PFR MODULE 7.2
DIGESTS
General
● What are considered as community/ conjugal property?
○ All the property owned by the spouses:
■ During marriage
■ After marriage
○ Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, if expressly made to form part of the
community property by the donor, testator or grantor;
○ Jewelry or properties with monetary value;
○ Winnings in gambling.
● When is property presumed to be community/conjugal property?
○ Art. 93 FC: In absence of evidence, property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the community, unless proven otherwise by strong and convincing evidence
● Are the words “married to” in the certificate of title proof that the property is community/conjugal?
○ No. The description or reference to marriage is merely descriptive of his civil status.
● Are the properties in these cases considered as community/conjugal properties?
○ Villanueva
■ Yes
○ Navarro
■ No
○ Imani
■ No
○ Dela Pena
■ No
○ Villanueva v. Court of Appeals
■ FACTS
● Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas and they acquired
properties during marriage
● Defendant N is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he
inherited from his parents.
● He left family and cohabited with the other defendant Pacita, and received income
of properties. They have a son (illegitimate) Procopio
● Pacita had no properties. Nicolas suffered stroke
● RTC & CA: The properties listed in paragraph 2 of the complaint are ​conjugal
properties ​of Nicolas Retuya and Eusebia Retuya although this was not one of
the causes of action in Eusebias complaint.
■ ISSUES
● Are the properties conjugal even if they got married before FC?
■ HELD
● Yes. FC applies even though they got married before FC.
● Art 116: If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. Note: properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal
● To rebut the presumption that Lot No. 152 is conjugal property by Pacita and
Nicolas because they bought it, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own
money to pay.
● Cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of the legal spouse.The marriage
continued to exist regardless of the fact that Husband was already living with
Cohab Partner. Hence, all property acquired from the date of their marriage until
the death of Wife are presumed conjugal. It was neither claimed nor proved that
any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period
○ Navarro v. Escobido
■ FACTS & ISSUE
● Spouse filed action for recovery of credit, a personal property considered conjugal
property without the other’s consent. Is it valid? YES
● Prior demand required for an action for a writ of replevin? NO
■ HELD
● Either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own.
● Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties.
● Article 124 FC: Either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so
long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the
other spouse’s consent.
● As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which
is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the
Civil Code
● The registration of the trade name in the name of one person – a woman – does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers
alone, when the woman is married.
● By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved
● Article 160 CC: It provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership
● Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
● This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act
with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No
need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before performing
an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or encumber their
conjugal property.
○ Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co
■ FACTS
● Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6
other co- sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding P6, 000, 000.00.
● CPDTI incurred an indebtedness around P164,000 to which it defaulted in paying
Metrobank.
● Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank
won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by Imani and filed to consolidate the
title to its name.
● Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property.
● The RTC: in favour of Imani--not conjugal, the loan proceeds never redounded to
the benefit of the family of Imani.
● CA reversed
■ ISSUE
● CA erred in saying it is conjugal and should be levied?
■ HELD:
● No. Imani failed to prove that it’s conjugal. Hence, it should be answerable for the
liabilities incurred.
● While all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage.
● As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of
Evangelina Dazo- Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture.
● Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
● Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
● Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property
belongs to the conjugal partnership.
○ Dela Peña v. Avila
■ FACTS
● Petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), "married to Antegono A. Dela Peña"
(Antegono) sold property to Gemma
● Gemma incurred debt and property will be levied
● Antonia said the sale is invalid because property is conjugal and sold without
consent of dead husband
● RTC in favor of Antonia: Property is conjugal so Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia
executed for Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required
under Article 130 of the Family Code.
● CA: Sale is valid. It was notarized.
■ ISSUE
● House and lot are conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela
Peña?
■ HELD
● No. Despite the presumption of conjugality, they failed to prove that they
acquired it during the marriage
● Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the
fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as
paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse
● It could've been acquired before marriage but registered after.
● “Married to” only refers to civil status
○ Tan v. Andrade
■ FACTS
● Rosario (widow) mortgaged property to Simon who foreclosed the same
● When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of
Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties. And she and son Proceso
sold it to Bobby
● Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests over the
properties.
● The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, as
instrumental witness.
● Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso, giving the
latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the
sum of P310,000.
● When Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over
the properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.
● On 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed a complaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the
RTC.
● They alleged that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually
an equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness
with Bobby.
● They also claimed that since the subject properties were inherited by them from
their father, the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had
no right to dispose of their respective shares.
● RTC: Exclusive of Rosario
● CA: Conjugal
■ ISSUE
● The properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband
and co-owned by her and her children?
■ HELD
● No.
● Art 160 NCC, property acquired during marriage is conjugal, does not apply
where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired.
● Records: conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon
the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title were
issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de
Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino."
● Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to
establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their
parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds.
● Will property still be community/conjugal if the spouses are separated-in-fact?
○ Article 100. T
​ he separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of
absolute community except that:
■ (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just
cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
● Example:
○ If one of the spouses leaves the conjugal dwelling without any justifiable
reason, he/she cannot ask for support.
○ But if she left the conjugal dwelling because she is being maltreated,
insulted by her husband, A; then, she can ask for the support.
■ (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
■ (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon
proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
● Is written consent of both spouses still required to dispose property?
○ Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
● What will happen if the signature of the spouse is forged?
○ Void
○ Titan Construction Corporation v. David
■ FACTS:
● 1957: Spouses Manuel and Martha acquired lot after marriage
● 1976: They separated
● 1995: Hubby found out that ex-wife sold the property to Titan Construction
Corporation (Titan)
● 1996, Hubby filed a Complaint For Annulment of Contract against Titan CC.
● Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge therefore void.
● He prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to
the spouses with a new title be issued in their names.
● Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose
of the property on behalf of the spouses.
● Manuel claimed that the SPA was fake, and that the signature was forged; hence,
Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.
■ ISSUE
● Sale null and void for?
■ HELD:
● Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale
to Titan required the consent of both spouses.
● Art 124 FC: requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property
must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is
void.
● Article 165 CC: the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership
● Article 172 CC: wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband‘s
consent, except in cases provided by law
● On forgery:
○ While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there
were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the
SPA was either genuine or duly executed.
○ The absence of Manuel’s data supports his claim that he did not execute
the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery.
○ Titan didn’t buy it in good faith
Excluded property
● What property is considered as exclusive property of the spouse?
○ Article 109.​ The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
■ (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
■ (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
■ (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property
belonging to only one of the spouses; and
■ (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
● Is the property in question in this case considered as community/conjugal property?
○ No. Exclusive because it was inherited by the husband
○ Tan v. Court of Appeals
■ FACTS
● Case for partition and accounting (petition) by spouses Tan against husband’s
brothers and their wives
● Parties are co-owners of a lot with improvements in Cebu acquired in 1970
● Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion
of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same.
● They alleged that they are entitled to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said
family business in the lot
● CA: Although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of the
spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the same
was inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.
■ ISSUE
● Should the ⅓ share of alfonso be partitioned between him and his wife as part of
their conjugal partnership upon legal separation?
■ HELD
● Husband’s acquisition by succession of a parcel of land during his marriage to his
wife simply means that the lot is his exclusive property because it was acquired
by him during the marriage by lucrative title.
● Their marriage was prior FC so regime is presumed to be CPG
● However, the other party was able to prove that the brothers inherited the lot from
the mother.
● Although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of
the property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively
● Article 148 CC:
○ Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (2)
That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
(inheritance)
Liabilities/charges
● Is the community/conjugal regime liable for debts/obligations incurred by a spouse?
○ It depends
○ Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
■ (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the con- jugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
■ (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse with- out the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
● What is the remedy of the other spouse?
○ file an independent action for the annulment of the attachment of their conjugal property
● Was the community/conjugal regime liable in these cases?
○ Ayala
■ No. Surety undertakings of a spouse cannot bind the conjugal properties of the husband
and wife even if it has become a part of his duties as an officer of a corporation. Didn’t
benefit the family
○ Ros
■ Yes because debt benefited family
○ Borlongan
■ No. No proof of benefit to the family
○ Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals
■ FACTS
● Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3 Million credit line loan from
Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As added security, Alfredo
Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness.
● Ayala filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching.
● The court declared PBM and Alfrdo Ching jointly and severally liable to Ayala.
● The Sheriff then served upon the Spouses Ching a notice of sheriff sale on three
of their conjugal properties.
● The spouses Ching applied for injunction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
the conjugal partnership cannot be made answerable since the loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
■ ISSUE
● Are the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, making it liable?
■ HELD
● No. The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
● PBM has a personality different from Ching’s family despite their being
stockholders. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and the right of
recourse to respondent as surety is only up to his corporate stocks.
● The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
and not for the surety or his family.
● If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term “x x x obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.”
● In this case, it was shown that Ching signed as surety. It is incumbent upon PBM
to prove that Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Absent such proof, the conjugal partnership is not liable.
● Here, no actual benefit may be proved. The benefits must be one directly resulting
from the loan.
○ Ros v. Philippine National Bank
■ FACTS
● Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14,
1974 and as security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding.
● As a result, PNB instituted foreclosure on the mortgaged property.
● Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag
● After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property
was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch
● Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the
conjugal property.
● Spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the
mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property: signatures were forged and that
the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
● PNB seeks for the dismissal
■ ISSUE
● Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.
■ HELD
● Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law.
● Article 161 CC: the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable in ―all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose
● The loan by husband was used for additional working capital for their family
business hence, it is considered that such loan was acquired for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
○ Borlongon v. Banco De Oro
■ FACTS
● Spouses found out that BDO filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank.
Likewise impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita, who supposedly
signed four (4) security agreements totaling ₱l3,500,000 to guarantee the
obligations of Tancho Corporation.
● Husband:
○ the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains he established with his wife.
○ the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment of the property
was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and City (Pasig
RTC). did not redound to benefit their family.
○ surety agreements and all other documents and processes, including the
ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale, shall be nullified.
■ ISSUE
● Charged to conjugal partnership despite non-consent of husband of debt because
family benefitted?
■ HELD
● No because BDO didn’t have proof that family did benefitted from the debt
● Art 122 FC: Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.
● Remedy: Eliseo can file an independent action for the annulment of the
attachment of their conjugal property
○ Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of
properties under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a
separate action with another court.
● What will happen if the conjugal property is not sufficient to cover debts contracted by the spouses?
○ Should the conjugal partnership be insufficient to cover the same, they shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
○ Delos Santos v. Abejon
■ FACTS
● Couple borrowed money to sister and mortgaged their lot in exchange
● Deed of Sale was made for the sister after death of the other party’s husband
● Petitoners: DoS was forged
● They likewise asserted that Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject land to
Teresita, and that they did not receive any demand for the payment, representing
the loan, representing the construction cost of the building.
● Finally, they claimed that the improvements introduced by Teresita on the subject
land were all voluntary on her part.
■ ISSUE
● Are all the petitioners liable for the loan obligation?
■ HELD
● Yes
● It must be pointed out that such loan was contracted by the couple during the
latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still subsisting.
● Married under CC covered by presumption of CPG
● Article 121 FC: the loan obligation, including interest, is chargeable to Erlinda
and Pedro's conjugal partnership as it was a debt contracted by the both of them
during their marriage;
● Should the conjugal partnership be insufficient to cover the same, then Erlinda
and Pedro (more particularly, his estate as he is already deceased) shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
● Erlinda as the only party to the sale is the only one obligated to refund the 50k
consideration
● Will property still be conjugal if the spouses are separated-in-fact?
○ GR: Yes
○ XPN: see below
● When can conjugal property be made liable for the civil liability of the spouse?
○ In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable
● What is the difference between liabilities under the absolute community regime and conjugal
partnership of gains?
○ ACP: Article 100. ​The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime
of absolute community except that:
■ (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just
cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
■ (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
■ (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall,
upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer
or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
○ CPG: Article 127.​ The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime
of conjugal partnership, except that:
■ (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just
cause, shall not have the right to be sup- ported;
■ (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
■ (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership prop- erty, the separate property of
both spouses shall be solidarily li- able for the support of the family. The spouse present
shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds
thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
○ Dewara v. Lamela
■ FACTS
● Couple was separated in fact
● Husband hit a person while driving, incurring criminal case and civil liability
● Husband had no property in his name so sheriff wanted to levy his lot
● Couple said it was conjugal property, acquired during marriage
■ ISSUE
● Is the subject property paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo?
■ HELD
● Conjugal. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
● Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.
● The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval
shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.
● Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner
in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds
is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
● However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property
of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may
automatically be levied upon inan execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses.
● Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership,
it should have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Administration
● If one of the spouses is a foreign national, what will be the property regime of the spouses?
○ Following PH law, CPG because they married after FC
● Will lands acquired in the Philippines be considered as community/ conjugal?
○ If one spouse is an alien, no. Constitution does not allow aliens to own lands so lands are not
included in the regime
● Can the foreign spouse participate in the administration of the property?
○ No, because he is now an owner.
● Is the consent of the spouse here necessary?
○ No, because he never acquired the right to own the property.
○ Matthews v. Taylor
■ FACTS
● British Husband and Pinay. Pinay bought a lot and constructed a resort, allegedly
financed by alien husband
● All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in
the name of wife’s sister.
● Joselyn who ran away with another guy, executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property.
● Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of
25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
● Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as
Music Garden Resort.
● Husband: Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamins) consent,
● Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of
the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband,
any transaction involving said property required his consent.
■ ISSUE
● Was the husband the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds
used in purchasing it despite being acquired during their marriage? Is wife
allowed to dispose property without his consent?
■ HELD
● No. Husband has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner.
● Consti: Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from 19 acquiring private
lands.
● Husband, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines.Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto.
● This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for
such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.
Disposition
● What is required for disposition, mortgage or encumbrance of community/ conjugal property?
○ Article 124.
■ The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly.
■ In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail
● Subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
○ Which must be availed of within 5 years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
■ In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties:
● The other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
■ These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse.
● In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.
■ However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
● Is the transaction in these cases valid?
○ Boston
■ No
○ Fuentes
■ Sale is void because there was no consent of the wife. Governed by FC.
○ Boston Equity Resources Inc. v. Del Rosario
■ FACTS
● CA annulled real estate mortgage
● No written consent of wife to the REM and amendment
■ ISSUE
● Transaction valid without written consent?
■ HELD
● No. Art 124 FC: see above
● Since the REM was an encumbrance on the conjugal properties, the contracting
thereof by Edgardo sans the written consent of Rosie rendered only the REM void
and legally inexistent.
● But they could still recover the loan from CPG in a proper case for that purpose
○ Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
■ FACTS
● Husband Tarciano sold property to the Fuentes.
● Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to
annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void
since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a
mere forgery.
● The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul
a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
● It must be emphasized that their marriage was contracted under the Civil Code,
but the sale was executed under the Family Code.
● Ruling that the Family Code applies, the SC held that the sale is void without the
consent of the wife.
■ ISSUE
● Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband was forged?
● The Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed?
● Not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale?
■ HELD
● Yes, hence, void
○ The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
● No
○ FC Applies. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano
sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a
few months after the FC took effect
○ Under the Family Code, sale of conjugal property without consent of
spouse is VOID, not merely voidable. Also: action to declare the sale void
is imprescriptible
■ Article 124 FC: does not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband's sale of the real
property.
■ It simply provides that without the other spouse's written consent
or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
■ “In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void”
● Yes, the heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.
● What is the effect of the sale of the spouse of community/conjugal property without the written consent
of the other spouse? What is the difference between the Civil Code provisions and the Family Code
provisions on this? What is the prescriptive period for the other spouse to question the sale?
○ CC: Without spouse’s consent - Voidable, file action within 10 years
○ FC: Without spouse’s consent - Void, action does not prescribe
● What is the legal remedy of the spouse?
○ Virginia's recourse is, therefore, to demand only the value of the property, i.e., the one-third
portion of the subject properties invalidly sold by Simeon without Virginia's conformity pursuant
to the same provision.
○ Ko v. Aramburo
■ FACTS
● Corazon is the sister of Virginia’s husband Simeon. Corazon and Simeon have
another sibling, Augusto, who predeceased them. Virginia and the heirs of
Augusto filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with Declaration of Nullity
and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with Preliminary Injunction
against Corazon.
● Corazon admitted having acquired the subject properties through cession from
their uncle and auntie. She, however, intimated that the properties were owned by
their parents. Binalik lang
● Corazon insisted that only she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the
subject properties. Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon
sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned properties in her
favor
● Hence, Corazon became the sole owner thereof and was able to transfer the titles
of the same to her name
■ ISSUE
● Are the parties all co-owners? YES
○ Augusto's heirs own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject properties
○ Simeon’s heirs, which include Virginia, also own one-third pro-indiviso
share in the subject properties
● Sale valid between Corazon and Simeon despite non-consent of wife? NO
○ CC: while the husband is prohibited from selling the commonly-owned
real property without his wife's consent, still, such sale is not void but
merely ​voidable
○ Wife has the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within 10
years from the date of the sale.
● If co-ownership of the subject properties exist, are co-owners entitled to the
recovery of their share?
○ While Augusto’s heirs are entitled to the recovery of their share in the
subject properties, Virginia is only entitled to demand the value of her
share therefrom pursuant to Article 173 of the Old Civil Code since it was
beyond 10 year prescriptive period already
○ Malabanan v. Malabanan
■ FACTS
● Lot was sold without consent of wife
■ ISSUE
● Is property formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-188590 was
conjugal, and thus, rendering its sale without the wife's consent void?
■ HELD
● Yes. Under CC: prop acquired during m = presumed to be conjugal,
● There’s no need to prove that the money used to purchase a property came from
the conjugal fund.
● What must be established: acquired during marriage
● Paraphernal only if: there’s convincing proof of the opposite
● Here, Jose had no right to either unilaterally dispose the conjugal property or
grant respondent Francisco this authority through the supposed Special Power of
Attorney.
● What is the effect of the sale of the spouse of community/conjugal property without the written consent
of the other spouse? What is a continuing offer?
○ Even if the sale by one of the spouses is void, as it was done without the consent of the other, it is
a continuing offer between the consenting spouse and the third person
○ It may be perfected as a binding contract upon acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
● Was there a continuing offer in this case? YES
● Was the sale valid? NO
○ Alejo v. Cortez
■ FACTS
● Property is absolute comm property. They built a house
● Wife sold lot to hubby’s dad without hubby’s consent
● RTC: sale is not void
● CA: sale is void
■ ISSUE
● Is the Kasunduan for the sale of a conjugal real property between a continuing
offer that has been converted to a perfected and binding contract? For, if Jorge has
not accepted or consented to the said sale, the Kasunduan is considered void
■ HELD
● Art 124
● The disposition of conjugal property of one spouse w/o the written consent of the
other is void.
● Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by
Jacinta and signed by her alone.
● Nevertheless, the void Kasunduan constitutes a continuing offer from Jacinta and
Dolores and that Jorge had the option of either accepting or rejecting the offer
before it was withdrawn by either, or both, Jacinta and Dolores.
● It is undisputed that after the execution of the Kasunduan, Jorge sent two letters to
Dolores: one, in forming her that he did not consent to the sale; and the other,
demanding that' Dolores pay the balance of the purchase price on or before
October 5, 1996 and failing which, the purchase price shall be increased to
PhP700,000.
● Clearly, Jorge's first letter was an outright and express repudiation of the
Kasunduan. The second letter, while ostensibly a demand for compliance with
Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied its terms on material points, i.e.,
the date of payment of the balance and the purchase price.
● Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be construed as evidencing Jorge's
consent to or acceptance of the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other
spouse's putative consent to the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate
document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first
document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.
● What is the effect of the donation of the spouse of community/conjugal property without the written
consent of the other spouse?
○ Void
● Was the property validly transferred to a third person in this case?
○ Just the ½ portion from Mercedes who consented to the donation, but noth the other half from
Juan because he didn’t consent
○ Carlos v. Tolentino
■ FACTS
● Without Juan's (owner) knowledge and consent, his wife and Kristoff (grandson)
who were then residing in the subject property, executed a Deed of Donation
dated February 15, 2011, thereby making it appear that Juan and Mercedes
donated the subject property to Kristoff
● Kristoff then sold it
● Juan executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and filed a criminal complaint for
Falsification of Public Document against Kristoff for forgery
● CA: Spouses Carlos (buyers) were negligent in not taking the necessary steps to
determine the status of the subject property prior to their purchase thereof.
● CA: Juan has a better right over the subject property.
■ ISSUE
● Void sale?
■ HELD
● M is prior FC. Property acquired during M. Hence, presumed to be conjugal
● The Court takes due notice of the fact of Mercedes' death which inevitably results
in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
● Donation of property valid as to one-half share of Mercedes because she
consented to donating such to Kristoff
● Not wholly void. But only to the extent of Mercedes' one-half share in the subject
property. And rightly so, because why invalidate Mercedes' disposition of her
one-half portion of the conjugal property that will eventually be her share after the
termination of the conjugal partnership?
● But remaining one-half undivided portion of the subject property is null and void,
Juan not having consented to the donation of his undivided half
● Buyers are confined only to the one-half undivided portion thereof. The other
undivided half still belongs to Juan
Effects of separation-in-fact, abandonment and non-compliance with obligations
Dissolution
Liquidation
● If one of the spouses is a foreign national, is the spouse entitled to a share if the property is land in the
Philippines? NO. CONSTI PROHIBITS IT
● Can said spouse be reimbursed instead for the amount used to acquire the property? STILL NO
○ In re Muller v. Muller
■ FACTS
● Pinay wife and foreign husband married in Germany but moved to PH
● Hey used husband’s money to buy land and house in the name of wife
● They separated
● RTC: violated constitution therefore he can’t reimburse
● CA: implied trust in favor of foreign husband
■ ISSUE
● Respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of
the Antipolo property?
■ HELD
● Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands save in cases of hereditary succession
● No implied trust was created in favor of respondent. He’s disqualified to own a
land. Periodt.
● Respondent not entitled to reimbursement. Can’t claim right because of consti
prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy
the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
● What will happen to the properties if the marriage is declared void?
○ CP is terminated
○ The absolute community or the conjugal part- nership shall be dissolved or liquidated
○ Offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned
○ Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Pascual
■ FACTS
● Spouses bought a lot during marriage
● Marriage voided bec wife filed for dec of nullity by psych incapacity
● Court ordered dissolution of CPG
● Spouses weren’t able to liquidate CP even after legal sep
● Wife remarried and obtained a loan from metrobank on their properties. They
failed to pay the load and the bank initiated foreclosure
● Former husband: bank can’t because it is conjugal and without my consent
● Metrobank: it’s exclusive property of ex wife
■ ISSUE
● Declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the regime
of community of property of the spouses? NO, THEY DIDNT LIQUIDATE
● Lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid? 1/2
■ HELD
● No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not
automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that
there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
● While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
● Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her 1⁄2 undivided interests in the
disputed party even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
● Will sale of community/conjugal property after the death of a spouse but prior to the liquidation of the
property regime valid? What is the effect of such sale?
○ Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property
shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
○ If no judicial proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within 1 year from the death of the
deceased spouse.
○ Death dissolved CP but since it wasnt liquidated, he could only share his undivided share
○ Sale is not necessarily void
○ Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servacio
■ FACTS
● When Marta Barola Go died (wife of Protacio Sr.), He and his son Rito B. Go
sold a portion of the property to Servacio
■ ISSUE
● Sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it was
made without prior liquidation?
■ HELD
● M prior FC. Property relation: conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
● Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of
the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
● Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to
Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation.
● Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
● Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share.
● Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had
the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of
his co-owners.
● Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent
of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling
co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a
co-owner of Marta’s share.
● Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of
the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
○ Domingo v. Molina
■ FACTS
● Spouse brought property
● Hubby borrowed money from Molinas
● Hubby died
● Molinas transferred title of former’s property to their name
● (Domingos’ Son) Melecio: property was only a collateral for the utang
● Anastacio could not have validly sold it without wife’s consent because she was
already dead at the time of the sale.
● Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were
substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.
■ ISSUE
● Sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without dead wife’s consent is
valid and legal?
■ HELD
● Properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of
co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse
until final liquidation and partition.
● The surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share
of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties
until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.
● An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs,
including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until
final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the
original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided
interest.
● Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the
conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
○ Uy v. Fernandez
■ FACTS
● Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in
Jaro, Iloilo City.
● Vipa and her husband Levi Lahaylahay have two children, Grace Joy and Jill
Frances.
● In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy over the
subject property and the improvements thereon to which Rafael bound himself to
pay the amount of P 3,000/mo with provision for a 10% every year thereafter.
● On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever, Grace Joy became
the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa.
● In 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate of
Vipa filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against Rafael.
● Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the complaint, unpaid rents amounted to
P271,150.00.
● MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises and to pay the
amount of unpaid rents with 12% interest per annum.
● On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and dismiss the complaint for
unlawful detainer.
● According the RTC, the property is part of conjugal property and after Vipa’s
death the conjugal partnership was terminated.
● Levi sold his property to Rafael, thus making him co-owner of the property.
■ ISSUE
● Is the property part of the conjugal property and Rafael can be considered as
co-owner of the property?
■ HELD
● Yes. Partly. At the time Rafael bought Levi's one-half share, the conjugal
partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such
disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties, is not necessarily void
● Legal basis: the sale by co-owner of his ½ undivided share of the property was not
necessarily void bec owner could sell his undivided share
● Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of
either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual invested one-half undivided
share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership.
● Deceased’s share: implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving
spouse and the other heirs of the deceased
● What is the difference in the processes of dissolution between the absolute community regime and the
conjugal partnership regime?
○ ACP
1. Inventory of all properties of the ACP,​ listing separately the communal properties from
exclusive properties of each spouse;
2. Payment of community debts;
NOTE: First, pay out of the community assets. If not enough, husband and the wife are
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
3. Delivery to each spouse of his/her remaining exclusive properties;
4. Equal division of net community assets
5. Unless there is:
a. An Agreement For A Different Proportion; or
b. A voluntary waiver of such share;
6. Delivery of the presumptive legitimes of the common children;
7. Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custody of common children (FC, Art. 102).
○ CPG
1. Inventory of all the properties;
2. Restitution of advances made to each of the spouses;
3. Reimbursement for use of exclusive funds;
4. Debts and obligations of the CP are paid;
5. Delivery of exclusive properties;
6. Payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each of the spouses;
7. Division of the net conjugal partnership;
8. Delivery of the common children’s presumptive legitimes;
9. Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custody of common children (FC, Art. 129).
○ Quiao v. Quiao
■ FACTS
● Wife obtained degree of legal separation against husband for cohabiting with
another
● The RTC judgment ordered, among other things, that the conjugal properties be
divided equally between the spouses.
● However, the husband’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children
■ ISSUE
● Art 102 ACP or Art 129 CPG governs?
● Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the CPG the same with the
computation of “net profits” earned in the ACP? NO.
■ HELD
● If M prior FC and no MS or void = CPG
● Since dissolution was during FC: Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
● Process (CPG)
○ An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. (In the
instant case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties
when they married)
○ Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the
conjugal partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of
the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made.
○ Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties.
○ But if the conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and
obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily
liable.
○ What remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband and of
the wife shall be returned to each of them.
● In the instant case, spouses have no separate properties so there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from
the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
● Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will
be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is
no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.