International Journal of Science Education
Vol. 28, No. 8, 15 June 2006, pp. 919–944
RESEARCH REPORT
The Relationship between
Understanding of the Nature of Science
and Practice: The influence of teachers’
beliefs about education, teaching and
learning
Stephen Waters-Adams*
University of Plymouth, UK
StephenWaters-Adams
Taylor
02006
00
s.waters-adams@plymouth.ac.uk
000002006
&
Francis
International
10.1080/09500690500498351
TSED_A_149818.sgm
0950-0693
Original
and
Article
(print)/1464-5289
Francis
JournalLtd
of Science
(online)
Education
This paper reports the relationship between four English primary teachers’ understanding of the
nature of science and their practice. Action research was included as a major part of the research
design in order to explore the dialectical interplay between various factors at work in the teachers’
practice. The influences of both tacit and espoused understandings of the nature of science were
considered alongside the teachers’ beliefs about education, teaching, and learning. These beliefs
were found to be the determining factor in the teachers’ decisions about classroom strategies. In
arguing for a dialectical perspective on teachers’ practice, the research suggests that teachers’
espoused understanding of the nature of science may also be at least partially formed by the influence of these beliefs, raising the possibility that influence may run from teaching to theoretical
understanding and not the other way round.
Introduction
The attempt to identify relationships between teachers’ knowledge and their practice is a persistent and long-standing focus for research. The reason is obvious. It is
common-sense to assume that what a teacher knows will influence what he or she
does in the classroom, so one way to improve teacher effectiveness must surely be
to ensure that teachers have the “right” knowledge. All that is then needed is an
understanding of how that knowledge will transmit into effective practice.
*Faculty of Education, University of Plymouth, Devon, UK.
Email: s.waters-adams@plymouth.ac.uk
ISSN 0950-0693 (print)/ISSN 1464-5289 (online)/06/080919–26
© 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09500690500498351
920 S. Waters-Adams
Science education research has for a long time been interested in these relationships. Perhaps inevitably (and unfortunately for common-sense), extended research
has suggested an increasingly complex picture, with the result that early assumptions
of a simple linearity from knowledge to practice have become less tenable. Developments in methodology have not only made problematic the identification and nature
of teachers’ knowledge itself, they have also highlighted the dialectical nature of
practice and the weakness of simple linear models of teacher behaviour (Lakin &
Wellington, 1994; Laplante, 1997, Waters-Adams with Nias, 2003). Tacit understanding can be seen to be potentially as significant as espoused; ideas, beliefs, and
values have all been recognized as integral elements of action.
This paper reports on a recent study of the influence on practice of teachers’
understanding of the nature of science (Waters-Adams, 2000). Such an understanding can only be measured against general categories, for there is no single “nature of
science” (Abd-El-Khalik & Lederman, 2000; Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996).
Schwab’s (1964) and Shulman’s (1986, 1987) idea of syntactical knowledge is
closest to these general categories, which cover aspects such as the status and validity
of scientific knowledge, the nature of reliable methods for obtaining that knowledge,
and where science ends and not-science begins (Koulaidis & Ogborn, 1995).
A Developing Recognition of Complexity
Shulman’s (1986) paper is perhaps the most seminal discussion in recent times of
what constitutes adequate knowledge of a subject for teachers, spawning much
further research, not least by Shulman himself. The paper came at a time that was
also seeing rapid developments in the understanding of teachers’ practice, particularly with regard to the kinds of knowledge they bring to bear as they teach
(Connelly & Clandinin, 1985, 1988; Elbaz, 1983) and how ideas and action are
linked dialectically (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Stenhouse, 1975). These developments
can be traced through the slow evolution of ideas about the influence of teachers’
understanding of nature of science on practice. The evolution has been tentative.
Although early assumptions of a straightforward cause–effect gave way to more
complexity (Duschl & Wright, 1989; Lederman & Zeidler, 1987), many studies still
seemed to give some support to the idea of linearity (Aguirre, Haggerty, & Linder,
1990; Brickhouse, 1989, 1990; Gallagher, 1991; Lakin & Wellington, 1994; Lantz
& Kass, 1987). It was not until well into the last decade that a consensus began to
emerge that the situation was complex (Brickhouse & Bodner, 1992; Laplante,
1997; Lederman, 1992; Murcia & Schibeci, 1999; Nott & Wellington, 1996; Tobin
& McRobbie, 1997).
An identification of complexity, however, does not necessarily mean a paradigmatic change. In his comprehensive review of research to that date, Lederman
(1992) identified a line of research that was beginning to suggest situational
constraints were important mediators of teacher knowledge in the classroom.
Collaborating with Abd-El-Khalik, he subsequently identified these constraints as
the pressure to cover content, classroom management and organizational principles,
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 921
concerns for student abilities and motivation, institutional constraints, teaching
experience, and lack of resources (Abd-El-Khalik & Lederman, 2000, p. 670). The
list is a description of the complexity of the teacher’s world. However, for all the
notion of complexity, the conception of Abd-El-Khalik and Lederman appears still
to be fundamentally that of a linear relationship between knowledge and practice.
They state that these “variables” “have been shown to mediate and constrain the
translation of teachers’ nature of science conceptions into practice” (Abd-El-Khalik
& Lederman, 2000, p. 670; added emphasis). Presumably, if they were not there,
teachers’ actions would be influenced in a straightforward and predictable way by
their theoretical thinking.
Moving towards a Dialectical Understanding
In their 1997 paper, Tobin and McRobbie reported that the “enacted” curriculum of
science teachers may be at odds with their espoused beliefs about of the nature of
science. They suggested that a range of other beliefs may be far more influential;
namely, those relating to teaching and learning, power relationships within the class
and the perceived restraints acting upon teaching (Tobin & McRobbie, 1997, p. 366).
At about the same time, Nott and Wellington (1996) reached a significant conclusion.
They stated that their research indicated that “teachers’ knowledge of the nature of
science may be as much formed by their teaching of science as informing their teaching of science” (Nott & Wellington, 1996, p. 284). These results disturb the intuitive
appeal of the linear mode of influence between theoretical understanding and action.
If teachers’ knowledge of supposedly underpinning theoretical ideas can be formed
by the act of teaching itself, then a simple linearity is not possible. Other elements that
determine the nature of the teaching act itself become potentially important in the
development of theoretical understanding. Laplante (1997) suggested that teachers’
epistemological understanding of science might be “nested” (Lyons, 1990) with other
epistemologies brought to bear in the classroom, such as those concerned with teaching and learning. If this were the case, there could be interchange and influence back
and forth between them. Tsai (2002) has taken this idea further, proposing that the
dialectical interchange which will determine, yet keep fluid, a teachers’ understanding
of nature of science, lies at the level of teachers’ beliefs. He claims:
… teachers’ beliefs about the nature of science … are related to their beliefs of learning
and teaching. That is, these beliefs are viewed as “nested epistemologies”. Changing
teachers’ beliefs of teaching and learning science may be a prerequisite of changing their
beliefs about science, or vice versa. (Tsai, 2002, p. 780)
A similar suggestion is made by Gwimbi and Monk (2003), who suggest that there
might be an “association” between classroom circumstances and a teacher’s views
on the philosophy of science (p. 470), implying that classroom context may be the
deciding factor in determining a teacher’s views on both teaching science and the
nature of science. Along with Tsai, they present a far different picture of influence
from the traditional linearity. The research informing this paper suggests a similar
922 S. Waters-Adams
level of complexity, highlighting lines of influence between beliefs, ideas, and action
that, it is suggested, take the debate further.
Research Design
The research examined the relationship between four teachers’ understanding of the
nature of science and their practice. It took place in the county of Devon, England
and lasted for 16 months. Unlike most research in this area, it involved teachers of
very young children. Three teachers of these children (Elizabeth, Carol, and Heather)
and one teacher of older primary children (Andrea) took part. Elizabeth was very
experienced, having been teaching for 22 years. Heather was in her sixth year of teaching, with Carol and Andrea in their third year. In England, early schooling is divided
into Foundation stage (3–5 years old) and primary (5–11 years old). Elizabeth and
Carol were both Foundation Stage teachers, but teaching in a Reception class (4–5
years old) in a primary school. Heather taught either Year One or Year Two (5–6/6–
7 years old); Andrea taught either Year 5 or Year 6 (9–10/10–11 years old). Science
is a statutory element of the English National Curriculum (Department for Education
and Employment [DfEE], 1999) and science-related work is represented within the
“Knowledge and Understanding of the World” section of the Curriculum Guidance
for the Foundation Stage (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 2000). Teachers
qualify to teach children from 3–7 years or from 5–11 years, and must teach all
subjects in the primary school; therefore all are required to have an adequate understanding of science syntactic knowledge. None of the teachers considered themselves
to be specialists in science, although Andrea had recently moved to the school to take
up the position of science coordinator. While such an appointment may seem a little
bizarre, it is relatively common to find English primary teachers who have areas of
responsibility outside their specialist interests. Elizabeth’s main interests were in
language and mathematics, Carol’s in art, and Heather’s in geography.
Methodologically, it was essential to attempt to identify two elements: the teachers’ understanding of the nature of science, and the nature of their teaching of
science. Both elements, however, are complex. Lakin and Wellington’s (1994)
suggestion that teachers’ understanding of the nature of science may not be readily
accessible through conventional interview or questionnaire had drawn attention to
the need to consider the whole of a teachers’ practice when attempting to identify
understanding. Ideas that teachers have difficulty in articulating, of which they are
unaware, or which may lay in tacit contradiction to their espoused understanding,
may be evident in action and need to be acknowledged. In addition, Nott and
Wellington’s (1996) recognition that teachers’ ideas about science may be formed
through their teaching of it emphasized the idea of a dialectic between theoretical
understanding and direct experience through teaching. The existence of this dialectic inevitably draws other elements, such as Abd-el-Khalik’s and Ledeman’s (2000)
“mediating factors” and the teacher’s beliefs and values relating to education, into
the generation of understanding. These elements, combined with the author’s
experience of action research (Elliott, 1991; Waters-Adams, 1994; Winter, 1987)
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 923
and the complexity of the motives for teacher action, led to the derivation of a
broad approach to data gathering in response to the two methodological necessities
(Waters-Adams with Nias, 2003).
A key aspect of the methodology adopted was the engagement of the teachers in
prolonged action research on an element of their practice. Given the need to explore
teachers’ action, it was essential that there was sufficient for analysis. Making ongoing
action research a central focus of the inquiry addressed this, allowing an opportunity
for frequent observation of practice. Action research invites continued reflexive
examination of the relationship between espoused goals and the results of action. A
rich dialogue was established with the teachers about the nature and derivation of
their action. This dialogue not only enabled continual reflection on the teachers’
understanding of the nature of science and whether it was static or changing, but it
also brought to the fore reasons why change might be occurring. This allowed access
to other potentially significant elements, such as the teachers’ wider aims for their
teaching and the beliefs that informed those aims.
Inevitably, teachers frequently act out of habit with a kind of dormant cognition
behind their actions. It was important to raise their awareness of the dynamics of
their practice so that it might be possible to better reflect on the decisions and
tensions inherent in their teaching. The inquiry addressed this imperative by, in
effect, establishing two sites for analysis. Although they were aware of the broader
aim of the research, the teachers themselves were engaged in a personal exploration
of how they could improve their science teaching. They developed their own focus
for action research, and the researcher’s involvement was as an impartial observer of
teaching and a critical friend for post-lesson reflective discussion and analysis. At
the same, however, these processes produced data in the form of plans, lesson
observations, and notes that acted as data for the wider inquiry (Waters-Adams
with Nias, 2003, pp. 285–289). This paper presents a brief analysis of the teacher’s
practice, shedding further light on the relation of an understanding of nature of
science to the reality of classroom action. It adds to Tsai’s position and suggests
that research needs to explore more fully the lived experience of teaching to understand more fully the influence that ideas about nature of science play in teaching
about science.
The science concepts addressed by the teachers ranged across all the main areas of
the Key Stage One and Key Stage Two curriculum. The areas themselves were not
analysed separately, but are regarded as conceptual contexts for the teachers’ understanding of the nature of science to become apparent. Future research might explore
whether conceptual context and understanding could be linked.
Data Gathering
A range of data gathering strategies was adopted, both to help with the action research
and to contribute to the overall inquiry. There were two main elements, generated
within or away from the immediacy of practice. They were mainly qualitative and are
summarized in the following (Table 1).
924 S. Waters-Adams
Table 1.
Data gathering strategies within the inquiry
Strategy
Data generated from practice
Lesson observations(fortnightly)
Notes of post-lesson reflective
discussions
Teachers’ written aims and
planning
Data generated away from the
immediacy of practice
Focused semi-structured
interviews (termly)
Teachers’ reflective commentaries
Researcher’s analytic memo
Bi-polar semantic differential
Questionnaire on general
pedagogical beliefs and values
Contribution
Gave strong indications of teachers’ understanding of nature
of science, particularly tacit. They were instrumental in
maintaining the dialectical challenge of the teachers’ action
research. Three main elements were analysed for data relating
to teachers’ understanding:
• Statements to children within the lesson
• Interactions (questions and responses) with children
• Overall structure and progress of the lesson
The observations raised questions for post-lesson discussion
The teachers’ analysis of their lessons gave access to
epistemological or methodological assumptions underpinning
their teaching. They indicated the levels of confidence the
teachers felt in their science teaching, highlighting potential
tensions between aims (including pedagogical beliefs and
values) and actions. They also engaged the teachers in
reflexive dialogue about their practice and promoted change.
Provided data that related to the teachers’ understanding of
science pedagogy and that could be related to their wider
understanding of nature of science, both espoused and tacit.
Seldom analysed separately from the accompanying lesson.
Provided strong evidence of teachers’ espoused
understanding of nature of science, but were also indicators
of tacit ideas. Provided a forum within which the teachers
could analyse their thinking. Teachers often did not make
direct statements about the nature of science, even when
asked directly. Frequently, these data were provided through
description of teaching and stories about the children in their
class.
Provided insights into the teachers’ reflection on their
practice and personal change and development. Provided a
window onto pedagogical beliefs.
Served as a focus for on going reflection and the preliminary
analysis of specific events. Helped with filtering and synthesis
of material
Provided “snapshots” of teachers’ espoused understanding at
different times in the inquiry, for further discussion in
interview. Acted as an indicator of change in understanding.
Explored teachers’ pedagogical beliefs and values through
responses to direct questions of the kind: “what would you
say motivates your teaching?”
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 925
Uncovering Elements at Work in the Teachers’ Practice
Tensions between espoused and tacit understanding. The comparison of an initial elicitation of the teachers’ espoused understanding of nature of science from interview and
subsequent completion of the bi-polar scale (Appendix) showed little direct link
between espoused understanding and practice. The teachers’ understanding of
science itself was tentative. Table 2 shows how two teachers, Elizabeth and Carol,
seemed to hold a wide range of varied ideas, akin to Koulaidis and Ogborn’s “eclectic”
category (Koulaidis & Ogborn, 1989).
It is interesting that all four teachers espoused a primarily hypothetico-deductive
position. Evidence from the interviews indicated that there was a strong tendency
for them to communicate their understanding of the nature of science through
examples from their practice or a description of their pedagogical approach to
science teaching, rather than specific epistemological discussion. This may be
significant. Philosophical discourse does not come easily to many primary teachers;
they think about science through the aims of their teaching of science. Learning
their teaching of science at the end of the twentieth century, it is inevitable that
they will have been affected by prevailing pedagogical theories, of which by far the
most prominent derive from the application of constructivist understandings of
children’s learning. Such approaches, founded on the elicitation, exploration,
development, or challenge of children’s ideas, promote a strongly hypotheticodeductive way of working. The frequent exhortation to start with the children’s
Table 2.
Elements of
science
Aims/purposes
of science
Epistemology
Ontology
Teachers’ espoused positions at the outset of the inquiry
Elizabeth
Carol
Heather
(a) a process
(b) a set method
(c) a body of knowledge
(a) finding out
(b) discovery
(a) a process
(b) a human
endeavour
(a) exploration
(b) finding out
(c) seeking order
and meaning
(a) provisional
(a) a set method (a) a process
(b) a body of
knowledge
(a) exploration (a) trying to find
(b) a search for
answers
explanations (b) the generation
of knowledge
(a) hypothetico- (a) hypotheticodeductive
deductive
(a) hypotheticodeductive
(b) public knowledge
(c) empirical
(d) provisional
(e) falsificationist
(f) inductivist
Realist (?)
Andrea
(b) hypotheticodeductive
(c) falsificationist
(d) empirical
(e) personal
(f) inductivist
Relativist
Realist
(b) provisional
(c) accretional
Realist
926 S. Waters-Adams
ideas leaves little alternative. Although the application of constructivism to science
teaching has been criticised—for example by Millar (1991), Suchting (1992), and
Matthews (1993), with a lively debate occupying the letters pages of Science
Teacher Education for over a year (Jenkins, 1997, 1998; Keogh & Naylor 1997,
1998)—little sense of this critique filters down to schools. In this atmosphere it is
perhaps no wonder that teachers may frequently espouse epistemological positions
in science that are hypothetico-deductive in character. It is the received wisdom of
their training.
This hypothetico-deductive approach was not, however, strongly apparent in their
practice, mirroring Tobin and McRobbie’s (1997) findings. Analysis of Elizabeth’s
early teaching revealed a preoccupation with ensuring that the children learned
specific facts. Similarly, although Carol seemed to hold strong ideas about the limitations of scientific knowledge and the centrality of the processes of exploration and
inquiry, they did not find a place in a practice that was highly tentative, poorly
focused, and, again, promoting factual learning. Heather began the inquiry with an
insecure but consistent understanding that science was characterized by specific
procedures aimed at achieving explanations for phenomena, but her teaching indicated that she, too, was concerned that the children learned specific elements of
knowledge. The short extract from a lesson observation presented in Table 3
demonstrates a disengagement from the children’s enquiry, suggesting that she was
Table 3.
Extract from lesson observation, Heather
Teacher
Children
Thoughts
Now G. [Takes the white paper] Can you see
through?
Are you sure?
I can’t. You must have a good imagination. I
think you saw a shadow
E. [Takes the brown paper] Do you think it
will be any good? I don’t.
N. [Takes the tissue paper. Draws attention to
the effects where it overlaps]
Can you see inside?
Yes, but you can’t see the real colours and
shapes
Which is the best so far?
I’ll tell you what, none of them were very good
Yes (!)
Yes
Whose ideas? Implication
of a right answer?
I can see a shadow
I can …
[Children think]
Notes: Focus: properties of materials. Lessons were recorded verbatim, where possible, onto this
basic grid. “Thoughts” were those of the observer, to aid post-lesson reflection and, as here, to
record an insight.
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 927
merely “going through the motions”. It serves as an example of how lesson observations were used to reveal tacit epistemological positions.
It was, perhaps, only in Andrea’s work that any agreement between espoused position and practice was evident, as she consistently tried to encourage the children to
follow a set hypothetico-deductive procedure that seemed to relate strongly to her
understanding of the place of the process in scientific activity.
The obvious question that arose was why there was so little connection. Although
the “eclectic” nature of Elizabeth’s and Carol’s ideas might have militated against
their translation into coherent practice, that did not explain why Heather’s more
straightforward and consistent understanding was not in easy accord with the tenor
of her classroom performance.
Lederman’s idea of mediation by situational factors is powerful, but its apparent
categorization of those situational factors as external to the teacher does not seem to
allow for the influence of the teachers’ own tacit understanding in the overall
picture. A central contention of this paper is that teachers may hold two conceptions
of nature of science at the same time: one espoused and one tacit within their practice. For example, although it can be seen that Heather espoused an investigative
approach, her practice could be seen to be full of a tacit need to “dish out facts”,
providing a strong impetus to her teaching. This was something that she was also
only too aware of, as the following interview extract suggests:
Heather: That’s always been my problem. I suppose because I mean you always go
from your own experiences, don’t you, and my science background at grammar school was the learn it off the board kind of thing. So I suppose I’m up
against that in a way, you know, having to give them the understanding,
without actually giving them the facts all the time, rather than letting them
explore.
SWA:
Is that the way you actually feel about teaching it then?
Heather: No, no … I mean going to teaching college told me the way they actually pick
things up is by exploring, by having a go, but I’m up against this having to
dish out the facts sort of thing, rather than letting them explore and then
forming their own understanding afterwards.
This recognition by Heather of influences that affected her tacit “theories in use”
(Argyris & Schon, 1974) disturbs the simple distinction between espoused and tacit
knowledge discussed by Altricher, Posch, and Somekh (1993) or Torff (1999),
suggesting a complex picture working a varying depths of conscious awareness.
Carol also found it extremely difficult to break away from a strong impulse that
science was a body of knowledge to be learned, even though she argued against it
and struggled to incorporate more open investigational work in her teaching.
Andrea’s understanding of the nature of science clearly included a naive realist
(Abell & Smith, 1994) element that science is a body of true knowledge and that
learning in science is ultimately a question of recourse to greater authority. Again,
this was not consciously articulated, but was present tacitly in her statements at the
beginning of the inquiry and remained a strong influence even as she was wishing to
encourage the children to become tentative and speculative.
928 S. Waters-Adams
The teachers’ understanding of nature of science was therefore a kind of battleground
between tacit and espoused ideas, with tacit ideas achieving power by virtue of the
formative quality of the experiences that led to them. Abell and Smith (1994), Aguirre
et al. (1990) and Gustafson and Rowell (1995) all considered the teacher’s schooling
to be the most crucial factor in the generation of their understanding of science. Both
Carol and Elizabeth suggested that their schooling had given them little confidence
in scientific knowledge. Carol’s insecurity was further compounded by her own family
experience. An arts graduate herself, but with three of her four brothers graduates in
science and her father a practising scientist, it is easy to imagine how a sense of inadequacy might have developed into a deep seated idea of science as external authority.
Situational factors may also have played a part in the determination of tacit positions. For example, all four teachers tended to transmit the same idea of knowledge
to their children. The English National Curriculum for Science (Department of
Education and Science/Welsh Office, 1989, 1991; Department for Education/Welsh
Office, 1995; Department for Education and Employment, 1999) may have been a
powerful situational influence here, governing the overall content of their practice.
All four teachers referred frequently to its influence, even though the Foundation
Stage teachers did not have to cover it.
The teachers’ beliefs about teaching. The complexity that Tsai mentions suggests that
an understanding of the dynamics of the teachers’ action, or of the relationship
between that action and their views of the nature of science, is inadequate unless
consideration is also given to the teachers’ general beliefs about education. These
beliefs—about the aims of education, about how children learn, and about how curriculum should be structured—have the potential to be determining factors in the teachers’ understanding of what constitute appropriate pedagogical strategies for children.
From the beliefs summarized in Table 4, it can be seen that the beliefs of these
four teachers had a strong internal consistency.
Although these kinds of beliefs are not situational factors in Lederman’s terms,
their existence suggests a prima facie reason why they should be included in the
factors that might affect teachers’ ideas or mediate their translation into practice.
For example, Carol had a strong commitment to the promotion of children’s independence, affecting her initial organization of science sessions:
As a teacher I am able to provide opportunities to extend their experiences, to raise their
awareness and deepen their thinking—i.e. not necessarily to provide answers for them
but to instil an investigative attitude in which they want to ask their own questions.
This commitment led to a wish not to “interfere” with the children’s activity. The
fact that her teaching of science cut across such exploration, as she tried to make
the children all learn the same answers, produced a significant tension. In the same
way, Andrea’s commitment to the promotion of children’s independent “life skills”
frequently conflicted with the formulaic approaches she adopted to develop her
children’s thinking in science and their understanding of the epistemological value
of systematic activity.
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 929
Table 4.
Summary of the teacher’s general beliefs about teaching, learning, and the curriculum
Elizabeth
Carol
Beliefs about the aims of teaching
The development of The development of
children’s self esteem; children’s ability to work
The development of independently;
children’s respect for
others;
The development of The development of
children’s thinking;
children’s thinking skills;
The development of
children’s ‘life skills’.
Heather
Andrea
The development of
children’s self-reliance;
The promotion of the
children’s ‘life skills’;
The development of
children’s ability to
think and inquire
The development of
children’s self esteem
and their feelings of
success;
The promotion of
The development of
children’s understanding children’s independence
and respect for the
environment.
Beliefs about the way children learn
That children learn
That young children are Through practical
activity and
through activity and active learners,
investigation;
experience;
generating
understanding through
experience;
Beliefs about the way curriculum should be structured
*That it should be
That it should allow That it should be
delivered through
for the ‘emergence’ of integrated;
investigative activity;
children’s
understanding and
capability;
That it should be
That it should reflect the
delivered through
holistic nature of
investigative activity; children’s experience;
That it should be
delivered through
investigative activity;
Beliefs about appropriate pedagogy
That the teacher
*That children should
should be a facilitator; be involved in
investigative work;
Through inquiry and
challenge;
That its purpose lies in
the promotion of
transferable conceptual
understanding and
thinking skills;
That it should be based
on continuity of
experience;
That children should be That children should
involved in independent be involved in activities
activity;
which promote inquiry
and challenge;
That children should That teaching should
That activities should
That teaching
be involved in
encourage exploratory
include practical
approaches should
investigative work.
and ‘discovery’ learning; challenges;
ensure success for
children;
That the teacher’s role is That activities should
That teaching
one of facilitator, not
promote children’s
approaches should
instructor.
inquiry and thinking.
inject a sense of purpose
into the curriculum.
930 S. Waters-Adams
It is clear that there were potentially contradictory elements at work within the
teachers’ practice: their espoused and tacit understanding of nature of science; their
understanding of what makes good science teaching; their beliefs about the aims of
education, the curriculum, and appropriate pedagogy; and the pressure of external
demands from school and curriculum. The tensions between these elements created
a fertile dialectical situation for change.
Tracing Developments in the Teachers’ Practice
The teachers’ action research precipitated changes, promoting a developmental
perspective on teachers’ understanding and allowing an examination of the dynamics
between the elements identified at the end of the previous section.
The central influence of teachers’ beliefs. There was little correspondence between
Elizabeth’s, Carol’s, and Heather’s espoused ideas about science and their practice
at the start of the inquiry. Relationships seemed to lie at the tacit level. By the end of
the inquiry, the situation had changed, with their espoused positions much more
closely aligned with the nature of their teaching. At the same time, all three teachers
had become more confident in their science teaching, displaying an ease that was not
there before. Carol, who was originally driven by an underlying need to transmit
“right” answers to her children, became much more secure about the place of
knowledge in her teaching. In the same way, Elizabeth started with tacit messages
about knowledge in contradiction to her aims, yet by the end of the inquiry she
could legitimate the position of knowledge within her teaching:
If somebody said you’ve got to teach all this knowledge, I think I’d find that extremely
difficult. I’d think this isn’t a good way of learning; this is a waste of time, because in six
months the children are not going to retain this knowledge. But I think the way I’m
teaching at the moment, they are. They’re building up a kind of internal structure, if you
like, that will enable them to be able to learn knowledge as and when it’s appropriate.
Examining how this accord between understanding and practice developed reveals
a distinct pattern. Change did not occur because a simple clarification of the teachers’ espoused ideas about science led to an understanding of how these should
influence their practice. A complex relationship developed between three key
elements: the teachers’ espoused ideas about the nature of science, the approaches
they adopted within their science teaching, and) their beliefs about the kind of pedagogy that supported their understanding of both how curriculum should be structured and what was appropriate for encouraging young children’s learning. The
teachers were well aware of the focus of the overall inquiry and there is no doubt that
the stimulus of being involved, both with their own action research and with the
knowledge that they were contributing to a more general analysis, frequently challenged them to think about the nature of science. However, at no point did the
understanding generated by this thinking become the sole or dominant factor in
their teaching. More realistically, it became part of a background of possibility
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 931
against which their practice developed. There were other influences as well.
Frequently challenging themselves to modify their teaching, the teachers seemed to
have confidence in their resulting practice only when it accorded with elements of
their deeply held beliefs about appropriate pedagogy. It was as if these beliefs were
overriding concerns through which they filtered any other criteria for the judging of
practice, including those relating to an understanding of the nature of science.
Carol’s example is instructive. The year included much anguish for her as she
confronted feelings of inadequacy and her avoidance of the teaching of science. Such
action brought her into direct conflict with her pedagogical beliefs, for she eventually
forced herself to impose a different structure on her teaching. The result was painful,
with her practice becoming a battleground between her ideas about science, both
tacit and espoused, and her overriding beliefs about how to teach Reception
children. She began to reappraise her understanding of how to realize her beliefs
about children’s learning and the way children should be taught. Change in both her
understanding of science and how she should be teaching thus proceeded together,
driven by a wish to arrive at practice that felt right and that she could implement
with confidence.
However, although Carol’s understanding of what her beliefs looked like in
action changed, the beliefs themselves appeared firm. At the end of the inquiry she
had a new confidence in her science teaching that came from an identification of
patterns of working in the subject that she felt were consistent with the teaching of
very young children. Overall, her understanding of the nature of the subject did not
alter very much, but it now translated into what she considered to be appropriate
practice for her Reception class. Science for her was still fundamentally hypothetico-deductive, but her teaching had now become primarily inductive. She justified
her new approach to teaching by claiming that children first needed experiences in
order to be able to generate ideas for exploration. Furthermore, her initial leaning
towards a provisional and relativist understanding of knowledge (see Table 1)
could also now be validated in how she taught. Most significantly, the ultimate
justification for her new position was its relationship to her beliefs about the right
way to teach. It made sense for her. Her new conception of science teaching
accorded with her persistent belief that the education of young children must flow
from their experiences. She could now be confident that the children still ultimately
had control.
This sense of a developing harmony between approach to science teaching and
general beliefs about appropriate pedagogy could also be seen with Heather, and to
an even greater degree with Elizabeth. Heather initially conceived of science as a
largely formulaic hypothetico-deductivism, reflected in her attempt to impose a set
method on the science work in her class of 6 year olds. At the same time, however,
she held strong beliefs that children should be encouraged to develop their ability to
inquire and to work independently. As a response to this and as an acknowledgement of her inadequacy in putting these beliefs into practice, she began her action
research with an attempt to improve her interaction with the children. In particular,
she considered her questioning style. In a science practice so lacking in confidence,
932 S. Waters-Adams
one of the few things she knew she ought to be doing was helping children raise and
explore ideas through asking suitable questions. As her own action research
proceeded, she began to identify how she might link her ideas regarding the nature
of the subject and her more general aims of developing children’s inquiry. Once this
started to happen, her confidence began to grow:
I felt I was better at allowing the lesson to go as it seems to go itself, from what the children are saying, rather than me saying I was going to do this, so tough luck what they’ve
just said, never mind that comment, you’re going to do what I’ve planned. I’m better at
sort of feeling more relaxed and saying: okay, forget what I’ve got planned, let’s go with
what your ideas are. I’m getting better at that …
Initially unconnected and only partially conceptualized aspects of the understanding informing her practice began to be linked. Heather started to see connections
between hypothetico-deductive method, constructivist ideas on the development of
children’s ideas, and the importance of her own questioning in the promotion of
their learning. This helped her to develop an approach to science teaching that had
clear potential in terms of encouraging children’s independent learning. The strong
tacit message within her teaching that science was primarily about learning facts
gave way to one of much more exploration. She could justify this as science because
she had developed an understanding that such exploration was in fact an integral
feature of the hypothetico-deductive process she had always wanted in her classroom. She had found a way of teaching the subject that not only accorded with her
wish to incorporate pedagogical strategies that promoted inquiry, but that also
coincided with an aim that drove her as a teacher: the development of children’s
independence.
Elizabeth’s progress towards this sense of agreement was perhaps the strongest of
these three teachers, yet there was never the stark insecurity or denial that was
found in Carol or Heather. Perhaps because of her maturity in the profession, she
was never at a loss when it came to what to teach, and she was strongly enthusiastic
right from the beginning. Yet despite appearances, she was insecure about her
science teaching. The tacit understanding evident in her practice that science was a
body of knowledge to be learned generated considerable tensions with her beliefs
about the way young children should be taught. She was passionately interested in
the potential that education has to change lives, placing the development of children’s thinking and the promotion of children’s life skills as the central pillars of her
educational aims. As with both Carol and Heather, it was not until she could see
links with these aims that she started to develop confidence in her science teaching.
As she engaged in her own action research, she recognized the potential for the
promotion of thinking within what the children were doing. She explored how it
was possible to link her initial hypothetico-deductive understanding with the inductive processes she used in her teaching. Critically, her understanding of a relationship between constructivist approaches and knowledge generation in science began
to legitimate her tacit understanding that science was a body of knowledge. At the
same time, however, her understanding of the nature of knowledge in science was
changing:
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 933
SWA:
Do you feel that your understanding of what science is has changed since we
started?
Elizabeth: I don’t know if it has or not, really. It’s become sort of much more complex,
I think, yes. I’m still asking myself what it is exactly, you know. I’ve still got a
slightly academic view of it, you know, because of school science.
SWA:
Because what you said to begin with was that you were worried about the
right answers.
Elizabeth: Yes. I’m not worried about that now. No, that’s definitely changed.
SWA:
Why not?
Elizabeth: Well, it seems that there isn’t really a right answer, you know…that people
are still struggling towards a right answer and that once they’ve got a right
answer then something else happens which challenges that, really….So I
think, yes, I don’t think there are right answers now and I’m quite happy for
children to sort of go through that process as well. (Interview, end of inquiry)
Recognizing science knowledge as provisional, Elizabeth developed a confidence in
how she could legitimately encourage children to explore, think, and change their
understanding as they carried out their science work. Slowly, the tacit drive for
“right” answers faded, to a situation in which, although knowledge was still the focus
in her practice, it was generated knowledge rather than received. As this occurred, she
felt a strong sense of reconciliation between her science practice and her central
values. There was a resonance between the two. However, it was her science teaching and her understanding of nature of science that changed over the course of the
inquiry, not her beliefs about the way children should be taught.
Over the course of the inquiry, therefore, these teachers’ espoused understanding
of nature of science became more congruent with the approach they generated in
their teaching. This congruence was not a feature of their normal practice before the
inquiry took place; it needed time, support, and the reflexive demand of the action
research in order to develop.
To summarize the main elements of the development of this congruence:
●
●
●
●
●
●
Initially, the teachers’ tacit understanding had more effect on their practice than
their espoused ideas.
The categories the teachers used to describe their espoused understanding of the
nature of science changed little over the course of the inquiry, but their interpretation
of those categories changed considerably.
The teachers were strongly influenced by the process of their action research to
appraise their espoused understanding of science and to explore its implications.
The teachers’ general beliefs about the way their children should be taught
remained constant over the course of the inquiry. However, their understanding
of how these beliefs might appear in practice was subject to change (see Carol in
particular).
The teachers showed real confidence in their teaching of science when the
approach they adopted accorded with the spirit of the beliefs that influenced their
understanding of what constituted appropriate pedagogy for their children.
The initial tacit understanding no longer drove their practice by the end of the
inquiry, but its essence could be recognized within their new approach.
934 S. Waters-Adams
New Dilemmas for Old Tensions
Andrea, who was teaching Year 5 and Year 6 children, did not show the same level
of resolution at the end of the inquiry. She began with a firm conception that science
is characterized by curiosity and a hypothetico-deductive process of prediction and
testing, the purpose of which was to provide knowledge in the form of explanation.
Unlike the other three teachers, it can be seen that there were links between this
espoused understanding and her practice; her teaching emphasized the application
and testing of children’s ideas. However, this led to tensions, as the following extract
from a lesson observation shows. Although she wanted children to practise science
procedures, it appeared that this was because she wanted them to learn “right”
answers and not hold on too firmly to alternative explanations. Epistemologically,
what she was giving with one hand—exploration, tentativeness, provisionality—she
was taking away with the other. Although perhaps a rather unusual introduction to
some investigative work, consider the strong tacit messages in the lessons extract
that science means ultimately a recourse to greater authority and that children have a
passive role in the generation of knowledge (Table 5).
A term later, this conception began to change. In a different class, a year younger
in age, she found more space to explore her teaching. She began to be driven by her
espoused aim that her teaching must help children in their later schooling. This
thinking took her to a position where she became convinced that the National
Curriculum structure was not helping children. It had too great a demand for knowledge and too little space for the development of children’s transferable skills. Now,
however, as she developed more exploratory, inductive processes with the aim of
letting the children generate their own ideas, she ran into a powerful dilemma. Her
core belief that the promotion of inquiry and thinking should be central to her practice encouraged her to explore the potential of these processes, but her continuing
attitude towards correct scientific knowledge told her that leaving knowledge generation to the children may have dangerous consequences, if one was not allowed to
tell them they were wrong:
And you leave children with really things that are wrong, but you have to leave it there
and that is the bit they’re going to remember. They take away the bit they’ve found out,
but actually what they found out wasn’t right, scientifically, but you can bet that’s what
they’ll remember.
Andrea left the inquiry in a state of flux. Her understanding of science became
increasingly tentative, indicated by the fact that she now placed 8 of the 14 categories on the mid-point of the bi-polar scale. She was beginning to conceptualize two
kinds of science, one on either side of her dilemma: public knowledge and
personal inquiry. Personal inquiry could be provisional and tentative, but it was
not for most people. In order not to disadvantage children, there was no substitute
for learning accepted public knowledge, in much the same way that Tobin and
McRobbie’s Mr. Jacobs focused strongly on passing tests and examinations (1997,
p. 366).
I have the National Curriculum Key Stages One
and Two. In here it tells me what I have to cover
in every subject at Key Stage Two and I have to
decide what each one of you should be doing
with that. When we do science, how do you know
what you’re supposed to be doing as an activity?
How do I know which one to do?
Do we do science topics?
How do I know what to teach you in our science
lessons?
Teacher
– You have a discussion with us?
– You give us a piece of paper that tells us what to do.
– You are told by the government.
– You pick one at random.
– You look through science books. If we’ve done one on
magnets, you’re not going to pick that one.
– The government say what they think children our age
should learn. They tell you what to do, say for
example through the year magnets, light, electricity
and it’s up to you to fit them in.
No!
Yes!
– From our reports.
– You look through science books.
– The government tells you what to do. You will have a
meeting with the other teachers.
– You’ve got books you buy and look at them to see
what to do.
– We’ve all got Records of Achievement—you look at
them.
Children
Table 5. Extract from lesson observation, Andrea
Thoughts
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 935
No, it begins with a P
I want you to plan an investigation (Refers to
instructions on the board):
What materials?
What will you do?
How record results?
What will you need?)
There is one thing left out, near the beginning
Any you are interested in?
Have you got a question?
Give me an example
I’m going to give you a list of statements (not a
question). Here is a list of 12 statements from
Key Stage Two science. Read through. Can you
recognize any? Is there one particular one that
interests you?
Teacher
Estimate
Predict
You’ve got a statement, you can turn it into a question.
The one about forces and balance—you can add “can”.
[Children read]
Children
Table 5. (Continued).
NC statement: “that unbalanced
forces can make things speed up,
slow down or change direction”
Thoughts
936 S. Waters-Adams
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 937
Discussion
The teachers recognized the success of their science teaching when they felt confident in it. The final arbiter of this confidence was not the understanding of science
they held, but whether their actions accorded with their beliefs about children, the
curriculum, and appropriate pedagogy. However, their confidence was greatly
increased if they could sense a congruence between the three elements: beliefs,
teaching, and understanding of science.
It is therefore most probable that, when given the opportunity to explore and
change their practice, the teachers were never likely to do more than develop an
understanding of methodological or epistemological aspects of science that accorded
with their existing beliefs about how they should teach children. This is a perfectly
logical state of affairs. Science deals with knowledge and ways of making knowledge.
To teach science entails the adoption of an epistemological position towards that
knowledge, whether it is held tacitly or clearly espoused. But a teacher is also preoccupied with his or her children’s position relative to the knowledge he or she has to
teach, whatever its subject matter. In determining this, he or she applies, consolidates, or generates central principles regarding the relevance of knowledge to
children and the way they should experience it. These processes give rise to a series
of fundamental aims for her practice. The teachers’ science teaching, therefore, deals
with the same issues that are central to all their pedagogy and the beliefs that underpin it; it is bound to be affected by them. It is logical to conclude that a teacher will
feel confident in his or her science teaching when there is a resonance between the
epistemology he or she adopts within it and that which is implicit within his or her
beliefs about how children should be taught.
Andrea’s dilemma at the end of her inquiry raised a further issue. In common with
Elizabeth and Heather, she espoused a predominantly realist perspective on scientific knowledge. There is a potential tension between a realist position and the idea
that children can be generating their own knowledge. This tension haunted Andrea
towards the latter stages of her inquiry. Interestingly, Elizabeth and Heather seemed
to resolve their teaching by developing the ability to hold both perspectives at the
same time. This apparently contradictory situation is, however, perfectly consistent.
A teacher may espouse a realist perspective on knowledge when asked to comment
on the body of scientific understanding and yet proceed pedagogically to promote
more relativist strategies within the classroom. When considered from the perspective of children’s development, relativist strategies may be eminently appropriate in
giving children the wherewithal ultimately to understand the nature of that knowledge the teachers understand as real.
The evidence of this inquiry suggests that a simple direct link does not exist
between teachers’ understanding of nature of science and practice. The appearance
in teachers’ practice of apparent influence from their understanding of science
cannot be understood without consideration of their wider beliefs about teaching,
learning, and the curriculum. This finding endorses the long-held claim from
Lederman and Zeidler (1987) or Duschl and Wright (1989) that direct transmission
938 S. Waters-Adams
from epistemological understanding about science to practice does not occur.
However, rather than a mediation of epistemological understanding by situational
factors, it suggests that the determining influence is personal to the teacher. Understanding of nature of science, goals for science teaching, and wider beliefs about
learning and teaching are locked together in a lived dialectical reality in which all
elements relate to each other and in which the wider beliefs are probably dominant.
It is possible that the findings of this study are peculiar to the primary or Foundation phases. Those teachers certainly have to contend with a wide mix of epistemologies within the range that they cover. Changing regularly between subjects, it is
perhaps inevitable that primary and Foundation teachers will generate an ultimate
reliance on core beliefs about education, rather than adherence to the epistemology
of specific subjects. Secondary science teachers are generally specialists and will,
perhaps, be more practised and focused in relating their educational beliefs to a
single epistemology.
It is worth considering, however, that this study might be offering a window onto a
general process that is usually hidden. Teachers of very young children in the United
Kingdom tend to have a very coherent set of core beliefs. Foundation and Key Stage
One sections of primary schools are frequently pervaded by a common and strongly
held belief that very young children need a distinctive curriculum. Deriving from the
work of Dewey and Rousseau (Fisher, 2002; Whitebread, 1996) and exemplified in
seminal approaches to teaching young children, such as Reggio Emilia (Municipality
of Reggio Emilia, 1996) and High/Scope (Hohmann, Banet, & Weikart, 1979), this
curriculum is conceived in terms of the integrated breadth of young children’s
experience and learning, rather than separation into subjects. Recently, this idea has
underpinned the development of the Curriculum Guidance for the Foundation
Stage in England and Wales (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 2000),
which also advocates a relatively holistic conceptualization of the curriculum.
This set of beliefs among the teachers of young children is coherent and resistant
to change. It has a profound effect on the way they organize their teaching. Given
the thesis that teachers may choose understandings in their science teaching that
accord with their underlying beliefs about education itself, it is likely that those
teachers with the most cohesive beliefs will show the most accord. Certainly, in this
study, Andrea showed less resolution between the elements of her practice than the
others. Coming from a non-teaching background, she was in her third year of
teaching, with core beliefs about the aims and methods of education that were still
developing. Although Carol had only been teaching for the same time, her previous
work as a playgroup leader and her focused initial training probably meant that she
was already strongly influenced by the belief system of early years teachers.
The experience of secondary science teachers is different from their primary
colleagues. Dominated by the epistemology of separate subject teaching, they have
not been subject to the same normative implications of whole-phase recommendations. However, this is not to discount the potential influence of their core beliefs.
Experience in the job will develop them, as Brickhouse (1990, p. 60) seems to
suggest. Individuals with 10 years’ experience are more likely to hold stronger beliefs
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 939
about the way children learn and how they should be taught than those who are
newly qualified. These beliefs are likely to begin to carry normative assumptions
about children per se, and not simply relate to children’s learning within the subject.
Tsai’s work is beginning to bring these beliefs into prominence in the analysis of
secondary studies.
In summary, the main findings of the study were as follows:
1. The teachers acquired a confidence in their science practice only when there
existed a resonance between their ideas about how to teach science, their
understanding of the nature of science, and their general beliefs about how they
should be teaching children.
2. The direction of influence ran first from beliefs about teaching, children, and
curriculum to choice of teaching approach, and then to the understanding of the
nature of science. It follows that these beliefs, and teachers’ consequent understanding of what constitutes appropriate pedagogy, may have a controlling influence in the development of teachers’ understanding of epistemological issues in
science.
3. It may be concluded that overtly similar ideas about the nature of science may
link with different forms of practice, depending on the character of the teachers’
beliefs. It is not possible to form a generalization that allows safe prediction of
the character of a teacher’s approach to science from the evidence of her
espoused understanding of the nature of the subject.
Implications
Tsai (2002) suggested that teachers’ beliefs and their understanding of nature of
science are “nested”. Gwimbi and Monk (2003) hinted at an “association” between
classroom context and attitude to the philosophy of science that was stronger than
that concerned with academic qualification or professional training (p. 485); they
suggested that “action shapes knowledge” (p.486). This study has supported both
these perspectives, adding beliefs to Gwimbi and Monks’ equation and tracing
possible lines of influence between the three elements.
Writing in 1992, Lederman wrote that “each line of research (in this area) is but a
piece of a much larger puzzle” (Lederman, 1992, p. 351). However, the picture on
the box of this puzzle keeps changing—and it may even have been upside down. The
intuitive appeal of the idea that the existence of a relationship must mean a causal
influence, running from understanding to action, is weakening. This study has
suggested that there are much more complex patterns involved.
In their study of elementary teaching students, Gustafson and Rowell (1995)
identified that their students’ views about the nature of science were tied closely to
their beliefs about teaching and learning (p. 484). They found that for many
students there was very little change in their ideas about teaching and learning over
the course of their training and that they would choose aspects of the ideas they were
encountering on their programme that agreed with their prior alignment towards the
940 S. Waters-Adams
purposes and nature of education. Gustafson and Rowell compared these findings
with those of Hollingsworth (1989) and Calderhead (1989), both of whom proposed
a similar position—with Calderhead suggesting that this alignment was “highly
influential in shaping what student teachers extract from their preservice training,
how they think about teaching, and the kind of teacher they become in the classroom” (1989, p. 47, cited in Gustafson & Rowell, 1995, p. 599).
What this study has consolidated is that confident and effective practice is not
simply a matter of adequate knowledge. It also needs to be satisfying and resonant
within the individual. There are messages here for programmes of continuing professional development in science teaching. Unused to philosophical reflection on their
subject, teachers will need to be helped to realise that their practice inevitably
reflects an understanding of the nature of science that they are transmitting to their
children. They will need to explore philosophical aspects of the nature of science and
be given the opportunity to experience the significance of those ideas within their
own practice, perhaps through carefully supported action research. Such an
approach would promote the dialectical interchange between beliefs, action, and
ideas that is essential for the development of consistent practice. Practice is a lived
dialectical experience; unfortunately a whole generation of teachers have been
subject to a centralized philosophy that has denied this and treated them as technicians. There are, however, signs of change, particularly in the primary curriculum.
The production of the Primary Strategy document “Excellence and Enjoyment”
(Department for Education and Science 2003) has prompted many primary schools
to think again about the way they organize their curriculum and many wish to move
away from the restrictive approach of the past decade. But it will not be easy. Once
familiar with Stenhouse’s (1975) call to become researchers of their own practice,
teachers have become used to operating with received wisdom and they lack the
confidence to break away from the superficial support it offers.
A promising area for change would be preservice teacher education. Studentteachers need knowledge of the nature of science, but they also need to engage in an
articulation and exploration of their developing beliefs about teaching itself. Teacher
education programmes must strive to ensure that student-teachers are given the
opportunity to reflect in context on how and why they teach in certain ways and
where they experience tensions in their overall development. Encouraging this kind
of reflection at the formative stage of student-teachers’ beliefs is more likely to
ensure that a productive accord between beliefs and the pedagogical implications of
ideas about the nature of science is established.
Perspectives are changing, with work by Hogan (2000), in addition to that of Tsai
and Gwimbi and Monk, showing how general understanding about the importance
of teachers’ beliefs and life experience (Goodson, 1991; Nias, 1989; Woods, 1995)
is becoming more influential in science education. Beliefs have an imponderable
nature and defy measurement; the idea of determining factors lying within an unpredictable and non-reducible area of human experience sits uneasily with traditional
interpretations of scientific method. Yet the pursuit of science education is not the
same as the pursuit of science. Although it is well known that personal beliefs and
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 941
prior orientations cannot be eradicated from scientific inquiry, it is possible for
practising scientists to continue their work as if they did not exist. They do not need
to enter the philosopher’s world of uncertainty and argument. Science education is
different. It is not simply education in science, it is education about science (see
Koulaidis & Ogborn, 1995, p. 274, in response to Wilson & Cowell, 1992). Koulaidis and Ogborn suggest that it is thus important that teachers have an adequate
understanding of the nature of science, so that they can grasp the syntax of the
subject that Shulman (1986) identifies. This must still, surely, remain an aim; it
would be hard to claim that such understanding was unimportant. What this study
has reinforced, however, is that understanding at a theoretical level does not predict
eventual practice. It is only one element of a web of influence on action and, quite
probably, is not the most important.
References
Abd-El-Khalick, F., & Lederman, N. G. (2000). Improving science teachers’ conceptions of
nature of science: A critical review of the literature. International Journal of Science Education,
22(7), 665–701.
Abell, S. K., & Smith, D. C. (1994). What is science?: Preservice elementary teachers’ conceptions
of the nature of science. International Journal of Science Education, 16(4), 475–487.
Aguirre, J. M., Haggerty, S. M., & Linder, C. J. (1990). Student teachers’ conceptions of science,
teaching and learning: A case study in preservice science education. International Journal of
Science Education, 12(4), 381–390.
Altricher, H., Posch, P., & Somekh, B. (1993). Teachers investigate their work: An introduction to the
methods of action research, London: Routledge.
Argyris, C., & Schon, D. (1974). Theory in practice. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Brickhouse, N. W. (1989). The teaching of the philosophy of science in secondary classrooms:
Case studies of teachers’ personal theories. International Journal of Science Education, 11(4),
437–449.
Brickhouse, N. W. (1990). Teachers’ beliefs about the nature of science and their relationship to
classroom practice. Journal of Teacher Education, 41(3), 53–62.
Brickhouse, N. W., & Bodner, G. M. (1992). The beginning science teacher: Classroom narratives
of convictions and restraints. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 471–449.
Calderhead, J. (1989). Reflection teaching and teacher education. Teaching and Teacher Education,
5(1), 43–51.
Carr, W., & Kemmis, S. (1986). Becoming critical: Education, knowledge and action research. Lewes,
UK: Falmer.
Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1985). Personal practical knowledge and the modes of
knowing: Relevance for teaching and learning. NSSE Yearbook, 84, 174–198.
Connelly, F. M., & Clandinin, D. J. (1988). Teachers as curriculum planners. New York: Croom
Helm.
Department of Education and Employment (1999). The national curriculum for England: Science.
London: Department of Education and Employment.
Department for Education and Employment/Welsh Office (1995). Science in the national curriculum. London: HMSO.
Department for Education and Science/Welsh Office (1989). Science in the national curriculum.
London: HMSO.
Department for Education and Science/Welsh Office (1991). Science in the national curriculum.
London: HMSO.
942 S. Waters-Adams
Department for Education and Science (2003). Excellence and enjoyment: A strategy for primary
schools. Nottingham, UK: Department for Education and Science.
Driver, R., Leach, J., Millar, R., & Scott, P. (1996). Young people’s images of science. Buckingham,
UK: Open University Press.
Duschl, R. A., & Wright, E. (1989). A case study of high school teachers’ decision making models
for planning and teaching science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 26(6), 467–501.
Elbaz, F. (1983). Teacher thinking: A study of practical knowledge. Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm.
Elliott, J. (1991). Action research for educational change. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
Fisher, J. (2002). Starting from the child: Teaching and learning from 3 to 8. Maidenhead, UK: Open
University Press
Gallagher, J. J. (1991). Prospective and practising secondary school science teachers’ knowledge
and beliefs about the philosophy of science. Science Education, 75(1), 121–134.
Goodson, I. (1991). Sponsoring the teacher’s voice: Teachers’ lives and teacher development.
Cambridge Journal of Education, 21(1). 35–45.
Gustafson, B. J., & Rowell, P. M. (1995). Elementary preservice teachers: constructing conceptions about learning science, teaching science and the nature of science. International Journal
of Science Education, 17(5), 589–605.
Gwimbi, E., & Monk, M, (2003). A study of the association of attitudes to the philosophy of
science with classroom contexts, academic qualification and professional training, amongst A
level biology teachers in Harare, Zimbabwe. International Journal of Science Education, 25(4),
469–488.
Hogan, K. (2000). Exploring a process view of students’ knowledge about the nature of science.
Science Education, 84(1), 51–70.
Hohmann, M., Banet, B. and Weikart, D. P. (1979). Young children in action. Ypsilanti, MI:
HighScope Press.
Hollingsworth, S. (1989). Prior beliefs and cognitive change in learning to teach. American
Education Research Journal, 26(2), 160–189.
Jenkins, E. (1997). Response to Keogh, B., & Naylor, S. (1997). Letters to the Editor. Science
Teacher Education, 21, 5.
Jenkins, E. (1998). Response to Keogh, B., & Naylor, S. (1998). Letters to the Editor. Science
Teacher Education, 23, 16.
Keogh, B., & Naylor, S. (1997). Making sense of constructivism. Science Teacher Education, 20,
12–14.
Keogh, B., & Naylor, S. (1998). Response to Jenkins (1997). Letters to the Editor. Science Teacher
Education, 22, 5.
Koulaidis, V., & Ogborn, J. (1989). Philosophy of science: An empirical study of teachers’ views.
International Journal of Science Education, 11(2), 173–184.
Koulaidis, V., & Ogborn, J. (1995). Science teachers’ philosophical assumptions: How well do we
understand them? International Journal of Science Education, 17(3), 272–283.
Lakin, S., & Wellington, J. (1994). Who will teach the ‘nature of science’?: Teachers’ views of
science and their implications for science education. International Journal of Science Education,
16(2), 175–190.
Lantz, O., & Kass, H. (1987). Chemistry teachers’ functional paradigms. Science Education, 71,
117–134.
Laplante, B. (1997). Teachers’ beliefs and instructional strategies in science: pushing analysis
further. Science Education, 81(3), 277–294.
Lederman, N. G. (1992). Students’ and teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science: A review of
the research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29(4), 331–359.
Lederman, N. G., & Zeidler, D. L. (1987). Science teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science:
Do they really influence teaching behaviour? Science Education, 71(5), 721–734.
Lyons, N. (1990). Dilemmas of knowing: ethical and epistemological dimensions of teachers’ work
and development. Harvard Educational Review, 6, 159–180.
Relationship between Understanding of the Nature of Science and Practice 943
Matthews, M. R. (1993). Constructivism and science education: some epistemological problems.
Journal of Science Education and Technology, 2(1), 359–370.
Millar, R. (1991). Constructive criticisms. International Journal of Science Education, 11(5), 587–596
Municipality of Reggio Emilia. (1996). The Hundred Languages of Children. Reggio, EmiliaRomagna, Italy: Reggio Children.
Murcia, K., & Schibeci, R. (1999). Primary student teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science.
International Journal of Science Education, 21(11), 1123–1140.
Nias, J. (1989). Primary teachers talking: A study of teaching as work. London: Routledge.
Nott, M., & Wellington, J. (1996). Probing teachers’ views of the nature of science: How should we do it
and where should we be looking? In G. Welford, J. Osborne, & P. Scott (Eds.), Research in science
education in Europe. London: Falmer.
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (2000). Curriculum guidance for the foundation stage.
London: Qualifications and Curriculum Authority.
Schwab, J. J. (1964). The structure of the disciplines: Meaning and significance. In G. Ford & L.
Purgo (Eds.), The structure of knowledge and the curriculum. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Shulman, L. S. (1986). Those who understand: Knowledge growth in teaching. Educational
Researcher, 15, 4–14.
Shulman, L. S. (1987). Knowledge and teaching: Foundations of the new reform. Harvard
Educational Review, 57(1), 1–22.
Stenhouse, L. (1975). An introduction to curriculum research and development. London: Heinemann.
Suchting, W. A. (1992). Constructivism deconstructed. Science, & Education, 1, 223–254.
Tobin, K., & McRobbie, C. J. (1997). Beliefs about the nature of science and the enacted curriculum. Science and Education, 6(4), 335–371.
Torff, B. (1999). Tacit knowledge in teaching: Folk pedagogy and teacher education. In R. J.
Sternberg & J. A. Horvath (Eds.), Tacit knowledge in professional practice. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Tsai, C-C. (2002). Nested epistemologies: Science teachers’ beliefs of teaching, learning and
science. International Journal of Science Education, 24(8), 771–783.
Waters-Adams, S. (1994). Collaboration and action research: A cautionary tale. Educational Action
Research, 2, 195–210.
Waters-Adams, S. (2000). The relationship between teachers’ understanding of the nature of science and
their science practice: Four case studies from an urban primary school. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Plymouth, UK.
Waters-Adams, S., with Nias, J. (2003). Using action research as a methodological tool: Understanding teachers’ understanding of science. Educational Action Research, 11(2), 283–300
Whitebread, D. (1996). Teaching and learning in the early years. London: Routledge.
Wilson, J., & Cowell, B. (1982). Methods of subject teaching: A challenge to current thinking.
Westminster Studies in Education, 5, 37–41.
Winter, R. (1987). Action research and the nature of social inquiry. Aldershot, UK: Gower.
Woods, P. (1995). Creative teachers in primary schools. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
944 S. Waters-Adams
Appendix: The bi-polar semantic differential
A range of attributes that could be applied to science, its nature and the kind of
knowledge that it produces is presented in the form of a continuum, with what could
be considered as opposite poles located at either side. The attributes I have chosen
originate from the ideas you have so far contributed about what you consider to be
important aspects of science and partly from my own ideas.
Each continuum is itself divided into five points. I should be obliged if you would
consider each and indicate by ringing a number where you would place your understanding of science on the continuum, e.g.:
(Strongly) Rigorous
1
2
3
4
5
(Strongly) Laissez faire
So, science is:
Explanatory
Certain
Sure
Systematic
Cohesive
Rigorous
Exploratory
Subjective
Verified
Public
Imprecise
Discovered
Changing
Questioning
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Descriptive
Provisional
Tentative
Unsystematic
Unconnected
Laissez faire
Lacking exploration
Objective
Unconfirmed
Personal
Precise
Constructed
Unchanging
Unquestioning
Please ignore those which you do not feel you can answer.