G20 Summit, September 2016
Slightly Less Fear and Loathing in Sino-Japanese
Relations?
Hugo Dobson
School for East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield
International
Media
Centre
–
G20
demonstrate global leadership in finding
Hangzhou Summit. With Japan hosting the
solutions to collection action problems
forty-second G7 summit in early summer
through the G7 and G20.
and China hosting the eleventh G20
summit a few months later, 2016 held the
Equally concerning was the fact that global
promise of being an important year both
summitry was under threat of becoming
for Asia’s two superpowers and the
embroiled in this Sino-Japanese rivalry
region’s
global
with each alphanumeric group little more
summitry. However, the recent poor
than a weapon of choice on each side. In
relations between
Japan
the blue corner, the G7 represents the old
threatened to scupper any chances of a
world order of ‘great powers’ that Japan
coordinated approach to global summitry,
seeks to preserve as a small and effective
let alone any resulting bilateral or regional
forum of discussion among like-minded
benefits. These poor relations resulted
leaders but China regards as irrelevant and
from competing interpretations of World
illegitimate. In the red corner, the G20
War 2 through to conflicting territorial
captures
claims in neighbouring waters, as well as
developed and developing countries sitting
diametrically
leadership
together equally in a more legitimate and
aspirations in the Asian region and further
representative forum with China as ‘first
afield in Africa. It seemed that these issues
among equals’ but which Japan regards as
of national interests would trump any
unwieldy and ineffective.
overall
presence
China
opposed
in
and
incentives on the part of both countries to
the
post-crisis
reality
of
G20 Summit, September 2016
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo set the scene
Asia with one eye on China. Finally, in
for this ‘Battle of the Gs’ at the G7 Ise
terms of agenda items, the G7 foreign
Shima Summit in a number of ways that
ministers meeting had already made
dovetailed neatly with an emerging and
statements on the importance of the ‘rule
eponymous
policy
of law’ in territorial disputes in the South
doctrine. This ‘Abe Doctrine’ seeks to
China Sea. The leaders’ final declaration
arrest Japan’s decline relative to China,
reaffirmed
these
remove various perceived ‘shackles’ that
statements
and
prevent it playing a proactive role in the
numerous references to the G7’s shared
world, engage in historical revisionism of
values of ‘freedom, democracy, the rule of
established postwar norms, and create an
law and respect for human rights’, which
economically strong Japan through the
obviously exclude and isolate China.
three-pronged approach of ‘Abenomics’.
Similarly veiled criticisms of China were
Japanese
foreign
specific
in
previous
addition
made
made in terms of Chinese over-production
First of all, the choice of venue was no
of steel and the importance of quality
accident. Ise-Shima was partly chosen
investment and infrastructure.
because of Ise Shrine, which occupies a
central position within Shintoism, has
China reacted to all this in predictable
connections to the Japanese imperial
fashion. On the first day of the Japanese-
household
values
hosted G7 (which fell coincidentally 100
perceived by the government as inherently
days ahead of the Chinese-hosted G20),
Japanese. Victims of Japan’s wartime
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated
aggression
this
that the appropriate venue for discussing
differently and having the G7 leaders visit
the global economy is the G20 not the G7.
the shrine was controversial to say the
Thus, the scene appeared to be set for a ‘G’
least. Japan also invited a number of
standoff
regional
simultaneously
and
represents
inevitably
outreach
regard
guests
including
throughout
2016
contributed
to
that
the
Vietnam at a time when Abe is seeking to
deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations
build a positive coalition with Southeast
and was in turn shaped by this.
G20 Summit, September 2016
After Ise Shima
possession of the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine.
Events after the G7 leaders departed Japan
appeared to amplify this development and
However,
despite
this
apparently
the increasingly lost opportunity that 2016
increasing turmoil, glimmers of hope
was coming to represent for Asia’s position
emerged. In mid-August, despite the
in global summitry.
earlier ‘swarm’ of Chinese vessels around
the disputed Islands, the Japanese Coast
On 12 July, the Permanent Court of
Guard rescued a number of Chinese
Arbitration in The Hague supported the
fishermen after their vessel collided with a
Philippines and ruled against China’s
Greek merchant ship near the disputed
historic claims in the South China Sea (see
islands resulting in an expression of
Annemie Zimmerman’s policy brief from
‘appreciation’ from the Chinese authorities
Hangzhou on this topic. Although not a
to Japanese.
party to the South China Sea dispute, Japan
expressed support for the Philippines and
The perennial issues of North Korea’s
urged China to respect the ruling. In
nuclear
response, China warned Japan against
presented opportunities for Sino-Japanese
interfering in the South China Sea dispute.
dialogue within the trilateral meeting of
and
missile
programmes
China, Japan and Korea’s foreign ministers
Tensions spread to the East China Sea in
in Tokyo that took place towards the end
early August when a spike was observed in
of August. Despite concerns as to whether
the number of official Chinese vessels
it would even go ahead, this represented
entering waters close to the disputed
the first ministerial visit to Japan by a
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Even the release
Chinese
of the game Pokemon Go became a site of
assumption of power. This provided
contestation
further
Japanese
between
gamers
over
Chinese
the
and
virtual
apparent
foreign
minister
opportunity
to
deterioration
since
escape
in
Xi’s
the
regional
relations and lay the ground for a possible
G20 Summit, September 2016
trilateral meeting of the leaders later in the
development and natural continuation of
year.
the positive efforts that took place
immediately prior to Hangzhou.
Senior politicians Kawamura Takeo and
Chinese Yu Zhengsheng met a few weeks
It appears as if the language on both sides
before the G20 and stressed the need for
became more emollient. The Chinese side
both sides to cooperate and dialogue with
turned much more towards engagement in
each other. These discussions fed into the
an attempt to get Japan on board with the
activities
Abe’s
G20 and ensure its success. In his pre-
longstanding foreign and security policy
summit discussions with Yachi, Yang called
consigliore, and Chinese State Councillor
on Japan to play a ‘constructive role’ and
Yang Jiechi, who explored the possibility of
this cooperative tone continued at the
setting up an Abe-Xi bilateral meeting, the
Abe-Xi meeting when Xi called for the two
first since April 2015 and their third ever,
countries to ‘put aside disruptions’ and re-
on the sidelines of the G20. In the run-up
establish normal relations as soon as
to the Hangzhou Summit, it appeared as if
possible. In response, Abe stressed the
China and Japan’s leaders might grab a
need to build stable relations taking into
small victory from the jaws of defeat.
account the bigger picture of a strategically
of
Yachi
Shotaro,
and mutually beneficial relationship.
Hangzhou and a partial reset in SinoJapanese relations
However, what stood out in this meeting
was that the willingness to compromise
In the end, confounding considerable
could sit alongside a readiness to discuss
speculation, the Xi-Abe bilateral took place
difficult issues, such as territorial disputes,
for thirty minutes on the afternoon of 5
in a frank way rather than whitewash and
September after the G20 had officially
shelve them. It was reported prior to the
ended. Although it may not prove to
meeting that Abe would raise the issues of
represent a full-blown reset in Sino-
both the South and East China Seas and in
Japanese relations, it is a welcome
particular the construction of military
G20 Summit, September 2016
facilities in the former and the incursions of
ASEAN and East Asian Summits that
Chinese vessels in the latter. After the
immediately followed the G20. In addition,
meeting it was reported that Xi called on
holding a trilateral meeting of the Chinese,
Japan to exhibit restraint in its responses to
Japanese and Korean leaders beyond the
the South China Sea. So, these hard issues
end of the year remains a concrete and
were indeed addressed and in an open
realizable goal. Of course, this may just be
fashion but also constructively as part of an
one more false dawn in Sino-Japanese
ongoing collective effort to improve
relations but there are genuine reasons to
communication mechanisms between the
be positive about the role regional and
two countries’ naval and air forces as
global summits can play in improving
quickly as possible so as to successfully
bilateral relations between countries,
manage unpredictable situations in the
rather than becoming mere pawns in their
East China Sea. In addition, reopening
rivalry.
negotiations
surrounding
the
joint
development of gas fields in the East China
Sea was discussed alongside various kinds
of exchange focused on both countries’
Hugo Dobson is Professor of Japan’s
experiences of hosting the Olympic Games.
International Relations in the School for
East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield
A number of further opportunities for the
two sides to meet on the edges of
multilateral meetings can be seen in the