Executive Summary and Recommendations
Humanitarian Assistance in Trouble
Humanitarian Assistance cannot prevent or solve conflicts when rigorous political
action is missing. Using humanitarian assistance as a substitute for political action is
not only detrimental to the victims but also very costly for international donors and
their taxpayers. Humanitarian assistance and politics are in a crisis.
(1)
The debate focused on four issues:
What do we know about the interaction between humanitarian assistance and
conflict?
-
Is there a need for military measures to create the necessary secure environment?
-
Can humanitarian assistance be co-ordinated with efforts for conflict resolution?
What difficulties do humanitarian actors face in dealing with the parties to the
conflict?
Answers to these questions are not only crucial for the conduct of humanitarian assistance in
the Great Lakes region, but for a number of other conflicts as well.
(2)
Some participants warned that humanitarian assistance would not survive as a viable
option of the international community for supporting people in distress if its abuse by the
perpetrators of violence, as well as the international community, is not stopped.
(3)
Representatives of humanitarian organizations criticized the fact that humanitarian
assistance is increasingly serving as a substitute for political action. Dealing with
humanitarian issues alone does not solve conflicts, but may create a situation where conflict
is likely to re-emerge, as the example in the Great Lakes region has shown.
If the political and military problems in the Great Lakes region had been solved in time, the
humanitarian disaster could most probably been avoided.
(End p13)
(4)
Many participants supported the position of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi
Annan, and others who believed that the deployment in late 1996 of an international peace
force in the Great Lakes region, with a clear and realistic mandate, would have calmed the
situation and limited suffering and killing in the region.
(5)
Humanitarian assistance is in crisis for two overriding reasons: First, it has become a
huge machine with a multitude of organizations, most of them with their own agenda and
interests. (One participant: "Florence Nightingale has gone business.") There is no escaping
the fact that this machinery thrives on conflict. ("Sending humanitarian assistance looks
much better than doing what is really needed.") Publicity has become a crucial factor for
mobilizing support and funds. Humanitarian politics are increasingly media driven. Secondly,
contemporary conflict has produced a situation where harassment, expulsion, rape, ethnic
cleansing, and even genocide are no longer the side effects of conflict, but have become
strategic elements for the warring parties. This has drawn the civilian population into the
centre of the conflict, which is particularly true for the Great Lakes region.
(6)
Today, humanitarian assistance has to operate in a very different context. Though
plainly unintended, humanitarian assistance has de facto become highly politicized.
Assistance to the victims is not considered neutral or impartial by the warring parties, as it
may have a direct relevance on the outcome of the conflict. Therefore, they either try to
manipulate humanitarian assistance to their advantage, or to block it. Humanitarian actors
come under considerable pressure to abide by the will of the perpetrators of violence, which
they have little means to counter. They become part of the conflict. Aid agencies, therefore,
need a stronger political awareness of possible implications of their actions during aid
operations.
(7)
A clear appeal arises from this experience: There is an indispensable need for
vigorous political or even military action to accompany humanitarian assistance. When
vigorous political action is not forthcoming, humanitarian agencies face a painful question:
How long can they continue to provide assistance and accept negative side effects? Some felt
that criteria have to be developed in order to make such a decision on a consistent basis,
while others objected on the grounds that it is the international community‘s obligation to
provide assistance to the victims under any conditions. Using humanitarian assistance as a
(End p14)
substitute for, or even an escape from, political action is not only detrimental to the victims,
but also costly for the international donors and their taxpayers.
The participants were in full agreement that prevention of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
would have been feasible, with limited military means (about a brigade), quickly deployed.
Most of the ensuing suffering and costs would have been avoided had the number of Blue
Helmets not been reduced from more than two thousand to less than three hundred.
(8)
The workshop‘s participants concurred that neither a compromising relationship with
combatants nor withdrawal was acceptable as an alternative and either would heavily
undermine humanitarian ethics. Cynicism is on the rise among all actors in the Great Lakes
region. Credible ethics, however, are indispensable for sustained and effective humanitarian
action.
The Outlook for Reconciliation in Burundi and Rwanda
The situation in Burundi and Rwanda is rapidly developing in a wrong direction.
Genocidal thinking has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy; prospects for
reconciliation are bleak. Violence is spreading despite the international community‘s
engagement.
(9)
Burundi and Rwanda‘s historically different backgrounds have been neglected in past
international dealings with the "Hutu-Tutsi" problem. In Burundi, antagonism between the
two groups is less prevalent than in Rwanda and the desire for reconciliation is, therefore,
stronger. However, this desire is rapidly diminishing. Events in either country, in particular
the killings, immediately affect conflict dynamics and the outlook for reconciliation in the
other.
(10) In May 1997 there was a major window of opportunity for finding a peaceful
settlement in Burundi by means of talks, dialogue and negotiations. However, the untimely
publication of the "secret" ceasefire negotiations conducted between the representatives of
the Buyoya government and the CNDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy) in
Rome, have seriously undermined this process (Footnote 1).
(Footnote 1: The negotiations started in February 1997, facilitated by the Comunita di San
Edigio, Rome.)
(End p15)
Powerful elements in the minority are in opposition. The Buyoya government is being
increasingly undermined and driven into a corner. Against this background it will be difficult
to get the peace process on track again.
(11) The Rome process was criticized for different reasons. First, the agreement signed
related not only to a cease-fire between the two participating parties, but also addressed
wider political issues which belong to multi-party negotiations. Second, the Buyoya
government, by moving straight to negotiations, seems to have abandoned the first two stages
of its process of internal talks, dialogue, and negotiations. Third, the government got
involved in the Rome talks at a time when it was still engaged in a debate within its own
support base as to whether there should be negotiations or not.
(12) It was the considered opinion of one participant, actively involved in mediation in
Burundi for the last two years as a consultant, that the various interventions by the
international community have done more harm than good in terms of conflict solution. Those
involved from the international side in this process should, therefore, strive to avoid past
mistakes, such as: (a) being perceived as taking sides between Hutus and Tutsis, (b)
disregarding the fact that - both - groups are emotionally and psychologically traumatized by
having committed and suffered from violence over the past 30 years; or (c) attempting to
impose processes and solutions on the conflicting parties.
Although not all participants shared the negative view of the international community’s role,
there was agreement in the workshop that any solution imposed from outside has no chance
of success.
(13) All parties in Burundi must feel ownership of the process of multiparty negotiations,
presently proposed for Arusha, Tanzania. To strengthen this process, it is essential that other
leaders, preferably African, join President Nyerere in forming a "Team of Mediators." A
"Team of Facilitators" should be appointed to interact with and between the different parties
during the process.
(14) The proposal to set up an international judicial process for the killings in Burundi was
not seen to have much chance of success, considering the difficulties with which such
tribunals in Rwanda and the
(End p16)
former Yugoslavia are already struggling. In principle, however, such a process would help
to promote reconciliation in Burundi (Footnote 2).
(15) Regarding Rwanda the outlook for reconciliation is no less depressing. The debate
focused on the question of justice. Justice must be based on truth. However, for each party,
the perception of truth differs concealing when and where genocide took place, and who
should be held responsible. Most of the participants shared the view that without at least
some justice there is no prospect of reconciliation and peace. The international community
still has difficulty understanding the problems and complexities of the background to the
genocide and for that matter, reconciliation.
For the Hutu in Rwanda, two genocides were committed, of Tutsis by Hutus in 1994, and of
Hutus beginning in October 1990, by the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) troops returning
from Uganda. In those four years a million people were displaced, most of them Hutu. Many
of those displaced joined the army, and in 1994 furnished the shock troops for the killing.
The assassination of‘ three Hutu presidents in both countries reinforced the Hutu's
perception of themselves as victims.
(16) Participants differed on how much justice is needed and how much can be
realistically expected. 130,000 people are in jail today. With more refugees returning, this
number may increase to 200,000. Not even Western countries with functioning judicial
systems would be able to handle this number of trials in a reasonable span of time. Ensuring
some semblance of justice and stopping impunity, therefore, can realistically only mean that
the instigators of the genocide are put on trial and punished. It must be accepted that, for the
rest, other outcomes must be found.
(17) The approach of the government in Kigali of differentiating between four categories
of perpetrators and participants in the genocide was welcomed as a step in the right direction.
Only a well-balanced mix
(Footnote 2 : A new effort for Burundi all-party talks was scheduled for August 25, after
consultation between former President Nyerere, Amb. Sahnoun, the UN-OAU Special
Representative for the Great Lakes Region, foreign envoys, and parties to the conflict.
However, former President Nyerere had to announce the postponement of the talks on the
very same date.)
(End p17)
of, on one hand, justice for the victims through punishment of the "masterminds" of the
genocide, and, on the other, the creation of a culture of forgiveness for the rest will provide a
chance for reconciliation.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Purification Commission in
Mozambique were identified as possible models.
(18) Participants also seemed to agree on the urgent need to convince the government in
Kigali not to undertake mass executions of those convicted after a proper judicial process,
although it probably cannot be prevented from executing some of the major perpetrators.
Public executions, and in particular mass execution, will lead to an explosion. Many of the
refugees would rather face death on their own terms with a weapon in their hand, than be
arrested and executed.
By the end of June 1997, a total of 142 judgments had been handed down, including 61
death sentences and eight acquittals.
(19) A serious imbalance regarding justice has been created by the disparity between the
procedures of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha and the
internal justice system in Rwanda. ALTHOUGH the Tribunal is limiting its trials to the
masterminds and worst killers, those standing trial before it in Arusha are enjoying a trial de
luxe in terms of prison conditions, legal support, fairness of procedures, etc. Perhaps, even
more problematic with regard to the concept of justice is the fact that they do not have to fear
the death penalty.
Past mismanagement still keeps the Tribunal from functioning properly. Although it has two
chambers only one can sit at a time since there is only one room available. Twenty people
are currently held in detention, three are on trial.
(20) The need for a balanced, understanding, and sustained involvement of the
international community in Rwanda and Burundi is at odds with the low level of interest of
most major international powers in both countries. There are no relevant strategic or
economic interests at stake. Calls for vigorous action by the international community were,
therefore, not realistically considered by most of the workshop participants.
(End p18)
(21) The low-level interest of the major international players in Burundi and Rwanda will
not change. Others, disagreeing, stated that - in terms of resources provided and diplomatic
activities undertaken - there is considerable involvement from the European Union and some
of its Member States, like for instance Germany. There is still room for more action, which
can assist the people in both countries.
(22) Participants agreed that sustained material and expert support are crucial for a longterm process towards reconciliation, especially in three areas: (a) the justice system; (b)
mediation efforts, undertaken inside as well as outside of both countries; and (c) for the
reintegration of refugees, while at the same the not neglecting the needs of the victims of
recent genocide inside the country. However, it will take much time and patience to break the
recurrent and traumatic circle of genocide and to prevent further genocide.
The systematic integration of therapeutic dialogue and reconciliation elements into
developments projects on both the local and regional level, as is presently being attempted by
the German GTZ was identified as an interesting concept.
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) - Outlook for Peace, National Unity and the
Transition to Democracy
The basic task that the new government, the people of the Congo, the region and the
international community are facing is how to reconcile two legacies: the
"revolutionary-militant" one, represented by the new President Kabila and the
Alliance (ADFL - Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire),
and the "democratic" one, represented by "civil society" organizations.
(23) There was general agreement that the overthrow of the old regime in the former Zaire
represents a truly momentous event in the history of Africa. It may bring about a viable
Congo in the middle of Africa, with a positive impact on developments throughout the
continent. Or, it could prove to develop disastrous consequences, where a series of events
leading to the collapse of the state and spreading disorder throughout the region can easily be
imagined.
(24) The Kabila government, despite many shortcomings, must be given a chance.
However, plural democracy does not seem to be on the new rulers‘ agenda, at least not for
the time being. National elections cannot
(End p19)
be expected too soon. Feeling victorious for having pushed Mobutu out, theme is a tendency
to base legitimacy on the power of the gun instead of on a democratic, lawful procedure
(25) ALTHOUGH there is a lively civil society, the country‘s infrastructure and
administrative institutions are in ruins. Two or three years may be needed to create the
necessary preconditions for elections. Intermediate steps, such as forming an Electoral
Commission and conducting local elections wherever possible, should be taken to prepare for
national elections. The people of the Congo, other African states, and the major international
donors must work together closely to keep the road to democracy open (Footnote 3).
(26) For the time being, Kabila‘s power base and his new government are not stable. The
victorious Alliance (ADFL) was founded less than a year ago, and there is still an infight
over policy definition. Internal organization and decision-making processes are weak and
incoherent.
Taking possession of houses, vehicles, and other belongings has already earned the Alliance
and its troops a negative reputation
(27) The security situation in the Congo is volatile. Some participants pointed out, the
Alliance came into power three years too early, moving into the power vacuum left behind
by the Mobutu regime. If some stability and good governance is not achieved in the near
future, the danger of violence, civil war and warlordism will increase. In contrast to earlier
times arms are now spread throughout the country. Fighting has started in some provinces.
The core troops of the ADFL are increasingly seen as an "occupying army." Major groups
within the ADFL, in particular the so-called "Kantangese Gendarmes", who played a vital
role in the final military victory over the Mobutu regime, are disillusioned with Kabila and
resent the dominance of certain
(Footnote 3: In August the European Union’s Troika of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
recommended that the EU should resume "structural co-operation" with the Democratic
Republic of Congo. This step is based on an understanding with the Kabila government to
respect such basic values as the principle of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
The visit of the Troika to Kinshasa was the first official contact between the EU and the new
authorities in the Congo.)
(End p20)
groups. Resistance groups are also springing up in different parts of the country and
organizing themselves.
(28) If this volatile mixture of forces and dynamics is fueled by widespread
disappointment over the performance of the Kabila government, and its over-reliance on
certain groups and repressive policies, an explosive situation may be created in the Congo.
Most participants feet that the people of the Congo, after living through a long amid violent
dictatorship, will not tolerate another one.
(29) The issue of territorial integrity and secession has not yet been raised, and to date
there have been no calls for secession. People and regions want federalism amid
decentralization, not fragmentation and secession. A dramatically deteriorating security
situation and a civil war, however, could create different dynamics (Footnote 4).
African and Western states, as well as the international community have a strong interest
in preventing a break-up of the territorial integrity by working together.
(30) The massacres in eastern Zaire, for which most participants in the workshop feet the
ADFL and Kabila must take responsibility, were widely discussed. The European countries
and the US are obviously more concerned about the reluctance of the Kabila government to
allow an international inquiry than are several African countries (Footnote 5).
Participants were encouraged by the statement of one member of the workshop that civil
society organizations in the Congo are condemning the massacres and demand that those
responsible be punished. At the same the, however they reject outside interference and onesided ethnic influence.
(Footnote 4: Reports form mid-July indicate that four generals loyal to former President
Mobutu are planning to launch a rebel movement and to fight for the secession of the
mineral-rich southern provinces of the Congo.
Footnote 5: The UN DHA’s Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reports on 29
August 1997 that the Kabila government again demanded the UN investigation team to stop
work . Inter alia Kinshasa asked for the removal of its team leader, Togolese citizen Koffi
Ameda, and that the mission should wait till it is joined by an OAU mission. UN spokesman
Fred Eckhard said the new conditions were "inconsistent" with the understanding reached
between the UN Secretary-General and President Kabila on the mission’s terms of
reference.)
(End p21)
(31) The immediate task is to stabilize the country and keep it from falling back into
anarchy. Participants in the workshop identified four areas of priority:
Emergency and economic development assistance are needed quickly to help the
distressed people and population and to satisfy the most urgent basic needs.
Technical, in addition to expert assistance, is necessary to build-up the infrastructure
and to provide basic administrative functions, as well as a justice system, so that the people’s
hope for better governance is not shattered.
An integrated, national, professional army with functioning command and control
structures must be created. It should not be dominated by any ethnic group or by outsiders.
African and Western help will be needed for training and building up such an army. The size
of the army should be reduced.
An effective police system must be established to restore confidence in public order.
It
should take over most of the internal security functions, which in the past have been
performed by the army.
The Concept of an International Conference
The region is in a profound process of transition. It will take the to restore trust and
stabilize the relationship between the peoples and their leaders, which have been
problematic since the days of slave trade and were not restored in the first phase of
independence. Violence and the deliberate use of force will be a major element and
instrument of change in the region for some time. An International Conference can
help to contain these trends and prevent further destabilization in the region.
(32) The idea of an "International Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Great
Lakes Region" (hereafter Conference) was inspired by the CSCE model (Conference/now:
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe). Rather than a regional organization in
the narrow sense of the term, it would be a mechanism which guarantees an on-going process
of dialogue on, and co-ordination of different baskets, ie., basic issues of security, human
amid minority rights,
(End p22)
economic co-operation, etc. There would be a small secretariat, but no bureaucratic
organization
A thorough analysis of the regional dynamics is needed to identify the issues with which the
Conference should deal. It was generally accepted that African researchers should be at the
forefront in undertaking this analysis.
Valuable experience can be drawn from the SADCC-process (South African Development
Cooperation Countries), which took a very pragmatic approach to regional co-operation
and security. Europeans and Americans could contribute their experience gained in the
CSCE/ OSCE process.
(33) Transition is the common denominator for most of the changes/trends which are
prevalent in Central and East Africa:
of
law.
The "one strong guy"-concept of government is gradually being replaced by the rule
There is a clear tendency to go from centralized to decentralized systems and, on the
economic level, from state to private enterprise with a reduced role for the state
On the social level, there is a transition from male dominance to female
empowerment
and from state to NGO control. Civil society is empowering itself.
The values of human rights and democracy must be strengthened. To date, these
values
have been venerated more by the people than by their leaders.
On the regional level, nation-state thinking is shifting toward regional self-awareness,
interdependence, and co-operation.
Violence and the use of force, rather than diplomatic means, are likely to continue to
be major instruments of change. Peace is not at hand.
(34) Obviously, an on-going and structured Conference would be helpful to manage this
complex and multi-level transition process. In particular, the Conference needs to set
minimum standards for principles and values.
(End p23)
(35) Despite its undisputed overall value for the region, the Conference should not become
a pretext for failure to engage in internal dialogue. An explicit effort must be made from the
very beginning to parallel regional with internal talks and round tables. Without internal
solutions regional solutions are unsustainable.
(36) Another concern was that the analogy of the CSCE process, or the EU in Europe, can
be misleading. In Europe, regionalization is based on functioning states which have the
structures to conduct amid implement such a process. In Central and East Africa, such
structures hardly exist. An International Conference cannot be a substitute for such
structures. This basic difference should be fully reflected when the framework of an
International Conference is developed.
(37) The complexities of security will have to be addressed on two levels: Security
between states and the security of groups within states. How can the level of violence be
reduced amid how can additional violence be prevented? Are there effective ways to reduce
the quantity of small arms in the region and to limit their inflow?
(38) An important difference to the CSCE/OSCE was noted with regard to confidencebuilding measures
In the Helsinki process they played a crucial role and turned out to be of key importance in
reducing the danger of military conflict in Europe. Such measures were comparatively easy
to define because the line of conflict (the Cold War border between the two blocs) and the
threat (conventional and or nuclear surprise attack) were clear and simple.
In Central and East Africa it will be much more complicated to develop effective confidencebuilding measures, due to the complicated network and interaction of dozens of local and
cross-border insurrectionist movements, which receive all types of support from states in and
outside of the region.
(39) Refugees and migration are another important issue. Over-population in some areas
has clearly been one cause of conflict. It was recommended that the Conference take up the
Bujumbura Plan of Action. This plan originated in a conference jointly organized by the
OAU and UNHCR in 1995, and addresses the problem of refugees,
(End p24)
roots of conflict, and possible solutions. If it had been implemented the conflict in the region
might not have spread as it so tragically did.
(40) Another difficult issue involves determining who should be invited to participate in
the Conference. Should a broad approach be taken, including all relevant actors,
governmental as well as non-governmental? Would this include the "perpetrators of
genocide" and rebel movements? Should the Conference be restricted to actors from the
region, and, if so, should the region be defined as the Great Lakes only, or Central and East
Africa? Should it include others, such as South Africa, the EU, and United States, as the
CSCE/OSCE included the USA, Canada, and all newly established states of the former
Soviet Union
Judging from recent experience, i.e., the Arusha and Nairobi process, a pragmatic approach
will be needed.
(41) Finally, there was full agreement that the process must be "owned" by Africans. The
overthrow of the Mobutu regime has created a strong feeling of ownership among regional
leaders regarding the fate of the region. The Conference and its agenda and mechanisms must
therefore be developed by Africans themselves It would be wrong for the international
community to attempt to control it. However, Europeans, Americans, and others can provide
valuable assistance and expertise as advisers.
The African Crisis Response Initiative
There is enormous amount of peacekeeping experience in Africa. African countries
have taken part in a number of peacekeeping operations, inside and outside Africa. In
Liberia, West African States have been conducting a major peace mission (ECOMOG)
since 1991. There have been partnerships in peacekeeping training between African
and non-African states for several years. Great Britain has projects in Zimbabwe and
Ghana; France is involved in West Africa and proposed to build up an African
peacekeeping force in 1994; the Nordic States are active in southern Africa. The United
States made a proposal for an "African Crisis Response Force" in 1996. In southern
Africa, Zimbabwe recently hosted a major Regional Peacekeeping Field Training
Exercise (Blue Hungwe). African troops under MISAB (lnter-African Monitoring
Mission) are in the forefront of managing the crisis in the Central African Republic.
(End p25)
(42) The US Special Coordinator for the "African Crisis Response Initiative" explained the
steps taken since the first American proposal in September 1996. The idea to quickly build
up a "Response Force" has been dropped. There seems to exist now a much better
understanding between the US, Britain, France, and the other non-African actors, as well as
the UN and OAU, about how to improve African crisis response capabilities. Issues of
common understanding are in particular:
Any initiative must have strong links with the UN and the OAU; there should be no
unilateral actions.
Western countries, in particular the US, France, and Britain, should coordinate their
policies to prevent possible competition and to give African countries a chance to deal with a
consolidated proposal.
For the time being, the initiative should limit itself to measures under Chapter VI and
place an emphasis on training (long term capacity improvement).
(43) Bilateral training programs with African partners are already underway. This training
must be based on a common doctrine, as well as communication training and equipment
support, to enable African battalions to fully co-operate in the field on the basis of different
existing doctrines. The experiences of African units which have served in peacekeeping
operations should be added to the curriculum that is being developed. International coordination must be extended, based on four basic principles:
-
all actors work together for long-term capacity enhancement
-
close co-operation with the UN and OAU;
-
the initiative is open to all nations that want to participate;
-
transparency.
(44) In order to guarantee transparency, an "African Peacekeeping Support Group" should
be set up in New York. It would need subcommittees of military experts from both inside
and outside Africa to discuss:
-
appropriate levels of training;
possible threats to a peacekeeping force;
(End p26)
-
control, storage, and maintenance of any heavy equipment supplied.
command and control (with the direct involvement of relevant organs or departments
of the UN)
(45)
Participants of the Workshop voiced concern regarding the following issues:
The initiative should not parallel structures which already exist within the UN, in
particular the "Stand-by Arrangements."
It was noted that response to the UN‘s Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) requests for troop contributions for missions in Africa (particularly Burundi and
East
Zaire) was poor, including the response of African countries.
Deployment of civil police is assuming an increasingly greater role in UN peace
operations. African countries should be encouraged to look beyond the military aspects and
equally enhance their capacity to provide police for peace operations.
It may not be realistic to limit the initiative to measures under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. The reality is that conflict dynamics are very violent. Robust mandates and peace
missions are needed and must be anticipated.
-
Competition between donors should not be underestimated.
There was disagreement among the African participants about whether African
leaders
resent the concept of an effective African Peacekeeping Force, for fear it might be used
against them.
(46) The representative of the OAU noted that such an initiative would have to pass
through all of the organization's decision-making organs, and so far it has only been formally
introduced and submitted to the Council of the OAU.
Winrich Kuhne, SWP, Ebenhausen, August 1997