The irony was not lost on the cryptocurrency communities when central banks (CBs) announced the possibility of issuing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) based off distributed ledger technology, the technology that underpinned cryptocurrencies, which was created to be autonomous and decentralized. Merits for adopting CBDCs range from deterrence of illegal transactions to circumvention of the zero-lower bound in conventional monetary policy. Notwithstanding, central bankers have to weigh these against their disadvantages, both in good times and bad times, bearing in mind their operating landscapes. In recent years, the unprecedented growth of non-cash transaction volumes (Capgemini and BNP Paribas, 2018), coupled with the declining currency-to-M2 ratios (Prasad, 2018), highlighted the dwindling importance of physical fiat currencies. This phenomenon has forced CBs such as Sweden’s Riksbank to consider issuing retail CBDC after the country’s cash withdrawal had declined drastically and with merely 20% of all retail payments made in cash (Sveriges Riksbank, 2018). However, the importance of considering a country’s operating landscape cannot be further emphasized. A case in point was the 2016 banknotes demonetization by India’s RBI, which demonstrated the disastrous outcome demonetization can cause to a cash-based society that lacked the necessary infrastructure. Furthermore, issuing retail CBDCs will mean that CBs, which currently work on wholesale banking structures, will have to adapt to deal with retail individuals – something that they are illequipped to do. It is also worth appreciating the complexity involved in reversing a transaction or cybercrimes on an immutable CBDC. Bearing in mind that majority of payments and monies are already electronic, and that other alternatives exist, such as the unification of retail payment methods (e.g. Singapore’s SGQR), issuing retail CBDCs provides limited upside potential while exposing a country to significant financial instability during crisis of confidence. On the other hand, wholesale CBDCs (e.g. Singapore’s Project Ubin), designed for financial institutions, such as banks or payment and settlement solution companies, may bring about significant efficiency gains through the reduction in transaction costs and better management of liquidity positions. However, if financial institutions are able to carry out settlements without going through central banks, certain policy tools such as the varying of short-term interest rates may be rendered inefficient. Notwithstanding, CBs may have more resources to be diverted into promoting financial stability. For instance, should a CB decide to transit from a Lender-of-Last-Resort model into a Pawnbroker-For-All-Seasons model, as proposed by Mervyn King, more resources can be diverted into evaluating the collaterals and appropriate haircuts. Bibliography Capgemini and BNP Paribas. (2018). World Payments Report 2017. Capgemini and BNP Paribas. Prasad, E. (2018). Central Banking in a Digital Age: Stock-taking and Preliminary Thoughts. Washington: Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings. Sveriges Riksbank. (2018, February 1). Sveriges Riksbank. Retrieved from The Swedish Payment Market: https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/financial-stability/payments/theswedish-payment-market/ Bank of International Settlements. (2018). Central Bank Digital Currencies. Committee on Payments and Markets Infrastructure. Bank of International Settlements. (2017). Central Bank Cryptocurrencies. Bank of International Settlements. Bank of International Settlements. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/sgqr-qr-code-cashless-paymentsingapore-rolls-out-unified-10727568?cid=FBcna (Bank of International Settlements, 2018) (Bank of International Settlements, 2017)