Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences, VU University
Renewable business for the German
energy transition
A Repertory Grid analysis of lobbying strategies
Kathrin Sühlsen
Student No.: 2205516
July 24, 2012
468017 ERM Research Project (18 ects)
1. Supervisor:
Dr. M. Hisschemöller, IVM
2. Superivsor:
Dr. E. Vasileiadou, IVM
External Supervisor: R. Schultz, Schultz Projekt Consult
1
Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences
VU University Amsterdam
IVM-ERM (Room A-503)
De Boelelaan 1087
1081 HV Amsterdam
The Netherlands
T: +31 (0)20-59 89508
E: erm@ivm.vu.nl
Copyright © 2012, Institute for Environmental Studies
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording
or otherwise without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.
2
Abstract
Germany’s decision in 2011 to phase out nuclear power and thus to transform the energy
system was a political will. Next to political decision-making, however, it is corporate business
of renewable and traditional energy that shapes the energy transition. This thesis examines
the influence of companies on the decision-making process by unfolding their diverse lobby
activities. Using a bottom-up approach and applying the Repertory Grid Technique, the
expertise of twenty interview partners is analyzed in a qualitative and quantitative manner
leading to the following conclusions:
First, although companies of renewable energy have developed from a niche into important
players of the energy system, the big four electric utilities operating on the German energy
market still possess wide influence. Second, interests of the renewable energy sector are
mainly directed at the legislative framework, particularly on the Renewable Energy Sources Act
and the feed-in-system. Third, these interests are enforced by means of various lobby
strategies. Experts identified 36 different lobby activities; the most effective ones are: ‘Regular
and personal maintenance of contact to politicians’, ‘Lobbying within association’, ‘Knowledge
development with correct information’ and ‘Top-down contacting of most powerful
politicians’. Furthermore, companies invest in public relations campaigns, offer external
expertise and technical solutions or organize political events. Fourth, the statistical analysis
reveals clear distinctions between companies with regards to their lobby strategies which are
evaluated differently by stakeholders. Finally, the thesis concludes that companies have a
strong influence on political-decision making and – together with governmental actors – form
a ‘policy network’ that strongly shapes the German energy transition.
3
Acknowledgements
This thesis is the result of my research project generated as part of the Master’s programme
‘Environment and Resource Management’ at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. I was able to
carry out this research due to the support of several people.
I would like to thank Schultz Projekt Consult for offering me an internship position and
agreeing to collaborate on quite short notice. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Reinhard Schultz
who established contacts to interview partners and supported the research with valuable
expertise and insights in German energy policy. Likewise, I thank Ms. Janet Hochi for guiding
me through the work process by providing information, facilitating the access to contact
people and giving feedback. The collaboration with Schultz Projekt Consult would not have
been possible without the recommendation of Peter Breithaupt to whom I also would like to
express my gratitude. Furthermore, I would like to thank all interview partners for their
willingness and time to participate in this research.
I was lucky to being supported by an enthusiastic and motivating supervisor who encouraged
me to apply a rather unconventional methodology. Thus, my sincere gratitude goes to Dr.
Matthijs Hisschemöller who guided me with valuable comments and feedback throughout the
research. I also would like to thank Dr. Eleftheria Vasileiadou and Dr. Eefje Cuppen for
providing me with in-depth information on SPSS and taking the time and effort to answer my
short-term requests.
My special thanks go to Alex Léguedé and my friends who not only helped me to stay
concentrated to complete this thesis, but, from time to time, also directed my attention to
other valuable things. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my family for all their support throughout
my studies in the last years. Thank you for your love and encouragement and for guiding me
through life to help me accomplish another stage of this journey.
4
Contents
List of figures and tables .............................................................................................. 6
List of acronyms ......................................................................................................... 7
1
2
3
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 8
1.1
Problem description ...................................................................................................... 8
1.2
Objectives and research approach ................................................................................ 9
1.3
Research questions ..................................................................................................... 10
1.4
Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................. 10
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................. 11
2.1
Regime transitions and paradigms of governance ...................................................... 11
2.2
Literature findings on lobbying ................................................................................... 12
2.2.1
Definition of lobbying .......................................................................................... 12
2.2.2
Lobbying in Germany .......................................................................................... 13
2.2.3
Patterns of lobbying ............................................................................................ 14
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................. 17
3.1
3.1.1
German energy system ....................................................................................... 17
3.1.2
Support policies for renewables until 1998 ........................................................ 19
3.1.3
Support policies for renewables since 1998 and the EEG ................................... 20
3.1.4
‘Energiewende’ since 2010 ................................................................................. 22
3.2
4
5
The German energy transition .................................................................................... 17
The renewable energy sector...................................................................................... 24
3.2.1
Status of renewable energy in Germany ............................................................. 24
3.2.2
Renewable energy market .................................................................................. 26
3.2.3
Key business stakeholders................................................................................... 27
METHODOLOGY............................................................................................... 30
4.1
Personal Construct Theory .......................................................................................... 30
4.2
Repertory Grid Technique ........................................................................................... 31
4.3
Methodological approach in the thesis....................................................................... 32
4.3.1
Identification of companies for analysis ............................................................. 32
4.3.2
Selection of interviewees .................................................................................... 34
4.3.3
Interview set-up .................................................................................................. 35
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 37
5.1
Perceptions of lobbying............................................................................................... 37
5.2
Interests of the renewable energy sector ................................................................... 38
5.3
Patterns of lobby activities .......................................................................................... 40
5.3.1
Overview of constructs ....................................................................................... 40
5.3.2
Knowing ‘who’ ..................................................................................................... 42
5
6
7
5.3.3
Knowing ‘how’ ..................................................................................................... 44
5.3.4
Knowing ‘what’ .................................................................................................... 45
5.3.5
Knowing ‘in what way’ ........................................................................................ 46
5.3.5.1
Continuously keeping contact to politicians ................................................... 46
5.3.5.2
Knowledge development ................................................................................ 47
5.3.5.3
Lobbying within an association ....................................................................... 48
5.3.5.4
Representative offices & political events ........................................................ 49
5.3.5.5
Mobilizing the public ....................................................................................... 50
5.3.5.6
Political landscape management .................................................................... 52
5.3.5.7
Deep lobbying ................................................................................................. 53
5.3.5.8
Holistic view of the system.............................................................................. 53
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 55
6.1
Most effective lobby strategies ................................................................................... 55
6.2
Analysis and interpretation of the grid ....................................................................... 55
6.2.1
Left side of the plot ............................................................................................. 57
6.2.2
Right side of the plot ........................................................................................... 58
6.2.3
Summing up of the plot ....................................................................................... 60
DISCUSSION..................................................................................................... 62
7.1
Discussion of the results.............................................................................................. 62
7.2
Implications for the energy transition......................................................................... 64
7.3
Reflections on research ............................................................................................... 66
8
RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 67
9
CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK ..................................................................... 69
10 REFERENCES ....................................................................................... 71
ANNEX .................................................................................................... 77
6
List of figures and tables
Figure 1: Research Approach ........................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2: Energy mix Germany, 2011 .......................................................................................... 17
Figure 3: Electricity mix Germany, 2011 ..................................................................................... 18
Figure 4: Transmission Grid Germany ......................................................................................... 19
Figure 5: Newly installed solar photovoltaic capacity 2000-2011 .............................................. 21
Figure 6: Development of electricity generation from renewables since 1990 .......................... 24
Figure 7: Structure of renewables-based electricity supply in Germany, 2010 .......................... 25
Figure 8: Structure of renewables-based heat supply in Germany, 2010 .................................. 26
Figure 9: Investments in construction of renewable energy installations in Germany, 2010 .... 26
Figure 10: Shares of manufacturers of wind turbines on newly installed capacity, 2011 .......... 28
Figure 11: Saturation of constructs ............................................................................................. 40
Figure 12: Advertisement of German Nuclear Panel .................................................................. 51
Figure 13: Slogan of RWE and advertisement of SolarWorld ..................................................... 51
Figure 14: Most effective lobby strategies.................................................................................. 55
Figure 15: Companies 1 to 13 plotted in a two-dimensional figure............................................ 56
Figure 16: Characterization of the plot ....................................................................................... 61
Figure 17: Final lobbying scheme ................................................................................................ 62
Table 1: Renewable Energy Sources Act ..................................................................................... 22
Table 2: Third amendment of the EEG ........................................................................................ 24
Table 3: Companies included in the analysis .............................................................................. 33
Table 4: Interview partners ......................................................................................................... 34
Table 5: Overview of all constructs ............................................................................................. 42
Table 6: Overview of associations of traditional and renewable energy .................................... 49
Table 7: Answers to research questions ..................................................................................... 69
7
List of acronyms
BMU
BMWi
Bundesnetzagentur
Bundestag
Bundesverband
EEG
EU
MP
MWh
TWh
NGO
RES
US
StrEG
Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und
Reaktorsicherheit
(Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safety)
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie
(Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology)00
Federal Network Agency (FNA)
The German Parliament
Federal Association
Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (Renewable Energy Sources Act)
European Union
Member of Parliament
Megawatt hour
Terawatt hour
Non-governmental organization
Renewable energy sources
United States
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz
(Act on Supplying Electricity from Renewables)
Political parties:
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
CDU
DIE LINKE
FDP
SPD
Alliance 90/The Greens
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands
(Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
The Left
Freie Demokratische Partei
(Free Democratic Party)
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(Social Democratic Party of Germany)
8
1 Introduction
1.1
Problem description
“The energy transition is a great task; you can say a Herculean task that we are
committed to” (Spiegel Online, 2012).
With this statement - following a meeting of the German government with representatives of
the federal states on May 22, 2012 - Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized the importance of
the German energy transition. Since the adoption of the Energy Concept in 2010 and the
decision in 2011 to definitely phase out nuclear power until 2022, the transition of the energy
system is a central issue in German politics, business and public discourse. Currently, the
expansion of renewable energy sources, the adjustment of feed-in tariffs and the upgrade of
grid infrastructure, notably the expansion of the grid, is much debated. Consequently,
achieving the so called ‘Energiewende’ is one of the major issues in German political decisionmaking which aims at generating 35% of electricity supply from renewables until 2020 and
80% until 2050.
Despite the development of the last two years, Germany has been a forerunner and
internationally one of the pioneering countries in the development and application of
renewable energy sources (RES) for decades. It has become a world leader in installing
renewable energy technologies and is one of the dominant countries in providing them for
export (Laird & Stefes, 2009). Germany’s support policies for RES have received a lot of
positive attention worldwide – the feed-in tariff model, determined by the Renewable Energy
Sources Act (EEG) of 2000, has been adopted by more than two thirds of EU member states
(Laird & Stefes, 2009). As a result of government support, renewable energy technologies
continuously increased their share in the German energy mix. In 2011, renewables contributed
12% to final energy supply and 20% to final electricity supply. In the latter, wind and
hydropower have the largest share, followed by biomass and solar photovoltaic.
As a manufacturer, developer and operator of renewable energy technologies, corporate
business plays a central role in the progress of the energy transition. Although the sector of
solar PV has received highest rates of feed-in tariffs and private investments over the last
years, solar business is struggling nowadays. This is mainly a result of the competition of
Chinese products which – due to lower manufacturing costs and high subsidies of the Chinese
government – are sold below German market value. Also, feed-in tariffs for solar photovoltaic
are gradually reduced which has, according to many companies, a further negative effect on
the development of renewable energy from solar PV. German producers of solar modules such
as Solon SE, Q.Cells SE and Sovello GmbH already went into insolvency. At the same time,
companies operating in the field of traditional energy support the current trend of reducing
tariffs for solar PV whereas corporate business of other renewable energy sources such as
wind or biogas demand adequate tariffs for their sectors as well.
It is apparent that an efficient energy transition can only be implemented by an interplay of
political decision-making and the activities of corporate business. In Germany, it is not only
companies of renewable energy sources which have a stake in the issue but also the four main
electric utilities which control close to 90% of the electricity market.
9
1.2
Objectives and research approach
This thesis aims at examining lobby strategies of the renewable energy sector in Germany.
Much research has been done on lobbying in general on a national level, as well as on a
supranational level such as the influence of interests groups on the European Union (Gullberg,
2008a). Also, lobbying activities of traditional oil and coal utilities have been researched and
are regularly perceived by the public through news reports and public debates.
However, corporate business on renewable energy and its interplay with the political system
has not yet been investigated significantly. Thus, this thesis aims at making an attempt of
studying the diverse activities of renewable energy companies to influence political decisionmaking. Various types of lobby strategies shall be identified and compared to each other in
order to detect the most effective ones in terms of their influence on German energy policy.
It is expected to allocate specific lobby strategies to selected companies operating on the
German market of renewable energy. For that purpose, information provided by the involved
stakeholders is crucial as it is them who possess a deeper insight in the activities of public
affairs of corporate business. Taking into account the rather limited information on lobbying
strategies of renewable energy companies being available in scientific literature and other
publications, for this thesis an empirical research method has been chosen (see fig 1).
Starting with a problem definition and research questions, a literature survey will lead to first
implications. The methodological part is based on interviews with economic and political
stakeholders using the Repertory Grid Technique. Assuming that people use their implicit
theory or certain constructs to judge events, this method is a way of exploring the structure
and content of such implicit theories (Fransella et al, 2004). Through the Repertory Grid
Method, it is expected that the interviewed stakeholders themselves identify different
constructs of lobby strategies. Though originally developed in psychological science, the
technique has proven to be a suitable tool in other research areas, especially policy analysis.
The outcome of the interviews will then be analyzed in a qualitative and statistical manner.
These results will finally lead to implications and solutions for the problem stated in the
beginning.
Figure 1: Research Approach
10
1.3
Research questions
Following the objectives mentioned above, this thesis aims at answering the main research
question:
To what extent do lobby strategies of renewable energy companies influence
political decision-making related to the German energy transition?
In addition, five sub questions have been developed. They will be answered throughout the
theoretical and analytical part of the thesis, leading to implications of the results and an
answer to the question presented above.
1. What are the characteristics of the German energy transition?
2. How does the renewable energy sector perceive its interests?
3. What patterns of lobby activities can be identified and how are they evaluated by
those involved?
4. Which lobby strategies are most effective?
5. How do companies differ in their lobby activities?
1.4
Structure of the thesis
According to the objectives and the research questions, the thesis is structured the following
way:
Chapter 2 and 3 form the foundation for the analysis: Chapter 2 accounts for the theoretical
framework, outlining regime transitions, four paradigms of governance as well as literature
findings on lobbying. The first part of chapter 3 explains the characteristics of the German
energy transition and system. The second part gives an overview of the development of
renewable energy in general and the activities of corporate business of sustainable energy.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in the analysis by providing background information
on Personal Construct Theory and Repertory Grid Technique by George A. Kelly. Afterwards,
the application of the method in the research and the building up of the interviews is
explained.
The analytical parts of the thesis can be found in the following two chapters. Chapter 5
analyzes qualitative results, particularly different patterns of lobby activities identified by the
interview partners. Chapter 6 presents the quantitative results gathered with SPSS.
Afterwards the results will be discussed in chapter 7 which will also illustrate implications for
the German energy transition. Finally, the researcher provides recommendations in chapter 8,
followed by the conclusion and future outlook in chapter 9.
11
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1
Regime transitions and paradigms of governance
Energy transition is often associated with a change in socio-technical regimes. Smith, Stirling
and Berkhout (2005) define these as “relatively stable configurations of institutions,
techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, practices and networks that determine the ‘normal’
development and use of technologies”. In order to arrive at a sustainable energy system, Smith
et al. argue for a change within regimes, including changes in broad political economic
landscapes or wider socio-cultural attitudes. Renewable energy in Germany has been
supported for decades, but the ‘Energiewende’ of 2011 can be seen as a cornerstone for such
a regime shift.
Not only in the field of renewable energy but in various technological areas, regime shifts are
inevitable for integrating a new technology as a competitive alternative in the system.
Scientists such as René Kemp (1994; 1998) have been concerned with the issue of
technological regime shifts since the early 1990s. Kemp et al. (1998) list seven barriers to more
sustainable technologies: Technological factors, Government Policy and Regulatory
Framework, Cultural and Psychological Factors, Demand Factors, Production Factors,
Infrastructure and Maintenance and Undesirable Societal and Environmental Effects of New
Technologies. These barriers need to be overcome in order to arrive at a sustainable energy
system; for this purpose Kemp et al. suggest a so called ‘Strategic Niche Management’ which
includes “the creation, development and controlled phase-out of protected spaces for the
development and use of promising technologies by means of experimentation” (Kemp et al.,
1998, p.186). According to the authors, the importance of policy and business in the process of
Strategic Niche Management is high: Political actors play a crucial role in designing a transition
as it is them who determine the regulatory framework. At the same time economic actors such
as entrepreneurs and technological inventors lay the foundation for technological
development. As chapter 3.1 will show, the development of solar PV in Germany by means of
financial support refers to that of a niche.
Following up energy transition and strategic niche management, political theory is also of
relevance for this thesis. Hisschemöller, Bode and van de Kerkhof (2006) unfolded four
paradigms of governance with respect to the transition to a sustainable energy system.
Paradigms serve as fundamental concepts of viewing the dynamics of society and the way in
which governments and/or governance can or cannot give direction to those dynamics
(Hisschemöller et al., 2006). The assumptions made by the authors concern governance by
policy networking, governance by government, governance by corporate business and
governance by challenge.
Governance by policy networking claims that is not the state alone, but a network of
governmental actors and civil society, especially business communities and environmental and
consumer NGOs, who jointly work towards a transition. Moreover, the paradigm emphasizes
collaboration between different stakeholders and different levels of governance
(Hisschemöller et al, 2006).
12
Governance by government, however, ascribes a higher importance to the government which
“should do what citizens or private actors cannot, which, is to safeguard the public interest”
(Hisschemöller et al, 2006). According to the concept, private actors will not voluntarily adjust
their behavior as to realize a public good, hence a strong role of the state is needed.
Furthermore, as people tend to a behavior of “free-riding” which causes social dilemmas, it is
the government which “acts, takes the initiative, experiments and, through trial and error and
with the help of science and technology, works to realize an improvement of society”
(Hisschemöller et al, 2006).
Governance by corporate business claims that the private sector, especially corporate business
and entrepreneurs, has the power, the knowledge and the ability to make the transition
happen (Hisschemöller et al, 2006). Through the private sector new actors enter and try to
influence the arena of energy transition. Thus, corporate business takes a crucial position by
not only developing technologies but also by acting upon political decision-makers, e.g.
through lobbying.
Governance by challenge, as a fourth paradigm, claims that “government should address rules,
regulations and privileges that may stand in the way of innovation” (Hisschemöller et al, 2006).
This includes enabling knowledge from the outside to access a regime which can lead nonincremental innovations and eventually to new technological concepts and new applications.
Also, competition between existing and new options of energy supply is improved. However,
the guiding principle for this paradigm is to remove privileges that vested interests may use to
resist innovation. Most of the time, these privileges are found in the rules, regulations and
institutions maintained by government itself (Hisschemöller et al, 2006).
By illustrating four different concepts of how an energy transition can be achieved, the
complexity and challenges become apparent. The analysis will investigate how corporate
business of renewable energy tries to influence the transformation of the German energy
system, particularly through lobby activities. Thus, in the discussion, it shall be clarified if it is
‘governance of corporate business’ that shapes the energy transition or if some of the other
paradigms can be applied to the German case as well.
2.2
Literature findings on lobbying
2.2.1 Definition of lobbying
The various activities of lobbying and its impacts on different policy fields have often been
researched. Thus, a multitude of definitions can be found in the existing literature. The
definition of the encyclopedia Britannica seems most straightforward which defines lobbying
as “any attempt by individuals or private interest groups to influence the decisions of
government” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). The American encyclopedia Merriam-Webster
gives a more precise explanation of the intransitive verb “to lobby”: “to conduct activities
aimed at influencing public officials and especially members of a legislative body on
legislation” (Merriam-Webster, 2012). A coherent definition offers the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2008):
13
“Lobbying is the process by which an organized interest communicates its concerns and
preferences to governmental policy makers in order to influence a policy decision”
All definitions describe the process of the lobbying activity; it should be emphasized here that
lobbying can be directed on the executive, legislative and judiciary branch of the government,
always aimed at influencing political decision-makers. However, legislative lobbying gains the
most attention and, with regard to Germany, lobbying activities mainly occur in the legislative
body represented by the parliament, and the interplay with the members of parliament
(Bülow, 2010).
A peculiarity of the German system is that relations between government and political actors
on the one hand and different kinds of private actors on the other hand are almost never
described as of lobbying. Ronit and Schneider (1998) point out that lobbying “has always been
and still is considered a foreign word with strong connotations of secretive policy processes
where illegitimate influence is sought”. Although this view has diminished over the years,
private stakeholders of lobbying rather define their work a “representation of interest”,
“Public Affairs” or “Government Relations”.
2.2.2 Lobbying in Germany
Once activities of private business correlate with politics, some sort of regulation is introduced
in order to control lobbying of private stakeholders. Being the “motherland” of lobbying, the
United States have strict regulations governing the activities of lobbying and their interaction
with lawmakers; the most prominent example is the “Lobbying Disclosure Act” of 1995. Also,
with approximately 15,000 lobbyists and 2,500 lobbying organizations in Brussels, the
European Union has developed a system for working with interest groups (EU Insight, 2008).
Whereas the European Commission keeps a voluntary register of lobbyists, accredited interest
representatives to the European Parliament need to subscribe to a specific Code of Conduct.
The German system of lobbying is far less regulated than the one in the US. Some attempts
have been made in the 1970s to regulate and formalize lobbying activities but the existing laws
do not reach the level of complexity of the US. However, the German parliament
(“Bundestag”) is the only house of parliament in the EU with specific regulations of lobbying
(House of Commons, 2009). Over the years, three areas have become regulated in more detail
(Ronit et al, 1998).
First, members of parliament (MPs) are obliged to report their involvement in extraparliamentary activities, including their salary, which may be of relevance for their
parliamentary work. Regulated within the General Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag and
the Rules of Conduct for the Member of the Bundestag, MPs are required to disclose their
perks once they exceed the amount of 10,000 € per year (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012).
Secondly, all interest groups and associations wishing to gain a “hearing status” to defend their
interest before the Bundestag or Federal Government must be entered on a register which is
updated annually. In the official version of recognized associations from May 2, 2011, some
2,110 interest groups were registered (Bundesanzeiger, 2011). Since the beginning of the
creation of the list in the early 1970s, the register has indeed brought more transparency to
14
the development of lobbying. However, critics refer to the content of information of the list is
almost zero as it lacks any legal force. For instance, if invited by MPs, non-registered groups
and individuals may still appear at committees (Ronit et al, 1998; House of Commons, 2009).
Third, committees and working groups have been attached to federal ministries where
associations and lobbyists can present their interests in public and non-public hearings. This
pattern will be explained in more detail in the next part.
Lobbyists can strongly influence political actors and their behavior. However, they are not
directly involved in political decision-making and do not have a democratic mandate.
Consequently, Leif and Speth (2006) characterize lobbyists as “a power without legitimation”.
Generally, two main groups of lobbyists can be distinguished: private interest groups such as
companies and large business associations and public interest groups representing nongovernmental groups or political and social associations. The latter, for instance, campaign for
the environment, worker’s rights or pensioners. Gullberg (2008b) points out that these two
groups notably differ in their budget spent on lobbying. Whereas private stakeholders often
have a lot of financial resources at their disposal, public interest groups are much more
restricted by budget constraints.
According to the German transparency NGO “LobbyControl” approximately 5,000 lobbyists
work in the political center of Berlin, partly registered within the official list of interest groups,
partly not registered at all (LobbyControl e.V., 2011). Lobbyists come directly from companies,
business groups or associations, but also from external Public Relations agencies representing
the interests of one or more private stakeholders (Leif & Speth, 2006).
2.2.3 Patterns of lobbying
Examining literature on lobbying, the variety of publications becomes apparent quite soon. In
order to derive patterns of different lobby activities one needs to study not only scientific
journals but also publications and books which approach the issue from a more practical point
of view. An extensive literature review revealed that one part of the publications focuses on
the institutionalization of lobbying actors and their interplay with the political sphere (such as
Kleinfeld et al, 2008; Leif and Speth, 2006). They target a scientific audience who wants to
investigate lobbying as an important part of the political system. Another part of the literature
which is dominated by American and British authors offers practical guides and applied
strategies of lobbying, mainly in the area of Public Affairs (such as Thomson and John, 2007;
Souza, 1998). Their target group is professionals working in the area and wanting to gain a
deeper insight in the various forms of lobbying.
This chapter gives a brief overview of the most common patterns of lobby strategies found in
the publications mentioned above.
With regards to the target group, lobbying in Germany focuses mostly on the executive and
legislative branch of the political system. Lobbyists try to influence and establish contacts with
politicians in the government and the ministries as well as in the parliament (Bülow, 2010).
Another distinction needs to be made when it comes to political actors and their partisan
15
background: Gullberg (2008a) claims that interest groups either lobby their “friends”, decisionmakers with positions similar to their own, or they lobby their “foes”, decision-makers with
positions opposed to their own. Having this in mind, lobby strategies may vary significantly
according to the target group. Lobbying a “friend” implies exceeding the already favorable
position of a politician, for instance by giving favorable information. On the other hand,
lobbying a “foe” aims at changing a certain position of a politician which differs from the one
of the interest group (Gullberg, 2008a).
Before starting the lobbying process itself, lobbyists first monitor the political system, including
past and current decision-making on the lobbied issue. Information is central for lobbying;
Thomson and John (2007) claim: “Monitoring provides the raw materials upon which a
successful lobbying strategy campaign is based”. After this initial step, the interest party
typically defines its objectives and the following lobbying strategy. This may include a variety
of activities and patterns which is implemented stepwise or simultaneously.
As it has been mentioned before, a popular strategy arises in the form of committees and
working groups which are related to ministries and where companies are allowed to
participate. Besides taking part in ministry hearings that are mainly held in the context of
legislative drafting, here, private actors can take the role of experts and are invited to
participate in the investigation of issues and negotiation about solution (Ronit and Schneider,
1998).
Contacting politicians on a more individual level, companies try to enforce their interest by
either acting individually, aligning with others within an umbrella organization or combining
the two (Leif and Speth, 2003). Especially for small companies with limited financial resources,
it seems convenient to look for support by an overarching organization.
Another factor is the geographical proximity of companies to political decision makers. Next to
their headquarters and production sites, many firms establish representative offices in Berlin
to be closer to the political process and its actors (Escher, 2003). Furthermore, companies
create public affairs or government relations department within their corporate structure
which directly implement the lobby activities. Others hire external public affairs consultancies
that design and apply a company’s lobby strategy (Leif und Speth, 1998; House of Commons,
2009).
In order to personally contact politicians, lobbyists choose various forms: sending briefing
papers, making telephone calls, organizing dinner with groups of parliamentarians and trying
to establish contact on a parliamentary reception or exhibition (Thomson and John, 2007).
Often, this is aimed at getting a personal appointment with a politician and to discuss an issue
in a private and non-public meeting. Bülow (2010) points out that lobbyists usually target
governmental politicians and “important” decision-makers which are directly involved in
drafting a new law; “ordinary” parliamentarians with less influence are lobbied less.
Another strategy is to lobby and establish close contacts with the media. A regular placement
of an advertisement in a newspaper or journal can be regarded as lobbying as well because
large advertisers gain influence on the media which again influences public opinion.
16
A widespread phenomenon but with little public perception is the direct influence private
actors have on the law-making process. Due to their expertise and limited financial resources
of ministries to recruit experts on every political issue, ministries hire employees from external
companies who work on drafting a new law. These experts either come from agencies and law
firms or from particular companies working in the field of the processed topic (Lobbycontrol,
2011; Leif and Speth, 2003). Although this is a standard procedure in many governments, it
remains a very sensitive issue as private actors and possibly lobbyists directly participate in
drafting a law.
17
3 Background
3.1
The German energy transition
3.1.1 German energy system
Regarding the number of different energy sources, Germany’s energy mix is quite diversified
but based primarily on fossil energy. Petroleum contributes one third to the energy
consumption, followed by natural gas, hard coal and lignite. Renewable energy sources have a
share of 11%, nuclear energy contributes 9% (see fig. 2). The high share of petroleum is
consumed by the energy intensive transport sector.
Renewable
energy
11%
Nuclear
energy
9%
Other
2%
Petroleum
34%
Brown coal
12%
Hard coal
12%
Natural gas
20%
Figure 2: Energy mix Germany, 2011
Source of data: AGEB, 2012
When only considering electricity supply and consumption one gets a different impression:
25% of electricity is generated from domestically mined brown coal, a traditional and still very
important energy source in Germany. Due to the fast development of renewable energy in the
last few years renewables contributed 20% to the electricity supply in 2011. The other 55% is
coming from hard coal, nuclear energy, natural gas and other sources such as fuel and pump
storages (fig. 3). Security of energy supply has always been one of the main pillars of German
energy policy – the electricity mix of 2011 shows: Over 80% of German electricity is generated
domestically (coal, renewables, nuclear). With the decision of phasing out nuclear energy until
2022, the more rapid expansion of renewables and the commitment to reduce CO2 emissions
(which are mainly caused by the combustion of brown coal), Germany’s electricity supply will
and has to transform fundamentally in the future.
18
Natural gas
14%
Other 4%
Brown coal
25%
Nuclear
energy 18%
Renewable
energy
20%
Hard coal
19%
Figure 3: Electricity mix Germany, 2011
Source of data: BDEW, 2011
Germany’s electricity market is dominated by four large electricity suppliers, so called
‘Verbundunternehmen’. They control close to 90% of the German electricity market and are
referred to as the “Big Four”, representing an energy oligopoly (OECD, 2006 and Laird & Stefes,
2009). These electric utilities are:




E.ON SE
RWE AG
EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG
Vattenfall Europe AG
The distribution network is locally fragmented, consisting of more than 950 small mostly
municipality owned local utilities, so called ‘Stadtwerke’. This is considerably more than in any
other European country (OECD, 2006). However, the ‘Big Four’ have acquired and continue
acquiring shares in the Stadtwerke.
Until the middle of the 2000s, these four companies also served as transmission system
operators until they had to sell their shares due to a transformation of the German energy
system: Ownership of transmission network was separated from ownership of energy
generation (OECD, 2006). Nowadays, Germany has four transmission system operators
responsible for balancing electricity feeding and take-off in their respective service territories:
Tennet TSO GmbH (subsidiary of E.ON); 50Hertz Transmission GmbH (fomer Vattenfall Europe
Transmission); Amprion GmbH (belongs to RWE AG) and TransnetBW GmbH (subsidiary of
EnBW). The transmission grid and its four control areas are depicted in figure 4.
19
Figure 4: Transmission Grid Germany
Source: Netzentwicklungsplan Strom, 2012
In 2005, new legislation setting the rules for the regulation of network access in the electricity
and gas industries was introduced, followed by the creation of the Federal Network Agency
(‘Bundesnetzagentur’, FNA) in 2008. The FNA is in charge of regulating the terms of access to
most of the electricity and gas network grids, with regulation of small, local networks assigned
to state authorities (OECD, 2006).
3.1.2 Support policies for renewables until 1998
Germany is regarded as a pioneer in the development of a regulatory framework to support
renewable energy sources (RES), following a comprehensive promotion approach for almost
40 years. Legislation on sustainable energy has already begun in the 1970s, paving the way for
the respected and often copied Renewable Energy Sources Act (“Erneuerbare-EnergienGesetz”, EEG) in 2000. Support policies for renewables can be divided into four sub-phases.
Renewable energy first caught the attention of policy makers in the wake of the 1973 oil and
energy crisis which produced major rethinking in Germany as in many other countries. The
result was a significant increase of research and development (R&D) for domestic energy
sources, including renewables (Laird & Stefes, 2009).1 During the 1970s and 80s it was the
wind sector which benefited most when many R&D projects were granted to industrial firms
and academic organizations for the development or testing of small to medium-sized wind
turbines (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). Much the same applied also to R&D in solar cells and the
1
Between 1974 and 1982, annual public expenditures for renewable R&D grew from 20 million to over
300 million Deutsche Mark (Laird & Stefes, 2009).
20
development of the solar sector. Though large sums were raised for the support of RES, the
bulk of subsidies was still spent on nuclear and coal. Furthermore, renewable energy in
Germany at that time still suffered from a hostile political-economic electricity supply system
and conservative opposition. The latter resulted in a cut of R&D spendings by almost half when
the conservative-liberal government of Helmut Kohl came into power in 1982 (Laird & Stefes,
2009).
The nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986 marked a turning-point for German energy policy
and the beginning of phase 2. Nuclear energy became discredited among German population
and electricity production of brown coal was criticized for its enormous government subsidies
and its impacts on global warming. These developments together can be regarded as a
‘window of opportunity for renewable energy’ leading to a gradual change of energy policies.
Two subsidy programs for photovoltaic and wind energy were passed: Launched in 1989, a
‘100 MW wind program’ guaranteed investors a payment of 0.03€/kWh; from 1991 to 1995
the ‘1,000-roof program’ sponsored the installation of solar panels on private houses and
public facilities (Laird & Stefes, 2009). In the following months, a series of proposals for
institutional change were formulated, finally leading to the Electricity Feed-in Law
(“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, StrEG) which came into force in 1991.
“The Feed-in Law required utilities to connect generators of electricity from renewable
energy technology to the grid and to buy the electricity at a rate which for wind and
solar cells amounted to 90% of the average tariff for final customers, i.e. about DM 0.17”
(Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006, p.264).
The StrEG gave large financial incentives to investors. As it excluded facilities bigger than 5
MW or those that were owned by large utilities, the law mainly benefited 3,500 owners of
small hydropower plants and modest-sized wind turbine operators. Especially for wind
energy, the Electricity Feed-in Law was the most important promotion instrument during
the 1990s (Becheberger & Reiche, 2004). This development shows that renewable energy in
Germany was able to grow rapidly with proper financial support.
3.1.3 Support policies for renewables since 1998 and the EEG
The third phase of the development of support policies for RES was heralded by the
liberalization of the German energy market and the change of government in 1998. The new
Social Democratic/Green coalition committed itself to an energy transition. The Feed-in Law
was incorporated in the ‘Act on the Reform of the Energy Sector’ and a second market
incentive program for solar PV was launched: the 100,000-roof program which came into force
in 1999. With its ambitious goals of realizing the installation of 100,000 new photovoltaic
plants with a capacity of 3 kWp each, it was one of the biggest promotion programs in this area
worldwide (Bechberger & Reiche, 2004). At the same time, the government decided to phase
out nuclear energy in the future.
Finally, in 2000, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) replaced the StrEG and became the
main legislative instrument of renewable energy in Germany (see table 1 below). While
21
tremendously increasing the remuneration of RES, in particular for solar PV which received a
raise in tariffs from 8.2 to 50.62 ct/kWh, the law also guaranteed fixed rates for investors for
20 years. They could expect a decent return on their investments and long-term planning
reliability (Laird & Stefes, 2009). Consequently, the installation of solar PV increased
enormously over the next few years so that the target of 300 MWp newly installed PV capacity
was reached much earlier than expected (see fig.5). Whereas in in the year 2000 only 45 MWp
of solar PV capacity was newly installed, the number raised to 1,270 MW p in 2007 and 7,400
MWp in 2011.
Figure 5: Newly installed solar photovoltaic capacity 2000-2011
Source: BSW-Solar, 2012
While the StrEG was successful promoting wind energy, the EEG dramatically increased the
importance of other renewable energy sources. The sector generating solar energy became
the biggest beneficiary of the EEG: while producing only 1 GWh electricity in 1990 and 64 GWh
in the year 2000, by 2005 it was already 1,282 GWh which increased 9-fold up to 11,683 GWh
in 2010 (BSW-Solar, 2012).
In the following years, three amendments of the EEG have been made, supported by several
other policy decisions favoring renewable energy such as the ‘Act on Combined Heat and
Power Generation’ and the transferring of RES authority from the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology (BMWi) to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) in 2002.
However, after initial enthusiasm for the strong support of renewables, opposition has grown
steadily, marking the beginning of the fourth phase. In particular large (fossil-fuel) electric
utilities strongly oppose political-decision making which favors renewables arguing that
subsidies represent a burden for government’s budget and an increase in electricity rates for
consumers. Within the sector of RES, many criticize the unequally favoring of solar industry by
the EEG and lobby for higher rates for other sectors of renewables.
With the change of government in 2009 and the installation of a conservative-liberal coalition
a slight shift away from a strong support of renewables can be observed. Feed-in tariff rates
for solar PV were constantly lowered, and in 2010, another amendment of the ‘Atomic Energy
22
Act’ was adopted in order to extent operating lives of nuclear power plants, thus reversing the
decision of a nuclear phase-out in 2000.
Year
Version of EEG
2000
Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)

Continuation of the Electricity Feed-in Law (StrEG)

Different fixed tariffs, depending on the source of energy as well as the
size and location of the renewable energy plant
(e.g. slight increase for wind power; biggest increase for solar PV)

Purchase guarantee and feed-in tariffs are fixed for 20 years after
commencement of operations of any new plant (investment protection)

Regressive element: falling remuneration over the next years

Remuneration system is uncoupled form the average utility revenue per
kWh sold and replaced by fixed, regressive and temporarily limited feedin tariffs for the whole amount of generated electricity from renewables

Introduction of a priority purchase obligation for RES power to be met by
the nearest grid operator

Every 4 years the EEG will be revised to reflect newest technological
developments
1. Amendment EEG

A variety of detailed regulations,
o e.g. for the purpose of improving transparency, reporting
requirements to the Federal Network Agency are expanded
(such as location and capacity of a RES plant)

For solar PV, introduction of a gliding digression: with higher additional
capacity and thus higher tariffs, the guaranteed tariff per kWh will be
decreased faster in the following year

Further regulations for wind, hydro, geo and biomass
2. Amendment EEG

Direct marketing: Operator of a plant needs to determine for every month
if he/she wants to receive the feed-in tariff for the generated electricity or
if he/she wants to directly merchandise it

A variety of detailed regulations for, particularly concerning fixed tariffs
for solar PV, wind power, hydro power, biomass and geothermal
2004
2009
Table 1: Renewable Energy Sources Act
Source: EEG, 2000 / EEG, 2004/ EEG, 2009/ Bechberger & Reiche, 2004 / Laird & Stefes, 2009
3.1.4 ‘Energiewende’ since 2010
Although the concept of ‘energy transition’ is being used in the relevant literature for quite
some time, it did not appear officially in German politics until the year 2010/2011. Since then,
the so called ‘Energiewende’ has become a constantly repeated term in political decisionmaking with high public reception.
By extending the operating lives of nuclear power plants in 2010, Germany’s future energy mix
would again include the use of nuclear energy. At the same time, the support of renewable
energies should be continued in an efficient and economical way. Consequently, the
government published the so called ‘Energy Concept’ which aims at designing and
implementing a long-term overall strategy for the period up to the year 2050. It formulates
guidelines for an “environmentally sound, reliable and affordable energy supply” in nine key
areas: Renewable energies, Energy efficiency, Nuclear power and fossil-fuel power plants, Grid
infrastructure for electricity & integration of renewables, Energy-efficiency of buildings,
23
Mobility, Energy research towards innovation and new technologies, Energy supply in the
European and international context and Transparency and acceptance (BMWi, 2010). Focus
points are the expansion of renewable energy and the increase in energy efficiency while
energy from nuclear and fossil-fuels still play in important role in the strategy.
With the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011, following a previous
earthquake and tsunami, German energy policy again turned decisively: after a public outcry
about the safety of nuclear power in general and German nuclear power plants in particular,
the conservative-liberal government reversed its previous decision on extending the operating
lives of nuclear power plants. On quite short notice, a nuclear power phase-out was decided
upon in June 2011, marking another significant change of German nuclear and energy policy.
Though targets of the Energy Concept of 2010 remain valid, the Concept itself was updated –
excluding the use of nuclear power and setting an even stronger emphasis on renewable
energy. The accelerating implementation measures illustrate the new direction of German
energy policy which aims to finally realize the Energiewende. These measures are (BMWi, 2011
and BMU, 2012a):











Accelerated nuclear phase out & restructuring of the fossil power plant park
Faster expansion of renewable energies
Integration of renewable energies into the overall energy system
Central component: wind energy & measures for biomass, solar PV and geothermal
Cost efficiency
Expansion of the electricity grids
Smart grids and storage facilities
Energy efficient buildings
New incentives for combined heat and power
Expansion of electric vehicles
Efficient procurement
The Energiewende is accompanied by several laws such as the amendment of the ‘Atomic
Energy Act’, the ‘Act on Measures for the acceleration of electricity network expansion’ and
the third amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (see table 2).
Similar to the adoption of the first EEG in the year 2000 and the first nuclear phase-out in
2002, the German Energiewende of 2011 is a unique project worldwide. With ambitious
targets and continuous political decision-making German politics wants to pave the way for a
sustainable energy future. The EEG continues to be the main instrument which determines the
highly competitive structure of feed-in tariffs.
A legislative overview of energy support policies can be found in annex 1.
24
2012
3. Amendment EEG

Targets of expansion of renewable energy: Share of renewables in
electricity consumption shall be 35% in 2020, 50% in 2030, 65% in 2040
and 80% in 2050

Integration of market, grid and system, e.g. through an optimal market
premium, flexibility premium, integration of solar PV into feed-inmanagement

New regulations and tariffs concerning all RES:
Expansion of off-shore wind power, simplified feed-in structure for
biomass, continuing reduction of tariffs for solar PV, increase of tariffs
for geothermal energy

Special compensation scheme and industrial consumption
Table 2: Third amendment of the EEG
3.2
The renewable energy sector
3.2.1 Status of renewable energy in Germany
The previous chapters outlined the governmental support of renewable energy sources. Thus,
it is unquestionable that the expansion of renewables in Germany since the 1990s is not only a
result of technological development and investment but essentially an achievement of a
favorable legislative framework. Figure 6 depicts the development of electricity generation
from renewable energies during twenty years’ time: Having generated around 18 TWh in 1990,
renewables contributed over 100 TWh to electricity generation in the year 2010.The most
important boom started after the adoption of the Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2000 when
RES doubled their share within only six years. The increase of renewables comes directly along
with an increase of fees under the EEG: in 2000 around 1,000 million Euros were paid, rising to
ca. 5,900 million Euros in 2006 and almost 13,000 million Euros in 2010 (BMU, 2011b).
Figure 6: Development of electricity generation from renewables since 1990
Source: BMU, 2011b, p.17
25
In the end of 2011, renewable energy sources are an important factor in Germany’s energy
supply though still representing a minority compared to fossil energy sources such as oil, coal
and nuclear. The shares of renewables are (BMU, 2012b):
12.2 % of total energy consumption
20.0 % of total electricity consumption
10.4 % of total heat supply
5.6 % of total fuel consumption
The relatively small proportion of fuel consumption is dominated by the use of biodiesel,
followed by bioethanol and a marginal share of vegetable oil (BMU, 2011b). A different
structure of renewables-based energy supply can be observed for electricity and heat supply:
Looking at the contribution of renewables to the electricity supply, wind energy clearly
dominates with 36.5%, followed by hydropower with approx. 20% and biogas with approx.
13%. Biogenic solid fuels and solar photovoltaic contribute each around 11% (see fig. 7). These
figures naturally decrease when relating them individually to the electricity consumption: In
total, wind power has a share of 6.2% while solar PV still has a small share of 1.9% (BMU,
2011b). Although the installation of solar PV massively increased over the last few years, it still
does not have a significantly high proportion in Germany’s electricity consumption. Certainly,
Germany’s physical characteristics allow better conditions for wind power than solar PV.
Figure 7: Structure of renewables-based electricity supply in Germany, 2010
Source: BMU, 2011b, p. 15
In contrast, the structure of renewables-based heat supply (fig. 8) is clearly dominated by
biogenic solid fuels (53.4% used by households; 15% used by industry). Biogenic solids can be
either residues or energy plants which are woodlike, strawlike, grass or garbage. Except for
small shares of solar thermal systems (3.8%) and geothermal energy (4.1%) it is biomass and
biogas which contribute most to the renewable-based heat supply.
26
Figure 8: Structure of renewables-based heat supply in Germany, 2010
Source: BMU, 2011b, p.15
3.2.2 Renewable energy market
Although wind energy, hydropower and biogas contribute more to the German electricity
supply, it is the sector of solar photovoltaic which received not only the highest amount of
tariffs over the last years but also biggest public attention. Lately, fees paid for photovoltaic
electricity fed into the grid were gradually reduced, but the sector continued to grow strongly.
In 2010, over 70% of all investments in the construction of renewables - representing 19,500
million EUR - were spent on solar photovoltaic (see fig. 9). Wind energy received 9.4% and
biomass electricity around 6% of total investments.
“It is also worth noting that over 88% of the investment was due to power generation
installations eligible for assistance under the Renewable Energy Sources Act” (BMU, 2011b,
p.34). Thus, it is apparent that investors strongly connect their capital expenditures to the
feed-in tariffs being paid which have been highest for the sector of solar photovoltaic.
Figure 9: Investments in construction of renewable energy installations in Germany, 2010
Source: BMU, 2011b, p.34
27
Renewable energy sources continuously increased their importance as an economic factor in
Germany. Next to rising investments in installations and production capacity, the sector also
increased employment rates. According to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, a total of more than 367,000 jobs in German can be
attributed to the field of renewable energies in 2010 (BMU, 2011b). Compared to 2004, the
number of positions doubled within six years.
Regarding the increase of installations, investments and employment in the sector of
renewable energy sources in Germany, its importance becomes apparent. In order to reach
the ambitious goals of the EEG and to manage the German energy transition, a close linkage of
political decision-making and corporate business of renewables is indispensable. Though still
lacking influence compared to the ‘Big Four’ of traditional energy, companies of RES are
seeking to gain importance and to make an active contribution to the ‘Energiewende’.
3.2.3 Key business stakeholders
With regards to renewable energy, three main groups of companies can be distinguished:
1. Manufacturers of technology
= Companies that build the technology. Examples are: wind vanes, propeller
anemometers, solar modules, turbines and turbine regulators for hydro power
generation or power plants, heating plants utilizing biogas and bio-waste technology.
2. Project engineers and developer
= Companies which plan, develop and (sometimes) finance operating systems for the
use of renewable energies.
3. Operators
= Companies which finance and operate the existing power plant or technology
application.
Within the German solar industry, there are currently around 15,000 companies operating on
the market, most of them in the field of solar photovoltaic (10,000) which has experienced
strong growth in recent years (BSW-Solar, 2012). The share of manufacturers of solar cells,
modules and other components, however, is rather small with around 350 producing
companies. By having ca. 150,000 employees, the solar industry provides many job positions;
only the sector of biomass employs slightly more people (BMU, 2011b).
Nowadays, American and Chinese manufacturers dominate the worldwide production of solar
cells and PV modules, the biggest being in 2011 Suntech Power (CN), First Solar (USA), JA Solar
(CN), Yingli Green Energy (CN), Trina Solar (CN) and Trina Solar (TW). Q.Cells SE (position 13)
and SolarWorld AG (position 20) are the biggest German producers worldwide (Photon, 2012).
Regarding the German market of solar PV, various companies divide the shares among
themselves, such as First Solar, Q.Cells, SolarWorld AG, Solon SE, Siemens Solar Solution,
28
Schott Solar AG or Bosch Solar. However, due to a decline in prices which can be mainly
ascribed to Chinese dumping techniques, many German solar manufactures are struggling,
leading to the insolvency of some such as Solon SE in 2011 and Q.Cells SE in 2012.
The majority of installed capacity of solar photovoltaic is concentrated in the southern parts of
Germany: By 2010, 8,067 MW was installed in the state of Bavaria, followed by BadenWürttemberg (3,581 MW) and North Rhine-Westphalia (2,812 MW). The northern and eastern
states of Lower Saxony and Brandenburg as well as Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate in the
west-southern part also show significant capacity of solar PV (SolarServer, 2012). With regards
to the additional installed capacity worldwide, Germany leads by far, having installed an
additional 7,437 MW of solar PV in the year 2010 and leaving Italy, (1,587 MW), the United
States (910 MW) and Czech Republic behind. However, looking at the total amount of
installed capacity, Germany comes third after China which possesses almost half of the world
wide’s installed solar PV, and Taiwan.
German wind energy shows a total installed capacity of 29,060,040 MW in 2011, generated by
approx. 22,300 wind turbines (BWE, 2012). The additional capacity installed over the last years
did not show a high increase such as the solar sector but rater stabilized between 800 and
1,000 additional windmill-powered plants per year. The sector of wind energy employs around
96,000 people, making it the third biggest renewable employment market after biomass and
solar energy (BMU, 2011b).
Looking at the installed wind capacity worldwide in 2010, China is leading followed by the
United States, Germany, Spain and India (WWEC, 2011).
The German market of manufacturers of wind turbines is clearly dominated by the German
Enercon GmbH with a share of almost 60% on new installed capacity in 2011. The Danish
manufacturer Vestas Wind Systems A/S contributes around 21%, REpower Systems around
10% and Nordex ca. 4% (see fig.10).
Figure 10: Shares of manufacturers of wind turbines on newly installed capacity, 2011
Source: DEWI, 2012
29
Hydroelectric power is the oldest electricity generation technology. Power plants are
especially suited to locations with reliable, serviceable water sources and good options for
connection to the grid (DENA, 2011). Thus, due to its geographical conditions, the generation
of hydro power in Germany takes place almost entirely in the southern states: in 2010, 3,536
hydroelectric plants were installed in Bavaria generating 2,506 MW. Baden-Württemberg has
1,492 plants generating 906 MW (BDEW, 2012). The vast majority of power plants (more than
7,000) are small plants (<1 MW) which produce around 8-10% of hydro power. Hence, up to
90% is generated from medium-sized to big plants of which there are ca. 350 (BMU, 2012c).
They are predominantly in the possession of the big four electric utilities whereas small
hydroelectric power plants belong to many different companies or the so called ‘Stadtwerke’.
The sector of bioenergy is much diversified and covers the generation of electricity, heat and
fuels: biogas plants produce electricity and heat; biodiesel from rape and vegetable oil is used
as fuel and heating of wood pellets or wood chips can replace oil or gas heating. By far the
most important source of bioenergy in Germany is wood provided mainly by the sector of
forestry. In addition, agriculture also plays an important role in producing biomass. Most
prominent are rape seed as crop for biodiesel production, the provision of substrates for
biogas production and the cultivation of plants for bioethanol production (BMU, 2012c).
Representing such a diverse field of economic activity, the bioenergy related sector employed
approx. 122,000 people in 2010 – most of them working in agricultural and forestry raw
material production and the industry producing biomass fuels such as pellets, wood chips or
biogas (BMU, 2012c).
Similar to the sector of hydropower, many different-sized companies are operating in the field
of bio-energy. Examples are M+W Group, Viessmann GmbH & Co.KG, EnviTec Biogas AG,
agri.capital GmbH or KTG Agar AG. In addition, the ‘Big Four’ also operate on the market of
bioenergy, mainly through their subsidiaries of renewable energy.
30
4 Methodology
4.1
Personal Construct Theory
Having outlined the theoretical framework and presented an overview of German energy
policy and renewable energy, it is the analysis which will finally lead to an answer to the main
research question. In terms of methodology, this research has applied a bottom-up technique
which is mainly based on information gathered from interviews. Besides a qualitative analysis
of the results, answers of interview partners will also be evaluated quantitatively. Both is
accomplished by using the Repertory Grid Technique which harks back to the Personal
Construct Theory.
The Theory of Personal Constructs was developed in the 1950s and 1960s by the psychologist
George A. Kelly, supported by its main publications “The psychology of personal constructs”
(1955) and “A theory of personality. The psychology of personal constructs” (1963). While back
in that time, Kelly took a pioneering and out-of-the-mainstream way of psychological science,
nowadays much of his outlook is shared. His Repertory Grid Technique gained international
importance in revealing the nature of individual and cultural differences and similarities
(Diamond, 1982). Besides psychology, the method has also been applied in other scientific
fields such as artificial intelligence, education, human learning and, more recently, in the field
of policy analysis (van de Kerkhof et al, 2009).
Kelly’s basic assumption is that people look at the world through transparent patterns, so
called constructs, which they create and then attempt to fit over the realities of which the
world is composed. Thus, constructs are ways of construing the world (Kelly, 1963). In other
words: Every person creates and re-creates a theoretical framework which is his or her
personal construct system. Thus, everyone lives, anticipates events and determines his/her
behavior in terms of this construct system.
Constructs are made of specific characteristics. According to Kelly
“A construct is a way in which some things are construed as being alike and yet different
from others. […] A construct is a single formulation of likeness and a difference.” (Kelly,
1963, p. 105 and 133)
Consequently, a construct usually is dichotomous and has an inherent bipolar nature, having
one affirmative and one negative pole. It is a way in which two or more things are alike and
thereby different from a third or more things. Kelly’s argument is that people never affirm
anything without simultaneously denying something. Examples of bipolar constructs are: black
vs. white, cheerful vs. sad or broad-minded vs. narrow-minded. Diamond (1982) interprets
Kelly’s work and argues that a construct is not a category but a contrived reference axis against
which any behavioral observation may be plotted.
The Theory of Personal Constructs can also be used to explain ‘culture’. People belong to the
same cultural group not merely because they behave alike but especially because they
construe their experiences in similar ways (Diamond, 1982).
31
4.2
Repertory Grid Technique
Kelly’s best known suggestion for eliciting constructs from some person or group with a view
to better understanding them is the Repertory Grid Method. According to Fransella et al
(2004) Kelly saw the grid “as no more and no less than another way of stating his theory of
personal constructs. It is personal construct theory in action”. The technique refers to Kelly’s
assumption that people always seek to improve their constructs by increasing their repertory,
by altering them to provide better fits (Kelly, 1963).
An explanation of the method is given by Fransella et al (2004):
“Behind each single act of judgment that a person makes lies his or her implicit theory
about the realm of events within which he or she is making those judgments. Repertory
Grid technique is […] a way of exploring the structure and content of such implicit
theories” (Fransella et al, 2004, p.3)
Originally, Repertory Grid has been used psychology, particularly in clinical settings to increase
the psychologist’s understanding of how a patient views the world. In the field of policy
analysis which is applied in this research, the technique is a useful tool to unfold people’s
implicit perceptions of reality and specific events.
Repertory Grid includes two main components, ‘elements’ and ‘constructs’ (van de Kerkhof et
al, 2009):
Elements:
are usually subjects or objects that people face in the world around them and
that they recognize as more or less relevant for them
Constructs:
according to the explanation above, constructs reflect the distinctions that
people make to distinguish elements and relate them to their personal,
individual world
The basic building blocks of the Repertory Grid are therefore elements presented as columns
and constructs presented as rows. In this analysis, fourteen different companies from the
renewable and traditional energy sector serve as elements whereas constructs are different
lobby activities that stakeholders use to distinguish between the companies.
One can regard the grid as a particular form of structured interview, because the usual way of
exploring another person’s construct system is by conversation. Interviewees select or are
confronted with a triad of elements (whose names are usually written on cards) and are then
asked to specify the way in which two of the elements are similar and different from the third.
The grid formalizes this process and assigns mathematical values to the relationships between
a person’s constructs (Fransella et al, 2004). It is the bipolarity of the constructs that makes the
designing of grids possible. Once the respondent mentions no new constructs anymore, in the
next step, some of the bipolar constructs are presented on a scale (e.g. a ten-point-scale, with
one pole of the construct at score 0 and the other pole at score 10). The interviewee is then
asked to rate the elements on that scale and to indicate thereby which elements perform best
(or worst) within the particular construct.
32
4.3
Methodological approach in the thesis
4.3.1 Identification of companies for analysis
For the Repertory Grid analysis fourteen companies have been identified which serve as
‘elements’: the four main electric utilities operating in Germany (EnBW AG, E.ON SE, RWE AG
and Vattenfall Europe AG) as well as ten players from the renewable energy sector. A key
assumption for this study is that the sector of renewables and its influence on policy-making
cannot be regarded exclusively without the “Big Four”. They need to be considered as they do
not only have been lobbying for decades, but traditionally possess large fossil-fuel and nuclear
power plants and thus possess great economic and political power in Germany. Furthermore,
they also have been entering the market of renewables with subsidiaries or branches of
renewable energy.
The companies of renewable energy have been identified in three consecutive steps:
First, an internet research was conducted in order to get a general idea about the market of
renewable energy in Germany and its most prominent companies. The initiative “renewables –
Made in Germany” of the German Energy Agency (dena) and the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology served as a basis for the research (Dena, 2011). Here, the biggest
companies of wind, solar, hydro, biomass and geothermal energy are listed and characterized
according to their corporate profiles. Next to these firms, international companies operating
on the German market were considered by the researcher as well.
Second, the most successful companies in terms of total revenue per year and number of
employees were selected. Compared to companies of hydropower, biomass and geothermal
energy, companies of wind power and solar photovoltaic are overrepresented in the selection.
This is due to the fact that wind and particularly solar companies have benefited most from the
EEG over the last years and traditionally have a strong interest in influencing policy-making.
Furthermore, they are usually most known among politicians and economic stakeholders,
whereas companies of hydro or bioenergy are less familiar.
In a third step, a pre-selection of 25 companies was performed (see annex 2) and then
presented to knowledgeable experts2. They were asked to identify the 10 most innovative and
influential ones on German energy policy. This step guarantees the inclusion of innovation and
power as parameters next to the economic factors mentioned before.
Consequently, the following fourteen companies are included in the analysis (table 3):
2
Scientific advisers and consultants of Schultz Projekt Consult and Biogasrat e.V. served as experts due
to their years of experience and daily work in the field of corporate business of energy.
33
Company
Description
Total revenue
(2011)
1
E.ON SE
Investor-owned electric utility
112.954 billion
2
RWE AG
German electric utility
3
EnBW AG
4
Vattenfall Europe
AG
5
Viessmann Werke
GmbH & Co. KG
6
7
Publicly traded German electric
utility
Electric utility (principal
shareholder: Swedish holding
company Vattenfall)
49.153 billion
No. of
employees
(2011)
83,097
74,919
18.789 billion
22,137
13.000 billion
20,500
Manufacturer of heating
systems, PV & solar thermal
systems, biomass and biogas
systems
1.269 billion
9,400
SolarWorld AG
Full-line provider of PV modules
1.046 billion
Q.Cells SE
Development, manufacturing
and marketing of PV cells. Filed
for insolvency in April, 2012.
1.023 billion
8
juwi Holding AG
Project engineer & developer,
service and maintenance in the
sectors of solar, wind, bio and
hydro energy
9
Vestas
Deutschland
GmbH
Danish manufacturer, seller,
installer and servicer of wind
turbines
10
SCHOTT Solar AG
Manufacturer of PV modules
and solar thermal power plants
11
Enercon GmbH
Manufacturer of wind turbines
12
First Solar
Manufacturing
GmbH
American manufacturer of thin
film PV modules & project
developer of PV power plants.
Decision of ceasing production
in Germany in 2012
13
Andritz Hydro
GmbH
14
agri.capital GmbH
Full-line provider of
hydroelectric power plants
Development, planning and
operating of biogas plants
Table 3: Companies included in the analysis
Source: Data from Hoppenstedt Firmendatenbank, 2012
1.000 billion
(expected)
963,960 million
(2010)
482,000 million
(2008)
432,000 million
292,170 million
(2010)
2,622
> 2,000
1,000
1,050
1,318
(2008)
2,500
725
78,000 million
400
53,000 million
143
34
4.3.2 Selection of interviewees
As mentioned before, a bottom-up methodology was used implying that main information for
the analysis was generated by the interview partners. In total, 20 interviews were conducted in
a period of six weeks. This number can be regarded sufficiently with regards to the range of
different business sectors, representation of all political parties and the acquired data for the
statistical analysis. The interviewed experts are primarily economic and political stakeholders;
two people represent external organizations (see table 4). Thus, it can be ensured that people
whose main activity is lobbying and people who are being lobbied equally contributed to the
outcome of the analysis.
In order to obtain information from economic stakeholders, two groups of experts were
interviewed: Representatives of companies, mainly those involved in Public Affairs and
Corporate Communication, and representatives of business associations which serve as a
‘common voice’ of the industry by focusing interests of different companies from one sector.
Economic stakeholders were all chosen from companies operating in the field of renewable
energy in Germany, either as manufacturers, project engineers and developer or operators.
They do not only possess a general overview of the market but are also involved in designing
and implementing various lobby strategies.
Political stakeholders are mainly Energy spokesmen or their respective scientific assistants of
parliamentary groups in the German parliament. Here, politicians from all five parties that are
currently present in the ‘Bundestag’ were interviewed: CDU and FDP as the governing coalition
and the opposition of SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grüne and Die Linke. In addition, representatives of
the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal Ministry for the Environment,
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and the Federal Network Agency were asked to give
information. Political stakeholders can be described as ‘the ones being lobbied’, therefore
knowing about different lobby activities of the renewable energy sector and being able to
evaluate their effectiveness.
Furthermore, two interview partners were chosen from other organizations than mentioned
above who contributed with specific external knowledge to the analysis.
Interviewees
ECONOMIC STAKEHOLDERS
Companies
Associations
POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS
Members of parliament
Ministries + federal agencies
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS; NGOS
TOTAL
Table 4: Interview partners
Number
6
3
6
3
2
20
35
4.3.3 Interview set-up
The 20 interviews with stakeholders and experts represent the main source of information for
the analysis. Due to the utilization of the Repertory Grid Technique the interviews were
structured with open questions. They were structured in that sense that the interviews
followed the rather clear outline of the method. Open questions with no predefined answers
to choose were asked in the beginning and in the end of the interview. In order to encourage
interviewees to give more precise and elaborate answers, the researcher used interposed
questions when necessary.
The names of the companies identified in chapter 4.3.1 were printed on cards which were
used in the interviews for applying the Repertory Grid Technique. Each interview took
approximately 60 minutes - in around half of the cases even longer - and was structured the
following way (the complete questionnaire of the interviews can be found in annex 4):
1. Part:
2. Part:
3. Part:
4. Part:
5. Part:
Short presentation of the research project by the researcher and
presentation of work area by the interviewee
Interests of the renewable energy sector
Repertory Grid of lobby strategies
a) Identifying constructs of lobby activities by picking three cards in
different rounds
b) Identifying three most effective lobby activities
c) Ranking companies on a scale of effectiveness for each of the
three strategies
Role of renewable energy sector within energy transition
Concluding remarks
As the analysis covers the entire business sector of renewable energy, the first question aimed
at identifying the various interests that companies pursue within the process of energy
transition. Having clarified for which objectives companies lobby, the Repertory Grid
Technique started. In various rounds (between 5 and 7) interviewees were asked to pick three
cards and answer the question:
In what respect are two companies similar or different to a third company with regards
to their lobby strategy?
By distinguishing two companies from a third one, the experts were able to identify different
constructs of lobbying activities. Some of them are clearly bipolar whereas others are
described as a lobby activity which a company either applies or not (yes or no). Once the
interviewees did not come up with any new constructs, the researcher asked them to identify
the three most effective lobbying strategies companies can use to enforce their interests in
political decision-making. In the third part of the Repertory Grid Technique, experts then
ranked the companies according to their ability to effectively apply each of the three
strategies. A scale of effectiveness was used; while “0” represents a very low ability of a
company to apply a specific lobby activity, “10” imputes a very high ability of a company to
make use of a lobby activity.
36
The last question of the interview aimed at leading to an answer to the main research
question. Interviewees were asked to state their opinion on the role the renewable energy
sector needs to play in order to make the energy transition happen.
An important aspect of getting honest and credible statements was to assure anonymity to all
interviewees. Therefore, the interview list has been codified to not connect statements to a
certain person. In case information could be ascribed undoubtedly to an interview partner
even without direct referencing, the exact source will be left out. The analysis, however, is fully
based on the information gathered by the interviews unless stated otherwise.
37
5 Qualitative Analysis
5.1
Perceptions of lobbying
As it was mentioned in the theoretical framework, lobbying is perceived very differently
according to the country where it occurs or according to the person being asked about his or
her opinion about lobby activities.
The vast majority of interviewed experts consider lobbying as positive (only two interviewees
argued against an organized form of influencing political decision making). Whereas companies
which are actively involved in this process of exerting influence naturally present their
activities as legitimate and part of a company’s strategy, politicians – as the ones being lobbied
- might think differently. However, except one political stakeholder, all members of parliament
and representatives from ministries described lobbying as a common part of the political
process. Often, the lobby activities of interest groups were described as “right and important”
and “good and necessary” (Int. 2; 9)3 for political decision-making.
Generally, two types of lobby activities can be distinguished:
1. Company representatives approach politicians for a meeting in order to talk about
general topics related to energy policy and to have an exchange of ideas and points of
views.
2. Company representatives approach politicians for a meeting in order to discuss a
particular concern or present a specific request of the company. Usually, these
concerns refer to the current development of the energy system and the political
decisions that are being made. Examples are the amendment of the Renewable Energy
Sources Act, the decrease of feed-in tariffs for a certain RES sector or the introduction
of new incentives programs for renewables.
Once company representatives talk to political stakeholders (either in bilateral conversations,
within parliamentary committees or in the context of a political event) it is about an exchange
of specific knowledge and ideas. Many experts pointed out that this process cannot be seen
negatively as long as the lobbied person responsibly handles the information he or she
receives. Thus, specific data or facts (presented by the company) might be checked up
afterwards - usually by scientific assistants of the members of parliament - and, more
importantly, many different economic stakeholders are being heard. Depending on the time
and willingness of the politician, a member of parliament welcomes up to five representatives
of companies or associations per week. By having different sources of information political
actors ideally form their own opinion about certain issues.
Very often it was pointed out by the experts that the information politicians get from
economic stakeholders are essential for their ability to make a political decision. Especially
members of parliament are concerned with many different topics on which they do not (and
often cannot) have sufficient knowledge. Once it comes to very specific issues such as the
digression rate of the feed-in tariffs, new legislation on combined heat and power or efficiency
3
As it was mentioned before, the sources of interviews in this and the following chapters refer to the
codified list of interview partners and therefore do not correspond with the interview list in annex 3. It is
only the researcher who knows the decryption.
38
data of biogas plants, politicians rely on external expertise. Though the ministries (BMU and
BMWi) employ specialists and experts in the field of energy policy, they do not present
themselves as omniscient. “We don’t know everything better and need information from
different sources, for example companies, scientific institutions and external experts” (Int. 7).
Consequently, it can be noted that lobbying activities of companies are perceived quite
positively by political stakeholders and are not only a common way of expressing one’s
interests but also indispensable for the political process.
Some experts, however, emphasized that more transparency is needed within lobbying
activities, in particular when it comes to the identity and employers of lobbyists. Many NGOs,
but also representatives of political parties demand a higher clarity so that ordinary citizens
are informed about the activities of every single lobbyist. LobbyControl e.v., for instance,
advocates a ‘lobby register’ where every economic stakeholder who is engaged in lobbying
shall be listed and being traced back to the company he or she works for.
One expert perceives lobbying as harmful for the political process, saying that politicians shall
rather gain information from independent scientific institutions than from companies that are
only pursuing their own interests (Int. 18). Once the articulation of interests is combined with
financial expenses for a certain political stakeholder, this cannot be regarded as lobbying
anymore but rather as bribery or corruption. However, when it comes to lobbying of the
renewable energy sector, this does not occur, according to the experts. Party donations can be
considered more critically and will be discussed in chapter 5.3.5.
5.2
Interests of the renewable energy sector
Through its lobbying activities, the sector of renewable energy tries to pursue certain interests.
All companies – large or small – share the common interest of profit maximization. Nowadays,
the sector developed out of a niche into a serious alternative to companies that are
traditionally focused on fossil fuel energy. Thus, renewable business does not solely engage in
the market out of sustainable conviction but with the aim of having a profitable market share.
As one interviewee points out: “No one invests in something that does not have a profitable
yield” (Int. 16).
Besides the quest for profit maximization, companies pursue other interests that can be
divided into three groups:
First, it is apparent that all companies included in the analysis (and assumable most of all other
companies operating on the renewable energy market) direct their lobby activities at the EEG
and the feed-in tariffs. As the EEG as well as the rate of the tariffs for each renewable energy
source is being amended almost every year, each company aims at receiving the most optimal
feed-in tariffs for its sector. Thus, the distribution of fees is highly important for every sector.
Though it is not the companies themselves receiving the tariffs but their final customers that
buy and install an RES system, companies do aim for the highest tariff possible. They consider
marginal costs, meaning the higher the tariffs, the more likely customers would be willing to
pay more for a renewable energy technology. Consequently, companies can adjust their prices
due to the demand. Almost all interview partners agreed on the fact that companies’ main
interest is to influence political decision-making related to the amendments of the Renewable
39
Energy Sources Act. A few companies direct their lobbying activities at other laws such as the
‘Act on Combined Heat and Power Generation’.
Representatives of companies and business associations mentioned a second type of interest:
Some companies lobby for general conditions, in particular the political framework and market
structures that are most favorable for them. Many are interested in the reliability of the feedin system and do not want frequent changes within the EEG. Others stress the importance of a
long term time horizon of the feed-in tariffs: Companies want to maintain the fees guaranteed
for 20 years in order to have a planning and investment reliability. One economic stakeholder
emphasized this interest by saying “The EEG is our business model”.
The general framework also includes the distribution of shares of each RES in the final energy
and electricity supply. Each sector (wind, hydro, biomass, solar, geothermal) is interested in
having the highest share and therefore wants to improve its own position. Though most of the
experts are of the opinion that the sector of renewable energy still clings together, this might
change in the future if conflicts between different sectors increase. In 2012, the sector of solar
PV is partly criticized by the wind and biomass sector for receiving very high tariffs.
Thirdly, a few companies are interested in long term market competitiveness without the
support of the EEG. Although all companies direct their lobby activities at the EEG, some are
aware of the fact that the subsidy system will and cannot last forever. In particular, experts
referred to juwi Holding and Schott Solar that try to lobby for becoming independent of the
feed-in tariffs. Companies pursuing this interest want to overcome the EEG in the future and
being able to operate in a fully liberalized market without subsidies. Some economic experts
are of the opinion that, if companies solely rely on the EEG, they will ultimately harm
themselves: First, companies cannot be sure whether the 20 years guaranteed payment will
still be installed in a few years. Second, fees for renewable energy sources will decrease over
time and therefore companies will need to become market competitive without government
support. Although many experts agreed on this interest being the most important one and
shall be pursued by the whole sector, only a few companies actively follow this aim. Two
political stakeholders from legislative and executive bodies stated that no company included in
the analysis has lobbied so far for market independence and the end of subsidies (Int. 1 and
11). Also, the market incentives program for renewable energy that was launched in 2011 has
not yet been fully accepted by the companies. The majority still prefers the system of feed-in
tariffs and is afraid of losing them in the future.
40
5.3
Patterns of lobby activities
5.3.1 Overview of constructs
In total, the interview partners identified 36 different constructs of lobbying activities. Figure
11 depicts the cumulative number of unique constructs.
Cumulative number of unique
constructs
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Interviewed experts
Figure 11: Saturation of constructs
The Repertory Grid technique claims to elicit the full range of relevant concepts, in this case
the highest possible number of different constructs of lobbying activities. In the graph, the line
of cumulative constructs per interviewed expert should flatten out, as after a certain number
of participants no new constructs will be added to the list (van de Kerkhof et al, 2008). Figure
11 depicts that this is the case in the research.
The first interview was conducted via telephone as the expert was not able to find time for a
personal conversation. The researcher considered the expert – a political stakeholder who was
mainly responsible for the creation of the Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2000 – as
important for the research, thus he was included in the analysis as well. However, as the
expert did not participate in the Repertory Grid, he did not identify constructs of lobbying
activities, but added valuable information.
Until expert no. 7 new constructs were continuously mentioned with every interviewee,
afterwards the line starts flattening out. From interview 10 until 14, again new constructs were
added until the line flattens out again. It can be concluded that the Repertory Grid exercise
elicited all constructs the group of economic and political stakeholders apply to lobbying
activities of renewable energy companies. These constructs can be seen in table 5 and will be
analyzed in detail in the following sub chapters. For this purpose, the most important
constructs were allocated to four different groups of lobbying activities: Knowing ‘who’,
knowing ‘how’, knowing ‘what’ and knowing ‘in what way’.
41
NC
Construct side 1
Construct side 2
Na
1.
Regular & personal maintenance of contact to
politicians
Unsteady contact to politicians
19
2.
Lobbying within association
Lobbying individually
19
3.
Top-down: contacting the most powerful decisionmakers
4.
Public relations campaigns to mobilize public
Bottom-up: contacts only with MPs & working level
of ministries
No public relations campaigns,
focus only on political actors
5.
6.
7.
8.
Political landscape management
(close links to parties, party donations, strategic HR
etc.)
Knowledge development with correct information,
e.g. technical expertise
Geographically close to Berlin/Bonn
(representative office)
Having a concrete topic/request to talk about;
clarifying interests
18
15
No political landscape management
13
Little knowledge development, wrong information
11
Far away from Berlin/Bonn
(using external PA agencies)
General & too many topics/requests;
unclear interests
11
10
9.
Visiting & organizing of political events
No visiting & organizing of political events
9
10.
Offering external expertise, technical solutions
Only presentation of company’s interests
8
Not using ‘deep lobbying’
8
Not seeing complexity of problems; only pursuing
company’s own interests
7
Having low financial resources
7
11.
12.
13.
‘Deep lobbying’: using think tanks, publishing
studies, contacts to journalist etc.
Having a holistic view of the energy system &
situation
Having high financial resources
(many lobbyists, big PR departments)
14.
Contacting technical level, specific committees
General contacting & many different MPs
6
15.
Drafting & offering exact formulation of a new law
Not drafting & offering exact formulation of a new
law
6
16.
Inviting politicians to visit/see company
Not inviting politicians to visit/see company
6
17.
Knowing the right people to contact
Not knowing the right people to contact
6
18.
Friendly, constructive & down to earth appearance
Arrogant & discriminating appearance
5
19.
Deliberate distinction of traditional energy
companies
No clear distinction of traditional energy companies
5
20.
Tackling staff & assistants of MPs
Not tackling staff & assistants of MPs
5
21.
Convincing opponents
Weakening opponents
5
22.
Specific branch/topic lobbying
Ongoing lobbying
4
23.
EU- and international perspective
National perspective
4
24.
Location bound, e.g. local or regional level
Not location bound
3
25.
Envision of disaster scenarios
No envision of disaster scenarios
3
26.
Tackling diversified interests (e.g. local citizens,
associations)
Not tackling diversified interests
2
27.
Technical experts with know-how; technical thinking
All-rounder, generalists; professional lobbyists
2
28.
Hiring of ex-ministry/MP employees
Not hiring of ex-ministry/MP employees
2
42
29.
Ability of self-criticism
No ability of self-criticism
1
30.
Organizing demonstrations against political decisions
No organization of demonstrations
1
31.
Astroturphing
No astroturphing
1
32.
Present company’s interest as public/general
interest
No presentation of company’s interest as
public/general interest
1
33.
Trying to impose decisions
Not trying to impose decisions
1
34.
Focus on various topics
Focus on topic “100% renewable”
1
35.
High credibility of company within energy transition
Low credibility of company within energy transition
1
36.
Knowing the right time to contact
Not knowing the right time to contact
1
Table 5: Overview of all constructs
a
N = number of people who mentioned the construct
C
N = number of construct
5.3.2 Knowing ‘who’
This category analyzes constructs 3, 14, 17, 20 and 21.
Companies need to know at which type of political decision-makers they direct their lobby
activities. As the experts pointed out this can be done either top-down, bottom-up or in a
combination of both.
Top-down lobbying refers to tackling the most powerful decision-makers, i.e. the chancellor
and the responsible ministers (in this case it is the minister of environment and the minister of
economics) as well as the chairs of parliamentary groups. Companies look for establishing
contacts with people at the highest level of the executive bodies because they are the ones
taking the final decisions. Only a few companies are able to use these channels of
communication due to their longtime importance on the German energy market. It is
particular the Big Four, E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall, which play a crucial role as electric
utilities and were therefore always incorporated in important decisions concerning the energy
market. These four companies, in particular their CEOs, have a personal relation to the
chancellor and are capable of using it ‘at the right moment’. If the government organizes an
energy summit to discuss important issues concerning the energy system or, more recently,
the energy transition, the Big Four are always important participants.
Next to the chancellor, companies try to establish personal contacts with ministers and Heads
of Division within ministries. Also on this level the Big Four are the dominant companies trying
to influence executive decision-makers. One expert points out that at least once a month there
one of the Big Four sends a representative to the ministry of economics (BMWi) or the ministry
of environment (BMU). Next to the four electric utilities, SolarWorld is the only player of the
renewable energy sector which has established close links to the ministries as well. This is
mainly an effect of their geographical proximity to the BMU in Bonn and the very strong public
and political presence of its CEO. Interviewed experts confirmed that he has a direct contact to
the ministers of environment and is also able to strongly influence them (Int. 7, 9). Often
43
ministers do not possess a specific expertise in the responsible areas of their ministries but
were appointed out of political reasons and change their positions usually every four years or
less. Ministry employees, however, are concerned with certain topics for years and can be
regarded as experts. Some companies use the fact that the minister is not an ‘expert’ and
confront him/her with specific information the company wants to transfer. In the past it did
appear that ministers tended to prefer information provided by companies over information
provided by his/her own ministry. Many experts agreed that it is SolarWorld which has been
particularly successful in influencing ministers.
Companies that are not able or do not want to establish close relations to the chancellor or
ministers rather follow the bottom-up approach in their lobbying strategy. They place their
interests at the level of MPs or the working level of ministries. Here, tackling as many
politicians as possible has been regarded as effective by many experts. MPs are then able to
take a certain issue or request of a sector to the executive boards of their parties. However, it
is not particularly effective to tackle every possible MP but only the ones being concerned with
the issues a company wants to talk about. Regarding issues of renewable energy, it is most
effective to contact energy spokespersons or energy coordinators of each party as well as the
ones working in committees concerned with energy related topics.
Furthermore, it is particularly useful for companies to contact scientific assistants and
employees of politicians. They are the ones preparing the MP for committee meetings, writing
speeches and are the responsible contact person if the MP does not have time. Assistants take
a key position and only forward requests and information of companies which seems relevant
and might interest the MP. Thus, some companies are aware of the decisive role of employees
of politicians and try to establish good relations with them. One interview expert said: “Once
you have the assistant, you have the MP” (Int. 20).
Some interviewed experts pointed out that it is relevant to know the ‘right people’ to contact
and also to know how to deal with opponents. Traditionally, SPD and Grüne are most
supportive to renewable energy, however, this has changed with the energy transition in 2010
so that nowadays all parties can be regarded as proponents of RES. Nevertheless, differences
between preferences of each party towards certain renewable energy technologies are still
visible, with SPD and Grüne having a higher affinity for solar PV as their politicians
predominantly come from municipal areas, whereas many politicians from the CDU come from
agrarian areas and particularly support biomass and biogas.
Although nowadays almost all politicians are in favor of the support of renewable energy,
every company pursues different interests and therefore is confronted with people who do not
support the company’s interests. Thus, it is also important to know how to deal with
opponents: Experts agreed that it is highly important for a company to keep a close and
continuous contact with the ones supporting the ideas of a company. People being neutral
towards the company – which is generally a big majority - shall be provided regularly with
information and be finally convinced to support the issues of a company. Interview experts
referred to different strategies how to deal with opponents. On the one hand, companies
should work to convince them through knowledge transfer and turn their opinions as well. On
the other hand, if the first strategy does not turn out to be effective, opponents can be either
completely ignored or weakened through public campaigns, tackle personal weaknesses of
politicians etc. However, weakening an opponent is also regarded critical by many experts and
44
can be even dangerous for a company. As the political process is constantly changing,
companies and politicians ‘always see each other twice’ (Int. 9). Thus, if a company chooses to
discredit a certain politician who might be in more powerful position later on, it will turn into a
negative outcome for the company.
5.3.3 Knowing ‘how’
This category analyzes constructs 18, 19, 27 and 35.
Companies need to know how they present themselves while lobbying. First of all, lobbyists
can have different types of characteristics. Some are technical experts with a competent
knowledge in specific energy related issues. Whereas some experts described this
characteristic as positive because knowledge transfer can be ensured, other stakeholders
referred to the downside of this attitude as this type of lobbyists might think too technically
and does not fully understand the political process. Other lobbyists, however, can be
characterized as all-rounders and generalists who do not possess a specific technical
understanding but are ‘professional lobbyists’ knowing how to influence and pursue people.
When needed, they add an internal technical expert to a conversation with a member of
parliament or a ministry employee, but still guide the discussion. Such a highly professional
form of lobbying is being conducted by the Big Four according to experts.
Within the sector of renewable energy many experts also referred to the manner of
appearance of companies as an important factor. Two distinct ways of lobbying can be
distinguished: having an aggressive and partly arrogant attitude or being friendly, constructive
and down-to-earth.
Most of the political stakeholders interviewed for this research pay attention to the way a
company presents itself and interacts with others. Although SolarWorld might have a high
public perception, it is not seen completely positive by all politicians. The company choses an
aggressive way of lobbing including controversial public campaigns and personal attacks on
politicians who do not support the interests of the company; in the case of SolarWorld, more
slowly decrease of tariffs for solar PV. According to experts, the company personally attacked
politicians who do not ‘follow’ the requests of SolarWorld as ‘climate killers’ and ‘not having a
sustainable thinking’. One interview partner described the way of lobbying of SolarWorld as “a
Bactrian camel” (Int. 11), another as “overbearing” (Int. 9). Despite a high public perception,
SolarWorld does not help the sector of renewables as its attitude appears to be repellent to
many politicians.
In this context, the Big Four and particularly RWE and E.ON have also been mentioned as
having an arrogant attitude and being a ‘know-it-all’. Political stakeholders emphasized that
they need the information provided by companies but do not appreciate an arrogant behavior
indicating that the sector knows better than politics which laws should be adopted.
On the other hand, most of the companies included in the analysis are being described as
pursuing a constructive way of lobbying, appearing friendly and serious. They get easily in
contact with politicians and have a relaxed, but also intensive personal relation to MPs.
45
Companies are more reserved in that sense that they try to present the interests of the whole
sector and do not come strongly to the fore as a company. Furthermore, they are capable of
accepting advices and hints from politicians regarding energy related issues. Enercon, juwi,
Q.Cells and Schott Solar have been described by the experts as firms pursuing this kind of
attitude.
Interview partners also mentioned the construct of a deliberate distinction to the Big Four. In
the past, almost the whole sector of renewable energy tried to strongly distinguish itself from
the four big electric utilities that mainly provide fossil fuel energy. Renewable business
regularly presented itself as ‘the good ones that care about the environment’ whereas the Big
Four were presented as ‘unsustainable and only interested in profit maximization’. Nowadays
this distinction still takes place publicly, also to mobilize the public and increase public
acceptance. However, some experts pointed out that during internal discussion the positions
of the renewable energy sector and the Big Four are closer than in the past. Since the political
declaration of the energy transition in 2010/2011, all companies operating on the energy
market face similar problems which they have to manage together (Int. 16).
5.3.4 Knowing ‘what’
This category analyzes constructs 8, 23, 25 and 34.
Companies need to know about what exactly they want to talk with a politician once they
approach him/her. This could either be a specific issue or general subjects with no clear
message. Almost all of the political stakeholders interviewed for this research preferred talking
to a company that has a concrete topic or request and wants to discuss it with an MP or a
ministry representative. In particular the members of parliament have a very limited time
schedule and thus prefer discussions about concrete topics. For instance, a company illustrates
the current development of German energy policy and points out the negative implications for
its business. Furthermore, companies should clarify their interests and make clear why they
approach a politician. One expert said MPs need to know “what they can do for the company”
(Int. 1) and how are they able to help. If the interest or request of a company is too vague and
inexplicit, the politician does not receive a clear message and, consequently, cannot take into
account the interests of the company it his/her decision-making. Companies that formulate
concrete topics and requests – according to interview partners - are Viessmann, juwi,
SolarWorld, E.ON and RWE.
Experts also referred to companies that envision disaster scenarios in order to have a stronger
influence on politicians. In general, these threats are not well perceived by the lobbied people
as, first, they feel pressured and, second, the amplified scenarios often turn out to be false.
The solar sector and the Big Four are named as the ones envisioning disaster scenarios.
Examples given by the experts are:
“Your government will not achieve its goal of 80% renewables in 2050, if you do not
implement a certain measure” (company of RES)
“If the tariffs for solar PV are further decreased, the whole sector of solar PV will collapse”.
(company of RES)
46
“If you don’t introduce a capacity market model4, traditional power plants won’t be
profitable anymore. Consequently, we will have to shut down power plants which will lead
to a blackout”. (Big Four)
“If you don’t increase subsidies for off-shore wind, we will not extend out activities in offshore”. (Big Four)
Once a company discusses an issue with a politician it can also take an EU and international
perspective or only focus on the national level of energy policy. Some experts stressed that
targeting a topic with an EU/international perspective is advantageous because many national
decisions taken in the energy sector strongly depend on European Union decision-making.
Thus, a company should be aware and take a greater perspective into account.
5.3.5 Knowing ‘in what way’
5.3.5.1 Continuously keeping contact to politicians
What was most frequently mentioned by the experts and was also identified as one of the
most effective strategies is a continuous keeping of contacts to political decision-makers (c. 1).
This includes all the activities lobbyists carry out in order to be known personally by MPs or
ministry representatives. For instance, companies regularly arrange appointments with
politicians or participate in political events to meet MPs. For political stakeholders it is
important to have a “relationship of confidence” (Int. 2) with a lobbyist who is a person of
integrity and honesty. One expert called this lobby activity “quiet diplomacy” indicating that
lobbyists should present themselves as diplomats of their companies with an appropriate
behavior. While keeping contact, lobbyists should be trustworthy and enable a constructive
exchange of ideas and opinions with politicians. Establishing personal contacts is very
important, also because politicians “do not want to feel lobbied” (Int. 1).
Being positively known by politicians forms the basis for further discussions pursuing of
interests. Experts pointed out that creating a personal network of contact people is highly
important to achieve the company’s goals of lobbying. Traditionally, the big four electric
utilities possess a very extensive network and easily get appointments with members of
parliament. Companies of the renewable energy sector heavily engage in keeping personal
contact as well; juwi, Enercon and Vestas are being mentioned several times by the
interviewees. Being seen in a positive way by politicians is important in the sense that it
evidentially has an influence on decision-making. A political expert referred to the example of
an amendment of the EEG that was reconsidered after a company expressed its concerns on a
specific issue. According to the interviewee this did only happen because the company has
established good and serious relations with the involved decision-makers.
On the other hand, companies that do not establish regular contacts with politicians but only
approach decision-makers if they want to push an urgent issue will not be successful. It is not
4
Electricity generation from renewable energy is more fluctuating and still less reliable than
conventional electricity generation plants. Thus, it is debated if capacity mechanisms are needed to
complement or even substitute the current energy market model (particularly compensate operators of
traditional energy generation plants due to the preference of renewables to be fed into the grid).
47
effective to contact politicians sporadically or reducing the contact to writing letters or sending
information material. In order to have an influence in political decisions, relations to politicians
need to be regularly and personal.
5.3.5.2 Knowledge development
As it has been mentioned before politicians also want to “gain” something once they talk to
companies (c. 6). Members of parliament but also ministry representatives cannot know all
technical details of certain issues in the field of renewable energy. Therefore, they are reliant
on external information that is often provided by companies working in the field of action. All
political experts emphasized that they are not interested in a “purely promotion of the
company” (Int. 1) but want to be informed about unclear and unknown topics. By talking to
many different companies political stakeholders get a general idea about a certain issue and
are able to form an opinion.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the information provided by the company is correct on which
politicians can rely. Contrary to public opinion on lobbyism, the correctness of the information
forms the basis of every discussion between a politician and a company. By providing false
information a company will harm itself significantly. Political experts described if finding out a
company did not tell the truth with regards to data and facts, it will later on have a reputation
of a liar (Int. 13). Also, politicians become skeptical and mistrustful towards the company and
will not be as open-minded to its requests and interests as before.
Knowledge development also includes offering of external expertise or technical solutions by
companies. Providing politicians with valuable and credible facts helps them in the process of
decision-making but also contributes to their personal distinction among other colleagues. One
company expert described it as very effective to provide a politician with “exclusive and new
information that no one knows so far”. That way a political stakeholder gets the feeling of
having an advanced knowledge. Moreover, companies should not only lobby for their own
interests but offer their services, products and advice to solve problems, for instance on the
extension of grid infrastructure. Politicians also expect companies to ask what the current
problems are and how they can contribute to avoid or solve them (Int. 7).
When providing information, some companies present a written draft law or the exact
formulation of a law to politicians which they can directly adopt. Also, official statements are
being sent out which are professionally formulated and could also serve as a draft law. Some
political experts said if the company is trustworthy and the content of the formulated law is
right, it is indeed helpful and might be forwarded to the next level of decision-making.
However, experts criticized the fact that companies actively write a law in cooperation with a
ministry. It was described as problematic if companies directly profited from this law (Int. 7
and 18); others were strictly against this method indicating that ministries should be able to
draft a law alone (Int. 2, 6 and 18).
48
5.3.5.3 Lobbying within an association
The most common way of representing business interests is the organizing of companies
within an industry association (c. 2). By the majority of experts this form of lobbying was
mentioned as important and effective in order to influence politics. Table 6 gives an overview
of the most influential associations in the field of traditional and renewable energy. Usually,
associations – so called ‘Verbände’ – follow internal democratic structures. They collect and
coordinate the various interests of their member companies until publishing official
statements and recommendations and making them available to the public and political
stakeholders. Often this process can be described as ‘finding the least common denominator’
as all companies need to agree on a certain common interest.
Associations are perceived very differently by the interviewed experts. On the one hand,
politicians point out their importance as they represent a whole business sector and not only
the interests of a single company. Thus, companies possess a higher influence when lobbying
together as a group. Members of parliament also referred to the role of associations as “a
mediator between companies and politics” and that they must act as a reliable partner for
politics providing useful information (Int. 17). Politicians are more credible when basing their
decisions on the interests of a whole sector when many different players are affected. On the
other hand, it is apparent that associations cannot provide concrete and specific information
than a company could. Also, by only representing the least common denominator of interests,
individual concerns of economic stakeholders become less visible. Consequently, many
political stakeholders prefer talking to associations and many different company
representatives at the same time in order to get ‘the whole picture’.
Furthermore, the various associations of renewable energy have been critically evaluated by
the interviewees. Whereas the BDEW (Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft) is a
strong and big organization representing mainly the interests of the traditional energy sector,
the BEE (Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie) is perceived much less influential. Many
companies prefer lobbying within a specific association of their sector (e.g. solar, wind, biogas)
than organizing themselves in the umbrella organization BEE. Hence, being less supported by
companies, the BEE lost much of its influence in politics. The BSW representing solar industry
pursues high-pressure lobbying which is not always perceived positively by politicians. Experts
criticized its attitude and sometimes aggressive way of lobbying as “unprofessional, highly
dismissive and ineffective” (Int. 5 and 9) and referred to diverging interests of member
companies. The BWE representing wind industry enjoys a better reputation as being better
organized and representing common interest. The biomass sector was criticized by some
experts as being too fragmented having too many different associations. Representative
organizations of hydro and geothermal energy do not have a strong influence on politics.
49
Name
Sector
No. of members
Bundesverband der Energie- und
Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW)
Energy and Water
1,800 companies
Verband kommunaler Unternehmen (VKU)
Bundesverband Neuer Energieanbieter e.V.
(bne)
Energy , Water,
Disposal
Energy providers
without own grid
1,400 companies
16 companies
Renewable Energy
25 federations with
30,000 individual
members & companies
Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft e.V. (BSWSolar)
Solar energy
800 companies
Bundesverband WindEnergie eV. (BWE)
Wind energy
Biogas
Biogas
Vegetable oils
20,000 companies
158
(24 federations, 127
companies & research
facilities)
4,400 companies
45 companies
No information
Hydro power
8 regional federations
Geothermal energy
900 companies
18 regional federations
and 45 associated
federations &
institutions
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e.V. (BEE)
Bundesverband Bioenergie e.V. (BBE)
Fachverband Biogas e.V.
Biogasrat e.V.
Bundesverband Pflanzenöle e.V
Bundesverband Deutscher Wasserkraftwerke
e.V. (BDW)
Bundesverband Geothermie e.V.
Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV)
(umbrella organization)
Bio-energy
Agriculture
Table 6: Overview of associations of traditional and renewable energy
5.3.5.4 Representative offices & political events
Many of the companies that lobby for their interests have a representative office in Berlin
where most of political decision-making takes place (c. 7). Experts emphasized networking
demands having contact people who monitor the current developments of energy policy and
are close to political stakeholders. Though having an office with employees in the capital it is
not regarded by experts as a necessity to lobby effectively. What is crucial is having at least
one contact person of a company who continuously approaches politicians. Most of the
companies included in the analysis keep a representative office in Berlin. SolarWorld as a big
player on the market of solar PV is not represented in Berlin, but operates in Bonn – the
former capital and still seat of some ministries, amongst others the ministry of environment
which is responsible for the EEG. Thus being geographically close to Bonn and the BMU is an
advantage, too.
Some companies that do not have financial resources to keep a representative office in Berlin
but want to engage in the lobbying process nevertheless, hire external public affairs agencies
that represent the interests of a company (c. 13).
50
An important part of networking is to visit and organize political events where members of
parliament, ministry representatives and other political stakeholders meet representatives of
companies and associations (c. 9). These events are often arranged along a certain topic which
reflects current developments of the energy system and are usually organized by a company or
a business association. Experts and members of parliament are invited to speak and after and
to have a public discussion afterwards. Within a week of parliamentary session, up to ten
different events per week can take place, usually so called ‘Parliamentary evenings’, ‘Energy
policy breakfast’ or big garden parties in summer (normally organized by one of the Big Four).
According to political experts, two factors play a role in their decision to attend such an event.
First, a specific and interesting topic must be discussed that has not yet been debated in other
events in the same period of time. Second, as politicians attend events to meet important
stakeholders, the size of the event and the selection of guests are important. If the event is too
small it is less interesting for politicians. For this reason, often companies align with each other
to organize an event.
Even if a company does not organize an event itself, it is important that its representatives visit
political events to get in contact with members of parliament and other companies.
5.3.5.5 Mobilizing the public
Some of the companies included in the analysis try to mobilize the public by big and small
public relations campaigns (c. 4). Advertisements in newspapers and magazines, television
spots or banner ads in football stadiums are some of the means companies use. The intention
of public relation is twofold: First, public acceptance of renewable energy projects shall be
increased in order to prevent a ‘NIMBY’ effect (‘Not in my backyard’). Within the energy
transition large infrastructure projects to extend the grid in particular might be disapproved by
citizens. Second, many of the experts confirmed that political decision-makers are “very
susceptible” for and “highly influenced” by the voters’ will (Int. 3, 19, 20) indicating that they
are dependent on public acceptance for their decision to be re-elected. Thus, public relations
campaigns also try to indirectly influence political decisions by directing public’s attention to
certain issues.
Not only with the decision of phasing-out nuclear energy in 2011 but well ahead, traditional
energy companies, in particular the Big Four, try to improve their negative public image by
large-scale advertising campaigns. However, once this leads to a form of ‘greenwashing’ the
result might be negative: The German Atomic panel (Deutsches Atomforum e.V.) published an
advertisement in 2010 showing a nuclear power plant and wind mills on a greenfield (fig. 12).
By entitling it with “Climate protectors among themselves. Nuclear power plant Brokdorf and
wind power: CO2 emissions = 0” nuclear power shall be associated with clean energy. However,
this campaign was received rather negative resulting in a complaint of the wind mill
manufacturer Enercon which refused to be linked with nuclear power.
51
Figure 12: Advertisement of German Nuclear Panel
Companies of renewable energy still refer to fossil fuel energy to publicly distinguish
themselves from “unsustainable and dirty forms of energy generation”. SolarWorld highly
invests in public relations campaigns to increase public and political acceptance of solar PV.
Next to many other forms of advertisements it reformulated the slogan of RWE in order to
incorporate it in its own ad (fig. 14). “VoRWEg gehen” means ‘going ahead’ and shall refer to
the innovative ability of RWE. However, when omitting the first three letters, ‘going ahead’
becomes ‘going away’ which SolarWorld used in it slogan: ‘Going away… and producing your
own energy at home!”. Although the use of the poster has been enjoined later (following a
complaint of RWE), the campaign illustrates the public relations strategy of SolarWorld:
Advertising campaigns of the solar company are often polarizing and emphasize positive
characteristics of solar energy compared to fossil fuel energy.
Figure 13: Slogan of RWE and advertisement of SolarWorld
Interviewed experts evaluate public relations campaigns differently: Whereas some
acknowledge their positive effects on people which increase public acceptance and eventually
influence political decision-making, others refer to possible negative impacts. It is the solar
sector in particular that is able to mobilize many people who then might attack politics for
certain decisions, e.g. the reduction of tariffs for solar PV. However, when political decisionmakers are convinced of decisions as being the right ones but at the same time are being
52
attacked disproportionally it comes back negatively at the companies involved in the
campaign.
Another form of artificially mobilizing the public is ‘Astroturphing’ (c. 31). Here, companies hire
external public relations firms to “create” group of citizens or experts which publicly promote
the interests of a company. Thus, it is pretended that grass-roots movements have developed
in order to support a certain issue. By creating these movements, companies can highly
benefit: “The use of such 'front groups' enables corporations to take part in public debates and
government hearings behind a cover of community concern. These front groups lobby
governments to legislate in the corporate interest, to oppose environmental regulations, and
to introduce policies that enhance corporate profitability” (Beder, 1998).
5.3.5.6 Political landscape management
Political landscape management (c. 5) includes all activities of a company to establish and
maintain close relations to political parties and their decision-makers.
The most common form is party donations that can be given continuously or to support
election campaigns of parties or single politicians. In Germany, party donations above 50,000
€ need to be reported immediately to the President of the parliament and be published
subsequently; party donations above 10,000 € but under 50,000 € need to be published in
statements of accounts of parties. Experts confirmed that party donations from companies
operating in the field of renewable energy occur regularly but are not as publicly discussed as
donations from other industry or banking companies. While in the past, most donations have
been given to SPD and Grüne which were very supportive of renewable energy, this has
changed over the years as nowadays all parties ‘officially’ support renewables. Experts and
internet research indicate that it is the solar sector in particular that financially supported
parties over the last years. For instance, SolarWorld donated 25,000 € each in 2007, 2008 and
2009 to the SPD in Bonn, First Solar donated 15,000 € in 2009 to the same recipient.5 In 2009,
other solar companies supported the CSU, the Bavarian sister party of CDU. IBC Solar donated
45,000 € and Phoenix Solar AG around 21,000 €; the Green Party was supported by SolarWorld
(15,000 €) and Lichtblick, a company of sustainable energy (10,000 €)6.
Although party donations are a common way of influencing political decision-making, experts
did not accredit a very high influence to it. They are only effective when accompanied by other
lobbying strategies mentioned above, such as continuous personal contacts of companies to
politicians. Also, as governments change regularly, financial support should not be focused on
specific parties but include all. Other interviewees expressed their concerns about party
donations indicating that they can be even problematic for a company when too high and
receiving a negative public perception. Two experts highly criticized the use of party donations,
even referring to it as “bribery” in some cases (Int. 20).
5
http://www.ulrich-kelber.de/glaesernermdb/spendenueberblick/index.html
http://blog.abgeordnetenwatch.de/2011/03/03/parteispenden-von-eads-philip-morris-und-kraussmaffei-bundestag-luftet-geheimnis-nach-mehr-als-einem-jahr/
6
53
Another aspect of political landscape management is the fact that companies invite politicians
to visit their production sites in order to inform them about the production process and
connect political decision-makers with the board of management (c. 16). This again has a
reciprocal effect: Political stakeholders gain more detailed information and companies usually
receive positive media attention when a politician visits their production plants.
Companies also try to connect with the political system by hiring former politicians, scientific
assistants or ministry employees (c. 28). With the help of a smart staffing policy companies
acquire highly qualified personnel that have an in-depth understanding of the political process
and know how to effectively influence decision-making.
5.3.5.7 Deep lobbying
Deep lobbing (c. 11) can be described as a process that shapes the intellectual atmosphere
around decision-makers and politicized topics which are based on a political and economic
agenda (Wallace-Wells, 2003). Very often, think tanks try to influence politics through
publications or subliminal messages.
Deep lobbying can either occur in the form of (semi-) scientific publications which are
published in order to support a certain issue. Usually, it is the associations collaborating with
scientific institutions in order to publish results. Experts confirmed that especially the big four
electric utilities make use of this method and regularly commission studies. Though the
scientific correctness can hardly be denied, these studies still represent a subjective point of
view which often favors the interests of a business sector. For instance, studies commissioned
by the Big Four often emphasize the high costs of solar PV while studies commissioned by the
wind, solar or biomass sector highlight the benefits of each RES source. Some interview
partners agreed on the fact that scientific publications have an influence on political
stakeholders and can even be cited in political statements.
Another form of deep lobbying is to establish close relations to journalists and the media.
Economic experts confirmed that some companies regularly provide journalist with specific
information and try to ‘activate’ them in order to report positively on renewable energy and
specific RES in particular. Though economic experts defend the influencing of journalists as
common practice, others criticized this approach of lobbying arguing that journalists lose their
critical control function in a democracy.
5.3.5.8 Holistic view of the system
Finally, companies are more effective in their lobby activities when they take up a holistic view
of the energy system (c. 12). Many experts considered companies more credible if they not
only fight for their own company’s interests but also regard current and future challenges of
the system, for instance system integration of renewables, grid extension or other specific
problems of the transformation of the energy system. Political stakeholders expect from the
business sector to look beyond the borders of their own sectors and also develop solutions for
the energy transition.
54
However, as the majority of companies still direct their lobby activities to the Renewable
Energy Sources Act and its amendments, they are mainly interested in feed-in tariffs and focus
their lobbying on what is best for the company. In order to have a greater influence and
actively contribute to the success of the energy transition companies should question current
developments of energy policy and lobby activities of companies and offer their expertise to
transform the system.
55
6 Statistical Analysis
6.1
Most effective lobby strategies
After having identified various constructs of lobby activities, interview partners were asked to
name the three most effective strategies of how a company can influence political decisionmaking. From all the lobby activities mentioned in chapter 5, experts recognized 21 strategies
as being most important. Mentioned by 13 out of 20 interview partners, ‘having a regular and
personal contact to politicians’ is considered to be most effective for a company. Seven
experts also named ‘knowledge development with correct information’ as being very
important. The complete range of most effective lobby strategies can be seen in figure 14.
Except the two most frequently mentioned activities, experts had rather different perceptions
of what the most effective ways of influencing politics are. For instance, ten of the most
effective strategies were only mentioned by one interviewee.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Regular & personal contact to politicians
Knowledge development with correct information
Lobbying within association
Top-down: contacting the most powerful decision-…
Contacting technical level, specific committees
Public relations campaigns to mobilize public
Offering external expertise, technical solutions
Visiting & organizing of events
Knowing the right people to contact
Holistic view of the energy system
Concrete topic/request; clarify interests
Political landscape management
Ability of self-criticism
Drafting exact formulation of a new law
Inviting politicians to visit company
EU- and international perspective
‘Deep lobbying’
Not trying to impose decisions
High credibility within energy transition
Knowing the right time to contact
Weakening opponents
Figure 14: Most effective lobby strategies
6.2
Analysis and interpretation of the grid
The statistical analysis was carried out with SPSS (Statistical Package of the Social Sciences) by
inserting elements, constructs and ranking values of companies in the data matrix. Here, the
companies (= elements) served as cases, whereas a combination of interviewee and lobby
strategy served as variables, for instance I1S1 (interviewee 1 + strategy 1) or I5S14
(interviewee 5 + strategy 14). In total, the analysis included 50 variables and 13 cases. Due to
the fact that the company ‘Andritz Hydro’ was unknown to almost all interview partners, it has
not been ranked and consequently was excluded from the analysis. Thus, the number of cases
is 13 and not – as expected – 14.
14
56
The purpose of the statistical analysis is to detect differences and similarities between
companies with regards to their lobby activities. Therefore, a Multiple Correspondence
Analysis was conducted which
“quantifies nominal (categorical) data by assigning numerical values to the cases (objects) and
categories so that objects within the same category are close together and objects in different
categories are far apart”. (Meulmann et al, 2010)
The analysis generated a two-dimensional figure that plots the 13 companies (fig. 15). The
output of the SPSS analysis can be found in annex 6.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
E.ON
RWE
EnBW
Vattenfall
Viessmann
SolarWorld
Q.Cells
8
9
10
11
12
13
juwi
Schott Solar
Vestas
Enercon
First Solar
agri.capital
Figure 15: Companies 1 to 13 plotted in a two-dimensional figure
57
Looking at the figure, it is apparent that the companies of the Big Four (E.ON, RWE, EnBW and
Vattenfall) form a clear cluster of companies pursuing the same interests and using similar
lobby strategies. Thus, the left side of the y-axis and in particular the quadrant top left depicts
companies that allocate high financial resources to their lobby activities, having traditional
strong ties with political decision-makers and generally lobby on a high pressure level. This side
of the axis certainly shows how the big four electric utilities pursue their interests on the
German energy market.
On the contrary, the right side of the y-axis depicts all companies of the renewable energy
sector. More precisely, companies in the top right quadrant pursue the most common way of
lobbying with regards to renewable energy. However, the lower companies are situated in the
bottom right quadrant, the more unknown they are and the less they dedicate time and
money to extensive lobby activities.
In the following, the spatial arrangement indicating similarities and differences between
companies will be further analyzed.
6.2.1 Left side of the plot
As expected, the big four electric utilities are arranged closely together in the top left corner of
the plot. As they are not companies focusing on the renewable energy market but being
energy providers, they are concerned with an overall development of the energy system, thus
pursuing different interests than the companies on the right side. Clearly, the left side of the
plot depicts the most powerful companies, also in terms of profit and number of employees, as
well as the typical regime parties that traditionally dominated the energy system.
The Big Four all score high on the ranking on ‘having regular and personal contacts to
politicians’ due to their longtime lobby activities on the energy market. Traditionally, they
possess the right “channels” into politics and know exactly whom, when and how to contact.
Interviewed experts also referred to the fact that it is only the Big Four who spend very high
financial sums on lobbying that allows them to have large representative offices in Berlin,
employ many lobbyists and organize well attended political events. Furthermore, these
companies are the only ones being able to personally contact the most powerful decisionmakers such as the chancellor or ministers. An exception of the renewable sector is SolarWorld
which is also able to directly contact responsible ministers.
Furthermore, experts referred to the Big Four as having a holistic view of the energy system
due to their high responsibility as electric utilities. However, they also tend to envision disaster
scenarios to increase pressure on politics.
Analyzing more precisely the relationship between the Big Four, it is apparent that E.ON (1) is
located farthest to the left. It indicates the outstanding position of the company generating the
highest profit and having the biggest number of employees of all companies included in the
analysis. With regards to ‘having regular and personal contacts to politicians’, ‘knowledge
development’ and ‘top-down contacting’ it scores slightly better than the other three. Experts
58
referred to the “highly professionalized way of lobbying” (Int. 1) of E.ON which is, however,
occasionally not as “relaxed and personal” as of companies of renewable energy. EnBW (3) is
located slightly more above which indicates, due to its regional bonds with the state of BadenWürttemberg, that the company is regarded a bit more “down-to earth” (Int. 7) and more
positively perceived by the public. RWE (2) follows the same approach as E.ON and possesses
longtime contacts to MPs and ministries. Its CEO Jürgen Großmann, however, often receives
negative public attention and is being regarded by some experts as “arrogant and
unappealing”. Vattenfall (4) is positioned lowest from all of the four companies. Though
following the same lobby approach as E.ON, EnBW and RWE, and operating on the German
energy market for ten years, Vattenfall is still considered as a “the Swedish enterprise” with a
little less influence than the three “German” electric utilities. Furthermore, particularly in the
northern part of Germany Vattenfall has a very negative public image mainly due to its nuclear
power activities.
6.2.2 Right side of the plot
The right side of the y-axis depicts all companies from the renewable energy sector.
Particularly noticeable are the positions of SolarWorld (6) and First Solar (12) that are
positioned highest in the top right quadrant as well as of agri.capital (13) and Viessmann (5)
that are located in the lower part of the bottom right corner. The remaining five – Q.Cells, juwi,
Schott Solar, Vestas and Enercon – form a cluster of companies pursuing a similar lobby
approach.
Regarding the top right quadrant, SolarWorld and First Solar are most far away from the
majority of the companies due to their strong and prominent role as representatives of the
sector of solar PV. They are most visible and recognizable on the market of renewable.
According to experts, both have in common a rather aggressive way of lobbying, working
within the solar association BSW-Solar and only focusing on the company’s interests. They
strongly demand a continuation of feed-in tariffs for solar PV and oppose a higher reduction of
fees. After balancing reasons about whether continuing to operate on the German market with
falling tariffs and Asian markets with lower production costs, First Solar even decided to cease
manufacturing in Germany in 2012. Thus, lobby activities were almost solely directed at the
EEG and the feed-in-system. With regards to ‘having a regular and personal contact to
politicians’, First Solar received different scores from experts, ranging from medium to higher
values.
Contrary to the expectations of the researcher, SolarWorld did not take a more ‘outstanding
position’ within the plot but is close to First Solar. Although many experts perceived and
characterized SolarWorld very differently from all other companies, it received similar scores
as First Solar in the ranking. SolarWorld pursues ‘high pressure lobbying’ by making use of
media and public relations campaigns as well as having close connections to the environment
ministry in Bonn and regional decision-makers. Personal contacts to members of parliament or
representatives from the economic ministry are far weaker than of other companies.
Moreover, SolarWorld – nowadays being the biggest producer of solar cells in Germany – does
not have a representative office in Berlin but prefers to conduct its lobby activities mainly
59
through the work of its CEO and a few lobbyists. Regarding his appearance, some experts
compared the CEO of SolarWorld, Frank Asbeck, to the CEO of RWE, Jürgen Großmann, both
heavily promoting their companies’ interests. Some interview partners criticized the aggressive
way of lobbying by SolarWorld which also includes personal discrimination of politicians (Int. 9).
However, politicians who support the interests of SolarWorld are being supported by the
company, mainly through financial donations in election campaigns. Whereas some interview
partners regard high and regular party donations as legitimate, in the case of SolarWorld, one
expert referred to them as “bribery” (Int. 20). Another reason why SolarWorld is located on
top of the quadrant is its rather opportunistic attitude which rarely looks for agreements with
other companies from the solar sector (Int. 4). Nevertheless, SolarWorld and First Solar
received quite high scores on the ranking of ‘working within an association’.
The other companies representing the sector of solar – Q.Cells (7) and Schott Solar (9) – are
different to the two companies mentioned above and similar the other three representatives
of renewable energy located in the middle of the right side. Q.Cells and Schott Solar focus
more on lobbying within the association and try to profit from frequent and personal contacts
to political decision-making, especially local politicians. They do not spend as many financial
resources on lobbying as the Big Four and SolarWorld and can be described as more reserved.
Experts referred to Schott Solar as “having a respectful behavior towards politicians” and
“lobbying for the interests of the whole solar industry” (Int. 9).
Enercon (11) and Vestas (10) - being the biggest manufacturer of wind turbines in Germany are located in the middle of the right side of the plot, close to the x-axis. Juwi (8) as a project
engineer and developer combines all sectors of renewable energy in its portfolio and is similar
to companies 7, 9, 10 and 11. It is assumed that the far left positions (within the top right
quadrant) of juwi and Enercon is a result of their high market share and company size which
automatically leads to higher possibilities of influencing politics. Moreover, they can be
regarded as least controversial indicating that most stakeholders can get along with them.
Vestas, Enercon and juwi are being described by the experts as having a positive and friendly
attitude and following a so called ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach: Looking for valuable partners in
politics, engage in regular networking (in particular through organizing and visiting political
events) and offering their expertise and exclusive information to political stakeholders. They
are also aware of the importance of scientific assistants of MPs and thus frequently address
them as well. Moreover, similar to Schott Solar, they do not look for high media attention nor
do they invest strongly in public relations campaigns. In general, experts regard these
companies with favor, and prefer this way of lobbying. Hence, just as the Big Four constitute a
cluster of energy companies representing the traditional regime parties, on the right side, the
cluster of companies 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 form a cluster of renewable energy companies that
pursue the most common (‘mainstream’) way of lobbying.
The bottom right quadrant depicts another form of lobbying which is less visible than lobby
activities from companies positioned above. Located very far away from the others and thus
pursuing a different lobby strategy are the two companies representing the biomass sector:
While agri.capital (13) develops and operates biogas plants, Viessmann (5) is traditionally a
manufacturer of heating systems, including – next to condensing technology oil and gas
systems – solar thermal and photovoltaic systems as well as biomass heating systems and
60
biogas systems. Its business areas which are quite different from the other companies explain
the ‘outside position’ of Viessmann. It also follows a distinct lobby approach by focusing on
specific branch or topic lobbying; it concentrates its activities on few but concrete issues that
are relevant for the company. Moreover, Viessmann does not operate aggressively but rather
“reserved and conservative” and establishes a strategic network of political partners (Int. 9).
However, compared to other companies included in the analysis, Viessmann is quite unknown
for the public and consumers and thus least ‘visible’.
Agri.capital (13) is located slightly closer to the other companies of renewable energy but is
also publicly unknown. It cannot exert high influence within its association as the sector of
biomass does not have one strong association, but several ones pursuing different interests.
Also, agri.capital received low to medium scores when it comes to ‘having regular and personal
contact to politicians’. However, it has to be noted that the ranking of agri.capital has many
missing values due to the fact that many experts were not able to evaluate the lobby activities
of the company. Out of 50 possible values, agri.capital only received 22 which certainly
influences the analysis and its position in the plot. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the only
two companies representing the biomass sector are clearly separated from the other
companies included in the analysis. Their lobby strategy is far more reserved and “quiet” and
does not attract much attention.
6.2.3 Summing up of the plot
The plot which was developed through a statistical analysis of SPSS depicts the diverse lobby
strategies of companies and the differences between them. Combined with the qualitative
analysis it can be concluded that the plot graphically illustrates the various forms of lobbying
on the market of traditional and renewable energy. Regarding the position of companies in the
plot and the values they received in the data matrix, an explanation of the axes can be derived.
The x-axis represents the characteristics and the role of companies being included in the
analysis. Thus, traditional regime players, i.e. companies that mainly operate on the market of
fossil energy are located left whereas companies of the sector of renewable energy are
depicted on the right side. The y-axis represents the way companies pursue their lobby
activities. The more located on the top, the more aggressively companies lobby and the more
visible and recognizable they are for political stakeholders and the public. However, the more
located at the bottom, companies are less visible and pursue a rather reserved strategy of
lobbying. The plot also gives information about the ‘mainstream’ form of lobbying, i.e. the
most common way companies pursue their interests: all companies following a similar
approach of lobbying within their category (either traditional or renewable energy players) are
located above the x-axis in the center. Figure 16 illustrates the plot with additional labeling of
the axis.
61
LOUD & VISIBLE
TRADITIONAL
REGIME PLAYERS
RENEWABLE PLAYERS
QUIET & LESS VISIBLE
Figure 16: Characterization of the plot
62
7 Discussion
7.1
Discussion of the results
The analysis has shown that corporate business of renewable energy strongly influences
political decision-making related to the German energy transition. It is apparent that, for
making the energy transition happen, technological developments of the business sector are
needed. Thus – although members of parliament shall make decisions impartially – politicians
are highly influenced by the interests of economic stakeholders. Political experts yet pointed
out the need for lobbying in order to gain more information and incorporate interests of
affected stakeholders in their decisions. The great majority of interviewed experts perceived
lobby activities as positive and essential for democracy, if companies do not resort to
dishonesty. Only the political party ‘The Left’ and an anti-lobby NGO explicitly criticized the
way lobbying occurs in the German political system. They demand more transparency about
lobbyists and their activities.
The selection of interview partners proved to be useful as both economic and political
stakeholders were able to inform about various types of lobby activities and evaluate their
effectiveness. As it was elucidated in chapter 5.3 and 6.1, experts identified many different
constructs of lobby activities (36 in total) and considered 21 of them as ‘most effective’. By
comparing lobby strategies that are most frequently applied by companies and at the same
time being also quite effective, a final scheme has been developed (see fig. 17). Companies
which effectively influence political decision-making usually make use of the strategies
depicted in the scheme below. It has to be noted, however, that it is not an ‘either – or’
decision of which strategy to apply but rather implementing a combination of various lobby
activities simultaneously. Having a regular and personal contact with political stakeholders is
most essential on which all other lobby strategies are based.
INTERESTS
•Profit maximization
•EEG + feed-in tariffs
•General market
conditions
•Long-term market
competitiveness
Figure 17: Final lobbying scheme
LOBBYING
• Regular & personal maintenance of
contact to politicians
• Lobbying within association
• Knowledge development with
correct information
• Top-down contacting
• Public relations campaigns
• Offering external expertise,
technical solutions
• Visiting & organizing of political
events
• Knowing the right people to
contact
• Concrete topic/request
• Holistic view of energy system
INFLUENCE
•Companies' interests
are represented in
political decisionmaking
63
Though lobby activities discussed in the analysis are considered to be most effective by all
experts, current and past developments of the renewable energy sector are noticeable: The
big four electric utilities E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall by far invest most financial resources
to lobby activities, including the employment of a high number of lobbyists who cultivate
longtime relations to politicians or the organization of big political events. Despite this form of
high-pressure lobbying, however, the Big Four were most disadvantaged by the 2011’s
decision to transform the German energy system. Traditionally focused on energy generation
by lignite, hard coal and nuclear, the companies’ portfolio of the Big Four will ultimately not
‘fit’ in a future energy supply system. Thus, although beginning to enter the market of
renewables, the Big Four are trying to delay the energy transition in order to minimize their
financial losses as much as possible. At the same time, companies representing the sector of
sustainable energy are trying to increase the speed of the energy transition. Two factors seem
crucial for the diminishing influence of the Big Four:
1. Since the beginning of the 2000s, renewable energy has received tremendous political
support in terms of the Renewable Energy Sources Act and its regular amendments.
This can be ascribed to a political will of the government coalition of SPD and Grüne
(1998 - 2005) and increasing lobby activities of the renewable energy sector. Though
geographically Germany might not be an ideal location to generate electricity out of
sunlight, highest rates of capacity expansion have been recorded for solar PV. Thus, by
supporting solar PV, political decision-making strongly took into account the interests
of related companies.
2. The decision in 2011 to phase-out nuclear power was primarily a decision in favor of
the voters’ will. By following the interests of a great public majority which fought
against the use of nuclear power for decades, the German government gave top
priority to maintaining its political power than incorporating the interests of the Big
Four into decision-making. It becomes apparent that lobbying can influence politics,
but only up to a certain extent. Usually, when decision-makers see their political
power waning, they try to preserve it while companies’ interests become less
important and influential. Hence, despite high pressure lobbying, E.ON, RWE, EnBW
and Vattenfall were not able to influence the decision of the German energy
transition.
The example of SolarWorld is also worth noticing: many experts criticized the way how
SolarWorld is trying to influence political decision-making. Their lobby strategy was often
described as “aggressive”, “arrogant” and “overbearing”. Nevertheless, when being ranked on
the scale of effectiveness, SolarWorld did not receive low, but medium to high values
indicating that its lobby activities are quite effective. Consequently, it can be noted that
attitude and manner of appearance leave a mark at politicians but do not affect the
effectiveness of a lobby strategy. The success of SolarWorld, contrary to many other
manufacturers of solar cells, is based on various factors:


Take the right business decisions, e.g. expand to other markets and do not solely rely
on subsidies
Get involved with politics (CEO Frank Asbeck is a co-founder of the green party)
64


Effectively address consumers and increase acceptance
Effectively influence political decision-making: top-down contacting, financial support
of political parties and politicians, contact the right people
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if SolarWorld will be able to maintain its high political
influence in the future. Decisions to further decrease tariffs for solar PV and raising the
importance of other renewable energy sources indicate a shift in political priorities. Companies
such as juwi, Enercon and Vestas demonstrate that lobby activities without attracting high
attention can be effective and successful as well.
7.2
Implications for the energy transition
As the analysis has shown lobby activities of the business sector have a strong influence on
political decision-making related to the German energy transition. However, as companies
mainly pursue individual interests, their influence on politics does not necessarily imply
continuous progress towards a sustainable energy system. What role politics and the sector of
renewable energy will have to play in the future can be interpreted differently.
On the one hand it can be argued that ‘governance by government’ is needed: it is primarily
politics that is responsible for the success of the energy transition by setting a favorable
conditional framework for all stakeholders involved. Companies need to be enabled to unfold
their full potential in order to effectively contribute to the energy transition, e.g. by developing
technology and overcoming the ‘valley of death’. It was particularly economic stakeholders
who stressed the importance of politics to create a reliable market environment, ensure
planning security for investments and adopt ‘indiscriminative policies’. These imply laws and
regulations that do not favor a certain renewable energy source nor indicate the exact
distribution of RES shares in the future energy system. In that sense many experts criticized
the ‘disproportional’ support of solar PV in the past and demand equal conditions for all
renewable energy sources. Moreover, the government shall set a strong conditional
framework that will be applied by all companies involved (fossil fuel and renewable).
As it is politics which has set ambitious targets of having a share of renewables in the
electricity supply of 30% in 2020 and 80% in 2050, many economic stakeholders expect the
political system to make it work. Politics has to provide a concept of how to achieve the energy
transition that economically motivates companies. However, experts also referred to the fact
that politics entered into a commitment by stating very concrete goals. This commitment
might be used by companies of the renewable energy sector to demand more support in terms
of subsidies and favorable amendments of the EEG. Nevertheless, although politics is
dependent on corporate business to further promote technologies of renewable energy,
energy efficiency and grid infrastructure it must refuse to be ‘blackmailed’ by the sector.
As the energy transition is a complex project which requires not only high investments but also
public acceptance, particularly when it comes to the extension of the grid, three interview
partners deny that a free market economy is able to finally lead to a sustainable energy supply.
They believe that a centrally planned economy is more helpful where the political system
determines demand and supply and does not “discuss about every single issue in order to
65
achieve 100% acceptance” (Int. 13). Though all of the experts (including the three mentioned)
prefer a liberalized market, these statements emphasize the high challenges and problems
related to the energy transition.
On the other hand one might argue for a ‘governance by corporate business’ approach: it is
the business sector which is mainly responsible for the process of transforming the energy
system. Some interview partners explained that companies must not expect politics to make
the transition happen but need to actively contribute themselves. Political stakeholders
demand companies to take a greater responsibility and to not follow an approach of “produce
it and forget it” (Int. 12). In detail, companies – being technical experts and having specific
knowledge - shall bring in ideas and solutions for current and future problems of the energy
system and support political decision-makers. By doing so, companies will also have a greater
influence on the design of energy policy. However, as the energy transition 2011 was mainly a
political will, it still requires governmental guidance to coordinate companies’ activities.
It is apparent that experts demand the application of two approaches: ‘governance by
government’ and ‘governance by corporate business’. However, regarding the outcomes of the
analysis and the characteristics of the energy system and energy policy, the paradigm
‘governance by policy networking’ seems to prevail in reality. Governmental actors collaborate
with civil society, especially the business sector of traditional and renewable energy. Lobbying
of economic stakeholders plays a crucial role in political decision-making; politicians are
dependent on external information provided by companies and associations. Nevertheless,
two features of the approach might be criticized: First, while policy networking focuses on
collaboration, it also lacks competition. As politicians prefer having a regular rather than a
sporadic contact to economic stakeholders, companies that do not engage in lobby activities
cannot “enter” the policy network, thus being often disregarded. Second, Hisschemöller et al.
also criticize that ‘governance by policy networking’ yields conservatism rather than
innovation:
“The networks to be governed become part and parcel of the governance setting itself, in other
words; they become institutionalized and resistant to innovative views and actors”
(Hisschemöller et al, 2006).
One can find this characteristic of policy networking in the German energy system as
companies of renewable energy focus their lobby activities on the legislative framework than
on innovative developments. The ones being part of the network are considered by political
stakeholders, however, small innovative companies that are still outside network and
representing a niche are often ignored. The current and future challenges of the energy
transition, particularly the extension of the grid and the increase of energy efficiency, highly
demand the inclusion of all companies capable of innovation. Though ministries try to
stimulate innovation by concluding contracts of innovative projects to the business sector,
companies being in the network automatically receive preferential treatment due to their
higher financial resources and lobby activities.
66
7.3
Reflections on research
Summing up, the research has been satisfactory and the applied method was well chosen.
Repertory Grid proved to be a suitable technique to investigate the problem and to unfold
stakeholders’ perceptions of lobbying and the activities of the renewable energy sector in
Germany.
None of the interview partners knew the interview technique before but all were curious to
become acquainted with it and perceived it positively in the end. ‘The game with the cards’
and comparing different companies allowed experts to identify many different constructs. Due
to their longtime expertise and involvement in the sector of renewable energy, interviewees
were able to illustrate concrete examples of companies’ behavior and lobby activities. With
few exceptions, experts were also able to distinguish companies and allocate different values
on the ranking.
Nevertheless, the research was also accompanied by a few challenges: In the beginning the
researcher faced difficulties in finding interview partners. Though political stakeholders in
general were willing to provide information, their time schedules hardly allowed an interview
of one hour. Thanks to the external placement company and permanent contact requests the
desired number of politicians could finally be interviewed. The majority of economic
stakeholders, on the contrary, was very hesitant to being available for an interview and often
denied the researcher’s requests. In general, companies do not want to ‘reveal’ their lobby
activities and the way they influence politics. Here, it was the external supervisor in particular
who used his broad network of contacts and enabled interviews with company
representatives. The delay of interviews also led to a delay of the research of two weeks. In the
end, three more possible interviews could have been conducted which have been postponed
by the interview partners several times. However, due to time constraints the researcher
decided to forgo these additional interviews knowing that no new constructs had been
identified by the last interviewed experts.
In the process of the interviews, it turned out that the big majority of experts did not know the
company ‘Andritz Hydro’ which consequently could not be included in the analysis. While
identifying companies, the researcher faced difficulties to identify one prominent company
operating in the field of hydro power due to a strong fragmentation of the hydro power sector.
Though being aware of the risk of including a rather unknown company, the researcher
wanted to have one company of hydro power to be present in the analysis.
Furthermore, when being asked about differences in lobby activities between companies,
experts first described their different business areas (“they operate in the field of solar PV,
these in the field of wind power”) and diverging interests. Often, the researcher then asked
the interviewees to specify their answer with regard to the differences in lobbying. Three
experts were not able to rank companies on a scale: one interview was conducted via
telephone and two stakeholders referred to not having concrete knowledge about the
differences between companies’ lobby activities.
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8 Recommendations
Following the discussion of the results, recommendations will be given for both economic and
political stakeholders.
For companies:
In order to work towards a successful energy transition, companies of renewable energy might
consider a few guidelines. These allow corporate business to play an important role in a future
energy system while at the same time achieving its goals.

Companies should apply an effective lobby strategy that targets the right people and
ensures the inclusion of corporate interests in political decision-making. The scheme
developed in chapter 7.1 gives an indication of what to include in a company’s lobby
activities. In order to exert strong influence, companies should compare their work to
competitors and evaluate their lobby strategies in terms of effectiveness.

While in the past companies of renewable energy held together and commonly
“fought” against the Big Four, nowadays an increasing fragmentation of interests can
be observed. Lately, the sector of solar PV receives criticism not only from fossil fuel
companies, but from other sectors of renewable energy as well. This, however, implies
a risk for the influence of the whole renewable sector because political decisionmakers prefer to be addressed by a common voice of renewable energy. In particular,
experts point out the importance of a strong organization of the renewable sector and
a clear presentation of interests. Due to diverging interests the main association of
renewable energy, the Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e.V. (BEE), has lost much
of its influence as companies prefer to use the channel of specific associations of wind,
solar or biomass. Although companies want to pursue their own sector’s interests,
they should simultaneously try to promote the whole sector and re-strengthen their
umbrella association.

While interacting with political stakeholders, it is important that companies show a
holistic view of the energy system. It is not sufficient to solely concentrate on
company’s interests but the sector needs to effectively address challenges of the
energy transition. Politicians are dependent on technical expertise and specific
knowledge of the sector and thus highly appreciate if companies bring in ideas and
solutions. These shall address issues such as
 How can the energy system be transformed?
 How can the grid infrastructure be extended?
 How can politics sustainably support renewable energy apart from the EEG?

It is essential that companies do not solely rely on the system of feed-in-tariffs nor
exclusively direct their lobby activities towards it. Although the share of renewables
shall be increased significantly over the next years, it can be anticipated that politics
will not endlessly continue the system of subsidies. Every company of renewable
energy should operate towards market competitiveness and becoming autonomous
from subsidies. This includes the design of alternative business and lobby strategies.
68
For political decision-makers:

Though politicians are dependent on external information provided by companies,
they should preserve their political neutral stands. Many different and diverging
interests are being directed at decision-makers of which some might be more, others
less significant for the success of the energy transition. However, politics should follow
an undiscriminating way of supporting renewable energy, i.e. no RES shall be favored
or disadvantaged towards another. The potential and technological developments of
each renewable energy source must be analyzed and evaluated in terms of its
contribution to a future German energy system. Politicians shall take decisions based
on this analysis and not primarily on companies’ courtesy or (financial) support.

Regarding the findings in chapter 7.2, political stakeholders should be aware of ‘policy
networks’ that automatically favor certain companies and discriminate others. It must
be questioned why ‘establishing regular and personal contacts” is most effective and
most important to politicians. Usually, only companies with high financial resources
can ensure these contacts. Innovative companies, however, which might contribute to
the energy transition with technological developments and business ideas, but at the
same time refuse to invest in lobby activities, will most likely not be considered by
politicians. Political decisions are taken within ‘policy networks’ that might ultimately
lead to conservatism and impair innovation. Therefore, political stakeholders must
think outside the box: Open up the policy network and include companies that foster
innovation even though they are still unknown; do not only rely on being contacted by
the sector but address new stakeholders oneself and strengthen the paradigm of
‘governance by corporate business’.

The energy transition will be accompanied by challenges of public acceptance. First,
the NIMBY effect might have an influence on the extension of grid infrastructure when
citizens demonstrate against transmission lines close to their houses. Second, the
public might criticize the high financial support of renewables due to rising electricity
costs. Here, politics need to strengthen communication towards citizens and illustrate
the necessity of a sustainable energy system and its benefits. Though the transition
must include high public participation it should not be fully dependent on it.
Consequently, politics need to enforce decisions albeit the resentment of certain
stakeholders.
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9 Conclusion & Outlook
The decision of 2011 to fundamentally transform the German energy system was a political
will. Although it is politics that took main responsibility for the success of the energy transition,
electric utilities and corporate business of renewable energy need to implement it. Thus, they
play a crucial role in the process, providing technological developments on the one hand while
pursuing their individual interests on the other hand.
The aim of the thesis was to examine lobby strategies of the German renewable energy sector.
This has been done by selecting a bottom-up research approach and applying the Repertory
Grid Technique that gathered information by political and economic stakeholders. As a result,
all research questions that have been posed in the beginning, were sufficiently answered (see
table 7).
Research question
To what extent do lobby strategies of renewable energy
companies influence political decision-making related to the
German energy transition?
1. What are the characteristics of the German energy transition?
2. How does the renewable energy sector perceive its interests?
3. What patterns of lobby activities can be identified and
how are they evaluated by those involved?
4. Which lobby strategies are most effective?
5. How do companies differ in their lobby activities?
Answer
Ch. 5, 6, 7 and 8
Ch. 3
Ch. 3.2 and 5.2
Ch. 5.3
Ch. 6.1
Ch. 6.2
Table 7: Answers to research questions
First, the theoretical framework has been outlined by embedding the research in theories of
regime change, niche management and paradigms of governance. Taking into account the
background information provided in chapter 3, the researcher concludes that the special
governmental support of solar PV can be regarded as a form of a ‘strategic niche
management’. However, after twelve years of a highly supportive feed-in-system, the sector is
still not market competitive and faces difficulties to compete with Chinese products which are
sold at dumping prices.
After having explained the methodology of Personal Construct Theory and Repertory Grid
Technique, the analysis was carried out by conducting 20 interviews in total. These were
analyzed qualitatively and statistically which allowed the identification of different lobby
strategies. Afterwards these were evaluated in terms of effectiveness and allocated to 14
selected companies
By identifying 36 different constructs of lobby activities, interviewed experts were able to elicit
the full range of relevant concepts. More than half of these strategies were characterized as
“being effective” for the purpose of influencing political decision-making. By far most
important is the activity ‘establishing regular and personal contact to politicians’, which is
followed by ‘Knowledge development with correct information’, Lobbying within an
70
association’ and ‘Top-down contacting of most powerful decision-makers’. The statistical
analysis revealed differences between companies and their lobby activities. In particular, the
big four electric utilities – E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall – show a similar behavior of how to
influence politics. Companies from the renewable energy sector pursue a different lobby
approach, where the activities of SolarWorld stick out in particular.
The discussion of the results and the recommendations for economic and political
stakeholders clarified the significance of two paradigms of governance. Many experts demand
an approach of ‘governance by corporate business” so that companies influence more strongly
the process of energy transition. At the same time – as the decision to transform the German
energy system was a political one – ‘governance by government’ still plays an important role. It
is the government which has set highly ambitious goals and is responsible for creating a
business environment that allows companies to ‘implement’ the energy transition.
Furthermore, the government is in charge of the main legislative instrument (Renewable
Energy Sources Act) which determines the progress of renewable energy. Despite the
estimation of experts, the researcher concludes that ‘policy networks’ dominate current
decision-making in the field of energy policy. These networks, however, might impede
innovation and the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in the future.
This thesis has demonstrated that companies of renewable energy highly influence decisionmaking related to the German energy transition. However, it remains open how the sector of
renewables, in particular solar PV, will develop in the future and if it will eventually be able to
operate without the feed-in-system. Moreover, it will be crucial how politics and the business
sector handle main challenges such as grid extension, NIMBY effects or higher electricity costs.
To make the energy transition happen, political and economic actors need to cooperate and
work together. If they will succeed, Germany can again become a pioneer - after the
development of the EEG - in shaping an effective and efficient energy transition and thus
become a role model for other countries.
71
10
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Annex
Annex 1:
Development of energy support policies
YEAR (entry
into force)
1935
2005
1989
1990 – 1995
1991
1998
1999 – 2003
2000
2002
2002
2004
2009
2009
2010
2011
2012
2012
LAW/POLICY
German Energy Act („Energiewirtschaftsgesetz“);
Last modification
100 MW wind program
1,000 roof program to support solar PV
Act on Supplying Electricity from Renewables
(“Stromeinspeisungsgesetz”)
Act on the Reform of the Energy Sector
(Liberalization of German energy market)
100,000 roof program to support solar PV
Renewable Energy Sources Act (“Erneuerbare-EnergienGesetz”, EEG)
Amendment of Atomic Energy Act (nuclear phase-out)
Act on Combined Heat and Power Generation
EEG – 1. Amendement
EEG – 2. Amendment
Act on the Promotion of Renewable Energies in the Heat
Sector
Amendment of Atomic Energy Act (extension of operating
lives of nuclear power plants) (drawback)
Amendment of Atomic Energy Act (nuclear phase-out)
EEG - 3. Amendment
Change of 3. Amendment of EEG (reduction of solar
remuneration)
78
Annex 2:
List of company pre-selection
No.
1
2
3
4
Company
E.ON SE
RWE AG
EnBW AG
Vattenfall Europe AG
Sector
Electric utility
Electric utility
Electric utility
Electric utility
5
6
7
8
9
10
Enercon GmbH
juwi Holding AG
Nordex SE
REPower Systems AG
Siemens Wind Power
Vestas Central Europe
Wind
Wind, solar etc.
Wind
Wind
Wind
Wind
11
12
13
14
15
agri.capital GmbH
EnviTec Biogas AG
KTG Agrar AG
Viessmann GmbH & Co. KG
Weltec Biopower
Biomass
Biomass
Biomass
Biomass etc.
Biomass
16
17
18
Andritz Hydro GmbH
OSSBERGER GmbH & Co. KG
Wasserkraft Volk AG
Hydro
Hydro
Hydro
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Bosch Solar Energy
First Solar GmbH
IBC Solar
Q.Cells SE
Schott Solar AG
Siemens Solar Solutions
SolarWorld
Solar
Solar
Solar
Solar
Solar
Solar
Solar
79
Annex 3:
List of interview partners
Dirk Becker
MP and Deputy Energy spokesman
Parliamentary Group of SPD
May 10, 2012
Lars Becker
Research Assistant of Dr. Maria Flachsbarth
MP and Representative of Renewable Energies
Parliamentary Group of CDU
May 10, 2012
Dr. Torsten Bischoff
Head of Division ‘Hydropower, Wind Energy and Grid
Integration of Renewable Energies’
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safety
May 31, 2012
Klaus Breil and Boris Greifeneder
MP and Energy spokesman / Research Assistant
Parliamentary Group of FDP
May 23 and 31, 2012
Dr. Steffen Dagger
Managing director of Mittelständische Energiewirtschaft
Deutschland e.V.
June 7, 2012
Hans-Josef Fell
MP and Energy spokesman
Parliamentary Group of Alliance ‘90/The Greens
May 4, 2012
(telephone interview)
Holger Gassner
Head of Markets and Political Affairs /
Corporate Responsibility
RWE Innogy
June 11, 2012
Dr. Jan Grundmann
Chief Representative
Mid-scale Solutions, Heat Distribution & Sales
Vattenfall Europe New Energy GmbH
June 1, 2012
Stefanie Hidde
Public Affairs
juwi Holding AG
May 11, 2012
Timo Lange
LobbyControl, Non-governmental organization
May 15, 2012
Dorothée Menzner
MP and Energy spokesman
Parliamentary Group of DIE LINKE
May 24, 2012
80
Jörg Polzer
Head of Division ‘Renewable Energies’
German Energy Agency
May 31, 2012
Christina Rettig
PR Manager, Corporate Public Relations
Schott AG / Schott Solar
June 6, 2012
Josef Schützeichel
Research Assistant of Thomas Bareiß,
MP and Energy Coordinator
Parliamentary Group of CDU
May 14, 2012
Reinhard Schultz
Managing director of Biogasrat e.V. and
Managing partner of Schultz Projekt Consult
May 14, 2012
Markus Staudt
Head of Berlin Office
Viessmann Werke GmbH & Co. KG
May 22, 2012
Dr. Anke Tuschek
Member of General Executive Management
German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW)
May 30, 2012
Dr. Gerrit Volk
Head of Division ‘Access to gas distributor networks’
Federal Network Agency
June 6, 2012
Christina Wittek and Claus Bueren
Head of Division ‘Renewable Energies’ /
Division III C4, ‘Renewable Energies’
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
May 9, 2012
David Wortmann
Vice President Public Affairs EU
First Solar Inc.
May 29, 2012
81
Annex 4:
Interview questionnaire
Interviewee No.: [add]
Interviewee Name: [add]
Company / Institution: [add]
Date: [add]
1. Presentation of myself and the research project.
2. First of all, I would like to know a little about your work at [add company].
Could you tell me what the business areas of your company are and what you do in your
position?
3. If you think of the renewable energy sector in Germany and the interests it pursues:
Is there a difference between companies of solar energy, wind energy, hydro energy and
bio-energy?
4. Start of Repertory Grid:
1. Now, I would like you to identify the most common lobby activities of 14 different
companies. To do so, we are going to use these cards. You can see 14 cards, each
having the name of a renewable energy company on it.
These cards will help to identify different constructs of lobbying strategies. In
various rounds you will pick different cards and say something about lobby
activities of the companies. In total, this will take around 30 minutes.
2. Please pick three cards randomly.
[interviewee picks cards]
3. In what respect are two companies similar or different to a third company with
regards to their lobby strategy?
[interviewee identifies clusters of lobbying strategies & gives explanation]
Repeat this procedure several times until interviewee stops coming up with new
constructs.
5.
1. You just identified these constructs of lobbying strategies:
[show constructs]
In your opinion, which are the three most relevant/important constructs?
2.
Please rank all the cards/companies according to this scale
[show scale visually]
6.
In your opinion, what will be the role of the business sector of renewable energy in order
to make the energy transition happen?
7.
End of interview
82
Annex 5:
Examples of companies’ rankings by interview partners
83
Annex 6:
Output SPSS Analysis
1. Multiple Correspondence
Credit
Multiple Correspondence
Version 1.0
by
Data Theory Scaling System Group (DTSS)
Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences
Leiden University, The Netherlands
Case Processing Summary
Valid Active Cases
Active Cases with Missing Values
Supplementary Cases
Total
Cases Used in Analysis
0
13
0
13
13
Iteration History
Variance Accounted For
Iteration
Number
66
Total
a
Increase
31,404273 ,000009
Loss
18,595727
a. The iteration process stopped because the convergence
test value was reached.
Model Summary
Variance Accounted For
Dimension
Cronbach's Alpha
1
2
Total
,991
,984
Mean
,988
Total (Eigenvalue)
Inertia
34,807 ,696
28,001 ,560
62,809
a
31,404 ,628
a. Mean Cronbach's Alpha is based on the mean Eigenvalue.
1,256
84
Discrimination Measures
Discrimination Measures
Dimension
1
I1C1
I1C2
I1C3
I2C4
I2C3
I2C5
I3C6
I3C2
I3C3
I4C3
I4C7
I4C4
I5C2
I5C8
I5C9
I6C3
I6C2
I6C1
I7C10
I7C11
I7C12
I8C13
I8C3
I8C2
I9C12
I9C14
I9C3
I10C3
I10C2
I10C15
I11C3
I11C8
I11C11
I12C3
I12C16
I12C4
I13C3
I13C17
I13C7
I14C12
I14C3
I15C12
I15C18
I15C19
I16C3
,529
,974
,759
,733
,551
,407
,804
,214
,449
,255
,368
,592
,915
,530
,863
,668
,758
,700
,507
,714
,152
,979
,924
,255
,368
,592
,873
,650
,746
,873
2
,796
,986
,657
1,132 ,381
1,068 ,778
1,058 ,615
,047
,331
,689
,368
,248
,661
,141
,285
,454
,771
,577
,753
,188
,657
,452
,244
1,068 ,946
,716
,782
,695
,141
,285
,454
,726
,685
,376
1,028 ,208
1,028 ,208
,590
,958
,312
,331
,326
,741
1,022 ,923
,288
,524
,526
1,026 ,825
1,019 ,675
,541
,223
Mean
,663
,980
,708
,756
,923
,837
,390
,441
,548
,586
,231
,555
,198
,326
,523
,843
,554
,808
,428
,708
,576
1,250 ,879
,479
1,007
,434
,881
,810
,198
,326
,523
,799
1,125 ,887
,715
,625
,618
,618
1,172 ,881
,973
,623
,418
,428
,925
,847
,433
,482
85
I16C2
I16C20
I17C10
I17C17
I17C21
Active Total
,803
,714
,425
,453
,359
,354
,780
1,005 ,729
,407
34,807
,581
,534
,602
,867
,430
28,001
31,404