SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY AND MISSIONS
THEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
MPTS650 AFRICAN TRADITIONAL
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL
VALUES
LECTURER: DR. MRS. DORIS YALLEY
BAFFOE PRINCE
GRS/TMP/20/0/2612
TOPIC: AFRICAN IDEAS OF COMMUNITY - PERSONHOOD,
SOLIDARITY & COMMUNALISM
TITLE: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PERSONHOOD AND COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
It is mostly the case of research work or study trying to strike the differences between
the concept of personhood and community which leads to finding which of the
ideologies or moral thought is superior. This research work will try to rather draw
views to establish a connection between the two concepts.
The individual is the issue or problem that occupied Rawls' neo-Kantianism in A
theory of justice (1971), as well as other individualist thinkers including Robert
Nozick, David Gauthier, Ronald Dworkin, and, to a lesser degree, Kymlicka.
From his Hegelian traditions, contemporary ‘communitarian authors' like Alasdair
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, and Charles Taylor focus fundamentally
on this same notion of ‘the person.'
To ask the question, “does the individual's existence belong to him or does it belong
to the community?” for Menkiti, for example, would be incomprehensible and
obnoxious, if not abominable, because, in his opinion, “it is the community which
defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of reason, will, or
memory” (1984, pp. 171-172) and that, “a community defines the person as person
not some isolated static quality of rationality, will or memory” (1984, pp. 171-172)
and that as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes
precedence over the reality of individual life histories, whatever these may be,” says
the author. (Page 180).
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the "relationship between personhood and
communalism within the African culture.
In this research work, I will analyse the concept of personhood and community based
on what some scholars proposed and opposed whiles sharing my views on these
concepts. Also I will then finally try to examine the relationship between these two
concepts.
“Wisdom is like a baobab tree; no one person can accept it,” says an African proverb.
LITERATURE REVIEW
“Negro-African society places more emphasis on the collective than on the individual,
more on unity than on the individual's action and needs, more on the communion of
persons than on their autonomy,” writes Senghor. “We live in a community.” (p. 49,
1964). He backs up his point by saying that "NegroAfrican culture is collectivist or,
more specifically collective, since it is ratified."
“If you want to go far, go alone,” says an African proverb. Go together if you want to
go far.” The culture, according to Wiredu and Gyekye, “alone constitutes the
background, social or cultural space, in which the actualization of the individual
person's possibilities will take place, providing the individual person with the
opportunity to express his individuality, to acquire and grow his personality and to
fully become the kind of person he wants”. (1992, p. 106)
According to Mbiti, the person is created by the community, and without the
community, the individual will not exist. ‘I am, since we are; and because we are, so I
am,' the person can only say. (1970, p. 141; emphasis mine). According to this way of
thinking, a human being becomes real only through her interactions with others in a
community or group, and as a result, the growth of an individual is limited.
So, in Kenyatta's words, "nobody is an isolated person." Or, to put it another way, his
individuality is a secondary reality about him; first and foremost, he is the relative and
contemporary of many people.” (p. 297, 1965).
Instead of the Cartesian individualistic concept of a human, such an African
communitarian interpretation of being would be better captured as “I am connected,
therefore we are.”
Other scholars have noted that African moral philosophy contains strands of
individualism. For example, in defending an African environmental ethics, Kevin
Behrens (2011) notes some strains of individualism in African moral thinking, but
ultimately prefers a communalistic account. In his influential essay, Thad Metz (2007)
”Toward an African Moral Theory” had stated that he had discovered that most of the
literature in African moral thinking takes an individualist orientation, but he goes on
to defend a community-based moral theory as the most logical way to interpret
African ethics in his survey of the literature (Metz, 2007; 2010).
THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNATARIANISM
A well-known term, ‘communitarianism,' often comes up in current philosophical
debates about the arrangement of the African nation. Communitarianism is described
as "the belief that the community (i.e., society) is the focal point of the actions of
individual members of the society."
Many African thinkers regard the African culture as communitarian, as will be
demonstrated shortly. Many African thinkers consider the African social structure to
be communitarian, but there have been some differences between Gyekye and other
scholars about how correct this description of the African social structure is. African
thinking tends to offer a variety of viewpoints on existence, as well as the world and
what it comprises.
Given this, as well as the current situation in Africa, where many of its educated
people are being exposed to Western concepts of individual rights, there is the
potential for differing interpretations of how the African social system can
compensate for or conceive of the common or community good (and how to achieve
it).
Despite the fact that they are members of a community, fundamental cultural
characteristics and allegiances are believed to be shared by a group of people. The
concept of a community can thus be described as "the concept of a group of people
living together in a specific location and sharing certain commonalities of history,
philosophy, belief system, beliefs, lineage, kinship, or political system" (Ikuenobe
2006: 1)
Because of the aforementioned differences among Africa's educated people,
especially philosophers, and the fact that they can each defend their positions with
strong arguments, the African (sense of) community cannot be easy. The term
"culture" in this paper refers to a "cultural community." As formulated by African
academics, the general perspective of the African cultural community's overall
perspective, as formulated by African scholars, must be grasped in its entirety,
including all historical underpinnings.
For example, shortly after the official end of the Cold War, some African states'
founding fathers, such as Kaunda, Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Senghortilt, changed their
allegiances to socialism.
Socialism could be expressed in African words, and the socialist state's social system
was comparable to, if not identical to, the African social structure.
Mbiti and Menkiti also argued for the African social system's enormously social
character and its ontological primacy over the person (Mbiti 1989: 141; Menkiti 1984:
171- 173).
Nonetheless, with Gyekye's theory of "moderate communitarianism" (Gyekye 1995:
154-162), the discussion of the idea took a significant philosophical turn, with a more
detailed exposition in his Tradition and Modernity.
Any minor disruption in the social equilibrium is bound to lead to this lack of
confidence in group life in a social setting where the person sees himself as supreme,
independent, and self-governing. In a similar way, when a person is confronted with
life problems that he cannot solve on his own, he becomes distraught; feeling
existentially alone in the world, the individual becomes cranky and comes to
conclude that community is a clog, obstructive and encumbering,
Unlike the attitude mentioned above, Africans are unlikely to give absolute power to
someone who is at odds with the party.
Africans, on the other hand, conclude that a person's life is only important in the sense
of their culture. To put it another way, it is in interacting with other members of
society rather than living in isolation.
The potent force of what is known as "the will of the nation" provides the evident
curtailment of a person's power to do as he wills among the Igbo people of Nigeria, as
well as among other African peoples in general. In Africa, as T. U. Nwala points out,
“the being of the community is greater than, and prior to, that of any of its individual
members, since the being of the community as a whole is larger than, and prior to,
that of any of its individual members.”
Opoku (1978: 92) argues that the saying “a man is a man because of others, and life is
when you are together, alone you are an animal” is a common one in Africa,
emphasizing this notion of the social essence of creation.
Community life contributes to a sense of belonging and security among society's
members. But it does so much more: it also contributes to the development of respect
for all members of society. And, according to W. E. Abraham, in Africa, society is
traditionally conceived as having "a sacral unity, which includes its living members,
its dead members" (who survive in less substantial form) (Abraham 1992:25).
Similarly, culture serves as a bulwark for the people' common interests to a large
degree. J. S. Mbiti's argument that "the personality does not and cannot exist alone
except corporately" in Africa supports Abraham's viewpoint (Mbiti 1969:108)
It is important to note that the communitarian concept of community is not to be
confused with the character portrayed in social contract theories, in which agreed
collaboration is centered on the quest for mutual benefits. Such a notion of
community, in the communitarian view, is understood as causal dependence between
"the person" and her "community." defended by individualists like Gauthier, (1986,
pp. 330-355) not only undermines the very identity.
THE PERSONHOOD CONCEPT
Ifeanyi Menkiti, a Nigerian philosopher, was the first to identify the normative
concept of personhood. It applies to people who live morally upright lives (Menkiti
1984, 2004)
In Akan philosophy, personhood is described in moral terms, according to Gyekye.
According to him, someone is called a ‘person' if she has a disposition that is largely
ethical in the group.( Gyekye 1992: 109-110)
By virtue of the person experiences or relationships with other members of the
community, as well as her general choices of behavior in life, such an individual is
deemed to be a source of goodness to the community.
Menkiti is based on Mbiti's concept of ,
"I am because we are, and because we are, so I am," says an African. "It is through
rootedness in an ongoing human culture that the individual comes to see himself as
man, and it is through first understanding this community as a stubborn perduring
truth of the psychological universe that the individual also comes to know himself as
man." (Menkiti 1984:171-172)
Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye are without a doubt two of the most prominent
moral thinkers in African philosophy. Both of them, interestingly, defend humanism
(Molefe, 2015). "Humanism" is a metaethical thesis that moral properties are better
interpreted in natural terms, specifically in terms of some human property (Wiredu,
1992; Gyekye, 1995).
Wiredu (1992: 194) uses the Akan maxim "onipa na ohia" to promote personhood,
interpreting it to mean "all human meaning derives from human interests." “The first
axiom of all Akan axiological philosophy is that man or woman is the indicator of all
value,” he writes elsewhere (1996: 65)
Individualism is perfectly evident in Wiredu's moral philosophy. The fact that Wiredu
defends humanism as a meta-ethical philosophy and posits human interests or wellbeing as the universal moral standard answers the question of whether his moral
theory is thoroughly individualistic. Gyekye's moral philosophy is in the same boat.
He is also a humanist, which means he would base morality on certain human
property because he excludes God from morality in certain ways (Gyekye, 2010). “All
other values are reducible fundamentally to the meaning of well-being... all things are
important insofar as they improve... well-being... as a „master value,” says Gyekye
emphatically (Gyekye, 2004: 41). So, Gyekye is a Wiredu fan.
As a result, we have two powerful moral theorists defending a humanistic meta-ethics
that locates morality in certain human property. As a result, Akan morality, as
embodied by these two prominent African philosophers, is individualistic in that it is
based on certain human property, specifically well-being.
The difference is that if communality is conceived as "the collective," it becomes a
matter of personal preference as to whether or not people choose to be a member of
"the community." Personism, on the other hand, defends the viewpoint that
communality, like individuality, is not a choice for the individual. To put it another
way, according to the personist study, an individual does not choose to be special. He
doesn't want to be communal (i.e. relational) either.
As a result, it will not be a matter of mediating between two distinct bodies in order to
give rise to liberalist or "moderate communitarian" claims like those advanced by
Gyekye, a renowned African philosopher (1995, pp. 154-162).
The primary focus of morality becomes how individuals react to this individualistic
aspect of life.
Gyekye's normative theory, for example, is consequentialist in the sense that it allows
us to encourage individual well-being, but these three religious thinkers may be
construed as defending a self-realization approach to ethics, which requires agents to
develop or maintain their vitality through perfecting their characters, or so I
understand them (Bujo, 2001: 88; Shutte, 2001: 14).
In light of the above, we can see that in both secular and religious approaches to
ethics, there is a tendency in an African tradition to regard individualism as a
hallmark of moral theorization. As a consequence, the following findings by Metz are
not surprising.
”It's a cliché to claim that dominant Western moral views are "individualistic," while
African moral views are "communitarian," so it's odd that the most popular theoretical
interpretations of ubuntu, which I've examined above, are all more "individualistic"
than "communitarian." (Metz, 2007:333)
However, according to African scholars, normative considerations are "germane" or
"more prevalent" in this tradition (Ikuenobe, 2006: 117; Wiredu, 2009: 13). “There is
an African conception of personhood that is not only distinct from Western notions,
but also foundational and characteristic of African philosophical thought,” according
to Behrens (2013: 105)
This idea, we are told, is different from what one might find in the West. It is also said
to be both fundamental and distinctive in African philosophical thinking. As a result,
it is unsurprising that Metz's review of African ethics literature concludes that "This is
possibly the prevailing understanding of African ethics" (2007: 331).
It's also worth noting that African scholars have repeatedly stated that the best way to
understand communitarianism is through the concept of personhood (Gyekye, 1992:
102; Gyekye, 1997: 49; Mbigi, 2005: 75; Wiredu 2008: 336)
‘Moderate communitarianism,' according to Gyekye, expresses the concept that, while
African culture is communitarian in nature, it still allows for certain autonomy and/or
individual rights.
However, Gyekye's position has been criticized for incoherence in his conceptions of
"individual, personhood, and culture" as a result of "difficulties existent in Gyekye's
own claims" that result in a lack of clarification (Majeed, 2018, p. 36).
The difficulty of subsuming individuality into ‘community' is faced by the same. The
argument here is that Gyekye's version of "moderate communitarianism" is not as
moderate as he claims; that the supposed divide between his viewpoint and the
"radical communitarian" viewpoint he criticizes might not be as broad as he claims
(Famakinwa, 2011).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONHOOD AND
COMMUNITY/COMMUNITARIANISM
The positions of Mbiti and Menkiti on personhood and Community can be
summarized as follows: a person has a propensity to behave morally and has the
general social good or the community's interest at heart. The group depends on its
members' goodness, which is provided by the individual. This is an example of how
personhood and culture are connected.
Yet, it is Gyekye's description of Mbiti and Menkiti as "radical" communitarians that
has led him to label them as "radical" communitarians.
Gyekye's roles on Mbiti and Menkiti, on the other hand, are difficult to come by. This
has influenced Martin Ajei's presentation of Gyekye's criticism of Menkiti, for
example. Gyekye considers Menkiti as a "radical communitarian," according to Ajei
(2015: 497). (extreme communitarian).
However, his claim that Gyekye regards Menkiti as such is debatable, given Menkiti's
belief that society in the African social setting "defines the individual as person... and
personhood is something that must be earned, not given simply because one is born of
human seed."
This interrogation will focus not only on Ajei's interpretations, but also on the flaws in
Gyekye's own claims against Menkiti. To begin with, Gyekye, contrary to Ajei's
belief, sometimes affirms (but does not deny) that personhood must be achieved, and
he (Gyekye) does not deny that not everyone is considered a person. According to
Gyekye, "much is anticipated" in Akan culture.
The promotion or practice of moral virtue is seen as fundamental to a person's identity.
(1992: 109). As a result, the Akan will describe such a person as a "true (human)
person" (ye onipa paa) who is "absolutely pleased with, and deeply appreciative of,
the high standards of morality of a person's behavior." (1992:109).
This means that, since not all humans would be able to demonstrate high moral
standards in order to be considered "persons" or "true human persons," Gyekye
indicates that personhood would not be achieved by all. This implies that personhood
can be attained and that human beings do not automatically achieve this moral status.
Indeed, Gyekye admits that ‘some expressions in Akan language, as well as
judgments or evaluations made about people's lives and actions, give the impression
that the society defines and confers personhood' (1992: 108-109).
And that there are certain "common standards and values" in the Akan culture to
which "a person's conduct, if he is a person, ought to adhere" (Gyekye 1992: 109).
The ultimate communal character of morals, norms, and moral virtues can be seen in
Gyekye's list of actions: "generosity, kindness, sympathy, benevolence, respect, and
empathy for others; in short, any action or behavior that promotes the welfare of
others" (1992: 109).
In contrast to Menkiti, Gyekye offers an additional explanation of the moral
conception of the individual in Akan philosophy: the human being is ‘considered to
possess an inherent capacity for goodness, for performing morally correct acts...'
(1992: 109).
‘Moral capacities as such cannot be said to be implanted by, catered for, or bestowed
by the society,' Gyekye observes. (1992, page 111). Gyekye acknowledges that the
community can play a part in a person's spiritual life, such as through "moral teaching,
guidance, admonition, and the application of sanctions" (1992: 111).
Gyekye's change is partially an effort to reduce the force or consequences of the
communal obligation of moral values conformity (which he has committed to in the
preceding paragraph). He correctly predicts that if the preceding paragraph's logic is
maintained, it would be difficult to dismiss Menkiti's version of communitarianism.
Because, if following moral principles and communal values ensures personhood, and
the community enforces this and determines which individuals are doing so, then the
community is the determinant of personhood in some way.
Gyekye's presentation of the inherent dimension of personhood, on the other hand, is
somewhat vague. He sets out to present it in contrast to the concept of communal
conferment of personhood, which is based on the ‘processual' acquisition of moral
personhood. That a human being is a human being regardless of age or social status.
Personhood may be fully realized in a culture, but it is not gained or accomplished as
one progresses through society.' (1992: 108)
Menkiti's idea that the community "fully defines or confers personhood" is something
Gyekye rejects and regards as extreme (1992: 111). In comparison to Menkiti,
Gyekye gives another understanding of the moral conception of the person in Akan
philosophy: identifying the human being as a person (onipa),
He's thought to have an inherent potential for virtue, for carrying out morally correct
acts... (Ibid., p. 109). However, as Gyekye points out, “[m]oral capacities as such
cannot be assumed to be implanted, catered for, or bestowed by the community.”
(1992: 111).
Gyekye acknowledges that the community can play a part in a person's spiritual life,
such as through "moral teaching, guidance, admonition, and the application of
sanctions" (1992: 111). Gyekye's change is partially an effort to reduce the force or
consequences of the communal obligation of moral values conformity.
He correctly predicts that if the preceding paragraph's logic is maintained, it would be
difficult to dismiss Menkiti's version of communitarianism.
Because, if following moral principles and communal values ensures personhood, and
the community enforces this and determines which individuals are doing so, then the
community is the determinant of personhood in some way.
As a result, he adds to the communal aspect the individual's right to "execute" her
own "life style and ventures" – primarily due to her rationality – to determine who he
or she is (1992: 111-112).
Another manner in which personhood is linked to communitarianism is that a person
who wishes to be labeled as a communitarian or as having achieved the status of
personhood can only do so by achieving the status of personhood.
These are granted to an individual (onipa) by the way she behaves. Furthermore,
communitarianism and personhood tend to be linked in quality and direction as a
philosophy of action. If one is or is not respecting the tenets of communitarianism, it
is determined by the nature (goodness or badness) of one's actions; and the direction
in which the requirements of both personhood and communitarianism lead an
individual.
CONCLUSION
In terms of personhood, I believe that the prospect of moderate communitarian
morality still lies in communal moral expectations for the common good and the
upholding of moral norms. It isn't within the realm of moral capability. An entity is
considered a ‘person' (onipa) in this sense when she, for example, contributes to moral
acts and the promotion of the well-being of others.
This sense of personhood is complex and distinct from the static sense of the moral
person, which Gyekye briefly touches on in his discussion of the normative
conception of the person. Personhood, in the static sense, is merely a capacity for
moral action (which a human being still possesses even if she has not acted) that
cannot be obtained in the future (since the human being has it)
But, if all people have the potential for moral action because they are already
individuals, what is the intellectual and practical value of proposing this definition of
personhood as a communitarian ethical theory?
Indeed, since one cannot choose not to be an individual, it cannot be a basis for
human ethical choices in the world, and it cannot be affirmed or rejected that it leads
humans to make ethical choices. The complex sense of personhood is the only sense
of personhood that confirms the spiritual foundations of communitarianism while still
having realistic ethical meaning.
Finally, an individual's personhood and communitarian orientation may be gained and
lost throughout their lives. In comparison to the connection between the definition of
an individual (onipa1) and communitarianism, all of this suggests a more clear link
between personhood and communitarianism.
REFERENCES
Gyekye, K. 1992. ‘Person and Community in Akan Thought’. In: Wiredu, K., Gyekye
K. (eds). Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I. Washington
DC:The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 101- 122
Gyekye, K. 1995. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual
Scheme (revised edn.). Philadelphia: Temple University Press
Ikuenobe, P. 2006. Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in
African Traditions. Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield
Mbiti, J.S. 1989. African Religions and Philosophy (2nd revised and enlarged edn.)
Heinemann: New Hampshire.
Nkrumah, K. 1964. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and
Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution. London:
Heinemann
Senghor, L. 1964. On African Socialism. Cook, M. (trans.). New York: Praegar
Menkiti, I. A. 1984. ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought’. In:
Wright, R.A. (ed.). African Philosophy: An Introduction (3rd edn.). Lanham, Md.:
University Press of Americas. pp. 171-181.
Wiredu, Kwasi 1983. ‘The Akan Concept of Mind’, Ibadan Journal of Humanistic
Studies 3: pp. 113-134.
Metz, Thad. “Toward an African Moral Theory”. The Journal of Political Philosophy
15, 2007: 321-341.
Metz, Thad. “Human Dignity, Capital Punishment and an African Moral Theory:
Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights”. Journal of Human Rights 9, 2010: 8199.
Behrens, Kevin. African Philosophy, Thought and Practice and Their Contribution to
Environmental Ethics. Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg, 2011.
Behrens, Kevin. “Two Normative Conceptions of „Personhood‟”. Quest 25, 2013:
103-119.
Submitted By:
………………………..
Baffoe Prince
Submission Date: 25th March 2021.