OPOSA V. FACTORAN JR. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 Facts: The petitioners are all minors duly presented and impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI). The original defendant is Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., Secretary of DENR but was substituted by the new secretary Honorable Angel C. Alcala. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayer’s class suit alleging the entitlement to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the virgin tropical rainforests. The minors further assert that they “represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn”. Petitioners prayed for the judgment upon (1) cancelling all existing timber license agreement in the country and (2) cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreement. Plaintiffs have a clear constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The original defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds (1) plaintiffs have no cause of action and (2) the issue raised is a political question. The respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion sustaining that there is no cause of action and it raises a political question. The Judge further ruled that granting of reliefs prayed would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology? Ruling: Yes, being impressed with merit, the petition is granted. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes such as the Philippine Environmental Policy, Philippine Environment Code already paid special attention to the “environmental right” of the present and future generations. The right of the petitioners is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 – to protect and advance said right. Non-impairment of Contracts Clause. The petitioner’s correctly pointed out Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (PD No 705) that provides “when national interest so inquires, the President may amend, modify, replace, or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted…” Thus, all licenses may be revoked by executive action. It is not a contract or a property right protected by the due process clause. Citing Tan vs. Director of Forestry, “a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license of privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or welfare.” In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. STONEHILL V. DIOKNO G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967 Facts: A total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and the corporations of which they are officers directed to any peace officer, to search the persons name and the premises of their offices, warehouses and residences to take and possession of several personal properties. The subject of the offense is stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense. The petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null and void on the grounds: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized; (2) cash or money not mentioned in the warrant, were actually seized; (3) warrants were used to fish evidence against petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants to be disposed of in accordance with law. In their answer, the respondents-prosecutors alleged (1) the contested warrants are valid and issued in accordance with the law; (2) the defects of the warrant were cured by the petitioner’s consent and that (3) in any event the effects seized are admissible in evidenced against the petitioner regardless of the alleged illegality. Issue: 1. Whether or not the searches and seizures made were illegal. 2. If the answer is negative, may it be used as evidences against the petitioners? Ruling: Yes, the searches and seizures made were illegal and the writ of preliminary injunction in connection to the documents, paper and other effects in the residences is permanent. The doctrine adopted in the Moncado case is abandoned; the warrants for the three residences are null and void. The document seized in split into two groups, first is those found and seized in the offices of the corporation and second are those seized in the residences. As for what was seized in the first group, the petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants because corporations have their respective personalities, distinct and separate. Legality of seizure can only be contested by the party whose rights have been impaired and objection is purely personal and cannot be availed of third parties. With respect to those seized in the residences of the petitioners, the resolution denied lifting the injunction in effect restraining the respondents from using them as evidence. The constitutional mandates on warrant are (1) that no warrant shall be issued but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in the Constitution (2) that warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific words had been alleged in the application and the averments were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued warrants to have found the existence of probable cause for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has committed particular acts or specific omissions, violating a given provision in our criminal laws. It would be legal heresy, of highest order to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and privacy of communication and correspondence at the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is the precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the provision – to outlaw the so called general warrants. Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that “a search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.” Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added a paragraph that “no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.” The grave violation made in the application for the contested warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects to be searched for and seized. Thus, the warrants are authorized were pertaining to all business transactions. The warrants sanction however seizure of all records, whatever were their nature, thus openly contravening the explicitly command of our Bill of Rights – things to be seized must be particularly described – tending to defeat the major objective of eliminating general warrants. The reliance of the respondent upon the Moncado vs. People maintaining that even if searches and seizures were unconstitutional, it is admissible in evidence against the petitioners, must be abandoned. Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach, adopting the exclusionary rule as it is the only practical means of enforcing constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN G.R. No. 14639 March 25, 1919 Facts: The Mayor of Manila, Justo Lukban, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for woman of ill repute. Between October 16 and 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. During this period, the city authorities quietly were arranging for the sending of the women to Davao as laborers. About midnight on October 25, the police acting pursuant the orders from their chief and mayor, hustled 170 inmates into patrol wagon and place aboard the steamers. The women were not given the opportunity to collect their belongings and were given the impression that they were being taken to the police station not knowing that they were destined to Mindanao (without consent). The vessels reached Davao on October 29 where they were received as laborers by the provincial governor, Francisco Sales and hacendero Feliciano Ynigo and Rafael Castillo, who claimed that they had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes expelled from the city of Manila. Attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of deportees presented an application for habeas corpus. Issue: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus be granted. Ruling: In granting the habeas corpus. One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society and at night without their consent and opportunity to consult or defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board to an unknown place. Despite the attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily, such was not the case as the fact is impossible to refute and was practically admitted by the respondents. There is no law, order or regulation which even hints the right of the Mayor or chief of the police to force the citizens of the Philippine Islands protected by the constitutional guarantee to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Law defines power. The very idea, said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of oppression (1) civil action ; (2) criminal action and; (3) writ of habeas corpus – devised and exists as the best and only devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The prime application of the writ of habeas corpus is the restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right. US V. BUSTOS G.R. No. L- 12592 March 8, 1918 Facts: In 1915, numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan for malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges are alleging for solicitation of money from persons who have a pending cases before the judge. The justice later then filed a motion for a new trial asserting that he was a victim of prosecution which overruled the earlier decision removing him from office. The justice of peace alleged that the accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory and libelous against him. Issue: Whether or not the defendants and appellants are entitled to the constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Ruling: Yes. They are entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege guaranteed by constitution in the bill of rights. The interest of the society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Ofcourse, criticism does not authorized defamation. The guaranties of a free speech and free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. Privilege is classified as absolute or qualified. As to qualified privilege, it may be lost by proof of malice. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The proving malice lies on the plaintiff. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. As a general rule, words imputing to a judge dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. In the case at bar, the direct and vicious accusations published in the press are of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication.
