What do we mean when we ask “Do we have free will”?
Mikkel C. Vinding1 & Morten Overgaard1,2
1) CNRU, CFIN, Dept. of Clinical Medicine, Aarhus University. 2) CCN, Dept. of Communications and Psychology, Aalborg University.
Abstract
Action
There are many, sometimes conflicting, definitions of free will. For a scientific approach
to succeed it should not begin by selecting one such definition, but start with the
definitions, incongruent or not, and specify possible empirical ways to address these, and
the epistemological and methodological obstacles.
Will is taken as conscious experience related to action generation. This gives rise to the
same problems and questions as investigating the mind-brain problem: How will relate to
neural states? The first step is to investigate phenomenological experiences related to
action generation, using first-person perspective methodology; then relate these to the
physiological mechanisms in action generation.
To answer whether will is free demands a different approach. Freedom can be defined in
several ways, and each definition has its own metaphysical assumptions. Freedom
defined as either ‘genuine freedom’ in the metaphysical sense, or as autonomy is
considered, including how the level of analysis (psychological, fundamental, etc.) affects
the scientific answers we can ask.
Together this leads to the problem of mental causation. Including the previous questions,
this goes beyond asking whether mental states have causal properties or are determined.
Instead we should view action generation as function of a complex system, involving
many conscious and unconscious processes.
focus should be on describing causal pathways in neural networks and relate different
experiences of will to these. For specific actions we can build model of how will
contribute to action, and, depending on the definition of freedom we choose, state
whether it was a “free will-action”.
There are many forms of action. We cannot assume one process behind action
generation. It is likely that we need several models for different types of actions.
A scientific approach to free will
(a)
The criterion for something to qualify as “free will” vary, depending on which
philosophical position you confront. With free will we have a concept that denotes
different phenomena (even if only hypothetical) and the concept suffers from being overdefined, thus losing its meaning outside the specific position.
(b)
Much of the free will debate have been focused on freedom and causality, somewhat
neglecting giving a proper definition of what will – as conscious mental states – really is
about. Previously will has been used synonymously with; action initiation, Intention,
decision-making, Executive control and Sense of agency. Though none of these seem to
entirely capture what will itself means. Given the various mental states will embrace,
conscious will should not be approached as a single mental state
Action generation is a function of a complex system, involving many processes. The
performance of actions demands an integration of relevant information for the action,
such as senso-motoric for body control, visual information, semantic information about
context, etc. What we are looking at are complex systems, even without differentiating
between conscious and unconscious processes.
Will is a category of mental states about or in relation to action and action
What are the mechanisms behind action generation?
The questions to answer is: Which processes and what information is necessary for
action? How much does the processes and information contribute? What is the
causal relation between the processes? Scientific study hereof should aim at
describing causal pathways in neural networks (which networks? Integration of
information? How: Parallel streams, specific linear series etc.?).
Answering the questions above, we can begin to make cognitive and neural models over
the time course of the physical states involved in generating actions.
The next to ask is: How does conscious will relate to neural processes of action
generation?
Whether this question is empirical or metaphysical is a matter of debate. Basically
the mind-body problem specifically for conscious will. Same methodology as
research on other domains of consciousness research.
The relevant question is: Which aspects of action generation is automatic and
how much is conscious?
Process might not always be unconscious, but only consciously accessible
sometimes. Different actions might have different involvement of conscious will?
These are questions that needs a posteriori answers – they are empirical questions,
that needs to be addressed.
The problem is giving an a priori definition of free will that will work as basis
for scientific studies.
As a consequence: Person A concluding that free will has been disproved by the new
empirical insight, rightfully according to A’s initial definition of free will, is challenged by
person B claiming that free will has not been disproved, also rightfully according to B’s
definition of free will. Since both define “free will” differently, they end up having a
disagreement of whether free will exists or not. The form of this disagreement appears to
be a disagreement about ontology, when it in fact is a disagreement about a priori
definition.
Definitions of free will can be formulated as factual statements. These can be true or false
(in scientific terms; plausible or unlikely). To have a successful scientific approach to free
will we should not a priori settle on specific definitions of free will, but formulate
existing assumptions as empirical questions (when possible). This will go beyond asking
“Do we have free will?” as a simple yes or no question. Instead of studying free will as an
object, it is best viewed as a collection of scientific questions about conscious will and
causal mechanisms in action generation.
The subject for a science of free will is the role of conscious will in the causal
mechanisms associated with action and action generation.
Mental causation
(c)
Addressing mental causation, we likely have several conscious and unconscious process
alike that are necessary for action. To address mental causation is not to ask: Do mental
properties (M) cause action (A)? (M → A). It cannot assume that neither conscious will
nor mechanisms in action generation are singular processes. Different aspects of
conscious will might have different causal properties (e.g. that prior intention a causal
facilitators of action, whereas the sense of agency reflects action feedback monitoring).
This should be taken into account when approaching mental causation – not just
empirically, but also in deductive arguments.
Instead of treating conscious will (M) as a unified state, we should identify the different
aspects (M1, M2, …, Mn) of conscious will, over time. The same apply to the cognitive and
neural mechanisms (P) in action generation – we should identify the different
mechanisms (P1, P2, …, Px) - investigate how they are causally connected – and then relate
the different aspects of conscious will to activation of the causal system.
The scientific approach to free will should relate differences in specific subjective reports
as a function of network activation. And then ask the question:
What are the causal properties of various content of conscious will?
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Aarhus University / Aarhus University Hospital
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Conscious will
(b)
To avoid confusing the plurality of what phenomenological will, and the singular form of
the word will - action consciousness might be a better term.
No metaphysical assumptions are made about the nature of conscious will.
The first answer we need to investigate is: What is the phenomenological content
of will?
There is a need for description and classification of the phenomenology related to
action. How are the various experiences related? Is there an overlap or might they
be different stages in the same global process? Is there a necessary time-course or
progression in the experiences?
These are empirical questions dependent on first-person or qualitative methodology.
Contemporary scientific approaches to free will relies to a great extend on indirect
measures, rather than subjective reports. In order to develop a scientific approach to
free will there is a need for more phenomenologically informed measurements.
The scientific study of conscious will falls within the already established field of
consciousness research. The “usual problems” regarding mind-body relation,
epistemology of 1st person perspective etc., apply here as well. There here however some
conceptual and methodological concerns that are salient when investigating conscious
will, compared to other aspects of consciousness.
The possibility of of automated or unconscious actions and action generation is a
confounding factor when looking for correlates of conscious will. Much of this
information necessary for action generation is (probably) unconscious and/or
inaccessible by direct report. To scientifically investigating the causal role of conscious
will it is important to consider the distinction between unconscious processes, and
conscious content not available for post hoc introspective reports.
Introspection on content of conscious will is perception of internal events. When using
introspective reports, there are not direct “objective” measures for comparison to – as
there are, e.g., in research on visual consciousness, where introspection is about
perception of external objects. This emphasises the need for development of adequate
tools for “measuring” conscious will.
Asking whether A is free is asking whether a specific causal relation (or lack thereof) is
true in the relation between A and something else B: “is A free from B?”. What the
“specific casual relation” is, and how to determine if it is a true condition, depends on the
meaning attributed to freedom.
Genuine freedom
A is free from B, if there is no relation whatsoever between A and B. To say that A is
genuine free from B means that if B, it is random if A. There is no formal language to
express this relation; it is indeterminable.
This is the definition often found in the metaphysical discussion of determinism. It is
however not a definition constrained to metaphysical discussions.
Autonomy
A is free from B, if the behaviour of A is a result of A in itself rather than a
consequence of B. Whatever behaviour we observe in A is guided by self-steering
processes in A, and not B.
Autonomy therefore requires an instinctive feature in A that can be the cause of A's
behaviour. A must therefore in itself be dependent on other causal relations, or it
would have to be a causa sui. Therefore autonomy is a feature of a causal system.
Note that autonomy does not exclude that there is a relation between A and B - only
that the relation is not so that B is not the sole cause of A.
There is a clear logical criterion for A being genuinely free from B: True or false. To
determine whether A is autonomous from B, is not as simple as that. Using freedom as
autonomy, one is obliged to further develop the terminology, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. How to define the parameters to determine autonomy?
Whether A is free from B (using either definition above) is an empirical question. It does
demand that we a priori specify what A and B denote. For free will A denotes conscious
will, but B can denote many different things. Examples:
Genuine freedom
Autonomy
Fundamental (Universal) If conscious will is free, it has to work (Not possible. Autonomy is a feature
Metaphysical level –
determinism.
outside the laws of physics.
of a causal system).
Psychological level
Conscious will is not caused by prior
unconscious neural or cognitive
mechanisms. Conscious will is the
single cause of action.
Conscious will can be dependent on
unconscious processes. Free as long
as conscious will is significant
contributor to action. The assessment
of freedom is then no longer a
question of either/or, but is dependent
on the specific processes involved.
Causal relation of neural and
cognitive processes or
conscious and unconscious
processes.
Actions performed by individuals are
Distinguishing individuals from uninfluenced by social factors. E.g. a
traditional Kantian agent who,
other individuals, groups,
culture, society and other social unaffected by context, makes rational
choices that guide action.
factors.
Social level
Individuals could be acting under
social influence, as long as they are
acting on behalf of their own
intentions and thoughts, they are free.
Freedom and personal responsibility
(e)
What definition of freedom should we use? This question can only be answered if we consider: Why do we want to know whether an action is a free will action?
Free will is taken as a prerequisite for personal responsibility. What definition of freedom we use is dependent on the conditions under which we want to address personal responsibility.
To talk about responsibility over actions implies that we can condemn or sanction actions. None of the questions elsewhere on this poster imply that we could, or should, hold people
responsible for their actions. To ascribe personal responsibility makes sense only from a normative perspective, in which there are prescriptions for how action ought to be. Though the
free will debate takes form as a discussion of ontology question, it has a strong but hidden normative element. This becomes clear when the question of defining freedom, is rephrased
into: How ought we define free will?
Normative principles
It is likely that we need several models for different types of actions or several models for
different kinds of implementation of intention, decision strategies, etc. – how this best
works has to be determined by the a posteriori results. For specific actions we can then
build models of how and which conscious experience that contribute to action.
Freedom
(d)
Ethics
Normative statements
Assessment of personal responsibility
Factual statements
Facts - “How thins are”
“Universal”
Context specific
When we want to determine whether an action is a “free will action”, we need to consult not just factual statement,
but also normative statements. Normative statements are about how one ought to act in relation to a given object or
given situation. They are derived from global normative principle (e.g. maximise happiness, what is good, etc.). A
normative statement is dependent on facts about objects or situations. A scientific approach to free will provide the
factual statements, but have to be aware of the normative element - as well as ethics has to take the scientific
approach into account as well, when issuing normative statements. This emphasise the need for a science of free will.