Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
THE ROYAL INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS
AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
SUBMISSION TO INQUIRY ON THE CAPABILITY OF DEFENCE’S
PHYSICAL SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING WORKFORCE
Conducted by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee
October 2015
THE ROYAL INSTITUTION OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS, AUSTRALIAN DIVISION
(ABN 84 024 326 548)
PO Box 462, Jamison Centre, ACT, 2614
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
Introduction to RINA
“Engineering is not merely knowing and being knowledgeable, like a walking encyclopedia;
engineering is not merely analysis; engineering is not merely the possession of the capacity to
get elegant solutions to non-existent engineering problems; engineering is practicing the art of
the organized forcing of technological change... Engineers operate at the interface between
science and society”
Dean Gordon Brown
1. Founded in 1860 in London to "...advance the art and science of ship design... ", today the
Royal Institution of Naval Architects is a world renowned and highly respected international
professional institution and learned society whose members are involved at all levels in the
design, construction, maintenance and operation of all marine vessels and structures. RINA
has members in over ninety countries, and is widely represented in industry, universities and
colleges, and maritime organisations world-wide.
2. RINA is represented in Australia by the Australian Division. About 700 members of the
Institution are resident in Australia and are therefore members of the Division. The Division
originated as the Australian Association of Naval Architects which in 1954 became a Branch
of the Institution and was subsequently elevated in 1979 to become RINA’s first Division. It
now has active Sections in Queensland, New South Wales, the ACT, Victoria, Tasmania,
South Australia / Northern Territory and Western Australia.
3. RINA is a Nominated and Licensed Body of the United Kingdom Engineering Council. On
gaining Corporate Membership, members are entitled to apply for registration as a Chartered
Engineer (CEng), Incorporated Engineer (IEng) or Engineering Technician (EngTech),
depending on their academic achievements, professional development and experience. These
registration grades are awarded under the Washington, Dublin and Sydney Accords which
apply internationally.
4. RINA’s activities in Australia relate solely to naval architecture as a specialist branch of
engineering, and are conducted in parallel and in cooperation with those of Engineers
Australia which cover all engineering specialities and also include provision of registration
under the Washington, Sydney and Dublin Accords.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
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RINA’s Interest in the Inquiry
1. As a professional society whose members comprise a significant element of Defence’s PSE
workforce, RINA’s interests lie in the preservation and improvement of professional
standards and the removal of impediments to its members’ ability to efficiently contribute to
the safety and security of the community. This applies in particular to the civilian PSE
workforce which is the perspective applying for the vast majority of affected naval architects.
2. While the Institution is not a trade union and therefore is not directly concerned with
promoting job creation for its members, RINA’s professional role relates directly to the
ability of Defence to effectively and efficiently use the resources represented by our
members, whether directly employed by Defence or in related private industry.
3. RINA members working in and for Defence may be constrained by restrictions on public
disclosure in their ability to provide the Institution with information for input to this inquiry.
The information on which this submission is based is therefore limited to that which is on the
public record and/or unclassified information which is well known within the maritime
industry.
4. This submission is based upon experience with administrative arrangements that have been in
place over recent years. However, RINA notes that the situation is changing with
implementation of measures in response to the Rizzo report, such as the formation of the
Naval Technical Bureau. Since implementation of the Bureau is in its early stages, both the
Bureau and the other improvements to the use and effectiveness of engineering work and
advice which will hopefully flow from those measures cannot be taken into account in this
submission.
5. It should be noted that the word ”ship” as used in this submission includes submarines.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
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ToR a:
The importance of the PSE workforce to Defence projects
a1. The core importance of the physical sciences and engineering (PSE) workforce is to provide
Defence (including ADF) with sufficient skills to be ‘informed customers and users’ of the
technical equipment that it acquires and uses. These skills are required to span a very wide
range of physical sciences associated with electronics, space, environment (including
weather/meteorology and sea physics), weapons, explosives, materials, manned and
uninhabited vehicles (including land, aircraft, ships, submarines), etc. The knowledge of the
application of these sciences to all of the equipment and operating environments is essential
to be able to understand the relevant design/selection trade-offs and compliances during
system/equipment specification, acquisition, operation, sustainment/maintenance and finally
disposal.
a2. Naval architecture is the branch of engineering specifically applicable to the design,
construction, equipment, maintenance, safety certification and operation of ships. It is based
upon many elements of the physical sciences and mathematics, including hydrodynamics,
stability of both intact and damaged ships, ship motions and structural design. The successful
acquisition, maintenance, operation and disposal of a naval ship as an engineering entity is
therefore dependent on obtaining and following the appropriate advice of naval architects. In
the operational environment it is important to national security that our own planning,
operational and support staff fully understand how to optimize the use of ADF equipment and
systems for the specific activity/task and operating areas that may differ from the parent
designer or user nation’s military activities.
a3. This fundamental need was reflected by the Chief of Navy, when addressing a gathering
associated with the Pacific 2015 Conference on 8th October 2015, stating that Navy’s
requirements with regard to its acquisitions were “capability, sustainability and reliability”.
a4. A naval ship cannot be effective as a strategic asset unless it is a viable engineering entity;
viability starts with the environmental conditions and operational envelope for which the ship
is designed/constructed and needs to be maintained throughout the ship’s operational life. If
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
the ship is not properly maintained or is operated outside the design parameters, then its
engineering viability is most likely to be put at risk and it may become a strategic liability.
This is particularly important in relation to a ship that is required to maintain its viability as a
platform for 25 or 30 years, whereas equipment and weapons carried on the ship may be
changed-out or upgraded several times in this period.
a5. So the usefulness of a ship as a Defence asset is dependent upon the appropriate engineering
advice being sought and acted upon to secure the ship as a viable engineering entity. As will
be presented later in this submission, this has not been the case with some ships and projects,
resulting in the taxpayer being required to meet avoidable bills for the repair or replacement
of ships and for aborted projects.
a6. Defence policy over the past two or three decades has been, wherever possible, to purchase
proven existing designs. However, as outlined below, the designs on offer in relation to a
specific requirement invariably need to be closely examined and adapted to meet the
engineering, strategic, environmental, safety and operational requirements of the Royal
Australian Navy. For these purposes, the PSE workforce needs to have appropriate skills to
ensure that the ship when in service, as the end product of the acquisition process, fulfils the
capability, sustainability and reliability requirements of the Navy.
a7. Even if Defence is procuring military or commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ designs or products it is
still essential that Defence personnel (ADF and/or APS) can perform or understand the
analyses of the ADF needs/requirements against contender designs and explain the legal,
operational and support compliance implications to Defence decision-makers and operators.
This will frequently require a detailed understanding of the physical science and the typical
analysis techniques to ensure that all comparative and absolute analyses have been
appropriately conducted, as well as to comprehend the results and interpret them in technical,
operational and cost/schedule risk impacts, including through-life. To be competent to
perform or review such compliance or comparative analyses requires both a good knowledge
of the relevant physical science/ engineering field and associated current analysis techniques
to ensure that appropriate analyses are performed. The ability to perform rigorous analyses of
the operating and support environments and implications on the cost of maintenance and
sustainment is even more difficult during the pre-acquisition phase as there may be limited
data available from the parent designer/user force – particular care and expertise is needed to
perform such sustainability analyses credibly.
a8. Because of the relatively short posting cycle for those in the ADF, the corporate knowledge of
the original design philosophy, and experience of what has worked or not worked in the past
mostly reside in the civilian PSE workforce, who are often in relevant positions for far longer
than the uniformed workforce.
a9. The situation outlined above also applies to through-life issues, including repair after damage
and modifications for upgrades, perhaps more so than in initial construction to incorporate
Australian experience with the ship in service. Overseas suppliers are certainly not in the best
position to help with these, as their advice is likely to be coloured by commercial
considerations and the experience of other clients at the expense of the needs and experience
of the Royal Australian Navy.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
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ToR b:
The current PSE capability within Defence, DMO and DSTO
b1. In addressing this term of reference, RINA assumes that the references to DMO and DSTO
are to the newly named Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) and the
Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) respectively, whose current names are used
throughout this submission.
b2. The present naval architectural capability within Defence lies within the Navy Engineering
Division of Navy, Maritime Systems Division and the Submarine Engineering Directorate of
CASG and in the Maritime Platform Division of DSTG.
b3. The PSE workforce is employed in two principal areas:
Current Fleet modifications, repair and maintenance. Effective repair and fast
maintenance turnaround require a clear understanding of all of the issues. Given the lack
of a naval dockyard in Australia, most modifications, repair and maintenance of
equipment have to be assessed, quoted and carried out by a prime contractor, but the signoff on this work requires appropriate skilled and experienced engineering input and
oversight.
Requirements Definition for and Design and Construction of New-Building craft,
including:
Assistance in definition of naval needs and subsequently in articulating these needs
in terms of functional and performance requirements provided to industry as the basis
for acquiring and assessing future capability options. This includes conceptual design
development to advise Navy of the likely design implications to satisfy capability
needs.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
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Design, incorporating:

Design for Manufacture,

Design for Maintenance,

Design for Australian conditions and labour requirements,

Check design meets the needs of Defence, including legislative and other
naval regulatory requirements and the capacity to scope and specify specific
requirements.
For all of the above reasons, it is necessary to maintain a PSE workforce to supervise
and influence the design.
Manufacture (including ease of access). Although the shipbuilder/repairer will be
generally chosen on the basis of a range of factors including total acquisition cost they
will always look to lower their costs. Only a shipbuilding engineer/ surveyor working
in the interests of the Commonwealth is likely to identify problems and oversee the
work to avoid experiencing such problems once a ship is in service.
Through-life issues (e.g. access to corrosion or weak spots, or removal routes, or
inaccessible systems). A good example is the ability of dry-dock operators to ensure
that a ship’s bottom is cleaned and recoated during a dry-docking. If the arrangement
of either the ship or the dock itself are such that keel-blocks supporting the ship
cannot be progressively removed and replaced then significant underwater areas of
the hull may not receive the required maintenance for a substantial part of the ship’s
life.
Managing change orders, which, if not performed efficiently, will delay projects and
substantially increase project costs.
b4. Currently the Defence PSE workforce is often compartmentalised, and only thought of as
being suitable for providing specialised advice (e.g. stability investigations). Whereas
training across other disciplines used to happen for all naval architects within the Defence
PSE workforce, its availability has become irregular.
b5. Outcomes of various reports over recent years that impinge on the procurement and
sustainment of Navy ships, from Kinnaird through to Mortimer, appear to have led to staffing
emphasis being placed on procurement and contract management at the expense of the
engineering viability of the ship as a whole.
b6. The need for the high level of engineering skills required for manufacture and maintenance of
a naval craft is not respected by the Australian Public Service (APS) or the Defence force.
Administration staff are generally used for project management, with little understanding of
engineering capabilities, risks or practicalities. Engineering is treated as a well-understood
task that can be done by young persons who know the basics, whereas the reality is that
engineering requires an underlying understanding of the interactions of a wide range of
physical science and related practical issues which can only be gained through experience.
This observation is consistent with the recommendations of the Rizzo review that the role of
engineers in Defence needs to be upgraded.
b7. The current PSE workforce appears to be highly dissatisfied with the way in which the
engineering profession is underutilised and managed. Engineers are by nature practical
people, and it is obvious to them that the current arrangements do not economically solve
engineering issues, rather they often create more work for them further down the track.
Generally there is a lack of morale and a feeling of frustration, including that numerous
previous reviews have not led to significant improvements or full implementation of their
sensible recommendations.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
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b8. Significant risks to Defence capability arise from inadequate internal generation of the
required competency through experience and training combined with an inability to recruit
suitably experienced personnel from industry/academia. This can, and frequently does, arise
through the lack of suitable employment in Defence to extend and develop skills, often as a
result of the significant reductions in PSE staff positions, inflexibility in the relocation or retasking of personnel and as a result of relevant tasks being contracted out to external service
providers. Further, the reduction in APS/ADF staff numbers in many of the Service technical
bureaus has resulted in the inability to provide suitable mentors and supervisors for the
adequate development of junior staff.
b9. The reduction in critical mass in many PSE sub-specialisations reduces their ability to provide
the requisite experienced task/development supervisors and mentors for junior PSE staff. It is
contended that the many Defence re-organisations imposed over the past 25 years, with many
PSE staff taken/ transferred from the original Service technical areas, has resulted in the
organizational separation of staffs into small groups of engineers that are relatively isolated
from one another and below a critical mass for adequate staff development. Outsourcing of
many previous internal Defence positions and commercialisation of naval dockyards and
Defence industry has also exacerbated the loss of relevant experiential/ development positions
and suitable competent PSE staff within Defence.
b10. The above considerations, including the inability to provide training and development to PSE
staff, has been especially apparent in naval architecture where the Australian industry supply
of suitably experienced and competent engineers is thinly spread and diversified. Defence
used to employ over 100 professionally qualified naval architects in the 1975-1985 period but
now would probably count no more than 40 spread very thinly across numerous navy
technical bureaus, CASG projects and other Defence organisations, and also between various
locations.
b11. This staffing arrangement, which has been termed “functional disintegration”, is no longer
internally sustainable and, unless steps are taken to address it, Navy will continue to be reliant
on external provision of suitable advice with a dearth of experienced staff to achieve the
actions identified against TOR item a, c & d at paragraphs a1. and a7. As an example, current
CASG staffing with expertise in submarines appears to fall well short of what can be expected
to support a Collins class replacement project, irrespective of the successful bidder and place
of build.
b12. Contract personnel are understood to find the salaries offered by Defence unattractive and are
unlikely to be available in the post-Rizzo environment which is understood to involve
replacing a perceived top-heaviness of Defence’s engineering workforce with a more even
spread across classifications.
b13. Accordingly, replacement of what would otherwise be Defence PSE staff with contractors is
generally only effective in cost-shifting out of a “salaries” budget and can only be cost–
effective beyond the short-term if the contracting company can provide at reasonable cost
skills, experience and tools that cannot reasonably be developed and maintained within
Defence. However, the work and output of contractors should be managed by suitable
Defence personnel which would typically be engaged at EL1 or EL2 level to ensure sufficient
experience to provide competent oversight of contracted work, resulting in some skewing of
the post-Rizzo staffing arrangements outlined above. Such an arrangement also limits the
possibility of growing PSE staff within Defence and so in the longer term is reliant on
attracting experienced staff from industry with appropriate remuneration.
b14. For successful construction of a ship, there needs to be a close understanding between the
designer and the shipbuilder as to the standards and procedures of the shipbuilder, as well as
an understanding by the shipbuilder of the intent of the designer. Satisfactory management of
the different shipbuilding standards and procedures can only be done if competent and
experienced naval architects from the PSE workforce are involved in the process.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
b15. Given the lack of a naval dockyard, the lowest-cost tenderer, whether for new naval
construction or repairs/refits/modifications, will be a commercial organisation. When placing
contracts for this work, it is essential to avoid costly contract variations and “extras” that the
task is closely specified at the time and that changes are subject to close scrutiny. In saying
this, RINA is well aware that much necessary ship repair work cannot be fully specified in
advance and only becomes evident after the ship or its machinery/equipment has been
opened-up by the ship repairer. Rotations of Defence staff have been known to bring new
perspectives to construction or refit projects and bring about additional change requests,
resulting in delays and extra cost. Project managers may not be engineers or naval architects
and therefore not understand the knock-on performance effects of engineering changes on the
finished product or the cost impacts of those changes. Defence invariably needs to be able to
change a contract, because the project scope might change during construction/repair, but
Defence may have little understanding of the engineering issues involved in such changes.
This is a key reason for employing an experienced PSE workforce.
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Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
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ToR c:
The potential risks of a skills shortage in the PSE workforce and a decline in
Defence's PSE capability
c1. The main potential risk of a skills shortage in the PSE workforce lies in the ability of Defence
to be an informed customer, such as in relation to large ship acquisitions.
c2. If we look back about 30 years, Defence had the capability to design at least some of its own
ships and to critically assess and secure implementation of the standards to which its ships
were built. This workforce was substantially reduced following the decision to purchase
predominantly existing and so-called “proven” military or commercial off-the-shelf (MOTS
or COTS) designs and no longer design ships in-house. Thereafter an initial design cell was
maintained to provide Defence with an indication of the size and configuration of possible
future ships to achieve required capabilities. While a concept design capability still remains
across a small group of staff within naval engineering in Canberra, the demands for its
services have been somewhat sporadic and as such, the resources are often engaged in other
work priorities.
c3. A review of the technical regulatory workforce in Defence conducted by Deloitte in 2012
found that 43% of the PSE employees leave Defence within between 2 and 6 years of
employment in Defence. It found that the engagement level of PSE employees was at around
10%, and that 55% of the workforce would be eligible for retirement by 2020 with 7%
leaving annually through attrition. Since that review in 2012, staff who left owing to
untargeted staff freezes have typically not been replaced; young engineers became
increasingly likely to leave because freezes removed opportunities for promotion, and hence a
loss of recognition of their increasing competence.
c4. The principal engineering knowledge of Defence force personnel resides with senior people
who are approaching retirement. Under the current industrial environment, engineers are
treated the same as administrative staff and this is only increasing the level of
disengagement. EL1 corresponds to a competent professional engineer and EL2 to a senior
engineer. For the administrative stream the bulk of the senior workforce is at the APS6 level.
Since there is no differentiation between salaries for the administrative stream and the
professional stream, professional positions tend to be located at a higher band, hence the main
PSE workforce is at the EL1 level. Despite the Rizzo Report, which recommended
strengthening the engineering capability of Defence, Defence has taken almost the opposite
approach by recently indicating that its workforce is “top-heavy”, and that voluntary
redundancies at EL1 and EL2 level are being sought. This belief that the work force is topheavy appears based on the mistaken presumption the EL level employees are managers,
whereas in the PSE family an EL is really just an experienced practitioner.
c5. RINA understands that some contractors employ structural engineers and mechanical
engineers (or even mechanical draughtsmen) rather than naval architects who are fully
conversant with not only the static loads to which a shore-based structure is subjected but also
understand the implications of the dynamic nature of loads created by operating on a seaway.
c6. Many tasks involving contractors only concentrate on solving the immediate issue, with no or
little understanding of the long-term effect of the solution. There is little opportunity for
oversight of contractors by the Defence PSE workforce who do have a broad range of
knowledge and experience.
c7. DSTG is the last bastion of specialist knowledge to resolve complex issues when something
does not work as intended and as such performs an invaluable role. Hence, for example,
DSTG have been called in to investigate structural failures in the Armidale class patrol boats.
However, it may have been much more cost-effective to seek active engagement of Naval
Engineering Division at the capability development phase and give effect to operational
measures that would have pre-emptively minimised such damage than to take action after the
event. DSTG is currently resourced with highly qualified naval architects who can be openminded in investigating problems and resolving issues quickly, simply and inexpensively; any
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
future changes to these arrangements need to be demonstrated to maintain and build on the
skills, efficiency and effectiveness of these PSE personnel.
c8. There have been instances of the use of classification societies to “class” the ship and some of
it associated systems, using their naval and/or commercial ship rules (refer Annex B).
Nevertheless a skilled base of PSE personnel needs to be maintained within Defence to
understand the effects of implementing rules from commercial organisations, which typically
design to a physical limit at which the risk of damage or a structural failure may occur and
give no consideration to the political, humanitarian or safety requirements for a naval craft
operation. The effects of operating outside of the classification society “envelope” need to be
understood, and this can only be done by a skilled and experienced PSE workforce.
c9. Notwithstanding the speech by the Chief of Navy mentioned above in relation to ToR a, a
number of recent naval acquisition projects have fallen short of these requirements due to
having insufficient measures in place with regard to safety of hull structures. These include:
a.
Cracking of hull structure in the Armidale class patrol boats (refer Annex A); and
b.
Failure of the previous “watercraft” project to proceed due to various design failures.
c10. To address the risks associated with MOTS/COTS designs and optimising their operation
within the ADF requires an understanding of how the PSE skills and competence of physical
scientists and engineers are generated and developed. For ADF personnel, the skills are
largely generated by a combination of progressive layers of tertiary education and relevant
experience within each Service. This is generally different for APS personnel who mostly will
have completed initial tertiary education, and possibly some industry experience, before
joining the APS, but they need to be appropriately trained and employed to develop and grow
their professional skills and experience. In the specific case of DSTG some personnel may
have extensive PSE competency before joining Defence.
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ToR d:
The ability of Defence to have relevant PSE capabilities to meet future
technological needs
d1. Even if the decline in PSE staff numbers could be halted, it will take time to rebuild the skills
and expertise that have been lost and no doubt will continue to be lost through the measures
being implemented in a questionable response to the Rizzo Report which has been
compromised by government mandated and largely un-targeted cuts across the Defence APS
workforce. The current environment means that even where staff are replaced, absence of
career or succession planning means that there are now more limited opportunities for one
generation to pass on their experience and ‘lessons learnt’ to the next generation. The
development of the skills to meet future technological needs is almost non-existent. Funding
for training and skills development largely comes from each business unit’s budget for
operating expenses. This budget also needs to cover operating expenses such as travel,
stationery etc. Years of cuts to operating expenses to meet arbitrary efficiency targets mean
that there are now insufficient funds to cover ongoing professional development of PSE staff
in some sections of Defence. This is particularly problematic for regional business units, who
often need to cover travel costs as well as course costs. This issue could be resolved by
having funding for ongoing continuous professional development set at an appropriate level
and separated from a unit’s operating expenses, but unless this happens there will be an
increased reduction in the skills to meet future needs.
d2. Once a person has been trained to undertake a task, whether through formal education (e.g. as
a graduate) or subsequent staff development, the skills and knowledge gained will be lost over
time unless they are exercised and further developed and updated through lived experience.
Further training courses may be able to update the theory but cannot replace such experience.
While this principle has long been recognised to keep uniformed personnel ready for action
through for example large-scale exercises, Defence’s PSE workforce has been left to finance
such costs against direct operational expenditure.
d3. Of course, the best way of building and solidifying skills is to have broadly the same groups
undertaking the same tasks from one project to the next. Building design skills is a sound
foundation for other skills applicable to later aspects of a ship’s life cycle. However, failing
the availability of real-life projects that allow the development of design skills, such as is the
case in an environment where COTS/MOTS designs are used, similar outcomes can be
achieved by conducting regular exercises against realistic requirements and have these
outcomes peer reviewed and criticized. This may involve inclusion of industry, as RINA
understands has been done in the United Kingdom, with Government funding in relation to
various aspects of submarine engineering and operation to keep the relevant experts current,
but budgetary considerations currently prevent this from happening. However, embedding
APS staff in industry for the purpose of gaining knowledge and experience needs to be
carefully managed to ensure that they do in fact usefully pick up the desired experience and
are not isolated from valuable technical and personal development.
d4. Failure of Defence to provide a satisfactory path for PSE staff development and advancement
must be seen as a major contributor to the low morale and possible loss of these staff.
d5. Linking the existing experience (based on the Collins class) with the plans for the new
submarines is surely a vitally important element. If this is not happening, as indicated by the
lack of continuity of PSE staff mentioned in relation to ToR b, then it would appear to
constitute serious mismanagement, and a wasted opportunity to learn experiences from the
past. Unfortunately, the Collins replacement situation would appear to be typical rather than
unusual.
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ToR e:
The ability of new technologies discovered by the PSE workforce to be
incorporated into Australia's defence capability planning
e1. Defence has many very bright engineers and scientists across the organisation. They are
routinely able to propose better ways of doing business or ways of taking advantage of new
technologies. However it is hard to implement such ideas in the way Defence currently does
business whereby there now seems to be a fear of doing anything different from a purely
COTS or MOTS solution, at least as far as the platform systems are concerned. In contrast, on
the combat system side, there appears to be a far greater appetite for customising a design to
meet Navy requirements including adopting new technologies even though past experience
across several navies suggests this is where major projects are most likely to go ‘off the rails’.
A demonstration that innovation and new technology is not something that must be feared is
the recent introduction of the CEA Active Phased Array Radar system on the ANZAC class,
which by all accounts has been a successful project. The success seems to have been due to a
combination of factors including a phased development and introduction, including a concept
technology demonstration, as well as the expertise of the supplier and the active engagement
of the Department in this project. The willingness to encourage innovativeness across the
entire naval shipbuilding and sustainment spectrum should be encouraged and the Chief of
Navy’s promotion of innovation within Navy is welcome. It is to be hoped that this
perspective extends more widely across Defence including CASG. However success can only
be ensured and failure avoided with an appropriately skilled PSE workforce within Defence
and industry to develop and assist in implementation of new technologies.
e2. In recent decades new-building naval ships have generally been required to be a proven
design (MOTS/COTS), and there was no consideration to permit the incorporation of new
technology that had become available after those ships were designed. Consequently newbuilding ships were out-of-date before they were floated, and this is still the case. In a climate
of fear of something new by Defence unless it is MOTS/COTS, it is difficult to see how any
new technology discovered by the PSE workforce, or even a simple improvement to the way
that ships are built or put together at a reduced cost and to make them more effective, can be
implemented.
ToR f:
The effect of project outsourcing on Defence's PSE capability
f1. There have been examples where the PSE elements of a project were outsourced to defence
industry partners, with the expectation that industry’s skills would be passed on to APS PSE
staff. However, this has failed as there have been insufficient APS PSE staff to cover all the
relevant skills areas, and those who have been embedded have been given roles where they
would not gain significant useful skills. Project outsourcing may lead to the perception that
the more attractive/interesting jobs are outsourced, thus leading to a reduction in the
motivation for PSE staff to stay. It is a serious problem if Defence PSE personnel are not
getting the experience of either undertaking the contracted work or managing the contracts.
f2. Skills may be built up by the external contractors, but these skills may then not be available to
Defence as and when required – they may be committed to non-Defence projects or otherwise
unavailable. Furthermore, Defence cannot control the skills available from the marketplace
when outsourcing tasks; it has to either accept whatever is available or undertake the task
internally, if it has still retained the capability to do so.
f3. There have been cases where Defence has not sought the advice of their own internal experts,
rather they have engaged consultants for advice; multiple consultants may have independently
examined the same issue. Defence has then found it difficult to make an informed decision
because of the variation in consultant’s advice. Ignoring internal advice and then finally
ignoring the consultant’s advice because of an inability to make an informed decision.
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f4. For example, about a year ago RINA made a submission to the Senate Economic References
Committee inquiry (currently due to report on 26 February 2016) into naval shipbuilding.
The conclusions reached in that relatively brief submission, which were based on a broad
understanding and assessment of the RAN’s shipbuilding program and processes, were
closely similar to those of the 294-page RAND Report published earlier this year.
f5. Of course the contractor's motivations are different to the Commonwealth's – they cannot
concern themselves with the eventual outcome but are there to undertake a defined task and to
make a profit for shareholders. However, that doesn't mean that contractors don't have a
place in the system; everybody has to recognise that contractors have a different motivation
from the public servants.
f6. The cost of engaging contractors is a matter for Defence to assess on a cost-effectiveness
basis, but it is clearly not cost-effective for Defence to engage contractors on an on-going
basis for work that is more efficiently undertaken in-house.
Ship Repair Aspects
f7. Up to the 1970s, engineering was recognised as an essential skill in society, and the naval
dockyards and other organisations such as state main roads, state water boards and state
railway workshops could manufacture almost any part for the ships, rolling stock etc within
their remit. According to Engineers Australia, 80% of professional engineers at that time
were trained in Government workshops. Jobs are now given out to the contractor with the
lowest price, and who may have no or very few experienced (professional) engineers.
f8. There are now so many contractors and sub-contractors involved in naval repair that it is very
difficult and time-consuming to manage and control them. Decisions generally have to be
referred back to head office, which takes time, sometimes a long time.
f9. Selection of ship repair sub-contractors follows Government guidelines, so the most suitable
candidate for a job is often not chosen. Contractors who are well qualified, capable and
willing to do the work to identify and solve problems may not be selected in favour of
contractors who are cheaper but less well suited to carrying out the task.
f10. The companies managing dockyards used for naval ship repair and maintenance in Australia
sometimes have little experience and few engineering skills appropriate for work on naval
ships. Many undertake work mainly on commercial ships and may be unfamiliar with the
highly optimised (and therefore potentially fragile) structure, equipment and arrangements of
naval ships and the practices and procedures required to efficiently and effectively carry out
the contracted work. The cost savings made possible by sharing facilities between naval and
commercial work may mean that the facilities are not available if and when required for
unplanned repairs of naval ships.
f11. Defence PSE personnel have to work within intellectual property (IP) constraints. There are
costly delays to the repair, modification and maintenance of the modern warship if the design
and building contract(s) do not provide for Defence to have ownership of, or access to, the IP
once the ship is handed over.
f12. Ship repair sub-contractors do not belong to Defence and have little or no responsibility and
hence care for the through-life issues or impact on the ship operation and operating costs,
usually being only interested in the immediate problem. Contractors working on specific
issues often have little comprehension or appreciation of the possible interaction with other
systems or equipment or other ship components. It is left to the Defence PSE workforce to
ensure that these interactions are appropriately considered.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
ToR g:
The ability to attract and retain a highly skilled PSE workforce in Defence,
DMO (CASG) and DSTO (DSTG)
g1. Putting pay-scales aside, attracting new personnel and maintaining the numbers of skilled
persons will be very difficult without chances of promotion or the opportunity to be involved
in a diversity of tasks creating job satisfaction. Factors include:

PSE skills and experience within the Defence civilian workforce are not recognised
as providing value to Defence, as outlined in this submission over and above, but
complementary to, the administrative skills of the organisation.

PSE staff located outside of Canberra and DSTG Melbourne have indicated a lack of:
a) professional development
b) training or exercises provided as a means to pick up other skills, and mentoring
programmes to allow experienced people to pass on their knowledge
c) benefit from use of external contractors in terms of training Defence staff
 The proposed use of standardised job descriptions and selection criteria, which at best
will fail to communicate the details of the skill-set that is required or even whether the
person needs to be able to understand or manage PSE issues.
g2. In light of these points, Defence may be vulnerable to a serious exodus of staff if there were
to be improved opportunities elsewhere, such as in the commercial shipping, shipbuilding and
offshore oil and gas industries.
RAN photo
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
ToR h:
Other related matters
h1.
The recommendations of the Rizzo Review have been slowly acted upon by Defence, with
actions becoming apparent only now, almost a year after the Chief of Navy declared in
relation to Rizzo implementation that “the task of rebuilding Navy engineering has entered a
new phase”. Stronger actions may have been implemented in relation to uniform personnel
than have been apparent on the civilian side as reflected in this submission.
h2.
Much reliance is placed by Defence on taking no risks in engineering, instead of managing
the risk bearing in mind that engineering is, by its nature, a risk management activity. At the
same time, some significant risks may be entirely ignored and any advice bringing them to
attention is unwelcome due to the excessive focus on potential short term schedule impact.
h3.
Engineering used to be based on experience and knowledge learned from others and passed
down through training and exposure to many different tasks. These days too much reliance is
placed on software, without the user understanding the basic principles but not necessarily
having the broader understanding to question results. This is where experience within the
PSE workforce becomes essential.
h4.
Defence used to be able to fix anything, and to fix it quickly. However, if there is no money
to do this, nor political will to make it happen, then ships may wait for repairs for some time.
In this period, they may go to sea with restricted capability but if the deficiency is sufficiently
serious the ship may have to remain in port. In either case, the taxpayer bears the cost of suboptimal capability being provided by these expensive assets and operating the ships in this
manner. In this regard Defence relies on a limited pool of engineers and technical officers
from the PSE workforce trying to keep ships working at full capability.
h5.
To summarise, the lack of effective recognition, encouragement, development and utilisation
of Defence’s PSE workforce, particularly the naval architectural element of that workforce,
has led to shortcomings in the achievement of the requirements for RAN ships as recently
detailed by the Chief of Navy, namely:
i.
ii.
iii.
h6.
capability;
sustainability; and
reliability.
Of course, RINA would be pleased to discuss with the Committee further details related to
this submission should that be the wish of the Committee
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
ANNEX A
Hull Structural Failures in the ARMIDALE Class Patrol Boats
These patrol boats were constructed during 2004-2008 in aluminium by Austal Ships and classed
(refer Annex B) by Det Norske Veritas under their High Speed Light Craft (HSLC) Rules.
Use of the HSLC Rules enabled the ships to be constructed to a lighter weight and therefore higher
performance than could be expected under rules for more conventional steel ships. However, the
reduced structural weight of HSLC Rules vessels is achieved at the expense of restricting their
operations to within a permissible envelope of ship’s speed against wave height, designed to prevent
the ships from being subjected to excessive bottom loads due to impact with the sea surface. Use of
aluminium also requires greater care and attention to be paid to reducing the risk of design details that
will result in failure. It is on the public record that the Armidale class has experienced systemic
structural failures, largely but not exclusively involving structural cracking.
These failures were attributed in the public domain to the “high operational tempo” to which these
ships were required to operate. While there is no reason to believe that these ships have not been
heavily utilised, such high usage was identified in the Defence Department’s specifications for this
class even before they were built. It would appear likely that the structural failures might have been
due to the design basis not accurately accounting for the loading this class would experience in
service, notwithstanding that the nature of the sea environment in which the boats would be operated
was well articulated prior to the acquisition of this class thanks to the PSE workforce the Defence
Department still engaged at that time to help articulate its requirements. The loads experienced by the
boats once in service might have been reduced, thereby prolonging the life of the class, if the
department could more effectively and swiftly engage its PSE workforce to provide crew with
operational guidance to manage the way in which the boats are operated in a seaway.
RINA notes that, although these structural failures have retrospectively been extensively investigated
by industry and DSTG, the cost and disruption associated with these failures could have perhaps been
avoided if the design load assumptions underpinning these ships’ design and construction had been
subject to more detailed analysis and review through engagement of the Defence PSE workforce.
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
ANNEX B
The Role and Processes of Classification Societies in Ship Certification
Classification societies were first initiated over 250 years ago to provide informed advice 70
prospective insurers, charterers and other users of shipping of the condition and seaworthiness of
ships they may be involved with. The concept of a ship being “classed” or “in class” remains valid
today as an indication of the ship’s fitness for service as indicated by compliance with published
“rules” established and enforced by the society.
Internationally, only twelve societies are recognised as members of the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS) and of these, eight are accorded “recognised organisation” status by
the Australian Maritime Safety Authority.
Six IACS member societies and one non-IACS society have joined with Australia and nine other
countries in the International Navy Safety Association to publish the Naval Ship Code ANEP77
through NATO.
The basic service offered by classification societies is “classing” the hull and machinery of merchant
ships of which there are about 45,000 operating internationally. Given an average ship life of about
25 years, this means that on average the classification societies collectively certify the construction of
about 2000 merchant ships per year for ocean-going service.
The process of “classing” essentially involves three stages of verification against the society’s rules:
1. Plan assessment and approval in the lead-up to construction;
2. Survey against the approved plans while under construction; and
3. Completion of initial survey and periodic survey after entering service (5 year cycle
commencing with “initial survey” or “special survey”).
In undertaking this volume of work, the societies have developed and refined not only appropriate
rules but also appropriate tools for the implementation of those rules.
The rules generally include provisions that allow the society to require additional investigations to be
carried out to ensure the ship’s fitness for service in areas where compliance with the rules may be
problematic. Material fatigue and finite element analysis of stress are typically issues requiring such
investigation. Compliance with the rules is therefore only assured if the vessel is assigned “class” by
the society after completing the relevant three steps as outlined above.
While the societies require to periodically (generally this is annually) inspect the ship for continued
compliance with their rules, they also require ship operators to report accidents and breakages that
may affect the ship’s fitness for purpose. Matters that may prejudice the fitness of a ship for service
may be covered by a “condition of class”. The defects resulting in such conditions are normally
required to be dealt with by a set date, and the safety of the ship is generally only considered marginal
if this date is not met or if a number of conditions of class are accumulated.
Most classification societies also offer these services in relation to naval ships, albeit with reduced
safety margins for reduction in effective thickness of structure owing to corrosion.
It can be seen from the foregoing that a Defence organisation processing perhaps one new class of
ships every 5 years cannot readily achieve in-house expertise comparable to any of the major
international classification societies.
It can also be seen that a ship that is purchased without “class” or on the basis of its plans purported to
comply with the rules of a society but without being assigned “class” is of doubtful value to the RAN
Capability of Defence's physical science and engineering (PSE) workforce
Submission 27
or the taxpayer in terms of its fitness for purpose over its expected service life unless its structure is
scrutinised with a comparable level of rigor to that of a ship “in class” with a recognised society.
On the other hand, compliance with the rules of classification societies does not guarantee the
structural integrity of ships. Those rules are subject to continual improvement to reflect changes
found necessary as a result of, for example, casualties especially those of concern to marine insurers,
changes in shipbuilding technology and advances in knowledge of the loads to which ships are
subjected when at sea. These rule changes are often developed cooperatively through IACS.