COERCIVE AND NON-COERCIVE DIPLOMACY ASSIGNMENT # 2…… SEMESTER FALL-2020 Submission date (NOVEMBER 30,2020) BY AYESHA IFTIKHAR ROLL # 19010920-074 COURSE CODE: MGT-226 COURSE TITTLE INTERNATIONA RELATION AND CURRENT AFFAIRS SUBMITTED TO MAM NAILA BBA 3rd SECTION B- DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES 1 QUESTION Write a detail note on coercive and non-coercive diplomacy? COERCIVE DIPLOMACY Coercive diplomacy or "forceful persuasion" is the "attempt to get a target, a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a nonstate actor-to change its unpleasant behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of incomplete force". This term also refers to "diplomacy presuming the use or threatened use of military force to attain political objectives". Coercive diplomacy "is essentially a diplomatic plan, one that relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force. If force must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuading, it is employed in an exemplary manner, in the form of quite limited military action, to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if necessary". Coercive diplomacy can be more clearly described as "a political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary's will or incentive structure. It is a policy that combines threats of force, and, if necessary, the partial and selective use of force in distinct and controlled increments, in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements. The aim is to induce an adversary to fulfil with one's demands, or to negotiate the most favorable compromise possible, while simultaneously managing the crisis to prevent unwanted military escalation. Former Stanford University political professor, Alexander L. George, defined coercive diplomacy as a “defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor, by persuading the adversary to stop what it is doing or to undo what it had done.” A successful example of coercive diplomacy is the 2018 U.S. missile strikes against the Syrian regime to compel them to stop chemical attacks on civilians. When employing coercive diplomacy, the coercing power must have a credible threat for noncoercive. OBJECTIVES OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an adversary to reverse an action already taken. 2 Third, it may persuade an adversary to make "fundamental changes in its government". When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy, policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand". METHODS OF USIND CORCEIVE DIPLOMACY Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of using coercive diplomacy could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include the following: 1. Ultimatum The first variant of the 'coercive diplomacy' strategy is the classic 'ultimatum'. An ultimatum itself has three distinct components: "a demand on the opponent; a time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible to the opponent and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable". 2. Tacit Ultimatum The second variant of coercive diplomacy, ‘Tacit ultimatum’, is similar to 'ultimatum' except that it doesn't set forth an explicit time limit. 3. Try-and-See The third variant of coercive diplomacy, the 'Try-and-See', addresses strictly the first component of the 'ultimatum' variant, "a demand on the opponent". There is no time limit set, no sense of urgency conveyed, instead the coercer makes a single threat or takes a single action "to persuade the opponent before threatening or taking another step". 4. Gradual Turning of the Screw Finally, the 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' approach is similar to the 'Try-and-See' method in that it makes a threat but then "relies the threat of a gradual, incremental increase of coercive pressure rather than threatening large escalation to strong, decisive military action if the opponent does not comply". When using the coercive diplomacy strategy, it is important to understand that policymakers may shift from one variant option to another depending on the success of each step taken. 3 CASE STUDIES 1. Success President John F. Kennedy used coercive diplomacy successfully in 1962 when he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and avert possible warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet Union's attempt to deploy forty-two medium-range and twenty-four intermediaterange ballistic missiles into Cuba, he established a naval blockade and threatened an invasion of Cuba with force to remove the missiles already there. Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy decided to use coercive diplomacy. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-andSee' approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a message to Nikita Khrushchev to persuade him that the U.S. was able and willing to use force if needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba. The blockade limited the showdown to Kennedy and Khrushchev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval blockade, Khrushchev "directed all Soviet vessels carrying missiles and other military equipment to Cuba to immediately turn back". To intensify the coercive diplomacy strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach. Kennedy addressed the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the naval blockade as well as conveying to Khrushchev the continued threat of a possible invasion of Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of coercive diplomacy added to negotiated concessions, Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba. 2. Failure During the 1990–91 Gulf War, coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Saddam Hussein to exit Kuwait and move his military forces back to Iraq; though the use of deterrence effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into Saudi Arabia, it did little to expel him from Kuwait.[5] Initially, the Bush administration along with the United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The UN Security Council placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's 4 imports and exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive diplomatic variant, 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply to the demands to leave Kuwait. Then the Bush administration, along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum' by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces. In this instance, coercive diplomacy failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus, when implementing coercive diplomacy not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be considered. Especially in the 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state actors may affect a nation's diplomacy. NON-COERCIVE DIPLOMACY Non-coercive defence diplomacy is based on the principles of transparency, reputation and integrity and, per definition, it eschews violence or the threat thereof. It is therefore an exclusive subset of the wide range of international defence cooperation (generically referred to as 'defence diplomacy') in which defence forces engage. In international relations, states often attempt to influence other states through the provision of benefits, rather than through the threat or use of force. In contrast to coercive diplomacy, whose effectiveness is based on the power to hurt, the logic of non-coercive diplomacy hinges on the power to reward. The more benefits a state can provide, the more likely it is to be able to buy a policy of another state in non-coercive diplomacy. Even if a state has an enough ability to use force or threaten to use force, this does not necessarily imply that it would actually employ such a coercive measure; a state uses force or threatens to use force only when doing so is more beneficial than buying off another state through non-coercive diplomacy. A theory of coercion must 5 incorporate the possibility of a non-coercive measure in order to derive an unbiased prediction regarding the likelihood of coercive strategies. ASSUMPTION In non-coercive diplomacy, a state attempts to influence the behavior of another state by providing benefits as side-payments. Providing side-payments is costly as it involves the transfer of economic or military resources. However, the disutility of doing so depends on the size of power resources owned by the state: the more resources a state has, the less disutility it suffers from providing some of its resources as side-payments. Similarly, receiving side-payments is beneficial, but a state’s utility of receiving resources depends on the size of resources owned by the state: the more resources a state has, the less utility it obtains from receiving resources as side-payments. This assumption of diminishing marginal utility of resources is common in the literature of international relations EMPERICAL ANALYSIS The empirical analysis also examines the mechanism behind the theory by using the data on foreign aid as a proxy of non-coercive diplomacy. To disentangle the effect of power on coercion mediated through the substitution by non-coercive diplomacy, I conduct a mediation analysis, which decomposes the total effect of power into mediated and non-mediated effects, respectively. The empirical analysis presents evidence consistent with the logic behind the theory: the stronger a state is, the more likely it is to provide foreign aid, and the increased ability to provide foreign aid in turn makes it less likely to employ coercive measures. CONCLUSION A theory of military coercion by considering the substitution between coercive and non-coercive diplomacy. A stronger state may be able to buy off a weaker state through side-payments, and this ability to employ a non-coercive measure prevents the stronger state from making a credible commitment to using force against the weaker state, despite its potential ability to use coercive instruments. Without paying much attention to the possibility that a non-coercive measure may be used as a substitute for coercive instruments, the existing theories of military coercion predict a monotonically increasing effect of power on coercive strategies such as the threat or use of force. In contrast to this conventional view, the commitment problem discussed in this paper suggests a 6 nonmonotonic relationship between power and any kind of military coercion, including the threat to use force. 7
