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An Examination of Religious Priming
and Intrinsic Religious Motivation in
the Moral Hypocrisy Paradigm
Article in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion · June 2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2009.01454.x
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An Examination of Religious Priming and
Intrinsic Religious Motivation in the Moral
Hypocrisy Paradigm
THOMAS P. CARPENTER
MARGARET A. MARSHALL
Department of Psychology
Seattle Pacific University
Reliable individual differences have not yet been identified in moral hypocrisy. This research examined whether
intrinsic religious motivation combined with an experimental religious priming manipulation would predict
decreased moral hypocrisy. A sample of Christian college students (N =142) completed the Religious Orientation
Scale—Revised, and the moral motivation paradigm, which tests whether participants will act in accordance with
their moral beliefs at a cost to themselves. Half the participants received religious priming prior to the procedure.
Intrinsic religiosity predicted decreased moral hypocrisy, but only when religiosity was primed. Findings support
Allport’s view of intrinsic religiosity, but with an emphasis on cognitive processes in addition to motivational
ones.
People tend to believe they are better than most other people in their ability and willingness
to perform moral behaviors (Klein and Goethals 2002). Unfortunately, the pervasive occurrence
of morally hypocritical behavior belies these perceptions (Batson, Thompson, and Chen 2002).
In a series of studies examining the phenomenon of moral hypocrisy, Batson and colleagues
found that most people consistently find ways to appear moral to themselves and others without
actually behaving morally (Batson et al. 1997, 1999; Batson, Thompson, and Chen 2002). Individual differences like social responsibility and empathic concern failed to predict hypocritical
behavior in their research (Batson, Thompson, and Chen 2002). One individual-difference variable not assessed in these studies that should theoretically predict moral hypocrisy is religious
motivation.
Allport (1966; Allport and Ross 1967) proposed that people are motivated to pursue religion
as either a utilitarian means to an end (e.g., personal comfort, social affiliation), which he
termed extrinsic religious motivation, or as an end in itself, which he termed intrinsic religious
motivation. According to Allport’s model, the intrinsic dimension should predict whether religious
individuals will act congruently or incongruently with their religious beliefs and values—for
instance, behaving in accordance with their moral standards of fairness toward others. The
present research was conducted to explore (a) whether intrinsic religious motivation would
predict decreased moral hypocrisy, and (b) the conditions that might facilitate this relationship.
Several studies have explored the relationships between religious motivation and behaviors
for which there are commonly religious norms, such as helping (Batson 1976; Batson and
Gray 1981), sexual behaviors (Woodroof 1985; Wulf et al. 1984), altruism (Maclean, Walker,
and Matsuba 2004), volunteering (Bernt 1989), prejudice (see Donahue 1985), and aggression
Acknowledgment: This research was based on Thomas Carpenter’s senior honors thesis. The authors would like to thank
Noél Brown and Caitlin Johnson for their assistance in conducting this research, and Baine Craft and Luke Reinsma for
their helpful comments on a previous draft.
Correspondence should be addressed to Margaret A. Marshall, Department of Psychology, Seattle Pacific University,
Seattle, WA 98119. E-mail: mmarsh@spu.edu
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (2009) 48(2):386–393
C 2009 The Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
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(Leach, Berman, and Eubanks 2008). In general, this research has found that those high in
intrinsic religiosity are more likely than those low in intrinsic religiosity to self-report behaviors
and attitudes consistent with their religious beliefs. Studies of actual behavior are limited and
have found few behavioral confirmations of these relationships. This has led some to posit that
intrinsic religiosity may involve a self-deceptive overestimation of one’s adherence to religious
values (Burris and Navara 2002). Such a possibility highlights the need for a more critical
examination of the relationship between intrinsic religiosity and moral hypocrisy.
Based on previous findings in the moral hypocrisy literature, Allport’s theory, and recent
research on priming of chronic self-relevant constructs, we reasoned that individuals high in
intrinsic religiosity would display lower levels of moral hypocrisy, but only when their religious
standards were made salient to them. Batson et al. (1999) highlighted the importance of attitudebehavior comparisons as antecedents to morally congruent behavior. In their research, when
participants had either their moral standards or behaviors made salient to them, they continued
to violate their moral standards for self-reward while reporting that they had acted morally.
Only when standards and behavior were made salient simultaneously, creating aversive cognitive
dissonance (Eliot and Devine 1994; Festinger 1957), did participants act congruently with their
standards. This suggests that moral hypocrisy is so common because individuals often have no
motivation to—or have motives not to—compare their attitudes and behavior.
However, in Allport and Ross’s (1967) description, intrinsically religious individuals will be
motivated to bring “other needs, strong as they may be . . . into harmony with the religious beliefs
and prescriptions” (1967:434). Following from this, we posited that intrinsic religiosity should
motivate individuals to voluntarily compare attitudes and behavior even when this would result
in congruent behavior at personal cost. Priming religious standards serves as a cue to the intrinsic
individual that a comparison needs to be made.
The necessity of activating or priming even chronic self-attributes1 to facilitate their accessibility has gained recent attention (Brown and McConnell 2009). For example, Jonas and Fischer
(2006) found that some self-protective effects of intrinsic religiosity manifested only after participants had a chance to actively reflect on their faith. If intrinsic religious motivation provides
a readiness to respond in congruence with religious beliefs, and priming religious standards
activates this readiness, then priming religious standards should decrease moral hypocrisy and
increase even costly moral congruence among more highly intrinsic individuals. At the same time,
we would expect unprimed intrinsics to show levels of moral hypocrisy more similar to those of
low intrinsics. We tested this idea using Batson and colleagues’ moral motivation paradigm.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 142 Christian undergraduate students from a small Christian liberal-arts
college. Participants (32 men and 110 women) were recruited from psychology and educational
ministries courses and were predominantly white (80.3 percent, n = 114) and Asian American
(9.2 percent, n = 13). All participants were informed that the study would involve the awarding
of a $30 gift card in a raffle. Most did not indicate a denominational affiliation (50.7 percent,
n = 72); of those that did, Presbyterian (9.2 percent, n = 13) and Methodist (8.5 percent, n = 12)
were the most common.
1
No research to date has addressed whether intrinsic religiosity would qualify as a chronically accessible self-attribute,
although theoretically it should be, if one adheres to Allport’s original formulation of the construct.
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Procedures and Materials
A cover story was used to disguise the true nature of the study and to prevent demand
characteristics. During recruitment, participants were told that the study was being conducted
on the relationship between attitudes about faith and the ways in which people respond to task
incentives, an adaptation of the cover story used by Batson et al. (1997). The experimental
procedure was a modified version of Batson, Thompson, and Chen (2002, Study 2). Participants
arrived at the lab by individual appointment and were led into a room with an inconspicuous
surveillance camera. This camera transmitted wirelessly to a television in an adjacent room. The
experimenter gathered informed consent, handed participants a printed instruction sheet, and left
the room.
The contents of the instruction sheet were a modified version of that used by Batson et al.
(1997). Participants were told that they had been paired up with another participant, although
in reality, no such participant existed. The study was described as an investigation of “task
consequences and religious attitudes on feelings and reactions.” Participants were told that there
were two task conditions: positive consequences (a ticket for a $30 raffle award), and neutral
consequences (no ticket). They were told that they would be in one of the two conditions, and the
other participant would be in the other condition.
In the no-prime condition, the instruction sheet concluded: “Please knock on the door to
let the experimenter know you are ready.” In the religious-prime condition, participants were
directed to briefly read through an attached sheet of nine Bible verses. The verses were selected
to prime intrinsic religious motivation, addressing themes such as love for God and God’s love for
humanity. Neutral filler verses were also included. Passages were screened to prevent accidental
simultaneous priming of extrinsic motivation (e.g., themes of divine reward or punishment). At
the end of the list, participants were instructed to knock on the door and summon the experimenter
to continue.
Next, the experimenter returned and handed participants a manila folder containing the
materials for the next portion of the study, and left the room. Taped to the inside of the folder
was a plastic bag containing a quarter, marked with a red sticker with the words “SELF to POS”
on one side and a green sticker with the words “OTHER to POS” on the other, in replication
of Batson, Thompson, and Chen (2002, Study 2). The folder also contained an instruction sheet
and a task assignment sheet. The instruction sheet was a modified version of the directions used
by Batson et al. (1999, Study 1). The sheet informed participants that it was their responsibility
to choose who would receive the positive or neutral consequences for the task, and described
how, if they wanted, they could flip the coin to randomly assign the task consequences. They
were also informed that the other participant would not know that they had assigned the task
consequences. While participants assigned the tasks, the experimenter observed and coded their
decision-making behavior (e.g., coin flipping) via the television monitor in the adjacent room.
The color coding of the coin allowed the experimenter to easily ascertain whether the participant
won or lost the coin flip.
When the participants were finished assigning the tasks, the experimenter returned to collect
the folder and left a “pre-task” questionnaire packet to fill out. Participants were told that this
packet would provide a point of comparison for a later post-task measure; in actuality, this was
the final measure. Participants were asked the open-ended question: “In your opinion, what was
the most morally right way to assign the task consequences?” This was used to assess their
moral attitudes, so that we could determine if they had actually acted in accordance with them.
Following this were some filler items about social dominance.
Participants next completed the Religious Orientation Scale—Revised (ROS-R) (Gorsuch
and McPherson 1989). This scale is a revision of the Age-Universal Religious Orientation Scale
(Gorsuch and Venable 1983), which is an updated version of Allport and Ross’s (1967) original
measure. This 14-item scale was designed to distinguish between intrinsic factors, personal
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extrinsic (E p ) factors, such as desiring comfort and solace, and social extrinsic (E s ) factors, such
as desiring friendship and group support. It consists of eight intrinsic items (α = .82), three
social extrinsic items (α = .68), and three personal extrinsic items (α = .58), and was scored
on a nine-point Likert scale. Sample intrinsic items include “My whole approach to life is based
on my religion” and “I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.” A sample
social extrinsic item is “I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing the people I know there”;
a sample personal extrinsic item is “What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble
and sorrow.” After the religiosity measure, participants completed standard demographic items.
Following the completion of the measures, the experimenter returned and completed a thorough
one-on-one debriefing, probing for suspicions and concerns, explaining the study in full, and
making a note of participants who either noticed the camera or suspected that deception had been
used. Finally, when all trials had been run, a raffle was held and two $30 gift cards were awarded
to the winners, selected at random from our sample.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
There were 191 initial participants, but 49 were excluded from analysis. Of these, seven
flipped the coin out of view of the camera, three acted outside the experimental protocol (e.g.,
flipped own coin), and six did not fully comprehend the study or complete the survey packet (e.g.,
participants for whom English was a second language). In addition, 14 participants provided
amoral (e.g., no morally right way), ambiguous, or blank responses to the open-ended item
asking how to most morally assign the task consequences. Exclusion of this last group was
necessary to ensure meaningful moral attitude-behavior comparisons. Also excluded were seven
participants who, when probed during debriefing, reported noticing the camera, and nine who
expressed doubt about the cover story. Last, three non-Christian participants were removed,
leaving a final sample of 142 self-identified Christian participants (32 men and 110 women).
On average, participants in this sample scored higher in intrinsic motivation (M = 7.05, SD =
1.37) than in personal extrinsic (M = 5.04, SD = 1.42) or social extrinsic (M = 3.49, SD = 1.39).
Analysis of the religious-prime (n = 75) and no-prime (n = 67) groups confirmed that participants
in the two conditions did not significantly differ in any religiosity, attitudinal, or demographic
(age, ethnicity, gender) variables. A two-tailed t-test revealed that intrinsic religiosity scores
trended slightly higher in the experimental religious-prime group (M = 7.24, SD = 1.20) than
the control no-prime group (M = 6.82, SD = 1.51), t(140) = 1.83, p = .07, but this difference
failed to reach statistical significance. There were no significant gender differences in any of the
religiosity subscales or in moral behavior (all ps > .2), and gender did not interact with religiosity
or experimental condition to predict moral behavior.
One hundred three participants said that the most moral way to assign the task consequences
was to flip the coin or use another fair method, whereas 39 participants said it was most moral
to give the positive-consequences task to the other participant. Approximately twice as many
participants chose to flip the coin (n = 92) as to not (n = 50). Of those who did flip the coin, 44
won the toss for themselves and 48 lost. A binomial test confirms that the coin was fair (z = .42,
p = .66). Seventeen of the participants who lost the coin toss (35.4 percent) proceeded to rig it
(e.g., reflipping the coin until it produced a favorable outcome).
Moral congruence between participants’ attitudes and behaviors was assessed by comparing
their answers about the most moral way to assign the tasks with their actual task-assignment
behaviors/outcomes. Participants who wrote that giving away the positive-consequences task was
the most moral were considered morally congruent (i.e., nonhypocritical) if the other person
received the positive-consequences task. Participants who wrote that flipping the coin or using
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another fair method was most moral were classified as morally congruent if they either (a) used a
fair method and followed through with it or (b) voluntarily gave away the positive-consequences
task.
We eliminated from further analysis all participants who took the positive-consequences task
after winning it fairly (n = 38), as moral congruence for these participants was conveniently
self-serving. In other words, although keeping the positive consequences after winning the coin
toss was technically “morally congruent,” it came at no personal cost to them and thus was
not comparable to the behavior of participants who lost the coin toss and gave the positive
consequences away fairly, or who willingly opted to give them away in keeping with their moral
standard. Of the final 104 participants considered in the main analysis, 63 were classified as
morally congruent and 41 as morally hypocritical.
Main Analysis
Because the dependent variable (moral behavior = congruent or hypocritical) was dichotomous, we used logistic regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989) to test our main hypothesis of
whether intrinsic religiosity, religious priming, and the interaction between the two would predict
congruence between participants’ moral attitudes and behavior. We hypothesized that participants
in the religious-prime condition with higher intrinsic religiosity scores would behave congruently
more often (i.e., hypocritically less often) than other participants. There were no main effects
of intrinsic religiosity (β = .24, log-odds ratio = 1.27, p = .14) or religious priming (β = .29,
log-odds ratio = 1.33, p = .18), and as expected, there was a significant interaction between
intrinsic religiosity and religious priming (β = .42, log-odds ratio = 1.52, p < .05). Post hoc
analyses of the simple effects revealed the nature of this interaction, confirming that intrinsic
religiosity led to moral congruence only among participants in the religious-prime condition
(β = .66, log-odds ratio = 1.94, p < .01) and not those in the control condition (β = −.18,
log-odds ratio = .84, p = .39). Similarly, being in the religious-prime condition led to moral
congruence only for those relatively high in intrinsic religiosity (β = .86, log-odds ratio = .24,
p < .01) and not those relatively low in intrinsic religiosity (β = −.29, log-odds ratio = .75, p =
.33). See Figure 1 for a graph of these results. Logistic regression analyses were also conducted
with all combinations of the extrinsic religiosity variables but revealed no significant findings, so
those results are not reported here.
DISCUSSION
The hypothesis that a religious prime would decrease moral hypocrisy among intrinsically
religious participants was confirmed. After reading a brief selection of Bible verses, participants
with higher intrinsic scores on the ROS-R were more likely to behave consistently with their
moral standard than those with lower intrinsic scores. In practice, this meant they were more
likely to either give positive task consequences (a raffle ticket for a $30 award) to another
participant spontaneously, or to flip and lose a coin toss and then honestly give the positive task
consequences away. Participants did not know that the experimenter was surreptitiously observing
their behavior as they did so, and they were told that the other participant would not know they
were responsible for the choice. Thus, participants who behaved in accordance with their moral
standards in this research did so at cost to themselves, in a situation where they believed they
were acting anonymously and where it would have been easy to take the reward without public
censure.
Prior research has shown that participants in this paradigm do not have to act morally to appear
moral to themselves (Batson et al. 1999). Opportunities for self-deception were high: participants
faced a low-salience moral dilemma in which many outcomes can be easily rationalized or
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INTRINSIC RELIGIOSITY
Figure 1
Predicted values in logistic regression of morally congruent behavior as a function of both
intrinsic religiosity and religious priming
High Intrinsic
Low Intrinsic
Congruent Behavior
2.0
1.8
1.5
1.3
1.0
Control
Religious Prime
Experimental Condition
Note: Higher scores on the Y-axis indicate stronger congruence between participants’ behavior
and moral attitudes (1 = hypocritical, 2 = congruent). Intrinsic religiosity predicted increased
congruence, but only for those who were religiously primed.
justified (Batson et al. 1997, 1999; Batson and Thompson 2001). If intrinsic religiosity were
largely self-deceptive as some have posited (cf. Burris and Navara 2002; Maclean, Walker, and
Matsuba 2004; Ryckman et al. 2004), then we would have expected ROS-R intrinsic scores
to be unrelated (or negatively related) to congruence, allowing intrinsics to capitalize on the
opportunity to self-deceive and violate their moral standards for profit. The fact that intrinsic
religiosity was only predictive of congruence when participants were primed suggests that the
effect may be reliant on attitude-behavior comparisons that are triggered by situational reminders
of religious standards. This is consistent with prior research showing that these comparisons
facilitate congruent behavior (Batson et al. 1999; Eliot and Devine 1994).
Although the efficacy of the priming stimulus implies the importance of cognitive activation
of religious standards, it is unclear how explicit these standards need to be and whether a less
overt priming stimulus would have been effective. Randolph-Seng and Nielsen (2007) found that
unscrambling sentences with religious content decreased subsequent cheating on a laboratory
task. The priming effect did not interact with intrinsic religiosity, but this might have been due
to a floor effect in the manipulation, with very few people cheating in the baseline condition and
no one in the prime condition. Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) found that priming God concepts
significantly increased participants’ prosocial behavior in a laboratory setting; in the second study,
this effect was more pronounced among religious participants.
Our study was limited by a few factors. First, we used a sample of Christian participants
at a religious university who were predominantly white and female, and it is unclear whether
our findings would generalize to a more diverse demographic or religious sample. Second, we
administered the ROS-R at the end of the experimental procedure, and the scores might have been
susceptible to influence by the experiment itself. We have some confidence this was not the case,
as intrinsic religious motivation is presumed to be stable within individuals (Allport and Ross
1967), and has shown consistency even after major life traumas (Overcash et al. 1996). Also, filler
items were administered prior to the ROS-R, and the scores were not significantly different by
experimental condition. Finally, our choice of religious prime might have been too overt, resulting
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in demand characteristics. Given that the increase in moral congruence was only found among
highly intrinsic participants, this seems less plausible. Also, the participants sampled attended a
university where the integration of religion with academic topics is common; this milieu worked
in our favor in reducing suspicion on receiving Bible verses (less than 5 percent of the sample
was eliminated due to suspicion over the cover story).
This research has implications for theory, research, and individuals. The intrinsic participants
in this study exhibited voluntary, costly morally congruent behavior without needing simultaneous
reminders of both their attitudes and behavior, providing support for Allport’s original theory. The
fact that intrinsics needed a prime at all suggests that motivations alone will not always produce
moral congruence, which is important information for both theory on religious motivation and
researchers seeking to investigate it. Our results fit with teachings from many world religions that
encourage active, regular engagement with one’s faith, such as participation in worship services,
memorization and study of religious texts, meditation on spiritual themes, and prayer. It seems
that these spiritual disciplines can help the intrinsically religious individual put their values into
action, even when doing so is costly.
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