RETHINKING EUROPEAN SECURITY – IRREGULAR
MIGRATION THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL
SECURITY1
Matija Černe
Officer Candidates School, Slovenian Armed Forces
BSc Political Science, currently employed in the Slovenian Armed forces as officer candidate
Abstract
Irregular immigration in the European Union is increasingly becoming a hot topic in political
debates all around the continent. Concerns over its impact on national security, however,
tend to be influenced mainly by cultural stereotypes and politically construed arguments, than
by empirical evidence. This article looks at contemporary developments in national security
studies, particularly at analyses on the securitizing of immigration and the emergence of new
concepts of soft security. Parallel to this trend, policy shifts and new approaches at tackling
irregular immigration are observed in the EU’s common policy strategies. They acknowledge
the need for a comprehensive approach that must address the root causes of immigration and
tacitly distance themselves from the securitization logic. Country-specific data and
challenges, posed by irregular migration, presented on the case of Slovenia, also confirm
these findings.
Keywords: immigration, irregular migration, national security, securitization, European
Union, Slovenia
1. Introduction
International migrations, particularly immigration to the European Union (EU), have been
extensively thematised, both through an “enemy at the gates” and a “lifeline for development”
1
Parts of this study were presented at the Central European Forum on Military Education Students Scientific
Conference “Conflicts of the 21st Century - Central European Perspective” at the National Defence University in
Warsaw, Poland in May 2015.
paradigms. It is no news that many a European country has long been jealously protecting its
borders and attentively controlling whom to concede its welfare means. Almost at the same
time, economists and sociologists alike, admittedly emphasised the need for young and fresh
forces to be allowed into national economies in order to provide the much-needed workforce
and to counter the worrying ageing rate of old European populations. The confrontation
between the two views has been obviously reproduced through national and common policies
on immigration, with the latter gaining momentum as human rights activist groups and
general social awareness increasingly raised their voices in view of recent refugee crises on
the doorsteps of Europe.
This article aims at showing just how this shift came about and what are the forces
operating behind the paradigm, which links irregular immigration with national security
concerns. It first starts with presenting the available data on irregular immigration to the EU.
Next, it summarizes the mechanisms and impacts of irregular immigration from the point of
view of receiving countries. Those are then analysed in national security terms with regard to
pertinent security theories and, towards the end, recent developments of EU’s policies on the
subject are presented. Finally, attention is given to the impact of irregular immigration, looked
at from a security perspective, on the case of Slovenia.
2. Telling numbers?
As a staple accompanying element of demographic change, international migrations are
substantially contributing to the (re)production and evolution of national politico-economic
environments. Besides providing for a constant influx of much-needed and inexpensive labour
force and countering the preoccupying trends in population ageing, unsolicited immigration
fosters various clusters of undesired phenomena as well.
A substantive portion of the migrating populace is in fact comprised of irregular
migrants. These are subjects who migrate to, and then stay and/or work in a country, without
the necessary permits or authorization. The scale or proportion of such irregular migrations is
particularly hard to comprehend for self-evident reasons. The data collected, therefore, rests
primarily on various security agencies’ reports and on the work of dedicated scientific and
humanitarian groups. The values produced this way can ultimately be only more or less rough
estimates, depending heavily on the efficacy and will power of border control and other
security institutions.2
In trying to summarize the reports and empirical data on the subject of immigration
to the EU, no univocal conclusion can be drawn. Data on legal immigrants residing in the EU
show hardly any change, while values concerning populations of asylum seekers, as well as
estimates on irregular immigrants diverge greatly (cf. Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2). At a more
in-depth look, however, the picture becomes even more complex.
Table 1: Numbers of non-EU nationals migrating to and residing in the EU3
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1: Detected numbers of irregular immigrants within the EU-274
Firstly, one of the biggest and already mentioned problems pertains to the sole act
of data collection, especially concerning the numbers of irregular immigrants. Although there
are various institutions dealing with and analysing the matter, they still rely largely on figures,
fed by individual national security bodies which carry out the work in situ. To illustrate thisestimate numbers of irregular immigrants residing inside the EU spanned between 1,9 and
3,8 million and all the way up to 4,5 - 8 million, according to different sources.5 There have
been steps taken toward a uniform and regulated data collection system, however, which
would make data analysis and comparison easier and more transparent, chiefly through the
adoption of the Regulation (EC) 862/2007.6
[Insert Figure 2 here]
2
Kovacheva, V. Security Challenges and the Composition of Irregular Resident Populations in Europe:
Overestimating the Young Men? “Database On Irregular Migration”, Working Paper No.8/2010. Accessed April
24, 2015. http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net.
3
Data source: European Commission. Immigration in the EU Infographic. Accessed April 10, 2015.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/docs/infographics/immigration/migration-in-euinfographic_en.pdf.
4
Data source: Eurostat. Database. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database.
5
CLANDESTINO. CLANDESTINO Project Final Report. Athens, 23 November 2009, p. 105. Accessed April 3, 2015.
http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/clandestino-final-report_-november-2009.pdf.
6
Eurostat. Asylum statistics. Last modified 23 March, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.
Figure 2: Aggregate estimates of irregular resident populations7
Secondly, figures on asylum seeking immigrants and refugees have shown
considerable fluctuations in numbers in the past decades. The last rise in asylum applications
lodged was in 2014, when in Italy it reached an increment of 124% (!) compared to the year
before.8 Besides, recent events have shown that flows of asylum seekers and other irregular
immigrants, particularly those coming from North Africa, tend to be rather unstable and
adaptive to current shifts in the political-economic atmosphere. This means that in the case of
a worsening of the socio-economic situation in countries of transition and especially in the
immigrants’ home countries, the migration flow would increase. Conversely, immigration
fluxes tend to decrease when the situation in the country of destination deteriorates, be it in
economic terms or through the adoption of more strict border control policies. Examples of
such surges in immigration flows could be observed during the crises in Libya and Tunisia
and, more recently, from Kosovo, where economic instability and political speculation
boosted emigration to the West.9
3. Irregular migration in a security perspective
3.1. Destination: Europe
Europe, or better, the idea of Europe has been throughout its turbulent history always defined
by its limits. More precisely, it was defined by what, or whom, stood outside its borders. This
was the case for the Romans and for the Holy Roman Empire, later for the awaking nationstates of 19th century and lastly, persisting to this day, in some form or another, for the
shaping of the European community. The part of the great unifying feature - the common
enemy, was in turn imposed upon various barbaric tribes, the Turks, the Moors and many
others, for whom the Lacanian term Other may be applied. This certainly does little good to
the ones being excluded from the “Fortress Europe”. It does nonetheless bring together – at
least symbolically – the populace already part of the so called Europe. Although this may
rather seem a worn out political rhetoric than a contemporary policy foundation, it does have
7
Data source: CLANDESTINO, op.cit.
Eurostat, Asylum statistics, op. cit.
9
See: Morehouse, C. and M. Blomfield. Irregular Migration in Europe. Washington, DC, 2011. Accessed on April
3, 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-irregular-migration-europe and Frontex. FRAN
Quarterly October–December 2014. Accessed 24 April, 2015. doi: 3864/2015.
8
pertinence in analysing actual political cooperation. Practical examples of the synergetic
effects a common border can have on internal cooperation comprise all EU enterprises in the
field of security, for which a certain degree of national sovereignty had to be waived by
individual states. This shows, rather explicitly, the extent to which states are willing to go in
order to enforce control over their borders.
Nevertheless, various reasons persist for a person to willingly embark on the illegal
and dangerous journey to a country inside the Schengen area. Potential immigrants are usually
driven from their homes by dire social and economic conditions, hostile political climate,
threat of potential or ongoing armed conflicts and similar causes. Without applying any
apologetic presumptions, it is safe to induce that considerable numbers of the immigrant
populace bear no inherent affinity to criminal undergrounds. Even more, the presence of
various paths into irregularity means that regularly entered and working immigrants can often
slip into irregularity for reasons of over-complicated bureaucratic procedures or other similar
red-tape loopholes.10
Another perspective, however, reveals that political, economic and social conditions
of EU’s member states – which much faith and hope is often put into by the populace of third
countries – are only reproduced through the workings of specific social equilibria. The latters’
strength (or better – fragility) was widely exposed with the recent economic crisis. Tens, even
hundreds of thousands of irregular and unscreened immigrants pouring in and consequently
affecting local and national economies in various ways are hence met with mixed feelings.
Examples of institutionalized standpoints on the matter are all but hard to find. A
communication of the European Commission regarding the fight against irregular
immigration for example reads: “Illegal entry, transit and stay of third-country nationals who
are not in need of international protection undermine the credibility of the common
immigration policy. Without reinforced Community action, the crisis as already seen and
perceived today would increase both in qualitative and quantitative terms.”11 But even from a
more general standpoint: “Irregular migration is perceived as a threat to the European Union,
and security concerns are almost automatically attributed to it.”12 But exactly which are the
10
CLANDESTINO Project. Op. cit., p. 118.
European Commission in Niemann, A. and N. Schmidthäussler. The Logic of EU Policy-Making on
(Irregular) Migration: Securitisation or Risk?. Paper given at the UACES conference: “Exchanging Ideas on
Europe 2012: Old Borders – New Frontiers”, 3-5 September 2012, Passau, Germany, p. 23. Accessed April 3,
2015. http://uaces.org/documents/papers/1201/niemann.pdf.
12
Kovacheva, op. cit., p. 4.
11
direct and subsequent effects of irregular immigration on the receiving societies, that produce
such standpoints?
3.2. Defining the threat
One of the possible answers lies directly in the first of the above quotations, that is –
uncontrolled immigration has a potential for damaging the credibility of EU’s policies on the
common immigration policy. It sure sounds reasonable but it hardly nests within the
sentiments of the larger populace and in national political agendas. The arguments used to
stress the threat of irregular immigrants to national security and stability, both real and
perceived, are to be found in their idiosyncratic modes and mechanisms of socio-economical
inclusion.13 In other terms:
Unauthorized migrants are often perceived as criminals, violating not only
immigration rules but disrespecting laws in general; irregularly working
migrants are perceived as a menace to the labour markets taking jobs away
from the native and the regular migrant population; asylum seekers and
undocumented migrants are perceived as illegitimate users of the welfare
system, living in publicly financed shelters and using services such as
emergency health care while working in the shadow economy.14
What is important to stress at this point is, however obvious it may seem, that the above
mentioned broadly-shared views are essentially what they are said to be – perceptions.
“Commonly, irregular migrants or attempts of third country nationals to enter the territory of
the Union are presented to be undesired for no specified reason, but seemingly for the mere
fact of being identified as ‘illegal’.”15 Empirical evidence in fact falls surprisingly short of
statistics that would support those claims, at least in a generalizing sort of manner in which
they are given. Again, acquiring tangible data on the scale and spread of black economy and
related figures is a challenging task in its own right. Applying and comparing the findings
with another elusive measure, like the extent and structure of the irregular immigrant
population, makes it then all the more daunting.
13
See, for example, Pinyol-Jiménez G. The Migration – Security Nexus in Short: Instruments and Actions in the
European Union. “Amsterdam Law Forum Journal” Vol 4, No 1 (2012). Accessed April 10, 2015.
http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/viewFile/255/442.
14
Kovacheva, op. cit., p. 4.
15
Niemann and Schmidthäussler, op. cit., p. 20.
Nevertheless, analysing the specific points presented in the quotation above, some
founded objections do present themselves. Firstly, informal work arrangements are evidently
the only option for an immigrant without the proper permits to seek subsistence. The majority
of immigrants being young and with little or no proper education, the jobs available for them
are usually those that require low-skilled, often manual labour force (e.g. in construction,
agriculture, tourism and other low-paying and unpopular sectors). To some extent the
population of (il)legal immigrants provides the niche workforce for certain segments of the
economy that would otherwise hardly operate.16 Secondly, while looking at empirical data
comparing crime rates and foreign minorities, the correlation between the two is hard to miss.
So far, statistical evidence shows that among immigrant populations, crime rates rise
considerably.17 Thirdly, in regard to the claim that irregular immigrants usurp the mechanism
of the welfare state while at the same time contributing to the shadow economy, a swift revisit
of the above mentioned entwinement between social dependency and informal economy
shows this to be a self-perpetuating problem.18 Apart from the more straightforward fears and
preconceptions about public safety and rising unemployment which the presence of an
irregular immigrant population on a territory provokes in the native population, national
governments’ concerns and discourse target wider economic and political implications of an
informal populace and the workings of the shadow economy.
Mainly, the most frequent and debated concerns over national security which arise
out of the irregular immigration phenomenon deal with:
-
16
undermining of states’ sovereignty and control over their territories,
contribution to the spread and scale of shadow economies,
erosion of the welfare state’s social mechanisms,
crumbling of national identities,
proliferation of organised crime dealing with illegal border crossing and
trafficking,
CLANDESTINO, op. cit., pp 128-131 and Boswell, C. Migration in Europe. A paper prepared for the “Policy
Analysis and Research Programme” of the Global Commission on International Migration, September 2005.
Accessed April 11, 2015. http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Organisationer/FN/GCMI/
Migration%20In%20Europe.pdf.
17
See Killias, M. EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/19 Immigration and Crime: The European Experience. San
Domenico di Fiesole, 2011. Accessed April 10, 2015. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/
handle/1814/18960/EU-US%20Immigration%20Systems%202011_19.pdf?sequence=1 and Aebi M. et al.
European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2014. Helsinki, 2014. Accessed April 11, 2015.
http://www.heuni.fi/en/index/publications/heunireports.html.
18
For a detailed analisys on the subject see De la Rica, S., A. Glitz and F. Ortega. Immigration in Europe: Trends,
Policies and Empirical Evidence. “IZA Discussion Paper” No. 7778. Accessed April 10, 2015.
http://ftp.iza.org/dp7778.pdf.
-
danger of terrorist infiltration,
potentially uncontrolled spread of infectious diseases and viruses.19
4. Rising up to the challenge – institutional responses to the
problematic of irregular migration
4.1. Reshaping the (inter)national security paradigm
The concept of national security has been thoroughly re-dimensioned in the academic and
political discourses since the end of the Cold War. Within the changing international
environment encompassing globalising economies, empowering supranational institutions and
arising politico-economic pressure groups, the notion of national security lost its traditional
theoretical anchorage. It has thus been extended along different dimensions to embrace nonmilitary domains affected by the security logic, and to include non-state actors that directly
partake in the shaping of the security environment.20 In this sense, a trend of de-militarization
of security has been observed, which has produced various alternative concepts, generally
labelled as “soft security”.21
Re-evaluating classic concepts within a contemporary analytical framework is to
actualize them and is one of the main motifs of reproducing scientific discourses. On the other
hand, uncritically adding new elements under the security umbrella poses the risk of including
within it the whole society, thus emptying the concept out of its meaning. Additionally,
regarding the linguistics of scientific and political discourse on security, Wӕver argues, that
various notions of security all conceptually stem out of the national security paradigm,
making other securities mere semantic derivatives, rather than analytical concepts in their
own right.22 Nevertheless, societies, states and international relations are evolving and so are
19
Adapted from: Kraler, A. and M. Rogoz. Irregular Migration in the European Union Since the Turn of the
Millennium – Development, Economic Background and Discussion. “Database on Irregular Migration”, Working
paper 11/2011, p. 22. Accessed April 24, 2015. http://irregular-migration.net; Niemann and Schmidthäussler,
op. cit. and Zbytniewska, K. and K. Kokoszczyński. Italian ambassador: ‘Illegal Immigration Poses Security Threat
to Europe’. “Euractiv.com”, February 9, 2015. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eupriorities-2020/italian-ambassador-illegal-immigration-poses-security-threat-europe and Cottey, A, Security in
the New Europe. Hampshire, 2007.
20
Rotcshild, E. What is Security? in Buzan, B. and L. Hansen (ed.), “International Security” Vol. 3. London, 2007.
21
Cottey, op. cit., p. 192.
22
Wӕver, O. Securitization and Desecuritization, in Buzan and Hansen, op. cit., p. 68: “The problem is that, as
concepts, neither individual security nor international security exist./…/There is no literature, no philosophy, no
threats and challenges that are being put forward in political debates. New concepts, such as
collective, environmental and societal security, are thus necessarily invoked in order to
address salient new phenomena; a critical approach is however needed in order to avoid
succumbing into analytical vagueness or inflation of the concepts.
Very close to the problem of defining security, as presented above, and naming the
related threats, lays the praxis of securitization. Namely, labelling certain groups or
phenomena as threats to national security, provoking hostile attitudes and consequently
pushing forward policies to counter the envisaged threat – securitization comes as a powerful
instrument at the disposal of the ruling actors of state. More specifically however, as Wӕver
famously puts it, securitization can be seen as a speech act. This is to say that security per se
does not positively refer to any particular state or order of things out there, but is construed
through the act of speaking about it. In other terms: “By uttering “security,” a staterepresentative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a
special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”
23
Realizing this, it is easy to
foresee the potential for manipulative practices in such politically constructed- securitized
realities.
Nonetheless, new and topical concepts on security are being developed, primarily
through the endeavour to exposing pressing issues in fields, other than national security. Not
only that, but with the reshaping of the security environment as a whole, radical new
conceptions of various securities’ (and their ends) were presented as well.24 The already
mentioned notion of societal security is one such example. Based on the same national
security logic, analysing the crucial points and workings of a community/state to survive, it
develops from the state-sovereignty dyad, a society-identity nexus.25 Shifting the referent
object from sovereignty to identity, a whole new dimension of possible threats is
consequently developed. From observing the phenomenon of deterritorialization of states’
sovereignty as resulting from different mechanics of globalization, key national identity issues
are prone to gaining momentum in contemporary political discourse. The concept of identity,
tradition of “security” in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and
practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning.” (emphasis in original).
23
Ibid., p. 73.
24
The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: “/…/security should be thought of in
terms of economic and political, as well as military objectives; that military security is a means, while the
economic security of individuals, or the social security of citizens “to chart futures in a manner of their own
choosing,” or the political security that follows when “the international system [is] capable of peaceful and
orderly change” were ends in themselves.” (brackets in original), cited in Rotcshild, op. cit., p. 3.
25
Ibid., p. 83.
moreover, falls naturally into the politicizing context of the possible impacts of immigration
on native societies.
It is obvious, then, that from whichever standpoint one analyses the shaping and
grounding of a certain approach to security issues, this ultimately resolves itself into a
question of political agendas. The efficacy of security strategies, particularly within an
international framework, being defined by a long-term approach and consensus on key issues,
is then that more vulnerable to the volatile orientations of everyday politics.
4.2. Between policing and promoting development: EU’s take on irregular immigration
The problems, or rather the various consequences of immigration to European countries, have
been constantly (re)surfacing in the political mainstream, particularly from the end of the
Cold War on. Traditional migration trends from East to West and from South to North were
accentuated during critical periods, especially by political transformations and regional crises
(e.g. the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, several EU enlargements, the Balkan Wars etc.).
Being closely linked to the cardinal concept of territorial sovereignty, however, the
administering and management of border control and the related immigration policies, were
all held in the exclusive domain of national governments. Eventually, following the
implementation of the Schengen area, policies and mechanisms regulating populational
movements were gradually delegated to supranational-EU levels.
Primarily, security concerns were focused on internal threats, mainly: organised
crime and terrorism; which were addressed within the framework of cooperation on Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA), later incorporated into the concept of Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice (ASFJ). Following the enlargements and the progressive empowerment of
institutions of the Union, different agencies and programmes were founded to tackle rising
issues. In this way, Europol, Frontex, the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Common
European Asylum System and many others were formed. The two main institutions currently
operating in these fields are the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG
HOME) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).26
Irregular immigration per se has not been dealt with through a holistic approach.
Instead, great effort was put into combating its symptoms. That is, strengthening border
26
See: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/index_en.htm and http://eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm.
control, cracking down on smugglers and traffickers and facilitating the return of
undocumented immigrants to the countries of origin or transit. Some of the praxes invoked
were met with loud disapproval from both- non-governmental organisations and the wider
public. The most infamous being the plan to employ military units from within the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to track down and destroy ships and vessels that could
be potentially used for trafficking immigrants.27 Less discussed, although not much less
intrusive- the bi-lateral agreements on the returning of detected irregular migrants (including
failed asylum seekers) which, coupled with pressures to enforce control over the transit of
migrants over their territories, were often imposed on countries in the process of negotiating
accession, and others on the receiving side of different kinds of aid.28
Besides moral and humanitarian reservations, the reach and efficacy of several
policies aimed at curbing irregular immigration have been put into question by researchers
and scholars alike. The already mentioned boosting of police and surveillance operations
focused on screening and data gathering is producing a singular paradox. By tightening
control over borders and increasing security checks over the movement of people, it is byproducing impressions of insecurity and at the same time encroaching on the same virtues of
civil rights and liberties it is purported to protect. Not to mention the fact, that the vast
majority of irregular immigrants does not reach the EU by crossing land or sea borders, it is in
fact comprised of those who enter the territory legally and only later outstay their tourist
visas, and it accounts to “almost 75% of so-called unlawful migration flows.”.29
There were, however, positive steps being taken towards approaching the
immigration problematic in a more comprehensive manner. Already since 2005 the Global
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has acknowledged that a crucial part of
remedying the problem of immigration currents lies in the partnership relations with the
countries of origin. More recently, a new European Agenda on Migration has been presented.
27
Cf. European Commission. A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.5.2015.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/backgroundinformation/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf and Glazebrook, D. EU’s
war on migrants will boost ISIS – but perhaps that is the point. “RT News”. Published time: May 18, 2015 17:15.
http://rt.com/op-edge/259685-eu-migrants-africa-military-action.
28
See: Marsh, S. and W. Rees, The European Union in the Security of Europe: From Cold War to Terror War.
Oxon, 2012, pp. 23-26; Bigo, D. Immigration Controls and Free Movement in Europe. “International Review of
the Red Cross”, Volume 91, Number 875, September 2009. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc875-bigo.pdf and Open Society Initiative for Europe, Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European
Union. Last updated April 2015. http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migrationand-asylum-european-union.
29
Bigo, op. cit., p. 586.
It stresses, among other, that: “To try to halt the human misery created by those who exploit
migrants, we need to use the EU's global role and wide range of tools to address the root
causes of migration. Some of these are deep-seated but must be addressed.”.30 Indeed, the
medium to long term priorities of the agenda include prospects of furthered cooperation and
assistance to countries facing social and humanitarian crises. Some of those are directly
connected to the already implemented instruments of European Neighbourhood (ENI) and the
Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development’s (EuropeAid) policies.
Many of those policies, however, were firstly developed from notions of “moral obligation,
historical legacy and economic imperative”31, and are only recently being re-presented as
vectors of irregular-immigration-relief.
5. The peculiar case of Slovenia
Slovenia’s geographic position and her historical embeddedness on the junction of changing
political entities occasioned her to function as a transit country from antiquity to present
times. The Balkan route, one of the main smuggling avenues of immigrants and goods into the
EU, passes also across Slovenia’s territory. It is mostly used by criminal groups from
countries of Ex-Yugoslavia although it also acts as a hub for smuggling from farther eastern
regions. Interceptions of immigrant smuggling have revealed several organized channels for
transferring people, including Afghan and Iraqi citizens through Bulgaria, Turkish Kurds,
Indian citizens from Dubai via Serbia, Pakistanis and many others.32 A telling sign of the
importance and scale of the Balkan route is the yearly net worth of trafficked drugs – a past
estimate put it at USD 400 billion.33
Traditionally, Slovenia’s role in the smuggling of immigrants was primarily one of
a transit country. However, the largest numbers of irregular immigrants arriving on its
territory were recorded at the beginning of the 1990s, when they reached an estimated 70.000
and in 2000, when the number grew to over 35.000.34 The reported figures correspond
chronologically to the beginning and ending of the Yugoslav wars, thus explaining the
30
European Commission, A European Agenda… op. cit., p.2.
Marsh and Reese, op. cit., p. 40.
32
Prezelj, I. and M. Gaber. Smuggling as a Threat to National and International Security: Slovenia and the
Balkan Route. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2005.
33
Içduygu and Toktas in ibid., p. 24.
34
Ibid., p. 24 and Lebar, J. The Effect of Illegal Migrations on the National Security of the Republic of
Slovenia, Master’s Thesis. Koper, 2011, p. 21.
31
dramatic increase. After the last surge in 2000, the numbers of detected illegal border
crossings fluctuated slightly yet still presenting a steady decline as shown in the figure below.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 4: Illegal border crossings detected35
Following the accession to the EU in 2004 the inclusion into the Schengen area in 2007
opened up Slovenia’s borders with Italy, Austria and Hungary, while at the same time
consolidating the border with Croatia, having it become EU’s outer border. Border control
activities have since been considerably increased, partly also due to intensified cooperation of
state institutions within the international framework, i.e. with institutions like the
aforementioned Frontex, SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at National Entry),
SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement Center) and others. Much of the irregular
immigration as well as smuggling on the Balkan route have thus diverted through Hungary.36
The total numbers of illegal border crossings detected on the West Balkan route, however,
increased dramatically – twofold since the previous year. Even more substantial is the
increase in the net number of Kosovo citizens detected. Values show a remarkable, tenfold
increase in only a few months span resulting in Kosovo citizens accounting for more than half
of all the detections.37
As mentioned earlier, the Balkan route encompasses channels for traffic of various
illegal goods. The illicit traffic of cannabis in the EU, for example, has shown a decrease in
the amounts imported from third countries, primarily because the increase in domestic
production made up for part of the demand. Exceptions to this trend are countries of southeast
Europe, including Slovenia, for which: “/…/mainly Albanian cannabis supplies the customer
demand.”38 It is noteworthy to stress that observations have already been made about the
steady strengthening of Albanian mafia and its potential security implications for the whole
region.39 Last but not least, one of the most infamous trades within transnational organised
crime is the trafficking of weapons. Closely linked to smuggling routes of other trafficker
35
Data source: Policija. Annual Report on the Work of the Police for the Year 2002, …2006, …2010, …2014 and
Frontex, Annual risk analysis 2015. Accessed April 27, 2015. http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/
Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf.
36
Policija. Annual Report on the Work of the Police for the Year 2014. Accessed April 29, 2015.
http://www.policija.si/index.php/statistika/letna-poroila.
37
Frontex. Annual risk… op. cit., p. 22.
38
Ibid., p. 34.
39
Prezelj and Gaber, op. cit., p. 16.
groups, it played a prominent role throughout the battlefields of the recent Yugoslav wars. An
estimated 800.000 illegally civilian-owned weapons are deemed to be located in Bosnia and
Herzegovina alone.40 In view of the most recent terrorist attacks on European soil41 and seeing
them being performed ever more frequently, such numbers indeed provoke well-founded
concerns over many a security aspect.
Even though at first glance statistics on legal and irregular immigration to Slovenia
suggest a positive trend in terms of security, they certainly do not expose the whole picture.
There are in fact present instances that could potentially occasion for further spread of violent
and/or organised criminality, mainly the smuggling of drugs and weapons and the related
strengthening of organised criminal organisations, potentially leading even to occurrences of
terrorist attacks.42
The picture of the irregular migration problematic, framed in the security
perspective, can be viewed also in another way, if focused on the internal conditions. Both,
long-term internal stability and sustained management of human resources within the defence
sector are affected by the changing demographics, which are, in turn, directly and indirectly
linked to immigration. In instances like those, impacts and consequences, resulting from legal
immigration, can be anticipated for the irregular spectrum as well, albeit, to a varying extent.
In a publication on the findings of a 2009 research programme, titled Demographic, Ethnic
and Migration Dynamics in Slovenia and their Impact on the Slovenian Army43, the
researchers analysed the impacts of the changing demographic in relation to the effects it has
on the employability in the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). The conclusions mainly pointed
to two central problems. One surrounds social stigma and the resulting troubles with socioeconomic inclusion that first- and second-generation immigrants face, while the other deals
with SAF recruitment issues in the view of a growing non-national, or immigrant, population.
Specifically, researchers advanced concrete policy proposals to tackle said issues. An oftmentioned proposition calls for the loosening of enrolment restrictions for residents
possessing two citizenships. Generally speaking, however, an institutionalised, wholesome
approach to cultural and ethnic diversity and the promoting and safeguarding of an
40
Frontex. Annual risk… op. cit., p. 36.
Note this year’s shooting at the offices of satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and the more recent
terrorist attack on the police station in Zvornik, Bosnia.
42
Europol. European Union Terrorism Situation andTrend Report 2014, p. 13. Accesed April 24, 2015. doi:
10.2813/15346.
43
Žitnik, J. S. (ed.) Demographic, Ethnic and Migration Dynamics in Slovenia and their Impact on the Slovenian
Army. Ljubljana, 2009.
41
individual’s cultural and ethnic identity, specifically within SAF’s cadre, is deemed a crucial
starting point for further social and ethnic inclusion and for strengthening SAF’s political and
symbolic representation in Slovenian society as a whole.
Summing it all up, it is possible to identify two potential irregular-migration-related
security issues for the Slovenian state. One is only pertinent if viewed in relation to activities
of organised crime groups and the trafficking of other goods and is already been dealt with in
terms of cross-national police cooperation and border security controls. The other may more
exactly be termed a soft security issue, insofar as it covers long-term social and political
stability and social inclusion issues. This latter, however, can only be addressed through large
scale civil support and political dialogue, thus making it a matter to be dealt with more within
a “social dialogue” framework, rather than within a national security discourse.
6. Conclusion
As already shown in the second and the following chapters, exact figures on the inpour of
irregular immigrant populations and its repercussions are hardly attainable. The causes and its
symptoms of human distress, on the other hand, are clear and in plain sight. Locking up the
gates and increased policing, on their own, are not going the limit the struggles of the
immigrant population to reaching for a better prospect of living on European soil, or diminish
its numbers.
Along with the pushes for the abolition of internal European borders and improved
international cooperation, a postmodern (inter)national security environment has been taking
shape. Together with the process of deterritorialization of national sovereignty came new
threats for national security. Following the delegation of powers and decision-making to a
supranational, EU, level and a re-orienting of nation states’ efforts in the domain of national
security, a new common consciousness emerged, albeit with a delay of several years. One
which acknowledges that, together with perks of the evolved common market and security
policy, also came new responsibilities. None of the currently employable mechanisms alone,
be it interventions in crisis areas, humanitarian relief aids or development programmes,
should be viewed as a panacea for the problems of immigration. Instead, they make up a
toolbox to be used within a framework of a comprehensive strategy. Evidently, European
forces do not lack the means, neither the resources, to operate within large scale operations
abroad. Instead, the main challenge lies in the proverbial reluctance of nation states to waiver
decision making on foreign policies, in order to comply with a consistent strategy. Therefore,
the only viable path appears to be a persistent struggle, particularly in domestic political
arenas, for the recognition of the need for a more cosmopolitan political view on the issue of
irregular immigration as a whole.
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