“Identification of Cost-Effective Methods to Improve Security at
Transit Operating/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger Stations”
July 2006
FTA-FL-26-71054-03
“Identification of Cost-Effective Methods to Improve Security at
Transit Operating/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger Stations”
Final Report
July 2006
Prepared by
Lisa Staes
Amber Reep
Rajesh Chaudhary
James Tucci
Deborah Sapper
Center for Urban Transportation Research, University of South Florida
4202 East Fowler Avenue
CUT100, Tampa, Florida 33620
Randy Borum
University of South Florida, Mental Health Law and Policy
Tampa, Florida
Arthur J. Kelly III
New Bedford Policy Department, MA (ret’d)
Prepared for
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration
Attn: Irving Chambers
400 Seventh Street, SW, Room 9402
Washington, D.C. 20590
Project Number
FTA-FL-26-71054-03
ii
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Technical Report Documentation Page
1. Report No.
2. Government Accession No.
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
5. Report Date
Identification of Cost-Effective Methods to Improve Security at Transit
Operating/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger Stations
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Report No.
July 2006
Lisa Staes, Amber Reep, Rajesh Chaudhary, James Tucci,
Deborah Sapper, Randy Borum, Arthur Kelly III
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
Florida Atlantic University /University Consortium for Intermodal
Transportation Safety and Security (UCITSS Headquarters)
5353 Parkside Drive, Suite 200
Jupiter, FL 33458
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
11. Contract or Grant No.
FTA-FL-26-71054-03
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration
400 Seventh Street, SW, Room 9402
Washington, D.C. 20590
Final Report
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
6407
15. Supplementary Notes
This project was funded under the Federal Transit Administration, FY 2004 Earmark, State of Florida,
Florida Atlantic University/University Consortium Intermodal Transportation Safety and Security. This
project is a Congressional earmark...
16. Abstract
Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States’ transit systems did a fairly successful
job of safely and securely protecting their facilities and passengers. Until that time, public transit security issues
generally dealt only with unruly passengers, fare evasion, vandalism, trespassing, and theft. With the events of
9/11, the public transit bombing attacks in Madrid, and the biological attacks in Japan, the U.S. has become more
focused on the issue of terrorism and is hardening the security of our public transit systems against terrorist
activities.
Most U.S. transit systems are increasing their security measures at both their operating/maintenance facilities
and passenger stations, but with limited funding. This research report investigates several agencies that have
innovatively and creatively implemented cost-effective methods of increasing security at their systems. In
addition, this report provides a historic summary of the consequences of terrorism on public transportation
systems and a literature review of existing resources.
17. Key Words
18. Distribution Statement
No restriction. This document is available to the
public from the sponsoring agency at the website
http://www.fta.dot.gov .
TRANSIT SECURITY
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
21. No. of Pages
Unclassified
xxx
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)
22. Price
Reproduction of completed page authorized
iv
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report on the “Identification of Cost-Effective Methods to Improve Security at Transit
Operation/Maintenance Facilities and Passenger Stations” is the result of contributions from a
number of individuals, transit authorities, and federal agencies. The Federal Transit
Administration funded the research for this report through the University Consortium for
Intermodal Transportation Safety and Security (UCITSS). The Center for Urban Transportation
Research (CUTR) at the University of South Florida served as the primary administrators and
researchers for this research project.
The information in this research report is derived from interviews, literature reviews, case
studies, site visits and previous work in this area. The case studies were conducted via
visits/reviews of transit properties and interviews with transit personnel. The participation and
cooperation of these transit agencies’ general managers, security personnel and other key staff
was critical in the creation of this research.
The principal investigators of the project were Lisa Staes and Amber Reep of CUTR.
Acknowledgements need to give to several key contributors including: V. Ray Cole, Robert
Brinson, Francis O’Hare from K & J Safety and Security Consulting Services, Inc., Arthur J.
Kelly III, New Bedford Policy Department (retired) and Randy Borum from the University of
South Florida The principal investigators would like to sincerely thank Dr. Steven Polzin from
the Center for Urban Transportation Research at the University of South Florida for his
coordination efforts with UCITSS.
Several key transit personnel and their transit agencies need to be acknowledged for their
willingness to participate in this study: Daniel O. Hartwig, Police Lieutenant, Counter
Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence/Swat, BART Police Department; David A. Genova, Manager,
Public Safety, Regional Transportation District (RTD); John F. Tarbert, Manager of
Security/Transit Police Chief, Regional Transportation District (RTD); James Dougherty,
General Manager of Safety & Security, Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS); William
Zielonka, Safety and Security Operations Division, Central Florida Regional Transportation
Authority (LYNX); Anthony Policastro, PROTECT program manager, Argonne National
Laboratory; Polly Hanson, Chief of the Metro Transit Police, Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (WMATA), Metro Transit, Joseph Carter, Chief, MBTA Transit Police, Paul
MacMillan, Deputy Chief, MBTA Transit Police, Bob Fitzsimmons, Sergeant, MBTA Transit
Police, and Sean McCarthy, Deputy Chief, Operations Control Center , MBTA Transit Police.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, transit systems in the U.S. did an adequate
job of addressing the safety and security of protecting their facilities and passengers. Until that
time, however, public transit security issues generally dealt only with unruly passengers, fare
evasion, vandalism, trespassing, and theft. With the events of 9/11, the public transit bombing
attacks in Madrid; and the biological attacks in Japan, the United States has become more
focused on the issue of terrorism and is hardening the security of our public transit systems
against terrorist activities.
Most U.S. transit systems are increasing their security measures at both their operating and
maintenance facilities and passenger stations, but funding is limited. This research report
investigates six transit agencies that have successfully and creatively implemented innovative
and cost-effective methods for increasing security at their systems.
The first section of this report provides this report provides a historic summary of the
consequences of terrorism on public transportation systems and a literature review of existing
resources. An introduction and overview of the safety and security challenges faced by U.S.
public transit agencies as well as the day-to-day challenges of successfully managing the security
of an open access public transit system are provided.
A brief literature review identifies several key transit security reports and documents used in this
study. Additionally, more in-depth, detailed reports, documents, and tools are provided on the
new “Transit Security Reference Resource” website, www.cutr.usf.edu/security, which was
specifically designed for this study to provide a more up-to-date and dynamic literature review.
This website was designed to provide a one-of-a-kind resource for transit security personnel to
find reports, papers, documents, contacts and learn about industry best practices.
The last section of this report identifies six U.S. transit systems that have conducted safety and
security activities. Each case study provides an overview of the transit system, a statement of the
problem identification and need for innovative security measures, a description of the transit
system’s previous attempts to address the problem, an outline of the proposed solution, a costbenefit analysis, performance indicators and lessons learned.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................vi
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ viii
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Asset and Vulnerability Assessment ............................................................................................2
Vulnerability Assessment .............................................................................................................4
Threat Assessments.......................................................................................................................5
Physical Security...........................................................................................................................8
Incident Planning and Response .................................................................................................10
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................12
Literature Review and Transit Security Reference Resource ..............................................15
Security Design...........................................................................................................................15
Security/Emergency Planning.....................................................................................................15
Security Funding.........................................................................................................................19
Detection and Deterrence............................................................................................................19
Transit Security Reference Resource..........................................................................................22
Case Studies/Best Practices......................................................................................................27
Introduction.........................……………………………………………………………………27
Case Studies:...............................................................................................................................27
Denver Regional Transit District .......................................................................................29
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.............................................................39
Charlotte Area Transit System...........................................................................................49
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority....................................................................59
Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority...........................................................67
Bay Area Rapid Transit ....................................................................................................77
Summary and Conclusion .......................................................................................................85
References..................................................................................................................................91
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2005, two planned terrorist attacks on London’s public transit system shifted international
concern about terrorist targets from the skies to surface transportation systems. A total of 37
people were killed in those attacks and another 1,000 were injured, sharply focusing the world on
the vulnerability of public transit systems. While the airborne attacks on the United States of
September 11, 2001 were unusually catastrophic and horrific, the reality is that worldwide
terrorist attacks against surface-based mass transit systems have been more frequent and more
lethal than those directed against any other category of targets. Nearly one of every three
recorded acts of terrorism internationally has been directed against transportation.1
More than one third of terrorist attacks on transportation targets have involved fatalities (a higher
fatality rate than for any other category of targets), and most of those involved multiple deaths.
Because of their criticality, accessibility, containment, and personnel density, Rand security
analyst Brian Jenkins has aptly referred to transportation facilities and vehicles as “ideal targets”
of terrorism. As shown in Table 1, buses and subways have been the most common target of
public transit terrorist attacks.
Table 1
Targets of Attacks on
Public Transit Systems
Buses
Bus Terminals
Tourist Buses
School Buses
Subways and Trains
Subways and Train Stations
Rails
Bridges and Tunnels
Other
32%
7%
7%
1%
26%
12%
8%
5%
2%
The attacks in London were the most recent high-profile transit attacks, but they certainly were
not an anomaly. On March 11, 2004, 191 people were killed in a succession of terrorist bombing
attacks on multiple commuter trains in Madrid. On June 5, 2003, terrorists detonated a bomb on
a bus in Chechnya, killing 16 people. Since 2000, numerous bombings—many of them suicide
bombings—have occurred on buses throughout Gaza and Israel. Perhaps most frightening was
the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on a subway in Tokyo, the first major incident that involved the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Although the attack produced eight fatalities,
thousands more were injured, and the psychological and economic impacts were absolutely
devastating.
1
Government Accountability Office. December 2002. “Mass Transit: Federal Action Could
Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges.” GAO-03-263. Washington, DC: GAO.
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The evolving nature of trans-national terrorism makes the targeting of public transit systems
even more worrisome. The methods and objectives of terrorists in the past have fit with Jenkins’
analysis in 1974 that “terrorism is theatre. Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of
people dead.” Tragically, in the current security environment, Jenkins and others have observed
that this maxim no longer holds true. Since the coalescence of al Qaeda and its affiliated factors,
cells, and entities, mass casualties have been an explicit objective. The implication of this
mindset for critical infrastructure protection is that terrorists will select their targets not only for
their symbolic value or functional importance, but also based on the potential to inflict death and
injury in venues where people ordinarily feel safe.
Not only radical foreign groups threaten public transit systems; domestic terrorism is also a
concern. One of the most deadly terrorist attacks in the United States occurred on April 19,
1995, when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed, an attack that
was planned and carried out by two United States citizens. This event resulted in the death of
168 people, including many children, and the injury of hundreds more. Public transit systems
may become a target for these domestic terrorists as well.
Protecting critical infrastructure requires that public transit systems identify and analyze their
assets and vulnerabilities, the potential threats, and the potential consequences of attack scenarios
in order to generate and implement effective countermeasures. A “threat” is typically defined as
any action that has the potential to cause harm in the form of death, injury, destruction of
property, interruption of operations or denial of service. A “vulnerability” is defined as anything
that can make an agency more susceptible to threats. Public transit systems are part of the
“critical infrastructure” of the nation because their effective function is vital to public health,
national defense and economy.2
This report focuses exclusively on surface public transit systems. These systems include all
multiple-occupancy vehicle services designed to transport customers on local and regional
routes, such as bus, trolley bus, commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light rail services.3 The
discussion that follows reviews the concepts and requirements for effective asset and
vulnerability analyses, threat assessments, and physical security equipment/resource deployment.
Also provided is a discussion of incident and response planning activities and the
implementation of an Incident Command System (ICS) to mitigate, contain, and respond to
attacks that may occur.
Asset and Vulnerability Analysis
Public transportations systems are designed to be convenient and accessible to the largest
possible number of people. Their success in that regard is precisely what makes them most
vulnerable and why they are considered by some as “soft targets.” Passenger airlines, for
example, have multiple checks on the identity and belongings of each of their riders. Having a
similar screening process for mass transit would be highly impractical and prohibitively
2
3
PDD-63; HSPD-7.
Government Accountability Office. 2002. “Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit
Systems.” GAO-02-1075T. Washington, D.C.
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expensive. The reality is that, in every country, mass transit systems carry many more passengers
than commercial airlines but have significantly fewer security personnel, less surveillance, and
less equipment with which to deter a terrorist attack. In 2002, the Transportation Research Board
identified several general characteristics of transit systems that make them vulnerable to attack:
•
•
•
•
•
they are open and highly accessible
they are extensive and ubiquitous
they emphasize efficiency and competitiveness
they have diverse owners, operators, users, and overseers
they are intertwined with society and the global economy4
Protecting open, ubiquitous systems designed for maximum access and efficiency is a daunting
task. The United States alone has 7,000 miles of transit lines; 113,000 miles of rail; 26,000 miles
of navigable waterways; and 4 million miles of roadway. London has 253 miles of underground
tunnels. Paris’s 131 miles of track hosts approximately six million passengers every day; the
Moscow Metro provides about 9 million passenger trips per day. More than 22,000 miles of rail
cover Japan, with 150 miles of subway in Tokyo. Because open transit systems are massive,
dispersed, and inherently more vulnerable, agencies must recognize that the protection of these
systems is an ongoing, active process, not a one-time event.
As illustrated in Figure 1, risk is a dynamic concept that varies as a function of target
vulnerability and the threat environment, either of which may change from day to day based on
events and information. The implication of this hydraulic model is that risk may be increased or
decreased by modifying either side of the equation. If, for example, a specific, credible threat is
directed to an identified target, then its risk would increase even if there was no change in the
target’s vulnerability. Conversely, in a high-threat environment, target risk may be mitigated by
reducing vulnerability (e.g., increasing access control, utilizing surveillance systems
incorporating Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts in facilities
planning and construction activities, etc.). Risk lies at the confluence of threat and vulnerability.
Understanding this principle of risk analysis is vital to protection and security.
Risk Analysis Model
Figure 1. Risk Analysis Model
Vulnerabilit
4
Threat
Transportation Research Board. 2002. “Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New
Transportation Security Imperative.” Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board,
National Academy of Sciences.
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Threat assessment and vulnerability assessment are related but distinct tasks. Threat assessment
focuses on the probable and likely types of attacks that may be perpetrated by potential
adversaries in a range of scenarios. Table 2 is a list of terrorist attack scenarios considered in a
recent U.S. Department of Transportation Vulnerability Assessment. Vulnerability assessment
focuses on the susceptibility of potential targets to unauthorized access, penetration with
weapons or tools intended for harm, and the likely impacts or effects of attacks on protected
assets (e.g., injuries, deaths, and physical damage to equipment and infrastructure). Some
common attack threats include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
arson
explosives
weapons of mass destruction
violent incidents and hostage situations
tampering
loss of power
use of a transit vehicle as a weapon
network failure/cyber attack
Vulnerability Assessment
Terrorists search continuously for vulnerabilities in the target environment. Public transit
systems, therefore, must also be aware of the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their protective
systems. Vulnerability assessments should be completed for each transit mode and should be
regularly updated. Many assessment tools and aids exist to support public transit systems in
conducting these appraisals. In the U.S., for example, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) collaborated with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to create the DHS Vulnerability Identification SelfAssessment Risk Tool (VISAT). Specific VISAT modules exist for mass transit (heavy
rail/subways), rail passenger stations, highway bridges, maritime, and operations centers. Others
are still being developed. Assessors must gauge the attractiveness of the target from a terrorist's
perspective and rate several consequence categories pertaining to public health, economic impact
and symbolic value. While some of the specific items are security sensitive, some of the main
categories covered in a vulnerability assessment typically include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
facility characteristics
type of security force
physical security measures
routes of access/egress
communications
availability of additional security and emergency responder resources
response time/distance for specialized security personnel
response time/distance for emergency responder personnel
proximity to critical areas within the community
geographic location and accessibility
proximity to international borders
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Table 2
Scenarios Considered in the DOT Vulnerability Assessment
Physical Attacks
• car bomb at bridge approach
• series of small explosives on highway
bridge
• single small explosive on highway
bridge
• single small explosive in highway
tunnel
• car bomb in highway tunnel
• series of car bombs on adjacent bridges
or tunnels
• bomb(s) detonated at pipeline
compressor stations
• bomb detonated at pipeline storage
facility
• bomb detonated on pipeline segment
• simultaneous attacks on ports
• terrorist bombing of waterfront pavilion
• container vessel fire at marine terminal
• ramming of railroad bridge by maritime
vessel
• attack on passenger vessel in port
• shooting in rail station
• vehicle bomb adjacent to rail station
• bombing of airport transit station
• bombing of underwater transit tunnel
• bus bombing
• deliberate blocking of highway-rail
grade crossing
• terrorist bombing of rail tunnel
•
•
•
•
•
bomb detonated on train in rail station
vandalism of track structure and signal
system
terrorist bombing of rail bridge
explosives attack on multiple rail
bridges
explosive in cargo of passenger aircraft
Biological Attacks
• biological release in highway tunnel
• anthrax release from freight ship
• anthrax release in transit station
• anthrax release on passenger train
Chemical Attacks
• sarin release in multiple subway stations
• physical attack on railcar carrying a
toxic chemical
Cyber and C3 Attacks
• cyber attack on highway traffic control
system
• cyber attack on pipeline automated
control system
• attack on port power and
telecommunications facility
• sabotage of train control system
• tampering with rail signals
• cyber attack on train control center
Source: Wegmann, F., & Everett, J. 2003. The Role of Security in the Surface Transportation Programming
Process. Knoxville, TN: Southeastern Transportation Center.
Threat Assessment
Threat assessment, like vulnerability assessment, must be an ongoing process. All transit systems
should have a process in place to support the identification, assessment, and management of
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threats to protected assets. These three functions (i.e., identify, assess, and manage) form the
foundation of an effective threat assessment program.5
To understand the proper scope of the threat assessment function, it is necessary to clarify what
constitutes a threat. One conventional approach is to confine the definition of “threat” to a
written or verbal communication of intent to harm. A major limitation of this approach is that it
fails to account for situations where there are indications of planning and preparation for an
attack, but no advance threatening communication directed to the target. In an early study of
threatening communications directed to celebrities and political officials, Dietz and Martell
(1989) dispelled the conventional wisdom about threats:
We have disproved the myth that threats and threateners are the only
communications or people of concern. The most common assumption in all
quarters—laymen, mental health professionals, law enforcement processionals
and lawmakers—is that threats foretell more dangerous behavior, but that other
odd communications do not. This is a groundless assumption and the source of
more misguided policy and decision making than any other error in this field. 6
An important distinction exists between making a threat (communicating intent to harm) and
posing a threat (engaging planning or preparation in furtherance of an attack). All communicated
threats must be taken seriously and investigated; however, people make threats for a variety of
reasons, and many who do so do not follow through. Moreover, some individuals and groups
seeking to attack transit targets do not communicate a threat before taking action. Simply stated,
many who make threats do not pose a threat, while some who pose a threat never make one.7
In the absence of receiving communicated threats, identifying warning indicators of a potential
attack becomes a critical challenge. Physical security and surveillance equipment can support
that effort; however, the enormous scope of the task and associated costs could quickly
compromise the efficiency of transit operations or become prohibitively personnel intensive.
Timely, accurate and useable information becomes critical. Transit security managers must
coordinate and develop collaborative relationships with intelligence agencies, federal, state and
local law enforcement, and with other transit systems to ensure that they have access to the best
information possible, as soon as it is available. An additional strategy that has been used with
some success by transit systems around the world is to mobilize passengers and transit operators
as watchful “eyes and ears,” asking them to monitor and report suspicious activity.
While encouraging the public to identify and act on their suspicions has clear benefits, concerns
have understandably emerged about racial or ethnic bias and “profiling.” The idea that there is an
accurate, useful profile of the terrorist is popular, but misguided. As an approach for identifying
5
Fein, R. A., & Vossekuil, B. 1998. “Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials.” NIJ/OJP/DOJ
Publication No. NCJ 170612. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.
6
Dietz, P., & Martell, D. 1989. “Mentally Disordered Offenders in Pursuit of Celebrities and
Politicians. Final Report.” Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, pp. 166-167.
7
Fein & Vossekuil.
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indicators of a pending attack, it is also inefficient. If, for example, one were to extrapolate a profile
from the September 11 attacks on the U.S., it might describe an Arab male in his late 20s or early
30s. The problem, of course, is that terrorism is relatively rare. The statistical reality is that the vast
majority of people who “fit” that or any other profile will not engage in an act of terrorism. The
reverse problem, though, is at least equally as troubling. There have been (and will continue to be)
people who commit these acts who do not fit any known profile.8
Therefore, an effective threat assessment program—or even a passenger/observer watch
program—must focus first and primarily on behavior. Behaviors are the most specific indicators
of pre-incident activity. Terrorists and other attackers typically follow a behavioral pathway as
they move from an initial idea about an attack to its execution. When those behaviors are
observed and identified they can warn of possible terrorist planning and preparation.9 The U. S.
Transit Watch Program is supported by APTA and provides “suspicious indicators” for the
purpose of assisting passengers and transit operators observe and identify such behaviors (see
Table 3).
Table 3
Suspicious Indicators from the U.S. Transit Watch Program
Behavior
If you spot any suspicious individuals engaged in questionable activity, look for the following:
• Visible signs of nervousness
• Excessive sweating
• Sprayer bottles or aerosol canisters
• Inappropriate clothing that is excessively baggy or too heavy in warm weather
Packages
If you spot an unattended package, look for the following:
• Placement in an out-of-the-way location
• Individuals in the act of abandoning the package and hastily departing the area
• Unusual attached batteries, wires, tanks, bottles or bags that might contain chemicals
• An attached message
• A suspicious cloud, mist, gas, vapor, odor or seeping fluid
• Nearby individuals showing signs of illness or distress
Recommended Course of action
• Do not confront suspicious individuals.
• Contact a transit employee or the police immediately.
• In the event of a suspicious package, do not use a cellular phone until you are a safe
distance away.
Source: Transit Watch Brochure, Washington, DC..: Federal Transit Administration.
8
Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Gelles, M. 2003. “Profiling Hazards: Profiling in
Counterterrorism and Homeland Security.” Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Reports
10(4) 1, pp. 12-13.
9
Fein & Vossekuil.
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When behavior or communication of concern comes to the attention of security officials, it must
be appropriately assessed.10 One level of assessment involves the use of technical measures to
detect weapons or harmful substances. For example, if an unattended backpack is reported on a
passenger train, an explosive detection K-9 unit (bomb-sniffing dogs) may be initially deployed
to screen the item. An even more complicated situation arises when the threat inquiry or
assessment focuses on people and on information rather than objects or materials. The system
should have a procedure for assessing threats and incoming intelligence and making
recommendations for transit operations.
Physical Security
Physical security involves the proactive deployment of physical resources to safeguard
personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to material (equipment, facilities and documents) and
to protect it against sabotage, damage, and theft. Because resources are limited, all assets cannot
have maximum protection at all times. The dynamic element of physical security involves
adjusting and allocating physical measures according to the assessed level of threat and target
vulnerability. The objective of these measures is to deter attacks by “opportunity reduction” or
“displacement.” The process is commonly referred to as “target hardening.”
The technological sophistication of physical security equipment varies widely. It may be as
simple as suitable lighting for dark or dimly lit passenger areas to retinal scanners and advanced
biometric sensors. Security equipment spans several categories and serves different functions.
One common category of measures deters infiltration through active monitoring and
surveillance, using devices such as CCTV cameras and recordings. Another class of equipment is
designed primarily for access control, so that only authorized or recognized persons can enter a
designated area. Access control measures may use electronically coded cards, passwords, retinal
scanners, or biometric indicators, such as fingerprints. Other equipment detects weapons (e.g.,
magnetometers) or impermissible materials (e.g., radiation, explosives, etc.) and warns of their
presence. Finally, perimeter security devices are designed to protect outer and inner perimeters
surrounding sensitive areas or assets. Inner perimeter devices (e.g., alarm systems) detect and
warn of any breach or penetration of a specified inner perimeter or secure zones, such as fare
collection drop areas, fueling areas, etc. Outer perimeter devices are designed to impede access
of people and vehicles into a zone of proximity that increases risk to the target (e.g., anti-vehicle
barriers).
In 2004, the American Public Transportation Association conducted a national survey of security
needs and funding priorities among transit agencies. A substantial majority of them (88.3%) said
they had adopted new security measures since September 11, 2001. Funding for additional
security and law enforcement personnel, training, and preparatory drills were rated as high
priority operating needs. The five most important physical security measures were:
10
Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. 1999. “Threat Assessment: Defining an
Approach for Evaluating Risk of Targeted Violence.” Behavioral Sciences & the Law 17(3),
pp. 323-337.
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•
•
•
•
•
radio communications systems, including operational control redundancy
security cameras on-board vehicles
controlled access to facilities and secure areas
security cameras in stations, and
automated vehicle locator (AVL) systems.11
Levels of physical security may vary within or across transportation modes depending on threat
level or target criticality. They may also change over time. Physical security levels have not been
uniformly standardized, but one example is presented are below. The levels are hierarchical—
that is, each successive level adds to the features of the one preceding it.
•
Minimum: Simple physical barriers, and simple locks. These are designed to impede
unauthorized external activity.
•
Low: Basic local alarm system, simple security lighting, basic security physical barriers,
and high security locks. These are designed to impede and detect unauthorized external
activity.
•
Medium: Advanced remote alarm system, high security physical barriers, and watchmen
with basic communication. These are designed to impede, detect and assess unauthorized
external activity.
•
High: CCTV, perimeter alarm system, highly trained armed guards, access controls, high
security lighting, local law enforcement coordination, and formal contingency plans.
These are designed to impede, detect and assess unauthorized external and internal
activity.
•
Maximum: Sophisticated alarm system, and onsite armed response force. These are
designed to impede, detect, assess and neutralize unauthorized external and internal
activity.
The primary guiding strategy for securing transit systems has been to use a layered defense. The
Transportation Research Board describes the strategy as follows:
Transportation security can best be achieved through coherent security systems
that are well integrated with transportation operations and are deliberately
designed to deter terrorists even as they selectively guard against and prepare for
terrorist attacks. In particular, layered security systems, characterized by an
interleaved and concentric set of security features, have the greatest potential to
deter and protect. Layered systems cannot be breached by the defeat of a single
security feature—such as a gate or guard—as each layer provides backup for the
others, so that impermeability of individual layers is not required. Moreover, the
interleaved layers can confound the would-be terrorist. Calculating the odds of
11
American Public Transportation Association. 2004. “Survey of United States Transit System
Security Needs and Funding Priorities: Summary of Findings.” Washington, DC.
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breaching a multi-tiered system of defense is far more difficult than calculating
the odds of defeating a single, perimeter protection.12
The effective installation and utilization of physical security systems and measures can
impede a terrorist’s ability to threaten a transit system. With the implementation of
layered defense mechanisms, the risk to an agency is greatly reduced.
Incident Planning and Response
Transit security managers hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. To minimize harm,
comprehensive security plans must address the entire continuum of protective action, including:
•
Prevention: This has several components, ranging from the actual stopping of an
attack before it occurs, to providing improved facility designs that prevent large
scale destruction. Surveillance, monitoring, and sensing technologies will likely
play an important role in the prevention phase of an incident.
•
Response/Mitigation: Reducing the harmful impact of an attack as it occurs and
in the immediate aftermath. This entails identifying the most effective routing for
emergency vehicles and the evacuation of large numbers of people, as well as
providing effective communication systems among emergency response teams
and for information dissemination to the general public.
•
Monitoring: Recognizing that an incident is underway, characterizing it, and
monitoring developments. Clearly, surveillance, monitoring, and sensing
technologies would be critical to this phase of incident response, as would public
information.13
Prevention should be the highest priority in protecting public transit systems from terrorist
attacks. However, transit agencies must have a comprehensive security system that includes
contingency plans to respond to incidents that may occur and mitigate their effects. Contingency
plans establish practices and procedures to follow in the event of critical incident, such as a
terrorist attack. Initiating an effective response in an emergency situation depends on advance
planning and preparation. Contingency plans must outline the essential response functions, and
address and coordinate the responsibilities of all response units and elements across multiple
service sectors (see Table 4). In most cases, a comprehensive contingency plan is best
established by a multi-disciplinary committee that may include police, fire, and medical services,
hazardous materials units, environmental agencies, power and water authorities, and the media.
As with vulnerability and threat assessments, the contingency plans must be continuously
updated and modified.
12
Transportation Research Board. 2002. “Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New
Transportation Security Imperative.” Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board,
National Academy of Sciences, p. 1.
13
Meyer, M. 2002. “The Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Preparing for Security
Incidents and Transportation Response.” Atlanta, GA: Georgia Institute of Technology.
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Table 4
Response Considerations for Incidents Involving
WMDs or Hazardous Materials
Control and containment of a contaminated area
• Crime scene protection
• Access control
Procedures for notification of an alert or actual incident/event
• Identifying the most likely or vulnerable locations
requiring heightened awareness in each responding
agency
Triage and treatment issues
• Decontamination protocols
• Staging and mobilization locations
• Hospital response and treatment issues
The key to successfully implementing a contingency plan is a well-coordinated Incident
Command System (ICS). The ICS has five central functions:
1. Command: Sets objectives, has overall responsibility at the incident or event
• Single point of contact for media and information dissemination
• Develops safety measures and monitors safe conditions
• Liaison with agency representatives and coordinate their involvement
2. Operations: Conducts tactical operations to carry out the plan, develops the tactical
objectives, organization, and directs all resources
3. Planning: Develops the action plan to accomplish the objectives, collects and evaluates
information, maintains resource status
4. Logistics: Provides support to meet incident needs, provides resources and all other
services needed to support incident response
5. Finance/Administration: Monitors costs related to the incident, provides accounting
procurement, time recording, and cost analysis
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To be adaptable to a range of different communities, the ICS concept is structured around
functions, not agencies or positions. It is necessary, therefore, that ICS be “institutionalized”
through the cooperative efforts of government and emergency management officials within a
given jurisdiction. Within the United States National Incident Management System (NIMS), is
institutionalizing ICS requires preparations at both policy and organizational/operational levels:
At the policy level, institutionalizing the ICS means government officials, i.e., governors,
mayors, county and city managers, tribal leaders and others should:
•
•
Adopt through the ICS an executive order, proclamation or legislation as the
jurisdiction's official incident response system.
Direct that incident managers and response organizations in their jurisdictions train,
exercise and use the ICS in their response operations.
At the organizational/operational level, evidence that incident managers and emergency
response organizations are institutionalizing the ICS would include the following:
•
•
•
ICS is being integrated into functional and system-wide emergency operations policies,
plans and procedures
ICS training is planned or under way for responders, supervisors and command level
officers
Responders at all levels are participating in and/or coordinating ICS-oriented exercises
that involve responders from multi-disciplines and jurisdictions.
When NIMS was established, it was not expected that all these activities would be completed in
FY 2005. It was expected that where possible they would be and that, at a minimum, planning
for such activities would be initiated and actions taken to put them into practice14.
Conclusion
Public transit systems are among the most attractive and most vulnerable terrorist targets.
Terrorist attacks on transportation are more common and more lethal than those against any other
class of target. Safeguarding systems that are designed and required to be open, accessible, and
efficient carries a multitude of challenges, but the right combination of personnel, technology
and access to information can help to keep these systems safe.
Transit security managers must first assess and confront the existing vulnerabilities of their
facilities, equipment, and systems. All assets should be accounted for, rated for criticality, and
evaluated for current security needs in the present threat environment. Security may be easily
enhanced in critical areas that do not affect passenger flow. Managers must also continuously
assess the nature and degree of threat against targets under the agencies. Threat assessment is a
continuous task that is highly reliant on timely, accurate, and usable information. Transit systems
must have liaisons and open lines of communication with intelligence officials, law enforcement,
14
NIMS Online, http://www.nimsonline.com/nims_faq.htm#incident
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and with each other. Passengers and operators can also be mobilized to serve as watchful eyes
and ears of suspicious behavior or material.
The current best practice approach to transit security is to use a layered system of defense,
particularly with regard to physical security measures. All assets cannot be given maximum
protection at all times. Exceptional and innovative technologies and measures exist and are
emerging to support the surveillance, impedance, detection, and assessment of unauthorized
persons and materials within a designated perimeter. They can be deployed in accordance with
asset criticality and assessed need. Preventive measures in physical security and protective
intelligence are absolutely critical; however, transit systems must also plan for mission failures.
They must prepare to contain, mitigate and respond to a range of attack scenarios that may occur.
This will involve extensive collaboration across multiple service systems, and is most likely to
be successful if rehearsed in practice drills.
With billions of passengers around the world every day, maintaining a climate of safety and a
shield of protection for our public transit systems should be among the highest priorities for
critical infrastructure and public protection.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND
TRANSIT SECURITY REFERENCE RESOURCE
The literature review provides several reports and resources related to transit security issues.
During the review four distinct themes emerged that are highlighted in this report. They are
security design, security, emergency planning, security funding, detection and deterrence. A
summary of these reports and reports are provided below.
Security Design
“Transit Security Design Consideration” (FTA 2004) provides an overview of the major
assets of transit systems—bus and rail vehicles, transit infrastructure and communications—as
well as a preliminary assessment of the vulnerabilities to various methods of attack inherent to
each asset. A new approach of integrating security measures at the design level is proposed in the
study. A systematic approach was developed for security design for public transit systems. The
intent of this study was not to provide industry-wide standards, but rather a compendium of steps
that a transit system can use while developing a security strategy. This study provides guidance
to public transit agencies to help deter and minimize the effects of attacks against facilities,
riders, employees, and the general public. The guidance provided can be implemented as part of
efforts to harden and retrofit transit agency assets. It addresses the topics of systems integration,
access management, and communications, all of which are crucial to the protection of transit
assets.
The study illustrates transit property design elements that planners, designers, and administrators
should consider when selecting a facility location, designing a new or renovating existing
facilities to protect them against potential threats. It was noted that it would be helpful to an
agency if the integration of security measures be considered during the design phase or
renovation phase of a project to cut down cost and also make “Crime Prevention through
Environment Design” (CPTED) possible. The components discussed in the report are site layout,
interior layout, structural engineering, architectural features, and systems/services. The report
describes in detail in each of these areas and provides guidelines for increasing security.
Security/Emergency Planning
“The Public Transportation Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide”
(2003) provides information on security and safety planning and response to major security
threats and emergencies. The report outlines step-by-step procedures in the system security
methodology and provides instructions on preparing a Security and Emergency Preparedness
Program (SEPP) plan. These instructions are comprehensive and can be used by the transit
agencies to develop their own SEPP plan.
Procedures are established in this report to deal with threats made via telephone or mail related to
a bomb, chemical, biological weapon, radiological threat, or other crimes including robbery,
firing, vandalism, etc. The guidelines for threats by telephone include remaining calm, activating
a recording device if any, listening carefully, explaining the consequences, and continuing the
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conversation with the caller in an effort to get more information. In case of threatening mail, the
item should be placed in a separate transparent bag and other suspicious mail should also be
isolated. The response to the threats should include contacting the appropriate officials to
conduct relative searches and follow-up activities.
Guidelines are provided in the National Transit Response Mode (NTRM)l that supports the
initiative of the Office of Homeland Security. (This was FTA’s response to OHS’s Homeland
Security Advisory System [HSAS]). The National Transit Response Model supplements the
existing HSAS Threat Condition Model by Black and Purple designations to further define
appropriate transit industry activities when an attack is in progress and during the post-event
recovery of transit services and facilities. The threat levels defined in the NTRM are provided in
Table 5.
Table 5
NTRM Threat Level Identifiers
Green
Low threat level
Blue
General threat level
Yellow
Elevated threat level
Orange
High threat level
Red
Severe threat level
Black
Actual attack
Purple
Recovery
The two most critical levels of the NTRM Threat Level Identifiers are the Black and Purple
designations. The Black and Purple designations are interpreted as follows.
•
Black indicates that an attack is under way against a specific transit agency or within the
agency’s immediate geographic area. The Black level is identified only when an attack
has occurred. The Black designation also includes the post-attack time period when the
transit agency may be responding to casualties, assisting in evacuations, inspecting and
securing transit facilities, or helping with other tasks directed by the local emergency
management authority.
•
Purple is reserved for the recovery time after an attack has occurred. Purple includes
restoration of levels of service, routes, and schedules, repairing or reopening facilities,
adjustment of staff work schedules and duty assignments, responding to customer
inquiries about services, and other activities necessary to restore transit service. Purple
follows the Black and may also exist for short time periods when the agency is
transitioning from a higher threat condition to a lower threat condition (e.g., from Red to
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Orange). Purple will coexist with the prevailing threat condition. In other words,
business recovery (Purple) will be accomplished while maintaining the prevailing
readiness status (e.g., Orange protective measures).
FTA recommends threat level protective measures or actions for each of the threat level
identified above. Training and communication are important in all the threat levels. Knowing
how to effectively utilize security and safety devices during a threat, resulting attack or during
the recovery phase is critical. The security devices should offer great flexibility due to the
inherently open architecture and free movement of people in transit facilities and passenger
stations. During low threat levels, it is suggested that basic security methodology be
implemented giving uninterrupted access to the general public. In times of high threat levels,
security of basic methodology should be combined with other advanced security methodologies
in the four areas: deter, detect, respond, and recover. Clear communication protocol should be
developed by the transit agencies to interact with other local, state and fed officials. It is also
suggested that evacuation routes be properly defined in any facility to ensure fast and safe
evacuation during threat/attack. Transit agencies are encouraged to establish communication
mechanisms within their facilities to effectively disseminate information.
In addition, the “Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit Agencies: Self
Assessment Checklist” was developed by FTA in 2003. The categories listed in the checklist
are:
• Management and Accountability
• Security Problem Identification
• Employee Selection
• Training
• Audits and Drills
• Document Control
• Access Control
• Homeland Security
The checklist will help transit agencies in assessing their current position for developing the
security program.
The “Mass Transit: Federal Actions Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security
Challenges” (GAO, December 2002) was conducted following the 9/11 attack. In this report, a
survey was conducted that clearly revealed that obtaining sufficient funding for security
measures has been the most significant challenge in making transit systems safe and secure.
The other challenges include coordination among transit stakeholders. Coordination is important
at the emergency planning level for developing security plans with the local, state and federal
agencies. The survey results also showed that limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit and
lack of coordination among various local agencies are also a contributing factor. The report
provides recommendations for the federal government’s role in funding transit safety and
security initiatives by addressing issues, including:
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•
•
•
•
determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security
developing federal funding criteria
establishing goals and performance indicators for federal efforts in transit security
selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments (e.g., grants and regulations) to
deliver assistance that may be deemed necessary by policymakers.
It also recommended for review of legislature change allowing transit agencies to use federal
urbanized area formula fund for operating expenses.
Source: Analysis of GAO survey results
Figure 2. Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems
as Reported by Surveyed Agencies
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Security Funding
“Survey of United States Transit System Security Needs and Funding Priorities: Summary
of Findings” (APTA 2004) includes results of an APTA survey of its transit agency members to
determine (a) the amount of funds they spend on and need for their security function; (b) the
extent to which they had increased and improved their security measures since 9/11; and (c) the
priorities they place on security measures that should be supported by federal funding. APTA
conducted a survey of a 120 transit agencies that operate all modes of service and are
geographically dispersed in United States. The survey results estimated a need for nearly
$6 billion of security-related investment. This amount includes $5.2 billion for transit agency
security-related capital investment plus $800 million annually for security-related personnel and
other security-related expenses. The dollar value clearly outlines the need of security systems in
our transit systems across the nation.
The survey also provided information that since 9/11 that more than 88 percent of the survey
respondents have implemented new security measures and 74 percent have increased security
measures that were already in place. The five security-related operating measures that were
ranked as “Very Important” for federal funding were:
•
•
•
•
•
Funding current transit agency/local law enforcement security personnel
Training for security personnel including preparatory drills
Funding additional transit agency/local law enforcement security personnel
Security training for other personnel
Joint transit/law enforcement training including preparatory drills
The five security-related capital investments most often selected as those for which federal
funding is “Very Important” were:
•
•
•
•
•
Radio communications systems including operational control redundancy
Security cameras onboard vehicles
Controlled access to facilities and secure areas
Security cameras in stations
Automated Vehicle Locator systems
In addition, the larger systems with extensive separated right-of-way rail lines and tunnel
networks also rated federal funding for chemical, biological, and radiation detection devices as
very important.
Detection and Deterrence
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Congress created the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) within the U.S. Department of Transportation. TSA was explicitly given the responsibility
for security in all modes of transportation and for the development of policies, strategies, and
plans for addressing transportation security threats. TSA is working on standardizing the security
measures across the different mode of transportation. “Deterrence, Protection, and
Preparation: The New Transportation Imperative Study” (TRB 2002) reviews the
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characteristics of public transportation systems in details and gives recommendations related to
strategic planning and research for effective working of TSA. The report recommends that
security technologies should be carefully selected based on the characteristics of the public
transportation system and transportation security. Transportation Security can best be achieved
through coherent security systems that are well integrated with transportation operations. The
systems should be deliberately designed to deter terrorists even as they selectively guard against
and prepare for terrorist attacks. Layered security systems, characterized by an interleaved and
concentric set of security features, have the greatest potential to deter and protect. Since the
security system overlap with each other, it cannot be breached by the defeat of a single security
feature. Increased sense of safety and security certainly increases the confidence in the riders
thus affecting ridership positively. The study proposes the use of already existing security
devices and enhancing its utility by adding new technologies that complements the already
existing ones. This approach capitalizes on existing processes and capabilities and it makes sense
given the potential cost and magnitude of the security task in the evolving and expansive
transportation sector.
The Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) has done a number of studies to understand
on the use of technology and their effectiveness for improving transit system security.
Technology plays an important role in improving security at transit systems but there is a need to
evaluate and understand the implications of its use under various scenarios. Modern technologies
not only require high expertise to setup but also have high implementation costs. The
“Guidebook for Selecting Appropriate Systems for Small Urban and Rural Public Transportation
Operators” (TCRP Report 76, 2002) developed guidelines to help transit agencies identify
technologies appropriate for their system size and needs. Some of the grants and available
revenue for funding these security measures are also explored in the report. In general it offers
assistance to transit systems for developing an implementation plan, conducting the procurement
process, and installing the new technology system.
“Applicability of Portable Explosive Detection Devices [EDDs] in Transit Environments”
(TCRP Report 86, 2004) demonstrates the capabilities explosive detection devices that exist in a
transit environment, including subways and bus station platforms. Most portable detection
equipment was designed for airport security and was focused on finding modern plastic
explosives that can create significant damage, even in small quantities. But now, there are a
number of current and emerging technologies that are suitable for portable instrumentation for
explosives detection applicable to transit industry. The study addresses three areas of expertise:
•
•
•
an in-depth understanding of transit operations and how EDDs can be used effectively
without interfering with efficient operations
scientific and technical expertise in the deployment and operation of portable EDDs
knowledge and experience in conducting field operational tests to assess the efficacy of
available portable EDDs in transit settings.
In this report, selected EDDs were tested in the transit environment, and the use of these devices
to check suspicious packages was evaluated. A variety of transit and geographical environments
were used in these tests. These devices were tested to understand the ease of use because the
intended operators would be transit security personnel, not explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
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units. The technologies discussed are Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS), Surface Acoustic Wave
(SAW), Electron Capture Detectors, Thermo-Redox Detectors, Amplifying Fluorescent Polymer
and Canine.
In the decision-making process for transit agencies considering the deployment of portable
EDDs, the acquisition, installation, training, operations, and maintenance costs associated with
these devices are important factors. The costs associated with the tested EDD in the research are
outlined in the report and they are further broken down into the device’s major components and
their respective lifetimes. This would help the transit agencies to understand the cost associated
with implementing the technology. In addition, this report makes recommendations for
improvement or adaptation of the devices to the transit environment, discusses the cost of
implementing and maintaining the instruments, and includes a comparison of portable detectors
and canines.
“Intrusion Detection for Public Facilities Handbook” (TCRP Report 86, 2003) provides
comprehensive information on application and implementation of a wide range of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) technologies to include in public facilities: Fencing Systems, Barrier
Systems, Lighting Systems, Video Systems, Access Control Systems, Sensor Systems,
Identification Systems, Data Fusion, Display and Control Systems, Crisis Management Software,
and a number of other systems. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) define, observe, control, and
sense entry into a defined controlled or secure area and Access Control Systems (ACS) manage
various combinations of entry, exit and/or movement through secure and controlled areas by the
use of an identifiable token. Many transit systems are already using a variety of intrusion
detection strategies. Initially, the strategies for deploying IDS and ACS were employed to reduce
hazards, vandalism and crime; restrict access to secure areas; and raise passenger-perceived
levels of security when using the transit system. But now IDS and ACS are now effectively
deployed to detect and prevent the transit systems from terrorism. In this study, a handbook was
developed for selecting and managing intrusion detection systems in the public transportation
environment.
The handbook also addresses transit agencies’ needs for evaluating and upgrading the intrusion
detection systems applicable to the spectrum of their facilities. It provides guidance on assessing
system needs; developing system designs; and estimating system costs, benefits, and risks. IDS
and ACS discussed in the Handbook range from low-technology to more complex hightechnology systems, and directly support the deterrence and detection of intrusion into secure
areas. In this handbook, ACS are a subsystem that support IDS by enabling access by authorized
personnel, preventing access by intruders, and interfacing with IDS to annunciate entry into
controlled or secure areas. ACS covers the spectrum from simple keys to highly integrated
biometrics controls. Since there are no specific ACS requirements or standards for transit
facilities, examples and references are provided from other industries that can be applicable to
transit systems. The handbook contains a survey list used to quantify and qualify the ACS. It also
provides guidance on the type of questions and issues to be considered in the selection process
for a capable, respected and reputable company that can provide the required security solutions.
“Robotic Devices: A Guide for the Transit Environment, Public Transit Security” (TCRP
Report 86, 2003) looks at unmanned tele-operated robotic vehicles and they can be used in
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transit. Tele-operated robotic vehicles have raised public awareness with successful use of this
device for search and rescue efforts following the 9/11 disaster. Robots have long been used in
search efforts and homeland security missions such as explosive ordnance detection and
disposal, perpetrator location and observation, and similar military applications. Their major
strength of interrogating areas impenetrable by humans while keeping their human operators out
of harm’s way is now being realized and is being applied to transit systems. The environments
for their applications are discussed in the report. These environments discussed are categorized
as “Structures,” “Vehicles,” “Roadways and Terrain,” “Weather Conditions,” “Optical
Navigation Environments,” “Radio Environments,” “Hazardous Environments,” and “Other
Requirements.” Both normal conditions and hazardous situations are examined in the study.
Robot systems include a wide variety of remotely controlled vehicles equipped with cameras,
sensors, and other navigational instruments to provide feedback to the user at a control station.
Payloads can include additional sensors such as X-ray cameras; nuclear, biological, and chemical
hazard detectors; bomb disarming devices; weaponry; and a variety of other deployable systems
such as medical supplies. The report gives recommendation to the transit agencies in the
appropriate selection of such devices for various transit scenarios.
“Electronic Surveillance Technology on Transit Vehicles, A Synthesis of Transit Practice”
(TCRP Synthesis 38, 2001) compiles information for on-board vehicle surveillance technologies
and transit agencies experiences in the application of those technologies. All the current and
emerging technologies designed for use in the transit industry are reviewed. There has been
considerable improvement in technologies for on-board vehicle surveillance since 2001, but this
synthesis provides an extensive overview of its benefits and issues with the use of surveillance
technologies.
This review of the literature illustrates it is become relatively easy to develop layered security
system for a transit systems. From this review a number of research studies have been identified
to help transit agencies develop security and safety plans, assess their system’s threats and
vulnerability and new technology has been identified to help make a system safe and secure
Transit Security Reference Resource
The Transit Security Reference Resource Website at www.cutr.usf.edu/security was developed
serve as a valuable resource for all transit professionals throughout the nation. The website
provides available transit security research, resources, publications, literature reviews and a
contact database for transit security reports and organization involved in transit security.
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The website has four categories: Reports, Tools, Best Practices, and Organizations.
The “Reports” tabs contains a number of reports published by FTA, FEMA, FBI, GSA, GAO,
EPA, AFT and other federal agencies.. The Report section also includes reports on security from
APTA, AASHTO, CTAA ,TSI and other organization that have published reports related to
transit security.
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The “Tools” tab provides examples of emergency preparedness plans and emergency response
plans from agencies around the country. These examples are provided as a resource tool to help
transit agencies to develop or improve their security and emergency preparedness program plans.
The “Best Practices” tab contains the case studies in this report and further illustrates the
innovative, cost effective, methods and solutions that transit agencies have implemented to
improve security operating/ maintenance facilities and passenger stations.
The “Organizations” tab provides links to on-line resources, federal government agencies, other
public transportation organizations and think tanks--other national organizations involved in
national security, weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
(CBRN) attacks.
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CASE STUDIES/BEST PRACTICES
Introduction
The mass transit industry has always been expected to operate efficiently, provide timely,
reliable service, and ensure the safety and security of customers and employees. In the preterrorist society most of these goals were met by our nation’s transit systems efficiently and cost
effectively. However, since September 11, 2001, with the increased onset of terrorism on
international public transit our transit properties are expected to decrease the opportunity for
address potential vulnerabilities with limited funds. At a time when additional operating funds
are no longer available or limited, the transit industry is being asked to provide heightened
security against terrorism.
Open access to public transit facilities and vehicles is the key to increasing ridership but, at the
same time, this open access becomes a challenge when protecting these agencies from possible
attacks. Open access leaves transit agencies highly vulnerability to possible attacks because of:
the number of people, high accessibility during time of day, main and secondary impact, easy
entry and exit, and anonymity.
Highly vulnerable transit centers have a high potential for significant loss to human life and
property damage if proper security measures are not address to somehow manage transit natural
open accessibility. However, investment cost for security measures based on the threat
assessments may be difficult to justify. Other factors should also be considered in determining
the total benefit. Improved security measures have a deep impact on impeding daily general
crime which in turn helps to improve ridership.
Case Studies
Identifying cost effective security methodologies for the transit industry requires an awareness
and familiarity with technology advancements and innovative problem solving. While modern
science has made it possible to come up with extremely accurate devices for enhancing the
security, at the same time, these technologies have high capital, operating and maintenance cost.
How can transit agencies implement cost effective methods to improve security at transit
operating/maintenance facilities and passenger stations without significant increases in their
operating costs? Nationwide, several transit agencies were identified that have successfully
accomplished this task. These agencies have creatively and innovatively incorporated solutions
to increasing transit’s security in a cost-effective manner. The six national transit properties are
listed in Table 6 along with their solution to the perplexing issue of increasing security.
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Table 6. Case Study Locations and Innovative, Cost-Effective Security Measures
Integrated security design criteria
Denver Regional Transit District (RTD)
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) - District of Columbia
Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) North Carolina
PROTECTS (Program of Response Options and
Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism)
State of the art access control systems, video
surveillance and integrated perimeter security
system
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA)
Innovative commander center
Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority
(LYNX) – Orlando
Biometric system to secure its fare counting room,
parameter security and complex firewall design
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) – San Francisco
Subway tunnel intrusion security technology
Following this section are six case studies that clearly detail the challenges and accomplishment
of each of these transit agencies to creatively improve transit security. Each agency’s approach
to improving security at their agency varies from simply strategically locating key personnel and
integrating safety and security in pre-construction design to more complex systems such as early
chemical warning systems and intrusion detection devises. All of the case studies provide
detailed responses to each of the categories listed in Table 7.
Table 7. Categories for Case Studies
• Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
• Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
• Previous Attempts (if any) to Address Problems and Results
• Reasons for Proposed Solution
• Solution Proposed/Implementation
• Cost/Benefit Analysis
• Measure Effectiveness of Implementation / Performance Indicators
• Lessons Learned/Conclusion
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Case Study
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT (RTD)
DENVER, COLORADO
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
The Regional Transportation District (RTD) in Denver is one of a few transit agencies
nationwide that has developed a specific transit-related Design Criteria Manual for its new Light
Rail Transit (LRT) systems. What is specifically significant is that the agency introduced and
integrated both safety and security design requirements into its LRT Design Criteria Manual.
The intent of the LRT Design Criteria Manual is to establish general criteria to be used in the
planning and design phases of newly planned LRT capital improvement projects. One of the
primary goals of the manual is to provide guidance to project engineers and architects for the
initial inclusion of safety and security requirements during the planning and design phases of
RTD’s LRT projects. RTD developed and modified these safety and security design criteria as a
result of lessons learned from earlier LRT projects, safety design criteria from other agencies,
and results from security evaluations and Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (TVA). The
success of this initiative has not only motivated the agency to expand and improve the LRT
Design Criteria Manual for future approved LRT projects, but RTD is now developing new
Design Criteria Manuals to cover future bus operations and facilities and commuter rail capital
improvement projects.
RDT’s Public Safety Division has the responsibility of the agency’s safety and security
requirements. The Public Safety Division is divided into sub-sections that include Safety,
Environmental and Security. The Division has 6 employees, 75 contracted security officers, and
a contract with the Denver Police Department to provide off-duty Police Officer security
assistance.
System Description
The RTD system has evolved into a transit system that services an area of 2,406 square miles,
and includes 41 municipalities in 7 counties. The system has 176 fixed routes, which includes
local bus services along major streets, express and regional bus routes providing non-stop
services along longer distances, Denver International Airport bus service, a free shuttle on the
Sixteenth Street Mall in downtown Denver, and a LRT system service serving Denver and its
southwestern suburbs. Basic operations include the following.
Bus Operations: The bus fleet currently has 1,074 buses, with an average fleet age of 8.1 years.
Eighty-seven buses are leased to private carriers. Annual boardings are now approximately 83
million passengers (279,000 boardings on an average weekday) through a network of over
10,237 bus stops. There are currently six maintenance and storage facilities district-wide, 67
park-n-rides and 17 transfer stations.
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Light Rail Operations: The light rail service operates on the existing 5.3 mile Central Corridor,
the 8.7 mile Southwest Corridor and the 1.8 mile Central Platte Valley Spur. The system
accommodates two lines, the C and D lines. The Southeast Corridor/T-REX design-build
project, adding approximately 19 miles of light rail service, is in construction and will be
operating by November 2006.
Other Services: In addition to the fixed route services, RTD provides services to sporting events
and other special events, special services for the disabled and senior citizens, and door-to-door
services in limited areas of the District.
The population of the Denver metro area grew from 2.1 million in 1995 to more than 2.6 in
million in 2005. Approximately 95 percent of the population of the region lies within the RTD
service area. The area’s rate of population increase peaked in 1999 and decreased steadily
through 2004. While continuing to grow, the region grew at a slower rate. In spite of a five-year
slowing trend, the area is forecast by the Denver Regional Council of Governments to grow to
2.87 million in 2010 and to 3.26 million in 2020, an increase of approximate 25 percent in 15
years.
Climatic Considerations for Systems Design
The Denver metropolitan area, within which RTD operates, is situated at the foot of the eastern
slope of the Rocky Mountains in central Colorado. The area has a semi-arid climate that is
somewhat characteristic of the High Plains but is modified by the Rocky Mountains to the west.
Because of this, Denver lies in a belt where there is a fairly rapid change in climate from the
foothills to the plains. This change is largely caused by the increase in elevation as you travel
west to the foothills. Denver has an elevation of 5,280 feet.
The average annual temperature is about 50°F at this elevation, though this varies a few degrees
as elevation changes. The wide average range in daily temperature of 25° to 30°F in the Denver
metropolitan area and a wide average range in annual temperature are typical for the High Plains.
Temperatures vary from day to day; extremely hot weather in summer and extremely cold
weather in the winter normally do not last long and are followed by much more moderate
temperatures.
System equipment including vehicles, electrification power and distribution system, signal
system and fare collection/validation equipment along with track-work, stations and other civil
features must be capable of maintaining operation within the unique weather and elevation
conditions of the region.
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
In the transit community as a whole, safety and security requirements have tended to be an afterthought in transit capital improvement projects. This has forced transit agencies to address
critical safety and security issues after the projects are designed, during project construction by
means of change orders, or even after project completion. One outcome of this approach is that
agencies must address un-programmed funding requirements for facility, equipment and or
systems changes that could have been avoided if these requirements were initially included.
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Previous Attempts (if any) to Address Problem and Results
RTD originally developed an LRT Design Criteria Manual for the design and construction of its
initial LRT system, the Central Corridor, which opened for revenue service in October 1994.
There have been three subsequent extensions: the Southwest Corridor in 2000, the Central Platte
Valley Spur in 2001, and the Southeast Corridor scheduled to open in November 2006. The LRT
Design Criteria Manual went through a number of revisions prior to the design of each
subsequent corridor, including a significant revision in 2000 which included a new section
dedicated to system safety. The system safety section was originally developed from a
combination of RTD’s System Safety Program Plan (SSPP), Military Standard 882, APTA
guidelines, FTA requirements and recommendations, and a safety criteria model of the Portland,
Oregon transit system. In addition, safety revisions were also incorporated from lessons learned
from previous RDT LRT projects.
In November 2004, the Denver metropolitan area voters approved RTD’s FasTracks program,
consisting of 6 new rail corridors (119 miles total) including commuter rail, LRT, and possibly
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). To address the ambitious needs of the FasTracks program, the LRT
Design Criteria Manual was again revised in 2005. This revision not only updated the safety
criteria but also introduced security criteria for the first time. RTD developed all of its security
criteria based on their System Security Plan (SSP), RTD requirements, FTA requirements and
recommendations, and as a result of security assessments and Threat and Vulnerability
Assessments (TVA) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These assessments were conducted through a
number of avenues, which included in-house efforts using the Department of Justice Threat and
Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) model , FTA (consulting contracts), State of Colorado
Department of Home Land Security (National Guard), and the Transportation Security
Administration’s Surface Transportation Security Inspectors.
As a result of the earlier success with the LRT Design Criteria Manual and the agency’s approval
of the safety and security design criteria, commuter rail and bus transit facilities Design Criteria
Manuals are now under development.
Reason for Proposed Solution
The primary reason for integrating safety and security design criteria in an initial project design
and/or procurement specification is to proactively address these requirements thereby including
them in an initial overall project budget. This could potentially save a transit agency hundreds of
thousands of dollars. In addition, this process can reduce the number of safety and/or security
related project construction and/or procurement change orders, thus preventing potential project
and procurement budget overrun.
Solution Proposed/Implementation
General Implementation
RTD developed and implemented the LRT Design Criteria Manual initiative with the General
Manager and senior management support and approval. This task was accomplished through an
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integrated approach that involved all staff sections of management as well as supervision of the
Executive Safety and Security Committee.
The LRT Design Criteria Manual revision and approval process in 2005 were challenging and
time consuming. RTD convened a group of subject matter experts from engineering,
construction, rail operations, bus operations, planning, facilities maintenance, scheduling, safety
and security. An orientation outlining the process, as well as the goals and objectives of the task
was presented to the participants to standardize the process. Each section of the manual was
assigned to a committee with a lead person responsible for the section revision. Once the
sections were initially revised a draft revision was submitted for review and comment. A
specific process was developed to allow all disciplines to provide comments, and for all
comments to be reviewed and discussed by the entire group for proper disposition of the
comments–a true systems approach. A final draft was then compiled and received a final review
by the senior management from rail operations, engineering, safety and security. The final
document was then approved by signature of senior management. Even though the process was
arduous, a 6-9 month process of meetings and 4 half day workshops, the end result was a
comprehensive document that was well accepted throughout the organization.
The newly-developed commuter rail and bus transit facilities Design Criteria Manuals were
developed in a similar, but not as comprehensive, fashion, primarily because much of the same
design criteria outlined in the LRT Design Criteria Manual carried over to the new manuals.
These two new documents are currently in the final review and approval stages.
Each Design Criteria manual has a section dedicated to system safety and system security.
However, the safety and security section does not capture all the safety and security design
criteria established in the manual. Specific system safety and security design criteria have been
integrated throughout sections that address landscaping, stations, operations facility, fare
collection equipment, and light rail vehicles, to mention a few. The system safety and system
security section of the LRT Design Manual establishes the foundation for safety and security
designs and detailed criteria are captured and integrated throughout the document.
The LRT Design Criteria Manual establishes basic criteria to be used in the design of new RTD
LRT systems. In addition, drafting standards, directive or sample drawings and management
procedures were prepared to standardize and guide the design activities and the preparation of
contract documents.
The safety and security design criteria that were included in revisions to the LRT Design Criteria
Manual addressed emergency access/egress, station design and walkways. The criteria require
the design to identify emergency access and egress locations and provide a list or matrix of the
necessary elements to be provided at each exit, such as lighting, signage, lock hardware,
intrusion detection, and other elements.
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Evans Light Rail Station, one entrance/
exit, in compliance with NFPA 130
Littleton Downtown Light Rail, non exit,
multiple entrances, in compliance with
NFPA 130
In addition, the criteria established the requirement for video surveillance equipment into
capital projects. The Design Manual requires that video surveillance systems be capable of
transmitting real-time (30 frames per second per camera) video to RTD’s Security
Command Center via a fiber optic transmission backbone. The manual requires all designs
to include system elements including communication houses, transmission infrastructure,
color cameras, and digital video recorders. The manual establishes that designs must
incorporate video surveillance covering station platforms, emergency telephones, elevator
waiting areas, stairwell entries, parking structures, pedestrian tunnels and pedestrian
bridges.
Digital
Cameras
Union Station, light rail with no video
surveillance
Littleton Light Rail Station with video
surveillance
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RTD Security Command System Console
camera placements and coverage, Littleton/
Mineral Park-and-Ride
Boeing, Visual Security Operation Console
(VSOC), 3-dimensional geographic
presentation
The LRT Design Criteria Manual also requires the placement of emergency telephones in
the design elements of capital projects. The manual requires that all emergency telephones
be consistent with existing RTD units and meet the performance requirements of RTD’s
existing emergency telephone network. Emergency telephones are required in designs for
all station platforms, elevator waiting areas, stairwell entries, parking structures, park-nrides, pedestrian bridges and tunnels.
Digital
Camera
Emergency
Phone
Union Station, Light Rail
I-25 & Broadway Light Rail Station,
no emergency telephones
Emergency phones being installed
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The manual also addresses the design requirements for parking structures, as well as
underground and/or below grade transit facilities. Stairwell and elevator designs must
maximize the interior visibility of stairwells, elevators and elevator shafts. It also requires
that wall construction materials be transparent, such as glass, and must allow visibility
from at least three sides. For underground, enclosed and/or below grade facilities, it was
recognized that these present unique security challenges. The manual recognizes the
importance of maximizing patron safety and security through various counterterrorism
measures. Specifically, the design elements of these facilities must include the provision
of video surveillance in the perimeter areas, portals, entrances, exits, the interior of the
facilities and all fare vending locations.
University Park-and-Ride, T-Rex Project,
elevators and stairs with no portal protection
Market Street Bus Terminal Entrance
RTD made a simple change top its new bus facility Design Criteria Manual that has proven to be
a significant cost savings. Due to a serious issue with acid etching, graffiti, glass replacement
and general maintenance with their glass panel bus shelters, they changed the design criteria to
have perforated metal sidings instead of glass and a curved shape roof line. These changes have
saved the agency roughly $150,000 in annual maintenance costs with a 3-4 year pay back benefit
with their current inventory of bus stop shelters. All new bus shelter procurements must now be
in compliance with the new design criteria.
Cost/Benefit Analysis
RTD did not conduct a cost/benefit analysis on this design criteria initiative. However, RTD’s
success of integrating safety and security design criteria early in the project planning and design
phases and cost requirements included in the project budget will prove to be a significant longterm cost savings to the agency.
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Old design with glass panels
One of many new design configuretions with perforated metal siding
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/ Performance Indicators
RTD’s effectiveness in implementing this initiative has been proven by the continued support of
the General Manager and senior management. This includes the success experienced by the
agency’s staff and the Executive Safety and Security Committee accepting this process and
approving the RTD Design Criteria Manual. In addition, just the fact that the agency continues
to update the LRT Design Criteria Manual to remain in compliance with accepted practices and
applicable codes and develop new Design Criteria Manuals for upcoming capital improvement
projects proves that the implementation was successful and effective.
Lessons Learned/Conclusion
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The initiative of having Design Criteria Manuals with safety and security design criteria
must have senior management’s approval and support.
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An integrated, horizontal approach with the agency staff is imperative for developing a
comprehensive product such as the LRT Design Criteria Manual and the other Design
Criteria Manuals.
•
A reasonable and practical approach is essential when developing the framework for
identifying specific safety and security design criteria. The difficult part of the process
is establishing the right balance between having the essential safety and security
requirements in accordance with codes and regulations verses having the latest
technology or capability.
•
With the integration of design criteria early in the project, project budget constraints may
be a challenge. This can apply during design review and the project Value Engineering
process. The establishment of this process which approves changes and/or deviations at
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the RTD Executive Safety and Security Committee level has proven extremely
important. This process not only controls changes but can initiate a compromise and/or
elevate an issue to the General Manager level for a final decision on project priorities
and design criteria changes.
•
To ensure the Design Criteria Manual requirements are included in the projected project
costs, a design manual should be given to the engineers and architects as early as the
Alternative Analysis (AA) portion of the project system planning phase. This is the
phase where the initial foundation of the preliminary project budget forecast is
developed and a specific amount is allocated for security requirements.
•
When new safety or security technologies are introduced for consideration, a detailed
analysis is needed to identify desired technological configurations, testing and
monitoring capabilities, training requirements, routine maintenance, management
responsibilities, and long term life cycle costs for sustainability reasons. This analysis
and findings are not only essential for the approval process, but once approved and in
place, it provides sustainable funding requirements that must be integrated into an
agency’s long range budget forecast cycles.
More information on the LRT Design Criteria Manual and specific fact sheets on LRT corridor
projects can be obtained through RTD’s website under “Light Rail” at www.rtd-denver.com/.
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Case Study
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY (WMATA)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
WMATA operates the second largest rail system and the fifth largest bus network in the United
States. The agency was created in 1967 by an Interstate Compact. In 1973, four area bus systems
were acquired. In 1976, the first phase of Metrorail began operation and in 2004 the last three
stations were opened. Metrorail and Metrobus serve a population of 3.5 million, within a 1,500
square mile service area. The transit zone consists of the District of Columbia, suburban
Maryland counties of Montgomery and Prince George’s, and the Northern Virginia counties of
Arlington, Fairfax and Loudoun and the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church. The rail
system begins revenue service at 5 AM and on weekends at 7 AM. The rail system closes at
midnight Sunday to Thursday and on weekends at 3 AM Friday and Saturday.
System Description
Transit service is provided along 350 bus routes and with nearly 1,500 vehicles and a 106-mile
rail system serving 86 stations (DC-38.30 miles, 40 stations; Maryland-38.31 miles, 26 stations;
Virginia-29.47 miles, 20 stations), with over 1,000 rail cars providing nearly 350 million
passenger trips.
WMATA’s Communications Branch is responsible for the efficient, effective and economic
management of the Authority’s communications systems in support of Rail and Bus Operations,
e.g., telephone, mobile radio, public address, cable transmission, fiber optic, fire and intrusion,
rail yard security, closed circuit television (CCTV), bus transfer dispensers, wayside/emergency
telephones, environmental monitoring, digital video recorders, and the PROTECT system.
Metrobus, Metrorail and Paratransit
Rail Service
• 198 million passenger trips projected in FY06
• 68 million miles of service projected in FY06
Bus Service
• 149 million passenger trips projected in FY06
• 48 million miles of service projected in FY06
Paratransit
• 310-vehicle paratransit fleet, operating over 1.45 million trips annually
Office of MetroAccess Services
• Mobility for people with disabilities in coordination with WMATA service
area and ADA programs
• 310 vehicle fleet (76 sedans and 234 Vans)
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145 million annual passenger trips
6,500 trips scheduled daily
The Department of Rail Services
The Department of Rail Services is responsible for ensuring train safety, on-time service and
reliable transportation for customers. With a staff of approximately 5,600 employees, Rail
Services operates and maintains 950 rail cars and their components, which travel over 64.4
million miles each year and responds to all customer calls and correspondence. In addition, Rail
Services operates and maintains:
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86 rail stations
2,129 pieces of fare collection equipment
313 parking gates
206 miles of track in revenue service and 38 miles of track in yards
Automatic Train Control systems
ventilation and fan shafts in tunnels that remove smoke
emergency call boxes
train intercoms
fire panels in every station
water system for tunnels and stations (fire suppression)
58,148 park and ride spaces at 20 garages and 35 surface lots (50,000 customers
per day), 44 stations with “Kiss and Ride”
Major assets of the Department of Rail Services include:
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97 traction power substations and 110 tie breaker stations
176 AC substations and 1655 emergency trip stations
317 UPS systems, 30 emergency generators, 317 battery banks, 7,205 relays, 250
miles of track feeder cables, 306 HV breakers, and 207 HV transformers
Power and lights for 11 bus garages, 86 passenger stations, 37 parking lots, 11
parking garages and 6 service and inspection buildings
247,000 lights
Landscaping services for approximately 550 acres of grounds, and cleaning and
repair services for 850 acres of pavement
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The Department of Rail Services operates and maintains:
• 323 tunnel standpipe systems (100 miles of piping)
• 493 fire suppression systems (wet sprinkler, dry sprinkler, deluge and halon
systems)
• 108 vent shafts
• 79 fan shafts
• 113 tunnel emergency exits
The Department of Rail Services has approximately 700,000 weekday customers and provides
service for 80 baseball games, 8 football (Redskins) games, over 120 MCI events, malls, and the
Cherry Blossom Festival events during the year.
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Department of Bus Service
The Department of Bus Service is responsible for ensuring that bus service is safe, reliable, and
clean for its customers. The 3,625 WMATA Bus Service employees::
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operate and maintain 340 bus routes that travel 48,243,600 miles annually
transport 132.3 million passengers annually
average 444,000 weekday passengers
operate and maintain 10 garages
operate and maintain 2 shops
operate and maintain 1,477 buses, ranging in size from 26 to 60 feet
Metro Transit Police Department
The purpose of the Metro Transit Police (MTP) is to prevent crime; protect Metro’s customers,
employees, facilities and revenues; and enforce laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. MTP
officers have jurisdiction and arrest powers throughout the 1,500 square mile Transit Zone that
includes Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia for crimes that occur on or against
Transit Authority facilities. They are nationally accredited through the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement, Inc.
MTP conducts annual counter-terrorism training and explosive device training, provides bomb
containment trash cans, participates in numerous interagency disaster-related drills, has 1,400
cameras monitoring the rail system, and participates in the testing of emergency technology.
WMATA’s Emergency Response Training Facility is the only transit facility of its kind in the
nation that is available 24 hours per day, seven days a week to train emergency personnel. The
facility includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency responders to train for
disasters such as smoke/fire, collisions and potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel
environment. WMATA’s emergency management team trains an estimated 2,000 federal, state
and local emergency personnel each year. MPT’s personnel include:
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422 sworn transit police officers
102 special police officers
4 revenue guards
23 support staff
Duties and responsibilities of the Metro Transit Police include:
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Public safety and law enforcement
Maintain peace and order
Prevent crime and acts of terrorism
Protect transit facilities and revenue
Partner with regional public service and law enforcement agencies
Enforce federal, state and local laws and ordinances
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Responsibilities of the Metrobus Enforcement Division include:
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Patrolling buses in all three jurisdictions
Investigating offenses that occur on buses, conduct follow-ups
Investigating internal theft that occurs on bus properties
Conducting terrorism awareness training for bus personnel
Attending monthly safety meetings at each bus division
Tracking data obtained from the Bus Operator Contact Program
Participating in targeted enforcement initiatives
Visiting local schools and establish mentoring programs
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
A terrorist attack on WMATA would have dramatic implications for our country and our
transportation systems. Brian Jenkins, Director of the National Transportation Center stated, “If
terrorists are determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, then public
surface transportation systems represent an ideal target.” Subways and buses are proven targets
around the world. In public surface transportation systems, terrorists can attack anonymously
and escape before being detected. Mass transit attracts crowds and gathers them in a contained
environment—nearly 700,000 patrons travel on the WMATA system on an average day.
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Almost half of Metrorail’s peak period riders (47%) are federal employees
More than 50 federal agencies or employment centers are located adjacent to Metro
stations
More than 22 million people visit the nation’s capital annually
Hundreds of thousands of people use Metro to attend major national events such as
Presidential inaugurations and Independence Day celebrations
Federal and regional emergency evacuation plans rely heavily on the Metro (on 9/11,
Metro calmly and successfully evacuated hundreds of thousands of people)
Previous Attempts to Address Problems and Results
Information on previous attempts was unavailable.
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Reasons for Proposed Solutions
WMATA took the lead nationwide in developing plans and procedures for response and
mitigation of a terrorist incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After
the sarin attack in Tokyo in 1995, WMATA analyzed the devastation and economic
consequences that a chemical attack on mass transportation would have to the United States and
began working with the region and the federal government to ensure that it was well-prepared to
respond to any emergency or catastrophic event.
WMATA examined the Japanese experience in dealing with the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacks
against the Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA) in 1995. Few other counties have faced such
a sustained chemical campaign of violence. The attacks included the following:
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1995-fumes sicken 11 people in a subway train car in Yokohama, March 5
1995-sarin attack on 5 trains, on three train lines, 19 stations affected, with 12
fatalities, and 5,500 injured, Tokyo
1995-400 people injured by fumes released in railway system in Yokohama, April 19
1995-25 people overcome by fumes in a store near Yokohama station, April 21
1995-toxic hydrocyanic gas-releasing devices found in a subway station men’s room,
Tokyo, May 5
The importance of detectors can be highlighted by the
fact that the Tokyo March 20 sarin attack took place in
less than 10 minutes; 16 stations were affected. Hundreds
of people spilled onto platforms coughing blood. Twelve
persons died, and more than 5,000 people sought
treatment at hospitals. More than 130 first responders
were injured, not knowing that it was a chemical attack.
What saved people was not first responders or transit
personnel but the poor quality of the chemical agent and
the dispersal system used by the terrorists.
The transit industry became aware of how vulnerable
transportation was to terrorism. No longer could transit
rely on first responders to rush in and immediately save lives and recover from the incident.
Without training, detection equipment, communications, personnel protective clothing,
hazardous material, and decontamination procedures, the responders would also be victims.
WMATA recognized the need for real-time protection against subway attacks. If an attack took
place, a system would be needed to automatically alert the transportation agency of a chemical
release.
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Solutions Proposed/Implementation
Enhancements by WMATA to increase the life-safety of employees and customers include:
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Placement of up to 300 explosion-resistant trash cans in the rail system (started 09/26/05)
Increased presence of transit police officers and K-9 units throughout the system
Digital message boards in the stations that can be used for system alerts
Automated electronic fire protection system in stations and tunnels
Call boxes spaced 800 feet (244 meters) along tracks
Fire extinguishers on platforms and inside rail cars
Video monitoring of stations, elevators and some station parking lots
Public address systems on the trains and platforms
Passenger-to-station-manager intercoms on platforms, in elevators and landings
Passenger-to-operator intercoms inside rail cars—one at each end
Chemical sensors in underground stations (research and development in chemical
detection was enhanced after the Tokyo sarin attack).
Establishment of an interagency agreement with all area fire departments
Relocated all newspaper vending machines, trash receptacles, and recycling bins to
station entrances/exits
Moved bicycle lockers away from station underpasses
Formalized procedures for handling hazardous materials
Request of $190 million in funding from the federal government for a variety of security
improvements and programs
Conduct of daily inspections of equipment and facilities
Assurance that employees are knowledgeable about safety procedures
A new emergency preparedness page on WMATA’s web site
(http://www.wmata.com/riding/safety/emergency_preparedness.cfm) linking to safety
and security brochures and press releases and to external sites including the Office of
Personnel Management's Emergency Guidance, American Red Cross Community
Disaster Education materials, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and emergency
preparedness sites for Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia
Testing and acquiring the latest safety technology to prepare for emergencies is necessary
for life safety
In addition to the other proposed solutions, PROTECT (Program for the Response Options and
Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism) was started in 1998, a joint effort
among the Federal Transit Administration, the National Institute of Justice, the Department of
Energy, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, as a result of the chemical
attack in Tokyo in 1995. PROTECT was developed by Argonne's Decision and Information
Sciences Division, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.
The PROTECT system is an early-warning system that is helping protect WMATA from the
threat of chemical attacks by terrorists. It is installed in the Metro subway system and provides
early warnings for commuters in the nation's capitol and quick-response capability to emergency
first-responders. It is the first and only systems-based application developed to address the
complexities of planning and testing emergency responses by multiple agencies, disciplines and
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jurisdictions. PROTECT incorporates software originally designed to evaluate ventilation
alternatives in extreme pressure, humidity and temperature as the trains move throughout the
system, and to model emergency ventilation systems efficiency in fire or smoke. The software
can also be used as a planning and simulation tool.
The program supports the development of any number of emergency plans, from hurricanes,
tornados, forest fires, chemical spills, etc., to any type of homeland defense emergency scenario.
It is the first systems-based application developed to address the complex problem of planning
and integrating responses to emergencies, particularly those involving different teams or
agencies.
Lead scientist Anthony Policastro, PROTECT’s program manager from Argonne National
Laboratory, found in tests using smoke that the moving trains pose the greatest risk. Subway cars
can carry chemicals from station to station. But the trains, in particular act as plungers that pump
chemicals through the subway tunnels and through vents, onto the streets above.
The PROTECT system includes detectors that sense chemical agents, video for incident
verification, a computer program to model the spread of contamination in the subway, aboveground flow modeling for dispersion of toxic materials from street vents and station exits and
wireless communication for emergency responders. When PROTECT is triggered, video
cameras verify the attack, alarms sound at the subway operation command center, and operators
are directed through a set of optimized responses shown on computer screens (e.g., photos,
facility maps, identification of the chemical agent and concentration, technical updates and
response procedures, weather and wind direction.)
This system (Argonne’s Chemical/Biological agent Emergency Management Information
System) provides immediate response protocols that vary depending on the amount and toxicity
of the chemical released. Police, fire and hazardous materials personnel are also informed what is
happening and where through a wireless communication system.
According to Peter Mottur, LiveWave’s CEO, ‘The whole automated system not only alerts first
responders but it also gives them the location and procedures to follow.’ PROTECT also
estimates which stations and trains are contaminated and predict whether contamination is likely
to spread to the street. Additionally, by having wireless access to video from underground,
emergency personnel can make decisions on how to execute rescues safely from above ground,
estimating the number of victims and conduct a video search for secondary devices that might
endanger responding rescuers.
PROTECT’s system of chemical sniffers, computers, and TV cameras is no longer an
experiment. It is an automated, 24-hour sentinel, judged reliable enough that, if it goes off,
subway operators will "red light" trains across the nation's capital and evacuate passengers.
Drills show the system cuts response times from 35 to 5 minutes, a critical difference since sarin
and most other chemical agents pose increasing health risk with time and dose. If the system
alarms, police and firefighters are trained to arrive with protective gear, and Metro officials will
keep street vents closed so that first responders have safe zones above ground to evacuate
passengers.
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“Every minute counts," said Susanna Gordon, a Sandia National Laboratories physicist in
Livermore, who worked on the PROTECT system. "If you can get people out of there a few
minutes quicker, you can save a lot of lives.”
Argonne outlined a process for responding to a chemical release on the system and WMATA
prepared the response procedure document. Argonne’s guidance document is aimed at assisting
rail transit managers in developing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP/s) for their systems.
The SOP recommends the response steps that should be taken by the transit personnel at the time
of the incident, in order to contain the incident and minimize casualties.
The guidance in the SOP basically follows two steps. The first involves information gathering
and decision making as to whether protective actions are needed. The second step involves
following a set of pre-determined actions to handle the threat if the results of the first step
indicate further action is needed.
Special areas covered in the SOP include:
• Methods to help prevent an unknown substance incident
• How to identify an incident that requires protective action
• The best means of responding that leads to no or minimal spread of the unknown toxic
material
• Identifying who should be called for assistance
• Notification procedures for WMATA staff and local and federal agencies
• Understanding of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention guidance on powders
and unknown substances
Recommended guidance covers actions to be taken by the Operations Control Center, train
operators, station managers, and supporting police officers. The transit system manager needs to
make choices in adopting SOPs that are transit specific for the system, based on the principles
presented in the general guidance since no one SOP can fully cover all systems.
Training for the PROTECT system was provided to both WMATA and the Fire Department both
on site and off site, utilizing individual training and train-the-trainer training. Personnel that were
trained in the PROTECT system, were taught on a need-to-know basis. All WMATA personnel
had to be given awareness training on the response to a chemical alarm.
Cost/Benefit Analysis
Costs related to the installation of PROTECT were funded by the federal government and
maintenance costs are paid by WMATA. The cost of installing and testing detectors in two
stations linked by fiber optics to PROTECT computers in Metro’s command center was nearly
$7.5 million. A total of $15 million was obtained directly from Congress for additional station
coverage. Each chemical sensor unit cost between $15,000 and $25,000. The cost of maintaining
of PROTECT can be estimated at 8-10 percent of the cost of purchase. Since the cost of
equipment and peripherals was borne by the federal government, and installation and training
was performed by national laboratories or outsourced by the national laboratories, no guarantees
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and/or warranties were needed. Argonne National Laboratory continues to assist WMATA in
support of PROTECT’s CB-EMIS.
There will always be false positives that a chemical incident is taking place if precautions are not
taken. The transportation agency has to identify all agents being used in their system and their
chemical composition, e.g., paint, cleaning agents, and any materials impregnated with a solvent,
etc. The sensors have to be refurbished and filters replaced quarterly. Testing is being conducted
on sensors to extend this to one year.
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/Performance Indicators
Chief Polly L. Hanson, Metro Transit Police Department, stated before the House Committee on
Home Land Security subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology on
July 2005:
As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, Metro takes its
responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA’s
approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers, the
transit police and other public safety departments in the region, and the federal
government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the
region’s emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships . . . .
WMATA continues to serve as a test-bed for the federal government and model for
the country on new transit security initiatives. Metro’s chemical detector system,
commonly referred to as “PROTECT,” has become a model for other transit agencies
across the nation and around the world. The early warning data flowing from
PROTECT is fully integrated into our Operations Control Center and the data and
live images can also be accessed at safe zones for use by incident commanders in the
region responsible for responding to an event. Federal partners who worked with
WMATA in the development of the PROTECT system include the Departments of
Justice, Energy, Transportation and Homeland Security. Working with our federal
partners, WMATA continues to offer training and technical assistance on the
PROTECT system to interested transit systems in the United States and around the
world. WMATA is actively engaging the Department of Homeland Security in efforts
to leverage the advances obtained by the PROTECT program to other emerging
applications in the chemical, biological and explosive detection areas.
Lessons Learned/Conclusion
The use of weapons of mass destruction in an attack on a subway system occurred in 1995 in
Tokyo and can happen again. It is imperative that subway systems such as WMATA plan for a
response to a chemical incident. The potential for casualties during an incident ranges from
hundreds to thousands depending upon the competency of the terrorist organization in
developing the weapon, the dispersal system they use and the number of potential victims. The
light security in a subway system and the confined nature of the system with large numbers of
people make a subway an attractive target.
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It is impossible to eliminate all vulnerabilities in an open society but we can plan, identify
equipment, personnel that are needed, and the training programs necessary for personnel on site
or responding to a chemical incident. Some areas that require additional attention for
transportation agencies that are implementing chemical detection are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Higher quality cameras for surveillance systems (old cameras degrade over time)
Cameras with pan, tilt, and zoom
Cameras that can operate from the OCC, not just from the station kiosk
Cameras that have recording capability
Improved radio reception (no dead spots)
Expanded radio coverage may need to be expanded
The need for prognostic hazard zone predictions
Improved notification/communication–important information is passed on to the first
responders as quickly as possible
Improved station lighting
Preplanning for a chemical attack requires that agencies understand that resources and training
have to be allocated, agency plans and procedures have to be current and applicable,
communication protocols have to be established, response mechanisms and interagency
agreements need to be implemented, and jurisdictional issues have to be agreed upon.
WMATA worked with Argonne National Laboratory and various federal agencies to develop a
system to detect the release of chemical agents, trained WMATA personnel and first responders,
rewrote procedures for response and notification, reduced response time, and enhanced the lifesafety of employees and customers.
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Case Study
CHARLOTTE AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM (CATS)
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
The Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) in North Carolina is one of a few transit systems that
has implemented strong security management measures, including security management and life
safety systems integration aimed at protecting passengers, employees, the general public, and
CATS’ physical assets.
CATS is a multi-modal public transit agency that offers fixed route bus, community circulator,
demand response (paratransit /special transportation service), trolley bus, vanpool, historic
trolley (rail) and light rail (under construction, at the time of this study). CATS is a department
and Key Business Unit within the City of Charlotte, headed by the Chief Executive Officer of the
Charlotte Area Transit System/Director of Public Transit. The transit agency is governed by the
Metropolitan Transit Commission. CATS currently serves Mecklenburg County, including
Charlotte, Davidson, Huntersville, Cornelius, Matthews, Pineville, Mint Hill, Concord in
Cabarrus County, Gastonia in Gaston County, Mooresville in Iredell County, Monroe in Union
County, Lincoln County, and Rock Hill in York County, South Carolina. CATS’ service area
population is approximately 800,000.
System Description
Bus Operations: CATS operates 277 buses for peak service daily over 68 routes, 33 local fixed
routes, 18 express routes, 15 community circulator routes, 3 downtown circulators, and 5 route
deviation shuttles. The total bus fleet consists of 326 buses. CATS’ bus service operates out of
two major bus facilities, the South Tryon Bus Garage and the Davidson Street Bus Garage. The
Charlotte Transit Center CATS’ Transportation Center is located in Uptown Charlotte and serves
as a transfer hub for 31 fixed routes and 18 express routes. CATS also serves three transit
centers and has broken ground to build two more major transit centers. Approximately 212
shelters have been installed in commercial and residential areas throughout the service area.
CATS’ bus service operates approximately 20 hours per weekday. Weekday boardings are
approximately 60,000. CATS’ ridership has increased steadily over the past five years.
Rail Operations: The historic trolley service, which is under service suspension allowing for
construction of the new south corridor light rail line, consists of four historic trolley vehicles that
are operated over approximately two miles of track. The new South Corridor Light Rail line is
scheduled to open in October 2007 and will consist of 16 light rail vehicles that will operate
daily over approximately 10 miles of double track, from the uptown area to I-485 and South
Boulevard in Pineville. A new rail maintenance facility is currently under construction and will
open the first quarter of 2007. An extension of the South Corridor line is already in
development, along with a commuter rail and streetcar line.
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Other Services: CATS fleet also includes 90 paratransit/special transportation vehicles providing
demand response service targeted for the disabled customers throughout the region.
Staffing: CATS cumulatively has over 1,000 employees, including approximately 700
contracted staff, through Transit Management of Charlotte (TMOC).
Review the Security and Safety Emergency Plan (SSPP, SSP, CEP):
Reason for Selection
The Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) has established an Office of Safety and Security,
headed by the General Manager of Safety & Security, utilizing a Charlotte Mecklenburg Police
Department – Transit Police Unit, “Off-Duty” Police, and contract security agencies. The
General Manager of Safety and Security reports directly to the Chief Operating Officer of CATS
but has corporate level oversight.
The Office of Safety & Security staff consists of the General Manager and:
• Administrative Officer
• Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Sergeant – Transit Police Liaison Unit
• Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Officer - Transit Police Liaison Unit
• two additional officers will be added in July 2006 and six officers in July 2007
• Manager of Safety – Bus
• Manager of Safety – Rail
o four – Safety Training Coordinators
o two Safety Specialist will be added in July 2006
• Contract Security Service, 24 fulltime Security Officers
o “Off-Duty” sworn law enforcement officers (approximately 10,000 hours
annually) to provide supplemental security at the Uptown Transit Center and
ride on-board buses
o five Fare Inspectors to be hired in July 2007
The Office of Safety and Security is currently drafting a formal “Policing Plan” that will likely
utilize “Company Police Officers” in lieu of private security guards. CATS anticipates
utilization of 32 full-time sworn Company Police Officers, posted at the Charlotte Transit
Center, future Eastland Mall and Rosa Parks Transit Center and at their bus and rail garages.
These officers will be contract sworn law enforcement officers under the North Carolina Statutes
and will enjoy full police powers, including arrest authority while on Charlotte Area Transit
System property. CATS will continue to utilize the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department
Transit Officers to complement the unit. Also, five fare inspectors will be hired to enforce the
“Proof of Payment” system when the light rail line opens. In addition to system security, the
Office of Safety & Security is responsible for system safety and bus and rail operator training.
CATS has a System Security Plan, signed by the Chief Executive Officer, that focuses on the
overall system security effort and addresses how security is integrated into every aspect of the
agency. Currently, the General Manager of Safety & Security is revising the July 2004 edition of
the System Security Plan to include the current efforts and level of security integration. It will
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also discuss and reference the CATS Policing Plan. This plan will also address the various New
Starts projects.
The CATS System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) is also under revision to include the various
corridor projects and system growth that CATS has experienced. Due to the revised 49 CFR 659
and the increase in staff and agency reorganization, the SSPP needs to be updated and republished.
The CATS Emergency Response Plan, which addresses various agency roles and responsibilities
in the event of an emergency, is in place and has been tested during recent drills and events.
CATS has an excellent working relationship with the various public safety entities in the area,
including police, fire, EMS, emergency management, transportation, etc. CATS also has a wellestablished relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation
Security Administration, Surface Transportation Section.
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
Prior the CATS becoming a department and a “Key Business Unit,” public transportation was a
division of another department. CATS became a Key Business Unit in 1999, after passage of a
0.5 percent sales tax and chartering of the Metropolitan Transit Commission. As CATS
developed and the organization continued to grow, it was decided to establish corporate level
fulltime Safety & Security Section in 2005. Prior to this time, the safety staff reported within the
Bus Operations Division and focused primarily on operator training and accident review. During
this time, one full-time police officer was assigned to CATS as the Transit Liaison unit. In
August 2004, a full-time Transit Safety & Security Manager was hired to bring the safety and
security function under the corporate level umbrella. The initial charge was to review the
existing safety and security plans and revise as necessary these plans, policies and procedures.
In addition, the manager was to transition the bus operations staff into the Charlotte Area Transit
System Office of Safety & Security and a Manager of Safety – Rail. The task of defining and
developing safety and security standards for the agency was also ongoing. It was determined
that, although the safety and security culture was present, the absence of security systems
integration was obvious and problematic.
According to E. Winters Mabry, MD, Director, Mecklenburg County Homeland Security Office,
as quoted in The Rhinoceros Times Charlotte on Thursday, March 09, 2006:
Charlotte is heightened risk for several reasons. One, Charlotte is the second largest
financial center in the country, we area also the only city that has two major nuclear
power plants within twenty-five miles of the center of town, and finally, because we
are a major transportation hub for rail and highways, we have numerous tankers of
dangerous chemicals and other hazardous materials moving through the area at any
time of the day and night.
Considering CATS’ long-term development plan, anticipated growth, opening of the South
Tryon Bus Garage in April 2005 (a $43M facility), construction of the rail facility, and the
potential for risk within the system, CATS decided that the time was right to implement state-ofFTA-FL-26-71054-03
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the-art security management practices from the ground floor. The security plan required
integration of security and life safety systems, including access control, facility video cameras,
fire detection and alarm systems, key and lock hardware, incident management, and emergency
call boxes. The old system did not allow for such things as a “one card credential” and remote
monitoring and control. CATS management desired one card that functioned as a unique
employee identification badge and a key card, that would function at any CATS operated facility,
with programmed permissions and schedules, based on an employee’s jobs duties and need for
access.
CATS reviewed the safety and security measures other transit agencies had implemented and
desired to have at least the same affect, but with full system integration. This included
interfacing the access control, fire alarm and video systems with one operating platform.
Installing physical door locks and padlocks with an established restricted patented high security
key way and key management software for control and tracking. CATS security staff continue to
monitor security technology for shelter lighting, wireless on-board video surveillance, and the
option of a third party remotely performing “camera patrols” at designated intervals of time, e.g.
every 30 minutes, depending on the circumstances and events.
These changes did not come without concern from the employees. Prior to the opening of the
South Tryon Garage, with the new security applications, employees had relatively unrestricted
access to all areas of the facility, all of the time. Some employees stated that they felt like “Big
Brother was watching,” and CATS management had to convince them that the security systems
were for their own protection as well as the agency and its assets. Most employees have now
adapted to the changes and the security systems appear to be widely accepted.
For the Office of Safety & Security staff to stay abreast of security activities and developments
within the U.S. and other countries, staff continually monitor daily reports from the FTA,
DHS/TSA, and other law enforcement agencies. Staff participate in the DHS/FTA Safety and
Security Directors/Chiefs Roundtable to help ensure a good networking relationship with peers
and colleagues.
Previous Attempts to Address Problem and Results
Prior to establishing the CATS Office of Safety & Security, other than the bus on-board camera
system, security hardware and systems were standard “low bid,” due to basic open specifications.
These systems did not provide the level of security management that CATS desired. Hence,
CATS looked at various security management systems to provide for future expansion, including
networking, hardware (card readers, inputs, outputs, etc) and full developer support. For access
control, CATS decided to install the Andover Controls Continuum Cyberstation (ACC) operating
platform for its security management. The fire system is the SimplexGrinnell 4100U, which
fully integrates into the ACC.
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Reasons for Proposed Solutions
The solutions decided on by CATS (through an agreement between CATS Safety & Security and
Technology groups), were based on the application of supported integration systems that are
network capable, expandable as the agency continues to develop, user friendly, maintainable,
locally supported, durable, secure and securable, with various levels of administration or
permissions assigned, graphical (layouts and graphics), and upgradeable. It was understood that
the application had to contribute to system efficiency and effectiveness to secure the assets and
resources of the Charlotte Area Transit System and provide for passenger, employee, and general
public safety and security.
Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
A formal Threat and Vulnerability Assessment (TVA) has not been documented thus far;
however, the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department has conducted several Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) studies. Some of the improvement recommendations
from the CPTED study were considered and have led to many improvements and considerations
in facility design efforts.
In considering the available options, CATS considered the experience of other transit agencies
with various security systems viewed as some of the most effective and efficient available today.
CATS wished to install security systems that allowed for expansion without becoming outdated
prematurely. CATS considered history of the product, vendor support and reputation, other
agency experience, durability, destructibility, integration with other systems, networkability,
maintainability, levels of permission / restriction, compatibility, and user friendliness. CATS
staff performed side-by-side comparisons of similar products, where appropriate, to evaluate the
best solution and provide the business case.
CATS considered the impact on staff and operations to determine how to accomplish the highest
level of security, while maintaining the CATS Mission: “To improve the quality of life for
everyone in the greater Charlotte region by providing outstanding community-wide public
transportation services while proactively contributing to focused growth and sustainable regional
development.”
Solutions Proposed/Implementation
The following significant physical security management solutions have been implemented at
CATS:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Identification cards/key cards
Access control/security management
Fire/life safety system
Key/lock management
Facility video camera system
Perimeter security
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Identification Cards/Key Cards - CATS chose SMART card technology by HID as its
identification employee identification card. Each card is a 64-bit SMART card and is currently
also used as a key card. Each employee identification card is fully covered on both sides with a
multi-color background image, the CATS logo, CATS division (e.g., Operations) vertically on
the right front side of the card, employee first and last name on both sides of the card, the
employee’s section (e.g., Planning), the employee’s unique ID number, the employee’s photo
and photo ghost images on both sides of the card. These details make the card difficult to
duplicate. Members of the Incident Management Team also have a yellow banner indicating
such on each side of the card for easy viewing from a distance. The cards are presented to iClass
R40 card readers by the authorized employee to gain passage to a permitted area. In high
security areas, iClass R40 card readers with numerical keypads have been installed. This
requires the employee to add a unique numerical password after presenting the card to the reader.
Although not currently in use at CATS, these SMART cards can be used to gain computer access
and a multitude of other business management applications, e.g. maintenance station kiosks. In
the future, CATS may consider using the SMART cards and readers in conjunction with
biometric devices, which would eliminate the possibility of allowing someone to borrow a card.
Access Control/Security Management (Andover Controls Continuum Cyberstation®)–In April
2005, CATS entered into a contract with SimplexGrinnell to install the Andover Controls
Continuum Cyberstation (ACC) building systems operating platform, for security
management/access control. CATS chose ACC because of its integration and inter-faceable
strengths. Although CATS is using the Andover System for security management, it also offers
modules for HVAC control, lighting, time tracking and virtually any other system that utilizes
input and output devices. The system includes a graphics suite for integrating employee photo
and system graphics, such as floor plans showing device locations and state, i.e., alarm, locked,
unlocked, etc. The system database has several fields that include information specific to the
employee, name, address, work location, auto, license plate, emergency contact, blood type,
seniority, etc. Every door or device is considering an “area” and therefore allows virtually any
combination of access. Day and hour schedules are programmed specific to each job or
employee. From each workstation or remotely via remote desktop or with installation of a
license key, the assigned administrator or manager, by permission level, can grant or deny
access. Any door or device can be remotely controlled, locked or unlocked, programmed to a
schedule. All doors can be secured or released remotely as desired. Devices can be set to alarm
under designated conditions, e.g., door ajar, unauthorized attempted access – lockout, fire, fire
trouble, etc. Virtually any condition can be set to alarm, as necessary, and any device or contact
can be programmed into the system. The Andover system was chosen by CATS because of its
network integration, expansion tested to over 4 million devices and being able to interface it with
other systems. In comparison to other systems, the Andover system was the most robust and met
CATS growing needs. Every event and all user activity are logged in a non-alterable database,
as an audit trail.
Prior to deciding on the right solution for the CATS application, the City of Charlotte required
extensive review and testing in an attempt to ensure that existing applications were not adversely
impacted by the installation of a new application. Although a necessary step to also maintain the
network integrity and security, this step added time and consideration by other groups. Most
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reputable established vendors understand this requirement and were willing to work with the
respective staff to help ensure a smooth installation.
For software applications it is necessary to determine that the vendor has the capability and
capacity to provide reasonable system support. In addition to being able to support the system
through updates, response time can be critical and should be considered in the selection process.
The figures below provide sample screen shots of the Andover Controls system. The screen on
the left is one of the customized views requested by CATS during the development phase. The
screen replicated on the right is one of the graphic floor layouts representing the status of the
doors on this layout. The door status changes when open or ajar. Any condition can be
programmed to alarm at the system administrator’s discretion.
Andover Controls System screen
Floor map with door lock status
Fire/Life Safety System (SimplexGrinnell Fire Annunciator Panel)–CATS chose the
SimplexGrinnell panel because of the capability to integrate other facilities fire systems into the
Main Fire Panel. The CATS fire system is also integrated with the ACC. The figures below
depict the address and status of every fire device, i.e., tamper switches, smoke, heat and duct
detectors, fire pull stations, water flow switches, etc.
Personnel screen with menu options
Reports menu
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Key/Lock Management–CATS selected the Ingersoll Rand Schlage Everest D Restricted
Patented Security Keyway for its lock hardware or “brass” key system. The reason for this
selection was that Schlage offers a high quality lock core pinning system and keyway offering
high security at a moderate cost, but reasonable for the quality of the system. The key system
chosen is a restricted patented keyway, available only to CATS for 15 years. This system was
selected, because it is security features, e.g., difficult to pick due to the core construction and
keyway design. The keys themselves are of sturdy construction, which reduces the chance of
breaking or shearing in the lock core and then left unattended, allowing relatively easy access by
an unauthorized individual. CATS, with the assistance of a local locksmith, established a
multiple level hierarchy considering its anticipated future development and facility construction
or Great Grandmaster Keying scheme. Each facility and, in a few cases, a function, e.g., Office
of Safety & Security, have been assigned a “grandmaster” key with subordinate master, sub
master and change keys. In a couple of instances sub grandmasters were established, i.e., for
contractor janitorial services and telecom/server rooms.
All key distributions were by job functions and requirements. Each key was serialized with a
unique number and assigned to an individual. Each and every key is tracked by issuance and
recipient’s acknowledgement signature. The keys are further tracked with the resource of the
SiteMaster® software package. This software, with a multiple installation license, is installed on
a few computers and the database is stored on a network server, which allows authorized users
access to a single database from multiple computers. The SiteMaster® software database allows
entry of individual information, e.g., name, facility location, department, section, door, core
pinning/construction, key cut by description, key assignment, key return, and receipt
documentation.
Facility Video Camera System–The CATS South Tryon Bus Garage and the new transit centers
are equipped with several cameras that are remotely accessible by an authorized user through the
City network. All facilities either under construction or rehabilitation will be outfitted with
similar remotely accessible camera systems. The cameras can be set for motion detection
recording to conserve on the hard drive space of the digital video recorders (DVR). Each DVR
depending on the model can accommodate either eight or 16 DVR’s. Under normal conditions,
the DVR stores recorded data for 10 days. The DVR drive can also be accessed remotely, played
and recorded to another storage device, e.g., server, desktop personal computer, etc. An
authorized user can control pan, tilt, and zoom (PTZ) camera functions, which are recorded and
stored. CATS uses a variety of cameras, fixed, PTZ, color, pendant-mounted, dome-ceilingmounted, and special cameras for covert operations. CATS safety and security staff believe that
the use of cameras reduces criminal or deviate behavior because one it likely to be caught and
charged with the appropriate criminal violation. The video system is frequently monitored
remotely by CATS security staff and requests have been made by local police to assist in
criminal prosecution or case closure.
Perimeter Security–The CATS South Tryon Bus and Davidson Street Bus garages have full
perimeter fencing. The fences were installed to control access by unauthorized individuals.
Although the primary gates are not always closed and secured, access points are. This includes
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unauthorized or non-CATS vehicles. A three-level parking deck was built at the South Tryon
Bus garage, with access to the second and third levels controlled by use of a SMART key card to
open the gate arm. All employees are issued serial-numbered mirror vehicle tags, which are to
be displayed anytime the vehicle is parked on CATS property. The parking deck has signs
posted throughout restricting unauthorized parking, enforceable by the Charlotte Mecklenburg
Police Department. The perimeter and parking deck are also under video surveillance. The
parking deck has 10 emergency call boxes that interface with the bus operations dispatchers, who
would contact the police in the event of an emergency.
Fencing along south S. Tryon perimeter
Camera/intercom at entrance
Cost/Benefit Analysis
CATS did not perform a formal cost benefit analysis. However, the needs of the system and
security requirements were met and, while cost was a consideration, it was not the only
consideration. Functionality, systems integration, network relationship, vendor support, future
development and expansion, capability and capacity were some of the considerations applied,
prior to acceptance.
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/Performance Indicators
CATS Safety and Security staff believes that the installation of its security management
resources have greatly increased the physical security of its facility.
Currently, CATS does not have enough data to confirm that security improvements have reduced
breaches of security; however, CATS believes that, considering the extensive effort in reviewing
the available security protection possibilities, consultation with resource experts, past experience
and sound practices, the systems and measures taken will ultimately provide extensive protection
in securing its assets and protecting its employees.
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The measures taken to date enable CATS to interface with its current as well as new systems and
provide for considerable growth with the unlikely possibility of “outgrowing” the security
system. The systems chosen took into account the future of the agency.
Lessons Learned/Conclusions
CATS staff realized that it takes a strong commitment from management and support of its
employees to implement new measures, especially when it involves security or the perception of
security. Not everyone felt the security improvements were in their best interest; some were
concerned that it would allow management to gain more control. This feeling created some
slowing in the momentum and implementation delays.
To successfully implement the broad and sweeping changes that require the involvement of
many sections, especially technology, significant time and patience are required to complete the
installation. This included various systems and network testing to ensure compatibility with the
existing systems, particularly for the Andover Controls and SiteMaster software packages.
The chosen security systems created a major impact on projects that were in the design stage
already and included basic specifications that were not compliant with the now new systems.
This required specification changes and, in some cases, issuance of change orders, resulting in
additional costs to the system. This created addition work for the design team, the consultants,
and the procurement staff. Many meetings had to be held to resolve issues; some are still being
addressed.
When considering security applications, it is critical to collect as much available information as
possible and study the information, remembering that most companies promote that their
products are the best. Those responsible must consider what is best for their workplace and
environment.
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Case Study
MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (MBTA)
TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) is the nation’s oldest and fifth largest
transit system. Its service area covers more than 3,200 square miles across 175 cities and
municipalities, extending as far south as Providence, Rhode Island. Servicing more than one
million passenger trips each day, MBTA operates and supports more than 2,200 vehicles along
162 bus routes with several thousand stops, light and heavy rail systems (subway and aboveground), and 5 boat routes.
The MBTA Transit Police Department is the principal law enforcement agency for all personnel,
passengers, facilities, stations, properties, equipment, and vehicles within the MBTA service
area. The Department began in 1968 with 35 officers and has evolved into a force of 250 sworn
officers, all specially trained to function in a transit environment. All officers have been trained
in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) ICS training levels 100-700, and all have
received advanced training for identifying and managing incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction. In addition to its patrol operations, the Department’s specialized services include
intelligence operations, criminal investigation, crime analysis, detective services, field training,
K-9, special operations, community services, prosecution, motorcycle operations, and explosive
detection.15
The innovations of the MBTA Transit Police Department have been recognized by the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), who honored them as the sole Law Enforcement
recipient with their “Innovation in Government Award,” and by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) who named the Department as a semifinalist for its prestigious WebberSeavey “Award for Excellence in Law Enforcement,” placing it among the top 25 programs in
the world.
Since January 2003, the MBTA Transit Police Department has served under the leadership of
Chief Joseph C. Carter (currently Vice-President of the 20,000-member International Association
of Chiefs of Police). In his first few months, Carter led a comprehensive effort, including
numerous focus groups drawn from all ranks within MBTA and members of the community, to
develop a “Plan of Action”16 that would restore public trust and confidence in the MBTA Transit
Police Department and advance police operations in the transit environment.
15
MBTA Transit Police Department, http://www.transitpolice.us/
MBTA Transit Police Department. June 2003. “The Plan of Action: A Commitment to
Excellence.” Boston, MA: MBTA Transit Police Department.
16
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Consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, antiterrorism and homeland
security were among the top priorities. The overarching philosophy for enhancing security was
to embed antiterrorism efforts in a broader framework of proactive, information-driven,
geographically-based and community-oriented policing, and to supplement with specialized
services, rather than carve out antiterrorism as a specialty function. The philosophy emphasized
that, as public trust and community partnerships became stronger, passengers would be more
alert and more likely to interact with and report problems to MBTA Transit Police officers.
Structurally, the Department decentralized by dividing the jurisdiction into six Transit Police
Service Areas (TPSAs), five of which are geographically-based, and the sixth based at
headquarters. A commander was appointed for each TPSA, and each area has an Advisory
Committee. Using the CompStat system, each commander is responsible to monitor and solve
crime, fear of crime, and security-related problems in his/her own TPSA. Leaders are held
accountable for these outcomes in weekly meetings of commanders from all TPSAs. In the first
nine months of operation under the TPSA model, MBTA crime declined by about 13 percent,
while crime in the greater Boston area, outside the MBTA, was rising.
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
In the report “Securing the MBTA: A Strategy for Homeland Security,” the MBTA Transit
Police Department concluded that:
… Based on these factors, state and local officials should consider the MBTA as
potentially highly vulnerable to attack by terrorists. The system is well-known,
highly visible, and a critical part of the transportation infrastructure of the Greater
Boston Area. It is an open system, accessible to the general public, and it covers
and extensive geographic area that makes effective countermeasures difficult.17
The MBTA Transit Police Department has examined, and continues to monitor, incidents and
trends in transit-related terrorism throughout the world and to review and modify their policies,
procedures and operations accordingly. Their seven-person Intelligence Unit continuously
monitors more than 40 databases, collecting and analyzing information on threats to transit
security from terrorism and others criminal activity. The unit’s capacity makes MBTA Transit
Police Department the state’s lead agency for transit security intelligence and positions them as
the statewide clearinghouse for this information. Their products are regularly sought and read by
the regional transit authorities, the Commonwealth’s Fusion Center, other regional intelligence
centers, and transit authorities throughout the world.
Given clear historical evidence that transit systems are attractive targets for terrorism, and
learning from the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that communication systems are among the most
vital of structures for effective response, the MBTA Transit Police Department recognized the
need to prioritize effective communications and to protect communications personnel and assets.
17
MBTA Transit Police Department. November 2003. “Securing the MBTA: A Strategy for
Homeland Security.” Boston, MA: MBTA Transit Police Department.
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While most terrorist transit attacks in the past have been directed at passengers on specific
vehicles, they assessed that the hub of operations and control, if left vulnerable, could endanger
many more people and vehicles and cause massive economic damages and service disruption.
MBTA’s Operations Control Center (OCC) is the system’s hub for all operations and safetyrelated communications. Several key challenges existed for improving communications and
protecting OCC assets. First, personnel from the OCC and the MBTA Transit Police Department
operated on different and non-interoperable radio frequencies. All calls from the public
originated in the OCC, with information subsequently transferred to the police, which made
communications more laborious and time-consuming and miscommunications inevitable. It was
estimated that 9 of every 10 emergency “after-action reports” involved human communication
problems between the police and OCC. Second, the OCC, located in the MBTA general office
building, was protected only by a non-police security guard and a series of three successive keycard access doors. There were no on-site resources to protect the OCC personnel and assets in
the event of infiltration. Third, the OCC was the sole and non-redundant source for system-wide
operational control. If the Center became non-operational for any reason, service would be
disrupted throughout the entire system until the OCC could be restored.
Previous Attempts to Address Problems and Results
Since September 11, 2001, the MBTA Transit Police Department has implemented a variety of
antiterrorism measures to enhance awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery –
the five domains in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan:
To enhance awareness, they have:18
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Established an MBTA Safety and Security Anti-Terrorism Task Force to coordinate
system-wide anti-terrorism and counterterrorism efforts.
Conducted several system threat and vulnerability assessments.
Expanded training for front-line personnel.
Established a TransStat process to improve management accountability and monitor
implementation of recommendations.
Participation in the US Attorney for the District of Massachusetts’ Joint Terrorism Task
Force.
Developed a high-level intelligence unit to collect and disseminate transit-related security
information.
Enhanced collaboration with a variety of federal, state, local, and private sector agencies.
To enhance prevention, they have:19
•
•
18
19
Provided officers with updated threat and vulnerability information.
Given authority and accountability to officers to monitor and solve security or
vulnerability-related problems within their assigned service area.
Ibid at 10.
Ibid at 12-13.
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•
•
Monitored problem-solving efforts through CompStat.
Mobilized and trained community partners to report relevant information and
observations.
To enhance preparedness, they have:20
•
•
•
Developed potential incident scenarios and response plans using threat and vulnerability
information.
Developed systems and processes for rapidly identifying emerging indicators. Their
expertise in this regard has been sought by the London underground transit authority
who has requested officers from the MBTA Transit Police Department to train their
officers and trainers in these procedures.
Trained all personnel to rapidly identify emerging incidents and to take appropriate
mitigating action.
To enhance response, they have:21
•
•
•
Developed formal partnerships and liens of communication with health department
officials, MEMA, BEMA, and related response agencies.
Participated in training exercises to identifying effects of WMD attacks.
Implemented protocols for OCC to notify the MBTA Transit Police Department if an
attack occurs.
To enhance recovery, they have implemented several measures designed to restore service in the
event of disruption; “however, a review of the MBTA Transit Police Department’s systems and
operations reveals a number of issues and single points of failure that could disrupt the continuity
of operations following a catastrophic emergency.”22
The MBTA Transit Police Department’s initial solution to improve communication with the
OCC was to acquire interoperable 800MHZ radio technology. This removed an unnecessary link
from the chain of transmitted information, but direct communication between police dispatchers/
call-takers and OCC personnel continue to be problematic.
To further secure OCC personnel and assets, a non-sworn security officer was hired to monitor
the initial point of access to the building and to track the activity of hundreds of video
surveillance cameras throughout the MBTA service area. Having only one person monitor the
screens proved to be an inadequate solution.
20
Ibid at 17.
Ibid at 20.
22
Ibid at 22.
21
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Reasons for Proposed Solution
The MBTA Transit Police Department established the criticality of communications assets and
the vulnerability of single points of failure through a multimodal assessment process that
included:
•
•
•
•
Review of policies, procedures, and security audits
Interviews with key personnel
Site visits to key facilities and stations
Review of recent system threat assessments, including:
o FTA Security and Counter Terrorism Readiness Assessment, conducted by Booz
Allen
o TSSI Threat Exposure and Response Matrix (TERM), conducted by Total Security
Services International
o MBTA Safety and Security Anti-Terrorism Task Force assessment
o Triennial On-site Security Audit by the Massachusetts Department of
Telecommunication and Energy, conducted by Interactive Elements, Inc.
o Security Inspection Program for the 2004 Democratic National Convention.
It was determined that removing communication barriers and enhancing the clarity and accuracy
of information flow during emergencies, a high priority, would require more direct interaction
between police dispatcher/call-takers and OCC staff. The review concluded they were neither
co-located nor accessible to each other by radio. In addition, no police were stationed to protect
OCC personnel and to do so would have required adding new police officers or pulling current
officers away from other assignments.
Physical security enhancements were identified as a way to mitigate OCC’s vulnerability as a
single point of failure, but would not reduce the down time for any service disruption. Without
any back-up system, if the Center were rendered non-operational, nearly all transit services
would come to an indefinite standstill. Any effective solution would require some auxiliary or
redundant control.
Solution Proposed/Implementation
The MBTA Transit Police Department concluded the review of their homeland security strategy
by noting that a serious weakness of any homeland security initiative is that they become highly
personnel and resource intensive. They recommended that, as homeland security strategies are
implemented, the Department should take care to maintain traditional crime prevention activities.
The multifaceted OCC challenges of impaired communication, site vulnerability, and operational
non-redundancy could not be completely eliminated by a single solution. The non-redundancy
problem could only be addressed effectively by implementing an auxiliary or redundant control.
Senior OCC operations leaders addressed that problem by pushing for a new alternate, redundant
control center located in another part of the greater Boston area. The cost of this effort is
substantial, but deemed necessary for the MBTA system to operate safely, not only from terrorist
attack, but from any systemic disruption.
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The communication and personnel protection problems were strategically addressed principally
by invoking a non-mechanical solution. Radio communication had been achieved, but
information to and from police officers and other responders still involved intermediaries.
MBTA Transit Police Department decided to move their dispatchers and call-takers (all of whom
are sworn police officers, per union rules) from headquarters into the OCC.
MBTA determined the OCC floor space could be more efficiently configured and could
accommodate the additional police personnel. This permitted face-to-face communication and
information exchange between the OCC and police personnel, ready hand-off of emergency calls
from the public, and direct lines of communication among and between key emergency response
personnel within the transit system. In addition, co-locating that function on the floor of the
OCC placed sworn police personnel inside the Center at all times, providing a tertiary line of
defense, if necessary, from unauthorized intrusion.
The proposed solution was in keeping with the Department’s strategic principle: “Cost-effective
implementation through better use of technology”–in this case, human technology. It did not
require any additional staff or staff reductions. It did not require product training or technical
maintenance cost. It did, however, require that several policies and procedures be re-written to
account for the new direct lines of communication. The only serious potential obstacle was the
“change in working conditions” (a phrase pertaining to the terms of work in union or collective
bargaining agreements) in the event that union representatives objected to the dispatchers and
call-takers being moved to the OCC. Fortunately, this concern never emerged as a barrier to
implementation. Although parking availability at the OCC was a greater challenge than at
headquarters, affected personnel seemed to believe that the benefits of enhanced security and
improved communication outweighed any nominal inconvenience. Passengers benefited due to
the fact that their emergency calls would be quickly directed to the police telecommunicators.
Passenger and staff operations were not disrupted in any way.
Cost/Benefit Analysis
A formal cost/benefit analysis was not conducted. However, the proposed solution did not
require funds beyond those already allocated. Rebuilding the OCC floor was already scheduled
to make more effective use of space.
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/Performance Indicators
Information on measuring the effectiveness of implementation/performance indicators was
unavailable.
Lessons Learned/Conclusion
The relocation of police dispatchers and call-takers to the OCC has only recently been
implemented. No data are available regarding its effectiveness or impact. The effect of
enhanced security at the OCC may be difficult to measure because no OCC infiltration and
attack has ever occurred. Improvements in communication can be measured both by monitoring
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complaints from OCC and police telecommunications personnel and by reviewing emergency
after-action reports.
The following outcomes of several post-9/11 MBTA security initiatives are known:
•
•
•
The geographic-based division of the jurisdiction into six TPSAs has been followed by a
13 percent reduction in criminal activity.
Passenger and public reports of suspicious activity on transit vehicles and properties
“increase dramatically” after each MBTA Transit Police “See Something, Say
Something” campaign. These campaigns are timed so .they do not .coincide with high
profile incidents or heightened alert levels.
Public trust and confidence in the MBTA Transit Police has increased, as evidenced by
increase passenger-initiated interactions and feedback from public members of the TPSA
Advisory Committees.
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FTA-FL-26-71054-03
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Case Study
CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (LYNX)
ORLANDO, FLORIDA
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
The Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority (CFRTA) was formed in 1994. Initially,
public transportation was provided under the official name of Orange-Seminole-Osceola
Transportation Authority (OSOTA), which was formed in 1972. In June 1984, OSOTA changed
its operating name to Tri-County Transit, which was later changed to LYNX in 1992. In October
1994, a merger of OSOTA with the former Central Florida Commuter Rail Authority became
official, and the merged organization became the Central Florida Regional Transportation
Authority (CFRTA). As a successor to OSOTA, the CFRTA continues to be known as LYNX
and serves as the focal point in developing all modes of public transportation in the Central
Florida region.
A five-member Board of Directors serves LYNX. The members of the Board of Directors
include one commissioner from Osceola County, the chair of the Seminole County Board of
County Commissioners, the mayor of the City of Orlando, the mayor of Orange County, and a
representative of the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT). Each serves a term as
designated by Section 343.63, Florida Statutes. The CFRTA Board of Directors typically meets
on the fourth Thursday of each month to conduct the business of the Authority.
The tri-county area, which includes Orange, Seminole, and Osceola counties, remains one of the
top growth areas in the country and is one of the premier tourist destinations in the world. The
area is ranked as one of the best areas in which to live and work by leading national business
publications such as Fortune 500. This area has experienced significant growth in population
over the last several years and is expected to continue for the next 20 years. The population was
1.63 million in 2005 and is projected to be 1.84 million in 2010 and 2.39 million in 2025.
Economy
LYNX plays a major role in the Central Florida economy. “The Economic Importance of LYNX
to Central Florida—2003,” a report by W. Warren Mchone of the University of Central Florida’s
College of Business Administration and Department of Economics, provides a comprehensive
analysis of LYNX’s role in the Central Florida economy. The report provides several key facts
that underline that role of infusing the local economy with federal and state revenue, as well as
generating numerous economic benefits for customers, suppliers and other local businesses
throughout the region. Some of these key facts include:
•
Worst case loss of annual economic output if LYNX were not available: $106.8 million
dollars.
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•
•
•
Medium case loss of annual economic output if LYNX were not available: $46.3 million
dollars.
Worst case loss of jobs if LYNX were not available: 4,062.
Medium case loss of jobs if LYNX were not available: 2,029.
Service
LYNX provides fixed-route, paratransit, and vanpool service. Fixed-route bus service is
comprised of 62 routes, called “Links,” serving the tri-county area. The service operates 7 days
a week. Weekday operating hours are from 4:15 a.m. to 3:10 a.m. Saturday service is operated
from 4:15 a.m. to 1:10 a.m.; on Sunday, service is operated from 4:39 a.m. to 11:30 p.m.
LYNX’s active fixed-route fleet consists of 238 lift-equipped buses; currently, LYNX’s peak
requirement is 197 buses. LYNX manages the paratransit operation via a single contracted
provider. The service is provided with 169 vehicles and is available from 5:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. 7
days a week. While federal ADA regulations only require ADA paratransit service within ¾ of a
mile of fixed route, LYNX provides ADA service throughout the three-county area. LYNX’s
ridership continues to grow to record levels, averaging over 2 million riders per month. In FY
2005, LYNX provided nearly 25 million trips.
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
The majority of Florida’s transit facilities utilized today were designed prior to the events of
September 11, 2001. In LYNX’s case, the facilities that LYNX owned (South Street Operations
base and the Downtown Bus Station) were over 25 years old. Safety and security requirements
were not addressed at the time these facilities were designed and constructed and have, for the
most part, been an after-thought/add-on at both facilities.
The South Street operations base complex dates back to the early 1970s when the transit
company first began to utilize the facility. The facility was shared with the local school board
until the early 1990s when the facility was completely taken over by LYNX. As LYNX
expanded, due to increases in ridership in the 1990s, additional leased properties were added to
facilitate the needs of expanding operations (the Princeton operations base and the leasing of
office space at the school board learning center).
In the late 1990s, LYNX began purchasing property to continue to expand operations to keep
pace with ridership demands. LYNX purchased a 27-acre parcel of land in an industrial area to
expand the main operation facility with the intent of moving out of the outdated South Street
Facility. This new, extremely modern complex is known as the LYNX Operation Center (LOC).
The new center will accommodate over 200 additional buses. LYNX will occupy the LOC
complex in the fall of 2006.
The old Downtown Bus Station was a ¼ city block complex that had been used since the early
1960s as the main public transit transfer station for LYNX. This structure was remodeled in the
early 1980s to address patron needs and operational requirements. The facility design was an
open-air structure with 2 bus lanes and 24 bays. The design of this facility did not accommodate
40-foot buses. There were two small customer service windows to handle customer needs and
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public restrooms were available. There were no designated public congregation areas or any
general use in-door space for the public. Customers and operators were exposed to the weather
conditions of the Orlando environment. The location of the Downtown Bus Station did not allow
any room for expansion.
With the possibility of a “new start” light rail system and the need to expand existing services to
better accommodate customer needs, LYNX chose the current property location for the
construction of the new LYNX Central Station (LCS) building. The basic concept for this
facility was to develop a building with an inter-modal design as a critical element as well as
combining both administration offices with an attached main bus terminal complex. The LCS’s
basic design was developed prior to the events of 9/11; however, security elements not originally
developed in the initial design of the building were added prior to the beginning of the
construction phase of the project.
The LCS building includes a six-story administration tower; a patron-accessible, fully airconditioned terminal with 3 bus lanes and 27 bus bays; and space available for retail use. A
larger customer service area was included in the terminal. The LYNX Central Station covers an
entire city block bordered by city streets and is directly adjacent to active CSX railroad tracks.
LYNX owns all property adjacent to the railroad tracks to allow for future transit or commuter
rail connection.
It was acknowledged by both LYNX management and the design team that, with the larger
building size and the addition of the administration tower, this complex would need a more
aggressive integrated security program than was originally conceived. The additional cost of the
integrated security system improvements for the LCS was added to the project’s capital budget
after the original bid specifications had been developed and after design and contact bids were
awarded. The security system project was contracted for directly through the security system
vendor and not through the construction contract. This was done to maintain a higher level of
security integrity for this critical piece of work. It was recognized through this process that
addressing security issues early during the design phase or construction phases of most transit
projects is critical. When neglected early in design additional costs associated with project
delays, re-design, limited integration or capability problems can arise.
Previous Attempts to Address Problems and Results
Prior to the 2004 opening of LCS, LYNX had not designed a new building or been involved in
the design of a new facility. Facilities were passed on from local funding partners to LYNX.
Security was a feature added to an existing facility as a post-original design concept but not an
integral element of the original design; hence, the security component was “force fit” into the asbuilt facility. To assist in addressing potential security issues not addressed by the facility
design, LYNX implemented an operational change to the LCS. Unarmed contract security
officers were contracted for and put in place to limit access by unauthorized personnel to
designated safety sensitive areas, as well as provide an overall increase in the patron perception
of security at the LCS.
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Reasons for Proposed Solution
Based on the post 9/11 changes to transit in the U.S. and the need to provide a safer and more
secure environment for the riding public, LYNX followed and implemented the directives of
FTA and APTA. Past Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (TVAs) performed at the LYNX
LCS and sponsored by FTA noted that public access was not restricted at the site and safety
sensitive areas were not separated and confined. The proposed solution was to use currently
available “off-the-shelf” security technology to increase the level of security delivered to these
areas which are constantly accessed by LYNX employees. Cameras in public areas are used to
provide a means of monitoring without hampering public use. LYNX’s current TVA will be
used to benchmark current security measures as well as define the need for future improvements
in the security program application.
Solution Proposed/Implementation
System Security Program
Based on the pending opening of the new LCS building and the associated security management
problems, LYNX started developing a formal authority security program in 2003. The Safety &
Security Division was formed and placed under the Operation Support Division in the Transit
Operations Department. Once organized, one of the first actions taken by the Safety & Security
Division was to develop contract language and then award a contract to a private security
company to supply uniformed armed and unarmed officers at all LYNX facilities. LYNX also
entered into a verbal agreement with the Orlando Police Department (OPD) to supply off-duty
officers at key LYNX facilities on a regular basis during normal LYNX operating hours.
LYNX Central Station (LCS)
In addition to the operational security support, a new integrated security system was also
incorporated into the LCS building design. The system now includes cameras that view of all
public areas, bus areas, and perimeter entrances and exits. Electronic ID cards and electronically
control door contacts have been placed on all perimeter doors limiting access to non-public
areas. Entrance readers and a secondary Access Control System (ACS) device (bio-readers) are
used to prevent and control unauthorized persons from entering any area that contains money.
All of the cameras and accessed controlled doors are electronically recorded in a CCTV control
room, which is staffed by members of the contract security force 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
All camera and ID card transactions are digitally recorded for 30 day time spans and archived for
one year. The CCTV control room monitors all activity in the public areas as well as the
entrances and exits to the non-public areas. In addition, the CCTV also monitors the Information
Technology (IT) room as well as all exists and entrances to this room. The IT room houses the
main computer system that uses current information technology to interface/integrate all three
main LYNX facility locations to one computer based system effectively allowing access and
monitoring to properly password protected LYNX staff on the local network. This main
computer system also runs the LYNX network and phone systems.
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LYNX South Street Operation Base (SST)
The LYNX South Street base is currently being retrofitted with a system-wide compatible
camera and perimeter security system that will be networked with and monitored at the LCS
CCTV control room. Once completed, CCTV cameras will monitor public accessible areas as
well as several other vital areas throughout the complex. All non-public areas will require an ID
card to access that area. Because interoperability and growth was a key consideration in
developing the integrated security system standards for the LCS, the same basic design and
standards are being used at South Street facility. Currently, the LYNX security force maintains
an unarmed security officer at the main entrance of the South Street facility 24 hours a day,
seven days a week.
LYNX Operations Base (LOC)
This new facility will be occupied in October 2006 and will have the same integrated security
system as the other two LYNX facilities to allow for ease of system integration functions and
compatibility. The cameras and door entrance system will be monitored at the LCS CCTV
control room. The LYNX security force will have an unarmed officer on property 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week.
LCS CCTV Monitoring Room
LCS Platform, contracted security officers
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Dome PTZ camera
Wall Mounted PTZ camera
BIO- ID card reader
Standard ID card reader
Training
LYNX, in partnership with the security contractor, implemented a “Transportation Services”
training course. The contactor was responsible to ensure all officers were properly trained to
perform the services LYNX required. Additional training on the operation of the LYNX security
system, as well as operating and emergency response procedures, were also provided to all
designated LYNX and contract security staff. LYNX staff training on the security system was
included as part of the integrated security system installation contract.
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Multi-camera view
DVC recorder
LYNX Central Station (LCS) – lane one
Maintenance
LYNX is entering the second full year of operation of the integrated security system. As part of
the installation scope of work, a full maintenance warranty was included. The LYNX Facility
Maintenance Team is supporting the mechanical portion of the integrated security system. The
installation contractor is supporting the computer and electronic “back-bone” of the system. To
reduce any potential increase in long term maintenance costs, LYNX is currently negotiating a
full service maintenance contract with the system installer.
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Cost/Benefit Analysis
Since the integrated security system is relatively new, there is limited historical data available to
developed actual cost savings. LYNX has been able to hold the costs associated with the
contract security force and police constant. The ability to document security related events has
reduced LYNX’s liability expenses by providing defensible evidence in legal cases directed
against LYNX. The LYNX security system has verifiably assisted law enforcement in
monitoring and suppressing criminal activity on LYNX property which also represents a
substantial cost savings realized by the authority.
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/Performance Indicators
The integrated security system acting in concert with the LYNX security force program was a
new direction for the agency. The system has met LYNX’s expectations and currently exceeds
the authority’s needs in its ability to expand well beyond any current facility growth plans.
LYNX is still learning about the total capacity of the security system and how best to use it
within the organization. However, since the security program and integrated security system
were put in place at the same time LYNX entered its new facility, there is no historical data to
base any performance results on, but clearly improvements have been noted.
With the assistance of LYNX’s new integrated security system, the current security program is
offering a significant increase in reported criminal activity and incidents at the LCS. The
reporting of criminal activity at the LCS by contract law enforcement and security officers is
greater then that of the old LYNX Downtown Bus Terminal. The new LCS is by far larger in
physical size, has more patron boardings per day, is located several blocks from the Old
Downtown Bus Terminal, and has a much more advanced ability to document security events.
This comparison appears to have identified that LYNX may not have had a criminal activity
increase at the new LCS as first thought, but just a much better identification and reporting
system via the new integrated security monitoring system.
A survey of LYNX’s customers has identified that they feel much safer in the new LCS facility
than they did in the previous location. The perception by LYNX’s patrons of a more secure
environment is consistent with customers and employees alike. With LYNX’s current
procedures in place, LYNX will be able to document the effectiveness of the security program
over the next few years.
Lessons Learned/Conclusion
A technology-based system or work force based system alone could not produce the cost
effective results needed by LYNX. The combining of the two systems has proven to be very
effective in providing a more secure operating environment for LYNX patrons, employees and
contractors. The capital outlay for LYNX’s technology-based, integrated security system allows
the current expenditure level of its security workforce to remain constant. LYNX now includes a
security component in all new facility designs and modifications. Current internal requests for
FTA-FL-26-71054-03
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expansion of the security system to other areas within the LYNX organization denote that
security is a major concern within LYNX and is being addressed. LYNX’s focus is directed both
on the internal operations of the transit authority as well externally on public operations. The
current integrated security system is being recognized throughout the entire LYNX organization
as a needed and valuable program.
LYNX’s proactive approach to develop and implement an all inclusive security program, that
includes safety and security both for LYNX employees and its customers, has proven to be
successful, based on LYNX’s current experience, the capital outlay, and current
operational/maintenance costs. The program appears to be worth the investment, but it is
recognized that the investment and inclusion of security and security systems must take place
early in the design process for this investment to realize its real value to a transit system.
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Case Study
BAY AREA TRANSIT DISTRICT (BART)
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Transit Agency Profile and Reason for Selection of Transit Agency
Overview
The San Francisco Bay Area Transit District (BART) is recognized as being on the cutting edge
of rapid rail transit since the fully automated system began passenger service on September 11,
1972. The fast and comfortable BART vehicles with their high reliability and a train control
system that provides the highest level of safety were required to attract commuters from their
beloved automobile. Over the last 35 years, BART has accomplished its initial task and the
system has grown with additional stations and vehicles to meet the increasing demand. The
increased service also includes the San Francisco Airport, a destination long awaited by BART’s
loyal riders.
System Description
The District provides fully-automated, high-speed, urban rail mass transit for the San Francisco
Bay Area, serving San Francisco, Contra Costa, San Mateo, and Alameda counties. The system
consists of 105 miles of double track rail service and 43 passenger stations, and a 4-mile
underwater tube linking San Francisco with Oakland.
Daily patronage is about 330,000 passenger trips. Stations are staffed with station agents who
provide assistance in system usage and directional information to patrons as well as emergency
service support. In addition, the agents monitor station facilities for station maintenance and patron
safety. All stations are serviced by local bus companies to provide convenient commuting for
BART patrons. Station platforms are 700 feet long and are serviced by escalators and an elevator.
The right-of-way in which the trains operate consists of at-grade, aerial, and subway. BART
operates in an exclusive right of way with no grade crossings and with fencing on all at-grade
rights-of-way. Much of the right-of-way is in the freeway median to minimize using residential
and business property.
BART train cars are 70 feet long and have a capacity of about 200 people per car. BART trains
have a maximum of 10 cars and a minimum of 3 cars. A 10-car train can carry about 2,000
passengers under crush load conditions and about 700 passengers in a fully seated load.
Automatic Train Control (ATC) provides a failsafe train protection system and central supervisory
functions, including fully automated train operations and automatic schedule adjustment.
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BART Operations Control Center
The Operations Control Center (OCC), located at the BART Lake Merritt Headquarters, provides
supervision over all phases of operations, including trains, patrons, system power, and wayside
equipment. The Central Manager is responsible, through controllers working in the OCC, for all of
the various functions that support revenue and non-revenue (e.g., maintenance) operations. The
primary control functions at the OCC are train control, third-rail power control, wayside equipment
control, alarm monitoring and response coordination. The OCC also coordinates assistance for
difficulties encountered with mainline vehicles, stations or wayside facilities, and provides
information to BART passengers.
Transportation Supervisors, through the Tower Supervisors, are responsible for all activities
performed in each yard area. These activities include third rail power control, changing train
lengths, movement through yard via route control, dispatching and receiving trains from mainline
and assigning Train Operators duties within the yard and for mainline service. Train Operators are
responsible for the train/cars they have been assigned to operate.
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The Department of Rolling Stock & Shops maintains the revenue vehicle fleet and is responsible for
the movement of revenue vehicles within the shop areas and on yard leads. Cars are cleaned,
inspected, repaired, and stored in the yards and shops.
Problem Identification and Need for Innovative Security Measures
BART’s at-grade, aerial, and subway systems usually do not offer good concealment,
particularly with the frequency of the trains and the operating hours. In addition, during hours of
train operation, the opportunity for unauthorized persons to be in the right-of-way without being
detected by passing trains is greatly reduced. However, at night and in subway sections there is
greater opportunity to be undetected. There are longer headways between trains so fewer eyes
are available and lower lighting levels provide better concealment. Securing this operating
environment from the risk of criminal activity or terrorist attacks is very challenging. Currently,
there are no viable means of providing public access to the transit system that ensure an adequate
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level of security while maintaining the “rapid” movement of people. After purchasing a ticket,
patrons have almost complete access to the passenger stations and trains.
BART recognized that one of their most basic security needs was ensuring access control,
particularly in more vulnerable locations, structures, and facilities. These include areas of higher
vulnerability where terrorist attacks would have the greatest impact to the system. While the use
of security forces, door locks, and card key access had provided sufficient security throughout
the system in general, facilities in remote locations and those with no permanent staff created a
need for additional innovative countermeasures.
Previous Attempts to Address Problems and Results
BART has always been aware of the need to control access to all its facilities. Locked doors,
fences, gates, and personnel training have historically been the barriers to uncontrolled access.
However, incidents such as 9/11 have caused public transit agencies to rethink their previous
control methods, which may not be sufficient given a terrorist bent on suicide to accomplish their
goal.
Reasons for Proposed Solution
The primary reason BART designed and constructed an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was to
provide a capability that did not exist, reduce system security costs, and protect people and assets
from deliberate harm. Under the worst-case scenarios, BART could lose the ability to operate
major parts of the system, and thus severely limit mobility in the area. In addition, a major
incident could lead to high capital repair and/or replacement costs for system facilities.
Solution Proposed/Implemented
To formally identify and rank areas of high potential risk, BART conducted a Threat and
Vulnerability Analysis. A TVA provides an analytical process to consider the likelihood that a
specific threat will endanger the transit system. Using the results of a transit security and
emergency management capabilities assessment and a FBI Terrorism Vulnerability SelfAssessment, the TVA identifies activities to be performed to reduce the risk of an attack and to
mitigate its consequences. These assessments typically use a combination of quantitative and
qualitative techniques to identify security requirements, including historical analysis of past
events, intelligence assessments, physical surveys, and expert evaluation. When the risk of
hostile acts is greater, these analyses may draw more heavily upon information from intelligence
and law enforcement agencies regarding the capabilities and intentions of the aggressors. The
following graphic portrays the process utilized by BART:
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System Security Program
Security Policy
Security Plan
Security Procedures
Identify Critical Assets
Final Review/Assessm ent
Identify Threats to Assets
Threat Scenarios
Quantify Threats
Threat and
Vulnerability
Management
Im plem ent Controls
Design/Control
Recom m endations
Threat Analysis
Identify Standards and
Requirem ents
Identify Controls to Prevent/
Mitigate Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Analysis
Identify Consequent
Vulnerabilities
Risk Managem ent
Threat and Vulnerability Management
A Threat and Vulnerability Resolution Matrix was used by BART to prioritize the threats and
vulnerabilities and identify the assets most at risk. Additionally, a scenario-based analysis was
used to help define the most vulnerable targets. At the conclusion of the scenario-based analysis,
BART developed a list of prioritized vulnerabilities that were documented in a confidential
report. Based on this list of prioritized vulnerabilities developed through the scenario analysis,
BART identified countermeasures to reduce those vulnerabilities.
Threat and Vulnerability Resolution Matrix
Frequency of
Occurrence
Vulnerability Categories
Catastrophic
1A
Frequent
1B
Probable
Occasional 1C
1D
Remote
Improbable 1E
Critical Marginal Negligible
2A
2B
2C
2D
2E
3A
3B
3C
3D
3E
4A
4B
4C
4D
4E
Unacceptable (Immediate Action Required)
Unacceptable (Management Decision Required)
Acceptable with Review by Management
Acceptable Without Review
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For BART, the potential of system intrusions posed significant threats. As such, BART
developed a system of intrusion detection for high risk locations that is based upon a device for
the detection of an unauthorized individual and a means for confirming the presence of the
individual that helps to reduce the number of false alarms. The system has the ability to track the
movement of a person within the protected location. Police response to the location will be
directed to the last detected location and any need to restrict train service will be implemented.
In the ranking of vulnerability and severity, these are highest risk locations that a successful
attack would essentially eliminate a major portion of the service area. It is at these locations that
BART has initially implemented their intrusion detection system.
Many of the details of this intrusion detection system are inappropriate to identify in this
document (classified as Security Sensitive Information). BART has a police force dedicated
solely to the security of the BART system. The BART Police Department, Office of the Chief,
Counterterrorism/Criminal Intelligence/SWAT, should be contacted at (510) 464-7077 for
privileged information concerning this intrusion detection system.
This case study includes a general description of the functions provided by the intrusion
detection system and its development by BART. One of the requirements of such a system is
reliability. What could be considered false alarms in a rail rapid transit environment would soon
destroy the credibility and reliance upon the intrusion detection system (IDS) (which rarely, if
ever, occur, according to a representative of the BART Police Department. The IDS must also
be able to distinguish between trains, animals, debris and authorized personnel. Accomplishing
reliability and definition with such a system requires the interaction and cooperation between
engineering, rail operations, maintenance and police. The IDS was designed by BART
Engineering using essentially off-the-shelf electronics and devices based upon BART Police
performance criteria. Rail Operations currently provides the monitoring of the IDS and
notification to BART Police when an intrusion is detected. Maintenance was required to
establish procedures for the new equipment and configuration.
When an alarm is received in the Operations Control Center, the Central Manager observes the
status of the location monitored by the IDS to determine the validity of the alarm and whether or
not the persons are authorized to be at the location. If the persons are authorized, the alarm is
reset, but if not, BART Police is notified for response and the Central Manager provides the
instructions, if necessary, to secure BART personnel and trains from the location. If a positive
determination cannot be made from the information available, BART Police will be notified and
will respond accordingly.
Cost/Benefit Analysis
BART did not conduct a cost benefit analysis for the intrusion detection system. However, the
implementation of the IDS prevents BART from stationing guards or police officers to protect
the most vulnerable facilities and locations, a far less cost effective means of providing security.
In addition, this use of security employees could not been sustained over the long term due to
budget constraints.
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As in any system safety, removing a hazard or, in this case, a threat from the system by means of
equipment design is almost always more effective than rules, procedures, or other human
measures in cost and performance.
Measure Effectiveness of Implementation/Performance Indicators
One of the measures of the effectiveness of safety and security at any transit system is patronage.
Currently, BART is at a high point in patronage. While much of the increased ridership could be
related to increases in fuel prices, the safety and security patrons experience while riding help
maintain current ridership and attracted new patrons. Choice riders are not likely to utilize a
transit system that is viewed as unsafe or unsecure. While the IDS is not visible or advertised to
the public, BART Police have shown they have increased security measures as complements to
the IDS system. Additional station security announcements and destination sign messages
provide warnings, alerts, instructions how to act when observing unusual behavior. In addition,
the stationing of uniformed officers on platforms and trains lends an increased level of safety and
security for patrons.
Lessons Learned/Conclusions
There are many challenges facing those who are responsible for making rail transit safe and
secure. There are means available to evaluate the threats and vulnerabilities that a rail transit
system faces. What is necessary to add to the mix of countermeasures is innovation and
technology. It is important for transit system to communicate and share information because
valuable time and money can be spent trying to “reinvent the wheel.” Sharing information about
accomplishments and failures will not only save money; more importantly, effective measures in
counterterrorism can be implemented to save lives and property.
BART used the threat and vulnerability matrix to prioritize their threats and vulnerability and
identify their assets most at risk. Additionally, a scenario based analysis was used to define the
most vulnerable targets. This approach allowed BART to identify counter measures to reduce
those vulnerabilities at high risk facilities and locations. The IDS provides constant monitoring
of access to these locations eliminating the need for additional security personnel.
Having the alarm directly in the Operations Control Center gives the Controllers the opportunity
to restrict train and maintenance operations from the area while simultaneously the BART Police
Dispatcher is being notified.
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The level of implementation at the BART system will depend upon the level of funding made
available for security measures. Ultimately, BART would like to have the Intrusion Detection
System in all tube and tunnel locations.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the wake of 9/11, extensive efforts have been taken to improve the security of public transit
industry. Special funds and grants have been allocated to conducted research to identify
innovative and effective approach to transit security. Despite the fact of understanding the
importance of safety and security, transit agencies face the problem of justifying the funds
needed for security. The challenge here is to utilize the funds in the most effective way. It is also
important to come up with innovative approach to deter terrorist activities or detect them in the
early stage to prevent large disruptions causing huge loss to lives and properties.
The case studies presented here provide insight into the best practices in the industry for design
and implementation of the security measures. The transit agencies selected have implemented
creative and innovative methods to improve security at transit operating facilities and passenger
stations without significant increases in their operating cost.
Regional Transportation District (RTD), Denver
Regional Transportation District (RTD) in Denver is one of the few transit agencies to include
safety and security in the planning and design phase of LRT capital projects. A design criteria
manual was initially developed in 1994 to serve as a guideline for all the LRT projects. Safety
and security are now included as a part of the design manual. RTD developed and modified these
safety and security design criteria’s as a result of lessons learned from earlier LRT projects,
safety design criteria from other agencies, results from security evaluations, and Threat and
Vulnerability Assessments (TVA). One of the primary goals of the manual was to provide
guidance to project engineers and architects for the initial inclusion of safety and security
requirements during the planning and design phases of RTD’s LRT projects.
The inclusion of safety and security requires a dedicated team to be committed for improving
safety and security including input from other department of the systems. The RDT’s Public
Safety Division is responsible for the agency’s safety and security requirements. The Public
Safety Division is broken down into sub-sections that include Safety, Environmental and
Security. The Division has 6 employees, 75 contracted security officers, and a contract with the
Denver Police Department to provide off-duty Police Officer security assistance. Although such
a large separate division may not be possible for all the transit agencies, it is recommended to
have a team or committee dedicated for developing security measures.
Currently, the security and safety criteria manual does not cover all the systems but it includes
criteria to have security measures implemented at stations, operations facility, fare collection
equipment, light rail vehicles, emergency access/egress locations, walkways and list of other
elements related facility design. It also includes specifications for the type of technologies to be
used as video surveillance equipment, emergency phones, and lighting systems into capital
projects. For example, the design manual runs into details of specifying video surveillance
systems to be capable of transmitting real-time (30 frames per second per camera) video to
RTD’s Security Command Center via a fiber optic transmission. These and other details helped
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RTD to ensure standardization of technologies in the entire system. Design principles like
CPETD are also included the manual.
The approach followed by RTD is unique, as decisions for developing criteria for security and
safety include integration from departments other then safety and security. This approach allows
weakness to be identified planning phase and eliminated in the design phase rather then after
implementation.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
WMATA took the nationwide lead in developing plans and procedures for response and
mitigation of a terrorist incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. After the
sarin attack in Tokyo in 1995, WMATA analyzed the devastation and economic consequences
that a chemical attack on mass transportation would have in the United States. WMATA
recognized the need for real time protection against subway attacks. It has developed a strong
team and a system (PROTECT) to effectively detect threat to safety and security and the
capability to respond accordingly. It is the first systems-based application developed to address
the complex problem of planning and integrating responses to emergencies, particularly those
involving different teams or agencies.
WMATA’s Communications Branch is responsible for the efficient, effective and economic
management of the Authority’s communications systems in support of Rail and Bus Operations,
e.g., telephone, mobile radio, public address, cable transmission, fiber optic, fire and intrusion,
rail yard security, closed circuit television, bus transfer dispensers, wayside/emergency
telephones, environmental monitoring, digital video recorders, and the PROTECT system.
WMATA has a Metro Transit Police to prevent crime, protect Metro’s customers, employees,
facilities and revenues and enforce laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Its Emergency
Response Training Facility is the only transit facility in the nation that is available 24 hours per
day, 7 days a week to train emergency personnel. WMATA response is highly enhanced by
using PROTECT system and the response time is reduced from 35 minutes to 5 minutes. The
PROTECT system includes detectors that sense the chemical, verify it, estimate the magnitude of
the problem and initiates communication with the local emergency response team. It not only
initiates communication but also suggests the action to increase effectiveness and dramatically
reduces response time.
The PROTECT system includes detectors that sense chemical agents, video for incident
verification, a computer program to model the spread of contamination in the subway, aboveground flow modeling for dispersion of toxic materials from street vents and station exits and
wireless communication for emergency responders. When PROTECT is triggered, video
cameras verify the attack, alarms sound at the subway operation command center, and operators
are directed through a set of optimized responses shown on computer screens (e.g., photos,
facility maps, identification of the chemical agent and concentration, technical updates and
response procedures, weather and wind direction).
The PROTECT system in one of the best system in the nation for detecting chemical or
biological attack but its implementation cost is very high and requires support at federal, state
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and local levels. But the approach certainly stresses transit agencies on understanding the
resources and training requirements to develop a very effective response system. Coordination
with local emergency responders is extremely important for the success of such an approach.
Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS)
Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) very recently took a unique approach of including safety
and security with full system integration. It is one of a few transit systems that have implemented
strong security management measures, including security management and life safety systems
integration aimed at protecting passengers, employees, the general public and CATS’ physical
assets. CATS established an Office of Safety and Security utilizing Charlotte Mecklenburg
Police Department Off-Duty Police and contract security agencies. It also included hiring
security professionals to review its safety and security plans and develop safety and security
standards for the agency. Thus, it has taken steps to integrate various departments and utilize
their resources for common goal of increasing safety and security.
CATS has a System Security Plan that addresses how to integrate security into every aspect of
the agency. The CATS System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) is also under revision to include the
various corridor projects and system growth that CATS has experienced. Its Emergency
Response Plan addresses various agency roles and responsibilities in the event of an emergency
and it has been tested during recent drills and events.
In addition to improving security plans, CATS has implemented physical security management
solutions include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Identification cards/key cards
Access control/security management
Fire/life safety system
Key/lock management
Facility video camera system
Perimeter security
One of the criteria for selecting the latest technologies was to ensure its compatibility with the
existing system. Also make sure that those technologies selected will allow for expansion
without becoming “outdated” prematurely. It was observed that it takes a great deal of energy to
successfully implement something of far reaching proportion and requiring the involvement of
many sections, especially technology, to actually complete the installation. To implement the
above measures CATS has spent considerable amount of time and effort in convincing the
employees to cooperative and change their perception for security. There was resistance from the
employees for installing video surveillance as they thought that they would be constantly
monitored. This and similar other issues were resolved by proper communication and awareness.
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Boston
The MBTA Transit Police Department is the principal law enforcement agency for all personnel,
passengers, facilities, stations, properties, equipment, and vehicles within the MBTA service
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area. All the officers are specially trained to function in a transit environment. In addition, they
have been trained in the National Incident Management System ICS training levels 100-700 and
all have received advanced training for identifying and managing incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction. In addition to its patrol operations, the Department’s specialized services
include intelligence operations, criminal investigation, crime analysis, detective services, field
training, K-9, special operations, community services, prosecution, motorcycle operations, and
explosive detection
MBTA Transit Police department’s seven-person Intelligence Unit has monitored continuously
information related to transit security from terrorism and other criminal activities. This approach
makes the Transit Police Department the state’s lead agency for transit security intelligence and
it acts like a statewide clearinghouse for this information.
MBTA’s Operations Control Center (OCC) is the central hub for all operations and safetyrelated communications. It was observed that there was no direct communication between OCC
and the MBTA Transit Police Department as they operated on different–and non-interoperable–
radio frequencies. Besides, the OCC was not secured and it had no back up for operation. Any
security breaches will bring the whole operation to a stand still. Recognizing the need to
prioritize effective communications and to protect communications personnel and assets, MBTA
took a very innovative approach to solve the problem. A new control center was proposed to
solve the problem of back up operation. Accommodating some police personnel in the OCC not
only increased the security at OCC but also increased the communication between them (OCC
and Transit Police Department). This kind of innovative approach substantially increases the
efficiency for response and does not entail huge cost. This approach certainly aligned well with
department’s strategic principle: “Cost-effective implementation through better use of
technology”–in this case, human technology. It is noteworthy that it neither required any
additional staff, nor any staff reductions. It did not require product training or technical
maintenance cost. It did, however, require that several policies and procedures be rewritten to
account for the new direct lines of communication.
Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority (LYNX), Orlando
With expanded service and new start light rail system LYNX came up with new facility called
the LYNX Central Station (LCS). Safety and security elements were not included in the initial
design but they were included prior to the beginning of the construction phase of the project.
The security system project was contracted directly through the security system vendor and not
through the construction contract to maintain a higher level of security integrity. It was also
recognized through this process that addressing security issues early during the design phase or
construction phases of most transit projects is critical. Also cost of implementation is lower is
considered in the design phase as compared to its implementation after construction.
LYNX had performed threat and vulnerability assessment (TVA) for LYNX LCS and came up
the technologies that should be used to increase the system safety and security. LYNX also
developed a formal security plan in 2003 that resulted in the formation of safety and security
division. Armed and unarmed offices will be included at all LYNX facility and it also entered a
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verbal agreement with the Orlando police department to supply off duty officers at LYNX
facilities on a regular basis.
In addition to the operational security support, a new integrated security system was also
incorporated into the LCS building design. The system now includes cameras for all public
areas, bus areas, and perimeter entrances and exits. Electronic ID cards and electronically
control door contacts have been placed on all perimeter doors limiting access to non-public
areas. Entrance readers and a secondary Access Control System (ACS) device (bio-readers) are
used to prevent and control unauthorized persons from entering any area that contains money.
All the cameras and accessed controlled doors are electronically recorded in a CCTV control
room with staffed members of the contract security force to monitor it for 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week. In addition to providing latest security to the new facility, old ones are also retrofitted
with safety and security devices. The new LYNX Operation Center (LOC) will so be equipped
with similar technologies to integrate it will the other two facilities. All the facilities will be
monitored centrally from LCS control room.
It was observed with the LYNX new integrated system, there was significant increase in the
reported criminal activities. This was due to the accurate and efficient recording system. In the
future these measures will certainly help in reducing those criminal activities and improve safety
and security. It was also observed that security has been given great priority and a combined
effort is made to improve safety and security.
San Francisco Bay Area Transit District (BART)
The San Francisco Bay Area Transit District (BART) is recognized as being on the cutting edge
of rapid rail transit since the fully automated system began passenger service in1972. Automatic
Train Control (ATC) provides a failsafe train protection system and central supervisory
functions, including fully automated train operations and automatic schedule adjustment. The
Operations Control Center (OCC) provides supervision over all phases of operations, including
trains, patrons, system power, and wayside equipment.
Securing such a huge infrastructure from the risk of criminal activities or terrorist attacks was
extremely challenging considering the open accessibility to the system which is one of the
requirement for public transit systems. It is difficult to maintain adequate level of security
without affecting the flow of people in and out of the system. BART conducted an extensive
Threat and Vulnerability Assessment to identify and prioritize the assets that need high security.
Additionally, a scenario-based analysis was used to help define the most vulnerable targets. At
the conclusion of the scenario-based analysis, BART developed a list of prioritized
vulnerabilities that were documented in a confidential report. Based on the results of the
scenario analysis, BART identified countermeasures to reduce those vulnerabilities. Since it was
identified that system intrusion posed significant threats, BART developed a system of intrusion
detection for high risk locations that is based upon a device for the detection of an unauthorized
individuals. It also had a system to verify those intrusions to reduce the number of false alarms.
The unique IDS system is able to distinguish between trains, animals, debris and authorized
personnel with the integration of and cooperation among engineering, rail operations,
maintenance and police. The IDS system provides monitoring and notification to BART Police
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in case of intrusion. It was observed that the reliability and efficiency of the system was
increased by integrating various departments in BART. The integration not only made the safety
and security system efficient but also reduced the response time and increased cooperation
among departments in case of emergency.
This research suggests that the system safety and security should be implemented at the design
and planning phase of the capital projects. Transit systems should spend considerable amount of
time and effort in developing safety and security plans. Transit agencies should conduct threat
and vulnerability assessment to understand their assets and the impact of terrorist attack or any
event causing disruption in the normal services. The capabilities and applications of the safety
and security technologies should be thoroughly understood by the transit agencies and used
according to their needs.
In addition to the research already done in the areas of safety and security, including this study,
several areas have been identified that need further research:
•
Performance measures for the safety and security measures implemented by a transit
agency should be developed. These performance measures will not only assist the
implementing agency to better understand its security system but also assist other
agencies in developing their own measures by serving as a benchmark.
•
It was observed that most of the agencies do not perform cost-benefit analysis. Though it
is difficult to accurately estimate the benefits of implementing security measures,
research in this area will help develop standards for estimating the benefits. Quantifying
the benefits will also create a sense of urgency among the transit agencies to make safety
and security a priority. Additionally, it will also help in justifying the fund requirements
by the agencies.
•
A decision making tool for transit agencies to understand the implementation cost of
safety and security devices should be developed. The tool should contain a list of
available technologies with their usage, capital cost, implementation cost, maintenance
cost, and useful life of each technology. The tool can eventually be updated to
incorporate the latest technology in the market. This tool should enable the agencies to
select different alternatives to find the implementation cost and help the agencies make
decision that best fits their budget.
•
Research to explore innovative ways to finance security projects should be conducted.
This would help agencies to overcome their funding requirements.
In general, safety and security are everybody’s responsibility, and awareness and training will
enhance it. Best practices and innovative approaches in the industry should be studied and used
by the other transit agencies in their planning and implementation.
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Government Accountability Office. 2002. “Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit
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Transportation Research Board. 2002. Deterrence, Protection, and Preparation: The New
Transportation Security Imperative. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, National
Academy of Sciences.
MBTA Transit Police Department, http://www.transitpolice.us/
MBTA Transit Police Department. June 2003. “The Plan of Action: A Commitment to
Excellence.” Boston, MA: MBTA Transit Police Department.
MBTA Transit Police Department. November 2003. “Securing the MBTA: A Strategy for
Homeland Security.” Boston, MA: MBTA Transit Police Department.
Meyer, M. 2002. “The Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Preparing for Security
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NOTICE
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the
Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange.
The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.
The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers.
Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein
solely because they are considered essential to the object of this report.
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