Uploaded by Conor Ward

Employee vs. Independent Contractor: Legal Tests

advertisement
Classifying the employee
Kahn-Freund (1977) described the contract of employment as the cornerstone of the modern labour
law system.
There is no comprehensive statutory definition of either “employee” or “contract of employment”.
Freedland (2003,p.22) has been very critical of the “strict legal dichotomy” between the employed &
self-employed.
Freedland (2006) argues that it is necessary to reconceptualise the employment relationship to afford
protection under employment law for a wider set of relationships.
Michael Forde: Employment Law Second Edition.
Those who work for others fall into two main legal categories. They may be employees, that is persons
who work under what is known as a contract of employment or service. Alternatively, they may be
self-employed, working for numerous persons under contracts for services. A typical employee works
only for one employer, arrives at and departs from the job at pre-ordained times, is paid at a fixed
rate which is usually based on the hours spent working, and takes instructions from the employer on
how the work is to be done i.e. factory workers. However, there are significant examples of who might
be described as atypical workers, who are neither obviously employees nor plainly self-employed.
Contract ‘of’ services: employee. Contract ‘for’ services: independent contractor.
The distinction is important in terms of:






statutory employment protection;
entitlement to state benefits;
tax assessment purposes;
social welfare contributions;
vicarious liability;
treatment as a preferential creditor if an employer is wound-up or put into
receivership.
Defining a contract of employment
Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 (s 1) defines a contract of employment
as:
o
“(a) a contract of service or apprenticeship, and
o
(b) any other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person,
who is carrying on the business of an employment agency within the
meaning of the Employment Agency Act 1971, and is acting in the course
of that business, to do or perform personally any work or service for a
third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the contract)”.
Payment of Wages Act 1991 and the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 apply a wider
definition of a contract of employment.

Both Acts define a contract of employment as occurring in contracts where an
individual has agreed with another person to do, or perform personally, any work
or service for “a third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the
contract) whose status by virtue of the contract is not that of a client or customer
of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual” (1991 Act)
or “that person or a third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the
contract)” (2000 Act).

Employment Equality Act 1998 (as amended in 2004 by s 3 of the Equality Act
2004) which includes contracts whereby “an individual agrees with another
person personally to execute any work or service for that person”
Applicable Tests: (i) Control test, (ii) Integration test, (iii) Economic reality test, (iv)
Entrepreneurial test.

Control Test: Most commonly used test – whether, under the terms of the
contract, expressed or implied, the employer has “the power of deciding the thing
to be done, the way in which it shall be done, the means to be employed in doing
it, the time when and the place where it shall be done.” – Ready mixed concrete
Ltd v Minister for Pensions [1968].
Yewens v Noakes [1880] ‘a servant is a person subject to the command of his master as to
the manner in which he shall do his work’. Person was an employee if an employer could
tell him not only what to do but how to do it. Grounded in agricultural/ early industrial
society.
Roche v Kelly [1969] IR 100 – a vicarious liability case, Walsh J observed that “while many
ingredients may be present in the relationship of master and servant, it is undoubtedly
true that one principle one, and almost invariably the determining one, is the fact that the
masters right to direct the servant not merely as to what is to be done but as to how it is
to be done.
In Re Sunday Tribune [1984] IR 505 – An employer – employee relationship can exist
without there being any form of extensive control. In the case of highly skilled personnel,
especially those doing work of a professional nature, the employer may exercise very little
control. Carroll J stated that the Control Test was too simplistic in these situations.
On the other hand, there can be extensive control, but the engaged person is nevertheless
an independent contractor.
O’Keeffe v Hickey [2009] 1 ILRM 490

The Integration Test: “employed as part of the business, and his work done is integral part of
the business.” As opposed to being “not integrated into but only accessory to the business.”
This test provides that under a contract of service the work done is an integral part of the
business.
Example 1: is a doctor in a hospital an employee of the hospital or an independent
contractor?
Example 2: you regularly contribute to a newspaper; you have no regular hours, write for
other papers and journals & have leave to write books. For this particular newspaper you
write regularly, including leaders & are an active member of the editorial staff, attend
regular meetings & take part in editorial decisions. Are you an employee?
In Re Sunday Tribune [1984] IR 505:
One of the journalists wrote a column for the Sunday newspaper for 50 out of 52 weeks
in the year and took part editorial conferences and received holiday pay. She was held to
be an integral part of the business of the newspaper and, accordingly, one of its
employees. Another wrote for the paper on a regular basis but not every week, she would
not work on a piece until it was commissioned by the editor. She was not paid at a rate
per word but on the basis of a collective agreement with the National Union of Journalists.
Carrol J. concluded that she was not an integral part of the business, and therefore was
an independent contractor in respect of her dealings with the company.
The difficulty with this test for identifying employees is that the courts have not spelt out
in general terms what is meant by integration. If the person assumes some commercial
risk in doing the job, he most likely will be classified as self employed regardless of how
integrated he is in the employer’s business.

Economic Reality / Entrepreneurial / Enterprise Test
Does the worker provide work for remuneration and agrees to be subject to the
company’s control? This test looks at the economic reality behind the relationship.
Market Investigations Ltd v Minister for Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173
Entrepreneurial test looks at whether the worker has engaged him/herself to perform the
services performing them as a person in business on his/her own account?
O’Coindealbhain v Mooney [1990] – the respondents job was as a branch manager of the
social welfare office in a country town, his remuneration comprised certain allowances
and a fixed fee related to the volume of work performed; he was required to purchase
and furnish his own premises and to employ competent assistants. He was held to be selfemployed, principally because “his profit is the amount by which his remuneration
exceeds his expenses; the lower he can keep his expenses the greater the profit.”

Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister for Pensions and National
Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497
Contract drivers (former employees) obliged to use vehicles bought on hire purchase from
the company.
Vans were in company colours, had a company logo & were maintained in accordance
with company standards.
Drivers could only use the vans for company business; had flexible hours; pay was based
on the amount of concrete hauled subject to an annual minimum rate; drivers could hire
substitutes.
Dispute arose over the payment of national insurance contributions.
MacKenna J adopted an open-ended approach to the question of determining employee status.
“A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled.
(i) The servant agrees that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration, he will
provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master.
(ii) He agrees, expressly or impliedly, that in the performance of that service he will be
subject to the other’s control in a sufficient degree to make that other master.
(iii) The other provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of
service…. The servant must be obliged to provide his own work and skill. Freedom to do a
job by one’s own hands or by another’s is inconsistent with a contract of service, though
a limited or occasional power of delegation may not be…”. (at 515)
Henry Denny & Sons (Ireland) Ltd. trading as Kerry Foods v. Minister for Social Welfare
[1998]
Worker hired as in-house demonstrator – demonstrating & marketing applicant’s products in
supermarkets. She had a brief induction; worked 28 hours per week at rate of £85 a week for 4850 weeks a year. She could refuse work but could not have others do the work for her.
Demonstration stand, uniform, products supplied to her & she had to abide by regulations &
directions of supermarket. No entitlement to holiday pay or sick pay. She was not a member of
the company’s pension scheme. Yearly contract signed stating it was a separate contract & she
was free to do other work. Yearly contract ended in 1988 – she continued to do work for company
under separate agreements for another five years. Agreements set out that she was an
independent contractor, not an employee.
1992 – both parties required to fill out a form to determine whether she was an insurable person
under the Social Welfare Acts 1993-1997. If contract was one of service she would be insurable.
Social welfare officer decided she was an insurable person.
Company appealed this decision – appeals officer rejected the appeal (worker was subject to
control, discretion of & dismissal by the company) – decision reviewed & upheld by chief appeals
officer. Company appealed to High Court – Carroll J applied the tests & held worker was an
insurable person.
Company appealed to Supreme Court - Keane J dismissed appeal.
(1) the extent and degree of control exercised by one party over another in the performance of
work; (2) the entrepreneurial test.
Keane J concluded that:
“while each case must be determined in the light of its particular facts and circumstances,
in general a person will be regarded as providing his or her services under a contract of
service and not as an independent contractor where he or she is performing those services
for another person and not for himself or herself. The degree of control exercised over
how the work is to be performed, although a factor to be taken into account, is not
decisive. The inference that the person is engaged in business on his or her own account
can be more readily drawn where he or she provides the necessary premises or
equipment or some other form of investment, where he or she employs others to assist
in the business and where the profit which he or she derives from the business is
dependent on the efficiency with which it is conducted by him or her”. [1998] 1 IR 34 at
50.
Minister for Agriculture and Food v Barry [2009] 1 IR 215
Appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT).
Respondents worked as temporary veterinary inspectors (TVI) at a meat factory in Cork.
To become a TVI, each respondent had to apply for approval from the Dept of Agriculture and
Food & once approval had been granted, each respondent had to submit a written application for
inclusion on a TVI panel for the purposes of selection for work in certain meat plants.
The Cork meat plant closed & subsequently, the respondents claimed entitlements under the
legislation regarding redundancy & notice.
This entitlement was contingent on the respondents being deemed employees of the appellant.
EAT deemed the respondents to have been employed under a contract of service & thus were
employees.
Appellants appealed to the High Court.
Edwards, J. held that the EAT had erred in law in its approach to the correct tests to be applied.
Edwards J. also found that the EAT had misconstrued the decision of Keane J. in Henry Denny as it
had referred to Keane J’s judgment as providing a “single composite test” to the enterprise test.
EAT had determined that the issues of control and integration were simply to be used as elements
in applying the enterprise test.
Edwards J found that this was a misreading of the decision in Henry Denny.
Edwards, J. :
“I believe that this confusion derives primarily from misguided attempts to divine in the
judgment the formulation of a definitive, ‘one size fits all’ test in circumstances where the
learned judge was not attempting to formulate any such test… I think it can sometimes be
unhelpful to speak of a ‘control test’, or of an ‘integration test’, or of an ‘enterprise test’,
or of a ‘mixed test’, or of a ‘fundamental test’ or of an ‘essential test’, or of a ‘single
composite test’ because, in truth, none of the approaches so labelled constitutes a ‘test’,
in the generally understood sense of that term, namely, that it constitutes a measure or
yardstick of universal application that can be relied upon to deliver a definitive result”. (at
239).
“The important thing to remember, however, is that every case must be considered in the
light of its particular facts and it is for the court or tribunal considering those facts to draw
the appropriate inferences from them by applying the general principles which the courts
have developed. That requires the exercise of judgment and analytical skills. In my view it
is simply not possible to arrive at the correct result by ‘testing’ the facts of the case in
some rigid formulaic way.”
 “It was incorrect [of the EAT] to assert that questions of control and integration are
to be regarded merely as elements to be taken into account in applying the enterprise
test. They are not. Like the question of enterprise, questions of control and integration
may also provide a court or tribunal with valuable assistance in drawing the
appropriate inferences. All potential aids to the drawing of the appropriate inferences
from the primary facts as found stand in their own stead, and no one is subsumed by
the other. Moreover, those mentioned do not represent an exhaustive list. There
could be other factors that might also assist… It is for a court or tribunal seized of the
issue to identify those aids of greater potential assistance to them in the
circumstances of the particular case and to use those aids appropriately.”
Louise O’Byrne: Mutual Obligation: Minister for Agriculture and Food v Barry ([2008] IEHC 216),
Edwards J. discussed the importance of mutuality of obligation in determining employment status. In
this case, the Minister contended that the claimants, who were veterinary inspectors, were
independent contractors. The claimants asserted employment rights in the context of seeking
redundancy and notice payments.
“The requirement of mutuality of obligation is the requirement that there must be mutual obligations
on the employer to provide work for the employee and on the employee to perform work for the
employer. If such mutuality is not present, then either there is no contract *12 at all or whatever
contract there is must be a contract for services or something else, but not a contract of service”.
Barry & Ors v Minister for Agriculture and Food [2015] IESC 43 (Supreme Court)
“It is correct to note, however, as was noted by Edwards J, that there is no universal test
whereby it may be said that if a particular indication is met or not met that person is
employed or not. Furthermore, it may need to be factored into any such analysis that it
can be that a course of dealings over years may turn from what was initially the
engagement of self-employed contractor to do work on a particular basis into an
employment relationship.”
Other Important Factors






Degree of control by the ‘employer’.
Degree to which the worker risks loss/stands to gain from profit.
Degree to which the worker’s work is an integral part of the business.
Regularity method of payment.
Regularity of hours.
Ownership of tools and equipment – McAuliffe v Minister for Social Welfare
[1995] 1 ILRM 189
McAuliffe v Minister for Social Welfare [1995] 1 ILRM 189
Appeal against the decision of the social welfare officer who deemed that the two delivery men
were under a contract of service. Appellant was a wholesale distributor of newspapers. Case
concerned whether two delivery men were employees or independent contractors
Both worked 5-7 days per week. Both paid monthly on foot of submitted invoices based
on daily rates of remuneration. Both owned their vehicles which they drove & were
responsible for any driving expenses. Could engage substitute drivers (whom they would
pay) but they had to get approval from the wholesale distributor. Free to carry goods for
other employers but not at the same time as this wholesale distributor
Both made Schedule E returns – one driver was registered for VAT
Both drivers were responsible for any damage to the goods carried and for any delays
High Court reversed the social welfare officer’s decision on appeal.
Other Important Factors – Mutuality of Obligations
Whether there is a mutuality of obligations - Minister for Agriculture and Food v Barry [2009] 1 IR
215 at 230:
“The requirement of mutuality of obligation is the requirement that there must be mutual
obligations on the employer to provide work for the employee and on the employee to
perform work for the employer. If such mutuality is not present, then either there is no
contract at all or whatever contract there is must be a contract for services or something
else, but not a contract of service. It was characterised in Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd. v.
Gardiner [1984] I.C.R. 612 at p. 632 as the "one sine qua non which can firmly be
identified as an essential of the existence of a contract of service." Moreover,
in Carmichael v. National Power plc. [1999] I.C.R. 1226 at p.1230 it was referred to as
"that irreducible minimum of mutual obligation necessary to create a contract of service".
Accordingly, the mutuality of obligation test provides an important filter. Where one party
to a work relationship contends that that relationship amounts to a contract of service, it
is appropriate that the court or tribunal seized of that issue should in the first instance
examine the relationship in question to determine if mutuality of obligation is a feature
of it. If there is no mutuality of obligation it is not necessary to go further: whatever the
relationship is, it cannot amount to a contract of service. However, if mutuality of
obligation is found to exist, the mere fact of its existence is not, of itself, determinative of
the nature of the relationship and it is necessary to examine the relationship further.”
 Mansoor v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2010] IEHC 389 – Louise O’Byrne –
Lavan J. considered the status of the Mr Mansoor who provided medical services to An Garda
Síocháná in respect of taking urine samples from prisoners facing charges of driving under the
influence of alcohol. Lavan J. held that mutual obligation was not satisfied in this case. The
defendants were not obliged to give the plaintiffs work, and the plaintiffs could declare that they
were unavailable. He could face no sanction or rebuke from the defendants.
 McKayed v Forbidden City Ltd [2016] IEHC 722 – unfair dismissal claim – question whether he
was an employee or independent contractor: “…the fact that work was given regularly for a
period of time is not determinative of whether one party had a legal obligation to provide the
other party with work.”
Other Important Factors:
Ability to provide a substitute (e.g. ability to delegate the performance of a contract).
The terms used by the parties – courts will consider the substance and not the form
Millen v Presbyterian Church in Ireland [2000] ELR 292
Henry Denny & Sons (Ireland) Ltd. trading as Kerry Foods v. Minister for Social Welfare
[1998] 1 IR 34
Louise O’Byrne - The right to use substitutes is another feature that will be examined in determining
employment status. In the case of Castleisland Breeding Society Limited v Minister for Social and
Family Affairs ([2004] IESC 40), the Supreme Court concluded that the inability to use substitutes
without the approval of business was not fatal to a finding that an individual is a contractor rather
than an employee.
-
In summary, in determining the nature of the parties' relationship, the courts will take a
holistic approach not confined to the written terms of the agreement between the parties.
In conducting such an evaluation, the courts will look to the respective bargaining power of
the parties and whether the written terms accurately record what was agreed (or whether
one party effectively imposed a set of terms on the other). Although parties cannot
themselves fix the status of their relationship in writing, the courts can look to the written
categorisation of the relationship and decide that same is an accurate reflection of the
relationship in reality, and as such, the written agreement may be determinative of parties'
relationship.
Employee or Independent Contractor?
Millen v Presbyterian Church in Ireland [2000] ELR 292
Employment Appeals Tribunal determined that a minister of the Presbyterian Church of Ireland
was not an employee within the meaning of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.
Tribunal stated that the Church does not make appointments but rather the particular
congregations of which the Church is made up. Issue of a P60 to the minister did not determine
the employment relationship regardless of the use of the descriptions ‘employer’ and ‘employee’.
Tierney v An Post [2000] - Plaintiff was a sub-postmaster. He provided his own premises, his
income was performance-based and he employed an assistant.
Respondent dismissed the employee under his statutory powers. Tiernay challenged this decision.
Respondent argued that Tiernay was not an employee.
In the High Court, McCracken, J. referred to the control test, integration test and the decision in
Denny.
High Court held that it was a contract of service.
Appeal to Supreme Court – held to be a contract for services – looked to other factors e.g.
postmaster supplied his own premises, could employ others to assist in business & was taking on
the risks of profit & loss in a business.
Atypical employment:



Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018
Part-time and casual work
o Directive 97/81 Framework Agreement on part-time work
o Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act 2001
Fixed-Term Work
o Directive 99/70 framework agreement on fixed term work
o Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003

Agency Work
o Directive 2008/104 on temporary agency work
o Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012
Gig economy – UK case law
Louise O’Byrne:
Engaging services through what has become widely known as the “gig economy” has become
increasingly popular in recent years. So, what is the gig economy? It can be described as a
working environment that offers flexibility with regard to hours of work, or, in the alternative, a
form of exploitation with little or no workplace protection. People who work in the gig economy
have agile/flexible jobs instead of (or as well as) more traditional full-time jobs. Instead of a
salary, workers get paid for the “gigs” they do, such as food delivery or a taxi journey. It is
estimated that some five million people are employed in the gig economy in the UK. In Ireland, it
is reported that some 5 per cent of the workforce have constantly varying hours of work (J.
O'Connell, “We're Working but we're not Employed”.
Benefits include flexibility and control over how they work but “Gig economy” working has sparked
plenty of debate recently, with low-paid work, zero hour contracts and reports of workers being
exploited and denied rights and entitlements that many would argue they are entitled to enjoy.
Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection published the Employment (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Bill 2017:
“An Act to provide for a requirement that employers provide employees with certain terms of
employment within a certain period after commencing employment; to impose sanctions for certain
offences; to further provide for a minimum payment due to employees in certain circumstances; to
prohibit contracts specifying zero as the contract hours in certain circumstances and to provide for
the introduction of banded contract hours; to further provide for prohibition of penalisation”
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41 – landmark UK Supreme Court case that deemed the
claimants to be workers within the meaning of the applicable UK employment regulations
Louise O’Byrne commentary - In practice, in this area of the law, it may be more common for a
court or tribunal to have to investigate allegations that the written contract does not represent
the actual terms agreed and the court or tribunal must be realistic and worldly wise when it does
so. So the relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding whether
the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the true agreement
will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the written
agreement is only a part. This may be described as a purposive approach to the problem. If so, I
am content with that description.”
Pimlico Plumbers v Smith [2018] UKSC 29
Uber BV v Aslam [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 – UK Court dismissed Uber’s appeal of Employment
Tribunal decision
Aslam v Uber BV [2017] I.R.L.R. 4 (UK Employment Tribunal) – Uber drivers deemed to be
workers for the purposes of applicable UK employment legislation regarding employment
rights, working time and minimum wage.
Dewhurst v City Sprint (2202512/2016) - (UK Employment Tribunal)
Independent Workers' Union of Great Britain (IWGB) v Roofoods Limited T/A Deliveroo (2017 WL
05632856) – (UK Central Arbitration Committee decisions).
Louise O’Byrne: The Uber Saga - The Uber Saga
The case of Aslam v Uber BV ([2017] I.R.L.R. 4) has been one of the more high profile cases to come
before the Employment Tribunal in London. The Tribunal, when tasked with making a decision on
the employment status of Uber drivers, concluded that Uber drivers are workers for the purposes of
the UK's Employment Rights Act 1996, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Working Time
Regulations 1998. At the time of the hearing, there were some 30,000 Uber drivers operating in the
London area and 40,000 in the UK as a whole. The underlying claims related to unlawful deductions
from wages (through an alleged failure to pay the national minimum wage) and in respect of a
failure to provide paid leave.
In this case, the Tribunal analysed Uber's business model and forensically assessed the terms
between Uber and the driver, including a welcome packet used for “onboarding” new drivers. The
Tribunal went on to make the following findings of fact:
• Drivers are not required to make any commitment to work. However, when a driver signs into the
app, this usually signals that they are coming ‘on-duty’ and available for work.
• Drivers supply their own vehicles and are responsible for all running costs, including the licence
costs.
• Passengers book trips through the Uber app. On receipt of a passenger request, the app locates a
driver logged into the app. The selected driver has 10 seconds to accept the booking through the
app, failing which Uber assumes that they are unavailable and locates another driver.
• If a driver fails to accept a series of bookings, this can result in losing his account status.
Acceptance statistics are recorded and Uber warns, “you should accept at least 80% of trip requests
to retain account status.”
• Once a driver accepts a booking, Uber places the driver and passenger in direct contact, through
the app.
• The driver is not made aware of the destination until collecting the passenger. The app provides
detailed directions to the destination and the driver is expected to follow those directions unless the
passenger stipulates a different route.
• At the end of the trip, Uber's servers calculate a recommended fare, based on GPS data from the
driver's phone. The driver cannot negotiate or agree a higher fare.
• The passenger pays the fare directly to Uber, via the app. Uber subsequently pays drivers, weekly
in arrears, in respect of the fares they have earned, minus a “service fee” of 20 per cent to 25 per
cent for connecting the driver to the passenger through the app.
• Uber operates a rating system. If a driver falls below a set average rating Uber can withdraw the
driver's access to the Uber app (effectively preventing him or her from being an Uber driver).
• Uber takes the risk in some matters such as certain passenger fraud.
• Uber deals with any fare complaints, often without requesting any comment from the driver.
• Drivers are not required to wear any uniform and are not permitted to display the Uber logo in
the London area.
-
-
The Tribunal commented on the remarkable lengths to which Uber had gone to compel
agreement with its description of itself and the analysis of its legal relationship with drivers.
The Tribunal noted that Uber had previously made numerous comments in “unguarded
moments” outside the case before the Tribunal, which ran contrary to the case it presented
before the Tribunal. One example cited by the Tribunal was written evidence given to the
Greater London Authority Transport Scrutiny Committee by Uber where it had referred to
drivers receiving “commission”. The Tribunal was satisfied that this reinforced the claimant's
simple case that Uber runs a transportation business and employs drivers to that end.
Uber's case was that it is a technology platform providing business opportunities for drivers.
The Tribunal was not convinced by this and concluded that it was “unreal to deny that Uber
is in business as a supplier of transportation services” and contrived to regard Uber as
working for the drivers. The contract between Uber and the drivers was not considered to
be at “arm's length between two independent business undertakings”. The notion that Uber
in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common platform was, in the
Tribunal's mind, “ridiculous”. In light of the above findings, the tribunal concluded that the
drivers are workers of Uber for as long as the driver: • has turned on the app; • is ready and
willing to accept fares; and • is in the territory in which they are authorised to drive.
The Uber Appeal:
Uber appealed the decision of the employment Tribunal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT).
The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that Uber drivers could not accept fairs from another
private hire operator and that they must accept 80% of their fairs when on duty. This creates a
mutuality of obligation. Uber sought to bypass the Court of Appeal and go straight to the Supreme
Court. This request has been rejected
Uber: The European Angle: Advocate General Szpunar gave an opinion on the boundaries of the gig
economy in employment law. Szpunar concluded that Uber was engaged in the “supply of transport
which is the main supply, and which gives the service economic meaning.”
The CJEU delivered a judgment in 2017 arising from a referral from Spain. The primary issue to be
answered was if uber journeys should be qualified as a service in the field of transport or as an
information society service. The CJEU concluded that Uber was; “intermediation service … the
purpose of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone application and for remuneration, nonprofessional drivers using their own vehicle with persons who wish to make urban journeys, must be
regarded as being inherently linked to a transport service and, accordingly, must be classified as ‘a
service in the field of transport’”.
The importance of this decision is that Uber is subject to EU regulation as it relates to the transport
sector. It should be noted that there are no common rules at EU level covering the type of services
provided within Uber's business model and, as such, Member States enjoy a wide margin of
discretion in regulating the conditions under which these types of services can be provided.
City Sprint: In Dewhurst v City Sprint (2202512/2016) - considered if a bike courier was a worker
under the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.230(3), rather than being self-employed, and was therefore
entitled to paid annual leave. The Tribunal placed significant emphasis on the nature of the control
exercised over Ms Dewhurst in arriving at its decision. It was concluded she was a worker; •
Citysprint had the power to regulate the work available. • Ms Dewhurst could not improve her
business opportunities through additional efforts. • There was an inequality of bargaining power. •
The ability to appoint substitutes was inoperable due to the insurance provisions that Ms Dewhurst
has obliged to fulfil thus rendering the right to substitute a sham. • Ms Dewhurst had little
autonomy to determine the manner in which the services were performed and no chance at all to
dictate its terms. • Ms Dewhurst was described as a “worker in a subordinate position … [and] a
typical example of the protection needed from the Working Time Directive”.
Conclusion:
What does all of this mean? It has been well canvassed that in determining employment status each
case has to be assessed by reference to its own facts and that a number of factors will be looked at
such as personal service, control, integration, mutuality of obligation and financial risk.
It would appear that some factors, where they can be demonstrated with certainty can be
definitive—or at least provide a greater degree of certainty—in arriving at an assessment in terms of
employment status. These are mutuality of obligation and substitution. Paying lip service to these
factors will not cut it and a factual analysis of what is happening or is capable of happening on the
day-to-day basis within the confines of the contractual relationship will be required. Where it can be
genuinely established that there is no mutuality of obligation then this should, in the main, be
sufficient to characterise the relationship as that of a contract for service. If the question of
mutuality is blurred, then the other factors have to come into play. Similarly, where there is no
requirement to provide personal service this, by and large, indicates an equality of bargaining power
that has been absent from many of the cases analysed above.
The recent UK decisions build usefully on the relatively extensive jurisprudence that exists in this
jurisdiction on employment status generally. They do not, in the writer's view, represent a significant
departure from any of the current principles already enshrined in the jurisprudence of this
jurisdiction.
Other categories of employees:




Office holders:
o ‘a position or place to which certain duties are attached, especially of a more or less
public character; a position of trust or authority or service under constituted
authority; a place in the administration of government, the public service the direction
of a corporation, company, society etc.’
Apprentices
The Public Service.
Persons beyond retirement age; under aged workers; illegal employment; persons employed
by a close relative.
Download