CARIAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001
Facts: Aboitiz received reports that some private electricians were engaged in the clandestine sale of
DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation with the following objectives: (1) ascertain
how DLPC materials were being stolen, the frequency of the thefts, who were perpetrating the thefts; and
(2) `catch’ at least one (1) DLPC employee that may be involved. ‘Canuto Duran’, Aboitiz’s undercover
struck an acquaintance with Cariaga and he told the latter that his boss ordered him to buy electrical
materials to be brought to Diwalwal, a gold panning area in Monkayo, Davao. Ricardo offered to supply
‘Canuto Duran’ with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same.
Siton’s (Duran) undercover work came to an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt.
Villasis’ team ‘apprehended’ ‘Canuto’ and turned him over, including the electrical wires that he
previously purchased from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. ‘Canuto Duran’
‘confessed’ in order to persuade Ricardo – and the others who were involved – to likewise come out with
the truth. Ricardo revealed that he acted as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and ‘Canuto Duran’
on November 27, 1988 and again on January 23, 1989; that the items that ‘Canuto Duran’ bought from
Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC properties. Jamero also confessed that Ricardo was his fence in disposing
of DLPC electrical materials that he pilfered but the items were not sold to ‘Canuto Duran’ but to
someone else. The recitals of Ricardo and Jamero in their sworn statements are substantially corroborated
by entries in the blotter. The accused was also invited to the San Pedro Patrol Station but he refused to
give a statement. The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not
be personally served upon him. According to the trial court, “the prosecution’s evidence considered as a
whole is strong, clear and convincing. The statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga
implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles, corroborated by Siton’s testimony and the
police records are formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused.”
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga without him taking the witness stand since it violates the fundamental right of the accused to
meet the witnesses against him face to face.
Ruling: Yes. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not
appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out
of the Philippines. It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases; hence,
“mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court
must exercise its coercive power to arrest.” In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the
witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly
subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have
been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this
rule.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM ONG
G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004
Facts: July 24, 1998 , Quezon City, Philippines, accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 980.50
grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug. Upon arraignment, the two (2)
accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do not show whether they had sufficient
knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the course of the trial, the two (2) accused
were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused
Ong, a Chinese citizen from the People’s Republic of China, claimed that he came to the Philippines in
1997 to look for a job. In June 1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted for another job.
Accused De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. On July 23,
1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M he was approached by persons unknown to him. They blindfolded and
brought him to a place. After a few hours, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, they removed his blindfold. He
denied knowing accused Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila,
Quezon City. Avelina Cardoz corroborated his story. When they returned to the car, accused De Ming
was nowhere to be found. They saw him next at the Quezon City Jail.
Issue: Whether or not the right to meet witness face to face was violated.
Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it
was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who
had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is hearsay and
possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay
rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis
would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case the
informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material
details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO BOHOL
G.R. No. 171729
July 28, 2008
Facts: On or about August 2, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused, without being
authorized by law to sell, administer, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or attempt to sell, or offer for sale for P100.00 and deliver
to PO2 Ferdinand Estrada, a poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance commonly known as "shabu" weighing zero point zero five four (0.054) gram,
which substance, after a qualitative examination, gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug. Consequently, the police officers brought Bohol to the police
station and the confiscated four plastic sachets of white crystalline substance were subjected to laboratory
examination. The specimens were confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as
shabu. Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Bohol despite the absence of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling: No. Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. During trial, the informant’s
presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court held that police authorities
rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and
informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is
material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Both requirements were
sufficiently proven in this case. The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that
the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the
prosecution when presented in court. Hence, we agree that Bohol’s guilt has been established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALICIA A. CHUA
G.R. No. 128280. April 4, 2001
Facts: In September 1992, accused Chua received a facsimile message from Harmony Electronics
Company in Taiwan. The message was written in Chinese characters except for the names of To-ong
Zenon Tumenlaco and Tercenio Domingo Fornaliza. Harmony asked her to call up To-ong and Tercenio
and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Accused Chua contacted To-ong and told him the
message. In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of accused Chua, and the latter told
them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of P15,000.00 each. She also
asked them to secure NBI clearances and medical certificates. On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together
with private complainant Lonito Baluis, went back to the office of accused Chua and submitted the
requirements. Tercenio and Lonito Baluis paid P15, 000.00 each for which they were issued a receipt
bearing the name Man Tai Trading and General Services with accused Chua’s signature. Accused Chua
assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months
passed, but they were not deployed. Tercenio became apprehensive and told accused Chua that he would
withdraw his application and ask for refund of the placement fee. Accused Chua repeatedly promised that
she would give back the money to him, but she never did. After a few more months, Tercenio could not
anymore locate accused Chua. Accused Chua used the same modus operandi on the other private
complainants. After requiring each complainant to pay a placement fee of P15, 000.00 each, to secure
NBI clearances and to undergo medical examinations, she would go in hiding. In time, complainants
inquired from the POEA about accused Chua’s activities. The POEA issued a certification that accused
Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of the constitutional right to compulsory process.
Ruling: No. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now
includes the right to secure the production of evidence in one’s behalf. U.S. vs. Ramirez which laid down
the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses may be applied to this expanded concept. Thus,
the movant must show: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in
previously obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time
desired; and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly
denied appellant’s motion for the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA
Certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that
appellant was not issued a license until then.
People v Malimit
Facts: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending
to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the
kitchen located at the back of the store Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of
Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from
his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store (Meanwhile, Batin
had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki)
if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant
coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was
sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life and death) Rondon, who was outside and
barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through
the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the
illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit
(Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon. After a brief
conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy
and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store.
Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily
noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his
pocket. Appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz.,
(1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, 2violates his right against
self-incrimination. 2Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation,
wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed
of his constitutional rights.
Issue : Whether or not his right against self-incrimination was violated
No. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this
case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does not apply to
the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but
an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own
vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of
his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be
obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the
evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion 28
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision
of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions
thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by
law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly,
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating
policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of
establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the
very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and
keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not
detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing
appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
People vs. Rondero
FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at
the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no
sperm. He was convicted of homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence
were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s
right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his
house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent
and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right
against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accused-appellant’s hair strands can be admitted as
evidence against him?
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the
accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of
the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accusedappellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use
of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in
evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accusedappellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the
garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence illegally
obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized
in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as
evidence.
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 109242, 26 January 1999]
Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to
his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the
post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as
a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post
Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the
aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for mail
pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI
agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day.
Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents
in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of
Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the
Esquerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front
of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold
Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with
him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra
and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the
mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The latter
transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then
secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing
Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just
in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing
and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan
went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the
postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and
Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo
and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed
by the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However,
they were not able to find him there. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of
622 letters. The names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of
Posts to claim their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters.
Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on
the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and
Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director
Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters
confiscated from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y Cruz
were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan
found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft. The
Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day of Prision
mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; Romero and
Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11
years, 6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to
the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.
Held: The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the
envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the
envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from
Marcelo were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since
these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under
custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the
Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
that he must be provided with one. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The
letters were validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that
Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on 17
February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful
arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized
from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were
not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the
testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.
Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG
allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette.
Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some big business enterprises such as
MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to
appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with
lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in
maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund
worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by
Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a
hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner
Bengzon s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRC s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
HELD:
1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the
government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent
of such powers.
2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy
Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry
also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee alleges. The
inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution.
3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private
citizens, hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but
of the courts. Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of
the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would
be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to
respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding.
This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the
petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.
People vs. Gallarde
Facts: In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses, their neighbors converged. Among them
were appellant and others. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent
lamp illuminated them as they partook beer. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a
kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look
for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed
them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. The searchers found appellant
squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. Asked where Editha was,
appellant replied: “I do not know, I did not do anything to her.” The searchers, thereafter, noticed
disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. They found the
dead body of the victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant
to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them
down and turned over the person of appellant, saying that he is the suspect in the disappearance of the
little girl. The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered.
The cause of Editha’s death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed “suffocation of the lungs
as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with laceration of the vagina and
raptured hymen. The trial court found the appelant guilty of homicide. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the incident is inadmissible as
evidence in court on the ground that “the same were taken while the accused was already under the mercy
of the police.” and the taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel is a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Held: No, The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional
right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled
to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as
to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from
his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.
Facts: In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses, their neighbors converged. Among them
were appellant and others. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent
lamp illuminated them as they partook beer. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a
kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look
for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute to where appellant. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed
them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. The searchers found appellant
squatting with his short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. Asked where Editha was,
appellant replied: “I do not know, I did not do anything to her.” The searchers, thereafter, noticed
disheveled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. They found the
dead body of the victim. Mindful of appellant’s safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant
to the municipal building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them
down and turned over the person of appellant, saying that he is the suspect in the disappearance of the
little girl. The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the
policemen shoved more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered.
The cause of Editha’s death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed “suffocation of the lungs
as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with laceration of the vagina and
raptured hymen. The trial court found the appelant guilty of homicide. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the incident is inadmissible as
evidence in court on the ground that “the same were taken while the accused was already under the mercy
of the police.” and the taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel is a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Held: No, The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional
right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the
right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled
to submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as
to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from
his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable
the foregoing things to be done.
COMELEC v. TAGLE
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeks the nullification of the orders of 16
March 2001 and 9 May 2001 of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, denying petitioners motion to
dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 and motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
[1]
[2]
During the 11 May 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of
mayor in the Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the
COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete,
Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado
del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and
Pedro Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four (44)
witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents and was docketed
as E.O. Case No. 98-219.
On 25 February 1999, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, the
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution directing the filing of the necessary
information against the respondents in E.O. Case No. 98-219 and authorizing the
Director IV of the Law Department to designate a COMELEC prosecutor to handle
the prosecution of the cases and to file the appropriate motion for the preventive
suspension of the respondents.
[3]
The Law Department filed the corresponding information against the respondents
in E.O. Case No. 98-219 before the RTC, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99.
Before the trial of Criminal Case No. 7034-99 commenced, or on 2 December
1999, a complaint was filed by Innocencio Rodelas and Gerardo Macapagal with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, for violation of Section 261(a) of
the Omnibus Election Code against the witnesses in the criminal case for vote-buying,
who were the witnesses in E.O. Case No. 98-219. The complaint was docketed as I.S.
No. 1-99-1080.
On 10 April 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file separate
informations for vote-selling in the various branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite,
against the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The cases were docketed as (1)
Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00, which were assigned to
Branch 22; (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 7973-00 to 7979-00 and 7970-00, assigned to
Branch 21; (3) Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, assigned to
Branch 20; and (4) Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00, assigned to Branch 90.
On 23 June 2000, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 appealed before the
COMELEC the 10 April 2000 Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 6 July
2000, the COMELEC en banc denied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However,
upon the urgent motion to set for hearing the appeal, the COMELEC en banc resolved
to defer action on the appeal and refer the same to the Law Department for comment
and recommendation.
[4]
[5]
The Law Department of the COMELEC filed motions to suspend proceedings
before Branches 20, 21, 22 and 90 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, until the COMELEC
would have resolved the appeal of the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. The
Presiding Judge of Branch 22 granted the motion for the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 7940-00 to 7949-00 and 7981-00.
In its Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, the COMELEC en banc, upon the
recommendation of its Law Department, declared null and void the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080. It held that the respondents
therein are exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to the fourth paragraph of
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution persons who voluntarily give
information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. It
further directed the Law Department to file the necessary motions to dismiss the
criminal cases filed against the said respondents.
[6]
[7]
Pursuant to Minute Resolution No. 00-2453, the Law Department filed a motion
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 before Branch 20
of the RTC of Imus, Cavite, presided by herein respondent judge. The latter, however,
denied the said motion and the motion for reconsideration. According to respondent
judge, before one can be exempt from prosecution under the fourth paragraph of
Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, it is necessary that such person has already performed
the overt act of voluntarily giving information or testifying in any official
investigation or proceeding for the offense to which such information or testimony
was given. It was thus premature to exempt the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080
from criminal prosecution, since they have not yet testified.
[8]
Hence, this petition, ascribing to the respondent judge grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in peremptorily denying the prosecutions
motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00.
This Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
required it to manifest whether it is adopting the petition. In a Manifestation and
Motion filed with this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the submissions
contained in the petition and adopts the petition as its own.
[9]
[10]
The petition is meritorious.
A free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election is indispensable in a
democratic society. Without it, democracy would not flourish and would be a
sham. Election offenses, such as vote-buying and vote-selling, are evils which
prostitute the election process. They destroy the sanctity of the votes and abet the
entry of dishonest candidates into the corridors of power where they may do more
harm. As the Bible says, one who is dishonest in very small matters is dishonest in
great ones. One who commits dishonesty in his entry into an elective office through
the prostitution of the electoral process cannot be reasonably expected to respect and
adhere to the constitutional precept that a public office is a public trust, and that all
government officials and employees must at all times be accountable to the people
and exercise their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
The provision of law alleged to have been violated by the respondents in E.O.
Case No. 98-219, who are the accused in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, reads as
follows:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. - (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises
money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or
grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or
indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or
against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar
selection process of a political party.
(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or
receives, directly or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or
employment, public or private, for any of the foregoing considerations.
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons whether candidates or not, who
come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of paragraph (a) of
this section and decide to commit it.
One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in
favor of the party whose vote was bought. This grant of immunity will encourage the
recipient or acceptor to come into the open and denounce the culprit-candidate, and
will ensure the successful prosecution of the criminal case against the latter. Congress
saw the wisdom of this proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646
on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph:
The giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and
conspirator referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided, That any person, otherwise guilty
under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any
violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information
and testimony were given: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall exempt such
person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
However, to avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers,
especially by the latters opponents, Congress saw it fit to warn vote-sellers who
denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony
should they not tell the truth.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws
and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The Chief
State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are,
however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC, to conduct
preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute
the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime
whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that
the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC.
[11]
[12]
[13]
In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the informations for vote-
selling, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such
withdrawal of the deputation was clearly in order, considering the circumstances
obtaining in these cases where those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to
the vote-buying incident and became witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as
accused for the same acts they had earlier denounced. What the Prosecutor did was to
sabotage the prosecution of the criminal case against the vote-buyers and put in
serious peril the integrity of the COMELEC, which filed the said case for votebuying. If the Prosecutor had listened to the command of prudence and good faith, he
should have brought the matter to the attention of the COMELEC.
Petitioner COMELEC found that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, who
executed affidavits and turned witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99, voluntarily
admitted that they were the acceptors or recipients in the vote-buying done by the
accused in said case. It was precisely because of such voluntary admission and
willingness to testify that the COMELEC en banc, in its Minute Resolution No. 002453, declared null and void the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 and held that the respondents therein are exempt from
criminal prosecution pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
Hence, it directed its Law Department to file a motion to dismiss the criminal cases
which the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed in court against the respondents in
I.S. No. 1-99-1080.
We agree with the petitioner and hold that the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080,
who are the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, are
exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last
paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that
at the time the complaint for vote-selling was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-99-1080 had already executed sworn
statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying in the case docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily
given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal
Case No. 7034-99 per petitioners Memorandum filed with this Court.
[14]
In a futile attempt to justify his denial of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00, respondent judge averred in his comment on
the petition that nothing was mentioned in the motion to dismiss that the accused in
said cases had already given information or testified in any proceeding. Besides, no
record of any preliminary investigation was attached to the motion to dismiss. The
petitioner merely referred to the dispositive portion of Minute Resolution No. 00-2453
without mentioning any preliminary investigation conducted by the Law Department
of the COMELEC.
This contention is without basis. A reading of the motion to dismiss Criminal
Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 shows that a certified true copy of
COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 was attached thereto and was made an
integral part thereof. The attached resolution indicated that the accused in the cases
sought to be dismissed had voluntarily given information and were willing to testify
against the vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized as witnesses in the pending case for
vote-buyers docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99.
Clearly then, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
denied the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00
despite COMELECs determination that the accused therein are exempt from criminal
prosecution for vote-selling pursuant to the proviso in the fourth paragraph of Section
28 of R.A. No. 6646.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200748
July 23, 2014
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00
which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused was later brought to
the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)
HELD:
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act,
but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.The drug test was in violation of the
petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner
refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs.