due)
Republic Glass and Gervel demanded to Qua reimbursement of the total amount that RGC and GC paid to Metrobank
Qua refused to pay
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Qua filed a complaint for injunction with damages with application for TRO
Issues
W/N payment of the entire obligation is an essential condition for reimbursement?
W/N there was novation of agreements as held by CA (that there was implied novation)
Ruling
On the first issue:
Contrary to RGC and GC’s claim, payment of any amount will not automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary
debtor pays the obligation in part, he can recover reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far his payment exceeded
his share in the obligation. This is precisely because if solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his proportionate share in
the obligation, then he in effects pay only what is due to him. If the debtor pays less than his share in the obligation, he
cannot demand reimbursement because his payment is less than his actual debt.
Since they only made partial payments, RGC and GC should clearly and convincingly show that their payments to Metro
bank and PDCP exceeded their proportionate shares in the obligations before they can seek reimbursement from Qua.
RGC and GC failed to do this, thus they cannot seek reimbursement from Qua
On the second issue:
There was no novation of the agreements. The parties did not constitute new obligations to substitute the agreements.
The terms and conditions of the agreement remains the same.
Novation extinguishes obligation by 1) changing the object or principal conditions; 2) substituting the person of the debtor
and 3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor
Chua v The Executive Judge
 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a
complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or
the Bouncing Checks Law
 MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a total of P540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty
 etitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis
instead of being required to pay the total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once
 orty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as undocketed cases under UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96
 18 April 2012, petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of the MeTC a motion entitled “Urgent Motion to
Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per Case Basis”
 26 June 2012, the Executive Judge issued an Order denying petitioner’s Urgent Motion
 petitioner’s plea would constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees that, in turn, contravenes Section
1(b) of the Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
 The Executive Judge erred when she treated the entire P540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation,
 Granting petitioner’s request would not constitute a deferment in the payment of filing fees, for the latter
clearly intends to pay in full the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
 Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and may be paid for each count separately.
ANTONIA A. CABARROGUIS v. TELESFORO B. VICENTE
 March 15, 1955, plaintiff Antonia A. Cabarroguis, a registered nurse and midwife residing in Davao City,
sustained physical injuries as a result of an accident when the AC "jeepney"
 permanent partial disability to her right forearm.
 entered on July 13, 1955 into a compromise agreement with the said victim Antonia A. Cabarroguis, obligating
himself to pay to her the sum of P2,500
 Of that amount, defendant has paid a total of P1,500.00 leaving therefore, an unpaid balance of P1,000.
 defendant fail to complete payment within a period of sixty days, he would pay an "additional amount of
P200.00 as liquidated damages."
Citing Article 1226 of the new Civil Code, he argued that in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty substitutes the
indemnity for damages and payment of interest.
if the obligation consists in a sum of money, the only damage a creditor may recover, if the debtor incurs in delay, is the
payment of the interest agreed upon, or the legal interest, unless the contrary is stipulated. (