Tapuz vs. Del Rosario
FACTS: Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and other John Does
totaling to 120 persons before Aklan MCTC. Private respondents alleged that they are the (1) registered owner of the disputed land; and (2) prior possessors, when Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms together with unidentified persons, entered the disputed land by force and intimidation without their permission and build thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. Petitioners, in
their answer, denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that they are the (1) actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and
(3) private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed land is spurious, asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. MCTC decided in private respondents’
favor, finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993. Such was appealed by petitioners to RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’ motion for issuance
of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond but the writ authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by public respondent Judge Del
Rosario after private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while private respondents filed a motion for demolition. Public respondent judge
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration to defer enforcement of preliminary mandatory injunction. Meanwhile, petitioners opposed the motion for demolition, but public respondent judge
nevertheless, issued a special order – a Writ of Demolition to be implemented within 15 days after the Sheriff’s notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houses to allow private respondents
to effectively take actual possession of the land. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition before the CA. Meanwhile, Sheriff issued a
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition; hence, petitioners filed before SC a petition for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUE: Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data, is proper?
HELD: No. While Certiorari is dismissible on the grounds of (1) filed out of time; (2) forum-shopping; and (3) substantive deficiencies, the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data cannot be granted on the
following grounds: (1) On the Writ of Amparo – what is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither it is a writ that shall be issued on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. In this case, what is involved is a property issues rooted from physical possession disputed by the parties. No issues relating to life or liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of the past violence has been alleged. Right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of threats and harassment implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist”
and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons, however, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the right to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing. (2) On the Writ of Habeas Data – there are no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. In this
case, petitioners failed to allege, much less, demonstrate, any need for information under the control of the police authorities other than those already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on insufficiency of efforts made to secure information has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data is nothing
more than a “fishing expedition” that the SC, in drafting the Rule on Habeas Data, had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not.
Caram vs. Segui
FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina
mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all
the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. On November 27, 2009, the DSWD,
a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then
commenced. On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she
wanted her family back together. On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring
Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority
and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from
DSWD.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.
HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court
in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are
missing. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to
qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the
pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
Vivares, et al. vs. St. Therese College
Facts: Julia and Julienne , both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school students at STC. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they
were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook
profile. Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only
in brassieres. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook. On March 1, 2012,
Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office Sr. Purisima, STC’s high school principal and. They claimed that during the meeting, they
were castigated and informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012. A week before
graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC and command the respondent not to implement the said
sanction which the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration. Despite the issuance of the
TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved. Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
RTC issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days
from service of the writ. In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition. the RTC rendered
a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. Hence the petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
Issues:
1.) Whether a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu?
2.) Whether the Respondents violated the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Held:
1.) NO, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The
provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data. To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal Endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. to agree with the argument of the petitioners, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view
of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting. adrianantazo.wordpress.com
2.) No, the respondents failed to established that the uploading or showing the photos to Tigol constitute a violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo to Tigol disproves their allegation that
the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s
claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. adrianantazo.wordpress.com It is well to note that not one of
petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by
(1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone
on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
Razon vs. Tagitis
FACTS: On October 31, 2007, Engr. Morced Tagitis(“Tagitis”),a World Bank Consultant and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Program,arrived in Jolo, Sulufrom a seminar in Zamboanga. He was accompanied by an IDB Scholar Arsimin Kunnong(“Kunnong”). The two stayed at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to purchase a boat ticket to Zamboanga for the following day butwhen Kunnong returned from this errand,Tagitis was nowhere to be found. According to the pension house’s receptionist,
Tagitis left his room key with the desk to buy food outside. Kunnong looked for Tagitisand contacted his phone but he could notbe reached. Kunnong also contacted Tagitis’Manila-based staff who
did not also know Tagitis’ whereabouts. Kunnong and the pension house staff then had Tagitis’ lockedroom opened and they discovered that Tagitis’personal belongings including cell phones,
documents and other personal belongings were all intact. Kunnong reported the matter to the police authorities in Joloand the latter insinuated that Tagitis could have been possibly abducted by the
Abu Sayyaf Group. After hearing this, Kunnong immediately contacted Tagitis’wife, Mary Jean,and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programmein the
Philippines.On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Prof. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station.On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance. On December 28, 2007,Mary Jean filed a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen.
Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police AntiCrime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet
CA RULING: On March 7, 2008, the CA issued adecisionconfirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the definition of the United Nations (UN) Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. It also
questioned Col. Kasim’s belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis. ased on these considerations, the CAextended the privilege
of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and
PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to
the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not
the military, that was involved.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be granted to protect Engr. Morced Tagitis?
2.Whether or not the Amparo petitionfiled by Mary Jean Tagitisis sufficient in form and substance?
HELD: 1. Yes.The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus,the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ
ofAmparoprovides for the following causes of action:Section 1.Petition. -The petition for a writ ofAmparois a remedy available to any person whoseright to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violationby an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The writ shall cover extralegal killings andenforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (emphasis supplied).The UN Declaration definedenforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:(a) arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;(c) followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.The fact of Tagitis’disappearance
was proven although there was no direct evidence indicating howhe actually disappeared. He was last seen going out of the ASY pension house but never to be seen nor heard again. The undisputed
conclusion, therefore, is that Tagitis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
2. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights.Section 5 provides:A petition for the Writ of
Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;(d) The investigation
conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved partyand the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.(emphasis
supplied)The pleader for the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actuallyacted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.The lack of supporting affidavit as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule should also not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. In this case, Mary Jean Tagitis substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon: knowledge about her husband’s
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in the disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual
violation to liberty.Based on these considerations, theCourt concluded that thedisclosure of Col. Kasim pointed to some government complicity in the disappearance. The Kasim evidence already
established a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers.To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, the Court referred the casebackto the CA for appropriate proceedingsdirected at
the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and thevalidation of their results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
Roxas vs. GMA
Facts: Melissa Roxas was a Filipino-American activist who was abducted by alleged soldiers under the presumption that she was an NPA member. She was a member of Bayan and was in Tarlac for a
Medical mission.
Together with two companions, she was in the house of one Mr. Paolo when 15 armed men banged at the door and seized her. They blindfolded her. She believed she was being taken to Ft. Magsaysay
in Nueva Ecija after estimating the travel time. She saw the faces of her captors. She was tortured under the premise of making her renounce her communist beliefs. She was released. The abductors still
did surveillance on her.
In her petition of writ of amparo and habeas data in the supreme court, against certain gov’t officials, she asked:
1. respondent government officials be enjoined from harming her family
2.inspection of detention area conditions in ft Magsaysay, nueva ecija
3. disclosure of documents regarding the spec ops group of the afp
4. expunge the docs regarding Roxas
5. return the belongings taken from her.
The case was brought to the court of appeals. To dismiss the petition, the respondents averred:
1. the abduction was done with the petitioner’s consent (stage-managed to smear the gov’t.)
2. the petitioner’s medical certificate showed only abrasions on her knees and wrists.
3. The president was immune from suit
4. no specific allegation that the government officials in question committed these atrocities
The CA was convinced that she was abducted. They gave credence to her MC. They court also acknowledged the abductors’ acts of monitoring her and called for the amparo as a duty for the
respondents to protect her. They also noted a breach of informational privacy committed by Palparan when her showed videos of her in a training camp for guerillas and told the court about insider infor
about Roxas’ joining the NPA. They weren’t convinced that the military was behind the abduction, though. Hence she petitioned the SC.
Issues:
1. Did the court of Appeals err in absolving the gov’t officials in the amparo proceeding?
2. Can her belongings be returned?
3. Can Ft. Magsaysay be inspected?
4. Can Habeas Data be used as a remedy?
Held: No to all four. Petition dismissed.
1. Petitioner- there was sufficient evidence of her abduction by govt due to the sound of guns and airplanes. She impleaded generals, the president, and the DND chief due to the doctrine of command
responsibility. Court- incorrect due to being substantive law that established liability in an amparo proceeding. Hague Conventions As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators C.R. is more aptly invoked in a criminal
or administrative proceeding than one in amparo. Amparo is part of “remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.” It is an action for relief available to the petitioner, not used to determine proof beyond reasonable doubt. The commanders may be impleaded on
accountability or responsibility From the case: “Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. “ “Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but
have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.” On responsibility, the court said that the petitioner alleged that the generals had in one
way condoned her abduction due to her assertion that govt agents were behind her torture and capture, the inclusion of the military base, etc. However, the evidence doesn’t warrant the conclusion that
they were really military. One, the similarity with her abduction to older cases of abduction don’t really point that the government orchestrated that. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. There was no direct evidence as regard the affiliation of the abductors. With regard to ft Magsaysay, the claim that she was taken there can’t be tenable due to
her status as a traveller and her blindfolded state.
2. An order directing respondents to return belongings is a conclusive pronouncement of liability which can be done in a full proceeding. Also, a writ of amparo cant be used to protect property rights.
3. A fishing expedition for evidence cant be sanctioned by a writ of amparo. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. The place msut be reasonably determinable from the party’s allegations. Her estimates were unreliable.
4. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. It protects a persons right to control
information regarding himself, especially when the info is being collected through unlawful means for unlawful ends. To issue the writ there must be showing of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim, which she failed to do. The court turned the investigation to the CHR. Habeas data was reversed.
Burgos vs. Esperon
Facts: Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon City.The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos.
The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had transpired and that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.
The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance. Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of Appeals concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the
Writ of Amparo. The respondents have not appealed to the court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s motion should be granted.
Ruling: No. After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the developments of the case, including the Court of Appeal’s decision that confirmed the
validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, the Court resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela. The Court note and conclude, based on the
developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the Court held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis the writ merely embodies the Court’s
directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is
curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of
a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to achieve. In
Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify in an Amparo case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted
in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has
ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance. The Court emphasize that the Court’s role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has
taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of
Amparo has been served in the present case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal
action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
Dolot vs. Paje
FACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioners filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. On September 16, 2011, the case was summarily
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. RTC relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions." The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied. RTC further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for
the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not RTC may motu proprio dismiss a petition for continuing mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction following A.O. No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional
Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12.
(2) Whether or not a final judgment finding that the public officials failed to act on the contemplated environmental issue is a condition precedent for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.
(3) Whether or not a petition for issuance of continuing mandamus requires the attachment of judicial affidavits.
HELD: (1) Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had
jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners. These administrative order issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to
confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government. Venue relates only to
the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as
it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently
incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court
orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
(2) The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4(c), Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court
would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final. Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court
and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision."
(3) RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of
testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.
Meralco vs. Lim
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door
of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS
MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL
NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her]
from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security. Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of
the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer. No response to
her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’
unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats
to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─
imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? (NO)
RULING: Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
informationregarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations
of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s
right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlierquoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
"highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a
"punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Lee vs. Ilagan,
FACTS: Police Superintendent Neri Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee were former common law partners. In July 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for
a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video she discovered
from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During their confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed
Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away. This prompted Lee to utilize said video as evidence in filing various complaints – criminal (in violation of the “Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004”), and administrative [for misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)] – against Ilagan. Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that
of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor is warranted. The RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce
Ilagan’s digital camera as well as the negative/original copy of the subject video.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Ilagan was proper. (NO)
RULING: The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.”
In order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on one hand, and the
right to life, liberty, or security on the other, which must be supported by substantial evidence. In this case, Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to life, liberty or security was or would
be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even
lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases
that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss
the habeas data petition.
Arigo vs. Swift
FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, otherwise known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009” “to ensure the protection and conservation of the globally
significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations.” Under the “no-take” policy,
entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the
TRNP. The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP. The USS Guardian is an
Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January
17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in
the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and TawiTawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A.
No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for being unconstitutional.
Respondents assert that: (1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already completed;
(2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and (4) the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive branch.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi in the case. (YES)
2. Whether or not US shall be bound by UNCLOS albeit it did not ratified to such. (YES)
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity of the US is found in the VFA. (NO)
RULING: 1. Yes, the petitioners have locus standi in this case. Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. ”Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., the Court recognized the “public
right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” The court declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. On the novel element in the class
suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature. ”Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
2. Yes. The United States should be bound by UNCLOS. According to Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where
they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea. According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has
not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of longstanding policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS, as can be
gleaned from previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. The UNCLOS is a product of
international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the
oldest customary principles of international law.The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial
sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located. Insofar as
the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the
territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions: Article
31Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes. The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or
damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for noncommercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial seaor with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law. An overwhelming majority – over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS,
but despite this the US, the world’s leading maritime power, has not ratified it. While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting, the U.S. delegation ultimately
voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership,
the bulk of UNCLOS member states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objectionable provisions. The revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI
implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and consent. Despite consistent
support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent required for the President to internationally bind the
United States to UNCLOS. Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on March 10, 1983 that the US will “recognize the rights of the other states in the
waters off their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states”, and
President Clinton’s reiteration of the US policy “to act in a manner consistent with its [UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other countries to do likewise.”
Since Article 31 relates to the “traditional uses of the oceans,” and “if under its policy, the US ‘recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their coasts,’” Justice Carpio postulates that
“there is more reason to expect it to recognize the rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case.” As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the
US’ refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,”
pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its [the US’] acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.” It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps
publicly endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its official website. The court fully concur with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. The court thus expect the US to bear “international
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner,
which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our
internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task
to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 which states that states shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation
of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty
upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout
the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
3. No. Waiver of immunity is not found in the VFA . The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common security
interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even
common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity fonder the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In any case, the
court considered that ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The court also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, the court cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Paje vs. Casino
Facts
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental
damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments
thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its
amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a
Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues
1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling
1.
Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
REPORT THIS AD
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal
link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities
in the issuance of the ECC.
Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait vs. Angelo Reyes,
FACTS: On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Tañon Strait. From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Tañon Strait, including a multichannel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to determine the area’s underwater composition. During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well.
Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled “Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures and For Other Purposes.” On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Tañon Strait issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the
Initial Environmental Examination commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of the latter’s application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). On 6 March 2007,
DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory
well with a depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town. On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for
violation of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait, joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo
Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No.
181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in
Region VII and representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their contentions are: 1. A study made after the seismic survey showed that
there is a drastic reduce in fish catch by 50- 70% attributable to the destruction of the “payao” or the artificial reef. 2. The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public
consultations and discussions prior to its issuance. 3. SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, considering that there is no general law prescribing the
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction 4. FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer
radius from the point where the oil-rig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination The respondents in both petitions are: the
late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L. Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and Chairman of Tañon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations are: 1. The “Resident Marine Mammals” and “Stewards” have no legal standing to file the
petition; 2. SC-46 is constitutional; 3. The Environmental Compliance Certificate was legally issued; and 4. The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case is moot and academic. (NO)
2. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing. (YES)
3. Whether or not SC-46 is unconstitutional. (YES)
RULING: 1. The Court makes clear that the “moot and academic” principle is not a magic formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of SC-46, the
Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues
raised undoubtedly affect the public’s interest, and the respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition.
2. Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any
Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature: “Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No.
8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)” Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure. Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective,
the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in
the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.
3. Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part: “The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in ac cordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.” The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and void. SC-46
appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract. Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the present and future
generations. Hence, safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and
agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service contracts herself. Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE, obtain the
President’s approval for the execution of any contract under said statute. The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis-à-vis other pertinent laws to serve as a guide for the Government when
executing service contracts. Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope
of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological
system. Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This means that no environmental
impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12
of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586. While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the
exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law
specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
West Tower Condominium vs. Phil. Ind. Corp., 758 SCRA 292 (Precautionary Principle)
Facts:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and
transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil
Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of
Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on
July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the
matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the
discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.
Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo’s power was shut down.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and
in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati
City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups who have expressed their intent to
join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues... involved.[1]
On November 19, 2010, the Cou... rt issued the Writ of Kalikasan[2] with a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members o... f their Boards of
Directors to file their respective verified returns. The TEPO... enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the
whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any... leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon
within 60 days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint Compliance[5] submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They
contended that they neither own nor operate the pipelines,... adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as
they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”
Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court,
answering a query of the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the
Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14] the appellate court was required to
conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and... recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’ memoranda.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19] of the CA’s Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal
Industry Research and Development Center; (b) a trust... fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before
the WOPL may resume its operations.
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon, the following issues defined by the
parties during the March 21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for... adjudication
Issues:
Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real
parties-in-interest;
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected
environment;
Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies; and
Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the environmental protection order.
Ruling:
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[39] Generally, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real... parties-in-interest.[40] In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.[41]
Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the... jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee
hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium
units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a
condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The
Condominium Act,[43] it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and deals with everything
that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or... users.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013
Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7[45] of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be
directly affected by an environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the
WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise,
concurs with the other recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent
FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG,
now known as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test,
also known as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)... inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement.[47]
Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI... inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests
to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary
caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free... from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification
that the WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of... the appropriate leak detection
systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require
said certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case... requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October
25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos
Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies
and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied
with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5,
2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the... operation of the WOPL. On the other
hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the
closure of the WOPL may be... ordered.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on
the basis of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL’s... actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on
the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its
proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the
DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the DOE of the pipeline’s actual
physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form integrity audit,[56] that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the
pipeline’s structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.
Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of
rehabilitating or restoring the environment.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited
purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered. Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the
prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.
The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal
cases filed by petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment... of damages is found warranted.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and the
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case
No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their
individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot... grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As
duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and... determine the individual liability of respondents, if any,
on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
Principles:
Said proviso... pertinently provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. – If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other litigation... expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by
the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the... court. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15(e), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases expressly prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners.
The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency
Committee on Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by
CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken.
DENR is the government agency tasked to implement the state policy of
“maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment”[57] and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution.”[58]
It is indubitable that the DENR... has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
With regard to petitioners’ March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in the pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect
on the environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it... fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the
health of the affected people, and to preserve and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the future generations to come.
Petitioner’s January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA’s Report need not be discussed and given consideration. As the CA’s Report contains but the appellate court’s
recommendation on how the issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this
Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
As to petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, the matters contained therein have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this
case. With all these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised by the... parties.
Republic vs. Cayanan
FACTS Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that elements of the CIDG, led by Pascua, were illegally detaining her husband Pablo, that Pablo was forcibly arrested by elements
of the CIDG, that Pablo is being detained at the CIDG, and that despite repeated demands, the CIDG has not produced Pablo. The CIDG denied having custody of Pablo and prayed for the dismissal of
the petition. In her memoranda, Regina reiterated her allegations but she amended her petition to now seek the issuance of a writ of amparo. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings before the RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor or Regina and maintains the issuance of the writ of amparo. The CIDG challenges this order and alleges that Regina was not able to prove her claims with substantial evidence.
ISSUE Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo is proper. (YES)
RULING The Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations of the petition and to warrant ranting the privilege of the writ. Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to accept a conclusion. The Court held that Regina was able to establish her claims with substantial evidence and cited the affidavit of an
eyewitness, who was with Pablo when he was taken, and in which Pascua was positively identified as the one who arrested her husband. Moreover, Pascua admitted the existence of the abduction, albeit
denying his participation and instead alleging that he was also a victim. Other witness were also presented by Regina to corroborate the affidavit. Moreover, CIDG failed to exercise the required
diligence as they only issued passive certificates. Under the Rule, the return should spell out the details of the investigations conducted in a manner that would enable the court to judiciously determine
whether or not the efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the person missing had been sincere and adequate.