Digest by: Ida Mariano Diamante
#4 G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy
on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place
of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to
disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of candidacy by
claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.
ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
RULING: Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence
presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the
fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father
of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died
on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San
Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to
be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. Considering that the
allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with
proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been
benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt
that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was
born on August 20, 1939, governed under 1935
Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens
of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of
whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
Digest by: Ida Mariano Diamante
#5 G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR.
MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew
and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil
Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose
Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred,
that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their
adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.
Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552
went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law
the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption
(Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference,
ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted
Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to
rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way
back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition
there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed
on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity
of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not
the adopter’s action prescribed.
RULING: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. The controversy should be resolved in
the light of the law governing at the time the petition
was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed
the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the
family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into
force, could no longer be pursued.
Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five
year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and
that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are
considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is
a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a
"vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guarantee of due process that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of
a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of
a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by a statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal
ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime,
and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.
Digest by: Ida Mariano Diamante
#6 G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle
name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
ISSUE: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?
RULING: YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of
her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as
her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can assert her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.