Almario vs Alba case digest
Amendment to the Constitution
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January
27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos.
104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are
embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners
herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an
additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos.
105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair
and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners
do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to
study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of
the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.
HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power
of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land
reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary
is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode
of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the
plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has
nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of
the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the
desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the
average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban land reform."
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it
has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us
for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new
Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil."
Facts:
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who
are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed
from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the
landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing
P.D. No. 27.
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The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of
retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate
area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they
derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under
its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the
Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners),
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners
to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do
not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted
one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation.
In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under
E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657.
Held:
P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared
that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except
that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood,
however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep
the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this
Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
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R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the
land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.
All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27
shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement
as to costs
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and
Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power]
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commanderin-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power
to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
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First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk
II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of
national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of
the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
“the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
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emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article
VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of
terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O.
No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 192856:March 8, 2011.
FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Gonzales and respondent Lim are candidates for the position of Representative of the
3rd Congressional district of Albay in the 2010 elections. a Petition for Disqualification and
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bicharaagainst Gonzalez on
the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 625.
Gonzalez denied having willfully made false and misleading statement in his COC regarding his
citizenship and pointed out thatBichara had filed the wrong petition under Section 68 of
theOmnibus Election Code(OEC) to question his eligibility as a candidate.Gonzalez also argued that
the petition which should have been correctly filed under Section 78 of the OEC was filed out of
time.The COMELEC, however, granted Bicharas petition.
Subsequently, Gonzalez was proclaimed as the winner of the elections, and filed a motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC decision, which was denied. The COMELEC held that the
proclamation of Gonzalez was illegal, and formed a Special Board of Canvassers to declare Lim,
the second placer, as the representative of the 3rd district. Lim then asked the House of
Representatives to include him in the Roll of Representatives, which House Speaker Belmonte
denied, citing that the issue of qualification of Gonzalez was within the jurisdiction of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
ISSUES:
Whether or not Bicharas petition was filed on time
Whether or not Gonzales was validly declared as the representative of Albay
Whether or not COMELEC had lost jurisdiction over the citizenship dispute
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW: Period within which to file a case for COC cancellation, as distinguished
from disqualification; jurisdiction of the COMELEC and HRET over election disqualification
cases.
First issue: Since the petition sought to cancel the COC filed by Gonzalez and disqualify him as a
candidate on the ground of false representation as to his citizenship, the same should have been
filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC, pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. (This is
the only provision where a person is allowed to petition for a candidates disqualification before
the elections.). Gonzales filed his COC onDecember 1, 2009.Clearly, the petition for
disqualification and cancellation of COC filed by Lim onMarch 30, 2010was filed out of time.
Second issue: The COMELEC ruled that the motion for reconsideration of the COMELECs
resolution filed by Gonzalez waspro formaand hence did not suspend the execution of the
COMELEC resolution disqualifying him as a candidate, therefore making the resolution
disqualifying him final and executory, which had the effect of making Gonzalez subsequent
proclamation invalid and illegal. However, mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the
court does not automatically make a motion for reconsiderationpro forma. Indeed, in the cases
where a motion for reconsideration was held to bepro forma,the motion was so held because (1) it
was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion
must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the
decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. In
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the case at bar, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by Gonzalez failed to show that it suffers from
the foregoing defects, since it substantiated the arguments contained therein. Not being pro forma,
the MR should have suspended the execution of the COMELEC resolution, and validated the
proclamation of Gonzalez.
Third issue: Under Article VI, Section 17 of the1987 Constitution, the HRET is thesole judgeof all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.Here, subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly
proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of
Representatives. The HRET therefore has jurisdiction.
Petition is GRANTED, and the COMELEC decision is SET ASIDE.
mbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)
Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970
RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention
Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from
each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of
320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population.
Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from
assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a
delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA
6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the
parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for
convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed
for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case
granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case,
Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
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- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof.
Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent
political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the
Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal
opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of
political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular
party/group, it applies to all organizations.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision
of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers to the thenincumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners,
Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous
People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the President and Vice-President was held
last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or the
previously elected President and Vice-President.
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court
states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his
allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge, and the people have made judgment.
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153
October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1.
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
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voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers
also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that
the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2.
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.
Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Issue:
What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how
may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may
be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard
required for a proper submission?
Held:
The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall
have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such
powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body
its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied
in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner
Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
8
amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the
Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior
courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement
provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that
our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Issue:
Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim
National Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?
Held:
Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the
same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there
can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution
may be revised and replaced with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because
‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.
Issue:
What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper
submission?
Held:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert
that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has
been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either
when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes
applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1
proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of
122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment
to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then
is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be
viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the
plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of
the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the
proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be
resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.” The
three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite
is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Sanidad Vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T.
GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN, J,:
9
Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP
881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by
petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional
Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate
the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his
choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to
justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public
concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not
be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to
either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times
Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No, 127325, March 19, 1997
September 16, 2018
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin (President of the People’s Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action or PIRMA) filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials (Delfin Petition) through Peoples’ Initiative based on Article
XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, where Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order:
 fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
 causing the necessary publications of the said Order in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and
 instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all regions to assist petitioners and volunteers
in establishing signing stations at the time and dates designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC through its Chairman issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition; and setting the case for hearing.
At the hearing, the petitioner-intervenors appeared and on the same day, Senator Roco filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioner filed the special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
 The constitutional provision on people’s initiatives to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed by Congress.
 RA No. 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative (Constitution, statutes, local legislation)
but it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution.
 RA 6735 only covers laws and not constitutional amendments.
 COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (1991) to govern the conduct of initiative is ultra vires
(beyond legal capacity) because only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass
implementing law.
10


People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution and not revision.
Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiatives.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution
– NO.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is valid – NO.
3. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order –
NO.
4. Whether the lifting of term limits as proposed in the Delfin Petition would constitute a
revision or an amendment to the Constitution – MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC – YES.
RATIO:
1. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executor and RA 6735 cannot
be the implementing legislation.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executory. The details for carrying out
the provision are left to the legislature. The interpellations which ensued on the modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Furthermore, the modified amendment confines initiative to amendments to
and not revision of the Constitution. However, RA 6735 does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution because there was no subtitle provided for it. Hence, RA
6735 is not sufficient to be the implementing legislation for Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
2. The COMELEC Resolution is not valid.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form
of delegation of legislative authority under the rule that what has been delegated cannot be
delegated. It will only be valid if the law a) is complete in itself; and b) fixes a standard. However,
these requirements were not met.
3. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order.
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing and thus, becomes
the initiatory pleading. The Delfin petition is not an initiatory pleading since it does not contain
signatures of the required number of voters (under Sec 2 of Article XVII), COMELEC has no
jurisdiction before its filing.
4. There is no need to discuss whether the petition presents an amendment or revision of
the Constitution.
The discussion on the issue of whether it is an amendment or a revision is unnecessary if not
academic since COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
5. The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the present petition for prohibition.
COMELEC has no jurisdiction so it must be stopped from proceeding further. Moreover, petition
for prohibition is the proper remedy. In this case, the writ is necessary in view of the highly
divisive consequences on the body politic of the questioned Order. This political instability and
legal confusion climate begs for judicial statesmanship because only the SC can save the nation in
peril and uphold the majesty of the Constitution when the system of constitutional law is
threatened.
Tanada vs Cuenco
Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests Vol. 2
April 13, 2015Gi LiteLeave a comment
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS:
1 Abueva vs Wood, 2 US vs Bull
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY:
1 Marbury vs Madison, 2 Angara vs Electoral Commision, 3 Tanada vs Cuenco
ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924
JOHNSON, J
The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was
ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of the
petitioners are members of the House of Representatives and four are members of the Senate of
the Philippine Islands and they all belong to the democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon
and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the Acting
Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine
all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and
expenditures made out of the funds of the Independence Commission.
11
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of
one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not
otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including
publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said
appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the
House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act
hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso
that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be
necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to
prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested
the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to
the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the
Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said
vouchers and documentary proofs.
ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of
the courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are
mere agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by
the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section
24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over
accounts, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto,
shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence
should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and
is therefore not justiciable.
The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910
Facts:
On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named
Standard commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said
vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter
and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get
hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts
No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be
filed because neither was it said that the court sitting where the animals were disembarked would
take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ship
involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no
jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of
the Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the
high seas, but the moment it entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the country. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant vessels
of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to
the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
12
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of
1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required
from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to
Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a
remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the
District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is
conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment.
Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to
deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a
remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the
Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all
other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave
it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and
inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in
a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original
jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual
to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is
required by law as an obligation.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
13
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen
new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was
an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but
they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been
delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury
applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel
Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of
1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues
Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required
from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to
Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of
the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of
that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a
remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the
District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is
conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment.
Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to
deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a
remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they
are unconstitutional and therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the
Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is
specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all
other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave
it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and
inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely
without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in
a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original
jurisdiction.
14
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior
jurisdiction that commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual
to perform, or refrain from performing, a particular act, the performance or omission of which is
required by law as an obligation.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filedo. Praying, among otherthings, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a
bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of twothirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the
right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.
Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of
separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than
to any of the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
15
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear
and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the
rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object
would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests
against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by
the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the
Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid
but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party
and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this
process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would
be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the
Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco
argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to
leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or
not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that
the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative
acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004
16
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed
the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006
declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the
Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution
further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30,
2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as
the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th
Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan
ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition
for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that
COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA
6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001
elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and
Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the
petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as
taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds;
nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and
01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the
statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of
voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a
substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill
vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
17
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted
the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to
document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special
election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of
R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the
office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14,
2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the
original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the
manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now
appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
STATE IMMUNITY
ATO v. David (G.R. No. 159402; February 23, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS
FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was
being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey
the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00.
However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the
RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land
that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the
deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of
P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied
in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of
Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this
suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and
reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to
P10,000.00.
ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?
HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions
has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952)
Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court,
reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO)
is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a
body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary
function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is
engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v.
Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)
18
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991. DENIED.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, et al., Respondents
Facts
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from
Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance
of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein
China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the
Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the
Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed
to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years,
with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote
a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s
designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction
of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey
basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD
421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart
financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the
Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the construction of Phase I
of the Northrail Project.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction
with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances
Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO
against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and
Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an
Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29
March 2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145
could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government,
making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of
an executive agreement.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and
setting the case for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for
should be issued. CNMEG then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.
Issue
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
Ruling
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
19
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of
the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions.
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility
Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign
functions by the Chinese government but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG
with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor
did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign
functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese
corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing governmental
activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine National
Railways, in which this Court held that “immunity from suit is determined by the character of the
objects for which the entity was organized.”
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it
contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does
not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise
definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG
claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche
Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a
government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the
capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver of
immunity from suit.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by
implication of state immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a
foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no
similar law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in
this case.
BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO
March 30, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded
in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international
law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory
states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to
have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among
the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the
RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied
20
under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government.
In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership
between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by
and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent
of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to
a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a
third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third
country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third
country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies
the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue
to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of
termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the nonsurrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the
exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and
that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared
as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being
that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international
doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of
notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally
accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the
usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The
signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure,
or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes
binding through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the
Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and
agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise –
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
21
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the NonSurrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be
bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among
nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner
would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American
criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already
discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its
sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary
to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as
aptly described by the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and
punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense
justice fairly and judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow
Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial
and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with
the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the
crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or
violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
22
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and
desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
1.
2.
1.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2.
Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to
use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY,
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy,
and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was
contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to
the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose
23
as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely,
Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party.
An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative,
the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot
to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the
Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent,
be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit
but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation
was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the
official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 2022). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines
on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted
to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are
still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by
private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under
both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of
a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its
claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with
the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a
determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government
and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings
on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine
government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED
G.R. No. 198457
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are Decision Nos. 2010-051[2] and 2011-045,[3] dated April 8, 2010 and August 8, 2011,
respectively, of respondent Commission on Audit (CoA) which affirmed Notice of Disallowance
(ND) No. 2008-09-01 (SAT)[4] dated September 8, 2008 for the amount of P3,386,697.10 and
24
thereby held petitioners Filomena G. Delos Santos, Josefa A. Bacaltos, Nelanie A. Antoni, and
Maureen A. Bien (petitioners), inter alia, solidarily liable therefor.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District
of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[5] (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas),
Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under
the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).[6] It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a)
Cuenco shall identify and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the
TNT Program for an amount not exceeding P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major
illnesses for whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent patient who has been a
beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the
hospital shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the
same are not available in its pharmacy, subject to reimbursement when such expenses are
supported by official receipts and other documents.[7] In line with this, Ma. Isabel Cuenco, Project
Director of the TNT Program, wrote[8] petitioner Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC,
requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from
Sacred Heart Pharmacy or Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the
Department of Health. The said request was approved.[9]
The Audit Proceedings
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of
prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On
December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded[10] Dr.
Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112,[11] a fact-finding committee to investigate the
matter.
Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the
hospital, came up with her own review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the
PDAF of Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the results of her review as contained in Audit
Observation Memoranda (AOM) Nos. 2004-21,[12] 2004-21B,[13] and 2004-21C,[14] all dated
December 29, 2004, recommending the investigation of the following irregularities:
a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for
anti-rabies and drugs costing P3,290,083.29;
b. AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80 mostly
to the staff of VSMMC and TNT Office covering the period January to April 2004;
and
c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for
other drugs and medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions
and referral letters for drugs and medicines costing P602,063.50.[15]
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report[16] dated
January 18, 2005 essentially affirming the "unseen and unnoticeable" irregularities attendant to
the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an
"unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds";[17] (b) the VSMMC
management was completely "blinded" as its participation involved merely "a routinary
ministerial duty" in issuing the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and
delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and complete;[18] and (c) the detection
of the falsification and forgeries "could not be attained even in the exercise of the highest degree
or form of diligence"[19] as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting experts.
In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM No.
2005-001[20] dated October 26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs
and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and
already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified;[21] (b) 46 prescriptions
for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and
already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified;[22] and (c) 25
prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50
were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been paid by VSMMC.[23]
In her Comment/Reply[24] to the aforementioned AOM No. 2005-001 addressed to Leonor D. Boado
(Boado), Director of the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City, Delos Santos explained that during
the initial stage of the implementation of the MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened,
interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries through the hospital's
social worker.[25] However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was
25
run by his own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker
and the Medical Center Chief, as well as the logbook.[26] From then on, the hospital had no more
participation in the said program and was relegated to a mere "bag keeper."[27] Since the
benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-rabies medicines were
purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no public bidding was anymore required.[28]
Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., State
Auditor V, was formed pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order Nos. 2005-019-A
dated August 17, 2005 and 2005-019-B dated March 10, 2006 to conduct a special audit
investigation with respect to the findings of Booc and her team.[29] Due to time constraints,
however, AOM No. 2005-001 was no longer included in the SAT focus.[30] On October 15, 2007, the
SAT reported[31] the following findings and observations:
1. The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20, 2001
prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760, as Reenacted (GAA for CY 2001) were not
followed;[32]
2. Existing auditing law, rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines
were not followed in the [program's] implementation;[33]
3. The [program's] implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and
between [Congressman Cuenco] and the Hospital;[34] and
4. Acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows:
a.
b. There were [one hundred thirty-three (133)] falsified prescriptions for
anti-rabies vaccines, drugs and medicines [costing] P3,345,515.75
[allegedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy [were] paid by VSMMC from the
[PDAF of Congressman Cuenco];
c. [Forty-six (46) falsified prescriptions] for other drugs and medicines
costing P695,410.10 [were likewise reportedly] dispensed by Dell
Pharmacy and paid by VSMMC from the [said PDAF] x x x; and
d. [Twenty-five (25) prescriptions worth] P602,063.50 [were also claimed to
have been] served by Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid x x x.[35]
Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the
purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no
actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were
found to be falsified as evidenced by the following:
1. Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions
supporting the claims. Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they
operate on patients.
2. Almost all of the patients named in the prescriptions were not treated or admitted
at the Hospital or in its Out-patient Department. Those whose names appeared on
Hospital records were treated at different dates than those appearing on the
prescriptions:
PATIENT
TREATED
BILL
DATE OF PRESCRIPTION
Leah Clamon
Nov. 12, 2003
11/11/03
11/03/03
Jean Cañacao
Nov. 30, 2003
11/25/03
11/18/03
Felipe Sumalinog
Dec. 17, 2004
12/10/03
12/08/03
Vicente Perez
Mar. 12, 2004
11/26/03
11/17/03
Vincent Rabaya
Sept. 8, 2003
12/12/03
11/28/03
Rodulfo Cañete
July 24, 2004
01/16/04
01/12/04
3. Full dosages of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although it
is gross error to do so for these medicines are highly perishable. These should be
refrigerated and injected immediately and periodically. For instance:
a. Mr. Vicente Perez received the full dosage on November 26, 2003
and again on November 27, 2003. (Hospital records showed that
Mr. Perez was admitted in March 2003 for surgery.)
b. Mr. Maximo Buaya received the full dosage on January 25 and on
February 29, 2004.
c. Mr. Gregorio Rabago received his full dosage on December 6, 2003.
4. The dates of 80 prescriptions for anti-rabies and 45 for other drugs and medicines
are earlier than the dates of the corresponding delivery receipts. The gaps in the
dates ranged from 1 to 47 days. On the other hand, 33 prescriptions for anti-rabies
had later dates than the dates of the delivery receipts. The difference in the dates
ranged from 1 to 22 days.
5. The Pharmacy Unit still prepared Purchase Request [PR] for the claims Dell
[Pharmacy] submitted to that office when the PR is no longer necessary as the
medicines have already been taken by the patients.
26
6.
Of the three South District residents personally interviewed by the Team, two
denied having sought or received help from the [TNT] Program or being
hospitalized at VSMMC for dog bite.
7. The hospital social worker, Ms. Mergin Acido, declared that she was bypassed in
the evaluation of the alleged patients for the TNT Office has clerks who "evaluate"
the eligibility of the patients. The prescriptions and referral slips were directly
forwarded to the Pharmacy Unit for stamping and submission to the Dell
Pharmacy. She had no opportunity then to see the patients personally.
8. Mr. Louies James S. Yrastorza has stated under oath the falsity of the claims for
payment. He stated that he was ordered to submit to the Pharmacy Unit falsified
prescriptions accompanied by referral slips signed by Mr. James Cuenco for nonexisting patients. Subsequently, sometime in September 2007 Mr. Yrastorza
"clarified" his statements effectively recanting his first oath.
9. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor certified that out of the 30 names
of the patients randomly selected, only 15 were found listed in the registered
voters' database.
10. Prescriptions were stamped "VSMMC" signed/initialed by the Pharmacist who is
off duty as shown by the attendance record, e.g. Mesdames Arly Capuyan, Norma
Chiong, Corazon Quiao, Rowena Rabillas, and Riza Sei[s]mundo.[36]
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-0901,[37] disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for antirabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other
VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.[38] Petitioners' respective participations were detailed
as follows: (a) for Delos Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and approving
the disbursement vouchers and checks; (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her capacity as
Chief Administrative Officer, for certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and
incurred in her direct supervision; (c) for Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit,
for approving the supporting documents when the imputed delivery of the medicines had already
been consummated; (d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in her capacity as Hospital Accountant, for
certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the supporting documents for the payment to
Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper.[39]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals[40] before the CoA which were denied through
Decision No. 2010-051[41] dated April 8, 2010, maintaining their solidary liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal[s] of Dr. Filomena [G]. Delos Santos, Dr. Josefa A.
Bacaltos, Ms. Nelanie A. Antoni and Ms. Maureen A. Bien [are] hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
However, the appeal of Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas and Ms. Riza
Seismundo is hereby given due course. Likewise, Ms. Arly Capuyan who is similarly situated is
excluded although she did not file her appeal. ND No. 2008-09-01 (SAT) dated September 8, 2008
involving the amount of P3,386,697.10 is hereby affirmed with the modification by excluding
therein the names [of[ Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas, Ms. Riza
Seismundo, and Ms. Arly Capuyan as persons liable. The other persons named liable therein, i.e.,
Ma. Isabel Cuenco and Mr. James R. Cuenco, TNT Health Program Directors, and Mr. Sisinio
Villacin, Jr., proprietor of Dell Pharmacy, and herein appellants Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni
and Bien remain solidarily liable for the disallowance.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration[43] of the foregoing decision was further denied in Decision No.
2011-045[44] dated August 8, 2011. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance
system inherent in our form of government.[45]
Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
27
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim, and despotism.[46] In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed below.
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved
in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has
acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuenco's PDAF.[47] Further, under the MOA executed
between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as "willing to cooperate/coordinate
and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program."[48] More importantly, it
undertook to ascertain that "[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made
in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations."[49] It is a
standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for their
failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are
expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations,
and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records.[50] However, as pointed out by
the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476[51] dated September 20, 2001
prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman's PDAF authorized under
Republic Act No. 8760[52] were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as
other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency,
i.e., the Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines
purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go through the required public bidding in violation of the
applicable procurement laws and rules.[53] Similarly, specific provisions of the MOA itself setting
standards for the implementation of the same program were not observed. For instance, only
seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that
an indigent patient can avail of from Cuenco's PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the
benefits more than once, again in violation of the provisions of the MOA.[54] Clearly, by allowing
the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of the benefits of
the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control safeguards, the
hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to
"cooperate/coordinate and monitor" the implementation of the said health program. They likewise
violated paragraph 5[55] of NBC 476 which requires a "regular monitoring activity" of all programs
and projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 123[56] and 124[57] of Presidential Decree No.
1445,[58] otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines" (Auditing Code),
which mandates the installation, implementation, and monitoring of a "sound system of internal
control" to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the
disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of
their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that
their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.
The Court is not persuaded.
Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the
presence of an explicit rule that was violated.[59] For instance, in Reyna v. CoA[60] (Reyna), the
Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims
of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines'
Manual on Lending Operations.[61] In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA[62] (Casal),
sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum who again, notwithstanding their
good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award granted to its officials
and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant of
productivity incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the
Office of the President.[63] In Casal, it was held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was
not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the
directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the ["approving officers"] liable for the
refund [of the disallowed incentive award].[64]
Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective
violations of the applicable rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have
equally failed to make a case justifying their non-observance of existing auditing rules and
28
regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners' neglect to properly monitor
the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell
Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions
related thereto.[65] Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the
irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from
processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners
cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the
ground that Cuenco always reminded them that it was his money.[66] Neither may deviations, from
the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in
the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries,[67] be justified as "a welcome relief to the already
overworked and undermanned section of the hospital."[68]
In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos' argument that the practices of the TNT Office
were already pre-existing when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the
same[69] remains highly untenable. Records clearly reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she
was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime "in the late 2003," Antoni
disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged
prescriptions.[70] Hence, having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have
probed into the matter further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the
situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself with giving oral instructions to resident doctors,
training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed prescriptions pads, which Antoni
allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors.[71] But, just the same, the falsification
and forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that Delos Santos
ordered a formal investigation of the attendant irregularities. By then, too much damage had
already been done.
All told, petitioners' acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances[72] and as
aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their
respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted to the irregular
disbursements from Cuenco's PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 104 [73] and
105[74] of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement
of Accounts,[75] as prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the
degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco's PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot
pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected and even
rendered illusory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO
SACRAMENTO, Union President, JPFCEA, respondents.
Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner.
Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the
Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at bench.
JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (public respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30,
1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint
for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO (private respondent) against petitioner.
First, the undisputed facts.
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP)
working at JUSMAG-Philippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his
dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the
incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His
services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.2 He was also advised that
he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against
his leave.
On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and
Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by
JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement.
29
JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United
States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued.4
In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint "
for want of jurisdiction."5 Private respondent appealed6 to the National Labor Relations
Commission (public respondent), assailing the ruling that petitioner is immune from suit for
alleged violation of our labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating its immunity from
suit for its non-contractual, governmental and/or public acts.
In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it
held that petitioner had lost its right not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two
grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employeremployee relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity
from suit when it hired the services of private respondent on December 18, 1969.
The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America,9 where the "United
States Government (was considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a)
contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the local
courts."
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue
on illegal dismissal.
Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN
NOT AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A
SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH HAD
NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED; AND
B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN JUSMAG AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT; AND
B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO
PRESENT PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.
JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21, 1947,
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of Air, Naval and Army group, and its
primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval matters. 11
Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services required by the
Group, including compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other
personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne by the Republic of the Philippines."
This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) of the Philippines, dated January 23, 1991, the United States Government, thru its Embassy,
manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to cover the salaries of security assistance support
personnel" and security guards, the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and housing, and the cost
of utilities. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated
April 18, 1991.13
Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and JUSMAG-Philippines, thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S. Brigadier General
Robert G. Sausser. The Agreement delineated the terms of the assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for
1991, the relevant parts of which read:
a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards
currently contracted between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and the
Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP). . . . .
b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active
duty uniformed members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty
at JUSMAG.
c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). Therefore, the AFP agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no more than
74 personnel to designated positions with JUSMAG.
d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines.
The term "Operational Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel
30
administrative actions, such as: hiring recommendations; firing recommendations;
position classification; discipline; nomination and approval of incentive awards;
and payroll computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of
JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. For the period of time that there is an exceptional
funding agreement between the government of the Philippines and the United States
Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay the total payroll costs for the SASP employees.
Payroll costs include only regular salary; approved overtime, costs of living
allowance; medical insurance; regular contributions to the Philippine Social
Security System, PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA);
and the thirteenth-month bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus
payments in addition to those previously defined above. Entitlements not
considered payroll costs under this agreement will be funded and paid by the AFP.
e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at
their current rate of pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of
employment thereafter subject to renewal of their appointment with the AFP
(employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). No promotion or
transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of
their pay and benefits.
f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at
established AFP civilian rates. Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be
made available to the Comptroller, JUSMAG, by the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP.
Additionally, any legally mandated changes in salary levels or methods of
computation shall be transmitted within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ
to Comptroller, JUSMAG.
g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to
Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. Any termination of these personnel thought to be
necessary because of budgetary restrictions or manpower ceiling will be subject to
consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that JUSMAG's mission of
dedicated support to the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.
h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all
appointed SASP. (Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current
SASP). Any termination of services, other than voluntary resignations or
termination for cause, will result in immediate payments of AFP of all termination
pay to the entitled employee. Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued
bonuses and annual leave will be presented to the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later
than 14 calendar days prior to required date of payment.
i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social
Security System.
A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 227, dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding agreement for
the salaries of SASP and security guards until December 31, 1992.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it
was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military
Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in
effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint.
Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized
principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state
and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is anchored on the principle
of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).17
Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State,
without its consent or waiver. However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et al., 18 we recognized an
exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a state, thus:
. . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a
contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or
reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if the
law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name
the officer against whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof,
the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a
contract, the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen and its consent
to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. . . . .
(emphasis ours)
31
It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of America
19 was decided.
In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States
Government for stevedoring services at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. It then sought
to collect from the US government sums of money arising from the contract. One of the issues
posed in the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the
defendant United States, a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court
upheld the contention of Harry Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract
with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of
an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the
contract."
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved
that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be
sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought about by
their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine. 20
Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons,
supra, with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative
authority."
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to
sovereign or governmental activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be
extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts ( jure gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court
(En banc) in US vs. Ruiz, supra:
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities
or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature
of the act. Ergo, since a governmental function was involved — the transaction dealt with the
improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay — it was held that the United
States was not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove was employed
as a cook in the Main Club located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, John Hay Air Station. He
was dismissed from service after he was found to have polluted the stock of soup with urine.
Genove countered with a complaint for damages. Apparently, the restaurant services offered at the
John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United
States government in its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well
known and available to the general public, thus, the services are operated for profit, as a
commercial and not a governmental activity. Speaking through Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the
Court (En Banc) said:
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine
of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by
Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were
acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed
Genove. For the matter, not even the United States government itself can claim
such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with
Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the
sovereign state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. 24 Such is the case at
bench. Prescinding from this premise, we need not determine whether JUSMAG controls the
employment conditions of the private respondent.
We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is
stopped from denying the existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent.
On the contrary, in its Opposition before the public respondent, JUSMAG consistently contended
that the (74) SASP, including private respondent, working in JUSMAG, are employees of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra,
(2) the exchange of notes between our Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the
United States, thru the US Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the Agreement on May 21, 1991,
supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG.
We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than
twenty (20) years. Considering his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more
compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed
32
Forces of the Philippines, can take the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working
for JUSMAG, pursuant to the aforestated Military Assistance Agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the impugned
Resolution dated January 29, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT
ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated July 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 77997. The assailed decision
affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC)2 Decision3 dated March 22, 2002 in
Civil Case No. 208-M-95.
The case stemmed from the following factual and procedural antecedents:
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-430064 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel of
land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’
consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway.5
In a letter6 dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value
of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras (petitioner Contreras), then District
Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of petitioner Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), offered to pay the subject land at the rate of ₱0.70 per square meter per
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan.7 Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the
current fair market value.8
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint9 for recovery of possession
with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject
parcel of land and that they be paid attorney’s fees.10 Respondents claimed that the subject parcel
of land was assessed at ₱2,543,800.00.11
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) that the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent;
(2) that the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents have no cause of action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation, they should
be paid only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941.12
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order13 granting respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the
doctrine of state immunity from suit. As respondents’ claim includes the recovery of damages,
there is no doubt that the suit is against the State for which prior waiver of immunity is required.
When elevated to the CA,14 the appellate court did not agree with the RTC and found instead that
the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because the recovery of compensation is
the only relief available to the landowner. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to
the landowner. Besides, petitioner Contreras, in fact, had earlier offered the payment of
compensation although at a lower rate.Thus, the CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the
complaint and, consequently, remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining
the just compensation to which respondents are entitled to recover from the government.15 With
the finality of the aforesaid decision, trial proceeded in the RTC.
The Branch Clerk of Court was initially appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the
Chairman of the Committee that would determine just compensation,16 but the case was later
referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation report on the value of the subject
property.17 In PAC Resolution No. 99-007,18 the PAC recommended the amount of ₱1,500.00 per
square meter as the just compensation for the subject property.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Department of Public Works and Highways or its duly
assigned agencies are hereby directed to pay said Complainants/Appellants the amount of One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter for the lot subject matter of this case
in accordance with the Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee dated December 19, 2001.
SO ORDERED.20
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation
stated above should earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the
action on March 17, 1995 until full payment.21
In its appeal before the CA, petitioners raised the issues of prescription and laches, which the CA
brushed aside on two grounds: first, that the issue had already been raised by petitioners when
33
the case was elevated before the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 51454. Although it was not squarely ruled
upon by the appellate court as it did not find any reason to delve further on such issues,
petitioners did not assail said decision barring them now from raising exactly the same issues; and
second, the issues proper for resolution had been laid down in the pre-trial order which did not
include the issues of prescription and laches. Thus, the same can no longer be further considered.
As to the propriety of the property’s valuation as determined by the PAC and adopted by the RTC,
while recognizing the rule that the just compensation should be the reasonable value at the time of
taking which is 1940, the CA found it necessary to deviate from the general rule. It opined that it
would be obviously unjust and inequitable if respondents would be compensated based on the
value of the property in 1940 which is ₱0.70 per sq m, but the compensation would be paid only
today. Thus, the appellate court found it just to award compensation based on the value of the
property at the time of payment. It, therefore, adopted the RTC’s determination of just
compensation of ₱1,500.00 per sq m as recommended by the PAC. The CA further ordered the
payment of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the time of taking,
which is the filing of the complaint on March 17, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court assailing the CA decision based on the following
grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THE HIGHLY DUBIOUS AND QUESTIONABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR ALLEGED
OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING JUST COMPENSATION TO
RESPONDENTS BECAUSE THEIR COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES IS
ALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION BASED ON THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF
THE ALLEGED PROPERTY OF RESPONDENTS.22
Petitioners insist that the action is barred by prescription having been filed fifty-four (54) years
after the accrual of the action in 1940. They explain that the court can motu proprio dismiss the
complaint if it shows on its face that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners likewise aver
that respondents slept on their rights for more than fifty years; hence, they are guilty of laches.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the just compensation should be based on the value of the property
at the time of taking in 1940 and not at the time of payment.23
The petition is partly meritorious.
The instant case stemmed from an action for recovery of possession with damages filed by
respondents against petitioners. It, however, revolves around the taking of the subject lot by
petitioners for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. There is taking when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a permanent duration, or for the
purpose of devoting the property to public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.24
It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more
than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the possession of their property. Is the
action barred by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to recover
possession or just compensation?
As aptly noted by the CA, the issues of prescription and laches are not proper issues for resolution
as they were not included in the pre-trial order. We quote with approval the CA’s ratiocination in
this wise:
Procedurally, too, prescription and laches are no longer proper issues in this appeal. In the pretrial order issued on May 17, 2001, the RTC summarized the issues raised by the defendants, to
wit: (a) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation; (b) whether or not the
valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking or at the time of the
filing of the action; and (c) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to damages. Nowhere did
the pre-trial order indicate that prescription and laches were to be considered in the adjudication
of the RTC.25
To be sure, the pre-trial order explicitly defines and limits the issues to be tried and controls the
subsequent course of the action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. 26
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail. Laches
is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.27 This doctrine finds no
application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to respondents’
claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property
is taken for public use.28 Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the longstanding rule "that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first
34
acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe."29
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the
remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or,
if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken.30
For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of
time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation.31 The trial and appellate courts found that respondents
are entitled to compensation. The only issue left for determination is the propriety of the amount
awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true
when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property
owner who brings the action for compensation.32
The issue in this case is not novel.
In Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National Railways [PNR],33 PNR
entered the property of Forfom in January 1973 for public use, that is, for railroad tracks, facilities
and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service without initiating expropriation
proceedings.34 In 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property
and/or damages against PNR. In Eusebio v. Luis,35 respondent’s parcel of land was taken in 1980
by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City
without the appropriate expropriation proceedings. In 1994, respondent demanded payment of the
value of the property, but they could not agree on its valuation prompting respondent to file a
complaint for reconveyance and/or damages against the city government and the mayor. In Manila
International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,36 in the early 1970s, petitioner implemented
expansion programs for its runway necessitating the acquisition and occupation of some of the
properties surrounding its premises. As to respondent’s property, no expropriation proceedings
were initiated.1âwphi1 In 1997, respondent demanded the payment of the value of the property,
but the demand remained unheeded prompting him to institute a case for accion reivindicatoria
with damages against petitioner. In Republic v. Sarabia,37 sometime in 1956, the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of a portion of a lot situated in Aklan,
registered in the name of respondent, without initiating expropriation proceedings. Several
structures were erected thereon including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station,
the Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. In 1995,
several stores and restaurants were constructed on the remaining portion of the lot. In 1997,
respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against the storeowners
where ATO intervened claiming that the storeowners were its lessees.
The Court in the above-mentioned cases was confronted with common factual circumstances
where the government took control and possession of the subject properties for public use without
initiating expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, while the
landowners failed for a long period of time to question such government act and later instituted
actions for recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the landowners’ right
to the payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The
Court has uniformly ruled that just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling for purposes of compensation. In Forfom, the payment of just compensation was
reckoned from the time of taking in 1973; in Eusebio, the Court fixed the just compensation by
determining the value of the property at the time of taking in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot at
the time of taking in 1972 served as basis for the award of compensation to the owner; and in
Republic, the Court was convinced that the taking occurred in 1956 and was thus the basis in
fixing just compensation. As in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this case should,
therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al.,38 and repeatedly held
by the Court in recent cases, thus:
x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date
of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it
is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property
should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at
the time it is taken x x x.39
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was
₱0.70/sq m.40 Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents
instead of the higher value which is ₱1,500.00. While disparity in the above amounts is obvious
35
and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving such outdated valuation
after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel
effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property
owner alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the public
which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.41
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, petitioners clearly acted in
utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights which cannot be countenanced by the Court.42
For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the form of actual or
compensatory damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full payment.43 This is based on
the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to
be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation of the
subject property owned by respondents shall be F0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square meter, with
interest at six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17,
1995, until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012
FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the
construction of extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid
for 2, the 3rd was not paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still
failed to pay. So Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period.
When they appealed on June 3, 2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002,
RTC denied it and issued a writ of execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but
was likewise denied. On December 21, 2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished
funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was
granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC directs sheriff to receive the check
from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is
pending. On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied on December 2005 but
UP files for petition for review. On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced Dizon, ordered the
withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files petition for
review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.
ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application
HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of
retroactivity or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes.
Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right
is impinged in its application.
USA vs Ruiz
Doctrine of Immunity from Suit
Caption:
USA VS RUIZ
G.R. No. L-35645
136 scra 487 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done
by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
36
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against
the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to
be able to invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the
United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A
state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated September 3, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (Manila RTC) in Civil Case No. 09-122643 which declared null and
void the results of the re-bidding for the supply of water pipes conducted by the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) of the City Government of Iligan due to the use of bidding documents outside of
the rules and procedures prescribed under Republic Act No. (RA) 9184,3 otherwise known as the
"Government Procurement Act."
The Facts
On October 3, 2006, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development4 (IBRD) entered into Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH5 for the
implementation. of the IBRD's "Support for Strategic Local Development and Investment . Project"
(S2LDIP). The loan facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00 was fully guaranteed by the
Government of the Philippines and conditioned upon the participation of at least two (2) local
government units by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank.6
On February 22, 2007, Land Bank entered into an SLA7 with the City Government of Iligan to
finance the development and expansion of the city's water supply system, which had two (2)
components, namely: (a) the procurement of civil works; and ( b) the procurement of goods for
the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings.8 The SLA expressly
provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan with
Land Bank were to be "procured in accordance with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines:
Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits' x x x, and with the provisions of [the] Schedule
4."9 Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its BAC, conducted a public bidding for
the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings using the IBRD
Procurement Guidelines.10
Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding and came up with the
second to the lowest bid in the amount of ₱193,959,354.34.11
However, in a letter12 dated July 27, 2009, the BAC informed Atlanta that the bidding was
declared a failure upon the recommendation of Land "Bank due to the IBRD 's non-concurrence
with the Bid Evaluation Report. Moreover, in a letter13 dated August 28, 2009, the BAC informed
37
Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it lacked several documentary
requirements.
In response, Atlanta, through a letter14 dated September 8, 2009, sought to correct the BAC's
erroneous assumption that it failed to submit the necessary documents and to have its
disqualification reconsidered. It expressed its objection against the BAC's declaration of a failure
of bidding, asserting that had it not been improperly disqualified there would have also been no
need to declare the bidding a failure because its tender would be the sole responsive bid necessary
to save the bid process.15
However, in a Resolution16 dated September 25, 2009, the BAC deemed it futile to reconsider
Atlanta's disqualification in view of the fact that the bidding had already been declared a failure
because of noted violations of the IBRD Procurement Guidelines and that, unless the BAC conducts
a new bidding on the project, it would not be able to obtain a "no objection" from .the World Bank.
Atlanta did not pursue the matter further with the BAC and opted, instead, to participate in the rebidding of the project, the notice of which was published anew on October 30, 2009.17
This notwithstanding, Atlanta, in a letter18 dated November 16, 2009, called the BAC's attention
to its use of Bidding Documents19 which, as it purported, not only failed to conform with the Third
Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs)20 prescribed by
the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained numerous provisions that
were not in accordance with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During
the pre-bid conference, the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184 or by any of
the GPPB 's issuances. It further announced that the bid opening would be conducted on December
14, 2009.21
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in contravention of RA
9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed on December 10, 2009 a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus22
with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the re-bidding .of the project against the City Government of
Iligan, the BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-122643
(Petition for Prohibition).
In their separate comments on the said petition, Land Bank and the BAC asserted that the case was
dismissible for improper. venue, mootness, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, failure to
implead an indispensable party, and the inapplicability of RA 918.4.23
In the meantime, with Atlanta's Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a 72-Hour TRO and
Special Raffle24 having been denied,25 the re-bidding of the project was conducted (as scheduled
on December 14, 2009), with four .C 4) bidders participating and submitting the following bids:
1. Atlanta Industries, Inc.
₱141,289,680.50
2. Moldex Products, Inc.
₱172,727,052.49
3. Dong Won Plastics, Inc.
₱189,184,599.74
4. Thai-Asia/Junnie Industries
₱191,900.020.0026
Thereupon, the case proceeded with the parties' submission of their respective memoranda27 and
the denial of Atlanta's prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ.28
The Manila RTC Ruling
In a Decision29 dated September 3, 2010, the Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and
void on the ground that it was done contrary to the rules and procedure prescribed in RA 9184 and
its IRR. Consequently, it enjoined the City Government of Iligan and. its BAC from entering into
and/or implementing the contract for the supply of water pipes with Moldex Products, Inc.30
The Manila RTC also ruled that the City Government of Iligan cannot claim exemption from the
application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of Loan Agreement No. 48~3-PH with the IBRD
because it was Land Bank, and not the City Government of Iligan, which was the party to the same.
Moreover, it .held that the IBRD could not have passed on its status as an international institution
exempt from RA 9184 simply because it loaned money to Land Bank.31 It added that the SLA
subsequently executed by Land Bank with the City Government of Iligan cannot validly provide for
the use of bidding procedures different from those provided under RA 9184 because the said SLA is
not in the nature of an international agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with the IBRD.32
The Manila RTC finally concluded that in view of GPPB Resolution No. 05-2009 (September 30,
2009) which requires "all branches, agencies, departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities
of the Government, including x x x local government units x x x to use the Philippine Bidding
Documents Third Edition for all their procurement activities," the City Government of Iligan and
its BAC exceeded their jurisdiction in conducting the public bidding using the questioned bidding
documents.33
Dissatisfied, Land Bank elevated the matter directly to the Court, vigorously asserting, among
others, that: (a) venue was improperly laid; and (b) the public bidding for the supply of water
pipes to the City of Iligan's Water Supply System Development and Expansion Project is exempt
38
from the application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of the SLA being .a related and subordinate
covenant to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH.34
The Issues Before the Court
The main issues presented for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over the instant prohibition case and eventually issue the writ prayed for; and (b)
whether or not the SLA between the Land Bank and the City Government of Iligan is an executive
agreement similar to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH such that the procurement of water pipes by
the BAC of the City Government of Iligan should be deemed exempt from the application of RA
9184.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The Court first resolves the procedural issues of this case, then proceeds to its substantive aspects.
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
The Manila RTC's Lack of Jurisdiction to
Issue the Writ of Prohibition Subject of
this Case; and Atlanta's Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Preliminarily, Land Bank asserts that the Petition for Prohibition was improperly filed before the
Manila RTC considering that the acts sought to be enjoined, i.e., the public bidding for the supply
of water pipes, are beyond the said court's territorial jurisdiction.35 Atlanta, for its part, counterargues that the acts of Land Bank are as much to be enjoined for causing the City Government of
Iligan and its BAC to continuously violate the provisions of RA 9184, its IRR, and the PBDs in the
conduct of the public bidding36 and that the filing of the prohibition case in the City of Manila was
in accordance with the rules on venue given that Land Bank's main office is in the City of
Manila.37
The Court finds for Land Bank.
A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment ordering the
respondent to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. Section
2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) reads:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to "acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person," the petition must be filed
"in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Court." Section 4 of the same Rules provides that:
Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition. -The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a
board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. H may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is .in aid of the court's appellate
jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21 ( 1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,38 otherwise known
as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP 129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original
jurisdiction over cases of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein are enforceable only within
their respective territorial jurisdictions. The pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari: prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
39
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Costaño v.
Lobingier,39 that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial
Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their
respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying previous
legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its complementary provision, i.e.,
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case that the CFI of Leyte had no power to
issue writs of injunction and certiorari against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was
outside the territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Arnado,40
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in the CFI of Manila
to question the authority of the Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department of
Labor in Cebu City to hear a complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to
enjoin said respondents from conducting further proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the
dismissal . of the case on the ground of improper venue, holding that the CFI of Manila had no
authority to issue writs of injunction, certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons outside its
territorial boundaries. Further, in both Cudiamat v. Torres (Cudiamat)41 and National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Reyes42 (NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in
securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to . restrain, in Cudiamat, the
implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply of a police call and signal box
system for the City of Manila, and, in NAWASA, the conduct of the public bidding for the supply of
steel pipes for its Manila and Suburbs Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases that the
injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to restrain acts outside the province of Rizal was
null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the instant case, the
writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
Also on a matter of procedure, the Court further discerns that the Manila RTC should have
dismissed the case outright for failure of Atlanta to exhaust administrative remedies. Under RA
9184, the decisions of the BAC in all stages of procurement may be protested. to the head of the
procuring entity through a verified position paper and upon payment of a protest fee.43 The
necessity for the complaining bid participant to complete the protest process before resorting to
court action cannot be overemphasized. It is a condition precedent to the court's taking cognizance
of an action that assails a bid process.44 When precipitately taken prior to the completion of the
protest process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.45 While Atlanta may have
written the BAC a letter objecting to some of the terms and conditions contained in the bidding
documents to be used for the re-bidding, its action fell short of the required protest. It failed to
follow through with' its protest and opted instead to participate in the re-bidding with full
knowledge that the IBRD Procurement Guidelines were to be followed throughout the conduct of
the bid. Having failed to observe the protest procedure required by law, Atlanta's case should not
have prospered with the RTC altogether.
With the procedural matters having been resolved, the Court now proceeds to discuss the
substantive aspect of this case concerning the SLA and Land Bank's claimed exemption from the
provisions of RA 9184.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Applicability of the Bidding
Procedure under RA 9184; and the
Nature of Loan No. 4833-PH · and its
Relation to the SLA.
While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts for the
procurement of civil works or supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only after
competitive public bidding, RA 9184 recognizes the country's commitment to abide by its
obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement. This is pertinently provided
in Section 4 of RA 9184 which reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Scope and Application. - This Act shall apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects,
Goods and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all
branches and instrumentalities of the government, its department, offices and agencies, including
government owned and/or -controlled corporations and local government units, subject to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138.1âwphi1 Any treaty or international or executive
agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a
signatory shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
The IRR of RA 9184 further supplements the law's treatment of treaties and international or
executive agreements as follows:
Section 4. Scope and Application of the IRR
4.1 This IRR shall apply to all procurement of any branch, agency, department, bureau,
office or instrumentality of the GOP, including government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs), government financial institutions (GFis), state universities and
colleges (SUCs) and local government units (LGUs).
40
4.2 Any Treaty or International or Executive Agreement to which the GOP is a signatory
affecting the subject matter of the Act and this IRR shall be observed. In case of conflict
between the terms of the Treaty or International or Executive Agreement and this IRR, the
former shall prevail.
4.3 Unless the Treaty or International or Executive Agreement expressly provides use of
foreign government/foreign or international financing institution procurement procedures
and guidelines, this IRR shall apply to Foreign-funded Procurement for goods,
infrastructure projects, and consulting services by the GOP.
Consistent with the policies and principles set forth in Sections 2 and 3 of this IRR, the GOP
negotiating panels shall adopt, as its default position, use of this IRR, or at the very least, selection
through competitive bidding, in all Foreign-funded Procurement. If the Treaty or International or
Executive Agreement states otherwise, then the negotiating panels shall explain in writing the
reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
While Atlanta admits that there are exceptions to the application of RA 9184, it posits that the City
Government of Iligan could not claim to be exempt under any of the enumerated instances because
it is not a party to the IBRD Loan Agreement.46 It further asserts that a provision in the SLA
between Larid Bank and the City Government of Iligan providing for procurement procedures
different from that required under RA 9184 would not be valid since it is not a treaty or an
executive agreement in the way that Loan Agreement, No. 4833-PH is.
The argument lacks merit.
As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH is in the nature of an
executive agreement. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo47 (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an
international agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, "whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation,"48 and further expounded that it may be in
the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (
b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than
treaties.49 Examining its features, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land
Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the
Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD,
which, as an international lending institution organized by world governments to provide loans
conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise
regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive
agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative
concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH - following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case
- is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law. Owing to this
classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and
conditions under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that
requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith.50 It bears pointing out that the pacta
sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the incorporation clause found
under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
Keeping in mind the foregoing attributions, the .Court now examines the SLA and its relation with
Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH.
As may be palpably observed, the terms and conditions of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH, being a
project-based and government-guaranteed loan facility, were incorporated and made part of the
SLA that was subsequently entered into by Land Bank with the City Government of Iligan.51
Consequently, this means that the SLA cannot be treated as an independent and unrelated contract
but as a conjunct of, or having a joint and simultaneous occurrence with, Loan Agreement No.
4833-PH. Its nature and consideration, being a mere accessory contract of Loan Agreement No.
4833-PH, are thus the same as that of its principal contract from which it receives life and without
which it cannot exist as an independent contract.52 Indeed, the accessory follows the principal;53
and, concomitantly, accessory contracts should not be read independently of the main contract.54
Hence, as Land Bank correctly puts it, the SLA has attained indivisibility with the Loan Agreement
and the Guarantee Agreement through the incorporation of each other's terms and conditions such
that the character of one has likewise become the character of the other.
Considering that Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH expressly provides that the procurement of the
goods to be financed from the loan proceeds shall be in accordance with the IBRD Guidelines and
the provisions of Schedule 4, and that the accessory SLA contract merely follows its principal 's
terms and conditions, the procedure for competitive public bidding prescribed under RA 9184
therefore finds no application to the procurement of goods for the Iligan City Water Supply System
Development and Expansion Project. The validity of similar stipulations in foreign loan
agreements requiring the observance of IBRD Procurement Guidelines in the procurement process
41
has, in fact, been previously upheld by the Court in the case of Department of Budget and
Management Procurement Service (DBMPS) v. Kolonwel Trading,55 viz.:
The question as to whether or not foreign loan agreements with international financial
institutions, such as Loan No. 7118-PH, partake of an executive or international agreement within
the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184, has been answered by the Court in the affirmative in
[Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr., 544 Phil. 645 (2007)]. Significantly, Abaya declared that the RP-JBIC
loan agreement was to be of governing application over the CP I project and that the JBIC ·
Procurement Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the
procurement of goods necessary to implement the main project.
Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact
embodied in the afore-quoted Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184, the RP, as borrower, bound itself to
perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate in
the concrete to this case, the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord, primacy to, the
WB Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the bidding/procurement process in
question.56
With the nature and treatment of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH as well as its accessory SLA herein
explained, the Court thus holds that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling that the
provisions of RA 9184 were to be applied in this case. Quite the contrary, it is the IBRD Guidelines
and the provisions of Schedule 4 which should govern. As such, the procurement of water pipes by
the BAC of the City Government of Iligan -as Land Bank meritoriously submits in its petition - is
beyond the purview of RA 9184, yielding as it should to the express stipulations found in the
executive agreement, to which the latter's accessory merely follows.
In view of all these errors, both on procedural and substantive counts, the Court is hereby bound
to reverse the trial court's decision and accordingly grant the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 3, 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (Manila RTC) in Civil Case No. 09-122643 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed before the Manila RTC is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Calalang vs Williams
GR 47800
December 2, 1940
Social Justice as the aim of Labor Laws
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de
la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and
along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from
7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director
of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the
Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal
Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.
On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and
during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic.
42
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be
enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private
citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of
prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as
Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people.
Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and
of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land
title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership
and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.
43
Magalona vs Ermita
Archipelagic Doctrine
MAGALONA VS ERMITA
G.R. No. 187167
16Aug2011
Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners,
vs
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on
February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among
others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect
the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters
enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit
definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It
is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will
not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has
sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to
precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and
it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
G.R. No. 183591
October 14 2008
44
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to
prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They
also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public
concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would
be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the
dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in
the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory
nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
45
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that
go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the
Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of
association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve
and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as
she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments,
she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put
in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals
as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain
in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
46
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in
the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human
ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act
No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the
signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian
can be considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through
an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
47
1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented
by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR
COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own
behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold what is
morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging
circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma between what is true and right as against his
security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that
[define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and chooses the fore.
This is the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and righteousness
even if it may mean the surrender of one's basic rights and privileges.1
The Procedural Antecedents
Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary
restraining order (TRO).2
In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and instead, required
respondents to file their comment on the petition.3
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per
Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the motion and resolved to await respondents'
comment on the petition.5
A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of the
petition-in-intervention and adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014,
petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion for leave to admit the Final Investigation
Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The Report8 was relative
to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia),
for themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and
Major Vladimir P. Gracilla (Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication. Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a
motion for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The manifestation was granted and
the motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.
After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated Comment12
on June 19, 2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by
petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May
48
22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted the same on August 11,
2014 and October 13, 2014.
Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early
resolution,15 which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014.16
The Facts
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere
military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A"
Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitionerintervenor (hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he was
supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as
the top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson
examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr.
Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the
4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H), while the 5th period class in
ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).
Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a
Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in
his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela
Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18
On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged and
transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two
days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came
directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."19
On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, meted out to him the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet lCL
Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged violation. The latter told him that the basis of the
punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who responded that she never
dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than
scheduled. When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment,
he was · advised to put the request in writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed
his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical
Officer (STO), asserting:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H
and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.20
A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1
CL Cudia and to indicate if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also
late.
On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based
on his investigation, the 4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander
sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the
denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang
reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th
period class ended at l 500H that made him late in the succeeding class.22
49
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what
Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's
conversations with their instructors and classmates as well as his statement in the request for
reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of
time to answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the matter,
was on emergency leave.
On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:
Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated november.
When maj hindang ask me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)
All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud
presume they wil finish early bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23
The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and
Maj. Hindang were not in the same time reference when the latter asked her.
Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:
Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I
stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and
Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE.
Our instructor gladly answered our question. She then told me that she will give the copy of our
section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the
room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to
our 5ti period class which is ENG412.
With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:
1. How could this be lying?
2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that honor
report)?
3. What are his assumptions?
I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully
reviewed for I did not violate the honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I
intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and for the following reasons:
1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given the fact that
no face-to-face personal conversation with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and
when exactly was the issue at hand.
2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.
3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of meted
punishment) further supports my explanation in my delinquency report.
4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a lecture in a typical
classroom instruction but includes every transaction and communication a teacher does
with her students, especially that in our case some cadets asked for queries, and I am
given instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her transaction and
communication with our other classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a
little bit.
I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to wait, and the
other cadets still have business with me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that "Our
class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing with matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45
seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)
50
And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).
(signed)
M COSTALES
w/ attached certification
5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did not attempt to
conceal anything that happened or I did.
6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a
conversation with regards (sic) to the same matter for which he can give important points
of my case.
7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms. Costales. 24
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the
reported honor violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the
investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 CL Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL
Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL Poncardas as members.25
Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the case
be formalized.
The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1
CL Rhona K. Salvacion, while the nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL
Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R. Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G.
Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko
Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were 4CL
Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed the trial were
Cadets 1 CL Balmeo, Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL
Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL Umaguing.28
The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning
the next day. Cadet lCL Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not
Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel
and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again
appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr. Costales
also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members
followed. After that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes through
secret balloting and submitted their accomplished ballot sheets together with their written
justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet
lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL Mogol,
the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for
further deliberation. After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the
9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed
of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor Code. He was immediately placed
in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.
On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full
text of which stated:
WRITTEN APPEAL
14 NOVEMBER 2013
This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on this
delinquency report when I received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I
came directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing the fact that in my delinquency report, it is
stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical enough for I
(sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came into my
mind that time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report,
but what I want to say is that I have no intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my
message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the instructor is with us, I used the
51
term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED" because I was under instruction (to wait for her to
give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL
ARCANGEL) still have queries and business with her that made me decide to use the word
"CLASS", while the others who don't have queries and business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1
CL DIAZ) were also around.
Note:
The four named cadets were also reported late.
Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)
It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the
section has been dismissed. EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any
competent authority for official purposes. "
The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of
class hour, 1500H). I waited for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made
me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my explanation. Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to
official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic schedule (to
which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H1 600H), and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word "CLASS".
19 December 2013
I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not
because I don't want to serve punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed
instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable and valid, that is why I approached our
tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that day.
In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that they
have a protocol to dismiss the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:
Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended
1500H and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th
period class, I went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.
These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I
specified the conflict in the schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it
further with these statements, my tactical officer said that since I was reported in a written form,
I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood what I want to
say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in having conversation
with him.29
Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales
attested:
1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making
query about their latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the ACADS office.
The following facts may explain their queries on 14 November 2013:
a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.
b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed during
Thursday, either in class or posted grades in the bulletin board (grades released
was [sic J based on the previous LEs: latest LE before UE was Decision Trees).
c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic) other
cadets have not taken the UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores but not to look
at the papers.
52
d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and
ARCANGEL verified grades. The two cadets said that they verified something with
me after the OR432 class and they were with Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of
the three (3) cadets are all the same and consistent, thus[,] I honor that as true.
2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time that I
dismissed the class. To this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is more than two
(2) months earlier. According to my records, there was a lecture followed by an LE during
(sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of my dismissal, maybe it can be
verified with the other members of class I was handling on that said date.30
Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no
reason to conduct a re-trial based on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners,
however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon until the filing of the petition-inintervention.32
From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group
(HTG) conducted an informal review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the
investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that
classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the acting
class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that
the class started not earlier than scheduled.
Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to
the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in
order.
On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets,
affirmed the HC findings and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA
Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia for violation of the First Tenet of
the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same date, Special
Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of
absence without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his
separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and
not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA. 33
Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of
Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34
Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in
her Face book account. The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar
Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the
HC.35 Copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff and other concerned military
officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The latter,
in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).
On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even
date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee
demanding the intervention of the military leadership.
Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA
cadets to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all
activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing
45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not given a copy
of the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged news report, PMA
Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet
1 CL Cudia. Among his offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the social
media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of initiative to resign, and smearing the name of the
PMA.37
On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4,
2014, to file an appeal on the ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training (
53
OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he also requested for copies of the Minutes
of the HC proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video footages and
recordings of the HC hearings.
The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO) in Baguio City.
The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the
Spouses Cudia dated February 18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case;
and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.
On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB
Chairman, informed Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for extension,
the CRAB would continue to review the case and submit its recommendations based on whatever
evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider his request for copies
of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings
since it was neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39
Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating
his request.40
Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation
of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.41
On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19,
2014, to file his appeal and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General
Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously
and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42
Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events
transpired:
On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. RuedaAcosta.43 On the other hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal
of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44
On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL
Cudia's requests for extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time
already given, and to be furnished with a copy of relevant documents because of confidentiality
and presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia, through PAO, then filed
an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.
On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres.
Aquino), who is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47
On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior officers to conduct a
deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the
inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to
investigate possible involvement of other cadets and members of the command related to the
incident and to establish specific violation of policy or regulations that had been violated by other
cadets and members of the HC.49
On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen.
Lopez. On March 14, 2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which
recommended the following:
a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty
vote;
b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of
the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;
54
c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating
cadet and allow him to graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;
d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's Case.50
On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and
Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended
that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other concerns. According to respondents, the
parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was without prejudice to
the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked
Gen. Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the
group conducting the review.
Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter
dated March 11, 2014 from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald
N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It
held:
After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying
the appeal for reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding
of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded
sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of the final verdict on January 21,
2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the
PMA CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the
Academy was voluntary. As such, he remained subject to the Academy's policy regarding
visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due process considering that the
procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy.
Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son, subject
Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from the Academy is sustained.
In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of merit.51
Thereafter, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on
March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52 Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special
investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the President.53
Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23,
2014, directing the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the case for
purposes of DND review and recommendation for disposition by the President.54
Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No.
2014-0029, concluding and recommending as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA
Honor Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of communication, and
good life.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities
for their immediate appropriate action on the following recommendations:
1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict
against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and respect the "8Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make an official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in
favor of Cadet Cudia;
2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest the ends of
justice and fate of Cadet Cudia, to:
2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the Philippine
Military Academy;
2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of Bachelors of
Science; and
55
2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of his academic
records for his BS degree, without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA
cadet.
3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing
administrative, criminal and civil suits against the officers and members of the Honor
Committee named hereunder, for violation of the Honor Code and System and the
Procedure in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot,
tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of
substantive part of the formal trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of
justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity, non-discrimination and due
process, which led to the infringement of his right to education and even transgressing his
right to a good life.
3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ
3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.
3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO
3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP
3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)
3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)
4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities should
investigate and file appropriate charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation
of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the
protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the PMA Holding
Center;
5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should investigate
Maj. DENNIS ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to exercise his
responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer and a good father of his cadets, in this case,
to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of administrative remedies;
6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philppines, the PMA Superintendent, to immediately cause the comprehensive review of all
rules of procedures, regulations, policies, including the so-called practices in the
implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies, rules of
procedures and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent with the
Constitution and other applicable laws;
7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law defining and
penalizing ostracism and discrimination, which is apparently being practiced in the PMA,
as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;
56
8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the passage of an
anti-ostracism and/or anti-discrimination law; and
9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure respect and
protection of the rights of those who testified for the cause of justice and truth as well as
human rights of Cadet Cudia.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR
recommendations.
Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the
complainants (the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the
respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National
Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.
SO RESOLVED.55
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and
the CRAB. The letter, which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:
This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a
reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the
case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia.
After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this
Office has found no substantial basis to disturb the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review
Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the claim that the decision of
the Honor Committee members was initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone
affidavit of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor Committee member,
lacks personal knowledge on the deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.
Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as
basis that Cadet Cudia's due process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary
in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as
discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.
In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military
law is regarded to be in a class of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v. Callaway, 519 F. 2d
184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of
the AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings that
ensued, as carrying great weight.
Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and
the PMA CRAB.56
The Issues
To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:
I.
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET
FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First Class
Aldrin Jeff Cudia was deprived of his right to have access to evidence which would have
proven his defense, would have totally belied the charge against him, and more
57
importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committee's hearing and
rendition of decision
B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at by
the Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military
Academy
C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military
Academy have afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial
D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military
Academy violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code
E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military
Academy, in deciding Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith,
misapplied the Honor Code so as to defy the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the latter.
II
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET
REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE
III
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED
BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57
On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the
issues below:
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
I.
THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF
GRADUATES OF SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.
II.
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.
III.
MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV.
IT IS PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT
ON CADET CUDIA'S APPEAL.
V.
WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT
AND REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY
MATTERS.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
VI.
58
CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES
BY VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.
VII.
THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS
OF THE ACADEMY.
VIII.
CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of
statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the
explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.
The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive
session/chambering, was adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor
Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote without any pressure from the other voting
members of the Honor Committee.
Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and are,
at best, recommendatory.
Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58
The Ruling of the Court
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Propriety of a petition for mandamus
Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be
included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises
was already rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa
Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie
to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not
be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to continue studying therein
because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this case, there is a clear failure on petitioners'
part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial duty to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list,
much less award him with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to
the case of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may
rightfully exercise its discretionary power on who may be admitted to study pursuant to its
academic freedom.
In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the
PMA 2014 commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other
reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a
particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect
of the petition must still be considered because it is within the province of the Court to determine
59
whether a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.
We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may
also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is
ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal
or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically
enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.61
In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of
the Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to:
1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of
2014 of the PMA, including inclusion in the yearbook;
2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if he
completed all the requirements for his baccalaureate degree;
3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and the
commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign;
4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the
proceedings taken against Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio recordings of
the deliberations and voting, for the purpose of allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent
review of the case of Cadet Cudia;
5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records without requiring
Cadet Cudia to submit new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;
6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales, the
new evidence consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring under oath that the
cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed to this officer that this cadet was coerced into
changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;
7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to
participate actively in the proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during the
exercise of the right to confront witnesses against him; and
8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet
Cudia a representation of a counsel.62
Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:
A. xxx
B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:
a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not
Guilty vote;
b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as
Not Guilty of the charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;
60
c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged
graduating cadet, including his diploma and awards.63
Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was
rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014
without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.
With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements
as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new
Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of
academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that
these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore,
beyond the province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the
President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing the words of Garcia:
There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be
of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore
satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to
issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.67
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which
pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision
of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to
control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which
he is not entitled by law.68
The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by
petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.
Factual nature of the issues
According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make
findings of fact because it sets forth several factual disputes which include, among others: the
tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his explanation thereto, the circumstances
that transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before the HC,
and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive
session/"chambering."
In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than
determining which between the two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly
centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of a person's rights to due process, to
education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System; and the
conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case
involves questions of fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed
questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question
of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct is a question of law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the
Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-encompassing issue of more importance is the
determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education, and to property in
the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit
61
thereof. Notably, even respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve.
In support of their contention that the Court must exercise careful restraint and should refrain
from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military matters, they argue that Cadet 1 CL
Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his entry into
the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the
PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal being purely legal questions, are of first
impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President
Aquino’s resolution of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion
of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL Cudia underwent the review procedures of his
guilty verdict at the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of whether the HC acted
according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant
of Cadets of the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA
Superintendent to warrant the administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate
review proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed to the President, who has the utmost
latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended that the President's power over
the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani
v. Lt./Gen. Senga70 and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The
National Defense Act''). As such, the President could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In
respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending resolution of the President
is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of
justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.
From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively
denied the appeal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts
to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from the APP officials and the President, but
was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation rites, which
was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before,
foreclose the possibility that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case,
petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute based on
the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.
We rule for petitioners.
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first
been resorted to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained
of, have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of Ringgold v. United States,75 which
was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a decision by
military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before appealing
to the court, the doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military and
civilian authorities and to conserve judicial resources.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to
judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
62
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76
Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the
PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the fact that during the pendency of this case,
particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained
the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars
any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Court's interference within military affairs
Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support
their contention that judicial intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and
that there should be a deferential review of military statutes and regulations since political
branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military needs. Likewise, in Orloff
v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian. According to respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military recognizes that
constitutional rights may apply differently in the military context than in civilian society as a
whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply due process and equal
protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.
In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to military affairs. Such respect is
exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper
will set an institutionally dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges
against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA. They state that with the PMA's mandate to
train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and procedure necessarily
must impose h different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.
Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-balance
machinery, specifically mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch
of the government or any of its officials acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert that judicial noninterference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger
and Parker, which were invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v.
Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on
account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of constitutional rights. Also, in
Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the judicial
power to determine whether the APP and the members of the court martial acted with grave abuse
o.f discretion in their military investigation.
Petitioners' contentions are tenable.
Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts,
with superintendence and control over the military because the courts generally lack the
competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military decisions and they are ill-equipped to
determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in
the U.S. cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead,
63
what applies is the 1975 U.S. case of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who
were separated from the United States Military Academy due to Honor Code violations. Following
Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the power of the
district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in the separation or dismissal of
cadets and midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional permissibility of the military to
set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts "have
expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for review of military
determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well settled that
federal courts have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military
procedures violates one's constitutional rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made major
revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by expressly providing, among others; for
a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by the military's highest appellate
authority.89
Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this
jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90 Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.91
The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be
considered a governmental activity. As ruled in Andrews:
The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the Academy
has been sufficiently formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that
committee's activities within the definition of governmental activity for the purposes of our
review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged violations to
the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee and the separation process
has to a degree been formalized. x x x
Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee under
its own procedures provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a
"guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard choice of either resigning or electing to go before
a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal separation from the
Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the
process whereby a cadet can ultimately be adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be
separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the committee's procedures and
determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental
activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial review92
No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a
matter of principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent
with the republican system of checks and balances, the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by
necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action.94
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties
Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a
civilian because the former' s rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military
purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt. Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95
recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service may be
curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the
duties required to be discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student
aspiring to a commissioned post in the military service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up
64
certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian population enjoys. The deliberate
surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor Code Handbook. It is
noted that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest
of Cadet Corps, took an oath and undertaking to stand by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due
process, is, for petitioners, contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of
Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military professionalism,
and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and
in bad faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case
considering that these should not be implemented at the expense of human rights, due process,
and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, they can never overpower
or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners stress that the
statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for
the Code and System to be implemented" simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order
to prove that they are men or women of integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices
and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary
investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers
to the cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.
We concur with the stand of petitioners.
Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests
for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a society
which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates,
and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and
liberties for the good of the group."100
It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews,
that a cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally
protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted
within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the PMA is not immune
from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due
process clause must be satisfied.102 Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being
expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming
a career officer and of probably
being forever denied that career.103
The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to
dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court
denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent. We
ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct order of
the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction
imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his "house arrest" (particularly, that he may not
issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of his detention) are
justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional rights to
information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free speech - not to due process
clause - were restricted to better serve the greater military purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA
Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the
PMA to dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the
Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or
dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are "gentleman's agreement"
that cannot take precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of the
taxpayer's money spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all
written or verbal agreements are null and void if they violate the law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, and public safety.
65
In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishment
as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express
provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets
since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although said law grants to the
President the authority of terminating a cadet's appointment, such power may be delegated to the
PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.
Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to
promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the
maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance
with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title
VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys
academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such freedom is
the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its students. Also, consistent with lsabelo,
Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,110 the
PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of
discipline and honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.
For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of
the HC' s decision to recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and
studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or should have been fully aware of the standards of
discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to abide by these
standards.
In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is
not absolute and cannot be exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the 1987
Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to choose what to teach, how to teach, and
who to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to graduate when
there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate
becomes a vested right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the
educational institution.
While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line
with the facts of this case. We have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in
nature. Once admitted, a student's enrolment is not only semestral in duration but for the entire
period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has an obligation to afford
its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is
imbued with public interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and
the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational institutions.113
The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences
appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal
rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education sufficient to
enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to
abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations."114
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning,115 has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia,
this Court espoused the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential freedoms" of a university: To
determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the
power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being
incident to the very object of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of
the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free
from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which
would call for some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never been meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An
equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121
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The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school
without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the
school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard,
the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which
includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.124 In Miriam
College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,
"how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of
an educational environment conducive to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally
necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.
Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."
Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students.
The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity,
respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development
of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values,
develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden
scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.
In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its
responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and
worthy citizens of the community."
Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may
be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that
it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose
lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act
done by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a
student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. Thus:
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional
autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia
v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to
"institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly
extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and
who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and
distinction of being its graduates.
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This
freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, .as the Court of
Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. It is
noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she
was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many
investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been
allowed to graduate.
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Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the
constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion."
Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University
Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of
Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless
if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be
more objectionable than bestowing a university's highest academic degree upon an individual who
has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the
university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to
protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.128
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills
of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or
flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e.,
one which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to education," students
have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a
right to select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.132 The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational
institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of
its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum
standard for cadet behavior and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the
cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the
PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps from
its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long Gray Line."
Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character development. It
defines the desirable values they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the
atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it makes them professional
military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society of
cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer
of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.134
The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets'
character development and as ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are
deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also
an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and
moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a
whole is characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and
punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all that
they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends or
associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case
Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in determining the
minimum standards for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions.
Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due
process.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the
important safeguards laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set
the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the due process
requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements in
the Guzman case are more apropos.
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Respondents rightly argued.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that although both
Ang Tibay and Guzman essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is
more apropos since it specifically deals with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the authority on the
procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent
case of Go v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142
In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process, to wit:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; ( 4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.143
We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings
in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be summary;145 that cross-examination is not an
essential part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in a student
disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."147
What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual,
which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149
Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her
interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.
"To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be
heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.150
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate a cadet's honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial
proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and
assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor
violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for
loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own
advantage.
The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way.
Technical and procedural misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting
the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be used to make unlawful attempt to get into the
truth of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member
of the CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound by the
existing norms that are logically applied through the Code and System in order to realize the
Academy's mission to produce leaders of character - men of integrity and honor.151
One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:
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2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but it does not
demean its Spirit by reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where
misinterpretations and loopholes arise through legalism and its technicalities, the objective of
building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public Law penalizes only the
faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the intention.152
Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is
unique in the sense that its primary business is to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily gives soldiers
less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process
hearing could sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several
days or weeks, sessions that become increasingly involved with legal and procedural' points, and
legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and inconsequential tend to disrupt,
delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive delays
cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy,
and, generally, to the Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve
fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of
first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the particular issue of a
dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for
some guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S.
military code produced a salutary effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155
Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and practices have persuasive, if not
the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible
concept, requiring consideration in each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.156 Hagopian opined:
In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting
private interests may properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid
formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the
contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing of various factors, including
the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is
adversarial in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the
burden that would be imposed by requiring use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type
procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the necessity for prompt
action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be considered
in each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)
Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process
required in the dismissal of a cadet. Thus:
[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily
but must observe due process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the
concept of due process of law precludes the dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one
context to entirely distinct forms of government action. "For, though 'due process of law'
generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a
trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally
true." x x x Thus, to determine in any given case what procedures due process requires, the court
must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected and of the
government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances
surrounding the case at hand.
While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it
may validly affect private interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government
concern such as national security and military affairs, the private interest must yield to a greater
degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the discretion
of the appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline and dismissal of the
future officers of the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and
morale in these young men who will be required to bear weighty responsibility in the face of
adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance scarcely within the
competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these factors historically the
military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures than the
civilian authorities.
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We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the
Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges
against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a
fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges against
him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view
of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet
must be given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered.
The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)
In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in
cases where cadets were separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code.
Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in order to be proper and immune from
constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the academy
must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an
adequate opportunity to present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use
of witnesses and other evidence.159 Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from
what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in Alcuaz v. Philippine School of
Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj.
Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary
investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation
to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the
honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses
against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting
members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA, to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also
conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review
was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation
of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings.
It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling
of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of
administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court, unless such
findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the
procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed
below seriatim:
As to the right to be represented by a counsel –
For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be
represented by a counsel who could actively participate in the proceedings like in the crossexamination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if remanded. This is because
while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163
According to them, he was not sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not
even asked if he would like to have one. He was only properly represented when it was already
nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO. Petitioners assert that
Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the charges against
him or her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.
On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165
in asserting that the right to a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or noncriminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's academic standing, he is said to be
obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
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confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In
any event, respondents claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's
advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC hearing.
Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel not
just in assisting him in the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB
but in participating fully in said hearings. The Court disagrees.
Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party
in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. Further, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the
Court held that "a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement.
More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:
The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of
the hearing. Where the proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative
and not adversarial and the government does not proceed through counsel, where the individual
concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x should enable him to
develop the facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing
taken as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167
To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as
a function of due process, in military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally
motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the
power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad
confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not
judicial in nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be
able to defend themselves.169 In Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality in the
proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be accorded the right to representation
by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the training
and education needed to understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of
doing so.170 In the subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel
but the opportunity to have counsel, instead of oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses,
make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself
and others, often under difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing,
with counsel's advice, was deprived of due process by being required to present his defense in
person at an investigatory hearing.
In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the
option or was able to seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that
he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and
reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at the very
least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted
as an observer who had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the
cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed out are the facts that the offense committed by
Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC and the CRAB were
investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts him
in the best position to look after his own vested interest in the Academy.
As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –
Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's
request for documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence
negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting his defense have been surely overlooked by
the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other
records of the HC investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to
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present them for the parties and the Court to peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of
the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report dated January 20, 2014
were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is
no way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish
these documents could only mean that it would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172
For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is
the ministerial duty of the HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the
case, all its records of the proceedings, including video footages of the deliberations and voting.
They likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to release relevant documents to Cadet 1 CL Cudia under
the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely
provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to the existing regulations
pertaining to rules of confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing
shall be disclosed without proper guidance from those with authority" (IV. The Honor System,
Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive Cadet 1 CL Cudia of
his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.
Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant to
the HC hearings are favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that
respondents' refusal to produce and have them examined is tantamount to the denial of his right
to procedural due process. They are mistaken.
In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or oral
or written presentation of facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
defense. The Court may require that an administrative record be supplemented, but only "where
there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the agency,"173 both
of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the
concealed evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty verdict would be overturned with the production and examination of
such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be further shown in the discussions below, the
requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's predicament. If at all, such
denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously prejudiced thereby.
As to the ostracism in the PMA –
To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order
No. 1 issued on February 21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him
without any opportunity, to secure statements of his own witnesses. He could not have access to
or approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1 voting result. It is
argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because
the Honor Code unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel
method of ostracizing Honor Code violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating
means and shall only have the option to make known among its alumni the names of those who
have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code."
On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention
attached a full text copy of the alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to
PMA is improper and misplaced because of petitioners' admission that ostracism has been
absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in International
Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was
issued, respondents contend that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose
of which was to give a strong voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet
1 CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of confindentiality of the HC proceedings.
More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
was ostracized by his fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was
already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding
Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA compound, the
Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein. The cadets
could not also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his meals at
the Holding Center. The circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly
foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in common areas accessible to other cadets. He
remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left the PMA. Contrary to
his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.
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However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The
practice was somehow recognized by respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA
Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution
dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism order originated from
because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a
tacit approval of an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have been
charged by the PMA officials. Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take his
meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to leave the place. Petitioners opine that
placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her presumed innocence
and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.
We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full
text copy or even a pertinent portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the
ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence and contents are of doubtful veracity.
Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.
The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol
during the CHR hearing that, upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet
Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not
something new in a military academy,175 ostracism's continued existence in the modem times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment
resulting in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may
render illusory the possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the
HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused cadet's protected
rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until
finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.
As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code
and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of
violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at
the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter
those cadets who are undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is
sequestered , therein until final disposition of the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the
segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary authority of Academy
officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army
authorities, 'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain, with
scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own
affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in Birdwell v.
Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military
discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom
of association.
Late and vague decisions –
It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the
decisions arrived at by the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him,
and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the justifications for the decisions were
vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he was
confronted with.
Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately
inquired as to the grounds therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he
would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014, Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that
the CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the General Headquarters
sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his
case, verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written
decision from the CRAB or the PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant
General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia family received the same only on
March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the factual and legal bases
used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the
CRAB and the PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to
what evidence was weighed by the CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and whether the new
evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.
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In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC
finding, not putting it in a written document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and
guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver
that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia
because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy
thereof.
Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating
that "[no] decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based,"179 such provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a decision issued in
disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on
the matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.180 What counts is
that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body,
assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to
how it was reached and he knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the
possible errors for review.
As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –
Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as
the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The
law gives no authority to the HC as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It
also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending
the cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed
the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his military service.
Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all records without
requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia to submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so.
In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC
recommendation and heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the letter from the Office of
the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings
and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by the subject
Cadet." However, the Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While
such report states that a report was submitted to the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014
and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice. This raised
a valid and well-grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an in-depth
investigation/review the first time it came out with its report, and the Final Investigation Report
was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by
petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and
review.
Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the procedural
and legal correctness of the guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher
authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the findings of the HC, noting that there was also a
separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7, 2014. Likewise,
contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of the case
despite the absence of necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and
even conducted another investigation by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body.
For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof in showing bad faith on the
part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that
petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of the PMA' s
higher authorities is presumed and should, therefore, prevail.
We agree with respondents.
The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and
determining whether or not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is
given the responsibility of administering the Honor Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely
investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means of encouraging
self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has
assigned it the function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion,
75
the HC does not have the authority to order the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The
results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding effect. The HC
determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the
PMA-CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due process safeguards do
not actually apply at the Honor Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose
decisions had no effect other than to initiate de nova proceedings before a Board of Officers."184
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that
irregularities in its proceedings were in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is
not required that procedural due process be afforded at every stage of developing disciplinary
action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing a
cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the
Commandant of Cadets, and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held
hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of commendation, petitioners find it "unusual"
that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never undertook an in-depth
investigation/review the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture
that deserves scant consideration.
As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –
According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet ICL
Cudia's charge, investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive
and who took advantage of the situation. Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and
was the second in rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1 CL, was part of the team which
conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman, previously
charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with
and tutoring his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the
charge was dismissed for lack of merit. Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a position
of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the
procedure for the removal of HC members.186
Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia,
his family, or his PAO counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitionerintervenor was advised to convince his son to resign and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen.
Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to Annavee: "Your brother,
he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never
really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's clear resolve to
dismiss him no matter what.
For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious
bad faith and that he failed to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved the
road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They
note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he revoked the penalty
awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to
the review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established
procedure followed at the PMA that Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances
surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add that bad faith cannot likewise be
imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the CTO of
Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other
cadets, Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded responsibility by
ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.
As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and determined to
destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia, for reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the
latter for an honor violation in November 2013, respondents argue that the bias ascribed against
him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a non-voting member of the
HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC
Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of
the HC are elected from each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the
incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet 1 CL Cu'dia believed that there was bias against
76
him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC members provided for in the
Honor Code Handbook.
Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent
Cadet 1 CL Cudia from graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his
dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic standing, the separation militates against PMA'
s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.
The Court differs with petitioners.
Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias,
petitioners' allegations do not hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is
speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the challenge, specific evidence must be
presented to overcome
a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that,
under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring
investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual poses such a risk of actual bias or
prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187
Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an
adversary of the cadet but an educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he
counsels from time to time as a future leader.188 When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be
questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular point or issue
may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in
class is proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred
and there is reasonable cause to believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations.189
For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause
of the Honor Code, i.e., "We do not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that
they are charged with a tremendous duty far more superior to their personal feeling or
friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and do what is
right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to
be characteristically honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action
of their peers, seniors, or subordinates.192 These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did, although
he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even the Honor Code and Honor
System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective.193
Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as
Brig. Gen. Costales have an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no
matter what, the latter's downfall, their nefarious conduct would still be insignificant. This is so
since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings
conducted were merely a farce because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount
to implying the existence of a conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity
of the other members who constituted the majority. Again, in the absence of specifics and
substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless insinuation.
As to the HC executive session/chambering –
Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL
Cudia because two voting rounds took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL
Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone
dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote. Pressured to change his
vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was
discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was
mentioned in the HC formal report.
The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by
petitioners since he purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to
change his "not guilty" vote after the voting members were "chambered." In the sworn statement,
Commander Tabuada said:
77
1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember
exactly the date but sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my
office filling up forms for the renewal of my passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had
business with my staff;
2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he approached
me and I let him sit down on the chair in front of my table. I told and asked him, "Talagang
nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied,
"Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh, bakit naging
guilty di ha pag may isang nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir,
bale pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago
ko, sir." So, I told him, "Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman" and he replied "oo nga
sir". After that conversation, I let him go.194
It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation
since, under the rules, it is required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet
guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits the HC Chairman to order the "chambering"
of a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to reconsider in order to
reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President
sanctioning the HC procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of
C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in
the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established procedures, the second deliberation
should be considered null and void.
Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right
which cannot be unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the
Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose
of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and philosophy behind the
provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is
in his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her
vote. They suggest that if one voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of
the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the HC through the vote of non-confidence
as provided for in the Honor Code.195 Anent the above arguments, respondents contend that a
distinction must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor System.
According to them, the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum ethical and moral
behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of rules for the conduct of the observance
and implementation of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as may be
warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral
training and character development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor
System can be used to supplement regulations. This being so, the voting process is continuously
subject to change.
Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet
from the charge of Honor violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not guilty"
in the voting sheets without stating their name or their justification. However, this situation drew
criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted his honor violation
but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.
In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting result in
7-2 or 8-1 the HC would automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called "executive session"
or "chambering," which is intended to elicit the explanation and insights of the voting member/s.
This prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing over the manifest
proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA
Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and
sham trial are, therefore, negated by the fact that such practice was in place and applied to all
cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.
It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal
conviction of the dissenter/s, without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can
also be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of since a vote may only be considered as final
when the Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.
To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the FactFinding Board/Investigating Body summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral
testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body an affidavit explaining that:
78
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our
baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the
Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my
attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang
nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na
bawal magsabi." Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer
nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga
nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh
naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si
Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196
Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which
he submitted before the CHR wherein he attested to the following:
3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code violation
committed by Cadet Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one who assess or
investigate the case whether the reported Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.
4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting
members of the Honor Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.
5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings and before the
presiding Officer told the members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I
have gathered some facts from the investigation to make my decision but for me it is not
yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote "NOT GUILTY"
with a reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive
at 8-1 or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened with the other's
justifications.
6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for guilty
and 1 for not guilty. By way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the
anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our respective justifications. I have been a
member for two (2) years and the voting committee will always go for executive meeting
whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.
7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my
confusions that time. I gave a thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting paper.
I then changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY" to "GUILTY" and the voting members of the
Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for guilty and zero (0)
votes for not guilty.
9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of
LYING. After that, all persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.
10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt
Cudia, inquiring and said: "Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process
yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They also asked who were inside the Chamber and I
mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt Cudia and Cdt
Jocson talked to me.
11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare
to asked (sic) permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I
will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.
12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of
the Office, CDR JUNJIE B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called
my attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga
ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the
Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito,
alam ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya
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[yung} Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber
kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto
nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not
Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang
si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. "197
Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone
dissenter, was made to explain in the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement
with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or pressure. For them, the records of the HC
proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could have been the best way
to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his
decision. Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit
why he initially found Cadet 1 CL Cudia "not guilty" and what made him change his mind. His use
of general statements like he "was confused of the case " and "saw things that enlightened my
confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners note the
admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the only one who was
given another ballot sheet while in the chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which
he only submitted the following day. However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0
vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura
submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.
We rule for respondents.
As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:
After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the
members to vote whether the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of
GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of violating the Honor Code.198
From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting "executive
session" or "chambering" is not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures
in' actual cases taking into account the exigency of the times. What is important is that, in the end,
there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of violating the Honor Code.
Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still rule that
there is nothing inherently wrong with the practice of "chambering" considering that the presence
of intimidation or force cannot automatically be inferred therefrom. The essence of secret
balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the voting member is
not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet
1CL Mogol before the CRAB:
13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case at
hand. The other members, on the other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as
well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The decision to change the vote of the dissenting
voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to change his/her vote
despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200
It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not
evidence.1âwphi1 It must be substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be
innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been regularly performed.201
The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the FactFinding Board/Investigating Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by
the other voting members of the HC. His representation must be accepted as it is regardless of
whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one who was
"chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the faith
that Cadet 1 CL Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his
or her own Final' Authority in honor; that he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him or
her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any person can have confidence that
a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his actions,
words and ways are sincere and true.203
As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the initial/first
voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks,
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the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for being harmless procedural errors that do not
materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.
Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements
Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time
reference as to when was the actual dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it
should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal after the section grade was given by Dr.
Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators and voting
members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five
minutes before the class was set to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier
was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia
perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not state what was the true
time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes
before the scheduled end of class.
It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that
his business was already finished as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was
initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia must stay and wait for the section grade. At
that point in time, he was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners claim that Dr.
Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion.
Her text messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its
investigation that she could not exactly recall what happened in her class on November 14, 2013.
Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started at
3:05 p.m., it proves that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his
Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-1600H class in ENG 412, he must
have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m. Thus,
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.
Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what
appears to have caused confusion in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that
the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is malicious for them to insinuate that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam Webster's
Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class"
refers to a body of students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these
two words do not have definite and precise meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words
"class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually be used in their generic sense,
there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or not
correct, but it is not false or not true.
For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive
or mislead. He did not manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His .. statements
were clear and unambiguous but were given a narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor
Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human communication is imperfect at
best, and some actions are often misinterpreted."
Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his
outstanding academic performance but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the
Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct, with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct
I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.
On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was
obviously quibbling, which, in the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling
a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements in his written explanation. Respondents
want Us to consider the following:
First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales
testified that a class is dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In
cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are dismissed from the time they have answered their
respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang
(1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx"
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Clearly, at the time Cadet Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed. Thus,
he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."
Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting
his paper, Cadet Cudia is free to leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a
conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was not under instruction by Dr.
Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.
Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales
clarified her statements in her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait" is
a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not her initiated instruction. Clearly, there
was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On the contrary, it
was them who wanted to meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation,
his subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the
informal review conducted by the HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong
confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the afternoon, or 1505H) and not
earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class
started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204
Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to mislead
or deceive but merely used wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering
his academic standing, it is highly improbable that he used incorrect language to justify his
mistake. Respondents' arguments are tenable.
The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for
petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not dutybound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. Moreover,
We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily
accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions,
there is no evidence that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not
supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led
to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether
lying is present in this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding
that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied.
For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.
As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP)
states: "We, the Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "
The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if
they make an oral or written statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful
information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is expected that every cadet's word is
accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that the
cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in
punitive action under the CCPB and CCAFPR.206
To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I
came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."
Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj. Leander, he
reasoned out as follows:
I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H
and our 5th period class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I
went to my next class without any intention of being late Sir.207
In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence,
he lied in violation of the Honor Code.
Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case
as follows:
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A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what
he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the
intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a
form of lying.208
The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely
telling the cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to
omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.
The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:
1. The act and/or omission, and
2. The intent pertinent to it.
Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the
act itself.209
The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:
1. Do I intend to deceive?
2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?
If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing.210
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's intent to deceive is manifested from
the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the matter
is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does not
correspond to what Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not
generic and have definite and precise meaning.
By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already
constitute a "class." The Court cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and
communication a teacher does with her students." Clearly, it does not take too much intelligence
to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing who were with him
when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when
compared with what Cadets 1 CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was:
"We approached our instructor after our class."212
Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen
minutes ahead of the scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as
a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he passed his LE
paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to
his request to see the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under my
instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr.
Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1 CL Cudia of inquiring about
his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time
because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked to
stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit him. Given such situation, a
responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely
decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Thus, it cannot be said that he already lost control over the circumstances.
It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in
the minds of respondents and eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter
of semantics and a product of plain and simple inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and
presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.
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Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records
(TOR) may reflect not only his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in
subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he
is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar
thing at another time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an
exceptional PMA student, it does not show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of
committing a specific Honor Code violation.
Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment
Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from
the cadet corps. Under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a
violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a
recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear
from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to
know that the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no
difference between a little lie and a huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code
has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against which cadets have measured
themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that only
those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As
held in Andrews, it is constitutionally permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly
high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits
his privilege to graduate from the PMA.
On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the
offense warrants his or her dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and
uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
case there is no need to distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood" since he did not
lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is
considered as unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of
dismissal is not commensurate to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what he
allegedly committed does not amount to an academic deficiency or an intentional and flagrant
violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners argue that the
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable
to the facts of the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only means by
which he may have a secure life and future.
Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that
violation of the Honor Code warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is
actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia,
by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in Andrews219
wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not
arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district
court, thus:
The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the
Honor Code is known to all cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of
a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of scienter on the part of the offender. While
separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression, it is not an
unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men
who have suffered ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or
lesser penalties for single violations might be more compassionate --or even more effective in
achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether the harsher penalty
violates due process.220
Nature of the CHR Findings
Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR, they
note, is a constitutional body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of
economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of society. Further, it was
contended that the results of CHR's investigation and recommendations are so persuasive that this
Court, on several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural
Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious
84
consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to hear what an independent and unbiased
fact-finding body has to say on the case.
In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that
the CHR is merely a recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive
determination of any controversy.
We are in accord with respondents.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and,
therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends
only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of subsequent
cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is
not empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The
power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
xxxx
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to
conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm
L Sec. 257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x
x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. "226
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles
19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not
85
effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the
"be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to pursue
military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal.
For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the
enlistment and reenlistment in the APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that
priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets.227 If the positions open
does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a PMA
graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best
suited to his credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that
choice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from
the Philippine Military Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012
FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the
construction of extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for
2, the 3rd was not paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed
to pay. So Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period. When they
appealed on June 3, 2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002, RTC denied it
and issued a writ of execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise
denied. On December 21, 2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP.
On January 10, 2005, UP files for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed.
After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005,
Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16,
2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review.
On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007,
UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw
funds.
ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application
HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of
retroactivity or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes.
Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is
impinged in its application.
MANOLITO AGRA, EDMUNDO P. AGUILAR, IMELDA I. AMERICA, EVELYN R. CONCEPCION,
DIOSDADO A. CORSIGA, PERCIVAL G. CRISOSTOMO, CESAR E. FAELDON, MA. REGINA C.
FILOTEO, ZARINA O. HIPOLITO, JANICE F. MABILOG, ROBERTO MARTINEZ, JONATHAN
MENDROS, NORMAN MIRASOL, EDRICK V. MOZO, LORENZO A. PENOLIAR, LOURDES
QUINTERO, GLORIA GUDELIA SAMBO, DEMOSTHENES V. ERENO, RHONEIL LIBUNAO,
ILUGEN P. MABANSAG, JOSEPHINE MAGBOO, MADELEINE ANN B. BAUTISTA, ULYSSES C.
BIBON, ANGELINA RAMOS, EDUARDO M. SUMAYOD, DOMINGO TAMAYO, HERACLEA M.
AFABLE, ANNA LISSA CREENCIA, CHONA O. DELA CRUZ, MERCY NANETTE C. IBOY, JEAN A.
LUPANGO, MARIE DELA O. NA-OBRE, PERLA LUZ OCAMPO, ROUCHELLEJANE PAYURAN,
ABIGAIL E. PORMENTO, THERESITA A. RIVERA, MILAGROS ROBLES, JOSEPHINE ROSILLO,
ARSENIA M. SACDALAN, PRECILA TUBIO, IRENE H. VIRAY, WILFREDO O. BUCSIT, BONIFACIO
DAVID, ROSARIO P. DIZON, EXEQUIEL EVALE, JR., RONALD M. MANALO, HENRIETTA A.
MARAMOT, FELICISIMO U. PULA, JONAS F. SALVADOR, ERNESTO SILVANO, JR., ENRICO G.
VELGADO, FEDERICO VILLAR, JR., ARNEL C. ABEN, ABDULMALIK BACARAMAN, VIRGINIA
BORJA, ANTONIO CARANDANG, JR., RINA RIEL DOLINA, MANOLITO FAJARDO, ARVIN B.
GARDUQUE, CAYETANO JUAREZ, MA. SHERYL LABONETE, HERCONIDA T. LAZARO, MARITESS
MARTINEZ, AURELIO L. MENDOZA, ARNEL M. NOGOT, GERARDO G. POMOY, DENCIO RAMOS,
CORAZON TAGUDIN, ANAFEL B. TIO, AGATONA S. ZALATAR, MARGIE EULALIA CALMA, RENEE
D. MELLA, ARLIQUIN AMERICA, DEANNA B. AYSON, GERALDINE J. CALICA, CHESTER
FERNANDEZ, LUISA I. HERNANDEZ, CYNTHIA E. LISONDRA, ALONA S. LLVATA, CLAIRE P.
QUETUA, ROSEMARIE S. QUINTOS, RUTH S. RAMIREZ, LINO VERMUDO, JR., ROLANDO R.
APOLONIO, CELIA I. ACCAD, MA. ALMA AYOS, PAMELA CASTILLO, ARNOLD DUPA, LAURENCE
FELICIANO, LEANDRO P. LIBRANDO, MARILOU B. LOPEZ, AMELITA P. LUCERO, ESTERBELLE
T. SIBALA, JONA ANDAL, ANDRES RATIO, MA. THERESA Q. MALLANO, DANILO P. LIGUA, JOY
ABOGADO, VIRGINIA C. STA. ANA, ALBERNARD BAUTISTA, JUBANE DE PEDRO, PAUL DINDO
86
C. DELA CRUZ, ALEJO B. INCISO, SHERWIN MAÑADA, JESUS T. OBIDOS, JOEL B. ARELLANO,
ALFREDO CABRERA, MARY LYNN E. GELLOR, JOHN JOSEPH M. MAGTULOY, MICHELLE
MONTEMAYOR, RHINA ANGUE, NORBERTO BAYAGA, JR., JUSTINO CALVEZ, EDWIN
CONCEPCION, ALAN JOSEPH IBE, CESAR JACINTO, JOSERITA MADRID, IRENE MARTIN, GINA
T. QUINDO, RENATO SUBIJANO, NIELMA E. VERZOSA, ALL NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTED BY REGINA FILOTEO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a special civil action via certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure from the Decision [1] of the Commission on Audit (COA) No. 2003-134
dated October 9, 2003, which denied the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) who were hired after June 30, 1989 (petitioners) and COA's
Resolution [2] No. 2005-010 dated February 24, 2005, which likewise denied petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989)
took effect, Section 12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. ” All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local
funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or
employee and shall be paid by the National Government. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to its authority to implement Republic Act No. 6758 under Section 23 thereof, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on October 2, 1989 issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), otherwise known as the œImplementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 6758. Paragraph 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 reads:
5.5 The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant to the
aforementioned issuances are not likewise to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed
to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 who are authorized and
actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date, at the same terms and conditions
prescribed in said issuances[:]
5.5.1
5.5.2
5.5.3
5.5.4
5.5.5
5.5.6
5.5.7
5.5.8
5.5.9
Rice Subsidy;
Sugar Subsidy;
Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
Medical/dental/optical allowances/benefits;
Children™s Allowance;
Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
Meal Subsidy;
Longevity Pay; and
Teller™s Allowance. (Emphasis added.)
A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 [3] claimed that they did not
receive meal, rice, and children™s allowances. Thus, on July 23, 1999, they filed a special civil
action for mandamus against NEA and its Board of Administrators before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 88, Quezon City, docketed as SP. Civil Action No. Q-99-38275, alleging violation of
their right to the equal protection clause under the Constitution.
On December 15, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision
following manner:
87
[4]
in their favor, disposing of the case in the
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED directing the respondent
NEA, its Board of Administrators to forthwith settle the claims of the petitioners and other
employees similarly situated and extend to them the benefits and allowances to which they are
entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5 of DBM
CCC No. 10 and their inclusion in the Provident Funds Membership, retroactive from the date of
their appointments up to the present or until their separation from the service. [5]
At the instance of the complainants, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 88, Quezon City, Lily
D. Labarda, issued a CERTIFICATION [6] dated January 24, 2000, which states:
This is to certify that the Decision dated December 16, 1999
reads the dispositive portion:
[7]
of the above-entitled case which
xxxx
is now final and executory.
This certification [is] issued upon the request of Ms. Blesilda B. Aguilar for whatever legal
purpose/s it may serve. [8]
Afterwards, the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 88, Quezon City issued a Writ of Execution [9] in SP.
Civil Action No. Q-99-38275 on February 22, 2000. [10] Thereafter, the RTC issued a Notice of
Garnishment against the funds of NEA with Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the
extent of P16,581,429.00. [11]
NEA questioned before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court, and the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62919. On July 4, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [12]
declaring null and void the December 11, 2000 Resolution as well as the January 8, 2001 Order of
the RTC, and ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of NEA. Thus,
NEA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
154200. Meanwhile, the RTC held in abeyance the execution of its December 15, 1999 Decision
pending resolution of this Court of the review on certiorari in National Electrification
Administration v. Morales. [13]
On July 24, 2007, this Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals decision and described the
subsequent events relating to the case in this manner [14]:
Meanwhile, in a letter dated June 28, 2000, former DBM Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno informed
NEA Administrator Conrado M. Estrella III of the denial of the NEA request for a supplemental
budget on the ground that the claims under R.A. No. 6758 which the RTC had ordered to be settled
cannot be paid because Morales, et al. are not œincumbents of positions as of July 1, 1989 who are
actually receiving and enjoying such benefits.
Moreover, in an Indorsement dated March 23, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA) advised NEA
against making further payments in settlement of the claims of Morales, et al. Apparently, COA
had already passed upon claims similar to those of Morales, et al. in its earlier œDecision No. 95074 dated January 25, 1995. Portions of the Indorsement read as follows:
This Office concurs with the above view. The court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it
entertained the petition for the entitlement of the after-hired employees which had already
been passed upon by this Commission in COA Decision No. 95-074 dated January 25,
1995. There, it was held that: œthe adverse action of this Commission sustaining the disallowance
made by the Auditor, NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired
from July 1, 1989 to October 31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, subject disallowance
is lifted.
Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to the above COA
decision cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower
court. Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode for
appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner
provided by law and the Rules of Court. Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it
entertained the subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never
attain finality, much less be executed. Moreover, COA was not made a party thereto, hence, it
cannot be compelled to allow the payment of claims on the basis of the questioned decision.
88
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the auditor of NEA should post-audit the disbursement vouchers on the
bases of this Commission's decision particularly the above-cited COA Decision No. 94-074 [sic]
and existing rules and regulations, as if there is no decision of the court in the subject special civil
action for mandamus. At the same time, management should be informed of the intention of this
Office to question the validity of the court decision before the Supreme Court through the Office of
the Solicitor General.
Parenthetically, the records at hand do not indicate when Morales, et al. were appointed. Even the
December [15], 1999 RTC Decision is vague for it merely states that they were appointed after June
30, 1989, which could mean that they were appointed either before the cut-off date of October 31,
1989 or after. Thus, there is not enough basis for this Court to determine that the foregoing COA
Decision No. 95-074 adversely affects Morales, et al.. Moreover, the records do not show whether
COA actually questioned the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision before this Court. [15]
The Court ruled that respondents therein could not proceed against the funds of NEA œbecause the
December [15], 1999 RTC Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a specific sum of
money susceptible of execution by garnishment; it is a special judgment requiring petitioners to
settle the claims of respondents in accordance with existing regulations of the COA. [16] The Court
further held as follows:
In its plain text, the December [15], 1999 RTC Decision merely directs petitioners to œsettle the
claims of [respondents] and other employees similarly situated. It does not require petitioners to
pay a certain sum of money to respondents. The judgment is only for the performance of an act
other than the payment of money, implementation of which is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 11. Execution of special judgments. - When a judgment requires the performance of any act
other than those mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and
such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
xxxx
Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of
money.
The RTC exceeded the scope of its judgment when, in its February 22, 2000 Writ of Execution, it
directed petitioners to œextend to [respondents] the benefits and allowances to which they are
entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Sec. 5 of DBM CCC
No. 10 and x x x to cause their inclusion in the Provident Fund Membership. Worse, it
countenanced the issuance of a notice of garnishment against the funds of petitioners with DBP to
the extent of P16,581,429.00 even when no such amount was awarded in its December 16, 1999
Decision.
However, in its subsequent Orders dated May 17, 2000 and January 8, 2001, the RTC attempted to
set matters right by directing the parties to now await the outcome of the legal processes for the
settlement of respondents' claims.
That is only right.
Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC -- a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, with capacity to sue and be sued. As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot
evade execution; its funds may be garnished or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment
rendered against it. However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for payment
of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which
has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle œall debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect
to money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or
disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for
certiorari to this Court.
89
All told, the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow
the parties recourse to the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the March 23,
2000 Indorsement issued by COA already spells doom for respondents™ claims; but it is not
for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it per its
Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.
In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate implementation of
the writ of execution through garnishment of the funds of petitioners,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 4, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated December 11, 2000 and Order dated January 8,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Quezon City in Special Civil Action No. Q-99-38275
are REINSTATED. [17]
Meantime, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 001295 dated June 1, 2001
interpreted Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 in this manner:
[18]
and
Material to the resolution of this instant request is Section 12 of SSL x x x.
xxxx
The Commission, x x x is of the view that this provision of law does not imply that such other
additional compensation not integrated into the salary rates shall not be received by employees
appointed after July 1, 1989. The word œonly before the phrase œas of July 1, 1989 does not
refer to incumbents but qualifies what additional compensation can be continued together with
the qualifying words œnot integrated into the standardized rates shall continue to be
authorized. The correct interpretation therefore is that, additional compensation being
received by employees not integrated into the standardized rates as of July 1, 1989 shall
continue to be authorized and received/enjoyed by said employees, whether or not said
employee was appointed prior to or after July 1, 1989.
A different interpretation will result in the creation of two classes of employees, i.e., one class
receiving less pay than another class for substantially equal work. Said interpretation will violate
Section 2 of the SSL which provides, thus:
xxxx
Additionally, this interpretation will also violate the constitutional precept that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). Applying this
precept the Supreme Court declared that œequal protection of the law is against unde favor on an
individual or class (Tiu vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999). [19]
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), in response to the request of then NEA
Administrator Manuel Luis S. Sanchez, issued on August 14, 2001 its Opinion No. 157, s. 2001 [20]
declaring that the RTC decision, not having been appealed, had become the law of the case which
must now be applied. The pertinent portion of such opinion reads:
HON. MANUEL LUIS S. SANCHEZ
Administrator
National Electrification Administration
NEA Road, Diliman, Quezon City
Re: Request for legal opinion on the propriety and applicability to NEA employees hired after
July 1, 1989 of OGCC Opinion NO. 086, s. 2001
xxxx
Pursuant to law, subject Decision became final and executory fifteen (15) days after its rendition,
there being no appeal or motion for reconsideration filed in the interim, as certified to by Atty.
Lily D. Labarda, Branch 88, Quezon City, on January 24, 2000.
The foregoing considered, this Office therefore cannot opine otherwise save to uphold the
supremacy and finality of the aforequoted Decision of the Court on the matter. Its judgment is now
res judicata, hence, the controlling legal rule, as far as Petitioners NEA employees are concerned,
is that they must be extended the benefits and allowances œto which they are entitled but which
90
until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5 of DBM CCC No. 101 x x x,
retroactive from the date of their appointments up to the present or until their separation from
the service. This is the law of the case which must now be applied. At any rate, we have stated in
OGCC Opinion No. 086, S. 2001 that even employees hired after July 1, 1989 may receive the
subject benefits provided there is determination by the DBM that the same have not been actually
integrated into their basic salaries.
Hence, your query is therefore answered in the affirmative.
[21]
Pursuant to the above opinion in its favor, the NEA Board of Administrators issued Resolution No.
29 on August 9, 2001 [22] approving the entitlement to rice, medical, children, meal, and other
related allowances to NEA employees hired after October 31, 1989, [23] and the payment of these
benefits, chargeable to its Personnel Services Savings. This resolution was the outcome of the
meeting of the NEA Board of Administrators on the same date, and reads:
RESOLUTION NO. 29
xxxx
RESOLVED THEREFORE TO APPROVE, as it hereby approves, the entitlement to rice, medical,
children, meal and other related allowances of NEA employees hired after October 31, 1989 and
payment of these benefits;
RESOLVED FURTHER TO CONFIRM, as it hereby confirms, the initial appropriation and payment of
One Million Six Hundred Forty Six Thousand One Hundred Twenty Seven Pesos and Thirty
Centavos (P1,646,127.30) for this purpose chargeable against the Personnel Services Savings. [24]
Thus, NEA granted the questioned allowances to its employees who were not receiving these
benefits/allowances, including rice allowance amounting to P1,865,811.84 covering the period
January to August 2001. [25]
However, the resident auditor of COA, Carmelita M. Agullana (Agullana), did not allow the
payment of rice allowance for the period January to August 2001 to NEA employees who were not
incumbents as of June 30, 1989, under Notice of Disallowance [26] No. 2001-004-101 dated
September 6, 2001. Agullana indicated the œFacts and/or Reasons for Disallowance as follows:
Payment of Rice Allowance for the period January, 2001 to August, 2001 to employees who were
not incumbents as of June 30, 1989 not allowed pursuant to RA #6758 as implemented by
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 prescribing the Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System for GovernmentOwned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Financial Institutions (GFIs) specifically
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 thereof. x x x. [27]
NEA, through then Acting Administrator Francisco G. Silva, and assisted by counsel, appealed
Agullana™s disallowance to the COA on September 27, 2001, [28] arguing that the disallowance had
no basis in law and in fact, and that the subject disbursement was anchored on a court decision
that had become final and executory.
The COA denied the appeal from the disallowance in a Decision
(Decision No. 2003-134). The COA stated that:
[29]
dated October 9, 2003
The Director of x x x Corporate Audit Office II recommended the affirmance of the subject
disallowance contending that Section 12 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 (Salary Standardization
Law) x x x remains applicable on the matter since Department of Budget and ManagementCorporate Compensation Circular No. 10, s. 1989 (DBM-CCC No. 10) was declared ineffective by
the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus, et al. vs. COA, et al. (G.R. No. 109023, August 13, 1998)
due to its non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. She
pointed out that the alleged discriminatory effect and violation of the policy to provide equal pay
for substantially equal work in the above-quoted provision have been sufficiently considered in
Philippine Ports Authority vs. COA, 214 SCRA 653 and later confirmed in Philippine International
Trading Corporation vs. COA, G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, wherein the Supreme Court ruled
that:
œx x x we must mention that this Court has confirmed in Philippine Ports Authority vs.
Commission on Audit the legislative intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and
91
allowances over and above those authorized by RA 6758 to continue to receive the same even after
RA 6758 took effect. In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its
intent to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay
and consistent with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fair
play.
She also conformed to the OGCC Opinion No. 52, s. 1999 dated March 22, 1999, edifying the
implication of the De Jesus Case which enunciated thusly:
œNotwithstanding the ruling in the De Jesus Case, the applicable law is still Section 12 of R.A. No.
6758 which allows additional compensation being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standard rates to continue. The recent nullification of DBM-CCC No. 10 applies
favorably only to those incumbent employees (hired prior to July 1, 1989) and does not in any way
change the position or situation of those employees hired after the cut-off date. With the issuance
of R.A. 6758, employees hired after July 1, 1989 must follow the revised and unified compensation
and position classification system in the government, for which the DBM was directed to establish
and administer and which shall be applied for all government entities.
xxxx
The new hirees having accepted their employment, aware of such a condition that they are not
entitled to additional benefits and allowances, they would be estopped from complaining.
Moreover, the Director noted that when the rice allowance to the claimants was granted in the
year 2001, the DBM had already published CCC No. 10.
Anent the contention that the subject decision of the RTC has become the law of the case which
must be applied, she stressed that the said doctrine is one of the policies only and will be
disregarded when compelling circumstances call for a redetermination of the point of law. As cited
in Black™s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 1990, œthe doctrine is merely a rule of procedure and does
not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in
unjust decision.
xxxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the disallowance in the total
amount of P1,865,811.84 is accordingly affirmed. [30]
NEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision, but this was denied in COA Decision
No. 2005-010 [31] dated February 24, 2005, the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful re-evaluation, this Commission finds herein motion devoid of merit, the issues
raised therein being a mere reiteration of the previous arguments of the movant in his appeal and
which were already considered and passed upon by this Commission in the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, there being no new and material evidence adduced as would warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant motion for
reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby, denied with finality. [32]
Thus, petitioners came to this Court questioning the COA™s decision and resolution on the
disallowance of their rice subsidy.
Petitioners claim that the COA™s reliance on DBM-CCC No. 10 is totally misplaced, alleging that
this interpretation had been œsquarely debunked by the Supreme Court in a number of cases,
including Cruz v. Commission on Audit. [33] Furthermore, petitioners claim that in a similar case
involving Opinion No. 086, s. 2001 of the OGCC, it wrote: œ[It] is our considered opinion that
employees of COA, whether appointed before or after July 1, 1989, are entitled to the benefits
enumerated under Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 x x x. [34]
We quote portions of Opinion No. 086, s. 2001 of the OGCC below:
Please be informed that our Office had previously rendered legal opinions involving the same issue
upon the request of some of our client corporations similarly situated. In our Opinion No. 55,
Series of 2000, we stated:
92
œAt the outset we would like to clarify that the amount of the standardized salary vis-Ã -vis the preSSL salary (plus allowance) is not conclusively determinant of whether or not a certain allowance is
deemed integrated into the former. Section 12 of R.A. 6758 expressly provides:
xxxx
The law is thus clear. The general rule is that all allowances are deemed included in the standardized
rates set forth in R.A. 6758. This is consistent with the primary intent of the Act to eliminate wage
inequities. The law, however, admits of certain exceptions and as stated in the second sentence of the
aforecited provision, such other additional compensation in cash or in kind not integrated into the
standardized rates being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 shall continue to be authorized. It
is our view, however, that a government agency, in this case NDC, does not have discretion to
determine what allowances received by incumbent employees prior to SSL are deemed included or
integrated in the standardized rates. It is the DBM which has the mandate and authority under the
SSL to determine what additional compensation shall be integrated and it is precisely why it issued
NCC No. 10.
The foregoing opinion is consistent with our Opinion No. 52, Series of 1999, wherein we opined:
œx x x Nonetheless, as Section 12 of RA 6758 expressly provides that such additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbent employees as of July 1, 1989 not integrated
to the standardized salary rates as may be determined by the DBM shall continue to be authorized,
the question becomes a matter of fact, on whether or not the aforementioned allowances have been
integrated into the salaries of employees. [35] (Emphases in the quoted text.)
Petitioners claim that œthe Civil Service Commission, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel and the highest court of the land, the Supreme Court, chose not to distinguish the
entitlement of benefits to those hired before and after October 31, 1989 (or in this case, July [1],
1989), while œthe COA sweepingly does so by just a wave of the hand. [36] To support this claim,
petitioners erroneously cite Javier v. Philippine Ports Authority, CA-G.R. No. 67937, March 12,
2002, as a decision by this Court, but said decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argue that assuming that they are not entitled to the rice allowance in question, they
should not be required to refund the amounts received, on grounds of fairness and equity. In
connection with this, petitioners allege as follows:
Prior to December 31, 2003, NEA consists of 720 employees more or less who received the rice
allowance. Upon [the] restructuring of NEA in December 2003, all NEA employees were legally
terminated. Out of 720 employees, only 320 employees are now left with to operate NEA. Most of
the (sic) them are rehired while minority of them are newly hired. Thus, the refund of
P1,865,811.84, shall be shouldered by those who remained as NEA employees. Secondly, those who
received the said rice allowance accepted it in good faith believing that they are entitled to it as a
matter of law. [37]
In its Comment [38] dated September 21, 2005, COA™s lone argument is that œ[t]he assailed COA
decision is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The disallowance of payment for the rice
[subsidy] by the COA is in accord with the law and the rules. COA maintains that the law on the
matter, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, is clear, as its last sentence provides reservation of
certain allowances to incumbents. COA argues in this wise:
The Supreme Court in Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on Audit confirmed the legislative
intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and above those
authorized by R.A. 6758 to continue to receive the same even after the law took effect. In
reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its intent to gradually
phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay and consistent
with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fairness and
justice.
Thus, pursuant to its authority under Section 23 of R.A. No. 6758, the DBM x x x issued on October
2, 1989, DBM-CCC No. 10. Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 enumerated the various
allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs which are not to be integrated into the basic
salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 who are
authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date. Among these was the
rice subsidy/allowance.
93
Hence, in light of the effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 on March 16, 1999 following its reissuance (in
its entirety on February 15, 1999) and publication in the Official Gazette on March 1, 1999, the
disallowance by the COA of the rice allowance for the period beginning January 2001 up to August
2001 is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion but in accord with the law and the rules. [39]
Petitioners, in their Reply, [40] anchor their petition on their allegation that the RTC Decision had
already become final and executory, could no longer be disturbed, and must be respected by the
parties. To support their claim, they cite Arcenas v. Court of Appeals [41] wherein this Court held:
For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors
or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a
final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose. [42] (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners likewise cite Panado v. Court of Appeals [43]wherein the Court held that œ[i]t is
axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. [44] From the foregoing
jurisprudence, petitioners conclude that the acts of COA in disallowing the claims and ordering
refund of benefits already received clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction inasmuch as said acts frustrated the final and executory decision of the trial court.
The pivotal issues as determined by the COA are:
1.
Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over the
exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA] to audit and settle disbursements of funds; and
2.
Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled to rice
allowance. [45]
The COA resolved these issues in this manner:
As to the first issue, the immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a
court possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise
of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
this Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by
claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court issued Administrative
Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in
order to prevent œpossible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit
and reiterating the basic rule that: œAll money claims against the Government must be filed with
the Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue
the State thereby.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original
and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently
such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all
orders and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited Supreme Court
Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the
Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
Anent the issue of entitlement to rice allowance by employees hired after June 30, 1989, this
Commission is left with no option but to affirm the disallowance in the face of the explicit
provisions of DBM-CCC No. 10. After its publication on March 9, 1999 in the Official Gazette, rice
allowance was allowed only for incumbents as of July 1, 1989. Obviously, there is no violation of
the equal protection clause as cited in the PITC case, supra, because whatever increments the
incumbents are enjoying over those of non-incumbents are transitory, for the same law provides
that such difference shall be deducted from the salary increase the former should receive under
Section 17. Thus, the equalization or standardization of what the two categories of employees will
94
be receiving in terms of benefits is ensured.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the disallowance in the total
amount of P1,865,811.84 is accordingly affirmed. [46]
We agree with the findings of the COA.
In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of garnishment against the NEA
funds to implement the RTC Decision was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive
jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the
implementation of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that œthe RTC acted prudently
in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to the processes
of the COA. [47] In fact, we even stated there that œit is not for this Court to preempt the action
of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000. [48]
We find that the COA had ruled in accordance with law and jurisprudence, and we see no reason to
reverse its decision.
Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is clear that rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted
to employees of GOCCs [49] or GFIs [50] only if they are œincumbents as of July 1, 1989. We
reproduce the first paragraph of Section 5.5 below:
5.5 The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant to the
aforementioned issuances are not likewise to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed
to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 who are authorized and
actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date, at the same terms and conditions
prescribed in said issuances[:]
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy; x x x.
[51]
We have defined an incumbent as œa person who is in present possession of an office; one who is
legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office. [52] There is no question that petitioners
were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989. We have likewise characterized NEA as a GOCC in
National Electrification Administration v. Morales. Thus, Section 5.5 quoted above, issued pursuant
to the authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, was correctly applied
by the COA.
We find our pronouncements in Philippine National Bank v. Palma
conclusive on this issue now before us:
[53]
to be applicable and
During these tough economic times, this Court understands, and in fact sympathizes with, the
plight of ordinary government employees. Whenever legally possible, it has bent over backwards
to protect labor and favor it with additional economic advantages. In the present case, however,
the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be
granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. Hence, much to its regret,
the Court has no authority to reinvent or modify the law to extend those benefits even to
employees hired after that date.
xxxx
Stare Decisis
The doctrine œstare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled) is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence. Once this Court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy.
The precise interpretation and application of the assailed provisions of RA 6758, namely those in
Section 12, have long been established in Philippine Ports Authority v. COA. The essential
pronouncements in that case have further been fortified by Manila International Airport Authority
v. COA, Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, and Social Security System v. COA.
This Court has consistently held in those cases that allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not
integrated into the standardized salaries prescribed by RA 6758, should continue to be enjoyed by
employees who (1) were incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of July 1, 1989.
95
In Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, the x x x Court said that the intention of the framers of that
law was to phase out certain allowances and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle
of non-diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to protect incumbents who were already
receiving those allowances on July 1, 1989, when RA 6758 took effect was emphasized thus:
œAn incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.
œThe consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is
promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessor™s RATA
privilege x x x or to the transition allowance.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the same case as follows:
œx x x. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer
was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued
grant. x x x.
In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, this Court confirmed the legislative
intention in this wise:
œx x x [T]here was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being
enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of
Sections 12 and 17 thereof. x x x.
The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents
alone, the legislature™s intention was not only to adhere to the policy of non-diminution of
pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of laws and the spirit of
fairness and justice.
xxxx
In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper
application of Section 12. In the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired
after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those
benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before its
enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured that the compensation of the
incumbents would not be diminished in the course of the latter™s continued employment
with the government agency. [54] (Emphasis ours, citations omitted.)
As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing the grant of the
benefit to them, as they were clearly not entitled to it. As quoted above, we have repeatedly held
that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, the only requirements for the continuous grant of
allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for employees of GOCCs and
GFIs are as follows: (1) the employee must be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) the
allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the standardized salary rate as prescribed by
Republic Act No. 6758. [55]
We hereby reiterate our ruling in Philippine National Bank v. Palma as regards Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758, as follows:
In sum, we rule thus:
1. Under Section 12 of RA 6758, additional compensation already being received by the employees
of petitioner, but not integrated into the standardized salary rates -- enumerated in Section 5.5 of
DBM-CC[C] No. 10, like "rice subsidy, sugar subsidy, death benefits other than those granted by
the GSIS," and so on -- shall continue to be given.
2. However, the continuation of the grant shall be available only to those "incumbents"
already receiving it on July 1, 1989.
3. Thus, in PPA v. COA, this Court held that PPA employees already receiving the RATA granted by
LOI No. 97 should continue to receive them, provided they were already "incumbents" on or before
July 1, 1989.
4. PITC v. COA held that in enacting RA 6758, Congress was adhering to the policy of non-
96
diminution of existing pay. Hence, if a benefit was not yet existing when the law took effect on
July 1, 1989, there was nothing to continue and no basis for applying the policy.
5. Neither would Cruz v. COA be applicable. In those cases, the COA arbitrarily set a specific date,
October 31, 1989; RA 6758 had not made a distinction between those hired before and those after
that date. In the present case, the law itself set July 1, 1989, as the date when employees should be
"incumbents," because that was when RA 6758 took effect. It was not an arbitrarily chosen date;
there was sufficient reason for setting it as the cutoff point. [56]
Notwithstanding our ruling above, however, we take up as another matter the refund ordered by
the COA on the rice subsidy that petitioners had already received. As regards the refund, we rule
in favor of petitioners and will not require them to return the amounts anymore.
This is because, to begin with, the officials and administrators of NEA themselves had believed
that their employees were entitled to the allowances, and this was covered by Resolution No. 29 of
the NEA Board of Administrators. The petitioners thus received in good faith the rice subsidy
together with other allowances provided in said Resolution. For reasons of equity and fairness,
therefore, and considering their long wait for this matter to be resolved with finality, we will no
longer require a refund from these public servants.
Our pronouncements on refund in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,
v. Hon. Alcala, [58] are applicable:
[57]
wherein we cited Blaquera
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund
of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received.
Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The
officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the
amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident
that they richly deserve such benefits.
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional
allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313
authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses,
the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such
payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the
allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA. [59] (Emphasis supplied.)
As in the cases above quoted, we cannot countenance the refund of the rice subsidies given to
petitioners by NEA for the period January to August 2001 at this late time, especially since they
were given by the government agency to its employees in good faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. COA Decision
No. 2003-134 dated October 9, 2003 and COA Resolution No. 2005-010 dated February 24, 2005
are hereby AFFIRMED with the CLARIFICATION that the petitioners shall no longer be required to
refund the rice subsidies for the period January to August 2001, which they had received from NEA
but were later disallowed by the COA.
SO ORDERED
BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CAYETANO PACANA III, NOE U.
DACER, JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E.
ROMITMAN, PORFERIA M. VALMORES, MENELEO G. LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA,
FRANCISCO D. MANGA, NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN,
RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M. NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision[1] dated April 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and
its Resolution[2] dated January 27, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
97
Respondents in the case at bar, Cayetano Pacana III, Noe U. Dacer, Johnny B. Racaza, Leonardo S.
Orevillo, Araceli T. Libre, Genovevo E. Romitman, Porferia M. Valmores, Meneleo G. Lactuan,
Dionisio G. Bangga, Francisco D. Manga, Nestor A. Amplayo, Leilani B. Gasataya, Loreta G.
Lactuan, Ricardo B. Pido, Resigolo M. Nacua and Anacleto C. Remedio (collectively, the DXWG
personnel), are supervisory and rank and file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City radio station
which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), a corporation managed by
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC).
On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed with the Sub-regional Arbitration Branch No. XI,
Iligan City a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of unpaid
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits, and attorney’s fees against IBC and BBC.
On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Abdullah L. Alug rendered his Decision[3] awarding the DXWG
personnel a total of P12,002,157.28 as unpaid CBA benefits consisting of unpaid wages and
increases, 13th month pay, longevity pay, sick leave cash conversion, rice and sugar subsidy,
retirement pay, loyalty reward and separation pay.[4] The Labor Arbiter denied the other claims of
the DXWG personnel for Christmas bonus, educational assistance, medical check-up and optical
expenses. Both sets of parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On May 15, 1997, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,[5] was jointly filed by IBC
and the DXWG personnel based on the latter’s admission that IBC is not their employer as it does
not own DXWG-Iligan City. On April 21, 1997, the NLRC granted the Motion and dismissed the case
with respect to IBC.[6]
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that (1) neither BBC nor its duly authorized
representatives or officers were served with summons and/or a copy of the complaint when the
case was pending before the Labor Arbiter or a copy of the Decision therein; (2) since the liability
of IBC and BBC is solidary, the release and quitclaim issued by the DXWG personnel in favor of IBC
totally extinguished BBC’s liability; (3) it was IBC that effected the termination of the DXWG
personnel’s employment; (4) the DXWG personnel are members of the IBC union and are not
employees of BBC; and (5) the sequestered properties of BBC cannot be levied upon.
On December 12, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution vacating the Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug
and remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin on the ground that while the complaint
was filed against both IBC and BBC, only IBC was served with summons, ordered to submit a
position paper, and furnished a copy of the assailed decision.[7]
On October 15, 1998, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan rendered a Decision adjudging BBC to
be liable for the same amount discussed in the vacated Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation to pay complainants the following:
1. Cayetano Pacana III
P 1,730,535.75
2. Noe U. Dacer
886,776.43
3. Johnny B. Racaza
1,271,739.34
4. Leonardo S. Orevillo
1,097,752.70
5. Araceli T. Libre
543,467.22
6. Genovevo E. Romitman
716,455.72
7. Porferia M. Valmores
562,564.78
8. Meneleo G. Lactuan
678,995.91
9. Dionisio G. Bangga
580,873.78
10. Francisco D. Manga
29,286.65
98
11. Nestor A. Amplayo
583,798.51
12. Leilani B. Gasataya
42,669.75
13. Loreta G. Lactuan
757,252.52
14. Ricardo B. Pido
756,835.64
15. Resigolo M. Nacua
887,344.75
16. Anacleto C. Remedio
887,345.39
___________________________
GRAND TOTAL
P 12,002,157.28
Respondent is likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney’s fee.[8]
Both BBC and respondents appealed to the NLRC anew. The appeal was docketed as NLRC CA No.
M-004419-98. In their appeal, the DXWG personnel reasserted their claim for the remaining CBA
benefits not awarded to them, and alleged error in the reckoning date of the computation of the
monetary award. BBC, in its own Memorandum of Appeal, challenged the monetary award itself,
claiming that such benefits were only due to IBC, not BBC, employees.[9] In the same Memorandum
of Appeal, BBC incorporated a Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award (of the Labor
Arbiter),[10] in order that the appeal bond may be reduced.
On September 16, 1999, the NLRC issued an Order[11] denying the Motion for the Recomputation of
the Monetary Award. According to the NLRC, such recomputation would result in the premature
resolution of the issue raised on appeal. The NLRC ordered BBC to post the required bond within
10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of
the appeal for non-perfection.[12] Instead of complying with the Order to post the required bond,
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] alleging this time that since it is wholly owned by the
Republic of the Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond.
On November 22, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision[14] in NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In said
Decision, the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BBC on its September 16, 1999 Order
and accordingly dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise dismissed the
appeal of the DXWG personnel for lack of merit in the same Decision.
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision. On January 13, 2000, the NLRC
issued a Resolution[15] denying the Motion.
BBC filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the above dispositions by the NLRC. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57847.
On April 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying BBC’s Petition for
Certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that BBC, though owned by the government, is a corporation
with a personality distinct from the Republic or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and
therefore do not partake in the latter’s exemption from the posting of appeal bonds. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents, We DENY the
petition. The challenged decision of public respondent dated November 22, 1999, as well as its
subsequent resolution dated January 13, 2000, in NLRC Case No. M-004419-98 are hereby
AFFIRMED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 15, 1998 in RAB Case No. 12-0900309-95 is hereby declared FINAL AND EXECUTORY.[16]
On January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review.
As stated above, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals dealt with only one issue – whether BBC
is exempt from posting an appeal bond. To recall, the NLRC issued an Order denying BBC’s Motion
for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award and ordered BBC to post the required bond within
99
10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of
the appeal for non-perfection.[17] However, instead of heeding the warning, BBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that it need not post an appeal bond since it is wholly owned by the
Republic of the Philippines.
There is no dispute as regards the history of the ownership of BBC and IBC. Both BBC and IBC,
together with Radio Philippines Network (RPN-9), were formerly owned by Roberto S. Benedicto
(Benedicto). In the aftermath of the 1986 people power revolution, the three companies,
collectively denominated as Broadcast City, were sequestered and placed under the control and
management of the Board of Administrators (BOA).[18] The BOA was tasked to operate and manage
its business and affairs subject to the control and supervision of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG).[19] In December 1986, Benedicto and PCGG allegedly executed a
Management Agreement whereby the Boards of Directors of BBC, IBC and RPN-9 were agreed to
be reconstituted. Under the agreement, 2/3 of the membership of the Boards of Directors will be
PCGG nominees, and 1/3 will be Benedicto nominees. A reorganized Board of Directors was thus
elected for each of the three corporations. The BOA, however, refused to relinquish its function,
paving for the filing by Benedicto of a Petition for Prohibition with this Court in 1989, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 87710.
In the meantime, it was in 1987 when the Republic, represented by the PCGG, filed the case for
recovery/reconveyance/reversion and damages against Benedicto. Following our ruling in Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. (BASECO) v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[20] the
institution of this suit necessarily placed BBC, IBC and RPN-9 under custodia legis of the
Sandiganbayan.
On November 3, 1990, Benedicto and the Republic executed a Compromise Agreement whereby
Benedicto, in exchange for immunity from civil and criminal actions, “ceded to the government
certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of the agreement and assigned or transferred
whatever rights he may have, if any, to the government over all corporate assets listed in Annex B
of the agreement.”[21] BBC is one of the properties listed in Annex B.[22] Annex A, on the other hand,
includes the following entry:
CESSION TO THE GOVERNMENT:
I.
PHILIPPINE ASSETS:
xxxx
7. Inter-Continental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), 100% of total assets estimated at P450 million,
consisting of 41,000 sq.mtrs. of land, more or less, located at Broadcast City Quezon City, other
land and buildings in various Provinces, and operates the following TV stations:
a. TV 13 (Manila)
b. DY/TV 13 (Cebu)
c. DX/TV 13 (Davao)
d. DYOB/TV 12 (Iloilo)
e. DWLW/TV 13 (Laoag)
as well as the following Radio Stations
a. DZMZ-FM Manila
b. DYBQ Iloilo
c. DYOO Roxas
d. DYRG Kalibo
100
e. DWLW Laoag
f. DWGW Legaspi
g. DWDW Dagupan
h. DWNW Naga
i.
DXWG Iligan . . . . . . . . . . P352,455,286.00[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
Then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
invalidate the Compromise Agreement, which was docketed as G.R. No. 96087. The Petition was
consolidated with G.R. No. 87710.
On March 31, 1992, this Court, in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN,
BBC and IBC,[24] promulgated its Decision on the consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 87710 and G.R.
No. 96087. Holding that the authority of the BOA had become functus oficio, we granted the
Petition in G.R. No. 87710, ordering the BOA to “cease and desist from further exercising
management, operation and control of Broadcast City and is hereby directed to surrender the
management, operation and control of Broadcast City to the reorganized Board of Directors of each
of the Broadcast City television stations.”[25] We denied the Petition in G.R. No. 96087 for being
premature, since the approval of the Compromise Agreement was still pending in the
Sandiganbayan.[26]
The Sandiganbayan subsequently approved the Compromise Agreement on October 31, 1992, and
the approval was affirmed by this Court on September 10, 1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[27]
Thus, both BBC and IBC were government-owned and controlled during the time the DXWG
personnel filed their original complaint on August 29, 1995.
In the present Petition, BBC reiterates its argument that since it is now wholly and solely owned
by the government, the posting of the appeal bond was unnecessary on account of the fact that it is
presumed that the government is always solvent.[28] Citing the 1975 case of Republic (Bureau of
Forestry) v. Court of Appeals,[29] BBC adds before us that it is not even necessary for BBC to raise
its exempt status as the NLRC should have taken cognizance of the same.[30]
When the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of BBC’s appeal for failure of the
latter to post an appeal bond, it relied to the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Presiding Judge,
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal.[31] The appellate court, noting that BBC’s primary
purpose as stated in its Articles of Incorporation is to engage in commercial radio and television
broadcasting, held that BBC did not meet the criteria enunciated in Republic v. Presiding Judge for
exemption from the appeal bond.[32]
We pertinently held in Republic v. Presiding Judge:
The sole issue implicit in this petition is whether or not the RCA is exempt from paying the legal
fees and from posting an appeal bond.
We find merit in the petition.
To begin with, We have to determine whether the RCA is a governmental agency of the Republic of
the Philippines without a separate, distinct and independent legal personality from the latter. We
maintain the affirmative. The legal character of the RCA as a governmental agency had already
been passed upon in the case of Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein this Court held:
“Congress, by said Republic Act 3452 approved on June 14, 1962, created RCA, in pursuance of its
declared policy, viz:
‘SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government that in order to stabilize the
price of palay, rice and corn, it shall engage in the 'purchase of these basic foods directly from
those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose
of their produce at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital
investment and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should
101
so require, shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers at areas of consumption
at a price that is within their reach.’
“RCA is, therefore, a government machinery to carry out a declared government policy just noted,
and not for profit.
“And more. By law, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriations yearly set aside by
the General Appropriations Act. So says Section 14 of Republic Act 3452:
‘SECTION 14. The sum of one hundred million pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the capitalization of the Administration:
Provided, That the annual operational expenses of the Administration shall not exceed three
million pesos of the said amount: Provided further, That the budget of the Rice and Corn
Administration for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and sixty-three to nineteen hundred and sixtyfour and the years thereafter shall be included in the General appropriations submitted to
Congress.’
“RCA is not possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the contrary, by the law
of its creation, it is an office directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines.”
Respondent, however, contends that the RCA has been created to succeed to the corporate assets,
liabilities, functions and powers of the abolished National Rice & Corn Corporation which is a
government-owned and controlled corporation separate and distinct from the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. He further contends that the RCA, being a duly capitalized entity doing
mercantile activity engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn cannot be the same
as the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity separate and distinct from the Republic of
the Philippines. These contentions are patently erroneous.
xxxx
The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn is only incident to
its primary governmental function which is to carry out its declared policy of subsidizing and
stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to make it well within the reach of average
consumers, an object obviously identified with the primary function of government to serve the
well-being of the people.
As a governmental agency under the Office of the President the RCA is thus exempt from the
payment of legal fees as well as the posting of an appeal bond. Under the decisional laws which
form part of the legal system of the Philippines the Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the
requirement of filing an appeal bond on taking an appeal from an adverse judgment, since there
could be no doubt, as to the solvency of the Government. This well-settled doctrine of the
Government's exemption from the requirement of posting an appeal bond was first enunciated as
early as March 7, 1916 in Government of the Philippine Island vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo and has since been so consistently enforced that it has become practically a matter of
public knowledge and certainly a matter of judicial notice on the part of the courts of the land.[33]
In the subsequent case of Badillo v. Tayag,[34] we further discussed that:
Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with
an original charter. As a general rule, however, such corporations -- with or without independent
charters -- are required to pay legal fees under Section 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
“SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities,
are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local governments and governmentowned or controlled corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from
paying such fees.”
On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges,
because it performs governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which
holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is
exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental functions.
102
We agree. x x x.[35]
We can infer from the foregoing jurisprudential precedents that, as a general rule, the government
and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from
posting appeal bonds, whereas government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not
similarly exempted. This distinction is brought about by the very reason of the appeal bond itself:
to protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive judgment
debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed
to be always solvent.[36] This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to GOCCs for
the reason that the latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC’s
majority stockholder, the State, will always be presumed solvent, the presumption does not
necessarily extend to the GOCC itself. However, when a GOCC becomes a “government machinery
to carry out a declared government policy,”[37] it becomes similarly situated as its majority
stockholder as there is the assurance that the government will necessarily fund its primary
functions. Thus, a GOCC that is sued in relation to its governmental functions may be, under
appropriate circumstances, exempted from the payment of appeal fees.
In the case at bar, BBC was organized as a private corporation, sequestered in the 1980’s and the
ownership of which was subsequently transferred to the government in a compromise agreement.
Further, it is stated in its Amended Articles of Incorporation that BBC has the following primary
function:
To engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, and for this purpose, to establish,
operate and maintain such stations, both terrestrial and satellite or interplanetary, as may be
necessary for broadcasting on a network wide or international basis.[38]
It is therefore crystal clear that BBC’s function is purely commercial or proprietary and not
governmental. As such, BBC cannot be deemed entitled to an exemption from the posting of an
appeal bond.
Consequently, the NLRC did not commit an error, and much less grave abuse of discretion, in
dismissing the appeal of BBC on account of non-perfection of the same. In doing so, the NLRC was
merely applying Article 223 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable
damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from. (Italization supplied.)
The posting of the appeal bond within the period provided by law is not merely mandatory but
jurisdictional. The failure on the part of BBC to perfect the appeal thus had the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory.[39]
Neither was there an interruption of the period to perfect the appeal when BBC filed (1) its Motion
for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award in order to reduce the appeal bond, and (2) its
Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the same. In Lamzon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[40] where the petitioner argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
103
dismissing her appeal on the ground of non-perfection despite the fact that she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File an Appeal Bond, we held:
The pertinent provision of Rule VI, NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides as follows:
xxxx
Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional
Director or his duly authorized hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the
surety bond posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount
of the bond. The filing, however, of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect appeal.
Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which
to perfect an appeal shall be allowed."
As correctly observed by the NLRC, petitioner is presumptuous in assuming that the 10-day period
for perfecting an appeal, during which she was to post her appeal bond, could be easily extended
by the mere filing of an appropriate motion for extension to file the bond and even without the
said motion being granted. It bears emphasizing that an appeal is only a statutory privilege and it
may only be exercised in the manner provided by law. Nevertheless, in certain cases, we had
occasion to declare that while the rule treats the filing of a cash or surety bond in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from, as a jurisdictional requirement
to perfect an appeal, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards is sometimes
given a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the
merits. However, we find no cogent reason to apply this same liberal interpretation in this case.
Considering that the motion for extension to file appeal bond remained unacted upon, petitioner,
pursuant to the NLRC rules, should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten (10) day
reglementary period following receipt of the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC to forestall
the finality of such order, resolution or decision. Besides, the rule mandates that no motion or
request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. The motion
filed by petitioner in this case is tantamount to an extension of the period for perfecting an
appeal. As payment of the appeal bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a
mere technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged NLRC Resolution of October 26, 1993
and Order dated January 11, 1994 in accordance with law. The appeal filed by petitioner was not
perfected within the reglementary period because the appeal bond was filed out of time.
Consequently, the decision sought to be reconsidered became final and executory. Unless there is a
clear and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the NLRC's
denial of the appeal and the motion for reconsideration may not be disturbed.[41] (Underscoring
supplied.)
In the case at bar, BBC already took a risk when it filed its Motion for the Recomputation of the
Monetary Award without posting the bond itself. The Motion for the Recomputation of the
Monetary Award filed by BBC, like the Motion for Extension to File the Appeal Bond in Lamzon,
was itself tantamount to a motion for extension to perfect the appeal, which is prohibited by the
rules. The NLRC already exhibited leniency when, instead of dismissing the appeal outright, it
merely ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a
warning that noncompliance will cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. When BBC
further demonstrated its unwillingness by completely ignoring this warning and by filing a Motion
for Reconsideration on an entirely new ground, the NLRC cannot be said to have committed grave
abuse of discretion by making good its warning to dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals committed no error when it upheld the NLRC’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated April 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and its Resolution dated January 27,
2006 are hereby AFFIRMED.
104
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel CorporationSolidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their
unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims
for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It
posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.
RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee
to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the
death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., Petitioner, v. DANTE ANDO, ABENIGO AUGIS,
EDGAR CARDONES, ZACARIAS GUTIERREZ, CORNELIO IBARRA, JR., ZENAIDA IBARRA,
TEOFILOI LIRASAN, EUNICE LIRASAN, RUTH MISSION, DOLLY ROSALES & EUNICE
TAMBANGAN, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH COUNCIL MEMBERS;
MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH; AND UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the
pendency of an action for recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the
summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to forum-shopping.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 and its January 26, 2011
Resolution3 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereon.4
105
Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ,
Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents
Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones, Zacarias Gutierrez, Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida
Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission, Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in
their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford
Church (MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint
was docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936.5
In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its Complaint
should not be dismissed for its failure to comply with the requirement on the certification against
forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.6 According to the MTCC, BUCCI
failed to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a complete statement of the
present status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land
earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI. (Civil
Case No. MAN-1669, captioned "United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and Mandaue
Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Defendant, for
Recovery of Ownership with Preliminary Injunction".)7
The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land subject of the
unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land, denominated simply as Lot 3-C. On October
13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-rendered its judgment in the recovery of ownership case
against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of therein defendant BUCCI. On November
19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but their
motion was denied by Order of March 10, 2005.8
Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order9 dated March 31,2005 dismissing
the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to the RTC which was docketed as Civil Case
No. MAN-5126-A.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch
56, affirmed the MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice. The RTC held that BUCCI was guilty of
forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath that there was another action involving the
same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending before another court.
BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order11 of June 23,2006.
Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR. SP No. 01935.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC correctly dismissed
the unlawful detainer case. The CA opined that whatever decision mat would be rendered in the
action for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in question would amount to res judicata in
the unlawful detainer case. The CA ruled that identity of the causes of action does not mean
absolute identity, and that the test lies not in the form of action but in whether the same set of
facts or evidence would support both causes of action. Furthermore, the CA found that BUCCI
indeed failed to state in the certification against forum-shopping in the unlawful detainer case a
complete statement of the status of the land ownership recovery case; and that such failure
impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CA dismissed BUCCI's
Petition for Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
dated January 26, 2011.14
Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.15
Issue
Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration
WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY
OF FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
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(CIVIL CASE NO. 4936) DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF
OWNERSHIP XXX (CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO [DISCLOSE] THE
PENDENCY OF THE [LATTER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669] IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-]
FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE [FORMER CIVIL CASE NO. 4936].16
The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed forum-shopping
when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum shopping of the unlawful detainer case
a complete statement of the status of the action for recovery of ownership of property then
pending before the RTC of Mandaue City. The unlawful detainer suit involved Lot 3-F which was
also involved in the complaint for recovery of ownership.
Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to the
instant Petition, stated that UCCP had also filed an appeal with the CA pertaining to the recovery
of ownership suit; and this appeal was docketed as CA-GR. No. 00983, then still pending
adjudication before the CA. In the same verification and certification against forum-shopping,
BUCCI stressed that the case for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land was entirely
different from the unlawful detainer case, because the first case does not involve at all the issue of
material/ physical possession of Lot 3-F.17
Petitioner's arguments
BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the
presence of all the elements of litis pendentia, namely, (1) identity of parties or representation in
both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) the reliefs are founded on the
same facts; and (4) the identity of the preceding particulars should be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration.
BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the unlawful detainer case
and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the other three essential elements are absent, to
wit: that mere be identity of cause/s of action; that the reliefs sought are founded on the same
facts; and that the identity of the two preceding particulars be such that any judgment which may
be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration. Specifically, BUCCI maintains that the cause of action in Civil
Case No. MAN-1669 is for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in dispute, whereas the
cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary action of unlawful detainer, is the
determination of who has the better or superior right to the material/physical possession (or
possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the prayer that they be declared the lawful owners of the
disputed lots in said Civil Case No. MAN-1669 is entirely different or dissimilar from the reliefs
prayed for in the summary action of unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI, which is
that BUCCI be given or awarded the material or physical possession (or possession de facto) of the
disputed Lot 3-F.
Respondents' arguments
Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two cases are dissimilar or
different is of no moment or consequence because the latter's deliberate non-disclosure in the
certificate against non-forum shopping in the summaiy action of unlawful detainer of the
pendency-in-fact of the action for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land, which
involved the same parties and the same property, in the action for recovery of ownership, is an
irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be cured by mere amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
107
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission, of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum[-]shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, (n)
The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the non-commission of
forum-shopping itself, and the submission of the certification against forum-shopping.18
xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia
to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other case.19
Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the
land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two
cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be awarded,
the material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof as a
fact); whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be
recognized as lawful owner of the disputed parcels of land.
With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution of a
subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the parties; (3) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties,
(b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action."20 It bears notice that in its
certification against non-forum shopping, now attached to this instant Petition, BUCCI mentioned
that the decision in the land ownership recovery case was still pending appeal before the CA, a
claim that was not controverted at all by respondents. Simply put, this means that the former
judgment is not yet final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two cases are not identical or
similar. To repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to be resolved is
which party has the better or superior right to the physical/material possession (or de facto
possession) of the disputed premises. Whereas in the action for recovery of ownership, the
question to be resolved is which party has the lawful title or dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to
the disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.21 the petitioner therein
asserted, among others, that the complaint for unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed
on grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping in view of the pending case for annulment of an
action for dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in another case, this Court
reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving ownership neither suspends nor
bars the proceedings in the summary action for ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view
of the dissimilarities or differences in the reliefs prayed for.
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The issue of
ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both cases.
However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would amount to res judicata
in the annulment case, and vice-versa.
The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the principle
that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or
108
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional
determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate an
ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration
of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply
designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has
been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.22
The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of ownership case
would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful detainer case, such that the court
handling the latter case would be bound thereby and could not render a contrary ruling in the
issue of physical or material possession."23 It bears belaboring that BUCCI alleged in the instant
Petition that although the RTC dismissed the complaint against it in the ownership recovery case,
it still filed the unlawful detainer case because there was never a ruling in the former case as to
who between the parties had the better right to the material or physical possession (or possession
de facto) of the subject property. Of course, no less significant is the assertion by BUCCI that
although it had previously tolerated or put up with the lawful occupation of the disputed property
by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an end to such tolerance or forbearance, because all
possible avenues for reconciliation or compromise between the parties in this case had already
been closed.24 Thus, a favorable ruling for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership would
not at all compel or constrain the other court (here the MTCC of Mandaue City) to also obligatorily
rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to the material or physical
possession, (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F because even if it be proved that it has
the lawful title to, or the ownership of, the disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity
to resolve in the summary action of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or unexpired
agreements between the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the actual occupants of
the disputed property. Indeed, in a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a
parcel of land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or
superior right to the material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease
or leasehold right thereto.
In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case because, among
others, the summary action of ejectment was different from the case for recovery of possession
and ownership. There, we expounded that:
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. xxx
xxxx
The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (action publiciand) and
from a reinvindicatory action (action reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of
possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry are
the two fonns of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside
from the summary action of ejectment, action publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right
of possession and action reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes
recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstance
obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals, we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which involved only the issue of
physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover
possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of
action between the two.26
This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw
109
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its January 26, 2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue City, Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course
to the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936,
instituted therein by petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. against therein respondents.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 187298
July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and
SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL.
EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in
their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively,
Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss
national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC
delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as
Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad,
one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.
On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.3 The
local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the leadership of
respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component
was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The
PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police
Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).4
Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians
coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.5 The
organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding"6 entered into
between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police,
represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the
extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors
to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved."7
This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of
each of the party signatories, as follows:
Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:
1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation
of the CEF;
2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall
participate in the operations and to propose them for the approval of the parties to this
agreement;
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3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the
CEF without the knowledge and approval by both parties.
Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):
1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and
law enforcement;
2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of
their assigned task(s);
3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of
operation(s);
4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the
course of operation(s)/movements of the CEF.8
Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
announced to the media that government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120)
Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3) hostages.9 However, the ASG made
contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle
area.10 The government troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines
withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces pulled back from the terrorists’
stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one of the hostages will be
beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps and bases in the
different barangays in Jolo.11 The authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.12
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09),
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a
ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security
Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during
man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.
In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints
and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation states:
NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL
TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN
THE PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE
ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY
FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:
1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;
2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be
issued by proper authorities;
3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the
kidnappers and their supporters; and
4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public
safety.
DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS
31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.14
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On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT.
Julasirim Kasim.15 Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his
relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting
that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong
Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial
Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi
Sabdani, were also arrested.16 The affidavit17 of the apprehending officer alleged that they were
suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2
April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.
On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the
"Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of
Emergency in the Province of Sulu."18 These Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to
seek exemption from the gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the
appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also allowed general searches and seizures in
designated checkpoints and chokepoints.
On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan
Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition,19 claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra
vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.20 Additionally,
petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian
armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.
In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts when they filed the instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed concurrent jurisdiction with
the
Supreme Court under Rule 65.21 This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan.
Respondents Gen. Juancho Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT.
Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective Comments.1âwphi1
On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as
Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code,
which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and
disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by
Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its regular session.23
The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of
the Local Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency,
and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general
searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial
governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the said provisions.
We grant the petition.
I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly
prevents judicial review by this Court in the present case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes
v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco.24 Simply put, the
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doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence
of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific
action for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly
and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court is a court of last
resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance.25
The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,26 the Court stated:
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the
Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions.
As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant
case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public. The
Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over
the instant case.27
The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme
Court possesses original jurisdiction.28 More crucially, this case involves acts of a public official
which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus impressed with transcendental public importance
that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be remiss in its
constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of judicial
hierarchy.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,29 the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance
involved in cases that concern restrictive custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as
"a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians ‘in police power’ cases due to the diminution of
their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."30 Otherwise, the importance of the
high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the nature of
"emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally
disposing of the claim that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited
transcendental public importance as an exception, stating:
Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga
(restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon,
dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,
(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang
kapulisan tungkol dito.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do
the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the
military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And
lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject
to judicial review.
Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the
foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public
interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken
against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert,
the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is
bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of
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recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned.31
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public
importance.
II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic
i. One executive, one commander-in-chief
As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,32 it has already been established that there is one
repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President
and no one else.33 As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:
With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is
crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of
the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.34
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the
calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one
president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that
there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the
Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers
to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the
other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second
paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:
Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.35
Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.36
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review
the factual basis thereof. 37 By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser
gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in
Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the
Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will
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validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.38
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates
that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the
nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations
and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.40 As Commanderin-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at
his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.41
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,42 the Court had occasion to rule that
the calling-out powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear
from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot
be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power.43 (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the
Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers
and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.44
That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to
suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he
can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the
Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this
lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his
judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to
judicial review.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent
to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
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involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.45 (Emphasis Supplied)
In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,46 the Court characterized these powers as
exclusive to the President, precisely because they are of exceptional import:
These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There
are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised,
would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration
of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning
power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.47
In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the
leader of the country’s police forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." During
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas
defended the retention of the word "control," employing the same rationale of singularity of the
office of the president, as the only Executive under the presidential form of government.48
Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."49
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the
police,50 and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations, viz:
Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law
full control of the police by the local chief executive and local executives, the mayors. By our
experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses. If the
national government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500 legally, technically
separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented police system, we will have a lot of
difficulty in presenting a modern professional police force. So that a certain amount of supervision
and control will have to be exercised by the national government.
For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police
problems, such as riots, conflagrations or organized crime, the national government may come in,
especially if requested by the local executives. Under that situation, if they come in under such an
extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day business of police
investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged in the mayors, and
if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day business of police service, what the
national government would control would be the administrative aspect.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being
performed by the ordinary policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives?
Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.
xxx
xxx
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xxx
Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the
National Police Commission?
Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments.51 (Emphases
supplied)
Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise
supervision and control over the police, through the National Police Commission:
Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of
all the armed forces.
Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose
they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.
Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of
the President of the Philippines.
Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.
Mr. Natividad: He is the President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.
Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.
Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The
President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local
governments. Under which does the police fall, under control or under supervision?
Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.
Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.
Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President.52
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the
framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in
emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their
jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to
day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the
government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the
exercise by the President of the power of executive control.53
iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon
the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the
Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.
Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v.
Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit
the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly
limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers the entire country,
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and does not include emergency situations in local government units.54 This claim is belied by the
clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the
sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional
Commission:
Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of
"invasion or rebellion." Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept the amendment
because under the first section of Section 15, the President may call out and make use of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion or rebellion without
declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting "invasion or rebellion" and substituting
PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can make use of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.
Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where
there is some lawless violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in another at
which times, the armed forces can be called to prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that
the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also exercise such powers should
the situation worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion" to be eliminated on line 14 are covered by
the following sentence which provides for "invasion or rebellion." He maintained that the
proposed amendment does not mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on
the armed forces to prevent or suppress the same.55 (Emphasis supplied)
III. Section 465 of the Local
Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09
Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act,
and used this incident to justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 109.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code, which
purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate
national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows
that there is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and
unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may be based.
Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit
of the kidnappers and their supporters,"57 as being violative of the constitutional proscription on
general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that this alone would be
sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are proscribed, for
being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.58
In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law
powers of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does
not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ."59
We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts
sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to
Section 16, which states:
Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.
xxx
xxx
118
xxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare
of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor
shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of
the provincial government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of manmade and natural disasters and calamities;
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of
the appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all
approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the province and, in addition to
the foregoing, shall:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot,
lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so
requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the disorder or
violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphases supplied)
Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said
provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The
governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement
emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under
this provision to justify their actions.
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons.
First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law
enforcement agency," to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments
belong.
Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend
the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the
national territory.60
Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were
inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the
recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement
agencies.
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in
the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the
President in matters of security and defense.
The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and
administrative in nature.1âwphi1 The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the
119
delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents,61 and should not be unduly stretched
to confer calling-out powers on local executives.
In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a
step towards the autonomy of local government units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose
success heavily relies on the power of taxation of the LGUs. The underpinnings of the Code can be
found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed LGUs to create their own
sources of revenue.62 During the interpellation made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the
latter emphasized that "Decentralization is an administrative concept and the process of shifting
and delegating power from a central point to subordinate levels to promote independence,
responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does not involve any transfer of final authority
from the national to field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and responsibilities. Certain
government agencies, including the police force, are exempted from the decentralization process
because their functions are not inherent in local government units."63
IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF
Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen
armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:
Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be
dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent
with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where
appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security
of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government."
Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the
organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor.
The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed citizens’ groups, as shown in the
following proceedings:
MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force
operating under the cloak, under the mantle of legality is creating a lot of problems precisely by
being able to operate as an independent private army for many regional warlords. And at the same
time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the discussions and objections to the
paramilitary units and the armed groups.
MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other
armed torces not recognized by constituted authority which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In
my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses committed by the CHDF (Civilian Home Defense
Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not know whether a particular CHDF is
approved or authorized by competent authority. If it is not authorized, then the CHDF will have to
be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National Defense,
if they are recognized and authorized, then they will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a
categorical answer to any specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are armed forces
which are not authorized, then they should be dismantled. 64 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is also invalid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to
desist from further proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its
Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared NULL and
VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
120
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the
residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 o
r the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly
and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water
quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in
general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state
will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long
as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well
-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
121
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing
mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end
in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the
rules of procedure for environmental cases.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
G.R. No. 154705
405 SCRA 126 June 26, 2003
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER
COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES,
respondent.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of
Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction
of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and
was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he
allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed
a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
122
1.
2.
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be
sued herein in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude
would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing
need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the
discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.
This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only
with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the government of a state), but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)
Rulings:
1.
2.
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived
its immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private
party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or
juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the
establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
o a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes
of the mission;
o an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of
the sending State;
o an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said
provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any
professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
123
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGANSANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D.
MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF
MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4,
2012 Decision1 which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and
Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.2
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary
proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary
proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding
the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1 O-J460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with
payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as
the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the
above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.
ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions
tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance
with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.3
In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for
reconsideration.
I. ANTECEDENTS
A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)
a. Factual antecedents
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police
Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.4
124
On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative
charge for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO
against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.5
On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office. The
Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24, 2008.6 Mendoza, et al.
filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order.7
Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure
to prosecute.9
On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her
review.10 In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.11
Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration12 on
November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.13
On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records to
the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14,
2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia
for review and recommendation.14
GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for
appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’
office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with the
case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman.16
On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza
hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on
board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the
hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on board
the hijacked bus.
In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the
incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable
for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza."17 The
IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate
resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings.19
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.20
b. The OP ruling
On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service.21
According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion
for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx amounted to gross neglect of
duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of
Procedure."22
125
c. The Petition
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April
27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to
the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval, the period it
took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only
within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order.23
B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several
others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia
filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied
Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence against Garcia.
On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff,
entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to:
(i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of money
laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In
exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the
real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the
information.25
The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the parties’ submitted
Joint Motion for Approval.27
The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee
on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the
Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust – grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770.28 The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and
the filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate
government office.
Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit.29 On March
24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OP’s jurisdiction.30 The question of
jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011,
prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.
II. COURT’S RULING
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition
and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman. (As the full explanation of the Court’s vote describes below, this conclusion does not
apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman
which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution. The prevailing
ruling on this latter point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Marvic Mario
Victor Leonen).
A. Preliminary considerations:
a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners
At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s September 4, 2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the
reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.
126
This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the
validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional
authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then
any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one.
In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the
constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.
b. The justiciability of the constitutional
issue raised in the petitions
We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the
Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question. A justiciable question is one which is
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law,31 as where the court finds
that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a
political branch of the government.32
In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant
concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory
grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core
constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as expressed in
Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.
To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 grants where the Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a
vacuum, more so when the authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and
constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties granted
and imposed on it by Article VIII of the Constitution.
B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to
serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and
misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their
function as government critic.33
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionallymandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate.
Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to
be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio,
any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers
previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was
given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.34
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II35
and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.
127
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to
be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to
function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard
against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of
the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary. [emphasis ours, italics supplied]
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court has upheld its actions,
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No.
6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law
and the Constitution.38
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit
to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed. [emphasis ours]
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies."39 It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.40
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s independence
Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as
"independent."41 The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however
varies and is to be interpreted with two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions
performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable
interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In
general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in
the impairment of their core functions.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the
interference that the President may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility
of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to
our legal system.
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The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions
and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the
express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based.
The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions’ need for independence.
In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by
providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law,
on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of
politics.43 In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on
Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.44
Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although it
enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal
autonomy is granted to the constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep the
Commission independent from the executive branch and other political leaders:
MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to him
our concept, he can advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the
committee is that we need a body that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive
because the Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this commission would need
not only the cooperation of the executive branch of the government but also of the judicial branch
of government. This is going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also want
a commission to function even under the worst circumstance when the executive may not be very
cooperative. However, the question in our mind is: Can it still function during that time? Hence,
we are willing to accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to reconcile this. We
realize the need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build in some safeguards
that it will not be rendered useless by an uncooperative executive.
xxxx
MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights go
to a country, the most credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often
these are private organizations, many of which are prosecuted, such as those we find in many
countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are proposing is an independent body on human
rights, which would provide governments with credibility precisely because it is independent of
the present administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be credible
because it is not subject to pressure or control from the present political leadership.
Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are
in opposition today and those who are in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow.
Therefore, if we have a Commission on Human Rights that would investigate and make sure that
the rights of each one is protected, then we shall have a body that could stand up to any power, to
defend the rights of individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and so on.45
These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional
commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are
concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies
prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President,
even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as
unconstitutional the President’s act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as
Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however well-meaning"47 it might have been.
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In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the
discretionary power of the President:
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created
by the Constitution to be independent – as the Commission on Human Rights – and vested with the
delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility
and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function with
independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made
dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the
constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared
unconstitutional.
Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,49 the Court considered even the mere review of the rules of
the Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of
independence of this body. Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less pressure
on a constitutional body than the Executive’s power to discipline and remove key officials of the
Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior –
but is similar in degree and kind – to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to
the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican
democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.50
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
vesting disciplinary authority
in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates
the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional
Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution against presidential interference with
the constitutional commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987
Constitution, on the other, in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions,
speak for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for
violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal
by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to
the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her
mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably
with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as
agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need
for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the
Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman fully
support this position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional Commission expressed
his apprehension that any form of presidential control over the Office of the Ombudsman would
diminish its independence.51 The following exchanges between Commissioners Blas Ople and
Christian Monsod further reveal the constitutional intent to keep the Office of the Ombudsman
independent from the President:
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MR. OPLE. xxx
May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an amendment
xxx, by way of designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good
government, efficiency of the public service and the integrity of the President of the Philippines,
instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which would be accountable
to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?
MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we
prepared the report, it was the opinion of the Committee — and I believe it still is — that it may
not contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of the
culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive department. Therefore, as
we saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous influence
of the President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a special fiscal. The
whole purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions and to produce a vehicle
that will give true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret that we cannot
accept the proposition.52
The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive
power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any
power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is
given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove
or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the public if the
rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the
Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged from approaching the
Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the
Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an
impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as
champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
d. The mutual-protection argument for
crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770
In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack of
an external check against the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the
Ombudsman and her Deputies.
While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that
this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in
place. On the one hand, the Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is
subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to
cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari.
The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.
The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a nonpolitical independent body mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial
disputes, whose judges and employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less questionable. The Members of the Court
themselves may be subjected to the impeachment power of Congress.
In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly
implausible. At the same time, the Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the
independence granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from either
the Executive or Congress – and is in full accord with constitutional intent.
e. Congress’ power determines the
manner and causes for the removal
of non-impeachable officers is not a
carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,53 Congress is empowered to determine the
modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
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The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second
sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of
"removal only by impeachment" to favored public officers.54 Understandably so, impeachment is
the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by its
nature, a sui generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a judicious and careful
handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding;56 the one-year limitation or
bar for its initiation;57 the limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined instrumentality given
the power to try impeachment cases;59 and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.60
All these argue against the extension of this removal mechanism beyond those mentioned in the
Constitution.
On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment
proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the
highest echelons of responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of the negative
practical effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive process in terms
of the cost of prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation.61
Thus, in a cost-benefit analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting Congress’
power to otherwise legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the country.
It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution should
be read. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as
blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the
manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent
with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due
process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers;
and the principle of checks and balances.62
In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and
cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can
ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.
In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority
is not a blanket authority for Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without
running afoul of the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without disrupting
the delicate check and balance mechanism under the Constitution. Properly viewed from this
perspective, the core constitutional principle of independence is observed and any possible
absurdity resulting from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the
Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to determine the manner and cause of removal
of all non-impeachable officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in
Macalintal v. Comelec63 is apt:
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."
While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is
intended as a measure of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor – since
these grounds are not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman that it creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles hangs over
the Deputy Ombudsman’s head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external pressures and
influence of officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of external reprisal from the very office he
is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the
Office of the Ombudsman.
That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high
standard required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable
offense) and that the President’s power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally
inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing of an
administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can
already result in their suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in
violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11,
a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to the
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very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried
to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.
At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its
decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The OP’s decision perfectly illustrates why the
requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered, even
at a minimum, a measure of protection of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue
a. The Office of the President’s
finding of gross negligence
has no legal and factual leg to
stand on
The OP’s decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct. The
assailed Decision of the OP reads:
Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the
inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain Mendoza’s Motion for
Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency in the performance of official duty.64
b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Let us again briefly recall the facts.
1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman,65 which was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration;66
2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and
make his recommendation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;
3. April 5, 2010 – GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate
superior, Dir. Cecilio;68
4. April 27, 2010 – Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order;69
5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) – Gonzales
endorsed the draft order for the final approval of the Ombudsman.70
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were
already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.71
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case
forwarded to him within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP72 relied on Section 8, Rule
III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series
of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on Mendoza’s Motion for
Reconsideration within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a motion
for reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:
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a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial
to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer
shall resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis
and underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to
Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply
a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed decision, the period for
resolving the case does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed:
Section 6. Rendition of decision. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared
submitted for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his
findings and recommendation for the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be
reviewed by the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned. With respect
to low ranking public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving
authority. Upon approval, copies thereof shall be served upon the parties and the head of the
office or agency of which the respondent is an official or employee for his information and
compliance with the appropriate directive contained therein. [italics and emphases supplied]
Thus, the OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five
days, to review a case was totally baseless.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The OP’s claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on
Mendoza’s motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly
groundless.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous cases
that involve the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot
conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendoza’s case should have been prioritized
over other similar cases.
The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.73 This consideration certainly militates against the OSG’s observation that there was
"a grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay"74 on the part of Gonzales.
Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among
others, quasi-judicial bodies,75 like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself a relative concept.76
Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective constitutional sense. Unfortunately,
because of the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in dismissing Gonzales, the political
and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what is legal and constitutional.
The facts do not show that Gonzales’ subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their
work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is
noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review the case for
the first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within four
months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the
records, research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and
discretion. If this Court rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the
Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country would be
subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that these
periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this with
the established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases – something the Court may be
hard put to justify.
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d. No undue interest
The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendoza’s case by having the case
endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.
The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if it
were based merely on the request of the alleged victim’s father. The Constitution empowers the
Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
any public official or employee of the government.78 This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA
No. 6770,79 and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.80
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the
unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on the prosecution officer’s recommendations, the finding of
guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al.
admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to stay the
whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was
allowed to leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his
promise to return with the proper documents.81 These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to
conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the proper procedure
for the apprehension of traffic violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when
appropriate.82
Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales’ decision differs from the
decision of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we cannot
tie the hands of any judicial or quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur with the
decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have also taken cognizance of the
case. To do so in the case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be repugnant to the independence that
our Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify the very purpose for
which it was created.
e. Penalty of dismissal totally
incommensurate with established facts
Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal imposed by
the OP necessarily suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be
held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made to account only for lapses in our
responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time —
nine days — followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia — the writer of the draft — took less
than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping incident
rendered Mendoza’s motion moot.
In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion, however,
does not preclude the Ombudsman from looking into any other possible administrative liability of
Gonzales under existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing
Tanodbayan at the time83 became the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution. While the composition of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing
discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to the
Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expounded in jurisprudence.
Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the
Ombudsman, known as the Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Accordingly,
on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted PD No. 1487.85
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Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive
authority" to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.87 PD No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the
power of control and supervision over the Special Prosecutor.88 Consistent with this grant of
power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail to the Office of the CSP
"any officer or employee of Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the executive
supervision thereof" to assist the Office of the CSP.
In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken away
from it by the Office of the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor" under the Tanodbayan’s control,90 with the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Unlike
the earlier decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint Special Investigators and
subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public officer or employees
who "shall be under the supervision and control of the Chief Special Prosecutor."91 In 1979, PD
No. 1630 further amended the earlier decrees by transferring the powers previously vested in the
Special Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan himself.92
This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987
Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created.93 The existing Tanodbayan is
made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function and exercise its powers
as now94 or hereafter may be provided by law."95
Other than the Ombudsman’s Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman.96 Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command, Congress enacted RA
No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman
and the extent of its disciplinary authority.
In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but the
Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the President the
authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor, from a list of
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law
requires that the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence.97
The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the
Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies.98 Their terms of office,99 prohibitions and
qualifications,100 rank and salary are likewise the same.101 The requirement on disclosure102 is
imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of vacancy in
the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman;
the President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting
Ombudsman.103 The power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other
government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by
the Special Prosecutor.104
Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would
insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the
Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman
was designed for.
Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the
Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and
supervision over that office.105 This power of control and supervision includes vesting the Office
of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem
fit.1âwphi1 Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her
duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.
Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-
136
ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and
removal powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department
are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates
against a differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special
Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only
for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an argument that, at
bottom, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the
Court said:
Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate
that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the President. Xxx
In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan,
to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently
refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It
follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution
on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has
the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman.107
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at
par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is
concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.
III. SUMMARY OF VOTING
In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We
declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to
the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES ET AL. (G.R. No. 196231) WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N.
137
OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 196232) (04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S:
DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA)
======================
DISPOSITIVE:
“WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No.
10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED
with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately)
even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection
with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation
of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”
======================
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
DOES THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?
YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE
OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that
138
Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —
xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT CORRECT?
NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN
HIS CASE.
PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED
ACTS, FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF
PUBLIC TRUST.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of
the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of
due process.
.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
139
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and
desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.
Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas
of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
140
2.
Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to
use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY,
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.
quino vs. Comelec
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito
Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of
Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution
that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino,
with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the
issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
141
Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in
the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was
in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and
actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a
domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed
him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as
well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he
claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
142
which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of
Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the
house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral
Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its
questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be
judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against
the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year
residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were
only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a
second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be
proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine
residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year
residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National
President (BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON.
NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON.
LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9335,2 otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations3
(IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.
The Facts
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335
which took effect on February 11, 2005.
In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:
143
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets
for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any
incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance
(DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC
or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a
representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution
and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6)
submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to
promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by
a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.5
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006.
Subsequently, the IRR was published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation,
the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard, and became effective fifteen (15) days later.6
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau
of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of rank-and-file employees of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President, Mr. Romulo A.
Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents
Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF),
Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC
Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and
its IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate
Collection District Performance Contracts7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials
and rank-and-file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently provided:
xxxx
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for
removing from the service Officials and Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the
target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this
Agreement hereby agree and so agreed to perform the following:
xxxx
144
2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further
accepts/commits to meet the said target under the following conditions:
a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes
and binds himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target
with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided
in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily
submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and
b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or
Employees under his/her section the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to
execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept their individual target. The
Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall
be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31,
2008.
x x x x8
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own
policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural
calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were
coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them, however, did not sign.
In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts
but they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters,
and sought several dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.
In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District
Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs
Examiners of the BOC during command conferences to make them sign their Performance
Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner Umali)
individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said personnel were
threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face
possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District
Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits.
Pagulayan approached Deputy Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of
harassment, but the latter merely said that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008,
BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file employees of the BOC
and BIR to sign Performance Contracts.9 In his letter-reply10 dated February 12, 2008, Deputy
Commissioner Umali denied having coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He
also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan
and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of the Performance
Contract from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy.11
This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of
the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional
rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among
others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should
they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.
In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of
BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987
Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided a
reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of
the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated
from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
145
In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve
its stated objectives; that the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the
extreme burden upon their shoulders when the Government itself has adopted measures that make
collection difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and tax exemption of big
businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested that
only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward system under R.A. No.
9335 despite the fact that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover,
despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,14 BOC continually refused to provide BOCEA the
Expenditure Plan on how such reward was distributed.
Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to Consolidate15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008.
However, pending action on said motion, the Court rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14,
2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer possible.16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
declared Section 1217 of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to
approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers.
However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant
to Section 1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of
R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.19
Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution20 dated
February 10, 2009, requiring them to submit their respective Memoranda.
The Issues
BOCEA raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND
BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES AS ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF
THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]
V.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A
PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.21
146
BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events
unfolded showing the patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first
year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts to
attain their revenue target of ₱196 billion which they surpassed by as much as ₱2 billion for that
year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made advance tax payments to
BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only in 2008,
the distribution of which they described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top
officials of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard task of
collecting, received a mere pittance of around ₱8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds Division
of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target but the higher management gave out to the
employees a measly sum of ₱8,500.00 while the top level officials partook of millions of the excess
collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a newspaper showing the list of
BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by way of reward.22 It claims that the
recipients thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist,
who performed no collection functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and
allocation of rewards was due to the failure of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines.23
In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year
2007 by subjecting five BOC officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the
Port of Manila substantially complied with the provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted
that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less than
arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of issuances and the
Government’s accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the
tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets
seriously affect BIR and BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse, subjected
them to attrition.24
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:
1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process
because the termination of employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the
year is peremptory and done without any form of hearing to allow said employees to
ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with the
requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately
executory. Such immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the
remedies available to an employee as provided under the CSC rules.
2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to equal protection
of the law because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC
employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating government agencies
like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, Department of Transportation
and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.
3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to security of tenure
because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary
course of administrative procedure afforded to government employees. The law likewise
created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of revenue collection target,
which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.
4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating
the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating targets, the distribution of rewards
and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of collection, which is
tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.
5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular
group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that
the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon
employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of
hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards
the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public
officer.25
147
On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335,
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG
argues that the classification of BIR and BOC employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is
based on a valid and substantial distinction since the revenue generated by the BIR and BOC is
essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the revenue produced by
other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that in view of
their mandate, and for purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No.
9335 complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests for the permissive
delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the Board exercises its delegated power
consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order that the Board
may identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their
removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance Contract were provided; and
that the rights of BIR and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly
accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that there was no encroachment of judicial
power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and
its IRR merely defined the offense and provided for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the
OSG reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance with
substantive and procedural due process. The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from
violating the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process, actually serves as a notice of the
revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to meet the same. More,
there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable
decision of dismissal.26
In essence, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;
2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal
protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process; and
3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi.
BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are
rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.27
However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are
being challenged. The Court already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our
decision in Abakada, which attained finality on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is
worthy of reiteration in this case.
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere.28 Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means
"what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another.29 However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,30
one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies
like the Board in this case.
148
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v.
Department of Energy,31 to wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume
and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws
that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the
need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute
and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.32
Thus, in Abakada, we held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells
out the policy of the law:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets."
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the
President to fix revenue targets:
"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to
as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess
of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection [Over] the
Revenue Targets
Percent (%) of the Excess
Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
—
15%
More than 30%
—
15% of the first 30% plus 20%
of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year
when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and
the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the
distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of
the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.
xxx
xxx
x x x"
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of
the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF
149
submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest
solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the
conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target
by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions
shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in
operation, and has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis
for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle
of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of
revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That
when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs officials or
employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or
force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be
considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the
application of the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from service under this Act
shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of public
officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and
Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx
xxx
x x x"
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest",
"justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.33
We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully
satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof.
Moreover, Section 534 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the incentives due to District Collection
Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he allocation,
distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a)35 of R.A. No. 9335
clearly mandates and sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and
guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance with
Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated
in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards as to negate BOCEA’s supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.
Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in
a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
150
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.361awphil
Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be
headed by and subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF],
shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and
duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx
xxx
x x x"
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to
the management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all
ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its
jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
151
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx
xxx
x x x"
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related
to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37
As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of
tenure of affected BIR and BOC officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were
also settled in Abakada:
Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process
is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary
action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.38
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s
apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No.
9335.40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due
consideration to all relevant factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner,
exemptions42 were set, contravening BOCEA’s claim that its members may be removed for
unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an
employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of
him.43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from
the service without according him his constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No.
9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the
last, but new issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed
under Section 22,44 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without
a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group
of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial.451avvphi1
In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,46 Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano traces the roots of a Bill of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back,
Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and
their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed.
366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power
by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life
or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat.
While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it
prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an
identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior
charge or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of
the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA
382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S.
303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the
archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x47
152
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The
democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee
are amply protected.
A final note.
We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation,
distribution and receipt of rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and
corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government in general which is nothing but noble,
these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but
rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate these
pernicious acts of graft and corruption.48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on
the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch.
Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give
statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof.49 Just like any
other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is
doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.50 We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s
is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and
Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
“The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent
or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care"
power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of
the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers
of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and
of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search”
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers
to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not
contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
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RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of
the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring
a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power
to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP
1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed
harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second,
manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body
cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject
to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
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interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing
the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency
to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a
state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article
VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not
yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008.
7/13/2010
0 Comments
Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the
eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting
Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of
Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the
First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).”
Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
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(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits –
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for
maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite
the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we
rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or
barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local
Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership
or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a
national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
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In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of
Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act
“which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the
14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City”
mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it
involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the
constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome
of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included
in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to
proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the
office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province
is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),
creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing
for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating
congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and
(2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of
legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present
case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress
itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate
alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to
create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is
created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that “each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district
by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of
RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of
2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus
become distinct possibilities:
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It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act
(RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the
Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the
ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima
undue delegation of power; separation of power
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D.
LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards.
Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should
not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President
158
without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
1.
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states
that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2.
3.
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines
the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
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1.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that
has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335,
its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided
in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only
the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities
through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the
demands of equal protection.
2.
3.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law
under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and
welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing
and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a
disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual
milieus has its complicated side.
In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the
official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is
unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective
local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her
third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption
which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
Limkaichong vs COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:32 PM
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to
run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District
of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not
160
a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros
Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen
because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification
based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in
accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may question in the
appropriate denaturalization proceeding.
2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath
of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the
jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in
Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec
Posted by kaye lee on 5:06 PM
G.R. No. 162759, 4 Aug 2006 [Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003 RA 9189; Dual Citizenship ]
FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act or RA No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or reacquired
Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year
residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of
1-year residency requirement.
RULING:
Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress
enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its
Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule
under the Section 5(d) of the same Act.
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect
to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may
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be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of
the Constitution.
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an
ex-officio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled,
"Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative,
Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For
Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from
administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among
others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(a) x x x
xxx
xxx
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any
of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or
hearing, the Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President.
The report and recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal
conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may
be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O.
13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS
INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities;
162
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to
promote economy and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code
of 1987) provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of
the Philippines to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the National Government and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group,
consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National
Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions and
authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations
Act of 2010) authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational
units or key positions in any department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and
corruption in the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote
economy and efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the
President (OP) to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the
Executive Department including heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and other
powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this
Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In
addition to the Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and
duties mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to
the President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report
and recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be
affected by the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under
existing laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered
to release the necessary funds for the benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel,
Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final
disposition or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may be
necessary, shall be in accordance with the applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the President)
dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later than 31 December 2010.
163
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and
Management, shall ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and
winding-up of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the
incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao
Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the
LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under
oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled,
"Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary
course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon
the following grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new,
additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only
usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasijudicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed
against the due process requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
164
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken
for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including
the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments
and Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments
or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's
authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an
express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III
of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President,
subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing
authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is
the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command
post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an
office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the
other way around.7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of
the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition,
consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and
offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President
Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President
to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
165
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand
and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security
but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive
actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was
created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the
ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of
the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now
been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by
E.O. 292 for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not
merely involve the abolition of an office but the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere in
the legal definition laid down by the Court in several cases does a reorganization include the act of
creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as
the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to
the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The
reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division – through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to
discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.
It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be
pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions
within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of
eradicating corruption in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that while
Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual
budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the
transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions
and maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the
President's Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates,
however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the
Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IADODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention is without legal
basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he
has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency
in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.17
Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of
2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in
166
any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the
general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the
executive offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise
given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the
savings in other items of the appropriation for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law
to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of
the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act
or approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total
amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the
necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office
budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the
legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial
powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is
reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the
legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term
"adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions
and duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the
Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the
Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power
in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the
executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
167
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's
primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him
notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges
and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers
the Ombudsman to –
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the
IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to
investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by
no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause
and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IADODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation
of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection
of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the
arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying
upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.29 It is embraced under the due
process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from
each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This
proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to
remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32
Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.33
Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his
right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level
positions in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower
positions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively
on the substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
168
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign
power of the people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IADODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,35 which
simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process
are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his
written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him.
His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of
due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial
tribunal, contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected
to the President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the
IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA
had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been
presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding
investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O.
13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I.
THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
169
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August
8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national
and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1.
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2.
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3.
Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
1.
YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections, including the ARMM elections.
170
2.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days
and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the
three separate readings requirement.
3.
YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order
to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint
OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections
assume office.]
3.1.
1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
171
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the
new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent
to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make
in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results.
3.2.
2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill
in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with
the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary
by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot
make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To
be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on
very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through
a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two
years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
172
3.3.
3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and
the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This
choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on
or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied
in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under
the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law
that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however,
does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
173
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of
the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on
its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be
invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that
due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically
denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s
self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts
of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets
of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
raullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
174
POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL REVIEW. We have already said that
the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law,
the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature
may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after
the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision,
this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under
such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of
the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation
of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor
desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system
of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; STRICT CONSTRUCTION ON THE ACCUMULATION AND UTILIZATION OF
SAVINGS. The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall
be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs
shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their
utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the
power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other
budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent
them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived
beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of
stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions
of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds
used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the
relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must
come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes
must be carried out through legal methods.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER TO AUGMENT; CANNOT BE USED TO FUND NON-EXISTENT
PROVISION IN THE GAA. Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing
item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings
may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the
GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred
thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution
and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget
execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, GR No. 191618, 201011-23
Facts:
Confronting us is an undesignated petition[1] filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty.
Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section
4,[2] Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional
provision does allow the "appointment of additional personnel."
175
Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC[4] which peripherally declared
that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PET,
Issues:
whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional,
and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which
tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004.
His failure... to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal's authority over the case he was defending, translates to
the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court's power of...
judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed... revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical:
The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction.It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson
andValdezpetitions.Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution
which provides:
"The Supreme Court, sittingen bancshall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked
after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President.There can be no "contest"
before a winner is proclaimed
Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez
I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for
prematurity.The Court has no... jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said petitions.
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically
and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively... as "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and VicePresident, Senators, and Representatives.
this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election...
contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election.
Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on
Elections[19] is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vicepresidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat - the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any... reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
176
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET.
But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations
which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view

one which really does not offer a solution.
Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of
judicial power mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Supreme
Court's constitutional mandate to act as sole judgeof election contests involving... our country's
highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power;... and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the
judicial power which may be exercised under the government."
The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial
power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4,... Article VII of the
Constitution is sound and tenable.
We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary
because this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.
FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. Therefore,
they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on
an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for... the House, normally, as
composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests.
So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to...
constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers
because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.[31]
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vicepresidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is
not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it.
Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vicepresidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the
PET in our country cannot be denied
To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing
an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and VicePresident. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court... were tasked to sit as
its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court
Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill,
absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.
R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the
bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary
government.
With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not
directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly,
while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.
177
In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was
restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was
formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually,... the
Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew.
These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3,
1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were... divided
equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa.
Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to
recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its
opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or... accomplishing
of election returns.
After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon
Aquino as President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed.
With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then
statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:
FR. BERNAS. x x x.
x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to
constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers
because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial... power.[
Clearly, petitioner's bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His
arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and
"Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is... authorized to
appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to
bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further
attention by the Court.
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET,
to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vicepresidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion
This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden
justifies the budget... allocation of the PET.
Doctrine of necessary implication - “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed”.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
"awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
necessary implication.[36] We cannot overemphasize that the... abstraction of the PET from the
explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of... power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof... he Supreme Court's method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the... aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
178
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives
Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions
of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different
electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are... constitutional bodies,
independent of the three departments of government - Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary - but
not separate therefrom.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna
Regalado E. Maambong
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793... has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right
to contest judicially the election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a
recount of the votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment
declaring that... he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as
such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office.
And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten
Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional
original jurisdiction of an exclusive character
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although
the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
n other words, there is only one... court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to
several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.
So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to... the Supreme Court, since it is the
same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those
of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions.
It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies

not unlawfully defies - the constitutional directive.
The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed
simply to highlight the... singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal's functions as a special
electoral court.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vicepresidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,[48] the task of deciding
179
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with... full authority in the exercise thereof.
The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET... and the Supreme Court.
In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members
of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department,... i.e., the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.
MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme
Court was able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that
was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme
Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the
election protests
MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme
Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests?
MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the
time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be
going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam
President.
MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before
teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the
"protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course, that... can be
expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the
Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections,
the kind of problems, and the court would only go over the objected votes on... which the parties
could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned.
What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because each party would have to
appoint one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big... amount.
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites
the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech
delivered on the Senate floor:
180
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with
a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to
be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants
that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the
JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like
her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11
of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in
all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session.No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import
of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
"is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
181
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and
mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of
idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvp
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on
constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator
of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court,
like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the
respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened
with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private
practice.7Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting
tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
182
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. Iam nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and
destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but
rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief
Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save
perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss
to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the
Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated
Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
183
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated our pronouncement
in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are
bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
"unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of
justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct"
or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose
or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the
integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We
have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda
in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted
and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the
Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court
from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration
dictates this kind of disposition.
184
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to
re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal,
and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to
protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing
the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone
referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own
chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically
denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege
speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Funa vs Agra (G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013)
Funa vs Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera
in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the
suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General;
and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5,
2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010,
he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary
of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of
Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then
relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment
of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.
185
Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding
the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of
resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of
Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlledcorporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the
office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself,
supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply
to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question
that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates
of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge
of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely
vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained
covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations
were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the
Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to
hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In
the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government
official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is
no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense
that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
186