Article XVII – Amendments or Revisions
Gonzales vs. COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Political
Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held
the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14,
1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned
as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving
the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress
when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913).
In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense
that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a
political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general
election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers
are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers
are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments,
is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it
reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say
whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional
limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held
on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the
[1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special,
not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite
be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission,
intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the
original proposition with the amended proposition.
Javellana vs, Executive Secretary
50 SCRA 30 – Political law – Constitutional Law – Political Question – Validity
of the 1973 Constitution – Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973
Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the
Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said
constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the
same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free
election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of
the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his
political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show
such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the
people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of
the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to
the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the
same had shown such acquiescence.
Defensor et al. vs. COMELEC
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s
Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general circulation,
and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers
in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
that 1.) the constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and
no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides
for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues
and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically
made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the
matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law – as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that
system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments to this
constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although
this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not
provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November 20, 2006 when ten
justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated,
that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare
decisis.
Lambino vs. COMELEC
Amendment vs Revision
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their
proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather
the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the
proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition
contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but
they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes
comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative
district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters.
This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed
amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec
1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These
proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug
2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in
pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended
that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties
within that case.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and
not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein
a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed
amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would
enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec
2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated,
that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.
The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be
decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of
constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.
***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted
by the Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that
Republic Act 6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare
decisis.
****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor
Preamble
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing
of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto,
and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government”. The fact that the fund is being used for
such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.
On religious freedom
64 Phil. 201 – Political Law – Appropriation – Religious Sect – Religious
Freedom
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof.
then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain
stamps the design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape
and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced
and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for
appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed
the production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of
said stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of
Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the
appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or
denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact,
what was emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but
rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the
other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No.
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is
recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we
implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If
should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional
mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
Article I — National Territory
Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue (CIR)
30 SCRA 968 – Political Law – Sovereignty
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide
technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan
imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got
permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US
citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for
$6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air
Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 pesos and
that his income tax would be 2,797.00 pesos. Reagan paid the assessed tax
but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is
exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark
Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan
also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his
employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and
countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over
the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine
income tax?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely
of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty,
the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of
(Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the
State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over
the lot located within the US Naval Base.
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases
Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not
become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the
Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases
– this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted
that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US
source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence
taxable.
People vs. Gozo
53 SCRA 476 – Political Law – Sovereignty
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval
Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon
the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she
demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary
permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by
the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her
to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP)
FACTS:On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of
the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x
xxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of
full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In
fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at
any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under
our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the
ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself
by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even
be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and
all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted
as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds
that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely,
the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Republic vs China
FACTS:The Republic of the Philippines(Philippines) instituted an arbitration
case against the People’s Republic of China(China) under the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(Convention or UNCLOS) since
both parties have ratified the Convention. However, China have consistently
stated its view on the lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the matter.
The arbitration concerns disputed between the parties regarding the legal
basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China Sea, the status
of certain geographic features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of
certain actions taken by China in the South China Sea.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Tribunal has jurisdiction.
2. Whether China have claims under historical rights and the “nine-dash-line”
3. What is the status of features in the South China Sea
4. WON the activities of China in the South China Sea is lawful.
5. WON the actions of China since the commencement of arbitration have
aggravated and extended the dispute.
6. What is China’s future conduct?
3. Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at
least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged
at high tide do not. The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily
modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled that the Convention
classifies features on their natural condition, and relied on historical materials
in evaluating the features.
Article 121 establishes a regime of islands as follows:
Article 121
Regime of Islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above
water at high tide.
RULING:
1. Article 288 of the Conventions states that “In the event of a dispute as to
whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by
decision of that court or tribunal.”
2. With respect to Submission No. 1, for the reasons set out above, the
Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, the
Convention defines the scope of maritime entitlements in the South China
Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein. the Tribunal
concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the
maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of
the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to
the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s
maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the
Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are
determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
The tribunal found that although there were evidence of transient habitation
on the features, there was no showing of permanent habitation that the
features could support a stable community therefore they are considered
rocks. Thus, Having found that none of the features claimed by China was
capable
natural condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef.
of generating an exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it
could—without delimiting a
6.The Tribunal considers it beyond dispute that both Parties are obliged to
comply with the Convention, including its provisions regarding the resolution
of disputes, and to respect the rights and freedoms of other States under the
Convention. Neither Party contests this, and the Tribunal is therefore not
persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate for it to make any further
declaration.
boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines, because
those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.
4. the Tribunal finds that China has, by virtue of the
conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough
Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine vessels and
personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and
16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of
the Convention.
Article II — Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Principles
Section 1
5. yes, it has. (a) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their
respective rights and entitlements in the area of Mischief Reef by building a
large artificial island on a low-tide elevation located in the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines. (b) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment at
Mischief Reef by inflicting permanent, irreparable harm to the coral reef
habitat of that feature.(c) China has extended the Parties’ dispute concerning
the protection and preservation of the marine environment by commencing
large-scale island-building and construction works at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery
Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef.
(d) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of
maritime features in the Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate
entitlements to maritime zones by permanently destroying evidence of the
Abueva vs Wood
FACTS:By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
provided for a standing appropriation of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per
annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise
appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission,
including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance
of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in the
annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the
rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act hereafter
approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the
proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments
authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they
are legally obliged to prevent the funds from being squandered, and to
prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the
purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the
respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary
proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds
appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners
from examining said vouchers and documentary proofs.
ISSUE:Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the
petitioners
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto,
shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the
Commission of Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a
question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore not
justiciable.
Free Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor
108 SCRA 757 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Completeness Test
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone
Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company.
Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the
issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the
provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of power
by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also
effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and
head of the executive department of the Philippine Government, is
subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the
Independence Commission, are mere agents of the Philippine
Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the
action because section 24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The
administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the
Minister of Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no
ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the
Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle
and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. But as to
whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to
be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual
determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it
set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being
limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”
Tanada vs Cuenco
103 Phil. 1051 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Political Question
Defined – Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado
Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the
SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator
the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled
in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So
did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by
NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of
the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose
the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The
issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the
SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat
of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case,
the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would
fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party).
This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its
own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the
Constitution.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Amendment to the
Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum
on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending
the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No.
1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept
1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for
a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the
court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification
raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power
of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly
during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue
of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The
Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a
limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments
to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people
in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP
883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap
elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.
BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to
continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7
of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special
election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for
such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably
vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held
and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his
oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate
his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They
have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore
stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election
on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes
to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the
purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot,
either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.
Dela Llana vs. COMELEC
Facts: Dela Llana filed a petition for prohibition or declaratory relief against
respondents from holding a referendum with the question: "Do you vote that
President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President
and be Prime Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to
the Constitution?"
Issue: Is the petition for declaratory relief prosper?
Held: No. The subject matter is a political and non-justiciable question,
involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the decision to call
for a referendum. The power to determine when a referendum should be
called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the
political branch of the Government, the exercise of which involves
consideration of a multitude of factors political, social, economic, etc. normally outside the periphery of competence of the courts.
Arnault vs. Balagtas
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue
ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of
contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.
Topic: Legislative power
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2
estates, the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the
attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase
which was effected. The price paid for both estates was P5,
000,000.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a
Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and
whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate
investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase
price, or P440, 000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this
question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of
the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in
the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special
Committee the name of the person who received the P440, 000 and
to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed a habeas
corpus proceeding.
CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of
petitioner pursuant to a Senate Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and
that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not
considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to
whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. Further, on the
ISSUE: W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt
YES
1.
The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses. This is implied or incidental or necessary to
the exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme
within the realm of its respective authority; it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independent of
the other's authority and power.
2.
Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative
power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the
legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and
absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary
power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the
exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
3.
The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or
authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein
offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that
criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within
the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts;
because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative
power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement
and application of the criminal law.
ISSUE 2: W/N petitioner has already purged himself of contempt
4.
5.
No. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as the person
to whom delivery of the sum of P440, 000 was made. However, the
Senate Committee refused to believe that this is the real name of the
person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate,
therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original
contempt, or reiterated it.
Finally, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued
confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby
interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations
Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,
entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),
“by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,
therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is
unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority
to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Humberto vs. PAGCOR
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
197 SCRA 52 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal
Protection Clause
Municipal Corporation – Local Autonomy – Imperium in Imperio
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
was created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted
PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s
operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399 was passed which
expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the
law creating PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because
a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy
clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms
of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and
other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced
cities like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as
PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form,
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is
violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse
racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races
(RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under certain conditions,
while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869
for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal
protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III,
Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create
its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy
(particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power
of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may
provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to
control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish
municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress
can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government
over local governments.
People vs. Vera
65 Phil. 56 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal
Protection – Probation Law
Separation of Powers – Undue Delegation of Powers – Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws – May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against
him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936,
he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office
which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A
hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.
The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is
presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu
Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The
Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila,
even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer – hence,
a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act
4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal
protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the
prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation
officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed – hence,
that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of
power because it gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to
apply the probation law – however, the legislature did not provide guidelines
to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the
executive’s power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing
for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executive’s power to
grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by
HSBC – ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the
probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
(sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining
whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only creates
a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution,
representing the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot
question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had
used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning
the validity of the said law (estoppel).
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the
power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach
upon the President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon.
Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a
power of the president to commute penalties.
Encroachment of Executive Power
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized
representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not
lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note.
There is violation of the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces
were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation
officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the
accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall
only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided
for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard
63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua
et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935,
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC
adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming
that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the
election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from
the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of
conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof,
the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that
no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution,
which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
Section 2
Mejoff vs. Director of Prison
admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry. He was
then ordered to be deported to Russia on the first available transportation to
said country. But Russian ships refused to take him due to their alleged lack
of authority to do so. He was then transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was
kept in detention as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is of best
interest to detain the unwanted alien while arrangements for his deportation
are being made. Mejoff contends that he was legally brought to the
Philippines by the then Japanese forces and he may not now be deported.
He also contends that the statutory period to deport him has long lapsed and
that we cannot detain him for an unreasonable period of time pursuant to the
Universal Declaration on Human rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff shall remain in detention?
HELD: Yes. The government has the power and the authority to eject from
the Philippines any and all unwanted aliens. He entered the country illegally
in 1944 and was arrested in 1948. Pursuant to Section 37 of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 an unwanted alien is subject to deportation within 5
years from arrest. And he may be held for a reasonable period of time
(depending on the circumstances) while arrangements are being held for his
deportation. There is no allegation however as to the length of time that he
has been detained. Hence, the same cannot be construed as
“unreasonable”. Further, there is no indication that the statutory period to
deport Mejoff had lapsed.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
90 Phil. 70 – Political Law – Universal Declaration of Human Rights
83 Phil. 171 – Political Law – Generally Accepted Principles of International
Law
Boris Mejoff was a Russian citizen who was arrested for being suspected as
a Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. It was found out that he
illegally entered the Philippines in 1944. He was without inspection and
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the
Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the
atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners
during the war. His trial was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is
questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided
for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is
not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal
charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take
cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional
provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague Convention and other similar
conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered
as part of the law of the land.
Agustin vs. Edu
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2)
‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4)
‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at
least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world,
who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway,
there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who
sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the
petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather
than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity
of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized
triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public.
Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would
only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police
power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote
Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public
needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the
well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The
police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the
fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
“To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense
Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the
imperative demands of public safety.
Reyes vs. Bagatsing
125 SCRA 553 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the
Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases
Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the
US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been
denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that
there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be
infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to
prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy.
Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US
embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we
“adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign
diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the
same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the
Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free
speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued
by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would
collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger
test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief
assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful
rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no
showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides,
there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally –
but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).
Section 4
People vs. Lagman
66 Phil. 13 – Political Law – Defense of State
In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled
by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the
military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support,
has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman
further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to
the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a
prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”
State Policies
Sections 7, 8, 9
Tondo Medical vs. CA
Facts: The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the
Department of Health (DOH) in 1999, which provided five areas of general
reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal autonomy to government
hospitals that implements the collection of socialized user fees and the
corporate restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners alleged that
the implementation of the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically
disadvantage Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for violating
the following constitutional provisions: Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of
Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII, and
Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV. On May 24, 1999, then President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the
functions and Operations of the Department of Health”, which provided for
the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH.
The petitioners contented that a law, such as E.O. No. 120, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of
its legislative function. They argued that E.O. No. 102 is void, as this was
enacted ultra vires on the part of the President. The Court of Appeals (CA)
denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which proved fatal.
The CA also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the
various sections of Article II, III, XIII and XV of the 1987 Constitution. A
motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed by the petitioners but the
same was denied in a resolution dated March 7, 2005. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. W/O the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution
2. W/O the issuance of Executive Order No. 102 was above the authority of
the President
Held:
1. No. As a general rule, the provisions of the constitution are considered
self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement.
However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this
Court as non self-executing.
2. No. Petitioners claimed that the structural and functional reorganization of
the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which the president usurped
when he issued E.O. No. 102. This line of argument is without basis.This
Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by
executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as other statutes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: “The president shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Therefore, the president is within his
authority for issuing E.O No. 102.