Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
EUROPEAN BOAT DESIGN INNOVATION GROUP:
THE MARINE DESIGN MANIFESTO
S McCartan, D Harris and B Verheijden, EBDIG-IRC, Coventry University, UK.
M Lundh and M Lutzhoft, Division of Maritime Operations, Chalmers University Of Technology, SWEDEN.
D Boote, DITEN, Genoa University, ITALY.
J.J. Hopman and F.E.H.M. Smulders, 3ME, Technical University of Delft, NETHERLANDS
K Norby, Oslo School for Architecture and Design, NORWAY
SUMMARY
A manifesto is a published verbal declaration of the intentions, motives, or views of an issue. It accepts a previously
published opinion and promotes a new idea with prescriptive notions for carrying out changes that the authors believe
should be made. Marine Design is presented as an interdisciplinary holistic approach to boat design, based on the
methodologies of Industrial Design, which are informed by both Human Factors and Engineering. The authors as experts
in their respective disciplines present the Marine Design Manifesto as a framework for innovation within the marine
industry. In every professional field there are definitive texts, this paper provides advocacy for Marine Design, an
interdisciplinary approach in its infancy. The authors review key Industrial Design manifestos in the context of Marine
Design. They then present a contextualised Marine Design manifesto.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The maritime industry is very different from the
automotive and aerospace industries in terms of business
model and R&D funding models. It is cost driven, and as
with any industry that is driven by cost it is challenged
by international competition. The automotive industry,
has a strong focus on technical innovation to meet
environmental and safety legislation. These issues are
now impacting the maritime industry through EEDI and
future safety legislation, combined with operational costs
issues such as reduced manning and increased fuel
prices. To enable the European industry to address the
future challenges the present ship design approach
requires to be complemented with a multidisciplinary
approach based on the principles of Industrial Design
rather than Naval Architecture alone. This is the
discipline of Marine Design.
The world depends on a safe and efficient shipping trade
network, 90% of trade uses maritime transport, which
employs 1.2 million seafarers. The industry has worked
steadily to improve safety performance but despite
innovative trends in maritime technology and the
implementation of safety-related regulations, shipping
accidents are still a leading concern. Investigations have
revealed that human factors contribute to the vast
majority of all accidents. The cruise ship Costa
Concordia being a recent example of Merchant ship
design still focuses on technical solutions, neglecting
human aspects associated with crewing and procedures
until a very late phase in the design/engineering process.
Manning issues are usually regarded as the responsibility
of the end-user usually relating to accommodation (and
other associated) facilities. Platform management issues
are addressed by standard International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) and class crew concepts and
procedures. This approach disregards the possibility to
aim for better and safer solutions. As merchant ships
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
have become more complex and highly automated,
resulting in reduced manning but with higher
performance and safety requirements, the importance of
including the human performance in merchant ship
design and engineering processes has increased. [1]
In a competitive industry with increasing cost
pressures, the key emerging challenges are:
 Crewing levels: Despite the greatly improved
efficiency of modern vessels some commentators
regard minimum crewing levels as too low, and
point out they do not allow for the inevitable
extra tasks that 24 hour operations require – with
‘human factor’ risks such as fatigue being a
significant cause of accidents.
 Crew training and language: many ship-owners
look to source crews from emerging economies
due to lower wage demands. Despite
international standards, training regimes and
assessment are not consistent and lead to
variations in crew and officer competence.
Concerns have been raised about communication
in an emergency or even understanding simple
instructions in routine operations.
 Risk management: Inadequate risk management
is a key challenge to be addressed through
improved safety management systems and
processes.
 Organizational structures: Bureaucracy is cited as
a source of pressure diverting crews from other
tasks and potentially compromising safety. This
is compounded by minimum crewing levels
which place further burdens on already hardpressed crews.
 Fire hazards: Fire remains a major on-board risk
especially in ‘Ro-Ro’ ferries (with relatively
open decking) and also on passenger ships with
increased ‘hotel’ services and large passenger
numbers. [1]
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
There are significant potential safety gains to be made
as a result of managing and eradicating human error. It is
important to effectively integrate Human Factors
Engineering (HFE) principles into design so that those
systems encompass human capabilities and limitations,
while
also
increasing
system
availability/safety/performance,
and
personnel
satisfaction. The Marine Design Manifesto promotes the
implementation of novel concepts of technology transfer
and cross fertilisation of technical solutions between the
aerospace and automotive sectors to the marine sector.
As a bottom-up proposal in which the user needs of the
crew within the marine sector are addressed through the
application of design methodologies and technology
derived from other transport and relevant sectors. This
proposal will satisfy important needs for surface
transport SMEs to collaborate and innovate together
through the use of open innovation, as well as managing
the process through the use of innovation funnels helping
to widen the participation in innovation of emerging
nations in an enlarged Europe.
1.1 Marine Design
User Centred Design (UCD) is a process in which the
needs, requirements, and capabilities of crew members as
end users of a vessel or system, are given extensive
consideration at each phase of the design process. UCD
is a sequenced problem solving process that requires
marine designers to analyse and anticipate end user
behaviour in working on a vessel or system, and to test
the validity of these assumptions through ethnographic
analysis of real users. Ethnographic analysis is necessary
due to the challenge for marine designers to intuitively
understand the experiences of a first-time user (crew
member) of their vessel or system design. UCD answers
questions about users, their tasks and goals, then uses the
findings to inform the design process with specific user
scenarios. [3]
UCD tools and methods characterised by two aspects, the
design activities they support, and the role of end-users
in these activities. The diagram in figure 1 uses these
properties to illustrate the position of active user
involvement and participatory design within the field of
UCD methods. The horizontal axis outlines the project
phases in which the methods can be used. The vertical
axis outlines the intended level of user involvement
achieved with each method.
Marine Design is an holistic design process with a strong
focus on the end users as well as stakeholders in the
design process, based on the principles of Industrial
Design. In contrast to Industrial Design, Naval
Architecture is about addressing a design specification.
The most important part of the Marine Design (Industrial
Design) process is reaching a well informed design
specification. Effective Marine Design requires a
multidisciplinary design team of Naval Architects,
Industrial Designers, Human Factors specialists,
environmental psychologists and interior designers. The
start of the marine Design process is understanding the
personas and needs of the end user. The aim of Marine
Design is to improve the aesthetics, human factors and
functionality of a vessel or system, and its' marketability.
The role of a Marine Designer is to create and execute
design solutions for problems of form, usability,
ergonomics, marketing, brand development, and sales.
Based on the principles of Industrial Design, the
objective of which is to study both function and form,
and the connection between product (vessel or system),
the user and the environment.[2]
Figure 1 relation between
participatory design [4]
Although the process of design may be considered
'creative', many analytical processes also take place. In
fact, many industrial designers often use various design
methodologies in their creative process. Some of the
processes that are commonly used are user research,
benchmarking, sketching, human factors evaluation and
CAD visualisation. Marine Design may also have a focus
on technical concepts, products and processes. It can also
encompass the engineering of objects, usefulness as well
as usability, market placement, and other concerns such
as seduction, psychology, desire, and the emotional
attachment of the user to the object. [2]
The two bottom rows of the diagram represent
'traditional' UCD methods in which the roles of designers
and users are quite distinct; designers generate solutions
for users based on explicit knowledge. This knowledge
can be gathered through ethnographic research such as
interviews or surveys with the user, or by observing users
during product use. Users are the objects of study and,
during usability testing, the testers of solutions. These
techniques are currently in common use in the product
design industry. Analysis, design and evaluation
activities as part of these methods are mostly conducted
by professionals for or together with users. [4]
user
centred
design,
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
There are however several challenges in product
development that cannot be addressed by these
traditional UCD methods:

Gathering rich user insights - Traditional
marketing tools do not always result in the
desired level of user insights as, for
instance, they focus on quantitative data
rather than in-depth qualitative data.

Acquiring experts knowledge - When
designing for professional use situations
with which designers are not familiar the
designer’s lack of practical experience
needs to be compensated.

Early validation of user requirements needs to validate concept directions with
users, traditional usability testing takes
place too late in the development process.

Obtaining a multi-perspective review - If
users with a variety of roles are involved in
the use of the same product, use situations
can become complex.
The top segment in Figure 1, represents active user
involvement and participatory design methods that have
been developed to address the aforementioned
challenges. Active user involvement methods have
become more broadly applied in practice over the last ten
years. Pioneers in this field, include design consultancy
IDEO, who are well known for their design approach of
user involvement in the analysis phase, and Philips, who
employ the LivingLabs approach. [4]
Participatory design had initially been used for the design
of software and organisational structures with the goal of
representing the interests of workers in the design
process. Recently it has been applied to civic
participation, healthcare design and architecture.
Compared to UCD and active user involvement
techniques, the broad adoption of participatory design in
industry has been moderate. As there is no homogenous
community that can be represented, nor is there a clearly
definable group of users to attend to.[4]
The field of active user involvement has a number of
methods addressing different parts of the spectrum, each
with its own interpretation of active user involvement.
The following characteristics can be used to differentiate
between the various methods: type of stakeholders
involved; number of stakeholders involved; type of
relation between the stakeholder and the product; project
activity in which stakeholders are involved. Involvement
can be limited to a specific activity phase (analysis,
design or testing), or applied throughout the project.
Despite the variety of methods and their implementation
in relation to the above characteristics, most of the
methods and techniques share one common goal, which
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
is to gain access to the user's tacit and practical
knowledge. [4]
Active user involvement methods help end users express
and analyse their current user interaction behaviour with
products and the context, allowing them to conceptualise
and reflect on future use scenarios. Effective
communication is required in order for end users to share
their tacit and practical knowledge with a design team
effectively and efficiently. However, communication
between users and a multidisciplinary design team is
challenging for both sides. As designers and engineers
are trained to communicate in a multidisciplinary
environment, but users are not. Therefore, it is difficult
for members of the design team to identify appropriate
questions for prospective users and construct them so
that the answers reveal useful design insights, as end
users are generally not able to translate their current
habits and routines into user requirements. It is therefore
necessary to employ a range of tools and techniques to
facilitate communication between end users and the
design team. They are often practical and action oriented,
encouraging participants to describe and explain their
actions. Designers can subsequently use this information
to improve the product. Physical mockups or virtual
prototypes are often used to reduce the threshold for
users to engage with the tools. Generic groups of
techniques include: task analysis; scenarios; virtual
reality. [4]
In field studies informing ship's bridge design, Luras and
Nordby [5] proposed the use of field research in
multidisciplinary design process of a bridge for an
offshore service vessel. They carried our ten field studies
over a three year period gaining considerable insight into
the value of field research in design projects for the
offshore industry. Allowing the designers to experience
the onboard environment for themselves is vital when
designing for such a complex domain. They have
developed a model for design-driven field research
relevant for these types of projects. The model
encourages designers to engage in design reflection while
in the field. The field studies were carried out as part of
the Ulstein Bridge Concept (UBC) design research
project. The aim of the UBC design research project is to
redefine the bridge environment of offshore service
vessels. The scope of the project includes all functions of
the bridge, and extends room layout to graphical user
interface. The multidisciplinary project team consists of
researchers and designers from the fields of interaction,
industrial, sound and graphic design, as well as experts in
human factors and engineering.
The model of design-driven field research, has three
areas of focus are: data mapping; experiencing life at sea;
on-site design reflection. Data mapping involves
collecting the specific data designers need in order to
develop relevant designs. This can include: recognising
the user group; documenting functions and tasks;
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
identifying the equipment used to conduct tasks;
mapping out the physical working environment.
Experiencing life at sea suggests an ethnographicinspired approach. The purpose of ethnography is to get a
deep, detailed understanding of how a group of people
experience and make sense of what they do. For this
project the approach involved becoming familiar with
life on board the vessel, gaining insights into the offshore
culture, and getting to know ' the men behind the user'.
Another important aspect of experiencing life at sea is to
understand the environmental, temporal ad bodily aspects
of staying on board. Design reflection involves reflecting
on possible design opportunities and on the potential to
design ideas while in the field. It also concerns being
conscious of using the field study to create a basis for
generating ideas and getting the Eureka moments later in
the design process. This involves being curious, not
setting strict boundaries for the scope of the field study,
and seeing everything on board as interesting. It also
relies on documentation of conceptual thinking while on
board. The model explicitly encourages the designer to
engage in design reflection in the field, in order to
accelerate the process of interpreting use situations and
more quickly arrive at appropriate deigns. [5]
1.1.1
AESTHETICS AND EMOTIONAL DESIGN
In considering the relationship of commercial vessel
exterior form language aesthetics and emotional design,
it is useful to first consider the automotive industry
where this relationship is firmly established. Perception
of a new car by a potential customer usually happens
from the outside to the inside through different levels of
detail. The first look catches the vehicle’s body style and
proportions. As the customer gets closer to the car,
surfaces come into focus. Eventually, details such as
door handles, and exterior trim parts are experienced.
The first characteristic of a car that catches a potential
customer’s attention, engaging their emotional
perception is the aesthetic appearance of its exterior
styling [6]. Automotive form language has been
developed in the superyacht industry for some time and
in recent years it has been implemented in the
commercial vessel industry. Where brand specific styling
features differentiate a vessel from its competitors, as is
the case with the car industry.
Both from the customer’s and society’s viewpoint,
styling makes a statement about the vehicle’s owner. For
most customers, the message sent out by their vehicle’s
styling is as important as the performance of the vehicle,
even if this statement is understatement. The following
are cars with distinctive exterior styling that send very
strong but different statements about the owner:
Lamborghini Reventon, provocation and radicality;
MINI Cooper, emotion and fun; Porsche 911 Turbo,
power and sportiness. Comparatively Ulstein, Damen,
Royal IHC, and Vard have commercial vessels with
distinctive but different messages. Exterior styling is
responsible for that visceral response of 'love at first
sight'. The fact that styling is as important for a vehicle’s
marketing success as its technical performance has been
known since the 1930s. The evolution of superyacht
design language in the last decade indicates that the
industry has arrived at the same realisation. The recent
exterior design developments by leading companies in
the commercial vessel sector show that they are
developing an appreciation of this realisation. [6]
Considering the distinction in perspective between the
designer and crew of a vessel. There is often a difference
between these two perspectives, but both similarities and
differences form a significant source of the affective
reactions that people have to products (vessels and
systems) and their interactions with them. These
reactions have a broad spectrum, including relatively
short-term emotions and longer term reactions such as
moods, preferences, and attitudes. The designer is
challenged by constraints such as functionality,
appearance, cost, characteristics of existing market
segments and competitors, and brand-identity issues.[7]
In terms of visceral emotional response and design
meaning, functionality and appearance are the most
relevant for understanding the relation between emotion
and design. From the perspective of the user,
functionality and appearance are important, but for
different reasons and in different ways. These two
aspects of the design space are the principal sources of
affective reactions. There are three types of users’
emotional reactions to products reactions that might or
might not have been anticipated or intended by the
designer. These three kinds relate to what Norman [8]
refers to as Visceral (perceptually based), Behavioural
(expectation based), and Reflective (intellectually based)
aspects of design, Figure 2 shows the relationship
between the two perspectives.[7]
Design Considerations
Appearance
Designer
Utility
Behavioural
ExpectationVisceral induced reactions
PerceptuallyReflective
induced
Intellectuallyreactions
induced reactions
User
Figure 2: The Designer’s View of the vessel differs from
the User’s view, adapted from [19].
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
Differences between designer and user perspectives of
the same product are particularly evident with respect to
the role of emotions. The designer may intend to induce
emotions through the design, but because emotions
(which are a special, but particularly salient form of
affective reaction) reside in the user of the product rather
than in the product itself, the emotions the user
experiences are not necessarily the same as those
intended by the designer. While, some of the emotions
the user might experience might have been intended by
the designer, some might not. Some might be just the
opposite of those intended by the designer. Productinduced emotions are often quite idiosyncratic,
depending, for example, on memories the product
invokes or on the particular circumstances of use. Yet
other emotions result from concerns outside the object,
such as the status it might or might not bestow. [7]
Designers have more control over users’ Visceral and
Behavioural reactions than Reflective ones, but even
here, the control is indirect at best. The attempts of
designers to influence these reactions are characterize as
attempts to provide emotional affordances. In other
words, designers can do things that provide opportunities
for the experience of emotions in users, just as, by
building in physical affordances, they can influence the
possibility of an object being manipulated and controlled.
But whether affordances are actually made use of is
beyond the designer’s control. [7]
1.1.2
EMPATHIC DESIGN AND DDI
The perceived comfort/pleasure of crew on a commercial
vessel is a combination of the emotional response to the
visual impact of the aesthetics of the vessel
exterior/interior and that of the interaction of the user
(crew) with the environment. Design must therefore meet
user (crew) needs, both functional and emotional, and
been informed by human factors (ergonomics). People
gain pleasure from products that meet their functional
and supra-functional needs, as defined in the most
comprehensive terms. Indeed, now that adequate product
functionality is the norm, supra-functional factors are
being recognized as more important. Emotional bonding,
symbolic representation, tribal connections, subculture
references, and so on all form part of the language
defining product personality and product semantics [9].
People relate to products in individual and interesting
ways. Different people relate to the same product in their
own particular way, depending upon its characteristics
and their own. Material possessions serve as symbolic
expressions of who we are. The clothes we wear, the
household items we buy, the car we drive, all enable us
to express our personality, social standing, and wealth.
The nature of a product can be described as a product
personality, and it is this, that determines the
relationships that users develop with different products
[8].
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Effective marine designers cannot rely solely on their
own experiences in the development of new products for
users unlike themselves. Their ability to create successful
products is enhanced through gaining empathy with the
user, which requires them to expand their “empathic
horizon”. Empathy is “our intuitive ability to identify
with other people’s thoughts and feelings – their
motivations, emotional and mental models, values,
priorities, preferences, and inner conflicts” [10].
Empathy is “the altered subjectivity that can come from
immersion into a particular context” [11]. a view that is
helpful for designers learning about human
communication during their designing process. Empathic
design research deepens the designer’s understanding in
the designing process. Intangibles such as feelings,
emotions, dreams, aspirations, and fears can provide the
designer with critical cues, triggers, and inspiration that
provide the essence to more balanced and functional
products. It requires designers to develop new ways of
seeing, thinking, and experiencing as they generate more
visionary ideas and concepts. Empathic design research
builds on the synergy of individuals developing
relationships [12] and is the essence of qualitative design
research [10].
Industrial Designers combine this
qualitative research with more traditional objective
research data (e.g., market research, socio-economic and
anthropometric) to fuel their creativity, develop inspired
products, and ensure more relevant design outcomes.
To facilitate design innovation marine designers should
consider implementing a Design-Driven Innovation
strategy as is often employed within product design.
People do not buy products but buy design meanings.
People use things for profound emotional, psychological,
and socio-cultural reasons as well as utilitarian ones.
Analysts have shown that every product and service in
consumer as well as industrial markets has a design
meaning. Marine designers should therefore look beyond
features, functions and performance, and understand the
real design meanings users give to vessels.
The process of Design-Driven Innovation is an
exploratory research project, which aims to create an
entirely new market sector for a given product through
changing the design meaning the user has for the
product. It occurs before product development, as shown
in Figure 3, and is not the fast creative brainstorming
sessions that are typical of concept generation but a
design
investigation
similar
to
technological
research[13]. In essence, it is the development of a
design scenario through engaging with a range of
interpreters in technology and cultural production.
Knowledge is generated from immersion with the design
discourse of the interpreter's groups. The process can be
structured or unstructured and is dependent upon the
nature of the relationship of the client with the
interpreters. The interaction between innovation of
design meaning and technology innovation can transform
the market within an industry and even create new
market sectors. The two strategies are complimentary as
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
technological and socio-cultural models are inextricably
linked, evolving together in innovation cycles. The
successful interaction between design-driven and
technology-push innovation is called a technology
epiphany, shown in Figure 4, it creates a market leader
and in some cases a completely new market sector. It is
the basis for successful products such as the Apple iPod.
[14]
societal/cultural environment (a further aspect of the
Medium). In shipping, the role of Management is
crucial.
Figure 5: The Five ‘M’s Model [16]
Figure 3: Design-Driven Innovation as research [13]
Figure 4: The strategy of design-driven innovation as a
radical change of design meaning [13]
1.2 Human Factors
The operation of a large ship is a socio-technical system
composed of people, equipment and organisational
structures. Socio-technical systems regard organisations
(in this case a vessel) as consisting of complex
interactions between personnel and technology. This
approach can also encompass the wider context to
include the societal infrastructures and behaviours in the
wider, shore-based management aspects of the
organisation. These aspects are linked by functional
processes (which are essential for transforming inputs
into outputs) and social processes which are informal but
which may serve to either facilitate or hinder the
functional processes (McDonald, [15]). In the Five ‘M’s
system approach (Harris and Harris, [16]) sailing a large
vessel is not just about the integration of the crew
(huMans) and ship (Machine) to undertake a particular
voyage (or Mission) within the constraints imposed by
the physical environment (Medium). It is also about the
The (hu)Man aspect of the five ‘M’s approach
encompasses such issues as the size, personality,
capabilities and training of the user, in this case the
vessel’s crewmembers. Taking a user-centred design
approach, the crew are the ultimate design forcing
function, as the design of the equipment and procedures
on the vessel have to lie within the core abilities of the
people involved. The (hu)Man and the Machine (ship)
components come together to perform a Mission tasked
by the Management. However, design solutions must not
only work within the parameters (Human Factors)
imposed by the crew, the ship’s technology and the
environment, and regulations governing the design,
construction and operation of the ship and the wider
norms of society. The owner’s Management must also
work within these rules. This prescribes performance
standards through the selection and training of crew or
the required technical performance of the ship.
The Management is the key link between the (hu) Man,
Machine, Mission and Medium. It plays the integrating
role that ensures compliance with the regulations and
promotes safe and efficient operations. The interrelationships between the five ‘M’s are illustrated in
Figure 5.
1.2.1 Human Factors Integration (HFI)
During the late 1990s the discipline of Human Factors
Integration (HFI) began to appear, initially in military
procurement programmes but subsequently in the oil and
gas industries. HFI provides a through-life, integrative
framework with the potential both to enhance safety and
increase performance while reducing through life costs.
HFI originally encompassed six domains [17]. These
were Staffing (how many people are required to operate
and maintain the system); Personnel (what are the
aptitudes, experience and other human characteristics
required to operate the system); Training (how can the
requisite knowledge, skills and abilities to operate and
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
maintain the system be developed and maintained);
Human Factors Engineering (how can human
characteristics be integrated into system design to
optimise performance within the human/machine
system); Health Hazards (what are the short or long term
hazards to health resulting from normal operation of the
system) and System Safety (how can the safety risks
which humans might cause when operating or
maintaining the system be identified and eliminated,
trapped or managed). Subsequently a seventh domain
was added, the Organisational and Social domain, which
encompasses issues such as culture, safety management,
information sharing and interoperability. Taking a
system-wide approach means that Human Factors can
now ‘add value’. Examples of this are already appearing
in the military domain (Human Factors Integration
Defence Technology Centre, [18]). For example, taking
an end-to-end system perspective, good equipment
design simplifies operating (and hence training)
requirements, making training faster and cheaper (less
time is spent in unproductive – not revenue producing –
work). Training is better targeted to the operator’s
requirements and is more efficient. Simultaneously,
better equipment design (e.g. interface design or design
for maintainability) and better specified training
produces superior, more error-free (safer) performance.
Careful crew selection processes may be more expensive
initially but they subsequently reduce the drop out and
failure rate in training (also expensive). Analysis and
modification of crew rostering practices can produce
rotas which produce more efficient utilisation of crew,
reduce fatigue, increase well-being and simultaneously
enhance safety. Such efforts can also reduce stress and
decrease employee turnover. At the same time a wellconsidered Human Factors aspect in a company’s safety
management system makes it cheaper to run and
produces the information required to promote safer
operations.
Implementing good Human Factors practices into the
design can make considerable through life savings. It
can also avoid costly re-works as a result of design misspecifications. For example, for the UK Royal Navy’s
Single Role Minehunters, it was discovered, after having
accepted the first of five ships into service, that it was
difficult to recover the Remote Control Mine Disposal
System back on board the ship in high seas. To address
the problem, a better crane with a remote control facility
was installed; a platform for the operator was made and
an additional recovery hook and pole was provided. This
was a simple manual handling problem which was
overlooked during development which eventually cost
£1.9 million to make the design changes to overcome
these difficulties. The Human Factors National Advisory
Committee for Defence and Aerospace [19] describes
examples of the benefits of taking a wider sociotechnical/HFI approach to equipment design. The
developer of an aircraft engine who adopted such an
approach reduced the number of tools required for the
line maintenance of a new turbine from over 100 to just
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
10; fewer specialist skills were needed further allowing a
consolidation in the number of maintenance trades
required which also resulted in an overall reduction in
training time.
The Human Factors Engineering (HFE) component of
HFI is usually the starting point for the HFI process.
One of the objectives of HFE is to minimize the potential
for error and promote the performance of assigned
activities as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Human error can be a direct cause or a significant
contributing factor for accidents onboard vessels and
offshore facilities. However, ‘Human Error’ in itself is
not an explanation to the cause of accidents and
incidents. It is merely the very beginning of an
explanation. Human errors are systematically connected
to features of an operator’s training, their tools and tasks
as it has its roots in the wider socio-technical system.
The question of ‘Human Error’ alone is an
oversimplified belief in the roots of failure (Dekker,
[20]).
From a Human Factors perspective, safety is all about
the error ‘troika’: prevent error; trap error, or mitigate its
consequences (Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm, [21]).
Prevention of error may be achieved by equipment
design (as seen in many computer interfaces which will
not accept an invalid input) or through procedural
countermeasures in ship operations. However, even
when an error has been committed, there should be
procedures which trap the error in a timely manner.
Continual crew monitoring of position should ensure that
even if an error has not been prevented or trapped, the
ship should not enter an unsafe condition (i.e. the error
should be mitigated).
Other approaches take an
integrated human/system approach to error prevention,
such as formal error identification methods. These deal
specifically with hardware and procedures rather than
looking more widely across the organisation (e.g.
examining its practices and culture) – a more systemic
approach. Reason [22] advocates this latter approach for
removing the underlying factors promoting error,
suggesting that addressing the ‘general failure types’
(such as poor tasking; poor scheduling; poor design; poor
procedures; poor training; poor planning and bad
communication) is the most cost effective approach.
Such Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) are conditions
which substantially increase the likelihood of human
error in a given situation. O’Hare [23] divided PSFs into
those external to the person (for example, environmental
conditions; equipment design; operating manuals and
procedures; training provided and poor supervision) and
those internal to the person (including their emotional
state; physical condition; stress and fatigue; and
experience; and task knowledge).
The US Department of Defense specifies four generic
categories of barrier to poor human performance that
may be applied in any system. Ideally, safety critical
systems should be defended at the highest level possible
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
(and at multiple levels). The hierarchy of barriers from
MIL-STD-882C [24] is:
 Design for minimum risk – Eliminate the
hazard from the system if possible. Design the
system so the accident cannot happen.
 Incorporate safety devices – Design into the
system automatic devices which, when a
specified hazard occurs, prevent the system from
entering a dangerous state.
 Provide warning devices – These should
activate early, leaving the operator time to stop a
critical system state developing.
 Develop procedures and training – Provide
adequate training in procedures to operate
equipment in a safe manner.
System-induced errors reflect deficiencies in the
implementation of the HFI processes. They include
mistakes in designating the number and type of
personnel, system operating policies, training
(competency assurance), data resources, logistics,
organizational
responsibilities,
and maintenance
requirements, and support. Design factors are related to
these errors and include aspects of the system hardware,
software, procedures, environment and training which
affect the likelihood of human error. They result from
human incompatibilities with the design of equipment.
Taking an integrated Human Factors approach in the
design process avoids mis-matches between system
design and human capabilities. The objectives of HFI and
HFE are to provide systems and equipment that reduce
the potential for human error, increase system
availability, lower lifecycle costs, improve safety, and
enhance overall performance (McSweeney, Pray, and
Craig, [25]). The key to demonstrating the utility of
Human Factors is not to count the cost of investing in it,
but to calculate the savings that it makes on a throughlife basis.
1.2.2. Maritime Accidents, Situation Awareness and
Crew Fatigue
An analysis of the most recent EMSA accident
reviews [26] (Fig. 6) revealed that “Cargo Ships” is the
largest category of vessels involved in accidents in and
around EU waters. This category also represents the
largest number of ships including general and
refrigerated cargo ships, Ro-Ro ships, bulk carriers and
car carriers. Within this category most accidents happen
with general cargo ships (approx. 80%) within the range
of 500 – 5000 GT. Another category with relatively high
numbers of accidents is the category of “Fishing
Vessels” due to their specific operational use and their
relatively limited size. From the same EMSA source an
overview of the number of vessels involved in the
different types of accidents in EU waters during the
period 2007 – 2010 is shown in Table 1. To put these
figures into perspective, it should be noted that per year
approximately 20,000 merchant vessels are recorded as
calling at EU ports and approx. 600,000 as port
movements.
14%
36%
11%
Cargo ships
Tankers
Container ships
Passenger ships
23%
Fishing vessels
10%
6%
Other vessel types
Figure 6: 2010 accidents by ship type [26]
no of accidents per type
Sinkings
Collisions/Contacts
Groundings
Fires/Explosions
Other
Total
2007
55
304
197
91
115
762
Cargo Ships
Sinkings
Collisions/Contacts
Groundings
Fires/Explosions
Other
Total
2007
11
132
108
29
50
330
2008
61
308
217
89
79
754
2008
10
120
115
26
36
307
2009
28
292
177
67
62
626
2009
6
93
76
30
20
225
2010
32
288
143
83
98
644
2010
6
97
72
17
42
234
Table 1: Top, the total number of ships involved in
accidents, bottom the number of cargo ships involved in
accidents [26]
A study by Baker and McCafferty [27] noted that human
error continues to be the dominant factor in maritime
accidents and that failures of situation awareness and
situation assessment predominate. Approximately 50%
of maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while
30% occur due to failures of humans to avoid an
accident. In an analysis of accidents involving
commercial vessels in Australia, Canada, Norway, UK
and the USA they concluded:
 Human error continues to be the dominant factor
in approximately 80 to 85% of accidents
 Failures of situation awareness and situation
assessment overwhelmingly predominate
 Human fatigue and task omission are closely
related to failures of situation awareness and the
accidents that result
Situation Awareness is the ability of an individual to
possess a mental model of what is going on at any one
time and also to make projections as to how the situation
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
will develop. In a review of non-technical skills within
the maritime domain Hetherington et al [28], reported on
a study that observed 71% of all human error types on
ships were situation awareness related problems. They
also reported that there was an increasing requirement for
‘non-technical’ skills in crewmembers. These are an
additional set of competencies that are used integrally
with technical shipping skills, such as those required to
manoeuvre the vessel. These skills encompass both
interpersonal and cognitive skills such as situation
awareness, communication, team working, and
leadership. Over the last 25 years research in the
aviation, medical, and nuclear power industries has
identified and implemented training in these fundamental
skills. Given the significant potential cost of accidents to
both insurers and operators, there is an opportunity to
develop interventions with the support of key industry
stakeholders using a transfer of innovation from other
transport sectors such as aerospace.
A review of fatigue in the shipping industry by
Houtman et al.[29] concurred that fatigue may be a
causal factor in collisions and groundings in between
11% to 23 % of the cases. It also suggested that fatigue
as a cause of accidents like collisions or groundings is
underreported, due to crew on watch being unlikely to
admit that they had been tired or stressed. Hetherington
et al [28] presented a survey of 1,000 maritime officers,
in which 77% felt that fatigue has significantly risen in
the previous 3–10 years, and 84% felt that stress was also
more prevalent, supporting the need for interventions to
resolve these key issues. Fatigue is defined by the IMO
as “a reduction in physical and/or mental capability as
the result of physical, mental or emotional exertion
which may impair nearly all physical abilities including:
strength; speed; reaction time; coordination; decision
making; or balance.” This implies that fatigue can be
understood and measured in many different ways. This
presents a challenge in relating research that has been
conducted in this field. Seafarers work in an environment
with a number of factors commonly associated with
fatigue. Long working hours, sleep disturbance and night
work are all present alongside factors unique to the
industry such as ship motion and noise. Working 24 hour
shift patterns on a moving vessel poses a number of
obstacles to gaining sufficient restorative sleep. Hence
the key factors associated with fatigue in the maritime
industry are: circadian rhythms; working patterns and
shift schedules; noise and motion; sleep. The potential
for fatigue amongst seafarers is high.
Disruption in circadian rhythms can result in
drowsiness which has significant implication for
activities such as watch keeping, or conversely being
awake when you need to be sleeping, thereby
exacerbating fatigue due to reduced sleeping hours. The
majority of seafarers also do shift work resulting in a
greater potential for disruption to circadian rhythms. A
study of the impact of fragmented work schedules on
alertness in seafarers showed a circadian dip in alertness
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
during the night and also a pronounced afternoon dip
which raises concern in terms of accident risk (Allen,
Wadsworth, and Smith, [30]). The MAIB 'Bridge Watch
keeping Safety Study' of 2004 concluded that fatigue was
a contributory factor in 82% of the groundings in the
study, which occurred between 00:00 and 06:00 hours.
Fatigue is compounded by factors such as minimal
manning; sequences of rapid turnarounds and short sea
passages; adverse weather and traffic conditions. The
effects of stress, fatigue and health factors associated
with long periods away from home, limited
communication and consistently high workloads result
not only in reduced performance but also ill-health and
reduced life-span. There is a significant body of research
into working hours and conditions and their
consequences on performance in rail, road transport and
civil aviation sectors, where safety and human error are
key concerns. This research from other transport sectors
has the potential to inform innovation in the commercial
marine sector. There are many more fatigue preventing
regulations in other transport sectors, with the issue of
fatigue being approached in a more systematic manner.
They therefore offer an opportunity for innovation and
technology transfer in the prevention and management of
fatigue at sea. The approaches of: regulation,
enforcement, awareness campaigns, training, and
guidance, are all potential areas of improvement given
the differential in current practices between the maritime
sector and other sectors. A study by Starren et al. [31] on
preventing and managing fatigue in the shipping industry
made a number of insightful recommendations. They
proposed that the transfer or delegation of tasks can
restructure crew members’ workload in such a way that
major errors and incidents may be less likely to occur.
They proposed that the delegation or workload
redistribution would be the most effective if it was
contextualized as a part of a Fatigue Risk Management
System (FMRS).
1.3 Ship Design Challenges and Recommendations
As the design of commercial vessels evolves and
crew sizes diminish, greater emphasis should be placed
upon the human factors input in order to ensure safety
and efficiency during both routine and emergency
operations. Severe ship motions limit the human ability
to operate command and control and communication
systems, navigate, perform routine maintenance and
prepare food. In an emergency, such operations as
refuelling at sea and damage control can be severely
hampered. In addition, ship motion can cause significant
mental degradation leading to overall performance
decrement and increased potential for injury (Dobbie,
[32]). Many ship design features can impact on the
cognitive workload onboard while others affect the
crew’s ability to sleep and the level of stress.
Appropriate implementation of automation is important
in terms of reduced workload, low stress Automation can
facilitate the work of the seafarers due to less time being
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
required to accomplish a task and effortless operation of
equipment aboard ship. Moreover, spending up to six
months aboard ship, subject to harsh weather, the life of
the seafarers is heavily dependent on the ship’s
equipment reliability which is a crucial factor leading to
fatigue [29]. Sleep and rest are essential components
underlying good (safe) performance, hence the physical
comfort in work and quarters are important features of
the ship design vital in alleviating fatigue. Ship motion
(instability) caused mainly by poor design of a vessel can
also influence the level of tiredness and fatigue [32].
Features such as noise within the ship have been defined
to be an important cause of fatigue at sea. Noise is
caused mainly by the engine operation, ventilation and
ship motion during harsh weather. Another internal
feature contributing to fatigue is vibration caused by the
engine and ship motion leading to the tiredness of the
seafarer [29]. Allen, Wadsworth, and Smith [30] reported
on a study which found that exposure to ship engine
noise at 65 dB (A) can have an adverse effect on sleep.
The working conditions in the engine room (ER) are
demanding due to the thermal climate, noise and
challenging working postures. The working practices in
the engine control room (ECR) have undergone
significant changes over recent years, with the
introduction of computer systems. Lundh et al [33]
carried out a study to identify the impact of these
changes. The aim of which was to understand how the
engine crew perceive their work situation and
environment, and to enable them to identify areas for
improvement. The results of the study show that the
design of the ECR and ER are crucial for how different
tasks are performed. Design which does not support
operational procedures and how tasks are performed risk
inducing inappropriate behaviour as the crew members’
are compelled to find alternative ways to perform their
tasks in order to get the job done. These types of
behaviour can induce an increased risk of exposure to
hazardous substances and the engine crew members
becoming injured.
Developments in simulation-based prototyping and
immersive virtual environment technology have created
an opportunity for the maritime industry. Virtual
environment technology is predominately aimed at
addressing
operational
safety
and
workplace
familiarization training. However, virtual environment
technology has the flexibility and accuracy to be
employed as a preliminary ship design support tool for
engine room operations. This would facilitate early
involvement of the crew in the design process, their
practical experience and expertise informing an
optimisation of the environment. Implementation of a
virtual environment training system would also enable
trainees and current crew to acquire the skills, experience
and proficiency within their job and work environment,
providing a more effective training platform and
educational experience. [34]
There is great potential for the application of virtual
environment applications within the marine shipping
industry as a design aid for subject matter experts to
evaluate ship designs virtually prior to ship construction.
Simulation-based prototyping has the potential to bring
attention to human factors and ergonomic concerns,
highlighting the importance of integrating these issues
into the design of the engine department. It also gives an
opportunity to take into consideration technological
developments and changes in work procedures.
Employing human factors design considerations through
simulation-based prototyping early in the ship design
process can also facilitate constructive feedback from
crew members and other stakeholders to ensure that the
design of the ship meets and supports the needs of
modern ships and its crew. Existing features of virtual
environment technology can be exploited to include
human factors into the design process and facilitate
preliminary ship engine room design and evaluation.
Such
features include: accurate visualization,
customization, flexibility, ease of use, realistic
interaction and simple communication platform (Figure
7). [34]
Figure 7:
technology[34]
Features
of
virtual
environment
Human Factors approaches can significantly reduce
through life design costs of vessel and systems. Ship
design still focuses on technical solutions, neglecting
human aspects associated with crewing and procedures
until a very late phase in the design/engineering process.
Manning issues are usually regarded as the responsibility
of the end-user usually relating to accommodation and
other associated facilities. In the maritime industry,
incidents and accidents in the Maersk shipping company
decreased by a third (from one major accident per 30
ship years in 1992, to one per 90 ship years in 1996) after
the introduction of Bridge Resource Management (BRM)
training. Furthermore, in 1998 insurance premiums were
lowered by 15%. This reduction was directly attributed to
the effects of enhances BRM and simulator training.[35]
2.0
State of the Art
2.1 Advanced Marine Platforms and Structural
Design Optimisation
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
A critical factor in Marine Design is the innovation of
platform technology to provide opportunities for design.
In examining the effect of bowshape on the seakeeping
performance of a fast monohull, Keunig, Toxopeus and
Pinkster [36] carried out computational analysis on the
three designs to evaluate their hydrodynamic
performance. The results of the comparison between
these three designs, (with this increasing change in
bowshape) show the AXE Bow to have a significant
reduction in the vertical acceleration of the wheelhouse.
Pronounced reductions (50%) have also been found in
the extreme peak values at the bow. The leads to less
slamming and therefore lower slam forces which is
beneficial to the construction of the ship as well as the
perception of the crew when sailing her. There was only
a small increase in the heave and pitch motion of the
AXE Bow when compared with the other ones, which
was to be expected. The results of extensive towing tank
measurements with the AXE Bow model and the same
model with a conventional bow were compared by
Keunig, Pinkster and van Walree [37]. From the results
of these tests it may be concluded that the application of
the AXE bow concept shows very good promise for
optimizing the seakeeping behavior and operability of
fast patrol boats in a seaway. The peaks in the vertical
accelerations in the head seas conditions are some 40%
lower with the AXE bow. Although roll and yaw do
increase with the AXE bow concept there appears to be
no increased tendency for broaching and/or course
instabilities in following and stern quartering seas.
The Ulstein x-bow is a backward-sloping bow that starts
at the extreme front of the vessel. This results in a
continuous and sharp bow shape, which smoothly divides
both waves and calm water. Increased volume above and
up front allows the vessel to efficiently respond to large
waves. In a comparison study between an X-BOW short
sea container vessel and an equivalent container vessel
with a conventional bow under expected service
conditions. At a design speed of 18 knots, results show 716% fuel reduction, depending on ship speed and sea
state. The performed tests of speed loss in waves for a
container vessel with the X-BOW compared to an
equivalent vessel with a conventional bow, indicate that
the X-BOW offers a significant speed advantage in sea
states most probable on a North Atlantic trade route,
where waves are expected to be above 2.5 metres 74% of
the time. The X-BOW has an average improvement in
speed loss of 19% in the 2.5-10.0 metre wave height
range. The first X-BOW designs were AHTS and PSVs,
since then the platform has been used for construction,
rescue, and seismic vessels, as well as the heavy offshore
and short-sea shipping segments.[38]
Boote et al [39] developed a new approach for the
structural analysis of a trimaran fast ferry (HSC) using
FEA. The results of the analysis show that transverse
connections with side hulls well withstand even the
highest wave loads considered in the calculations
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
whereas the longitudinal strength of the main hull should
be reviewed. The FE analysis highlighted the limits in
using HSC rules for the preliminary scantling of trimaran
structures even if they allowed to set a starting point for
subsequent optimisation procedure. In further research
[40] a procedure for the determination of global design
loads by a seakeeping analysis on two hull geometries of
two different loading conditions corresponding to the
maximum hogging and sagging bending moments. This
was followed a procedure for structure scantling has been
developed starting from a preliminary approach based on
HSC rules, up to the determination of global design loads
by a long term analysis. [41] In the structural assessment
of a cargo trimaran, a finite element numerical model
was set up to investigate the strength of the vessel when a
quasi static wave load is applied to it. In a second phase a
more detailed FEM investigation was carried out to
assess the structural strength of the vessel under the
action of global dynamic loads. [42]
McCartan et al [43] presented a design concept based on
this high speed platform to compete with road transport
and air transport, supported by specialised infrastructure
to optimise the vessel loading and unloading process for
cars and HGVs. The vessel design combined the
following functions: high speed ferry as an alternative to
HGV road transport; passenger ferry as a alternative to
flights; luxury cruising cabins. It is based on a 120m
trimaran platform designed to operate at 40 knots as a
coastal cruiser in the Mediterranean, connecting the coast
of Spain, France and Italy. The project was an
engagement in Design-Driven Innovation (DDI), with the
objective of changing the design meaning of what a
multi- purpose commercial vessel can be. Proposing the
CLF (Cruise Logistics Ferry) as a new market sector for
the commercial marine industry, Figure 8. The key driver
was sustainable luxury, as the vessel is multifunctional,
providing a high speed alternative to less sustainable
modes of transport. Thus addressing the growing
European definition of green luxury with the potential to
create a new market sector between cruise ships and high
end passenger ferries, while also reducing motorway
traffic and hence logistics carbon footprint.
Figure 8: Exterior of CLF (Cruise Logistics Ferry)
Dudson and Gee [44] reported on the optimisation of the
seakeeping and performance of a transatlantic
pentamaran containership capable of 40 knots, which
was extensively model tested. It established the
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
feasibility of building a large steel 40 knot container
ship, and demonstrated that the long slender stabilised
monohull form of the Pentamaran provides additional
seakeeping and performance benefits. A critical issue for
fast freight vessels is their ability to maintain speed in
adverse sea conditions. Where designs are ‘motions and
accelerations’ limited rather than ‘power’ limited, and
have to reduce power and speed in high sea conditions.
The model testing demonstrated that in all conditions up
to sea state 6, speed loss will be limited by power only,
and will amount to an average of 2.7 knots. In further
work [45] the hydrodynamic optimization of the central
hull of a 290m Pentamaran for SeaBridge in order to
maximize the speed of the vessel with a pre-determined
machinery package. The optimization of the central hull
was performed by combining the parametric CAD with
the CFD via the generic optimization tool. A scale model
of the optimized central hull was made and a series of
resistance tests undertaken to verify the accuracy of the
CFD calculations and to prove the validity of the
optimization. The process of parametric optimisation
through CFD provides the designer with a tool which
significantly enhances the usability of CFD and results in
a truly optimized hull, rather than an improved hull. The
application of formal strategies to fine-tune the
Pentamaran’s central hull for high-speed sea
transportation services proved to be successful.
Figure 9: Exterior Concept of pentamaran superyacht
McCartan et al [46] reported on a multidisciplinary
superyacht design project engaging in Design-Driven
Innovation through the application of a 130m pentamaran
platform combined with the implementation of a
culturally specific emotionaldesign framework. Building
on the emotional design aspects of high speed boating
and contemporary Chinese luxury,including the heritage
of Chinese Art Deco, this project proposes a change in
the design meaning associated with superyachts by
developing an Art Deco high speed superyacht coastal
cruiser for the Chinese market, shown in Figure 9.
Figure 10: Final Exterior Render
McCartan et al [47] reported on a transatlantic superliner
design concept (figure 10) based on a 290m Pentamaran,
which engages in Design-Driven Innovation to develop a
new market sector for high speed multifunctional vessel
to compete with both air freight and business class air
travel in addition to the role of a superliner cruise ship.
This design proposal offered the business traveller a
personalised office space with global connectivity to
make the journey a seamless extension of the working
environment. The logistics role of the vessel gives the
cruising passengers and business travellers a lower
carbon footprint that a single function vessel, thereby
engaging in green luxury.
Boote and Mascia [48] developed a fast passenger ship
with a very low wake wash to be used in a short range
transport close to the shore. Where wake wash represents
the biggest limitation to the commercial development of
fast vessels, which is exacerbated by vessel size. The
feasable platform typologies examined were: hydrofoil;
catamaran; SWATH. They synthesized a new topology
the ENVIROALISWATH, combining hydrofoil and
SWATH principles, in order to achieve low
environmental impact and reduced wave washing
phenomena, while maintaining a high speed. Providing
high performances, manoeuvrability and controllability
typical of hydrofoils combined with the good sea keeping
qualities and low installed power, typical of a SWATH.
The vessel consists of the hull and a submerged body
connected together by two column structures, shown in
Figure 11. The submerged body houses the main
propulsion system, and has four foils providing the
dynamic lift. The hull (Figure 12) has a trimaran
configuration with two hard chine lateral bodies and a
central hull supporting the column structures and
protecting the cross deck from wave impacts. the
ENVIROALISWATH has alength of 63 m and the
breadth of 15.5 m with a transport capacity of 450
passengers and 50 cars (see fig. 1).
Figure 11: Side view of ENVIROALISWATH
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
The submerged body has a length of 50 m, a breadth of
4.10 m and a depth of 2.6 m and it provides the 80% of
the hydrostatic buoyancy. The remaining 20% is
provided:
• at zero speed and in the preplaning phase by the
two lateral hull bodies;
• at cruise speed by four foils lifting force.
sector. In terms of an injury prediction model, standing
occupant models were used to simulated injuries and
trauma at selected positions in the ship. The results will
be used to inform a GA development process to improve
evacuation and propose innovative active safety
technology, to mitigate the risk of fatalities.
Achieving 27 knots with moderate wave making.
Platform technical innovations such as this will enable
marine vessels to create new markets to compete with
other forms of logisitics and public transport.
Figure 13: Analysis of upper aft deck vibration
Figure 12: Sectional view of ENVIROALISWATH
The on-board comfort of large motoryachts has become
the object of specific attention by most Classification
Societies which issued new rules and regulations for the
evaluation of noise and vibration maximum levels; this is
an equivalent to NVH analysis in the automotive
industry. In a comprehensive investigation into the
dynamic behaviour of superyacht structures, Boote et al
[49] carried out a detailed FEA analysis of a 60.0m
superyacht. In order to investigate the natural frequencies
of the main steel deck and of the superstructure
aluminium alloy decks (Figure 13). The numerical results
were validated with experimental data of components
carried out during vessel construction. This marine NVH
analysis process resulted in the addition of extra
structural mass to reduce aft deck vibration. This
approach to structural design optimisation would greatly
address the comfort Human Factors issues of commerical
vessels.
Crash of these high speed vessels platforms has more in
common with automotive accidents than those of slower
larger vessels. In the work of Bastien et al. [50] a
computer simulation model was developed to predict the
structural damage and the injuries to ship crew and
passengers, in the event of a 40knot crash of the CLF
with a harbour structure. The work involved reviewing
and implementing established crash modelling and
occupant simulation methodologies from the automotive
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Vessel structural loading conditions are primarily
determined from hydrodynamic loading in a range of sea
states. Due to the significantly higher speed of road
vehicles compared to conventional marine vessels,
automotive structural design, in which nonlinear FEA
has been well established for over 20 years, is focussed
on crash structural loading. Where crumple zones are
designed to have structural compliance in order to absorb
energy, and a rigid safety cell is designed to protect
occupants. This approach is critical to the future of
structural optimisation of high speed vessel platforms.
2.2 Human Factors Integration and Technology
Transfer
Significant efforts are now being placed on the
transfer of technology from military to civil applications
and from aerospace applications to the road sector (e.g.
the use of vision enhancement systems). Similarly,
technology that was previously only found in commercial
products is now finding its way into consumer products.
However, not all transfers of technology are successful or
desirable but there is a requirement to assess the likely
success of a transfer of technology before the product is
designed, produced, marketed and put into use. From an
ergonomic perspective, technology tends to be evaluated
solely in terms of its usability and functionality.
However, when transferring technology from one
application domain to another, the wider context needs to
be assessed to ensure the safe and efficient use of a
technology in its new application area. It is vital that the
suitability of a technology in a particular domain be
considered at the outset, otherwise ergonomics input will
be constrained to user-interface issues. Whilst userinterface design is obviously important, if the broader
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
domain issues are not first addressed, ergonomics should
not be expected to compensate for inappropriate
technological application. To address these issues, the
evaluative framework proposed by Harris and Harris,
2004 (the Five ‘M’s framework) can be implemented for
considering the likelihood of success in transferring
technology.
Good Human Factors can now make positive benefits to
enhancing performance and safety and also adding value
and reducing both operational and through life costs. It
can make things ‘better’. Examples of this are already
appearing in the military domain. The key to
demonstrating the utility of Human Factors is not to
count the cost of investing in it, but to demonstrate how
it either adds value and/or calculate the savings that it
makes on a through-life basis.
In a structured analysis of Human System Integration
programmes undertaken by the Australian Defence
Science and Technology Office (DSTO, [51]) it was
observed that early implementation of Human Systems
Integration activities in capability acquisitions could
result in extremely large returns on investment across the
life of the programme:
 returns on investment from HSI programmes in
US helicopter and armoured fighting vehicle
programmes of between 22-33:1.
 US Air Force studies (2009) suggest that if HSI
comprises between about 2.5-4% of acquisition
costs a return in investment of between 40-60:1
will be realised.
 Within the maritime domain the US navy
reported that the application of HSI principles
allowed for a 11% reduction in manning of its
aircraft carriers and a 25% reduction in
manpower on its next generation of amphibious
assault class.
 In the case of radical new designs (e.g. the
DD(X) destroyer programme) the potential for
cost savings via the early application of HSI
processes at the design stages could reduce the
personnel requirement by 70%. Similar cost
savings attributable to early Human Factors
analysis have been calculated by the French,
Canadian and Royal Navy.
2.3 Ergonomics and the transfer of technology
Previous unsuccessful transfers of technology have
focused almost entirely on the engineering associated
with the equipment and have ignored the wider
sociotechnical system. Shahnavaz [52] labelled
technology that was not ergonomically re-designed to the
requirements of its new environment ‘transplanted
technology’, and observed that such transfers were
‘doomed to failure’. Ergonomic re-design and evaluation
goes beyond user-centred design and testing and now
requires the appraisal of the technology within a broader,
sociotechnical system context. This is one of the key
concepts in HFI. Transfer of technology will often
involve the cross-fertilisation of engineering principles
among application areas but will always involve an
operator; therefore, it will always involve ergonomics.
The user is the component that determines the success of
the transfer of technology. Furthermore, ‘Technology’ is
not really a ‘thing’; it is better characterised as an
approach. It is the application of scientific principles to
solve practical problems.
Technology has been
described as having three facets: material artefacts; the
use of artefacts to pursue a goal; and the knowledge to
use these artefacts [53]. Technologies can be product
technologies (associated with the physical and
engineering aspects of equipment) and process
technologies (associated with the processes by which
problems are solved). Not all transfers of technological
concepts among application areas are likely to be
unsuccessful, though: far from it. The flight deck
management approach to promote good team working
and safe operations in civil aircraft (CRM) has
successfully transferred to the air traffic control
application domain, aircraft maintenance and the surgical
operating theatre. In the maritime industry it has been
implemented either as Bridge Resource Management or
Maritime Resource Management, and is shortly to
become a mandatory training requirement.
Previously, the Five ‘M’s framework has only been
presented as a sociotechnical system framework, but it
can be used to consider the likely success of technology
transfer from one domain to another (Harris and Harris,
[16]). Essentially, the more characteristics described
within the Five ‘M’s that the donor and recipient
application areas have in common, the more likely it is
that a technology will transfer. Transfer of technology is
a key principle, ensuring lessons learned in one
application area do not need to be relearned when
addressing related problems in a different area. Transfer
of technology is all about transfer of appropriate
solutions to problems. However, it may be the case that
the transfer of technology from a sector such as
aerospace to the marine industry is not motivated by such
a problem-solving requirement; hence the transfer of
technology may not be particularly successful. The
framework is not intended as a checklist, but as a frame
of reference for taking into account the key issues that
need to be considered before transferring a technology
into a different domain. A key part of this proposal is to
investigate the transfer of design principles and solutions
from other transportation (and high-risk industries) to the
maritime industry (for example, in the design and
operation of display systems on the bridge and ship
automation).
3.0
Progress beyond the State of the Art
3.1 Preliminary Design Process Optimisation
Wagner [54] presented the results of an early application
of a packing approach on the design of deepwater drilling
vessel, as a test case in order to evaluate its practical
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
capabilities. The 3D packing routine for the early stage
configuration design of ships has the potential to enable a
more thorough consideration of a large number of
alternative designs early in the design process. Their
work illustrate that a large and diverse set of compact
and coherent drilling vessel configurations can indeed be
obtained on the basis of one single input model,
demonstrating its capability to generate a large number
of alternative designs. They demonstrated a two-step
approach, in which a designer first generates a large
amount of configuration alternatives and consequently
evaluates and select solutions, can flexibly be applied,
demonstrating its utility in the early stage design of
deepwater drilling vessels. The generated configuration
alternatives were shown to be logical in configuration,
reasonably compact and all satisfy a basic level of
feasibility. Application of the approach starts with
developing a suitable model which is then used to
generate a comprehensive cloud of configuration
alternatives. On the basis of the available alternatives the
designer manually evaluates and selects solutions. Any
of the modeling, generation and evaluation steps may
need to be revisited in order to adjust the focus of the
search for designs of interest.
In the field of Naval Architecture, decisions in the design
process, and their justification, are extremely important
and influential. Although decisions are taken (and
rationale expressed) during all phases of the design
process, they are most important during concept design.
It is estimated that 90% of the major design decisions
have been made when less than 10% of the design effort
has been extended. These decisions have a direct
influence on the quality of the resulting design. If
improper or inferior decisions are taken, the resulting
design can be suboptimal, or in the worst case, fail.
Although design rationale occurs in multiple areas of
concept design, it would be particularly valuable during
the configuration design of complex vessels. The layout
of spaces in complex vessels represents unique blend of
experience, judgment and tradition. In addition, the
decision knowledge required to identify and justify the
relationships, i.e., interactions, between objects in the
design is often tacit, qualitative and not explicitly
available. For example, factors such as habitability,
operability and convenience are difficult to describe
quantitatively; but, without specific consideration, can
result in difficulties for the ship and crew’s overall
functioning. Given a collection of objects in a design,
there are two primary categories of rationales describing
configuration: interactions and compromises. Interaction
rationales describe the spatial proximities between
objects in the design and the reasons, i.e., rationale,
justifying such relationships. Compromise or trade-off
rationale describes the preferred priority between
competing or conflicting interactions. [55]
Identification of interaction rationale is important in ship
design because it motivates proper analysis (in design)
and forms the basis of compromise or trade-off decisions.
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Without knowledge of the interactions in the design, it is
difficult to understand the consequences of compromises.
Rationales can also provide an increase in the relative
quality of knowledge in the ship design process. The
“Knowledge- Cost-Freedom” curve shown in Figure 14
illustrates the benefits of increased knowledge during the
early stages of design. As knowledge becomes obtainable
earlier in the design process, design freedom increases,
committed costs can be postponed to a later point in the
design cycle and overall design time can be reduced.
This is especially important during periods of reduced
capital reinvestment in complex ships.
Figure 14: Distribution of cost, knowledge and design
freedom during the early stages of design. [55]
de Nucci and Hopman [55] described a methodology for
capturing configuration rationale in complex ship design.
The approach uses Reactive Knowledge Capturing to
“trigger” the expression of design rationale. Once
expressed the rationale is (re)structured in an argument
based semi-formal ontology. This arrangement also
captures dependency structures between objects and
relationships in the design. A dedicated feedback
mechanism for expanding the knowledge (rationale) base
is presented. This methodology first identifies gaps
present in the rationale database. Subsequently, it uses
these gaps to instruct the design generation module to
produce designs likely to trigger naval architects into
expressing targeted rationale. At the same time, user
expressed rationale is also incorporated into designs.
Through two independent test cases, the RCT proved to
be an effective and usable tool for the capture of
configuration rationale. van Oers and Hopman [56]
developed a simpler and faster version of a novel type of
parametric ship description, based on mathematical
packing problems. Where the description is still able to
apply large and concurrent changes to the entire ship
description, i.e., the shape and size of envelope,
subdivision and -crucially- the configuration of systems
inside and on the envelope.
Existing packing-based
descriptions took considerable computational effort,
however, which limits their suitability for a range
applications, hence the need to reduce the computational
effort by describing the ship in `2.5D’. This describes the
ship configuration in three transverse `slices’. Main
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
benefit is that this reduced the number of transverse
positions to consider, which helps to lower the
computational effort by a factor of three to seven.
An interactive design exploration approach geared
towards early stage ship design was proposed in the work
of Duchateau et al [57], which allows the naval architect
to perform requirements elucidation better. The proposed
approach gives the naval architect the means to explore
and assess a broad range of design options, which are
integrated into coherent design solutions, thus covering a
large area of the design space. Interactive visualization
methods, together with pareto-front visualization
techniques are developed to give the naval architect the
means to identify emerging relationships between
requirements and the design solutions. This insight can
then be used by the naval architect to steer and control
the design exploration process through a feedback
mechanism within the approach. This empowers the
naval architect to not only identify, but also act upon the
emerging relationships between requirements and the
design, which can then either be avoided within the
interactive approach or communicated to the
stakeholders in support of a better requirements
elucidation process.
Van Brusiness et al
[58] examined the initial
development of a design and engineering strategy for
complex ships in between incremental and radical
innovation. The majority of European ship-design
industry concentrates on the development of complex,
one-off ‘specials’ for the offshore industry. To control
the complexity of these vessels the industry uses large
and expansive knowledge bases that support the design,
engineering and manufacturing activities. As current
strategies are aimed at controlling the complexity, they
leave very little room for more innovative developments.
They interviewed stakeholders from the ship industry,
researched design literature developed case studies.
Based on case studies they proposed an alternative
design strategy that leaves more space for innovation,
which focuses on the complex interactions between the
different levels of decomposition in a complex structure
such as a ship. They identified that the wide range of
actors involved in these designs make such a change in
industry a socio-technical challenge.
3.2 Crew Resource management
A ship is a complex socio-technical system.
Navigating such a vessel and managing all the associated
activities within it (propulsion; electrical power
generation;
engineering;
communication
and
surveillance; cargo management; passenger management,
etc) is an exercise in command and control. The crew
undertaking these functions are widely distributed across
a moving vessel which is itself a large, complex space
with many inter-related systems. Many crew members
are specialists.
BRM (Bridge Resource Management), or when
applied more widely to the rest of the ship MRM
(Maritime Resource Management), is the process by
which ship-wide command and control is exercised.
MRM is concerned with the effective use and coordination of all the skills, knowledge, experience and
resources available to achieve the established mission
goals of a voyage safely and efficiently. BRM/MRM
concepts are built upon of Crew Resource Management
(CRM) ideas initially developed by the commercial
aviation industry.
Revisions to the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers now require senior members
of a ship’s crew in positions of responsibility to
undertake mandatory MRM training. Good CRM (CAA,
[59]) requires knowledge of:
 Human error and reliability, error chain, error
prevention and detection.
 Company safety culture, Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), organisational factors.
 Stress, stress management, fatigue and
vigilance.
 Information acquisition and processing,
Situation
Awareness
and
workload
management.
 Decision making.
 Communication and co-ordination.
 Leadership and team behaviour.
 Automation and the philosophy of the use of
automation.
The processes underpinning CRM/MRM includes
(from van Avermaete, [60]):
 Co-operation – Team building and maintaining;
considering others; support and conflict solving.
 Leadership and managerial skills – Use of
authority/assertiveness;
providing
and
maintaining
standards;
planning
and
coordination, and workload management.
 Development of Situation Awareness – System
and environmental awareness; anticipation.
 Decision
making
skills
–
Problem
definition/diagnosis; option generation; risk
assessment/option choice and outcome review.
However, modern approaches to human behaviour
extend beyond the human alone. A ship and its crew can
be regarded as a Joint Cognitive System (JCS). You
cannot study human behaviour without the context in
which it takes place, as human beings use artefacts
around them to enhance their cognitive abilities.
Distributed cognition (the behaviour and information
contained in a JCS) is the co-ordination between
individuals, artefacts and the environment. At the very
simplest level possible, writing things down on a piece of
paper using a pencil improves human memory, either in
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
the long-term (e.g. a diary) or in the short term (when
doing arithmetic). To some extent it is a ‘cognitive
amplifier’; the role and function of memory is now
distributed between a human and a non-human
component. However, distributed cognition can go much
further than this. Rogers [61] describes four generic
properties of distributed cognition:
 Cognitive systems comprising more than one
person have properties over and above those
individuals making up the system (e.g. a ship
and its crew).
 The knowledge possessed by members of such a
system is highly variable and redundant: teams
working together on a collaborative task will
possess different kinds of knowledge and so will
engage in interactions that allow them to pool
their cognitive resources.
 Knowledge is shared by the individuals through
formal and implicit communication with prior
knowledge of each other, enabling them to
engage in heedful interrelating during tasks.
 Distribution of access and sharing to
information
and
knowledge
promotes
coordinated action.
Distributed cognition is predicated upon a degree of
common understanding of the situation amongst the crew
about the aims and objectives of the task and the agreed
method of achieving the goal. Most models of Situation
Awareness (SA) concentrate on the individual, however
people in a JCS act in conjunction with equipment and/or
as part of a wider team. This introduces the notions of
shared and overlapping SA. In shared SA all members of
the ship’s crew would have a common mental model and
a complete shared understanding of the current (and
future) situation. However, it is unlikely that an entire
crew will have such a close (shared) appreciation of their
situation. There will be some common elements to their
SA (for example, where they are and what their
immediate and longer term intent), however it is more
likely that each crew member will be concentrating on
the individual responsibilities associated with their role.
It would actually be unproductive and inefficient for
crew to attempt to achieve complete shared SA
throughout a voyage.
Endsley and Jones [62] developed a model to
promote shared SA which treated a team as part of a JCS.
 Requirements – What information and goals
need to be shared?
 Devices – What devices are available for
sharing this information?
 Mechanisms – What mechanisms do crew
members possess to aid in developing team SA?
 Processes – What formal processes are used for
sharing information, verifying understanding,
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
prioritising tasks and establishing contingencies,
etc.
Newer concepts of SA in a JCS draw heavily upon
theories taken from cognitive science. In Distributed
Situation Awareness (DSA) SA is held both by the
various human and/or machine components right across a
JCS (Stanton, Stewart, Baber, Harris, Houghton,
McMaster, Salmon, Hoyle, Walker, Young, Linsell and
Dymott, [63]). Operators are now active supervisors or
managers who need to co-ordinate a suite of human and
automated resources to perform a task. The automation
is treated almost as part of the crew. Stanton, Baber,
Walker, Salmon and Green [63] proposed a set of basic
tenets underpinning DSA.
 SA can be held by both human and non-human
elements in a JCS.
 There are multiple views of the SA of the same
scene held by all the different agents.
 Non-overlapping and overlapping SA depends
on the human or machine agent’s individual
goals: although they are part of the same
system, the goals of the individual components
comprising the system can be quite different.
 Communication between agents in the system
may take many forms including the non-verbal
behaviours of others or even ingrained customs
and practices.
 One component in the system (be it human or
machine) can compensate for degradation in SA
in another agent.
DSA is dispersed across human and non-human
components in the system and there is often implicit
communication of information between elements rather
than detailed exchange of mental models. On a bridge all
agents may be co-located, however in a larger ship there
is no reason why this should always be so. The agents
(technological or human) may be separated by some
distance. This then requires more formal communication
methods to promote DSA.
BRM/MRM is one
mechanism by which DSA can be promoted. The
concept of DSA operates at a systems level, not at the
individual level. It also is not shared SA. Shared SA
implies the same collective requirements and purposes
amongst the human and machine components in a
system, all of whom share the same understanding of a
commonly held ‘bigger picture’. DSA implies different
but
compatible,
requirements
and
purposes.
Furthermore, the appropriate information/knowledge
relating to the task and the environment (held by either
by individuals or captured and processed by devices)
changes as the situation develops (Stewart, Stanton,
Harris, Baber, Salmon, Mock, Tatlock, Wells and Kay,
[64]).The EAST (Event Analysis of Systemic
Teamwork) methodology (Baber and Stanton [65]) was
developed for the generic analysis of C4i (command,
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
control, communications, computers and intelligence)
activity. It also incorporates the modelling and analysis
of DSA at a system level.
3.3 Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST)
EAST uses a combination of HF methods to form a
framework for analysing C4i activity. A brief description
of each component method is provided below:
 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) – involves
describing the task in a particular scenario under
analysis using a hierarchy of goals, sub-goals
and operations.
 Observation – is used to gather data surrounding
the scenario under analysis. The observational
data obtained are used as the primary input to an
EAST analysis.
 Co-ordination demands analysis (CDA) –
involves defining the task-work and team-work
tasks involved during the scenario, and then
rating each teamwork task step against the CDA
taxonomy of; communication; situational
awareness; decision making; mission analysis;
leadership; adaptability; and assertiveness.
 Comms Usage Diagram (CUD) - is used to
describe
collaborative
activity between
distributed agents. The output of CUD describes
how and why communications between a team
occur, the technology involved, and the
advantages and disadvantages of the technology
medium used.
 Social Network Analysis – involves defining and
analysing the relationships between agents
within a network. A matrix of association and a
social network diagram are constructed, and
agent centrality, sociometric status and network
density figures are calculated.
 Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD) –
represents the tasks, actors, communications,
social organisation, sequence and time in which
a scenario takes place. It captures the flow of
information between actors and shows how this
is mediated through technology and team work.
 Critical Decision Method (CDM) – involves the
use of interview probes to elicit information
regarding the agent decision making strategies
adopted during the scenario under analysis.
 Propositional Networks – The CDM output is
used to construct propositional networks for
each phase. Propositional networks are
comprised of nodes that represent sources of
information, agents, and objects that are linked
through specific causal paths. The propositional
network thus represents the potentially ‘ideal’
collection of knowledge for an incident.
EAST is a comprehensive technique offering a multifaceted assessment of the C4i network in question
providing an assessment of agent roles within the
network, a description of the activity including the flow
of information, the component tasks, communication
between agents and the operational loading of each
agent. The methodology has been applied in a number of
domains, including the fire service (Baber et al [66]
[67]), naval warfare (Stanton et al, [68]), military
aviation command and control (Stewart et al, [69]), air
traffic control and rail domains (Walker et al, [70]).
EAST provides a dynamic view of the DSA held by both
human and non-human components in a system, and
illustrates how this can vary with task requirements
(Stanton, Baber and Harris, [71]).
3.4 Digital Human
Biomechanical Analysis
Modeling
(DHM)
and
There is a need to support the maritime sector to
facilitate anthropometric and biomechanical aspects of
Human Factors Integration in the design process.
Traditionally, this has been supported through the use of
mock-ups, with their effective use for anthropometric
assessment often not being fully realised due to time
constraints or uninformed practices. Physical mock-ups
are typically constructed to assess the interaction
between the user and their working environment, but this
is still the exception rather than the norm. There are three
recognised classes of mock-up fidelity, which
designers/manufacturers may use:
 Class 1 - Low fidelity: used to evaluate
approximate work/accommodation shape, space,
external vision and new ideas.
 Class 2 - Good fidelity: produced to be close to
the craft drawing dimensions, used for the
assessment of detail design, crew stations
configuration, passenger space, maintenance
access, ability to undertake emergency
procedures, etc.
 Class 3 - High fidelity: constructed with
production materials and to production
tolerances, used to interrogate Man-Machine
Interface details, task lighting, layouts of wiring,
plumbing, etc.
An issue with the production of Class 2 and Class 3
mock-ups is the resource required, both in terms of cost
and development time, however 3D Computer Aided
Design (CAD) has become the norm throughout the
marine design industry. The ability of CAD to optimise
human factor design considerations as an integral part of
the design process is an effective solution both in terms
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
of cost and development time (Dobbins, Hill, McCartan
and Thompson, [72]).
In the early 90s the German car industry developed a
CAD tool for early integration of ergonomics in the
vehicle design process. This CAD tool for ergonomics
and occupant packaging, was called RAMSIS (Realistic
Anthropometric Mathematical Simulation in Situation).
Its goal was to overcome the limitations of conventional
automotive industry practices of using two-dimensional
human templates, as well as to provide methods for
predicting driver postures and comfort. RAMSIS is based
on a highly accurate DHM (Digital Human Model) that
can simulate occupants with a large variety of body
dimensions from global anthropometry databases. A
probability-based posture prediction model was
developed through research on driver postures and
comfort. The assessment of comfort allows designers to
optimize packages with respect to driver comfort early in
the design process. Analysis tools include: reach and
vision; force-based posture and comfort prediction
model; simulation of ingress and egress. This DHM has
resulted in a reduction in development costs of more than
50% for the automotive industry through a reduction in
vehicle development timeframes by a factor of 3 to 5
(van der Meulen and Seidl, [73]). RAMSIS is now used
in the aerospace sector by companies such as Airbus,
EADS, Embraer and Eurocopter to address customer
specifications regarding the comfort, safety and
operability of aircraft.
Commercial vessels are similar to aircraft in that they
are very often sold at the digital model stage. As with
the automotive industry, using DHM, the development
timeframe can be reduced and optimized at the same time
because different design options can be easily compared
with one another. Posture in the cockpit, comfort and
ease of operation in the passenger cabins and the
feasibility of maintenance tasks can all be simulated. It
also facilitates the testing and optimization of the
feasibility of performing assembly, maintenance and
repair work. van der Meulen and DiClemente [74]
describe the use of the DHM in a proposed flight deck
design for the Eclipse 500 jet. The results were used to
detect accommodation problems, as well as to establish
further guidelines and requirements for design of the
cockpit and interior components.
RAMSIS Cognitive is a module for analyzing and
optimizing the perception and management of
information in the vehicle. As the number of instruments
in drivers’ cockpits increases it is vital to know how well
they can be perceived, and to ensure all the displays fall
well within the field of vision. This concerns all technical
information of a vehicle such as instruments, control
displays, and optical indicators. The additional
functionality allows simulation of viewing conditions in
the car, including methods for the analysis of sight
shadows, limits of visibility of liquid crystal displays,
estimating the time of focus shifts of the driver and the
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
modelling of the optical parameters of head-up displays.
This offers optimized instrument visibility resulting in
greater operational safety and increased comfort. It also
results in lower costs for modifications during the
development phase (Remlinger, Bubb and Wirsching,
[75]). The work undertaken within the European Boat
Design Innovation Group (www.ebdig.eu) found that
tools such as RAMSIS are effective human factor design
tools in the majority of marine applications, (Dobbins,
Hill, McCartan and Thompson, [72]).
3.4 Open Innovation
In order to facilitate transfer of technology into the
Maritime sector we propose the use of ‘Open innovation’
(OI). OI is a new paradigm for the management of
innovation. It is defined as ‘the use of purposive inflows
and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal
innovation, and to expand the markets for external use of
innovation, respectively.’ It thus comprises both outsidein and inside-out movements of technologies and ideas,
also referred to as ‘technology exploration’ and
‘technology exploitation’. As a result, a growing number
of MNEs have moved to an OI model in which they
employ both internal and external pathways to exploit
technologies and, concurrently, to acquire knowledge
from external sources. In order to better profit from
internal knowledge, enterprises may engage in three
activities related to technology exploitation: venturing,
outward licensing of intellectual property (IP), and the
involvement of non-R&D workers in innovation
initiatives (Figure 15). Venturing is defined as starting up
new organisations drawing on internal knowledge, i.e. it
implies spin-off and spin-out processes. The third
practice to benefit from internal knowledge is to
capitalize on the initiatives and knowledge of current
employees, including those who are not employed in the
internal R&D department. Several case studies illustrate
that informal ties of employees with employees of other
organizations are crucial to understand how new products
are created and commercialized. Many practitioners and
scientists, also outside the field of OI, endorse the view
that innovation by individual employees is a means to
foster organizational success. Work has become more
knowledge-based and less rigidly defined. In this context,
employees can be involved in innovation processes in
multiple ways, for example by taking up their
suggestions, exempting them to take initiatives beyond
organizational boundaries, or introducing suggestion
schemes such as idea boxes and internal competitions
(van de Vrandea et al., [76]).
However, innovation in SMEs is hampered by lack of
financial resources, scant opportunities to recruit
specialized workers, and small innovation portfolios, so
that risks associated with innovation cannot be spread.
SMEs need to heavily draw on their networks to find
missing innovation resources. External networking to
acquire new or missing knowledge is therefore vital for
European Maritime SMEs to remain competitive. OI is
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
therefore highly relevant for both service and
manufacturing organisations and is described in the
following collaborative model (Figure 16).
changes through which OI has been implemented involve
four major dimensions, i.e. networks, organisational
structures, evaluation processes and knowledge
management (KM) systems. They should be therefore
conceived as the managerial and organisational levers an
innovating firm can act upon to streamline its journey
toward OI.
Figure 15: Open innovation model for SMEs
As the Maritime Sector is heavily populated by SMEs
but other transport sectors are less so, the use of this
model to efficiently transfer knowledge while
engendering trust in a mutually beneficial relationship is
both novel and ideal.
Figure 16: Possible models for open innovation with
SMEs
Survey data from Far East SMEs supports this
framework proposition. SMEs have been encouraged to
establish cross-functional collaborative networks. The
results supports the concept of OI for technology transfer
into European Maritime SMEs by indicating effective
networking as one possible way to facilitate their
innovation capabilities, through the use of the
conceptual framework in Figure 17. In examining how
firms dynamically implement the OI management
paradigm, Chiaroni et al [77] identified a three-phase
process that comprises the stages of unfreezing, moving
and institutionalising. Moreover, it emerges that the
Figure 17: Conceptual framework of intermediary role
Having identified the main levers on which managers
intervene to realize the transition from a Closed to an OI
model as: networks; organisational structures; evaluation
processes and KM systems we propose a move to a
virtual collective technology centre. Communication,
collaboration and social networking technologies present
in the Web 2.0 are being adopted within corporations and
organizations to support OI activities. This will enable
Executives and manager to pursue productivity and
innovation improvement and understand how the
information and knowledge gained, impacts on business
indicators as follows;
 Search application: Solution for document
retrieval according to users’ queries including
the ability to understand the meaning of terms.

Knowledge management: Experience sharing,
document management and question answering
functionalities are included in this solution.

Skill management: Solution for employee skill
management
and
staffing,
including
optimization of intellectual capital.
 Innovation management: Solution for idea
management and overall support for the
innovation process based on the ‘OI’ paradigm.
Open Innovation therefore enables an open business
model for companies to "co-innovate" with their partners,
suppliers, and customers in order to accelerate the
rewards of innovation. For example, a small or midsized
company develops a game-changing new idea and works
with a larger company to bring the product to market. It
enables companies to leverage new ideas and products,
and conduct experiments at lower risk levels. Given the
maritime industry this would be beneficial to facilitate
collaboration with smaller companies in and outside the
industry and quickly develop new concepts and ideas.
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
4.0 Innovation
So now the challenge, an integrated systems design
approach within the commercial marine industry from
large companies to SMEs. To enable customers to have
an informed collaborative design process with the
insurance underwriters as a stakeholder in the process, as
well as end users and subcontractors. As previously
discussed good design improves Human Factors and
reduces risk. The potential for reduced insurance
premiums due to reduced risk, present a significant value
proposition. Where the increase is design costs 2.5-4%
offers a return on investment of 40-60:1 in reduced
operating costs. An integrated systems design approach
is very different from sending a number of
subcontractors a specification and negotiating on price. It
requires a framework for communication that facilitates
best practice and effective communication while
respecting the IPR of all parties involves to develop
design realisation for mutual benefit. In order to facilitate
transfer of technology into the Maritime sector we
propose to use ‘Open innovation’ (OI). This is a new
paradigm for the management of innovation. It is defined
as ‘the use of purposive inflows and outflows of
knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and to
expand the markets for external use of innovation,
respectively.’It thus comprises both outside-in and
inside-out movements of technologies and ideas, referred
to as ‘technology exploration’ and ‘technology
exploitation’ respectively. As a result, a growing number
of MNEs have moved to an OI model in which they
employ both internal and external pathways to exploit
technologies and, concurrently, to acquire knowledge
from external sources.
This Marine Design process of innovation will require
large, multidisciplinary teams in which specialists
provide expertise, simultaneously. Inside New Product
Development (NPD) teams specialists often find it hard
to communicate with each other, as they use a different
technical vocabulary, have different perspectives on the
subject in question and engage in distinctive
methodological approaches. This results in boundary
forming within the team. One of the specialists is a
marine designer, who focuses on the usability and
experience of use of products. Stompff and Smulders
[78] reported on studies that found that industrial
designers have a boundary spanning capability in teams
and organisations. Designers continually translate
technical choices to the realm of product and/or user by
means of expressive representations of the product.
These representations are communicated in a language
understood by all and this enables the other specialists to
reflect on their choices and those of others, i.e. crossdisciplinary. This capability is referred to as ‘mirroring’,
as the process of translation of technical choices to
consequences for product/user is analogous to placing a
mirror in front of the specialists, enabling them to reflect.
Yet designers are not explicitly assigned the role of
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
boundary spanning, nor are aware of this capability. It is
their practice that enables them to span boundaries.
Effective Marine Design requires a wide range of
specialised knowledge and capability that is distributed
over many actors. In order to develop a unified and
coherent vessel or system, in addition to Marine
Designers, a range of specialists need to work together
and integrate their knowledge: engineers, Naval
Architects, Human Factors specialists, interaction
designers, and marketers. This collaboration is
challenging as complexity is addressed by
disaggregation, resulting in the component part design
briefs. These tasks are assigned to specialists, enabling
companies to optimise then as a resource. The division of
design work impedes the ability to maintain an holistic
perspective of the process. It becomes difficult to ensure
that an integrated product is created, in which all parts fit
seamlessly without redundancy. Design problems are
seldom confined to a given specialist discipline or subsystems. They require the insight of a multi-disciplinary
team and variety of communication practices[79].
Resolving these problems requires specialists to 'think
collectively' as a team, which is called 'team cognition'
[78]
However, in multi-disciplinary NPD teams, its members
may find it hard to understand each other. Team
members can experience boundaries at any point in time:
imaginary, perceived demarcations between specialists,
departments or functional units. Across these boundaries,
team members find it difficult to communicate situations
and challenges. Those that share the same practice are
part of communities of practice, and within practices,
knowledge is easily shared. However, sharing and
disseminating knowledge across practices is challenging.
The specialists may deploy entirely different vocabulary
and tools, causing an issue of comprehension between
team members. There are other causes of boundaries
such as having sub-teams at different locations. In this
case, team members cannot see each other and are not
aware of concurrent activities across locations, which can
be global, even if they share the same practice. The team
members are confronted with time-zones, different first
languages and diverse cultures. There are also
organisational boundaries when parts of the product are
developed by suppliers or by strategic partners. [78]
Global NPD has many benefits and is widely practiced.
For example, vulnerable strategic alliances are started, so
that technology and ideas are bought to access and
integrate specialised knowledge 'open innovation'. But in
these alliances, boundaries are omnipresent. It is hard to
name the group of developers a 'team', as the members
do not have a shared context, applying disparate methods
and tools, and speak different first languages. Therefore
spanning boundaries is an important challenge for
managing product development. Effective 'mirroring' is
dependent upon the abilities of designers to frame any
problem ‘user-centred and outside-in’ and to express
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
their
interpretation
well
through
compelling
representations. Generally designers do not have a
formalised role to span boundaries, and are unaware of
their boundary spanning capabilities. The explanation for
this is that it is not the designers themselves who
facilitate boundary spanning, but their design practice.
Design practice involves translating technical choices
into product proposals by sketching; making models and
demonstrators that can be interacted with; the practice of
'talking products and users'. A structured process of
mirroring would empower organisations to span the
challenging cultural and/ or organisational boundaries in
the Marine Design innovation process. [78]
A final remark regarding innovation concerns the
implementation of the described practices from the field
of Industrial Design. In fact, introducing these practices
to the field of ship design requires the industry actors to
innovate the processes by which they presently innovate.
In a recent publication by Smulders et al.[80], it is
asserted that the transfer of design methods (Design
Thinking) beyond its traditional domain requires a
careful consideration of the fitness of present
organizational context for such a transfer.
5.0 A review of Industrial Design Manifestos
A manifesto is a published verbal declaration of the
intentions, motives, or views of an issue. It accepts a
previously published opinion and promotes a new idea
with prescriptive notions for carrying out changes that
the authors believe should be made. A number of key
design manefestos will now be presented and reviewed in
the context of marine design.
components of great architecture. Today the arts exist in
isolation, from which they can be rescued only through
the conscious, cooperative effort of all craftsmen.
Architects, painters, and sculptors must recognize anew
and learn to grasp the composite character of a building
both as an entity and in its separate parts.
Only then will their work be imbued with the
architectonic spirit which it has lost as “salon art.” The
old schools of art were unable to produce this unity; how
could they, since art cannot be taught. They must be
merged once more with the workshop. The mere drawing
and painting world of the pattern designer and the
applied artist must become a world that builds again.
When young people who take a joy in artistic creation
once more begin their life's work by learning a trade,
then the unproductive “artist” will no longer be
condemned to deficient artistry, for their skill will now
be preserved for the crafts, in which they will be able to
achieve excellence.
Architects, sculptors, painters, we all must return to the
crafts! For art is not a “profession.” There is no essential
difference between the artist and the craftsman. The artist
is an exalted craftsman. In rare moments of inspiration,
transcending the consciousness of his will, the grace of
heaven may cause his work to blossom into art. But
proficiency in a craft is essential to every artist. Therein
lies the prime source of creative imagination.
Let us then create a new guild of craftsmen without the
class distinctions that raise an arrogant barrier between
craftsman and artist! Together let us desire, conceive,
and create the new structure of the future, which will
embrace architecture and sculpture and painting in one
unity and which will one day rise toward heaven from
the hands of a million workers like the crystal symbol of
a new faith."
5.1 Bauhaus Manifesto and Program (1919)
The aim of the Bauhaus was to bring together the
disciplines of sculpture, painting, arts and crafts, as
integrated components of a new architecture. To produce
unified works of art in which there was no distinction
between monumental and decorative art. This was
achieved through educating architects, painters, and
sculptors to become independent creative artists.
Resulting in a working community of leading artistcraftsmen, capable of designing buildings harmoniously
in their entirety-structure, finishing, ornamentation, and
furnishing. The Bauhaus principles involved thorough
training in the crafts, acquired in workshops and the
indispensable basis for all artistic production. Bauhaus
used the craft system structure of masters, journeymen,
and apprentices. Another principle was the constant
contact with leading experts of crafts and industry. The
final principle was dissemination of practice and
principles, through exhibitions and other activities.
Walter Gropius [81] stated the manifesto as follows,
"The ultimate aim of all visual arts is the complete
building! To embellish buildings was once the noblest
function of the fine arts; they were the indispensable
The utopian definition of the Bauhaus was, "The building
of the future", an integration of the arts into unified
creative practice. The Bauhaus developed a new type of
creative practitioner (designer/artist) with a broad range
of academic specialisations and practices. In order to
develop these specialisations and practices, Walter
Gropius, saw the necessity to develop new teaching
methods based on arts and craft, "the school will
gradually turn into a workshop". Both artists and
craftsmen directed classes and creative practice. The
objective was to remove any distinction between fine arts
and applied arts. Technology and mass production, led
to design opportunities that could not be fulfilled by an
arts and craft approach. Resulting in a new motto: "art
and technology, a new unity". Industrial Design
principles of mass production were applied to design
standards, regarding both functional and aesthetic
aspects. The Bauhaus workshops produced prototypes for
mass production, from a lamp to a complete buildings. In
a similar way the Marine Design Manifesto must link
Human Systems Integration to Industrial Design
principles and Naval Architecture. To encourage an
integration of these critical areas into a unified design
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
practice for a new generation of vessel designers, marine
designers.
5.2 Dieter Rams: ten principles for good design
In the late 1970s, Dieter Rams was becoming
increasingly concerned by the state of the world around
him – “an impenetrable confusion of forms, colours and
noises.” Aware that he was a significant contributor to
that world, he asked himself an important question: is my
design good design? As good design cannot be measured
in a finite way he set about expressing the ten most
important principles [82] for what he considered was
good design as follows:
Good design is innovative: The possibilities for
innovation are not, by any means, exhausted.
Technological development is always offering new
opportunities for innovative design. But innovative
design always develops in tandem with innovative
technology, and can never be an end in itself.
Good design makes a product useful: A product is
bought to be used. It has to satisfy certain criteria, not
only functional, but also psychological and aesthetic.
Good design emphasises the usefulness of a product
whilst disregarding anything that could possibly detract
from it.
Good design is aesthetic: The aesthetic quality of a
product is integral to its usefulness because products we
use every day affect our person and our well-being. But
only well-executed objects can be beautiful.
Good design makes a product understandable: It
clarifies the product’s structure. Better still, it can make
the product talk. At best, it is self-explanatory.
Good design is unobtrusive: Products fulfilling a
purpose are like tools. They are neither decorative
objects nor works of art. Their design should therefore be
both neutral and restrained, to leave room for the user’s
self-expression
Good design is honest: It does not make a product more
innovative, powerful or valuable than it really is. It does
not attempt to manipulate the consumer with promises
that cannot be kept.
Good design is long-lasting: It avoids being fashionable
and therefore never appears antiquated. Unlike
fashionable design, it lasts many years – even in today’s
throwaway society.
Good design is thorough down to the last detail:
Nothing must be arbitrary or left to chance. Care and
accuracy in the design process show respect towards the
user.
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Good design is environmentally-friendly: Design
makes an important contribution to the preservation of
the environment. It conserves resources and minimises
physical and visual pollution throughout the lifecycle of
the product.
Good design is as little design as possible: Less, but
better – because it concentrates on the essential aspects,
and the products are not burdened with non-essentials.
Back to purity, back to simplicity.
These principles for good design propose a minimalist
approach to aesthetics, currently seen in more
progressive commercial vessels, and support a strong
user centred design focus. The engagement in emotional
design in the context of vessel design is not the excess of
luxury in superyacht design but the 'super normal' beauty
of everyday things. Fukasawa and Morrison [83] defined
'super normal', as a commitment to reinventing the
principles of early modernism: technological innovation
and fitness for purpose. A celebration of normality in
design. Morrison stated in an interview, 'The objects that
really make a difference to our lives are often the least
noticeable ones, that don't try to grab our attention.
They're the things that add something to the atmosphere
of our homes and that we'd miss the most if they
disappeared. That's why they're 'super normal'.'
Commercial vessel design should be 'super normal'.
6.0 The EBDIG Boat Design Manifesto
The authors have reflected upon their collective expertise
and the needs of the future European marine industry. To
be competitive we must innovate, as we cannot compete
on a cost only basis in international markets. The key
tenets of the marine design manifesto, which are
discussed in the previous sections are as follows:
1) Design user experiences not just marine structures
2) Design-Driven Innovation: Define new design
meaning for vessels and develop new market
sectors through dialogue with cultural and
technology interpreters. Using Open Innovation
and other tools!
3) Preliminary design process optimisation is critical,
as 90% of the major design decisions have been
made when less than 10% of the design effort has
been extended.
4) In order to facilitate transfer of technology into the
Maritime sector we propose the use of ‘Open
innovation’. Supported by effective 'mirroring',
the ability of designers to frame any problem
‘user-centred and outside-in’ and to express their
interpretation
well
through
compelling
representations. the Five ‘M’s framework should
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
be used to consider the likely success of
technology transfer from another domain.
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7.0 Conclusion
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network members of the European Boat Design
Innovation Group (EBDIG) for their discussions and
contributions towards the Marine Design Manifesto.
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10.0 Authors Biography
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Frattini,F., The Open Innovation Journey: How
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innovation management paradigm,
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SCHIFFERSTEIN, R., SMULDERS, F., and
van der VOORT, M., (eds),'Advanced Design
Methods for Successful Innovation: Recent
methods from design research and design
consultancy in the Netherlands', Design United,
Sean McCartan holds the current position of Course
Tutor, Boat Design at Coventry University, UK. His key
research area is TOI (Transfer of Innovation) from other
sectors to the marine industry, in the areas of DesignDriven Innovation (DDI), advanced visualisation and
Human Systems Integration(HSI). He leads the EBDIG
(European Boat Design Innovation Group) network,
which includes Chalmers University; Genoa University;
TU-Delft; and a number of leading European marine
design consultancies. He is currently project co-ordinator
for the Leonardo TOI project EBDIG-WFSV (European
Boat Design Innovation Group - Wind Farm Support
Vessels), which aims to develop online training material
for Naval Architects in the subject areas of: Human
Factors; WFSV design (Industrial Design); WFSV
mothership design (Industrial Design).
Don Harris holds the position of Professor of Human
Factors in the Faculty of Engineering and Computing at
Coventry University. He is a Fellow of the Institute of
Ergonomics and Human Factors and a member of the UK
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Marine Design, 3-4 September 2014, Coventry, UK
Human Factors National Technical Committee for
Aerospace and Defence. He has been a recipient of the
Royal Aeronautical Society Hodgson Prize and was part
of the team that in 2008 received the Ergonomics Society
President’s Medal. Don has over 25 years of experience,
including research into distributed cognition in Royal
Navy warships and performing requirements analysis of
bridge equipment for emergency ice breaking vessels.
He has written over 150 scientific papers and is author or
editor of 18 academic books, including ‘Modelling
Command and Control’ (Ashgate, 2008). Don has
previously worked on EU funded programmes, such as
FANSTIC and DRIVESENSE.
Bob Verheijden holds the current position of Course
Director, Interior Design at Coventry University, UK. He
has over 20 years professional practice in the following
disciplines: architecture; urban planning; interior design;
product design; multimedia; brand development. He is a
Member of the BKVB (The Netherlands Foundation for
Visual Arts, Design and Architecture), and has won a
number of prestigious awards for his architectural and
furniture designs.
Monica Lundh is a former Marine Engineer and holds
the current position of Senior Lecturer and Head of
Division of Maritime Operations at Chalmers University
of Technology. She is responsible for the research project
Engine Room Ergonomics and Safety. Her previous
experience includes 11 years in the Swedish merchant
navy.
Margareta Lützhöft holds the current position of
Associate Professor at Chalmers University of
Technology in Sweden, leading the research in the
Maritime Human Factors research group at the
Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, within
the Lighthouse competence center. She is a master
mariner, trained at Kalmar Maritime Academy in
Sweden, and sailed for 13 years on Swedish ships. After
leaving the sea, she studied for a Bachelor’s degree in
Cognitive science and a Master’s in Computer Science.
In December 2004 she received a PhD in HumanMachine Interaction. Her research interests include
human-centered design, the effects of new technology
and resilience engineering. She is a frequent guest
lecturer on maritime human factors, risk and safety for
medical, nuclear and similar industries.
Dario Boote holds the current position of Ship Structure
Professor at the Naval Architecture section of the
Department
of
Electrical,
Electronic,
Telecommunications Engineering and Naval Architecture
(DITEN) of the University of Genoa. He is the Chairman
of the Bachelor and Master Course in Yacht Design in La
Spezia. His initial experiences include a long research
activity in the field of Ship and Offshore Structures
followed, since 2000, by an intense activity in the field of
sailing and motor yachts. From 2009 to 2012 he has been
Chairman of the V.8 ISSC Committee on "Yacht Design"
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Hans Hopman is a Professor and head of Delft
University of Technology’s department of Ship design,
Production and Operation. He has over 25 years of
experience in the design of naval ships and more
specifically in leading multi-disciplinary design teams
working on complex ships. As such, he was involved in
research and design studies related to human-machine
interfaces, design and lay-out of command and control
spaces including navigation bridges, engine room control
rooms, control & monitoring philosophies, lay-out of
consoles and reduced manning studies. He also was
leading in the development of new accommodation
standards for the RNl Navy.
Frido Smulders is an Associate Professor of Product
Innovation Management & Entrepreneurship and director
of the international master program Strategic Product
Design. He has considerable industry experience as a
management consultant in the field of innovation and
technology. He was involved in government funded
projects aimed at increasing the collaboration between
suppliers and their industrial clients. In the past he also
worked in the maritime industry and currently
collaborates with the department of Maritime
Engineering within Delft University of Technology on a
scientific research project that focuses on innovating the
ship design process. In fact Frido can be considered as
having a dual career over the last 25 years, one in
business and one in academia and both were focused on
the same subject: innovation and collaboration. He was
educated as an Aerospace Engineer and received his PhD
in Innovation Sciences. Both degrees are from Delft
University of Technology. He lectures in Corporate New
Business
Development,
Technology
based
Entrepreneurship, Project Leadership and Collaborative
Business Design. In his academic career he has
supervised more than 100 master students and is
currently supervising 3 PhD-students in the field of
design and innovation. Over the years he has (co-)
authored over 50 articles, book chapters and books
Kjetil Norby holds the current position of Associate
Professor at the Oslo School of Architecture and Design.
He is the project manager of the Ulstein Bridge Concept
design research project. He holds a Masters Degree in
Interaction Design from Umea University and a PhD
from Oslo School of Architecture and Design.