HAZOP, SIL Determination & Verification Study, Formulating the SRS, and Conducting FSA 1 ~5
&
Conducting QRA & ERDMP
Introduction
CDU unit in Khartoum Refinery Company is exposed to risks from incidents like fire, explosion, equipment
malfunction, etc. causing fatalities and/or monetary losses. The objective of the HAZOP, SIL determination
& verification and SRS study is to identify Hazard and Operability problems and to reduce the probability
and consequences of an incident that would have a detrimental impact to the personnel, plant, property
and environment. In summary, the bidders shall do the following:
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Conduct full plant HAZOP & SIL studies to determine the hazards and hazardous events of the
process and associated equipment, the causes of events leading to the hazardous event, the process
risks associated with the hazardous event, the consequence, the existing safeguards, and the
requirements for risk reduction and the safety function.
Bidder shall study working documents covering P&IDs, equipment & instrument
specifications and interlock diagrams etc.
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Identify and rank process hazards and operability problems related to the design and operation.
Identify existing engineering and safeguards that will reduce the consequences related to the hazards,
recommend additional safeguards/ protection layers and improvements, where necessary to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level.
 Evaluate and verify SIL loops, and Identify SIL targets for SIFs taking into consideration Safety,
Environment and Financial criteria to classify the loops.
 Decide on Qualitative or Quantitative Method; to arrive at the Target Risk Integrity Level (SIL)
number for each safety Instrumented function (SIF).
 Formulating the Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) for each safety function.
 Use verification techniques carry out SIL verification, that is, we evaluate and confirm, and whether
the existing system is really having the safety integrity level that meets the target SIL (Calculate the
actual SIL (PFDavg) for the existing safety function.
 Design the Safety Instrumented function that meets the target SIL requirement.
 Use combinations of sensors, logic solver and actuators to come up with the target SIL requirement
if the existent SIL not meet the target SIL.
 Based on the target SIL, determine the amount of time, after which the system must be tested (Proof
test interval). To ensure that it works as intended (Theoretically, the shorter the proof-test interval,
the lower the failure rate, however if it is too low, then the system will have more downtime due to
testing, rather than being in line and protecting a running plant. Recommend the testing frequency to
the initiator, logic solver and final control elements in a tabular form as per the newly arrived SIL
classifications.
 Bidders shall create Functional Safety Management Plan (FSMP) for managing CDU unit safety lifecycle.
 Conduct Cyber Security study for the Control system Hardware/Software.
 Conduct Functional Safety Assessment FSA1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 as per IEC61511 standards.
 Bidder shall give a presentation of work of action and shall collect the documents required for
preparation of HAZOP SIL Determination & verification Study and formulating the Safety
Requirements Speciation (SRS), QRA and ERDMP.
In some details the bidder shall carry out following:
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HAZOP & SIL Determination & FSA
SIS Safety Requirements Specification (SRS), and FSA.
SIS Verification Calculations and FSA.
QRA
ERDMP
1. HAZOP & SIL Determination details
The bidders shall conduct and lead a HAZOP & SIL Determination study for the Crude Distillation Unit
(CDU) by a certified specialist consultant, the work consist the following:
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Bidders shall develop the Technique & Methodology for HAZOP, SIL Determination to assess the
safety and operability of a process system in a systematic manner.
On receipt of work order, Bidder experts shall collect, review and accept the documents/
data required.
Bidder shall study and review the process by an experienced multi- disciplinary team to
discover potential hazard and operability problems.
Subsequent to HAZOP & SIL Determination study, Bidders shall developed the node list
together with the KRC client’s using a full set of up-to-date P&IDs, a presentation has to be made of
by the bidder prior HAZOP & SIL Determination study.
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Bidder shall prepare HAZOP worksheet along with detailed Nodes Description. The
HAZOP working sheets containing the following columns:
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Guidewords
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
Risk ranking before safeguards
Safeguards provided/available
Risk ranking after safeguards
Risk Ranking and SIL study based on the Ranking.
Recommendations
Others
Bidder shall collect relevant, recent and updated documents, drawings, the data required for HAZOP
& SIL Determination study, and the bidder shall study to familiarize with the systems and
facilities before start of the work.
The bidder shall undertake HAZOP study as per standards acceptable to Owner for identifying
hazards and problems associated with the operating & safety procedures, to ensure safe operation of
CDU unit and refinery.
The study will be conducted on the recent and updated P&IDs provided by Owner.
Applicable software (to be specifically mentioned by bidder and accepted by the Owner) shall be
used for recording the proceedings of the HAZOP study.
The HAZOP study notes are to be recorded in the format called “WORKSHEET” where each
deviation is considered, every possible consequence is reported and actions where necessary are to
be recorded and where not necessary, the reasons are to be stated.
All action items are to be numbered to enable clear identification of the cause and consequences of
potential hazards. The key aspects of the study are:
o Intention - The intention defines how the section of the plant under study is expected to operate.
o Deviation - These are departures from the intention which are discovered by systematically
applying the guidewords.
o Cause - These are the reasons for which deviations might occur.
o Consequences - These are the results of the deviations should they occur.
o Safeguards - These are the protections provided and operating instructions or design review
requirements for smooth operation of the system.
The examination procedure should take into account, a full description of the process, systematically
questions every part of it to discover how deviations from the intention of the design can occur and
decides whether these deviations can give rise to hazards. Necessary action plans to mitigate/reduce
the hazard is to be suggested based on available safety provisions. The question is to be focused in
turn on every part of the design.
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Each part is to be subjected to ensure that the questions are formulated around a number of guide
words. The guide words are used to ensure that the questions, which are posed to test the integrity of
each part of the design, will explore every conceivable way in which the design could deviate from
the design intention. This usually produces a number of theoretical deviations and each deviation is
then considered to decide how it could be caused and what would be the consequences. Some of the
causes may be unrealistic and so the derived consequences will not be meaningful. Some of the
consequences may be trivial and would not be considered.
Flow, Pressure, Temperature, Level, quality etc. of individual systems with identical design
intentions is to be thoroughly analyzed for possible causes and consequences and required action
plan to eliminate/reduce the hazards is to be suggested on the basis of existing protective systems.
The bidder shall identify the Tolerable Risk Definition together with KRC. Define the acceptable
risk level for occurrence, depends on developed KRC Risk Matrix (Use Risk Matrix used for RFCC
& DCU HAZOP & SIL study or recommend other) and the local laws concerning hazardous
operations.
The bidder shall identify Hazards/Deviation, Causes, Consequences and based on the possibilities of
occurrences ranking the Risk with no Safeguard.
The bidder shall list all the existing safeguards, Alarm, PSV, and SIFs. Provides a framework to
mitigate risk by determine the suitable SIL for the existing SIF or by adding a new safety
Instrumented Functions (SIF).
The bidder shall identify the Risk Reduction required for each safety Instrumented function, evaluate
if a sufficient number of layers are present, to prevent and undesired events. Reduce the risk to an
acceptable level by additional protection layers.
The bidder shall use two different methods (LOPA and Risk Graph), to arrive at the Target Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) number for each safety Instrumented function (SIF).
The (LOPA) method will determine what PHA safeguards serve as Independent Protection Layers
(IPL) and confirm risk is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 1 levels, and this will
fills the gap between qualitative process hazard analysis (PHA) and detailed quantitative risk
analysis (QRA), when a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) is one of the IPLs, the LOPA is also
used to determine Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and SIF demand frequency.
Determined the overall SIL of a SIF by the minimum SIL achieved by the SIF considering the
three different constraints (Three barriers), a systematic capability (SC) constraint, an architectural
Constraint (SILac), and the achievable PFDavg or PFH that are implied by requirements
per international safety standards IEC 61511 [1] and IEC 61508 [2].
When used thoughtfully, much more information can be captured by the LOPA that is required for
specification and design of a SIF. LOPA will also document key information later needed for Safety
Requirements Specification (SRS) including, Demand frequency, Additional mitigation, Risk
receptors, Related interlock
At the conclusion of the formal HAZOP& SIL Determination study and prior to report submission, the
bidder shall assign a qualified safety engineer consultant to independently review the information and
provide cross check that we got everything we need, and we meeting our risk reduction target. The
information (Including identification of causes and their respective, frequencies, consequence
definition and severity classification, and identification of I (IPL); their independence and
effectiveness) captured during the study must independently check and review (FSA1).
This (FSA1) exercise is critical in ensuring correct target SIL results and that skipping this activity
will result in many cases of safety risk exposure and/or unnecessary high cost of implementation and
operation due to incorrect target SILs.
The HAZOP & SIL Determination report in PDF, Word & application file shall be the deliverable for
this SOW.
2. Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)
The bidder shall Formulating the Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) for each safety function, that
specifies with some degree of details, what each safety Instrumented function supposed to do. The SRS
must describe the functional safety requirements for the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) overall, as
well as the detailed requirements applicable to each of the individual SIFs. The Safety Requirements
Specification (SRS) must include all safety relevant information for all (SIFs) including the following:
A. SIF Details (Sources of Demand, Demand Rate on SIF, Trip points,)
B. CCF (Electrical Power Loss, Compressed Air Loss, other.)
C. Process Details (Safe State Definition, Process Safety Time, other).
D. SIL Data (Target SIL, Max Allowable SIL, PFD Target, Spurious Trip Rate...).
E. Trip Actions (Manual Shutdown Requirements, Energize/De-Energize To Trip).
F. Desired SIF Response (Sensor Failures, Logic Solver Failures, and Final Element
Failures).
G. Maintenance Issues (Maintenance considerations).
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The Safety requirements specification (SRS) will document the SIF and SIS requirements using the
HAZOP and SIL report, and it will specify the requirements for each SIS, in terms of the required
safety instrumented functions and their associated safety integrity, in order to achieve the required
functional safety.
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The SRS will show the reliability and integrity of all instrumentation, including the human
intervention, in any control loop and assigns a SIL rating for each loop.
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The deliverable from the SIL Determination process will form part of the information requirements
for the SRS, as well as other functional requirements, (e.g. input/output logical relationships, safestate definitions, and override and reset functions etc.).
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If instrumentation is to be effectively used for safety instrumented functions, it is essential that this
instrumentation achieves certain minimum standards and performance levels target known as the
Safety Integrity Level (SIL).
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The Safety Requirements Specification must be developed by a qualified certified consultant in close
cooperation with KRC engineers.
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Prior to submission, the SRS work must be independently reviewed by a qualified safety engineer, to
provide cross check that we got everything we need, and we meeting our risk reduction target (FSA).
The SRS PDF, Word and application files shall be the deliverable for this scope item.
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The Engineering Company shall make the conceptual design proposal based on the SRS report
(Scope Item 2).
3. SIL Verification Calculations
The bidder shall use verification techniques to carry out SIL verification, which will evaluate and
confirm whether the current system is really having the safety integrity level that meets the target SIL.
The calculations have to verify whether the functions meet the target SIL in terms of the Probability of
Failure on Demand (average), the Architectural Constraints as defined by IEC61508, [N1] and
Systematic Capability.
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These calculations must depend on realistic device failure rates for the different failure modes; they
also take into account real life constraints such as imperfect proof test and maintenance capability of
the operating facility.
The SIL Verification have to include the following: a. RBD Analysis (Subsystem, Voting, PFD,
Adding the Sensors Branches, Adding the logic Branches, Adding, Final Elements Branches, Mange
Elements, Reliability Block Diagram, Sensitivity Analysis (Proof Testing Coverage %, Proof
Testing Interval, Periodic Automatic Testing Coverage %, Periodic Automatic Testing Interval).
The calculations must find the gap between the current SIL of the conceptual design SIF and the
target SIL for the SIF. The outcome must recommend a design improvement for those SIFs which
did not meet the target SILs.
The conceptual design Proposal (SIFs) form Engineering Company will then be verified to make
sure the designed SIF meets the target SILs. The report will recommend design improvements for
those SIFs which did not meet the target SILs.
Once the SIF conceptual design is finalized all SIF components are fully identified, (manufacturer &
model) together with their failure rates.
Based on the target SIL, determine the amount of time, after which the system must be tested (Proof
test interval) to ensure that it works as intended (Interlocks are currently tested every turnaround
every 2 years, however, for some complex and critical interlocks this may not be enough to ensure
appropriate reliability.
Theoretically the shorter the proof test interval, the lower the failure rate, however if it is too low,
then the system will have more downtime due to testing, rather than being in line and protecting a
running plant).
Adapt the testing and maintenance schedule of the instrumentation to fulfill the SIL requirements,
Prepare a plan and procedure for performing a Proof Tests for each SIF.
Some interlocks may need to be tested on-line, with appropriate modifications made to allow safe
on-line testing; any instruments and interlocks which fail to meet this minimum rating should then
be upgraded.
The designer can then precede with the details design to meets the target SIL requirement. The
designer must use combinations of sensors, logic solver and actuators to come up with the target SIL
requirement if the existent SIF not meet the target SIL.
A qualified, certified consultant must perform SIL Verification calculations for all Safety
Instrumented Functions, (SIFs).
Prior to report submission, the work must be independently reviewed by a qualified safety engineer, the
reports must describe the assumptions made and calculation results of the analysis (FSA), to prove to
provide cross check that we got everything we need, and we meeting our risk reduction target.
The final report must indicate that all the SIFs achieved their target SILs after improving the designs.
The SIL Verification reports in PDF, Word & application files shall be the deliverables for this
scope item.
The Engineering Company shall then proceed with the detailed design based on the SIL Verification
reports.
Terms and Conditions
Bidders:
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The bidders shall provide qualified Consultant to carry out the HAZOP, SIL determination &
verification Study and formulating the Safety Requirements Speciation (SRS) and Functional safety
assessment (FSA), Quantitative Risk Assessment QRA for the CDU unit and shall prepare
Emergency Response & Disaster Management Planning ERDMP documents/manuals as per the
regulations of Technical Standards and Specifications. The personnel have to be proven expertise (
CV of key personnel should be attached)
The bidders must show and prove that their company Functional Safety Management Plan SMP in
Place.
Prior to report submission, all the work (HAZOP, SIL Determination, SRS and SIL Verification)
must be independently reviewed by a qualified safety engineer and cost to be borne by the bidder.
The bidders shall agree and accept all the required information (PFD set, P&ID set and operational
manuals) required prior to the commencement of the HAZOP study.
The bidders not permitted to disclose KRC information, and technical data.
The bidders shall perform and execute the work (HAZOP, SIL Determination, SRS and SIL
Verification) in accordance with latest regulations and standards of the following:
o IEC61511 safety life cycle (Analysis phase, Design and implementation, and Maintenance
and operation phases).
o N1 IEC61508, 2010 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/ Programmable Electronic
Safety-Related Systems.
o N2 IEC61511, 2003, 2016 and the latest Functional Safety – Safety Instrumented Systems
for the Process Industry Sector.
o IEC 61882:2016, which provides a guide for HAZOP studies (how to apply the HAZOP
technique and procedure, including definition, preparation, sessions, documentation and
follow-up).
The bidders shall state clearly the working and days for the HAZOP & SIL Determination, SRS, and
SIL verification proposal in the proposal.
The bidders shall mention which software will be used for executing the work (HAZOP, SIL
Determination, SRS and SIL Verification). This software must be provided with full license for 3
users as deliverable to KRC.
The bidders shall provide Hardcopy and Softcopy of HAZOP, SIL determination, verification, loopa,
SRS, FSA files (.Lopa or any other format).
The bidders shall provide a comprehensive advanced training and support on (IEC61511, IEC6108)
standards and the used software.
Bidder shall establish HAZOP, SIL Determination & verification Study and formulating the
Safety Requirements Speciation (SRS), Functional safety assessment and Risk Assessment
Study Procedure/Method/technique.
The final report (three copies) and a soft copy in CD are to be prepared and submitted to OWNER
after review of draft report by OWNER.
The bidder shall provide two draft hard copies of the HAZOP & SIL Determination study report and
a soft copy in CD within 01 months/2 Weeks from the effective date of start of work for each
location, which should include
i. Executive Summary
ii. Study at a Glance
iii. Introduction
iv. HAZOP Work Sheets
v. Major Observations of HAZOP Study
vi. Recommendations
Three copies of the final HAZOP report shall be submitted to OWNER within one week from the
date of receipt of all comments/observations from OWNER on the draft HAZOP report.
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Owner/KRC:
o Provide/arrange the following information, services and assistance to carry out the
study, at no cost to party.
o Data, drawings, document as required for study. Though all updated P&IDs will be
provided, but if in any node major recommendation comes, then the bidder has to
visit and verify the P&IDs at site.
o Nominate suitable engineers at required time to participate in the discussions/study, as
needed at no cost to bidder.
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Provide assistance to bidder in any other manner as mutually agreed upon for timely
completion of the study.
Opening meeting for the study will be done at OWNER Office, wherein the bidder will give
the methodology of study and data collection. Thereafter OWNER’s internal team consisting
of Instrumentation, HSE, Operation and Mechanical shall be interacting for the smooth
carryout of entire study.
The bidder selected for HAZOP, SIL determination & verification Study and formulating
the Safety Requirements Speciation (SRS), QRA and ERDMP preparation should adhere to
OWNER’s General Conditions of Contract (GCC), a copy of which would be given to the
bidder selected for carrying out the HAZOP, SIL determination & verification Study and
formulating the Safety Requirements Speciation (SRS), QRA and ERDMP study by the
Engineer-in-Charge from OWNER side.
4. QRA – Methodology:
The methodology for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study of will be as follows:
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To identify hazards this could lead to catastrophic events of the CDU unit.
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To estimate potential consequences of such an event and subsequent effects of fire, explosion,
toxicity etc. whichever and wherever is applicable.
To estimate the risks to individuals, group of individuals, and property wherever these are affected
To recommend suitable risk reduction measures to mitigate the risks and hazards.
To review design issues as risk potential sources.
Risk Assessment Study will comprise of the following steps / activities:
System Description
Hazard Identification (Identification of possible hazards)
Identification of possible failure types and how they could materialize.
Identification of credible scenarios with regard to failure causes and failure types.
Failure case listing.
Release Consequence Estimation based on Maximum Credible Accidents (MCA) Scenario
Consequence analysis of undesired events like leakages etc. and subsequent effects of fire,
explosion, toxicity etc. whichever and wherever is applicable.
Determining failure frequencies for credible scenarios
Consequence analysis
Risk evaluation, Risk Assessment & Risk Presentation
Recommendation for Risk Reduction and mitigation of consequences.
Hazard Identification:
o Detailed study of process and engineering information, plots and layout plans
Identification of process hazards.
o Preliminary identification of hazardous sections of the plant and that of storage
including gas and liquid fuel) with recourse to fire and explosion index for these
units. The study shall cover fire, explosion hazards and also toxic/health hazards. A
critical review of the existing service facilities in the identified hazard zones will
also be carried out. The study team would identify the potential hazards likely to
occur in the proposed facilities.
o Analysis of major inventories in process and storage and identification of major
hazardous locations of the plant.
o Study of the past accident information to identify possible worst accident scenarios.
o Delineation of the vulnerable operations.
o For the selected failure cases under the failure case list, the hazard distances shall be
calculated with respect to lower flammable limits (LFL) of the material, thermal
radiation effects, blast over pressure effects and toxic effects. The consequences will
be reported in terms of LFL distance, thermal radiation distances, blast overpressure
distances and toxic hazard distances.
o Estimation of failure frequency for the selected failure cases will be carried out
based on the results of consequence analysis and the estimation of failure
frequencies, the individual risk will be estimated, taking into consideration the
detailed weather conditions, probable ignition sources identified and the details of
the population and the other facilities in the near vicinity of the proposed facilities.
o Identification of accident sequences and consequences with resource to Event Tree
Analysis (ETA) and to evaluate propensity of occurrence of the top event through
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
o Past accidents data/information analysis in similar installations to develop the
credibility of worst come worst accident scenarios.
o The individual risk computed would be presented in the form of risk transects which
represents the chance of an individual fatality. The estimate risk levels will be
compared with internationally acceptable risk acceptance criteria. Based on the
findings of the analysis, risk conclusions will be made and suitable recommendations
will be suggested
o Review of previous QRA etc.
o The expected outcome of this study will be identification of hazard prone operations
and estimation of maximum damages, distances based on probable accident/release
scenarios within the project site and around the equipment within the premises.
5. Emergency Preparedness Plan:
Evaluation of the Emergency Preparedness Plan for onsite and offsite emergency management and
delineation of measures for warnings, evacuation and co‐ordination of off‐ site emergency activities
along with suggestions on safety provisions.
Consequence Analysis:
o Consequence modeling shall be done by using licensed applicable software to
generate the Overpressure profile around the reactors, tanks, pipelines and allied
facilities for worst case scenario i.e. Scenario like Catastrophic Rupture & Leak
shall be performed for each reactor and storage.
o The methodology to determine the potential for damage or injury from specific
incidents will be based on Maximum Credible Accidents (MCA) scenario.
For the chosen scenarios, following steps will be carried out:
o Determination of source strength.
o Computation of thermal loads at various distances due to pool fire, BLEVE, and jet
flame and identification of consequence distances
o Cloud contour concentration as a function of distance from source and amount of
flammable material between explosive limits; overpressures if any due to explosion
shall be calculated as a function of the distance from the center of explosion
(Delayed ignition case)
o Dispersion calculation for the airborne toxic chemicals shall be carried out to arrive
at the damage distances and impact zones for the chosen threshold values (Damage
Criteria)
o For dispersion modeling, predominant influencing factors being the wind speed and
stability classes for the region shall be considered. Two sets of stability class and
wind velocity combinations shall be used one representing typical day conditions
and the other night conditions.
o Damage criteria for the study shall be based on thermal radiation, overpressure and
exposure to toxic substances.
Risk Assessment & Risk Presentation:
o The result of Risk Assessment will be analyzed as Individual and Group risks with
magnitude of consequences & probability of occurrence. The computed Risk shall be
presented as either in the form of risk contours & FN curve.
Recommendation for Risk Reduction:
o Based on the Risk Assessment study, findings of the consequence analysis & safety
review check-list and Firefighting & other emergency facilities available,
recommendations to be made for reduction of risks and provisions for suitable safety
systems in place.
Contours:
o Pressure profile contours shall be plotted (x-y graph) using the applicable software
for the worst-case scenarios and also be plotted in Auto CAD.
Interpretation:
o The results shall be interpreted. A consequence analysis report shall be submitted.
The graphic plots in the form of effect zones for fire radiation and explosion
overpressure shall be plotted on the site map using latest applicable software and the
report will illustrate whether the destruction / effect zone is in off site or on site on
individual case basis. All such interpretation, graphs, Contours, etc. to be submitted
in soft and hardcopies.
Reports Deliverables for QRA:
o The bidder shall provide draft hard copy and a soft copy in CD within four weeks for
QRA from the effective date of start of work, which should includei. Introduction
ii. Scope of Work
iii. Facilities description
iv. Study Methodology
v. Detail Study inputs
vi. Study results
vii. Conclusion & recommendations
o Study result shall include
i. Individual risk – contour
ii. Individual risk at reference points
iii. Societal risk – FN Curves
iv. Major risk contributors to societal risk
v. Risk Ranking
vi. Mitigation measures
vii. Consequence analysis (dispersion, heat radiation & over pressure contours for
minor, major and FB leakage)
o Three copies of the final QRA reports shall be submitted to OWNER within one
week from the date of receipt of all comments/observations from OWNER on the
draft QRA reports.
EXCLUSIONS
o Process Design checks, Preparation and modification of any P&ID and checking of
P&IDs with respect to site installation.
o Mechanical/structural design and other detailed emergency checks.
o Basic and detailed engineering of suggested remedial measures.
o Economic cost benefit analysis for additional installation / modifications suggested.
o Secondary and micro-planning of the On-site Disaster Management Plan.
o Safety Audit/HSE Audit of the facilities.
o Any responsibility of getting approval of the studies from statutory authorities,
o It should be mentioned in the scope that the HAZOP study is to be done as per
relevant API codes.
o Preparation and/or modification of any of OWNER’s drawings
o Verification of P&ID with site installations
o Checks With respect to process design, mechanical/structural design and cost benefit
analysis
o Basic and detailed engineering of suggested remedial measures
o Secondary effects from adjoining facilities
TYPICAL LIST OF DATA, DRAWINGS, AND DOCUMENTS:
Prior to carrying out the HAZOP Study, QRA and preparing ERDMP documents the required data,
drawings and documents shall be collected by bidder in co‐ordination of OWNER. Typical list of
data/drawings/documents are as follows:
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Facilities description.
Relevant process data.
Latest revision of process flow diagrams (P&FDs).
Latest revision of Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs).
Latest revision of Operating manual.
Latest revision of safety manual.
Latest revision of Equipment specifications and Process and Engineering
data sheets of major equipment and critical instruments.
Latest revision of plot plans, equipment layout plans (drawn to scale) of the
process facilities under scope of the study.
Latest meteorological data as given below: ‐
o Average wind speeds and the corresponding wind directions experienced by the site
during the day and night times (to be furnished separately for day and night times)
on a monthly basis for all the 12months.
o Mean minimum and mean maximum temperatures experienced by the site over 24
hours and averaged out, over a month. This data would be required for al the months
in the year.
o Mean maximum and mean minimum relative humidity’s experienced by the site on a
monthly basis for all the 12months.
o Alternatively, in the absence of the above meteorological data, party shall use
meteorological data for typical representative locations
o All the operating conditions/possible unhealthy conditions of the CDU& associated
facilities to be analyzed in HAZOP study and all safety interlocks/Trip
interlocks/alarms in all the P&IDs especially of Rotating equipment’s, storage
vessels, columns, heat exchangers etc. to be analyzed and discussed with OWNER
and relevant suggestions wherever required as per the study to be given in the
HAZOP study conducted by the bidder.
METHODOLOGY OF ERDMP MANUALPREPARATION:
ERDMP manual will be prepared as per standards. Once the ERDMP documents are prepared, the
same are to be submitted to OWNER for review. The comments on document, till complete
approval of the document, will be responsibility of the bidder to get incorporated in the
documents. Final report will be certified by OWNER.
Content of ERDMP
The ERDMP will include following as a minimum:
1. Classification of Emergencies;
2. Implementation Schedule;
3. Consequences of Defaults or Non-Compliance;
4. Statutory Requirements;
5. Pre-Emergency Planning;
6. Emergency Mitigation Measures;
7. Emergency Preparedness Measures;
8. Emergency Response Procedures and Measures;
9. Emergency organization and Responsibilities;
10. Infrastructure Requirements;
11. Declaration of On-Site and Off-Site Emergency;
12. Resources for Controlling Emergency;
13. Demographic Information;
14. Medical Facilities;
15. Evacuation plan;
16. Public Relations and Information to Public;
17. Reporting of the Incident;
18. Emergency Recovery Procedures;
19. Security threat plan and action plan to meet the eventualities.
Data/Documents Required
Following minimum data to complete the ERDMP manual and submit for approval will be collected
by the bidder in co‐ordination of OWNER personnel.
1. MSDS of all hazardous chemicals being handled
2. HAZOP and QRA Report (prepared by bidder)
3. Overall layout
4. Firefighting system details
5. Roles and Responsibilities with direct numbers of officers
6. Training details
7. Safety Committee
8. HSE Policies and Safety Measures
9. Emergency Actions
10. Work Permit Formats
11. Alarms and Detection System details
12. Preventive Maintenance Schedule
13. Medical Facilities
14. Any other details as and when required.
Reports/Deliverable
ERDMP draft report shall be delivered within two weeks from the date of data receipt for each
facility including reports of HAZOP Study & QRA (prepared by bidder). Four hard copies for each
location shall be delivered.