Brett W. Smith
The Catholic University of America
ABSTRACT
Recent authors have debated the continuity of Augustine’s thought in the mid-390s, as
well as the continuity of On the Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio), which he
completed around that time. This study contributes to the current debate surrounding De
libero arbitrio by identifying one strand of thought that Augustine develops with a
natural continuity throughout the dialogue, namely, his natural law theory. This article
argues that, when read as a unified whole, De libero arbitrio implies a working natural
law theory centered on the order of the universe and applied to man particularly through
his ordered nature, with attendant rewards and punishments. The argument proceeds
through the themes of order, nature, and retribution in turn, explaining each from
passages in De libero arbitrio. The first of these sections also discusses some of
Augustine’s other early works as important background for understanding his concept of
order.
KEY WORDS
Augustine, De libero arbitrio, early works, ethics, natural law, On The Free Choice of the
Will, order
.
Augustine’s Natural Law Theory in De Libero Arbitrio
Recent interest in the early works of St. Augustine has raised questions about the
continuity, or rather, the assumed discontinuity, of his thought.1 Authors like Carol Harrison
have challenged the notion that Augustine’s “Pauline Revolution” in the mid-390s totally
changed his thinking.2 One particular battleground in this debate is Augustine’s On the Free
Choice of the Will (hereafter De libero arbitrio). This work is of particular interest because
Augustine wrote De libero arbitrio over the course of about seven years. He wrote
approximately the first book and a half in Rome in late 388, but he did not complete the second
and third books until sometime after his ordination in 391, most likely in Hippo Regius before
the end of 395.3 This means that the composition of De libero arbitrio spans the “Pauline
1
One can observe this interest both in the production of new translations of his early works and in new or
recent studies on even his obscure early works. Some of the recent translations include those by Peter King of some
of his philosophical dialogues and Silvano Borruso’s new translation of De Ordine (Augustine, Against the
Academicians and The Teacher, trans. Peter King [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995]; Augustine, On Order, trans.
Silvano Borruso [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007]; Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, On
Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Peter King [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010]). Some of the recent studies include a master’s thesis on De Musica by Sherri Anderson and a study on the
conceptual unity of De ordine by Virgilio Pacioni (Sherri Anderson, “Rhythmic Attunement: Augustine’s Theory on
Ordering the Soul” [MA thesis, Villanova University, 2013]; Virgilio Pacioni, L’unità teoretica del “De ordine” di
S. Agostino [Rome: Millennium Romae, 1996]).
2
Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for continuity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), vi.
3
Ibid., 202; See also Roland Teske, “Libero arbitrio, De,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An
Encyclopedia, ed. Allen D. Fitzgerald et. al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 494.
1
Revolution.” Accordingly, as Simon Harrison has remarked, “In general, scholars have
approached lib. arb. with a scalpel in one hand.”4 They have tended to read De libero arbitrio as
if the more Pauline Augustine of the mid-390s is correcting in books 2 and 3 the “more Pelagian
than Pelagius” optimism about human nature present in book 1.5
Some recent scholars, however, have argued that all three books together present one
coherent argument.6 One key point they make is that Augustine deliberately brackets complex
issues in book 1 which he later addresses in book 3.7 The increasing difficulty of the subject
matter in books 2 and 3 can explain some of the changes that scholars notice from book 1 to
4
Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De
Libero Arbitrio, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.
5
The quotation is from Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, new edition with an epilogue
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000), 141; For an overview of scholars who take this
approach see Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 17-27, esp. 21-26. He deals with Brown in particular
on pages 21-23; For examples of the divided approach to De libero arbitrio see: P. Séjourné, “Les Conversions de
Saint Augustin d’Après le ‘De libero arbitrio, Livre I,’” Revue des Sciences Religieuses 25, 3-4 (1951), 243-264,
333-363; Robert J. O’Connell, “De Libero Arbitrio I: Stoicism revisited,” Augustinian Studies 1 (1970), 49-68;
Paula Fredriksen, “Augustine’s Early Interpretation of Paul” (PhD. diss., Princeton University, 1979), 174-191, esp.
186-191. Séjourné states that in book I, « il est au paradis. Il reviendra sur terre aux livres II et III» and that the
purpose of the latter books was « repentir et retractation tout à la fois » (“Les Conversions,” 359). In terms of the
arguments employed, O’Connell reads book II as a more Neo-Platonic correction of the primarily Stoic book I
(“Stoicism revisited,” 50-51). Fredriksen says of book III, “Its harshness, its note of gloom, could not stand in
greater contrast to the mood of Book I” (“Early Interpretation of Paul,” 190). For an overview of Augustine’s life
during this period that upholds the divided view, see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 139-150.
6
Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 203, 222-224; Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way
into the Will, 28-62.
7
Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 210.
2
books 2 and 3, such as an the increase in average sentence length.8 Another point in favor of
continuity is that Augustine seems to develop the definitions of key terms over the course of the
dialogue.9
This study contributes to the current debate by identifying one strand of thought relevant
to human nature that Augustine develops with a natural continuity throughout the dialogue,
namely, his natural law theory.10 Without denying that new ideas appear in the later books that
qualify the interpretation of the first, the analysis that follows assumes, with Augustine of the
Retractationes, that one can read the work as a coherent whole.11 If this assumption bears fruit
in a coherent account of Augustine’s basic natural law theory, this fact will be one point for
scholars to consider when debating the continuity of the work.
The thesis of this article, then, is that De libero arbitrio, when read as a unified whole,
implies a working natural law theory centered on the order of the universe and applied to man
particularly through his ordered nature, with attendant rewards and punishments. The argument
will proceed through the themes of order, nature, and retribution in turn, explaining each from
passages in De libero arbitrio. In order to appreciate fully what De libero arbitrio says about
8
Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will, 31.
9
Ibid.,, 54-57.
10
For background discussion of Augustine’s natural law theory, see the section “Conclusion and Relevance
of This Study” below. For a concise summary of Augustine’s theory, including his mature thought, see Jean Porter,
Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1999), 125-127.
Porter (179) notes the following as particularly helpful: Alois Schubert, Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre Nach Inhalt
und Quellen (Munster: i.W. Aschendorff, 1924) and Philippe Delayhe, Permanence du Droit Naturel (Louvain:
Editiones Nauwelaerts, 1960), 53-65.
11
See Augustine, Retractationes 1.9.
3
order, it will also be helpful to consider the theme of order in Augustine’s other works that he
completed before or during the compositon of De libero arbitrio. These works will help to
clarify Augustine’s thinking in this dialogue. Since the issues related to nature and retribution
follow logically from Augustine’s thinking on order, this practice will not be necessary for the
themes of nature and retribution. Consequently, the latter two sections of the article will be
shorter and will deal with De libero arbitrio exclusively. The conclusion will suggest additional
ways in which this study is relevant to Augustinian scholarship.
I. Order and the Eternal Law in De libero arbitrio
If reason is the center of gravity in Thomas Aquinas’ natural law theory,12 where to be
rational is what is ultimately natural for man, it may be fair to say that order is the center of
gravity in Augustine’s theory.13 Augustine views the entire universe as an ordered whole in
which all the parts are interrelated according to God’s supremely rational and beautiful design.
This design, or order, operates on two basic levels. There is the order in which all things operate
beautifully by doing what they were designed to do in their proper relationships to other things,
and then there is the broader order which encompasses even deviations from the first order in a
larger, maximally ordered and beautiful whole. Augustine uses the first order to fix moral
obligation by identifying it with goodness, as will become clear below. For clarity, then, I shall
refer to the first order as “normative order” and the second as “all-encompassing order.”14
12
See Thomas Aquinas, STh. I-II qq. 90-108.
13
Augustine agrees with Aquinas that to be rational is what is most proper to human nature, but this fact is
less central to his thought. See Augustine De lib. arb.1.8.18, as well as the discussion of this passage below in the
section “Ordered Human Nature in De libero arbitrio.”
14
The terms for designating these levels of order, and other sub-levels introduced below, are my own in the
sense that Augustine does not seem to have established technical terms for these concepts at the time when he wrote
4
Foundations of Order in De ordine
In his early work On Order (hereafter De ordine) (386-387), one of Augustine’s
Cassiciacum dialogues, young Augustine makes his first attempt at considering the philosophical
dimensions of order (ordo).15 His summary statement about ordo appears in the first line of the
work: “There is an order to be found, within things and between them, which binds and directs
this world.”16 This order is that by which God governs all things rationally,17 and there is
nothing outside it.18 Even evil, though it did not originate with God, plays its own special role in
the overall order of the universe. It provides contrast with the good, thus adding to the beauty of
De libero arbitrio. As I shall show, however, he must have understood the distinctions between them. See the
Appendix for a chart that summarizes the relationships among the multiple levels of order in De libero arbitrio;
Chroust makes a similar distinction (Anton-Hermann Chroust, “The Fundamental Ideas in St. Augustine’s
Philosophy of Law,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 18, 57 [1973], 60).
15
Virgilio Pacioni, recognizing the intentionally multivalent nature of ordo in the dialogue, reads De
ordine as a unified work (“Order,” trans. Matthew O’Connell, in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed.
Allen D. Fitzgerald et. al. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999], 598; Here Pacioni also refers to Virgilio Pacioni,
L’unità teoretica del “De ordine” di S. Agostino [Rome: Millennium Romae, 1996], 13); For the background of
Augustine’s stay at Cassiciacum and the Cassiciacum dialogues, see John J. O’Meara, Young Augustine: The
Growth of St. Augustine’s Mind up to his Conversion (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1965), 191-199.
O’Meara treats the dialogues as works of fiction that are quite possibly based upon real events, perhaps even upon
notes taken at real events (193).
16
Augustine, De ordine 1.1.1 (trans. Borruso). The entire Latin sentence is as follows: “Ordinem rerum,
Zenobi, consequi ac tenere cuique proprium, tum vero universitatis quo coercetur ac regitur hic mundus, vel videre
vel pandere difficillimum hominibus atque rarissimum est”; Both this Latin text and the English translation are from
St. Augustine, On Order, trans. Silvano Borruso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
17
De ord. 1.5.14; 1.10.28.
18
De ord. 1.6.15.
5
the whole.19 This is Augustine’s first attempt at tackling the problem of evil. 20 Yet there is also
an order of nature, an order of the state,21 an order of the disciplines,22 and an ordering of the
soul that can lead to God.23 The list could go on; there seems to be an ordo for every kind of
thing.
Pacioni captures two aspects of Augustine’s concept of ordo. It is both “an arrangement
of equal and unequal things that assigns to each its proper place,” and it is “a principle in
accordance with which all the things God has created are moved to their ends.”24 Having a
“proper place” is a norm that operates between kinds. The ordo that moves things to their
respective ends is a norm that is distinct within each kind of thing. These two aspects of the
normative meaning of ordo are only part of the story, however. The all-encompassing sense of
19
De ord. 1.7.18 (CCSL 29:98): « Ita nec praeter ordinem sunt mala, quae non diligit deus, et ipsum tamen
ordinem diligit; hoc ipsum enim diligit, diligere bona et non diligere mala, quod est magni ordinis et diuinae
dispositionis. Qui ordo atque dispositio quia uniuersitatis congruentiam ipsa dictinctione custodit, fit, ut mala etiam
esse necesse sit. Ita quasi ex antithetis quodam modo…ex contrariis, omnium simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur. »
Cf. De ver. rel. 40.76.
20
Joanne McWilliam, “De ordine,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allen D.
Fitzgerald et. al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 602.
21
Augustine, De ordine 2.4.12
22
De ord. 2.5.17.
23
De ord. 1.9.27, 2.19.51.
24
Pacioni, “Order,” 599; Cf. Jean Porter: “For Augustine, any intrinsic norm of existence or activity can be
described as an order. Hence, the principles of operation intrinsic to a thing can be described as an order, as can the
harmonious interrelationships among the different components of a complex reality” (Porter, Natural and Divine
Law, 125).
6
order is also present from this early stage as the order that includes even evil.25 The distinction
between normative and all-encompassing order in De ordine is perhaps not as clear as a modern
reader would like, but Augustine must have understood that there was a distinction. Otherwise,
he could never have addressed the problem of evil by including it in the universal order. 26
One paragraph in De ordine merits particular attention, as it lays the foundation for
Augustine’s metaphysical treatment of order in De libero arbitrio. In De ordine 2.23, he
contrasts good (bonum) with nothing (nihil), thus by implication equating goodness with
being/existence. He also posits that “order itself is either good or proceeds from good (ordo ipse
aut bonum est aut ex bono est).”27 At an early date, Augustine was already thinking about
whether order may be the same as being and goodness.28
25
See the passages cited in notes 17, 18, and 19 above.
26
In De ord. 1.7.18, quoted above, Augustine’s argument turns on this very distinction. The order that God
loves in contrast to evil, which He does not love, is the kind of order that is normative. The kind of order which
includes even evil (nec praeter ordinem sunt mala), is the all-encompassing order.
27
De ord. 2.23.
28
This idea of order is in contrast to the later thought of Thomas Aquinas, where, according to Silvano
Borruso, order is an accident that describes the relationship between things rather than things themselves. Therefore
it is not a substance (See Silvano Borruso, “Introduction,” in Augustine, On Order, trans. and intro. Silvano Borruso
[South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007], xii). Borruso faults young Augustine for not being a Thomist in his
account of order and claims that Augustine retracted this idea at the end of his life (Borruso, xii-xiii). The sentence
he quotes as his proof from the Retractationes is as follows: “When I saw that the subject, difficult indeed to
understand, could not by disputation be brought to the comprehension of those with whom I was debating, I
preferred to talk about an Order of Study, by which one can advance from corporeal things to the incorporeal” (trans.
Russell, quoted in Burruso, xiii). This sentence, however, simply mentions that Augustine was not able to convey
his idea in a way that people could understand. It does not retract the idea in any way.
7
Silvano Borruso has noticed, “[T]he point that evil is aversion from order…is never made
[in De ordine],” and “[m]ost of the discussion gives the impression that evil is something.” 29
The former point may not be made explicitly, but it is tacitly assumed in De ordine 1.7.18.30 The
latter point cannot be more than poor expression on Augustine’s part, for he refers explicitly to
evil as “this non-entity we call evil (nihil quod dicitur malum).”31 Still, in the relationship of evil
to order, one can see a progression of thought from De ordine to De libero arbitrio. The latter
work seems to clarify and extend the thinking of the former without changing it in any
fundamental way.
The Eternal Law in De libero arbitrio
The last and most important of Augustine’s philosophical dialogues, De libero arbitrio
provides the “first, relatively comprehensive view of Augustine’s understanding of human beings
in their relation to God.”32 The work particularly explores the problem of evil through the lens
of free will. Augustine, with his dialogue partner Evodius, reasons that evil is in the world
because God created man with free will.33 Dougherty treats De libero arbitrio as though its only
contribution to Augustine’s natural law theory is the distinction between temporal and eternal
29
Borruso, “Introduction,” xiv.
30
See notes 19 and 26 above.
31
De ordine 2.23.
32
Teske, “Libero arbitrio, De,” 494.
33
Simon Harrison does not think De libero arbitrio necessarily belongs to the same genre as the
Cassiciacum dialogues (Augustine’s Way into the Will, 34). He points out that the manuscript tradition is not
consistent on the identities of the speakers and that, unlike the three dialogues written at Cassiciacum, De libero
arbitrio contains no narration to stage the dialogue (Ibid., 31-34). He follows the traditional identification of the
speakers based upon Ep. 162, and he does read it as a dialogue. Yet Harrison insists that literarily, “Evodius” is
supposed to be an anonymous disciple with whom the reader identifies (Ibid., 49).
8
law, which Thomas Aquinas would later utilize.34 While the word “law (lex)” does not appear
often after book 1, and lex naturalis does not occur at all,35 Augustine’s natural law theory is
implied in De libero arbitrio if for no other reason than that the eternal law is Augustine’s
natural law theory in its most compressed form.
Early in the dialogue (1.6.15), Augustine and Evodius work out the difference between
“temporal law (lex temporalis)” and “the eternal law (lex aeterna).” Temporal law is based upon
the eternal law, insofar as it is legitimate, but it may be changed as circumstances require in
different times and places. The eternal law, which is also called “supreme reason” (summa
ratio), can never change and applies to all people. Further, it is “impressed upon our nature.”36
The word “nature” does not actually appear in the Latin, which reads quae inpressa nobis est.
The perfect passive participle inpressa may suggest that Augustine has illumination in mind.37
34
Richard Dougherty, “Natural Law,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allen D.
Fitzgerald et. al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 583-584. Thomas uses the eternal law of De libero arbitrio 1.5-6
especially in STh I-II q. 91 a. 2. On the significance of this fact see Terry L. Miethe, “Natural Law, the Synderesis
Rule, and St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), 94-97.
35
Augustine uses lex naturalis in other works to describe the “imprint” of the eternal law on a rational soul
(Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 68; Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus 83 53.2). Thus the term “natural law,” for
Augustine, describes the application to man of his overall natural law theory. Thomas seems to follow Augustine’s
usage in this respect: “It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s
participation of the eternal law” (STh I-II q. 91 a. 2).
36
Augustine, De libero arbitrio 1.6.15 (trans. Russell); all Latin quotations of De libero arbitrio are
according to Green’s edition: Aurelius Augustinus, De libero arbitrio libri tres, ed. W.M. Green, in Corpus
Christianorum Series Latina Volume 29 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1970), 205-321.
37
Russell claims as much in a footnote to his translation (in loc.). Markus also states this opinion and adds,
“Thus the precepts of the eternal law are ‘written in the heart of man,’ or engraved upon it as am ‘impression’ of the
9
In any case, the fact remains that people know this law without needing to construct it actively,
and that Augustine is discussing a theory of natural law.38
Augustine summarizes the eternal law as “that law in virtue of which it is just that all
things exist in perfect order” (ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima). This
formulation deserves some scrutiny. The noun clause, from ut to ordinatissima, is the subject of
the verb est, and iustum is its predicate adjective. This particular kind of ut clause could indicate
that all things actually do exist in perfect order or merely that they should so exist.39 Since
Augustine is articulating here the effect of a law, it seems that the latter meaning is more likely.
The eternal law establishes obligation, not a particular state of affairs. It is evident from De
ordine that Augustine does think that all things are included in an actual all-encompassing
order,40 but here he is invoking the normative sense of order.41 Within the ut clause
eternal law. This, in a somewhat fluctuating terminology, remained Augustine’s unchanging teaching on this
subject” (R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970], 88); Augustine introduces his doctrine of illumination in De Magistro 13.46.
38
In De diversis quaestionibus 83 53.2, Augustine refers to this or a similar impression as a “natural law.”
Therefore, even though he does not call it such in De libero arbitrio, Augustine’s discussion of man and the eternal
law is his natural law theory as he conceives it during this period. His thought in the diversis quaestionibus passage
may be based upon Romans 2:15. See also note 35 above.
39
See the entry for ut, definition 38, in P.G.W. Glare, ed. Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 2115.
40
The idea of an all-encompassing order also occurs in book 3 of De libero arbitrio. See for example
3.15.44.152 and discussion in the section “Ordered Retribution in De libero arbitrio” below.
41
Understood this way, the formulation here is consistent with the one found in Contra Faustum (c.397/9):
“A sin therefore, is a deed, word, or desire contrary to the eternal law. But the eternal law is the divine reason or the
will of God, which commands that the natural order be preserved and forbids that it be disturbed.” (Augustine,
10
ordinatissima, “maximally ordered,” is functioning as a predicate adjective for the subject
omnia, “all things.” Thus, Augustine is not merely saying that all things should coexist in an
orderly way, like nations with a mutual non-aggression pact. He is saying that all things should
have the quality of being highly ordered. This means that the internal state of each individual
thing should be ordered, as well as the relationships between things. In this single statement one
can perceive a snapshot of Augustine’s natural (or “eternal”) law theory. All people must seek to
be well-ordered and to uphold order in the world.
Augustine and Evodius return to this concept from a different perspective in book 2, in
the argument for God’s existence.42 Augustine tries to show that there must be something above
Contra Faustum 22.27 [trans. Teske]). He them goes on to discuss what is the natural order for the human being.
Markus thinks the formulation in Contra Faustum is very different from the one in De lib. arb. because it “speaks of
the natural order and of the eternal law as two separate things” and that God’s will “is not said to be embodied, or
even reflected, in the order of nature, but stands behind it as its ultimate source and sanction.” (Markus, Saeculum,
90). The value of this, Markus thinks, is that “there are human realities which are not subject to ‘the order of
nature,’” although he admits “this is not yet being said here [in Contra Faustum]” (Ibid.). He says this new
definition allows Augustine later to remove de facto political arrangements (such as slavery) from the endorsement
of nature while maintaining that “God’s sovereignty is all-embracing” (Ibid., 92; see also 93 and Augustine, City of
God 19.15). Although Markus may describe Augustine’s later use of the Contra Faustum definition fairly,
Augustine’s theory in De lib. arb. is already equipped to handle such problems. All he would need to classify unjust
de facto political arrangements as against nature would be to say that a given unjust arrangement, like any evil, is
against the normative order of the eternal law and is only included in God’s all-encompassing order. Augustine may
not have had these terms, but he had the concepts. For more on how Augustine’s theory applies to political
arrangements, including slavery, see the principles discussed in the section “Ordered Human Nature in De libero
arbitrio” below, and particularly note 83.
42
Augustine’s argument is not intended as a proof in the modern sense. In Augustine’s epistemology,
belief precedes understanding (De Magistro 11.37). Augustine and Evodius have agreed upon belief and are using
11
the human mind by which all minds are able to make judgments. This truth (veritas) or wisdom
(sapientia) “reveals all true goods, which people elect for themselves to enjoy…in accordance
with their capacity for understanding.”43 He even goes as far as to say “No one passes judgments
on it, and no one passes judgments rightly without it.”44 This latter point proves that the truth is
more valuable than our minds and so either is God or comes from God.45 All people have access
to it, 46 and in pursuing it, they can find happiness in the highest good.47 Since the eternal law of
book 1 is also “supreme reason” and is obviously above the human mind, one must equate it with
this truth by which people judge rightly.48 Therefore, all people do have access to the eternal law
the argument to proceed to understanding. For more on the question of whether De libero arbitrio presents an
argument for God’s existence, see Roland J. Teske, To Know God and the Soul: Essays on the Thought of Saint
Augustine (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 26-48 and John M. Rist, Augustine:
Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 61-71.
43
De lib. arb. 2.13.36.141 (trans. King).
44
De lib. arb. 2.14.38.152 (trans. King).
45
De lib. arb. 2.14.38.152-15.39.153; Augustine and Evodius had previously agreed that if they could
prove that there was something higher than the mind, it would be God, unless there should be something higher yet
(De lib. arb. 2.6.14.57). Samantha Thompson concludes in light of this earlier passage that for Augustine “truth is
God” (Samantha Thompson, “What Goodness Is: Order as Imitation of Unity in Augustine,” The Review of
Metaphysics 65, 3 [Mar. 2012], 539).
46
De lib. arb. 2.9.27.104-105.
47
De lib. arb. 2.9.26.102-103.
48
Chroust seems to make the same equation, although dealing with more works and some of Augustine’s
later terminology (“Fundamental Ideas,” 64-68); By doing this, Augustine is combining the Stoic idea of the lex
aeterna, which was impersonal, with the Neo-Platonic idea that truth resides in or is God. For the Stoic origin of the
lex aeterna see Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 59. For Neo-Platonic sources of Augustine’s forms as ideas in the
12
and, insofar as they are free, are able to follow it to happiness in the highest good. In practice,
this involves a turn to God in obedience and faith: “Our freedom is this: to submit to this truth,
which is our God Who set us free from death—that is, from the state of sin.”49
Order, Goodness and Being in De libero arbitrio
Augustine gives a crucial explanation at the end of book 2, in which he equates order
with being and goodness, thus revealing the metaphysical core of his theory:
Do not hesitate to attribute to God as its maker everything in which you see number and
measure and order (mensuram et numerum et ordinem). Once you remove these things
entirely, absolutely nothing will be left (nihil omnino remanebit). For even if some
inchoate vestige of a form were to remain, where you find neither measure, nor order, nor
number—since wherever these exist the form is complete (forma perfecta est)—you must
also take away the vestigial form, which seems to be a sort of material its Maker needs to
complete. For if the completion of a form is good (formae perfectio bonum est), the
vestigial form is already something good. Thus if every good (omni bono) were taken
mind of God see Ibid., 58 and James F. Anderson, St. Augustine and Being: A Metaphysical essay, (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 54.
49
De lib. arb. 2.13.37.143 (trans. King); Cf. De vera religione 1.1: “The way of the good and blessed life is
to be found entirely in the true religion…”; Augustine equates truth with God elsewhere as well (Confessions
7.17.23; see Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 535 and Anderson, St. Augustine and Being, 43-47). Augustine can
also speak of truth as a principal form in the divine intellect (Augustine, Div. q. 46), although he does not seem to
intend any kind of composition in the divine nature when using such language. See discussion of De vera religione
below.
13
away, what will be left is not something (non quidem nonnihil), but instead absolutely
nothing (nihil omnino remanebit).50
For Augustine, number and measure are aspects of order. 51 In the case of number, Augustine
has suggested this fact earlier in book 2, saying that there is an “intelligible structure (ratio)” that
extends though numbers “by the most certain and unchangeable law (lege).”52 Numbers are
inherently ordered, so to have number is to have order. The passage above suggests that number
and measure belong to order in that Augustine names all three factors together as inseparable for
completing the form (forma) of a thing. The triad is helpful for Augustine’s argument in this
particular passage because the removal of the triad results in nothingness. It is far from obvious
that matter cannot exist without order, but it seems impossible even to think about matter that has
absolutely no number or measure. 53 In summary, Augustine says of both order and the good that
their removal results in nothingness. This implies that both order and goodness are equivalent to
existence or being and therefore to each other as well.54
50
Augustine, De lib. arb. 2.20.54.203-204 (trans. King); Cf. De lib. arb. 2.16.42.164 and 2.16.44.171.
51
He gets the triad from Wisdom 11:21: “You have arranged all things by measure (mensura), number
(numero), and weight (pondere),” quoted in Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 549. Here Augustine has
interchanged order for weight because weight has a directive meaning for him. For discussion of this triad in
Augustine’s metaphysics see Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 549-552. One relevant passage where Augustine will
later (c.399) use this triad in the same way is De natura boni 3, on which see John Hugo, St. Augustine on Nature,
Sex, and Marriage (Princeton, NJ: Scepter Publishers, 1998), 49.
52
De lib. arb. 2.8.23.90 (trans. King).
53
He presumably does not mean that order is matter, only that matter cannot exist without some order.
54
By making this equation, Augustine distances himself from Platonic and Neo-Platonic metaphysics, in
which the One and the Good are higher than Being. For a comparison of Augustine’s Christian metaphysics to
Platonic and Neo-Platonic metaphysics, see Anderson, St. Augustine and Being, 4-8.
14
Augustine applies this conceptual framework in book 3 to suggest that whatever falls
away from the design (ars) that is the wisdom (sapientia) of God, which “truly and supremely is
(vere summe que est),” is by this fault falling away from existing.55 Because order is the same as
being, a turn from order is a turn from existence. Because goodness is the same as being, this
turn from existence is blameworthy as a turn from goodness. This is why Augustine’s eternal
law could stipulate order as obligatory without qualification.
De libero arbitrio 2.8 contains an additional hint about the nature of order. Here
Augustine argues that all use of numbers assumes a basic unit of one. Yet nothing in human
experience is simply one, for all physical things are divisible. Since people know this “one” by
the light of reason, it must exist in the truth that is above the human mind.56 Since the truth or
wisdom above the human mind is God, this discussion suggests that the unity of “one” is also in
God.57 As such, it cannot be separable from the unity of divine simplicity. It seems that order,
through the unity of number, is ultimately based in the divine simplicity.
From De libero arbitrio, then, it is possible to deduce in rough outline the metaphysical
basis of Augustine’s natural law theory. The order of the universe, which is based in the unity of
55
“If the design in accordance with which all things were made, that is, the supreme and unchangeable
wisdom of God, truly and supremely is—as in fact it is—consider where anything that falls away from that design is
heading!” (De lib. arb. 3.15.42.144-145 [trans. King]) See also the section below entitled “Ordered Retribution in
De libero arbitrio.”
56
De lib. arb. 2.8.24; Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 542.
57
Augustine gives strong support to this interpretation a little later on in 2.11.30.123-124, where he says it
is “indisputable (nimirum)” that wisdom and number are “one and the same thing (quod una quaedam eademque res
est)” (trans. King). In the same place, he says that, even if there is some difference between number and wisdom,
“both powers belong to one and the same Wisdom (cum sit utrumque unius eiusdemque sapientiae)” (trans. King).
He then reiterates the identity of number and wisdom in 2.11.32.127-128.
15
the divine being, prescribes a particular arrangement in which all things must be ordered and
maintain order. This is the eternal law. To the extent that creatures live in accord with this
normative order,58 they fully exist and are good. Yet, these concepts have less clarity than one
might desire. To further explain the normative concept of order present in De libero abitrio, and
to demonstrate that the concept was firmly established in Augustine’s thought, it will be helpful
to look at two works Augustine wrote concurrently with De libero arbitrio.
Order in De moribus Manichaeorum
Augustine wrote On the Way of Life of the Manichees (hereafter De moribus) around
388-390. In this work Augustine contrasts his own metaphysics (among other things) against the
dualist metaphysics of the Manichaeans. In one passage he describes the two kinds of good
things in his own metaphysics:
One good which is supremely good in itself, and not by the participation (participatione)
of any good, but by its own nature and essence (propria natura et essentia); and another
good which is good by participation, and by having something [bestowed] (habendo).
Thus it has its being as good from the supreme good, which, however, is abiding and
loses nothing. This second kind of good is called a creature (creaturam), which is liable
to hurt through falling away.59
This passage shows that Augustine holds to a participationist metaphysic.60 He goes on in De
moribus to state that what is corrupted loses order, “and order is good (ordo autem bonum
58
Chroust notes that Augustine frequently treats “law” and “order” as synonymous concepts
(“Fundamental Ideas,” 61).
59
Augustine, De moribus 2.4.6, quoted in Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 529; Cf. Div. q. 51.2.
60
For a summary of participation in Augustine’s metaphysics, see Anderson, St. Augustine and Being, 54-
61.
16
est).”61 Thompson elucidates, “Augustine is not saying that order happens to be one good among
others, but that what good (or at least created good) is, is order.”62 To put the matter another way,
to be good is to acquire order.63 Therefore, to exist is to acquire order.64 It follows from this that
creatures participate in order as they do in goodness/being. They participate somehow in God’s
order. De libero arbitrio suggests that this participation would relate in some way to God’s
unity, since that is the basis of order. In order to understand how this participation works, one
may consult De vera religione.
Order in De vera religione
Written during the same time that Augustine was writing De libero arbitrio, his work On
True Religion (hereafter De vera religione) (390) contains the same basic account of order as De
libero arbitrio and clarifies it at certain points. Taking an inductive approach, Augustine
considers why some arrangements of windows are more pleasing than others. Symmetry is what
gives pleasure, and symmetry suggests unity to the mind. It is through symmetry that beautiful
things can approximate unity, even though they contain disparate parts.65 The mind is able to
judge this unity according to an unchanging standard, as it judges all square things against the
concept of a square. The standard by which the mind judges is truth. As in De libero arbitrio,
61
De moribus 2.5.7, quoted in Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 528.
62
Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 528 (emphasis hers).
63
This helps explain the normative order of the eternal law. As Deman has aptly noted, “La conception de
la vie morale présente dans le De libero arbitrio n’est pas différente de celle que nous offrait [le De Moribus]”
(Thomas Deman, Le Traitement Scientifique de la Morale Chrétienne Selon Saint Augustin [Montréal: Institut
d’Études Médiévales, 1957], 77).
64
Augustine, De moribus 2.6.8.
65
Augustine, De vera religione 30.55 ; Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 542.
17
Augustine concludes that truth is higher than the human mind.66 Here, however, he clarifies how
truth relates to God: “We must not have any doubt that the unchangeable substance which is
above the rational mind, is God. The primal life and primal essence is where the primal wisdom
is.” This “primal wisdom” is “the unchangeable truth which is the law of all the arts…”67 Thus,
truth and the beauty that it judges are somehow aspects of the divine being,68 whose ultimate
unity all true and beautiful things reflect.69
Augustine goes on to show that this divine law of the arts is the same as the eternal law of
De libero arbitrio. He writes, “Accordingly, the law is that according to which [‘the spiritual
man’] judges all things…” This is distinct from temporal laws made by men, which men should
make “according to the immutable rules of eternal life” they perceive in the eternal law.70 For
66
Augustine, De ver. rel. 30.56.
67
De ver. rel. 31.57 (trans. Burleigh)
68
“Not even the Father judges of truth, for it is not less than he is” (De ver. rel. 31.58 [trans. Burleigh]); On
the question of how precisely truth and beauty relate to the divine being, Augustine does not always use the same
terminology. Thus, although I have shown above that the eternal law is truth, Chroust can prove the eternal law to
be an act of God (Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 60, citing Augustine, Div. q. 79.1) while Thompson and Anderson
can show that truth is to be equated with the divine being (Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 535, citing Augustine,
Confessions 7.17.23; Anderson, St. Augustine and Being, 43-47). In Augustine’s thought generally, the latter
interpretation seems better.
69
“For unity alone bears the whole similitude of him from whom it has received existence” (De ver. rel.
31.58 [trans. Burleigh]); John Rist has recognized the interconnection of beauty and unity, noting that for Augustine,
“the form of each thing is indicated by its unity, and every beautiful thing, insofar as it exists and is formed,
possesses a vestige of divine unity” (John M. Rist, What is Truth?: From the Academy to the Vatican, [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008], 179, quoted in Anderson, “Rhythmic Attunement,” 19.).
70
De ver. rel. 31.58.
18
Augustine, there is one law of truth, beauty, and unity above the human mind, and this is the
eternal law of God.
Augustine brings order into this work a little later. He writes, “Nothing is ordered that is
not beautiful.”71 The reason for this becomes clear still later on. The “principle of unity (unum
principale)” is the “mode of order (ordinis modus).”72 In other words, the approximation of
unity is what makes something ordered, just as he had previously said that this approximation
was what made something beautiful. Beauty and order are identical for Augustine. Both amount
to imitation of God’s ultimate unity.73
God’s unity is the “first form”74 according to which all things that “have being and
resemble unity” are made.75 The transformation into the new man in the true religion involves
turning one’s mind from created things to God in order to behold this form by which man judges
created things. Summarizing this idea, Augustine combines the eternal law, the form of unity,
goodness, and beauty in one sentence: “We turn from artistic works to the law of the arts, and we
shall behold with the mind the form by comparison with which all the things are tarnished which
its very goodness has made beautiful.”76 Augustine’s thinking on order is remarkably unified.
Throughout his early writings, then, Augustine developed order as a component of his
71
De ver. rel. 41.77 (translation mine); Nihil est ordinatum, quod non sit pulchrum. Latin for De vera
religione is according to Aurelius Augustinus, De vera religione, ed. K.D. Daur, in Corpus Christianorum Series
Latina Volume 32 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 1962), 169-260.
72
De ver. rel. 43.81.
73
Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 542-545; Cf. De moribus 2.6.8.
74
Augustine, De vera religione 44.82.
75
De ver. rel. 43.81.
76
De ver. rel. 52.101 (emphasis mine).
19
metaphysics with ethical implications. He relates order to ethics most clearly in De libero
arbitrio, with his concept of the eternal law. The metaphysical dimensions of order are also
present in De libero arbitrio, although they are easier to understand in the light of Augustine’s
other early works. In short, God has arranged all things so that they participate in order by
imitating God’s unity in their appointed ways. This arrangement is itself a perfectly ordered
whole. Therefore, each created thing should be ordered in itself and keep its proper place in the
order of the universe so that all things might “exist in perfect order.”77
II. Ordered Human Nature in De libero arbitrio
It is one thing to say that Augustine sees the ultimate order of divine simplicity as the
form in which all lesser orders participate in their appointed ways, requiring that all people
should seek to be well-ordered and to uphold order in the world. It is another thing to show how
this grand view of order/goodness/being applies to the actual deeds of humans politically and
personally. Augustine treats both the political and the individual dimensions of the human order
in De libero arbitrio.
Order in Society
On the level of society, the normative order of human nature is not difficult to find in De
libero arbitrio, although an added degree of complexity appears on close scrutiny. Augustine
believes leaders should make temporal laws that uphold order among all people in society,
77
Augustine, De libero arbttrio 1.6.15; Porter, summarizing Augustine’s thought on the subject in general,
states, “All authentic orders of existence, together with the order of the universe taken as a whole, are grounded in
the eternal law of God, which can be seen from one perspective as the creative and providential wisdom of God, and
from another perspective as God’s will for the existence and preservation of the created world. In a fundamental
sense, the eternal law is God, seen under the aspect of providential wisdom and love” (Natural and Divine Law,
125-126, emphasis hers).
20
giving each person his due according to his place in the universal order.78 This is what it means
to uphold justice. Temporal laws that fulfill this requirement are applications of the eternal
law.79 Unjust temporal laws cannot be based in the eternal law and therefore are not valid.80
The complexity enters with retribution that the state carries out. He says that according
to order or justice “good people deserve a happy life and evil people an unhappy one.”81
Therefore, in “whatever kind of state can be set up with such people” as love the goods of this
world, the state sometimes must take away temporal goods, such as political freedom, from
people who act unjustly.82 This implies that people may find themselves in a position, such as
penal slavery, that is not prescribed by the created order (since they are created equal to other
men) yet is prescribed by a second level of normative order. This societal level of order still
applies the eternal law to the extent that it makes society as ordered as possible, given the
circumstances. On this second level, the governing authority tries to get people to live in accord
with the created order for the sake of “holding together” the state for “peace and human
78
De lib. arb. 1.6.15; 1.15.31-32; Div. q. 31.1; Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 71.
79
De lib. arb. 1.6.15; Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 72; Cf. De ver. rel. 21.58.
80
“…for a law that is not just does not seem to me to be a law (Nam lex mihi esse non uidetur, quae iusta
non fuerit)” (De lib. arb.1.5.11.33 [trans. King]); See also Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology,
206; For a summary of this idea in the history of natural law theories, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 363-366; Cf. De lib. arb. 1.15.31.107.
81
De lib. arb. 1.6.15 (trans. King).
82
De lib. arb. 1.15.32 (trans. King); Cf. 1.5.13; Here (1.15.32) Augustine lists the goods that may be given
or taken under the temporal law as 1) the body, 2) political freedom, 3) family/friends, 4) the state itself, 5) honors,
and 6) property. Therefore penal slavery would be one possible application of the temporal law.
21
intercourse” and seeks to serve justice by such means as retribution.83 None of this would be
necessary, however, if people obeyed the eternal law as individuals.84
Order in the Individual
On the level of individual ethical decisions, scholars apply Augustine’s concept of order
to humans in surprisingly different ways. Chroust relates the eternal law to each individual as a
83
Ibid.; Markus argues that Augustine later departs from the view of the temporal law found in De lib. arb.
by treating “the sphere of human action, choice, and contrivance” as separate from the natural law in The Literal
Meaning of Genesis (Markus, Saeculum, 91). Markus states, “The earlier assimilation of all order, human social,
political, to a single cosmic order which manifested the eternal law is now decisively rejected” (Ibid.). The findings
above, however, suggest that Augustine never really thought that all social and political arrangements manifested the
eternal law. Rather, he saw them as subject to the cosmic order in its normative sense, bound to promote that
normative order by establishing a second level of normative order for society, and included within the cosmic order
in its all-encompassing sense. That Augustine (happily) later used a distinct term for all-encompassing order,
namely, divine providence, does not mean he fundamentally changed his theory. Markus is probably correct when
he points out that Augustine went from being relatively optimistic about political states the late 380s and even 390s
to being relatively pessimistic about them later in life (see Ibid., 88-94). This does not, however, mean that
Augustine had to change his thinking in any fundamental way. The move towards pessimism may only mean that
some features of political states he once thought belonged to the normative order, such as the natural superiority of
rulers to their subjects (see Ibid., 93), turned out later only to belong to the all-encompassing order, if they were real
features at all. In The City of God 19.15, God, rather than the state, is said to carry out punishment by allowing
slavery, yet the state still has to be the instrument and this punishment is still said to promote a peaceful order, which
I have described as the second (or societal) level of normative order. (See the appendix for a visual representation.)
That even good people may find themselves enslaved, as mentioned in this later passage, is consistent with his early
notion that the wise man does not fear losing the goods of this world anyway (De lib. arb. 1.15.31). See also note
41 above and the section on retribution below.
84
De lib. arb. 1.15.31.107.
22
distinct creature in its own place in the overall order: “He who fully achieves his unique
individuality and does so in conformity with his being a ‘link’ in the infinite ‘chain of being’ or
‘chain of meaning’ is just and good in that he is truly himself.”85 N. Joseph Torchia, on the other
hand, passes over everything about human nature except that the human soul is midway in being
between God and bodies in the hierarchy of being.86 He notes that in De libero arbitrio order
requires that the less perfect be subject to the more perfect and, therefore, that people should love
in proportion to the level of being.87 In other words, people should love and seek eternal things
because they exist to a greater degree than humans.88 They should love and seek God above all.
They should use purely physical things without valuing them too highly, since bodies are of a
lower order than souls.89 Torchia’s analysis is correct as far as it goes; this is the basic outline of
human ethical obligations in De libero arbitrio. Torchia neglects, however, the significance of
human nature as a created thing with its own distinct order.
Chroust recognizes that the natural law applies to individual natures, but he is mistaken in
thinking that Augustine conceives of every human as having a distinct nature all of her own.
Rather, as Thompson has recognized, having a nature is what makes a being “a member of its
85
Chroust, “Fundamental Ideas,” 72.
86
N. Joseph Torchia, “The Significance of Ordo in St. Augustine’s Moral Theory,” in Augustine: Pesbyter
Factus Sum, ed. Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J., Earl C. Muller, S.J., and Roland J. Teske, S.J. (New York: Peter Lang,
1993), 266.
87
Augustine, De libero arbitrio 1.10.20; Torchia, “The Significance of Ordo,” 268, 270; Deman, La
Morale Chrétienne, 74.
88
Augustine, De lib. arb. 1.15.32.108 ; 1.16.34.116 ; 2.19.53; Teske, “Libero arbitrio, De,” 494.
89
Augustine, De lib. arb. 1.8.18 ; 2.19.50; Div. q. 30.
23
own kind.”90 That is to say, natures distinguish created kinds, not individuals. Individuals are
distinct by being separate instances of the one human nature. In this sense Augustine often
speaks of each individual as a “nature (natura)” or “substance (substantia),” but not for the
purpose of assigning each individual a different nature.91
In the overall argument of De libero arbitrio, Augustine’s discussion of human nature
serves to show that there cannot be anything proper to man’s nature that causes sin because then
man would not be culpable for it. Instead, it would be the case that “whenever he sins, he is
doing what he ought to do.”92 To this Augustine adds, “If it is wicked to make such an assertion,
then no one is forced by his nature to sin.”93 This statement appears in book 3, showing that
Augustine could sound just as positive about human nature in the mid-390s as he had sounded in
book 1 in the late 380s. 94 The key to understanding both this statement and similar statements in
book 1 may be to look at Augustine’s elucidation later on in book 3. In 3.19.54 he says,
90
De moribus 2.2.2; Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” 547.
91
“Now I call ‘nature (naturam)’ what is also usually termed ‘substance (substantia)’” (Augustine, De lib.
arb. 3.13.36.128 [trans. King]).
92
De lib. arb. 3.16.46 (trans. Russell).
93
De lib. arb. 3.16.46 (trans. Russell).
94
Here are two of the optimistic statements about human nature from book 1: “Nothing makes the mind a
devotee of desire but its own will and free choice” (Augustine, De lib. arb. 1.11.21.76 [trans. King]); “We have
established that what each person elects to pursue and embrace is located in the will, and that the mind is not thrown
down from its stronghold of dominance, and from the right order, by anything but the will” (De lib. arb. 1.16.34.114
[trans. King]). See also De lib. arb. 1.13.29. Here are two more statements from book 3: “[K]eep the following brief
summary in mind: Whatever the cause of the will is, if it cannot be resisted there is no sin in yielding to it; but if it
can be resisted, let someone not yield to it, and there will be no sin” (De lib. arb. 3.18.50.170 [trans. King]);
24
So, too, we use the term ‘nature (naturam)’ in different senses (aliter). In the strict sense
(proprie), we speak of man as having a specific nature in which he was originally created
in the state of innocence as one of a class. We use it in another sense (aliter) to indicate
the nature into which (istam in qua) we are now born as mortal creatures, ignorant and
slaves to the flesh, following the sentence of condemnation which was passed upon the
first man.95
The proper sense (proprie) in which Augustine uses the term “nature” is to speak of man before
the fall, man as God designed him to be. This is the sense Augustine normally uses throughout
all three books of De libero arbitrio.96 Even in the fallen state, whatever causes sin must be
something contrary to human nature, even if always accompanying it. It cannot be something
intrinsic to human nature. The sense of “nature” in which man’s nature causes him to sin is
sanctioned by Scripture,97 but it is not really nature in the sense that Augustine normally means
in this work. For Augustine, “every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good.”98 Human nature,
“Although [the soul] was born in ignorance and trouble (in ignorantia et difficultate), it is nevertheless not pressed
by any necessity to remain in the condition in which it was born” (De lib. arb. 3.20.56.192 [trans. King]).
95
Augustine, De lib. arb. 3.19.54 (trans. Russell); Evodius perhaps anticipates this explanation in 1.11.23-
24, where after mentioning the fall he says that he and Augustine are fools and “have never been wise.” In that
context, the wise man is the person with a good will, yet Augustine does not show any disagreement with Evodius’
claim that the two of them are fools from birth. Thus it is possible that even in book 1 the theoretical statements
about free will are not meant to apply directly to all people in their present experience.
96
Simon Harrison’s description of the function of book 3 is relevant here: “What we have here is a series of
exercises. We take the conclusions that we have gained from the first two books and by elaborating upon them we
come to understand them in ever increasing depth” (Augustine’s Way into the Will, 53).
97
Ephesians 2:3, which Augustine quotes in De lib. arb. 3.19.54.
98
De lib. arb. 3.13.36 (trans. Russell).
25
vitiated by the fall, is less than it was, but it is not something different. The corruption of human
nature may cause sin, but not the nature itself.
The consistent view of De libero arbitrio regarding the individual’s relationship to order
is that each human must live in accord with the way God designed human nature to function.
The key passage in De libero arbitrio for understanding this point is 3.15.54, where Augustine
states that natures “become vitiated to the extent that they depart from the design (arte) by which
God has made them.”99 If departure from the design is vice, the design must be normative. By
using the construction “in tantum…in quantum” Augustine shows that departure from the design
of human nature can happen in degrees. Some vices are worse than others, and what makes them
worse is that they depart from the design of human nature to a greater degree.
Elsewhere in De libero arbitrio Augustine defines vice as that which is contrary to nature
and states that anything that is in accordance with a created nature “is no vice.”100 This is so
because “[v]ice…is evil simply because it is opposed to the nature of the thing of which it is the
vice.”101 When a nature does what is proper to it, it is in accord with order and therefore right by
the light of the eternal law.102 For human nature, what is highest and most proper is reason, by
99
De lib. arb. 3.15.42 (trans. Russell); the Latin is as follows: “…in tantum vitiosae sint in quantum ab eius
qua factae sunt arte discedunt…”; See also De lib. arb. 3.14.40.139, where Augustine speaks of “laws eminently
designed for the government of the universe according to the natural capacity of each part” (trans. Russell) and De
lib. arb. 3.17.48.167: “[T]he root of all evils is not being in accordance with nature (non esse secundum naturam)”
(trans. King, emphasis his).
100
De lib. arb. 3.13.38.132-134; Similar remarks appear elsewhere as an important part of his argument
(De lib. arb. 3.16.46, 3.17.48; 3.18.51).
101
De lib. arb. 3.14.41.142.
102
De lib. arb. 1.8.18.
26
which one must maintain control over “the irrational movements of the soul.”103 The person who
does this is “well-ordered (ordinatus).”104 The person in whom the mind (mens) or spirit
(spiritus) rules all other parts is perfectly ordered (ordinatissimum).105
The rational soul should place spiritual and eternal goods over bodily and temporal
goods, and it should love God above all.106 It should also keep the lower aspects of human
nature in their proper order. Such is Augustine’s primary account of how human nature
participates in order, 107 but it is not the whole story. Earlier in the same passage where
Augustine advocates reason’s control over the passions (the disordered movements of the soul),
103
De lib. arb. 1.8.18.65: « A. Ratio ista ergo uel mens uel spiritus cum inrationales animi motus regit, id
scilicet dominatur in homine, cui dominatio lege debetur ea, quam aeternum esse comperimus.»
104
De lib. arb. 1.8.18.64-65: « [A.] Hisce igitur animae motibus cum ratio dominatur, ordinatus homo
dicendus est. Non enim ordo rectus aut ordo appellandus omnino est, ubi deterioribus meliora subiciuntur. An tibi
non uidetur ? E. Manifestum est. »
105
De lib. arb. 1.8.18.61: « A. Illud est quod uolo dicere: hoc quicquid est, quo pecoribus homo
praeponitur, siue mens siue spiritus siue utrumque rectius appellatur—nam utrumque in diuinis libris inuenimus--,
si dominetur atque imperet ceteris, quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum »; Russell notes
in his translation of this passage that Augustine does not have a fixed terminology for the soul (88). For an
explanations for the various terms Augustine uses, see Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophynof St. Augustine,
trans. L. Lynch (New York: Random House,1960), 269-271; Notice in this paragraph (of my text) how seamlessly
the account of human nature in book 1 fits with the view presented in book 3.
106
See the passage above where I discussed Torchia’s view of De libero arbitrio.
107
Teske identifies two clear definitions of sin in De libero arbitrio. One, which appears at the end of book
1, is “to neglect eternal realities to turn to those that are uncertain and temporal” (Teske, “Libero arbitrio, De,” 494).
The other, which appears at the end of book 2 is “the will’s tuning away from the common and unchanging goods to
its own private good in pride, or to external goods in curiosity, or to lower goods in lust” (Ibid.). Both of these
definitions fit under the broader definition of sin as departure from normative order.
27
he also discusses what human nature has in common with other animal natures and with plants.
Among these things he mentions “bodily nutrition, growth, reproduction, and health.”108 Since
these actions also belong to human nature, Augustine’s logic would seem to imply that they, too,
are part of God’s design for how human nature should participate in the normative universal
order. All of human nature is good, not just part of it.109 This suggests that while one should
govern the lower aspects of human nature according to reason, one should not neglect or work
against them, as though they were superfluous to human nature. To despise the lower aspects of
human nature would be to violate the higher reason of God’s design. The lower must be subject
to the higher, so human reason must submit to God’s design of the human body as it governs the
lower aspects of human nature. Augustine does not explicitly state these implications here, but
they do seem to follow from his reasoning.110
One may reasonably ask how Augustine expected individuals to recognize where human
nature fits in the universal order and what they should do about it, in other words, how they are
to access the Truth by which to make judgments.111 The answer, within the text of De libero
arbitrio, is twofold. First, as mentioned above,112 Augustine held that the natural (or eternal) law
108
De lib. arb. 1.8.18 (trans. Russell).
109
That is, human nature as originally designed by God. On the goodness of every nature and how the
results of the fall are not properly part of human nature see discussion above, within this section.
110
Augustine does seem to apply this sort of reasoning in later treatises, particularly when he deals with
questions of sex, procreation, and contraception, although he generally states the conclusions without explicitly
explaining the basis for them that he has revealed in De libero arbitrio. See De bono coniugali,(401) and De nuptiis
et concupiscentia (419/21) in particular.
111
On the matter of universal access to the Truth, see the sections “The Eternal Law in De libero arbitrio”
and “Order in De vera religione” above.
112
See discussion of De lib. arb. 1.6.15 above.
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is impressed by God on each individual soul. Every person begins life knowing (or able to
know) that all things should be maximally ordered. Second, Augustine suggests that God gives
every soul a “natural judgment (naturale iudicium) by which it puts wisdom ahead of error and
peace ahead of trouble, so that it might attain these things not by being born to them but by
pursuing them.”113 He states that every soul can choose to follow the direction of this judgment
or not.114 Those that do follow it can count on God for help and guidance.115 Presumably God
would guide them through reason, as He has guided Augustine himself.116 In this way, all have
access to the natural law and a natural capacity to make judgments by it, but they still need
God’s help at the point of actually making right judgments and living in accord with them.
III. Ordered Retribution in De libero arbitrio
Given the normative order of the eternal law and its particular application to humans
through the ordered design of human nature in De libero arbitrio, the theme of retribution
follows quite naturally. In Augustine’s natural law theory, retribution is built into the order of
the universe in both its normative and its all-encompassing senses. All people seek happiness,
and they enjoy happiness insofar as they achieve order in their own being as individuals and
113
Augustine, De lib. arb. 3.20.56.191 (trans. King). Here is the whole sentence in Latin: “Non enim ante
omne meritum boni operis parum est accepisse naturale iudicium quo sapientiam praeponat errori et quietam
difficultati, ut ad haec non nascendo sed studendo perueniat.”
114
Ibid.
115
De lib. arb. 3.20.57.196; 3.20.56.190.
116
On the role of reason in recognizing the natural law in Augustine’s thought, see the summary in Porter,
Natural and Divine Law, 126-127; Cf. Carol Harrison: “This eternal law is known to man by reason, which orders
his mind, and enables him to know what can and cannot be lost against his will, in other words, what he should seek
and desire and what he should not” (Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 206).
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insofar as they uphold order in their relationships with other things in the universe. To depart
from this normative order is to depart not only from goodness and existence, but also from
happiness. In this sense, sin is its own punishment.117 Considered from another perspective, it is
licit to speak of punishment as issuing from God in the sense that He maintains the allencompassing order of the universe by ensuring that all violations of normative order are met
with just punishment. Samantha Thompson has established these two aspects of punishment
from Augustine’s works more generally, calling the first “the natural account” and the second
“the legal account.”118 She has also argued that both of these accounts grow out of Augustine’s
view of order.119 This section will show that both the natural account and the legal account of
(reward and) punishment are present in De libero arbitrio and are part of Augustine’s ordercentered natural law theory.
In book 1, Augustine lays the groundwork for the discussion of retribution: “Certainly,
the eternal law, which it is now time to consider again, has unalterably decreed that merit is in
the will, whereas reward and punishment are identified with happiness and unhappiness.”120 He
also gives a preview of the legal account in particular when he mentions that crimes that go
unpunished by temporal rulers “are nevertheless punished by Divine Providence, and rightly
so.”121 He picks up the thread of retribution again in book 3, where, after reviewing the
117
See below for explanation.
118
SamanthaThompson, “Augustine on Suffering and Order: Punishment in context,” (PhD diss.,
University of Toronto, 2010), ii-iii.
119
Ibid., 114-133, 161-179.
120
Augustine, De lib. arb. 1.14.30 (trans. Russell); He has already introduced the topic more generally in
121
De lib. arb. 1.5.13.
1.6.15.
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discussion from book 1 with no hint of retraction, he explains that blameworthy actions must
originate in the will because otherwise they would be natural, and therefore blameless.122 Vices
are blameworthy to the degree that they depart from the good divine design of ordered human
nature.123 Since this departure is nothing else than a departure from the wisdom of God, “which
truly and supremely exists,” it is also a departure from existence itself.124 In the context of
Augustine’s metaphysics,125 this clearly means that departure from nature is a departure from
goodness/order into evil/disorder, an obviously undesirable state.
Augustine goes on to explain the necessity of this punishment, as well as the opposite
reward. As he does this, he also maintains the natural and the legal accounts side-by-side.126
God gave the soul the ability to do what is right “when it so wills,” and so it is appropriate that
God is in some sense the cause both of the happiness (sit…beata) that results from acting rightly
and of the unhappiness (sit…misera) that results from failure to do so.127 In the legal account
this is necessary to uphold the all-encompassing order/beauty of the universe: “The beauty of the
universe (uniuersalis pulchritudo) may not be disfigured even for an instant by having the
122
De lib. arb. 3.1.2.
123
De lib. arb. 3.15.42; See the discussion of human nature above.
124
De lib. arb. 3.15.42.
125
For the elements of Augustine’s metaphysics that are relevant here, see the section “Order and the
Eternal Law in De libero arbitrio” above, especially from “Order, Goodness and Being in De libero arbitrio” to the
end of the section.
126
It is worth noting here that they probably are not distinct accounts in Augustine’s mind. I am
maintaining Thompson’s distinctions for the sake of clarity and scholarly utility.
127
De lib. arb. 3.15.43. The Latin is as follows: “a quo enim accepit posse recte facere cum uelit, ab eo
accepit ut sit etiam misera, si non fecerit, et beata, si fecerit.”
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ugliness of sin without the beauty of a just punishment (sine decore uindictae).”128 God must
punish sin, and He must do so instantaneously. In order to explain how punishment is
instantaneous, he invokes the natural account. The punishment that will be manifest in the end is
even now going on in secret.129 He uses sleep as an illustration: “Just as one who is not awake is
sleeping, so too, the man who fails to act as he ought experiences at once the suffering he
deserves, because the happiness that comes from justice is so great that one cannot depart from it
except to embark upon unhappiness.”130 This explanation makes perfect sense in the context of
the natural law theory Augustine held at this time.131 Since participation in order as the imitation
of God’s unity is participation in goodness and being, this participation must also correspond to
happiness. For a human to be happy is to participate in the order proper to human nature. To
depart from this order, to sin, is to participate less in order/goodness/being and therefore less in
128
De lib. arb. 3.15.44.152 (trans. Russell); This passage finally gives the basis for the view of retribution
stated on faith in De lib. arb. 1.1.1.
129
De lib. arb. 3.15.44.152 ; Cf. De lib. arb. 1.6.14.42; The future judgment is the final judgment that
Augustine accepts from Christian theology. This passage thus gives the key to understanding how the final
judgment fits into Augustine’s natural law theory; it is a manifestation of the reward and punishment already at work
in the souls of the just and the unjust. Augustine’s thinking on justification thus fits quite nicely with his natural law
theory. On Augustine’s doctrine of justification see Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian
Doctrine of Justification, third edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. See also Robert
Dodario, “Justice,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allen D. Fitzgerald et. al. (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999), 481-483.
130
De lib. arb. 3.15.44.153 (trans. Russell); Thus book 3 reaffirms the view initially set forth in 1.13.28-
14.30 that having a good will makes one happy and having an evil will makes one unhappy.
131
This is not to imply that he ever ceased to hold this theory. The point is that, as I have shown, he
already had the theory at work in his thinking at the time when he wrote this passage.
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happiness. In this way, being unjust is punishment in and of itself, and so it happens as soon as
one chooses it.
All of this explains why, in actual human experience, “man…does not enjoy the free
choice of the will to choose the right thing…”132 The free choice Augustine has been discussing
throughout the work is finally shown to be “the freedom with which man was created.”133 This
was a valid subject of discussion, even if it is removed from present human experience,134
because free choice of the will pertains to human nature as God designed it. God’s original
design is the one that is ethically relevant because it is the one that reveals how the individual
human is supposed to participate in the normative order of the universe.135 The present lack of
freedom results from ignorance and difficulty, both of which result from the fall. On the legal
account, this was a “perfectly just penalty (poena iustissima) for sin.”136 On the natural account,
ignorance and difficulty “are truly present in every soul that sins.”137 Even in the fallen state,
Augustine believes that people have the God-given ability (the naturale iudicium) to interpret the
132
De lib. arb. 3.18.52.177 (trans. Russell).
133
De lib. arb. 3.18.52.179 (trans. Russell).
134
Evodius noted this removal as early as 1.11.23-24.
135
In this way, Augustine’s view that there would have been sexual reproduction even without the fall was
determined by his natural law theory long before he explicitly expounded it in his writings. Sexual reproduction had
to be a part of pre-fall human nature in order for it to be good. He is non-committal on the question in De bono
coniugali 2.2-3, written around 401, although even there he seems to lean towards his mature view. He articulates
his settled position in Letter 6(3), written between 416 and 421, and in The City of God 14, written between 413 and
427.
136
De lib. arb. 3.18.52.178 (trans. Russell).
137
De lib. arb. 3.18.52.178 (trans. Russell).
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natural law implanted in each soul, but they need God’s help both to do this and to obey what the
natural law teaches.138
IV. Conclusion and Relevance of This Study
This article has argued that De libero arbitrio, when read as a unified whole, implies a
working natural law theory centered on the order of the universe and applied to man particularly
through his ordered nature, with attendant rewards and punishments. Order is goodness, and so
it is good that “all things should exist in perfect order.”139 To participate in goodness, all people
must seek to be well-ordered and to uphold order in the world. Because God’s design of the
universe appoints to everything a particular nature through which it exists and relates to other
things, there is only one right way for humans to live. They must live, according to human
nature, directed toward the highest good (God) in order to be happy. Failure to so direct the will
brings the instantaneous punishment of departure (in degrees) from order, from goodness, from
existence itself—an unhappy state indeed.
If this argument has succeeded in adducing a coherent natural law theory from De libero
arbitrio as a unified whole, scholars should take this instance of continuity into consideration
when debating the overall continuity or discontinuity of the work. In addition to this modest
138
De lib. arb. 3.20.56.190-191; 3.20.57.195-196. See discussion of the naturale iudicium at the end of the
section on human nature above; Augustine perhaps alludes to the need for grace to do what is right in 2.13.37.143:
“Our freedom is this: to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us free from death—that is, from the state of
sin” (trans. King). He readily admits in Retractationes 1.9, however, that “since this [i.e., the origin of evil] was the
question at hand, there was no examination of grace in these books [i.e. De lib. arb.]…Whenever an opportunity to
mention this grace came up, it was mentioned only in passing and not defended by detailed reasoning as though it
were the subject being dealt with” (trans. King).
139
De lib. arb. 1.6.15.
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contribution to the contemporary debate, five other benefits to Augustinian scholarship follow
from the results of this study.
First, insofar as the debate over the continuity of De libero arbitrio is a microcosm of the
debate over the continuity of Augustine’s thought from his conversion to 395 in general,140
whatever this study implies about De libero arbitrio it also implies to some degree about the
continuity of Augustine’s thought through his “Pauline revolution” of the early to mid-390s more
generally.
Second, this study has shown that order as the imitation of God’s unity is an important
concept in Augustine’s natural law theory, a fact that not all have noticed.141 Samantha
Thompson deserves the credit for this advance, insofar as I have followed her ideas correctly.142
Third, this study has shown that the philosophical basis of Augustine’s mature natural
law theory was already in his thought by the time he wrote On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina
Christiana) and Confessions.143 Jean porter has observed that one can “find reflections on God’s
140
Carol Harrison remarks, “Our argument for continuity in De libero arbitrio is therefore also, in
microcosm, the argument of this book as a whole” (Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 203).
141
Chroust, whose study (“Fundamental Ideas”) is generally excellent, seems to miss it completely.
142
See Thompson, “Augustine on Suffering and Order,” and Thompson, “What Goodness Is,” as well as
the citations of both works above.
143
To the extent that scholars do recognize Augustine’s systematic thought on natural law, they generally
explicate it from Contra Faustum (c.397/9) and other works from 395 or later. See for instance Dougherty, “Natural
Law,” 583; Miethe, “Natural Law,” 95. Thompson uses both early and later works, but the later works seem to set
the definitions. This practice is understandable, since these works contain the clearer statements. Chroust utilizes
Augustine’s early works to build some parts of the system he presents, but he relies upon Contra Faustum and The
City of God for others (“Fundamental Ideas,” 57-79).
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eternal law, and the natural law that stems from it, throughout Augustine’s writings.”144 One of
his key reflections as he developed his theory was that the Ten Commandments summarize the
natural law.145 This was a logical conclusion because order requires the love of God above all
and the love of equal beings (other humans) as oneself146, and the two tables of the Decalogue, in
Augustine’s view, summarize one’s duties to God and neighbor.147 Inasmuch as De libero
arbitrio shows the philosophical basis for loving God and neighbor, it provides valuable context
for reading many passages which both discuss God and neighbor and resonate quite well with the
normative order of the universe, such as the uti/frui discussion of De doctrina book 1.148
Inasmuch as this normative order of love provides the logical basis for some of Augustine’s later
thought on the Decalogue, De libero arbitrio furnishes some background (to supplement the
144
Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 125.
145
Ibid., 127.
146
See the section on human nature above; This reasoning occurs as early as De musica (387-391): “That
soul keeps order that, with its whole self, loves Him above itself, that is, God and fellow souls as itself” (De musica
6.14.46 [trans. Taliafero]) and as late as The City of God (413-426/7) (See The City of God 19.14).
147
Augustine, Confessions 3.8.15-16.
148
Synthesizing several of Augustine’s works written before De doctrina, including De libero arbitrio,
Thompson offers a summary of sin that illustrates the coherence of Augustine’s natural law with the rest of his
theology, including the uti/frui distinction: “The sinner turns towards inferior goods, and so away from God (lib.
arb. 1.16; vera rel. 20.38; 38.76). We have seen that to expect happiness from something is to serve that thing, to
follow it wherever it leads. Augustine’s language, therefore, is strong: to expect happiness from a creature is to
commit idolatry, to treat what is not God as though it is God. Everyone worships something, he insists, even those
who profess not to (vera rel. 10.18-19;35.65-38.69). This is the first layer of Augustine’s analysis of sin, what all
sins have in common: the disorderly attempt to “use what ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy what ought to be used”
(div. qu. 30).” (Thompson, “Augustine on Suffering and Order,” 117 [emphasis mine])
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relevant Bible verses149) for understanding passages like Confessions 3.8.15-16, where the
Decalogue is connected with God and neighbor but the reason for the connection is not clearly
explained. The eternal law also may be relevant to several passages in the Confessions that refer
to God’s law.150
Fourth, this study has perhaps shown that Augustine’s natural law theory is more
systematic than some scholars have appreciated. Richard Dougherty writes, “One searches in
vain in the corpus of Augustine for any extensive or systematic treatment of the role of law.”151
This statement is true, strictly speaking, but it needs qualification in light of this study. De libero
arbitrio is no treatise on law, but it does contain the basic elements of Augustine’s natural law
theory.
Fifth, this study has provided a solid basis from which scholars can evaluate the
relationship between Augustine’s natural law theory and Thomas Aquinas’ natural law theory at
their primary point of contact, the eternal and temporal laws of De libero arbitrio book 1.
Thomas cites De libero arbitrio 1.5-6 at least five times in question 91 alone of the Treatise on
Law. This study suggests that Aquinas was correct in his choice to focus upon De libero arbitrio
1.5-6 as the key passage for understanding Augustine’s natural/eternal law theory.152 It also may
suggest, since the eternal law is the essence of Augustine’s natural law theory, that Aquinas’
149
Matthew 22:37-40; Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:25-28.
150
See Augustine, Confessions 1.7.12, 1.14.23, 2.2, 2.5-6, 3.7-8.
151
Dougherty, “Natural Law,” 583.
152
Thomas Aquinas, STh I-II q. 91 aa. 2-3; Cf. discussion in Dougherty, “Natural Law,” 584.
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adoption of the eternal law is more significant than some have thought.153 Perhaps Augustine
deserves a more prominent place in the history of natural law theory.154
153
See, for example, Dougherty, “Natural Law,” 584; For a scholar who has recognized this significance,
see Miethe, “Natural Law,” 94-97.
154
A comment by Manfred Svensson reveals something of the present view of Augustine in the history of
natural law theory: “[T]he concept of natural law certainly plays some role in the work of Augustine, but he is not a
key figure in the development of the notion” (“Augustine on Moral Conscience,” Heythrop Journal LIV [2013], 42).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to Dr. John Grabowski for his advice on this project and to Charles and Susan Staines for
reading and commenting upon a draft of this article. Thanks also to my reviewers for their
helpful critiques.
Funding Statement
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
Biographical Note
Brett W. Smith is a PhD student at the Catholic University of America in the area of Historical
Theology. He resides in Maryland with his wife and children.
96smithb@cardinalmail.cua.edu
Brett W. Smith
43 Daniel Dr.
Lothian, MD 20711
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